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Seanad Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 28 May 1969

Vol. 66 No. 14

Industrial Relations Bill, 1966: Committee and Final Stages.

Section 1 agreed to.
SECTION 2.
Question proposed: "That section 2 stand part of the Bill".

During the Second Stage debate on the Bill I raised the point about the advisability of having a further extension of the members of the Labour Court beyond what is in section 2 so that in time we might develop a situation in which more sections of the court would be available and, indeed, that at times of peak demand on the services of the Labour Court, delays might be reduced. In his reply to the debate, the Minister indicated that he felt this was not necessary at the moment, that it was something which would be kept in mind.

I was glad to hear from the Minister that he is prepared, if it appears to him that such a development becomes necessary, to come back—if he is the appropriate person to do so—to seek amending legislation. However, I was somewhat disturbed at what the Minister said in respect to the question of delays in relation to disputes. He commented that each industrial dispute has its own shape and that an early proposal for settlement could often be premature and that the situation must develop for a time before a settlement can be reached.

Though this is true of some industrial disputes, I do not think it should be a consideration which should govern the size of the Labour Court or the number of divisions of the Labour Court which should be made available, because though what the Minister said may be true of some disputes, equally there are disputes of which it is not true. The important thing in this respect is that industrial peace is of such vital importance, not only from the economic but the social viewpoint as well, that we should not get ourselves into the position that the settlement of disputes, the handling of outstanding disputes by the full Labour Court, should at any time be restricted.

We have a situation here resembling that of the ESB in planning the investment in plant for the electricity supply of the country: it is necessary for the ESB to invest in plant which will be used not only in peak time—it is necessary for them to have a certain standby beyond what will be used day in day out. Indeed, even in the coldest day of the year in mid-winter, they do not year by year reach the actual limit of their supply.

In somewhat the same way, in regard to the provision of divisions of the Labour Court, which it has been suggested might become specialised divisions in regard to particular types of occupations or regions of the country, it might become necessary to have these available in ample numbers to provide for peak demand, so that if peak demand comes at a critical time in our industrial relations, divisions of the Labour Court will be available for the immediate hearing of a case. I accept that the Minister's mind is open on this point but I wish to press the point that the problem of the settlement of disputes is so important that we should be prepared, as it were, to build into the Labour Court what might appear to be excess capacity.

I am not suggesting, in fact, that this is an essential point. Indeed, from the point of view of industrial peace, I do not think the work of the court itself, or its divisions, is nearly as essential as the work of the industrial officers in the sphere of the prevention and the early handling of disputes. In this regard, of course, the court is free under the Bill to expand to meet the demands made on it. It is in this sphere that we will have the main crunch in doing this particular job. Behind this there is the question of the Labour Court and its action. We hope that in the years to come the court will fulfil a wider and wider function as a court as such. So I think there would be no harm at all in, as it were, some excess capacity being built into it.

I would have thought that it would have been wiser for the Minister to have taken powers in this Bill to add further to the size of the court where he thought it necessary. He is unduly tying his hands here. If he finds later that it is desirable to have additional members of the Labour Court, to do that, he will have to introduce legislation. This is the first major piece of legislation we have had on industrial relations for 23 years. The title of the Bill is the Industrial Relations Bill, 1966, and we are now in 1969. I know that delays were necessary to try to reach agreement as far as possible with the trade unions and with Congress, but here we have an example of how rather difficult it is to introduce and get through legislation dealing with industrial relations.

It is true that at periods in the past the court has been overburdened and there have been delays in having hearings, in having disputes investigated, in having public hearings and having recommendations made. If the trade unions are to be encouraged to use the court, it is very desirable that the court should be able, within reason, to hear disputes and make recommendations quickly. It is a bad thing to have some disputes waiting for months for a

Labour Court hearing and recommendation. I grant you that this is not always the position and that there are peaks, but it is desirable that there should be provision to deal with those peaks.

In this Bill also we are adding to the functions and duties of the Labour Court. We are having members of the Labour Court added to the existing arbitration boards for the civil servants, for teachers, for Garda and for smaller bodies. We are also abolishing the ESB Tribunal. All of this means that there will be additional work for the members of the Labour Court.

I suppose it is a matter of judgment as to whether the increase being provided for in this Bill is sufficient. I do not know. As I say, it is a matter of opinion. What I am disturbed about is that the Minister is tying his hands unnecessarily in this respect. I think it would have been far more prudent to give him the authority to add to the personnel of the court if he was satisfied that it was required. I suppose it is too late to do anything about it now. This was an unwise section because it ties the Minister unnecessarily and unduly. I would have preferred a situation in which the Minister could take power to add to the number of the court where that was thought desirable.

The point I want to raise is quite different from the points already raised. I am a little worried about the composition of the court. Section 2 provides that the court shall consist of a chairman and four or six ordinary members. In section 4 it is provided that the Minister shall appoint a deputy chairman or a second deputy chairman. If they are acting as members of the court under section 3, does the court then consist of nine members? Under one section the chairman would be presiding, and I presume that would be quite correct. Under paragraph (a) (ii) of section 3 a court would be sitting with a deputy chairman presiding and under paragraph (iii) there would be another court with a deputy chairman presiding. In those two latter cases would the decision arrived at be perfectly correct if the court consisted of six or seven people only? It seems to me that there might be some illegality where a court was sitting with possibly nine members instead of the original seven of which it must consist under section 2.

I should like to support the case made by Senator Dooge and Senator Murphy on the need for the Minister to have more discretion in this. The Minister has promised that he will come back quickly if he finds there are changes to be made, and this is one change that should be made. I very rarely advocate the giving of more discretion in legislation to any Minister, but this is a case where it is really necessary. It would seem to me that as well as permanent members of the court there should be part-time members that the Minister can call on as the occasion demands. That surely is one of the ways in which peak demand can be met. The whole cost of the court is a very small amount to pay for the great influence it can have on industrial harmony and industrial peace. Even if there was excess capacity as is mentioned here, six members and so on, during slack periods these members could be sent on missions of study to inspect conditions in other countries that might have some lesson for us to learn.

I am at a loss to know how the members are to be selected. The provision says that two shall be workers' members and two employers' members. Does that mean that the workers' members will be nominees of the TUC and the employers' members nominees of the FUE? If that is so, it seems again rather restrictive in so far as the Minister is proposing in section 9 to broaden the scope of the duties. However, I shall have something more to say on section 9 in that I do not agree with it specifically. If the Government decide to go ahead with section 9 and insists on having these members present, then it obviously calls for a much wider interpretation of the words "employers' representatives" and "workers' representatives" than would be associated with merely taking the category of people affected by the Labour Court, workers being members of the trade unions and others having membership of the FUE.

I should like to apologise to the Seanad for being late in arriving. I miscalculated altogether the pace of activity today. I hope it continues.

Which way is it going?

It must have been very fast before I arrived, seeing that I was late. In relation to these sections, we had this discussion about the possibility of more than one section. Once I raised the question at all of having a third rather than two sections to the court, it was almost certain that people would say: "Why not have four or six?" This is a matter of getting work done with more expedition. This legislation is a product of the delay of two years caused by consultation, very deep and continuous consultation, with the people concerned in the operation of the industrial relations machinery and procedures. My whole thinking now is to try to get people to negotiate and solve the problems as early as possible, to increase the number of conciliation officers or industrial officers available to help them in this. My approach would be not to lean so heavily on the court for the simple reason that it has not been accepted by everybody; in fact well over half the workers who went to the court last year rejected its findings. Therefore I have greater faith in the long-term development of proper, meaningful negotiation between the parties concerned and possibly the conciliation officers.

If the court in its experience finds a ready acceptance of its recommendations or indeed a ready acceptance of this early intervention, I would perhaps then be considering many sections, but I am quite satisfied that the number of sections provided for here, three, is what the people concerned, both sides of industry and those already in the established procedures machinery, think would be adequate, even for a peak period. We do not have seasonal peaks in this business of industrial relations.

We do not have predictable peaks.

But we have accidental peaks at times. I am satisfied from what I have gleaned in consultations that there has not been any delay in settlement due to the lack of availability of a court to make a recommendation. I have been advised that early interference with the machinery of negotiation and conciliation has sometimes postponed a settlement by changing the mood.

When I spoke of the development of a dispute along the lines that Senator Dooge mentioned I meant to show this thinking, that the setting up of extra procedures will not bring better results. The better results will, I believe from my experience and from my consultations, come from causing more meaningful negotiations to take place, by making the employers—and I put the accent on the employers' side of it —get down to this job of negotiation and do it properly. The trade unions must also so organise themselves as to make negotiation with the employers a reasonable, rational thing. Until both sides seriously decide that we have to live in a civilised fashion in the industrial sphere, then all the procedures in the world will have no effect.

I go all the way with Senator Dooge in saying that there is great promise in the idea of having extra conciliation officers who have this experience of "babying" recalcitrant people along and getting them together. I do not need any further powers from the Oireachtas to make these extra appointments, and I think that will be the line of development. As I said to the Seanad at the beginning of the Second Stage, we are trying to find what will work. It do not think we should since the original Act set up the Labour Court and I do not think we should wait too long, certainly not that long, for further legislation. I think the people involved in industrial relations are now satisfied that, as experience teachers us a new procedure or new ways of doing things, we should be ready to legislate. I found this idea accepted in both Houses of the Oireachtas.

To answer Senator Cole's question, I took this from the original Act. The potential for two sections is there and the legal problem has never arisen in the 20 years. I hope it will not arise in the future.

Would the Minister answer my query as to whether the worker members are nominated directly?

Yes, they are. The Minister is entitled to specify which bodies will be the nominating bodies and the Irish Congress of Trade Unions has been the nominating body for the worker members of the court and the FUE have been the nominating body for the employer members.

Will the court be asked to deal with disputes involving employees who are not members of any trade union and involving employers who are not members of the FUE? If that is the case, then it would seem necessary to broaden the scope and, if three employer members are selected, surely one member at least should represent groups outside the FUE and surely the same situation should exist with regard to employees who do not belong to any trade union.

I should like to follow up that point by asking the Minister if he can tell us what the position is under section 10 of the principal Act. That section provides:

The Minister shall, in respect of each workers' member, designate an organisation representative of trade unions of workers to nominate a person...

I should like to ask the Minister does this mean that there can only be one nominating body on the workers' side and only one on the other side?

As read in that way it has a legal interpretation. I hope to designate a trade union of employers to nominate.

Does it mean that the Minister must nominate the same organisation representative of trade unions in respect of each workers' representative or could he designate two of the three to be nominated by one organisation and the third to be nominated by another organisation?

Before my time there were two Congresses and I am informed that they were both designated to make nominations. In my time there has been only one Congress of Trade Unions and my immediate predecessors, like me, accepted the Congress of Trade Unions as the nominating body for employee members of the court. I do not know if there is any reason why I should side with the FUE. There may not be another trade union of employers, but there are other employer organisations. I would, I think, have to take legal advice. I do not think there is any reason for sticking to one if there are others available, but they may not be as designated in the section.

Should the Minister not have power to take one from employers outside the FUE altogether?

No. It must be a recognised trade union.

Inter-organisational rivalries could play a part and this could be used to make certain employers join the FUE or join some other group.

Pressure could be used to make other organisations become registered. If there is another trade union of employers the Minister would be entitled to ask them for a nomination.

If you take the County Managers' Association, by no stretch of the imagination could a representative from that be selected.

No. According to the act it would have to be a trade union of employers.

It seems somewhat restrictive at a time when the Minister is widening the scope of the Labour Court.

We may go into this at greater length later, but this is primarily a court for the industrial and commercial sector and the Senator will observe from the head shaking of Senator Murphy that he would not accept the Senator's point of view at all. Basically it is essential that we find peace in this particular field and offer procedures which will help both sides to find peace. In the beginning I had the idea of extending the functions of the Labour Court and I had hoped that the Labour Court would be accepted instead of the arbitrator. My intention was to extend the personnel of the Labour Court to cover a much broader representation but in the consultations with those concerned this idea was rejected and what I have here before the Seanad represents a balance that was struck. It is certainly nothing like what I wanted, but it is better than no improvement.

Perhaps, in due process of time, with the development of reason and sense, we will progress towards less suspicion and more acceptance of the national need and of some body capable of giving a general outline of the limits to which claims should be pushed and the limits to which the economy should be battered when people go looking for increases in salaries and wages. At the moment the Labour Court deals mainly with what I might call the ordinary run of workers and that creates a problem in some people's minds in regard to a later section in which we bring members of the court into conciliation and arbitration bodies, which are perhaps removed from the typical employer and typical worker atmosphere of the Labour Court. It is a problem. I have discussed it with the professional groups. The problem may be imaginary, but I think we should give this a trial.

The Minister can be assured of our full support in broadening the scope. It is salutary to observe the contrast between the way the Minister handles organisations and the way in which the major industry, agriculture, is handled in its organisations.

I deal with very reasonable people, like Senator Murphy.

I am glad to hear the Minister acknowledge that he is dealing with very reasonable people.

The real point is that the Senator is dealing with a very reasonable man.

It may be no harm to point out that the Irish Congress of Trade Unions has affiliated to it practically all the trade unions. All the civil service organisations are affiliated to Congress. The three teacher organisations are also affiliated to Congress. That may not be generally known. The idea may be prevalent that Congress represents simply what might be described as manual workers. That is not the case. Congress represents the white-collar worker and the professional people as well.

Question put and agreed to.
Section 3 agreed to.
SECTION 4.
Question proposed: "That section 4 stand part of the Bill".

Why is subsection (6) necessary: "No person shall be appointed to be a deputy chairman unless he is ordinarily resident in the State".

I presume it is for convenience. It is a stock provision in this kind of board because people must be available. It is desirable that the chairman should be aware of what is going on and should be readily available.

Could he return here to take up the position?

Yes, but he would be resident here while he was a member of the court.

The subsection refers to his appointment and not to the time during which he is acting. We had a very distinguished member of the Labour Court who had previously served in the International Labour Office. If we wish to bring someone home from the International Labour Office there might be a form of legal impediment in this.

This refers only to "deputy chairman".

"Resident in the State". That means that you cannot get a man from Newry but you can get a man from Donegal, but from the point of view of convenience the man from Newry might be much nearer.

There are other considerations.

Are we Partition-minded here?

If the size of the State should change the word "State" would still operate.

You are taking the State as being confined to the Republic.

No, we just say "State".

The logic of this defeats me.

Does the Senator want somebody from Newry on the Labour Court?

I do not know anybody in Newry but it is important to have a man——

The desirability of having somebody in Ireland——

Newry is in Ireland, if I may say so.

I had not finished the sentence. However, if the Senator wants to go on that way——

(Interruptions.)

It seems that the proposed appointee should be resident in the State before being appointed as deputy chairman——

He can then emigrate.

If there was some distinguished man living abroad whom you wished to bring home, can you do that with this impediment? He would be resident after being appointed.

It has never arisen. I would have to get legal advice. My own interpretation is that if you want a deputy chairman then he should be living here, but when you want to put that into law it never comes back the way you said it. I do not think we should worry too much about having distinguished people abroad not being able to take up this post.

What about the distinguished people at home who have to live on the wrong side of the border?

I think we will find that all we want is one man as deputy chairman and we will find him near enough to us if we look.

Are we right to exclude Irishmen from the North?

I would not say we are right; when we are dealing with disputes and people are looking for a neutral chairman what they mean is somebody who is for them. Whether they would have a better chance of getting somebody for them outside the State than in it, is one point. They might find a greater degree of neutrality in the people they know than in people with whose thinking they are not familiar. I am not too worried about this section. I do not see the problem arising. It has not arisen before and it will hardly arise in future.

I do not think we should worry about this unduly but it is an irritant that this restriction should be there and I would urge the Minister that this be noted for the legislation which we hope will be along reasonably quickly in the future.

It is taken from the original Act and——

That is no guarantee of purity.

In that it is the chairman and members of the court——

That means that the Partition-mindedness goes back to 1946. If you appoint a Newry man he could move to Donegal.

The Senator has a thing about Newry. If the Seanad likes I will take legal advice and if it needs to be changed to allow a Newry man or others to be appointed we can consider it again.

Question put and agreed to.
Section 5 agreed to.
SECTION 6.
Question proposed: "That section 6 stand part of the Bill".

There is agreement on all sides that the work of the industrial relations officers is going to be the key to the implementation of this Bill. The Minister in his Second Stage speech indicated that he hoped to see these industrial relation officers playing a wider role in the future, that they would be concerned at earlier stages in disputes and would be concerned with the general state of industrial health. I should like to ask the Minister to indicate what he thinks the scope of their duties will be in the future and the particular points in which they will differ from their more restricted duties at present.

That thinking is along the same lines as my own, in changing the name. Over the years they have amassed a great deal of valuable information and, in the case of some of them, it is an absolute feeling for doing the right thing at the right time. Most if not all of them enjoy the confidence of the trade unionists and of the employers. I should like to see more initiatives being taken. There was, perhaps, a passivity about the Labour Court and I would like to see the experience these people have, and their knowledge and the fact that they are trusted, being put to good use outside areas of disputes. They must know where there are good procedures, where there are effective procedures and attitudes and must be able to give advice to management in cases in which industrial relations are inclined to get into trouble. I would like to see them, and I hope we will see them, operating in that way, advising management and workers how to break down tensions and being able to anticipate causes of disputes and irritants, and generally putting their talents and knowledge to an active use. I would like to think that with their experience their job will be to prevent disputes as well as to cure disputes and doing this in a way which we could not do it.

I am trying to get the feel of what the situation will be in this regard. As I said, it is a very welcome development. Let us take one position. Let us suppose that a works committee is formed within a given industry and they want to get advice on what they might do in regard to getting this works committee under way and into operation. Would the industrial relations officers be available as advisers and will sufficient officers be appointed so that they can proceed along these lines?

Yes, for the setting up of any procedures to avoid conflict. They will be available for that.

Can we go a little further than what the Minister said? The Minister said to avoid conflicts but perhaps——

To promote the procedures that would in themselves prevent conflicts.

And, indeed, take positive action towards the improvement of harmony in industry.

Yes, I would say in that way.

It would be appropriate to record our appreciation of the work done by the conciliation officers over the years—their title is now being changed to industrial relations officer—and the trade unions who have had experience of their work have been most appreciative of their hard work, patience and understanding. Complaints have sometimes been made that people who have developed the art and skill of conciliation have moved out of the job because of promotion in the Civil Service and have therefore been a great loss to both sides in a particular industry in which they have come to get the feel of the problems and the difficulties involved. I understand that efforts will be made to avoid this in future and that there will be some avenues of promotion for the people concerned so that it will not mean that you will have people skilled in this work moving out simply for the purpose of promotion, not because they want to leave the work which they like and so on, but because they want promotion or an increase of salary. That is a bad thing and I trust it will not happen in future.

The next point I want to make is in relation to the development of internal machinery of negotiation. It is surprising, really, the number of major industries where there is not an established machinery of negotiation, where agreements in regard to conditions of service, pay, et cetera, are not written out and available to all the people concerned and where there is not a written agreement as to how grievances, et cetera, should be processed. It is essential to have this machinery. It is the basic thing that must be supplied if we are to improve industrial relations in this country.

A point of criticism that I want to make is that we have had one important undertaking, namely, CIE, which has inherited well-established, wellproved machinery of negotiation that went back to the old Irish Railway Wages Board in 1924, which, largely operating on the railway side, was successful and acceptable to the trade unions. There were, as far as I can recollect, only two strikes during the period of over 40 years of its existence. One was an inter-union dispute which was certainly not the fault of the machinery and the other was a question of some pay cut during the difficult years of the '30s. Here was established machinery of negotiation, a writtendown way of processing grievances, of dealing with problems, culminating in a joint industrial council at the top and CIE gave notice to the trade unions and withdrew from that formal machinery of negotiation, with the result that now you have the sort of loose and haphazard way of dealing with disputes and problems, eventually going to the Labour Court if you want to, and with no obligation, really, on the trade unions to process disputes and claims in an orderly way and to submit them to a joint industrial council presided over by an agreed chairman.

That is a mistake. We should try to encourage the setting up of internal machinery of negotiation; first of all, as I said, to put down in writing what exactly the agreements are, the conditions of service, et cetera, have these generally available to all the workers concerned, have a laid down procedure as to how any question of interpretation or grievances, et cetera, should be dealt with. This is the sort of basic work that should be done.

We have had too many things, in my opinion, going to the Labour Court which could better be dealt with through internal machinery of negotiation. I am not saying that we should not have the Labour Court at the very top—we should, but as a last resort and for major grievances. So, I am glad to know that it is apparently being envisaged according to the wording of the section that the industrial relations officers will have a function to encourage the setting up of voluntary internal schemes of negotiation within industries and services. That would be a good thing and I hope that progress will be made in that direction.

Would it not have been more suitable if there were only one type of officer and that all the work was carried out by the one type of officer and that they were all officers of the court and not necessarily under the Minister's Department? Inspectors have a certain duty here. Rights commissioners have a certain duty under section 13. Would it not have been more suitable to have that work carried out by officers of the court only and that once the court had, as it were, authority in a case it was completely divorced at that stage from the Department's inspectors, thus bringing it more into line, perhaps, with ordinary courts of law?

I am not quite sure what the Senator has in mind.

There are inspectors whose duties come under section 12. Could the industrial relations officers not do that work? There are, then, rights commissioners. Admittedly, there is certain work prescribed for them but they come under section 13.

I think it is tidiness the Senator is looking for. The conciliation officers today, which would be these industrial relations officers, have a particular type of activity which requires long negotiations moving between two parties. As we envisage it, they will be building up procedures for improving negotiations between employer and worker. An inspector may not have this kind of talent at all but he would come and inspect whether registered agreements are being complied with and it involves quite a different type of activity. The rights commissioner, again, would be a man who would come from outside, neutral to the dispute, and offer a solution. In his case, also, he would not start negotiating with the parties. In that case it would be, not in terms of money or conditions of employment, but in terms of rights that the worker might feel had been infringed that he would come and give his recommendation as to how the dispute should be fixed. The functions in all three cases are different. I would see no advantage in having all these functions given to one person.

I think there will be some overlapping as between the conciliation officer and the rights commissioner.

If I could explain—the rights commissioner I see as having a separate function. It goes back to the two types of dispute which we have. One is a dispute about money and conditions of employment and the other is a dispute about rights, discipline, dismissal or some right a worker has by custom or that he thinks he has for some reason or other. In the case of conditions of employment, these things are usually negotiated and there is a fair amount of horse-trading going on and I think the Seanad will be aware of those that were done in public. They take quite a time. Both sides start off from a position that they cannot leave and they adopt postures and high principles and gradually they work towards a solution and a conciliation officer helps in this procedure and the timing of offers and so on.

If a man is dismissed for doing something or not doing something in a situation in which he thinks he is entitled to do or not to do that thing, very often this leads to a walk out in the whole plant and then it would have to go to the Labour Court for decision if the parties cannot agree. I see a rights commissioner being readily available. We have overcome an awful lot of obstacles to progress and I am sure we will soon learn to go on the principle that if we want solutions we can have them. In these sudden dispute cases, on rights, if we get to the stage that employers and employees accept that a solution must be got some day and that there is no point in shutting down the plant and bringing all the workers out, they will look for somebody to be the man between because both obviously think they are right. This is the rights commissioner. He will make a recommendation. It may be appealed, of course, to the Labour Court on the basis of going to the Labour Court as an arbitrating body.

I think we all agree on the emphasis placed on these industrial relations officers. I want to raise the question of training. I know that people must have a great aptitude for this type of work but, having got it, you have to develop it as fully as possible. Therefore, I should like to see a great emphasis so that people would be let off to take some of these numerous courses on public relations that are available outside the country and sometimes at home to keep up with the subject. Apart from picking people who have a natural bent for this sphere of activity, I think more should be done to train people suited to it. Industrial relations within the university system are non-existent. Someone will say that it would be up to the Minister to try to encourage—monetarily and otherwise—the development of industrial relations training in our universities. Not alone those who would end up as industrial relations officers but those who would take part in our industry afterwards would benefit by being exposed to good departments of industrial relations within the colleges. That is commonplace within the American setup and we should profit by it.

I think there is a distinction between the rights commissioners and the industrial relations officers. I should like to think that the industrial relations officers would frequently come into plants without being asked: it would not mean that they would be called there. I should like to think of the industrial relations officer in the same context as the agricultural instructor going in to advise the farmer. I should like to feel that these officers can drop in occasionally for a chat without being suspected of having an ulterior motive for calling.

Might I mention the work of the College of Industrial Relations in regard to the training of people, of the ordinary worker, and, in turn, the part-time officials and the officials involved in trade unions dealing with industrial relations? I think we will all accept that industrial relations are terribly important. I suppose it is natural that we have to work by the sweat of our brow: we have all accepted that. However, I do not think there is anything terribly natural in having to work to a clock and under supervision and direction and to work for somebody else. There is something about that that goes against the grain in the human individual. Modern working needs a lot of adaptation. The fact that somebody has finished school and is an adult does not mean that that person would not benefit by further education, particularly in regard to human relations and industrial relations. I would hope that the Minister and the Government—whatever Government will succeed them—will have regard to the very useful work being done by the College of Industrial Relations. I believe they are anxious to expand their work. It does mean finance. However, I think it would be a worthwhile investment. They do contribute greatly and, certainly amongst the trade unions, their work is very well appreciated.

There are proposals from the college, on which I could not comment at this particular time. A director is now appointed in charge of the conciliation officers. It would be for him to see to their training. I think he is accepted widely as expert. There will be no limitation from my point of view on what will be available, financially or otherwise, to have them trained. I am not a great believer in courses on their own. I think we have been coursed and seminared almost into befuddlement. However, I have read about studies of negotiation and training in particular to negotiate. It would not be too far amiss for a lot of our management to learn how to negotiate. I should say it about both sides—to be neutral—but the trade union side seem to know their job well about negotiation. I know there is a study on how to negotiate. The bigger nations have expert negotiators to deal with problems. However, in this field of industrial relations, you can learn how to negotiate. I think we have suffered a great deal from amateurism in this field. We should seek to have people who are trained to negotiate.

I think I can assure the House that the director of the conciliation service is well equipped to decide and to know what courses, what training, should be available. I am glad of the opportunity to suggest to everybody concerned in the procedures that it is possible to learn how to negotiate. Perhaps the universities can offer the courses even if they cannot offer the example.

There is not a simple statutory or non-statutory lecturer in industrial relations in any one of the universities. That is a shocking position.

I do not think that is correct.

There is a section in University College——

Certainly, people lecturing on industrial relations——

Lecturing yes, but not holding a specific duty as lecturer in industrial relations. You have many of that standard in American and British universities.

Change the title.

It seems to be wide of section 6.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 7.
Question proposed: "That section 7 stand part of the Bill".

I must confess that the more I hear of it the more confused I become about the relationship of the court and the rights commissioners. I should have thought it would be more appropriate for a rights commissioner to have a function where there is a dispute as to the interpretation of an agreement. Where some worker says he should have been paid overtime in accordance with the terms of the agreement covering his job or that he was entitled to annual leave or extra annual leave because of his service, and so on: I should imagine that that would be an appropriate matter for the rights commissioner to come in on quickly and deal with. On a further section, we seem to preclude the rights commissioner from doing that. We have the position here that we are taking a big gun—the court—to deal with the interpretation of an agreement. Really, in a matter like this, what the trade union and the employer want is some neutral person to sit down and read the agreement and to say: "I interpret it as so-and-so. That is the position." If there is disagreement, it can go for arbitration. Here, we are putting into section 7 that the court may deal with the interpretation of an agreement.

It should be the function of the court to deal with the question as to whether rates of pay, holidays or a shorter working week should be included but to simply take an existing agreement which both parties have signed—and I hope there will be more signed agreements—and ask the court to interpret that is going a bit too far. It would be more appropriate, in my opinion, for a rights commissioner and if it could not be satisfactorily dealt with there then go to the courts. If the Minister will look at the section in conjunction with the section dealing with rights commissioners he will see that we are running ourselves into the position, maybe inadvertently, that a question of an interpretation, which may involve one individual, what increment he should have on the scale or something like that, will be a matter to go to the court for interpretation, whereas to my mind this would be more appropriately dealt with by a rights commissioner and then, if it is not satisfactorily dealt with, or if the rights commissioner's interpretation does not finalise the matter, it could be a matter to go to the courts.

I wonder is the wording of section 7 quite satisfactory. It says:

The Court may, at any time, on the application of the parties to an agreement...

It does not say on the application of a single party. This might be read to mean that both parties would have to apply, which probably is not the intention.

There is not a means of enforcing the court decision and usually it is only of any use to give an interpretation if the parties seek the court's interpretation. This is already in existence for agreements registered with the courts and there has been 20 years of experience of it.

But if one party is quite happy and only the other party wants an interpretation? From the wording of this, it looks as if both parties would have to apply.

What I am doing in that section is bringing in agreements which are not registered with the Labour Court to have the same status as agreements registered with the Labour Court. This is covered by section 33 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1946 and interpretation by the Labour Court is provided for in that.

Section 33 of the Principal Act says:

The Court may at any time, on the application of any person, give its decision on any question as to the interpretation of a registered employment agreement or its application to a particular person.

I support Senator Sheehy Skeffington on this and, indeed, was going to rise on the same point. It appears to me that section 33 allows application from a person, whereas in the present section 7 it would appear to require both parties being agreed. One feels that if they got that far there should not be much trouble in reaching complete agreement.

I see the point now. I will have to get legal advice on what the interpretation of this would be. The Senator means that the words "on the application of the parties to an agreement" mean that both parties would have to apply but that in section 33 the words are "on the application of any person".

There is quite a divergence there.

I will have to seek legal advice on that interpretation.

The Minister is making quite some progress towards his next Bill in this debate.

It is a long, educative process. The only fear is that I will be the only one educated by being at it all the time. I should like the Seanad to be in my office all the time talking about it.

Perhaps, the Minister will be a Senator by the time this is over.

It could happen.

Perhaps, the Senator will not be here to join him at that time.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 8.
Question proposed: "That section 8 stand part of the Bill."

I am long past the stage where I am surprised at being puzzled by the ways of parliamentary draftsmen but the way in which subsection (1) of section 8 is drafted here does seem to me most strange.

It says in effect:

An investigation of a trade dispute by the Court shall be conducted in private, but shall if requested be conducted in public.

That, in fact, is a slight condensation of what is here. We respect the professional expertise of parliamentary draftsmen but it seems to me that it should be possible, without doing violence to their traditions or leaving undue loopholes in the law, to phrase this so that it could say that an investigation of a trade dispute shall be conducted in private unless a request is made by a party to the dispute that it be conducted in public. It seems to me that the plain reading of this is unpleasing in the manner in which it presents itself because of its awkwardness.

Senator Dooge's point had struck me. I would have thought it is more than unpleasing, it is just downright nonsense in its present form.

Like the Fine Gael programme.

That may be unpleasant to Senator Ó Maoláin. I have been looking at this question independently and I was going to suggest that it be changed to "unless the court is requested to take an investigation in public in which case it shall be so conducted".

There is one further point regarding "if requested by a party". Surely there is a case where the court would have to decide where one party says "Yes" and the other party says "No". Section 20 (7) of the Principal Act says:

The Court may hold any sitting or part of a sitting in private.

That seems to cover the point amply without section 7 at all.

My mind is still a bit on Senator Sheehy Skeffington's comments on section 7. Although I said I should take legal advice, I think the difference here is that I am bringing in unregistered agreements and I think both parties would have to agree in that. The registered agreement is drawn up with the help of the court. I will take advice on it but I may not have a chance of addressing the Seanad before it is law.

In regard to section 8, the court at the moment has absolute discretion about holding a court hearing in private or public and generally, this can be argued but I felt that people who have been through negotiation and conciliation and go to the court are inclined to strike a party line, if you like, as happens at election time with us and to go back to the beginning and expose an attitude which may not be what their reason tells them to be. This applies to both sides. You can get posturing and play-acting. I felt that, perhaps, we could get solutions in private. I have a recent one notched up for the benefit of private talking and I felt we should have all hearings in private. I was told fairly forcibly in the Dáil, and it is coming up here now, that people like to make their case in front of the people for whom they are speaking. Therefore, we think that at the request of a party they could have some of it anyway in public or all of it. One must leave room for the Labour Court to say that a particular piece of evidence should not be exposed to the public—perhaps, something to do with a worker's or an employer's character or the details of a business which would be giving away secrets to competitors.

However, as drafted, the section makes a starting point that the hearing would be in private. Up to now it has been totally at the discretion of the court. It is very hard to know which is right but I believe that we should start off with the idea of doing as much business in private as possible because as soon as the publicity glare is on, lots of extraneous pressures appear which should not exist at negotiation. On the drafting, I say nothing.

On the drafting, there is anguish.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 9.
Question proposed: "That section 9 stand part of the Bill".

Senator Quinlan and I have indicated that we are opposed to section 9 of the Bill. Section 9 provides that members of the Labour Court should automatically be added to the various conciliation and arbitration boards set up for the public service. Indeed, it was mentioned by the Minister during discussion of an earlier section that he himself in drawing up this legislation was anxious to broaden the Labour Court and that he was anxious to ensure that at all times membership of the court, other than those persons who would be presiding at any session, should be truly representative of both employer and employed. However, the Minister has indicated that on negotiation it was not found possible to get agreement on this point and that, accordingly, he accepted the position that he should have regard to the area of private employment, of commercial operations and of private industry by leaving the position as it had been before, namely, that the sole representation on the employers' side should be from the Federated Union of Employers and that the sole representation on the employees' side should be from the Irish Congress of Trade Unions.

This may well have been a wise decision under the circumstances which the Minister faced but when the Minister goes further here in section 9, having left the position of the Labour Court such that only two bodies, in fact, appoint to it, he now places these persons, representatives of employers and representatives of workers—each group having been appointed by a single body—as members of these conciliation and arbitration boards. The conciliation and arbitration boards are concerned with employees of many types. They are concerned with people of many categories but they are practically all people who are employed in Government service or in semi-State service. There will be very many cases in these instances in which neither the employer nor the employees concerned in a particular dispute will be represented in any real sense by the members of the Labour Court who have been added to the conciliation and arbitration board.

It is unfortunate that, as a result of compromise, the Minister has found himself in this difficult position. I should like to say that, in particular, members of my own profession—the engineering profession—and members of other professions who are represented by the Federation of Professional Associations believe that in regard to industrial relations in their own particular sphere they are not getting what has been given to industrial workers by the setting up of the Labour Court.

The professional bodies and other workers who are not represented by the Irish Congress of Trade Unions—there are some in spite of the long list that Senator Murphy gave us—feel that in conciliation and arbitration they should be represented on the workers' side by people who will appreciate their own particular problem. It is considered that it would be better that the conciliation and arbitration boards should be left alone rather than that this change should be made. There is no doubt that the Minister has been properly worried over the possibility of different conciliation and arbitration boards making decisions in regard to similar problems which should be in harmony. The Minister and the Government would naturally be concerned that, to a certain degree, having various conciliation and arbitration boards would lead to different awards under similar circumstances. There should be other ways of solving this problem. If this is the reason for placing two Labour Court members on the conciliation and arbitration board and if this is the method the Government have adopted for ensuring that things remain reasonably in line, it is a rather bad solution. What are we to have under these circumstances? Is the Minister now proposing to put in two people to outvote the chairman so that in fact it will be the Labour Court, through these two representatives, who will make the decision in regard to arbitration? Is the Minister, having failed to bring all of these people under the Labour Court, when they would have had a much stronger argument that they should have some part in the nomination of the workers' representatives on the Labour Court, now seeking to have the decision made, not by the Labour Court in full hearing, but by two representatives of the Labour Court outvoting the chairman of the conciliation and arbitration board?

There are a number of minor difficulties which will occur also and which make this an unwise move. Conciliation and arbitration has been a slow procedure. Members of my own profession in the local authority service are suffering grievously and not very patiently at the moment because, having gone through the long process of conciliation and arbitration, having done all they were asked to do under their existing negotiating procedure and having been delayed for almost three years, they find that their arbitration award given by the chairman and accepted by the local authorities has been pushed over the horizon by the device of a review board.

Therefore, apart from this question of awards finally being made, it is often very difficult to get conciliation and arbitration working. People are not always available for the public hearings. If we have a period of industrial unrest the Labour Court itself might be fully stretched, particularly in view of the fact that we have only three divisions of it at the moment. There may be a further delay in conciliation and arbitration arising from the non-availability of members of the Labour Court. I oppose this section on behalf of those members of my own profession who, though not satisfied in all respects with conciliation and arbitration, would prefer the board they know rather than the board which the Minister seeks to impose under section 9.

I should like to agree with Professor Dooge in opposing the section, but we must recognise that what we have is a compromise. It does not suit the unions concerned in the existing conciliation and arbitration machinery. It is not to their liking. It is not to the Minister's liking. Originally the Minister wanted the conciliation and arbitration machinery to virtually disappear and the Labour Court to take the place of the arbitration boards. We have a compromise. For our part we are prepared to abide by that compromise, knowing it is not completely satisfactory but recognising that it is something which has been agreed. There was give-and-take on both sides, and this is the result.

May I express trepidation about the position which will arise with the addition to the arbitration boards of two members of the Labour Court? Generally speaking, the arbitration boards are composed of a chairman agreed by both sides, two management representatives and two staff representatives. We are about to add two more to that, one an employers' member of the Labour Court and one a workers' representative, making seven people in all. There could be some sort of inner cabinet in the newly-expanded arbitration boards. The chairman and two representatives of the Labour Court could consult together, providing some sort of inner circle within the arbitration boards. That would be disastrous. It would make the position of the workers' representative completely invidious. It would minimise the confidence of the various unions and staff associations involved in conciliation and arbitration proceedings. I would like the Minister to give us some reassurance on this point.

We are now involving the Labour Court with the conciliation and arbitration machinery generally for the Civil Service, local authorities, teachers and Army. There have been complaints that what we have is not really conciliation at all. The chair is normally taken by a management representative. It is not conciliation in the sense that trade unions generally understand conciliation and have come to expect from conciliation officers in the Labour Court. They will now be industrial relations officers. We are now relating the Labour Court to that sort of machinery and perhaps we should take other steps now. Perhaps an industrial relations officer could sometimes act as chairman at conciliation level of the conciliation and arbitration machinery. This would perhaps lead to matters being settled without going to arbitration at all. We all know that the arbitration proceedings conducted in the Civil Service generally are long drawn out. It seems that much of this work is purely conciliation work. Clearly defined matters should be referred for arbitration. People should know what the issues are. The issues should be narrowed down as much as possible so that an arbitration board could deal with the problems. The Minister might consider such a course. There is no need for special provisions in the Bill to deal with it. It would be a help if the services of the industrial relations officers were made available at this level of conciliation and arbitration. Such a move would be welcomed all round and might lighten the burden of the eventual arbitration body.

The third point I want to mention is the question of pay research. In Britain pay research is well-established and seems to be satisfactory. It leads to confidence. There is an examination of the work done. It is a good idea that such research should be done, not only in the public service but also in other large centres of employment, where people could be specially trained and an assessment of work made. A report on a particular job could be prepared and discussed by both employer and employee. The Civil Service organisations have suggested the establishment of a pay research unit but they tell me there has been no positive reaction from the other side. Now that the Minister is getting involved in this problem perhaps he would consider the desirability of having a pay research unit established. It would be good that experts should be brought in to look at the problem and ascertain the facts before starting negotiations. There is nothing more difficult than trying to negotiate where neither side is very clear as to what the facts of a dispute are supposed to be.

I hope that the Minister will give me an assurance on these three points. My first point was about the suspicion that there is an inner cabinet. I would like the Minister to consider this point carefully. My second point was concerned with the bringing in of the industrial relations officer at conciliation level, if possible. My third point was that I would like the Minister to consider sympathetically the establishment of a pay research unit.

I wish to support the case made by Professor Dooge. The Minister is engaged in a great effort to try to adapt the Labour Court but it seems rather wrong, certainly at this stage, to tie it up with the arbitration schemes for the groups listed. While the arbitration has not been satisfactory and has been too long drawn out, certainly the engineers and, I believe the other groups would prefer to have what they have rather than what is foreshadowed here. The Minister's intentions are, I know, all for the best but I am afraid they will not achieve that purpose because, unless the scheme has the confidence of the professions and the groups concerned, it is not likely to prove successful.

Of course, it is particularly bad, coming at the present time, when we have the experience of the last recommendations by the arbitration board being set aside pending this general review—already it has taken over two years in processing. Therefore, the groups concerned, especially the local authority engineering groups, have every right to feel aggrieved with what they have got and every right to feel apprehensive about what is offered here.

This is a point where I should like to develop the thinking again from the position of having direct negotiations with the Minister. There are a big number of those conciliation and arbitration schemes in existence and the terms of the schemes are being negotiated by the Ministers concerned and the people concerned. This went some way to satisfy people that they were having a fair hearing because they had a say in appointing the arbitrator and generally they sought to appoint a man whom they trusted to be sympathetic to their way of thinking.

A big number of those schemes in existence over the years may have been satisfactory from the point of view of getting a fair hearing from the man in whose appointment they had a say but the variety of arbitrators appointed resulted in a variety of concessions being given in each claim. Those, in turn, led to an uneasiness about the criteria by which the decisions were made—the decision was in fact made by the chairman—and this uneasiness had two effects. One was immediate discontent. I have seen outrage expressed very forcibly by a group at the decision of a man who was their man—somebody put up to the Minister as their man.

At any rate, there was great discontent at many of the decisions of the court. The other bad effect was leapfrogging in claims. One group did better under an arbitrator who brought in a better decision which the other group did not get and the other group had to try and catch up. We had this damage to the economy as well as discontent in the community. At this point, while not rejecting the idea of an independent conciliation and arbitration scheme, I felt we should try to bring some continuity of thinking into the picture and some knowledge of what is going on in the field of wages and salaries and in the economy. The only body with this type of knowledge available was the Labour Court.

My first proposal was that the Labour Court should be put in the place of the arbitrator in each scheme. The Labour Court which I envisaged doing this job would be a much wider Labour Court and have economists and people with other types of skill brought on to it. There would probably be fewer objections to it than the Labour Court, as it exists today, from the professional people. I have met stonewall resistance to the idea of having the Labour Court as an arbitrator. I think this is mainly due to the feeling that people want a say in the appointment of the arbitrator and each group feel they have a special arbitrator to see to each special case. This is natural and is human nature. There was stone wall opposition to having the Labour Court brought in there, even extending to the professional personnel.

I propose here having two members, one from both sides of the Labour Court and this represents a compromise. I will say there may be some faulty thinking here but having somebody from both sides of the Labour Court represents a balance. Since they are from the Labour Court and out of the field normally inhabited by the professional people the professions may feel both representatives would be unsympathetic towards them. This is a point of view I have had expressed to me. At the same time what I am doing is bringing in people for their knowledge of the wages and salary movements, for their knowledge of the economy—as far as anyone can know the future of the economy. The way we have it here is it would not be introduced into the scheme.

We are not taking away the right of the negotiating scheme. If and when this becomes law then the Minister for Finance, who is the Minister concerned in those things—and I presume the Minister for Labour would be involved too—would have to set about re-negotiating all those schemes. I presume, generally speaking, the parties to the schemes, other than the Ministers, would seek to so negotiate them that the Labour Court members would not have a vote at all. This would mean you would not have this mini-court or pauper's court, or whatever you like to call it. In other words, if I was approaching it from the point of view of the individual or the people representing the individual, the professional man, or whoever he is, would approach it on the basis that we now have to re-negotiate our schemes with two people from the Labour Court present. Those two people are taken, one from the employers and one from the employees, the trade union representative, for a balance. But in our schemes we are not negotiating a position where they will have votes because of the various reasons presented here in the Seanad, and which are being presented to me in private.

When an order is made by the Minister for Labour bringing in this section it would be brought in the context of re-negotiating the schemes. I imagine the schemes will take a long time if my experience to date is anything to go by and they will be re-negotiated on the basis that the chairman will still be appointed by agreement and the chairman will still be the man who decides. I presume the two people from the Labour Court will not have a vote but they will bring knowledge and continuity into the various schemes. It is a very small step towards protecting the community from the discontent of having separate schemes without any relation to one another and the protection of the economy from leapfrogging in which there would simply be a lack of continuity.

It is a very small step towards what I want. If they are prepared again to give it plenty of time and patience and negotiate the schemes we can get something which is satisfactory to everybody. I agree the professional people, whose representative bodies I have met and with whom I had long and tough discussions, have a point. They have a great deal to offer to the community and they may feel the rest of the community is going ahead towards this use of force in every dispute. I am very much disposed to protecting this their point of view. I think it is very desirable to have it there and indeed to expand it, if possible. I am sure that any Minister bringing in the Order would do everything in his power to see that this was protected. It can be protected by the negotiating power available through the associations' side of each of the conciliation and arbitration schemes.

The other thing that Senator Murphy suggested could be done by having a conciliation officer. Again, this would have to be negotiated and agreed to. I think it is a good idea. This tendency to go to arbitration recently I should imagine may be due to the fact that representatives of associations are probably getting so much pressure on them that they find it easier to go to arbitration and have a handed down decision than to go back to their members saying: "We have negotiated this and it is the best we can do at this time." There is this tendency to push things to arbitration no matter what their own opinion is. Having a conciliation officer in the conciliation part of the machinery might just supply that extra piece of help needed to enable them to go back to their members and say: "We have negotiated this agreement. It is the best we could get at this time." It may provide a solution apart from arbitration.

Acting Chairman

Perhaps, the House would like to rise for tea at six?

The House might agree to continue this discussion until we complete the Bill. We could then adjourn and leave the Housing Bill for another day.

I wonder if the Senator knows what he is letting himself in for. There is quite a number of sections yet to be dealt with.

There is no objection to completing the discussion of this Bill at this sitting but, speaking for myself and I think for Senator Murphy, we should hate to be cramped by the feeling that we were delaying the Seanad in this regard. This is an important measure and I think we have had a most useful debate on it this afternoon. I should hate it to tail off in haste. I realise the difficulties we have.

Adjourned to the next sitting day?

No. The suggestion was that we continue the discussion of the Bill now and adjourn when it is completed.

It is unlikely to be completed before seven o'clock at the very earliest.

Speaking as a hungry man, I oppose that.

The House is aware that there is a function which many Senators would like to attend this evening. It is not that we are hungry or have any anxiety to curb the discussion. It is only that we wish to pay tribute to a very worthy official of the House who has retired.

Why not continue on until 6.30 p.m. and see how we stand then? We shall probably finish.

It seems unlikely that we shall finish this business in half an hour or even in an hour and it might be better to adjourn it to a later sitting or adjourn now and reconvene at seven o'clock and continue until ten o'clock.

I think we might continue until seven o'clock and see how we get on. Neither Senator Stanford nor Senator Skeffington will die of hunger in that time.

I understand that the presentation to Mr. O'Reilly, former Clerk Assistant of the Seanad, was timed for 6 o'clock and I imagine that Mr. O'Reilly and his wife are already awaiting the rising of this House and it seems impolite to delay them unduly.

I think in deference to the Leader of the House that we should adjourn and agree to re-convene and sit until this business is finished. I take it that would be convenient for the Leader of the House. It may go on until 11 p.m.

If the Senator is so damn unco-operative and so unsociable I am quite prepared to move that the House adjourn until 7 p.m. or even 8 p.m. and that we shall sit all night, if necessary, to continue the discussion when Senator Sheehy Skeffington has gone home to his nice cosy bed as he usually does when a discussion of this nature arises.

That is quite untrue.

It is not untrue.

Does the Minister want to complete this Bill?

Yes, I should like to have it completed as I shall be away next week.

Business suspended at 6.10 p.m. and resumed at 8 p.m.

Before business was suspended we were discussing section 9 and the various problems that might arise by the application of section 9 to members of the Labour Court who had been members of conciliation and arbitration boards. At first, I should like to thank the Minister for what he said in discussing this section immediately before the interval. I think it will be gratifying to those professional bodies who are concerned at the possible effects of section 9 that the Minister has a sympathetic understanding of their position in this matter. These organisations, as I indicated before, feel very strongly about this position and, as both the Minister and Senator Murphy have said, section 9 is a compromise. Whenever there is a compromise, somebody suffers and in this case these organisations will suffer.

The second thing I should like to say on the section is that I join with Senator Murphy in what he said regarding the possible use of conciliation officers and of the great desirability of a pay research unit. Looking at the Bill as it stands, with section 9 there, and the addition of two members of the Labour Court, it seems as if some of the people who are in the public sector are under this Bill getting some of the disadvantages of being brought partly within the ambit of the Labour Court and very little of what we are all agreed will be the great strength of the Labour Court machinery in the years ahead. It would be a most excellent thing if in some way the industrial relations officers from whom we expect so much confidently, and rightly so, were to play some part in industrial relations in the public sector.

Of course, if the various bodies were willing to come under an extended Labour Court such as the Minister had in mind, these advantages would automatically be open to them. We appreciate the great burden that the Bill implies for industrial relations officers in the commercial and private sectors. Nevertheless, I join with Senator Murphy in hoping they will play some part also in the public sector.

Also in common with Senator Murphy, I think there would be a great deal of value if a pay research unit were to be established which would have the confidence of the various associations in the public sector. The Minister has failed in his attempt to have various specialists associated with the Labour Court but it may well be that he would get a great deal of what he sought for in that respect by the establishment of an objective pay research unit in which the sectors which he had hoped to bring into the Labour Court might well enter the industrial relations field in this way. It would be dangerous if such a unit were less than objective, if such a unit had not the confidence of the associations. But if it were possible to have a unit which would have the confidence of the associations, the benefit would be an immeasurable one.

Because section 9 brings disadvantages to the various associations in the public sector and to the professional associations whom I represent vocationally in this House, without any of the advantages which might accrue, I am afraid that in spite of being gratified by the Minister's statement of his personal opinion, I am still opposed to the section.

I wish to support the sentiments expressed by Senator Dooge. There is no need to go over this. At the present juncture we have very little hope of persuading the Minister to change his mind. I can appreciate that this is the result of a compromise but I feel that from the point of view of the professions it is a bad compromise. The Minister wants to try to introduce a measure of uniformity, but it seems to be a poor way of introducing it through two people who are directly labelled, one as the employers' representative and the other as the workers' representative, from a section that would not be considered as being involved in any of those arbitrations. Would there be any hope even at this stage of getting the Minister to go even half way? If he wants to bring in certain background information and certain uniformity, why not have one of the deputy chairmen to discharge this function? It would seem that such a person would be more acceptable than either of the two mentioned.

As the chairman?

To replace the two Labour Court representatives by one of the deputy chairmen appointed. That would seem to bring in what the Minister is looking for and he would not be in any way regarded as being biased. I am not saying that the members would be biased, but everyone must accept the fact that the person is not biased.

Subsection (2) says that "this section shall come into operation on such day as the Minister may appoint by order". I would appeal to the Minister to go slow on this. He is making changes in the Labour Court. He is anxious to see it working in the way in which we all hope it will work. Therefore, he should give it a chance to work along those lines and he should not impose on it other responsibilities. Let the order lie there, and let the other procedure operate for a while into the future. Meantime it may be possible—I would suggest within a couple of years, having seen how the Labour Court as reorganised in this way has been operating—to have another look at it and at what the Minister is trying to achieve, and perhaps he may get the full agreement of the professional groups to go ahead with it.

Glacaim go h-iomlán leis an méid atá ráite ag an Seanadóir Dooge agus ag an Seanadóir Ó Caoinleáin faoin alt seo. Is cuimhin mé féin a bhí gníomach agus páirteach i gceann de na sean scéimeanna idir-réitigh agus eadrána le fada an lá agus bhí siad sásúil. Ar ndóigh, bhí loctha orthu ach níor ghá na loctha sin a bheith orthu, sé sin, dá mbeadh dea-thoil ar an dá thaobh i gcás cúis ar bith a chuirfí os a gcomhair do bheadh said sásta, ach de réir mar oibrigh siad cuireadh moill orthu agus bhí rudaí ann a fágadh ar an mhéir fhada, rud nár ghá a dhéanamh ach, tríd is tríd, bhí siad sásúil. Tá mé cinnte maoin leis an muintir a bhfuil mise im ionadaí anseo acu go dtiochfaidh aon athrú ar na scéimeanna mar atá said á moladh anso in alt a 9 agus tá a chúis acu, mar bhí bord eadrána ar siúl anuraidh agus bord atá ar aon dul beagnach leis an rud atá á mholadh anso—an bord a dtugtar an Ryan Tribunal air agus a bhí ag plé le tuarastal múinteoirí. Bhí sé comhdhéanta díreach ar an mbealach céanna is atá molta anso, sé sin, ionadaí óna fostóirí agus ionadaí óna fostaithe in éineacht le cathaoirleach.

Anois má tá fianaise ar bith ag teastáil in aghaidh ruda mar sin sé an praiseach ceart atá déanta ag an mbord sin ar thuarastal muinteoirí tré chéile. Tá sé le feiceáil an lá atá inniu féin ann—múinteoirí fós féin ar stailc ar fud na tíre agus é sin ar fad ag eascairt as an obair a rinneadh ansin.

Mar sin cuirimse go láidir in aghaidh seo, in aghaidh daoine den chineál atá molta anso a chur ar na boird eadrána agus tá mé cinte go mbeadh na móinteoirí uile ar an dul céanna mar is léir dóibh sin freisin nár tháinig as ach easaontas agus mí-shástacht.

Agus faid atá mé ar mo chosa ba mhaith liom freisin cur leis an moladh a rinne an Seanadóir Ó Murchadha ar ball faoi chathaoirleach nea-spleách a bheith ar an gcomhairle idir-réitigh. Go dtí seo sé an duine a bhíodh againn air Rúnaí na Roinne. Toisc duine den fhreasúra é sin ó thaobh na ndaoine atá ag déanamh éilimh ba mhaith liom mar adeirim cuidiú leis an moladh sin.

I should like to add my voice to the voices of previous speakers in asking the Minister to reconsider section 9. I am sure he has heard this ad nauseam, but I really believe that the professional groups feel very strongly about the extension of their boards to people other than representatives of their own professions or employers. They feel very strongly that only these people know their problems and are in a proper position to appreciate them. I foresee further trouble that may not have occurred to the Minister. There has been going through the Dáil a Health Bill. One of the aims towards which we have been striving for some time has been a unified health service. This new Health Bill provides the mechanism for regional hospital services with three regions controlling all the hospitals and streamlining hospital services. This regionalisation would involve all the members of the voluntary hospitals at the moment in taking contract with the regional hospital boards and being employed by them. Section 9 would affect them very much. We have had tremendous difficulty, up to the present, in having the possibility of a unified hospital system accepted. If those people who have had total independence up to date realise that not only will they have to face arbitration and conciliation boards, but boards whose members know nothing about their problems, the possibility of getting this provision through the Health Bill will be very slim indeed. This may seem a small point and a very small facet in the present debate, but I think the Minister should realise the depth of feeling there is among the professional bodies at this time. I have seen the Medical Association split because of problems not unlike this and I foresee militant professional groups being established because of this kind of legislation.

I appeal once again to the Minister to reconsider this section before he commits to law a provision containing the words "shall include". We appreciate the Minister's sympathies in this matter, as we know him to be a reasonable man. However, times change and the word "shall" will be there and that will leave very little room for manoeuvre in the future.

Cheap mé go raibh críochnaithe againn leis an gcuid seo den Bhille. Ní hionann fiosrú de shaghas an Ryan Tribunal agus comhairle idir-réitigh agus eadrána. Is feidir liom a rá ón taithí a bhí agam nach raibh an Seanadóir Ó Conalláin sásta leis an gcóras idir-réitigh. Bhí easaontas tar éis breith a thug an chomhairle sin nuair a bhí mise im' Aire Oideachais agus bhí sé chomh dona leis an easaontas atá ann anois.

To say that because the Ryan Tribunal had members of the Labour Court its findings caused disturbance or disunity is not perhaps bringing a fair element into the idea of putting Labour Court members on the board of conciliation and arbitration. While under the conciliation and arbitration councils the arbitrator has been appointed by consent and everything done to fulfil the reasonable desiderata of both sides, there have been occasions when the findings of a council have caused just as much disturbance. I am answering Senator Ó Conalláin and I would point out that my experience in this regard at a time when he was dealing with me as Minister for Education, was that a finding of the council did cause quite an amount of dissatisfaction among the people whom he represents, and this dissatisfaction was taken out, as all dissatisfactions are in our country, on the community at large, in this case on the children.

To say that the Ryan Tribunal caused dissatisfaction because it had Labour Court members on it is totally unfair in the light of our experience. Before we adjourned I had said that I am favourable to the professional attitude in this, and for two years we have been trying to find a way to develop this attitude of mind and standard of behaviour which the professional people are contributing to the community. I have been faced with the problem of trying to find some method of bringing a continuity into the conciliation and arbitration schemes so that uneven findings will not cause the type of discontent which results in the community having another period of suffering through withdrawal of labour, and also to have some continuity so that there will be on each board somebody who has regard to the overall economy.

If we had the extended type of Labour Court that I envisaged when I first set about making proposals for changing the legislation, we would have on that people with special experience, and I think that such a Labour Court would have satisfied the professional people. In the event this was not acceptable to the main body of people using conciliation and arbitration machinery. The only course left to me was to find representatives of the Labour Court.

I imagine that with the passing of time this country will have to develop new procedures on the lines of an incomes policy—without declaring it, because there is no Government decision on it. If there were a board or a body studying incomes and making recommendations, then such a body would be usefully introduced into the arbitration part of the scheme, but we have not got that yet. What we have is the Labour Court, and I try to bring in the Labour Court in such a way as to be neutralised, that is, one from each side. I quite accept that, while an employer and a worker neutralise each other in the ordinary course of events, in the eyes of a professional man both could be unsympathetic. Therefore, as I said before, when the order is made—and it will not be made too quickly because all this has to be negotiated—it will be made when new schemes have been negotiated introducing these two people. I believe the way it will be negotiated is to have these two people non-voting, bringing only their knowledge and experience. In so far as anything else is concerned the decision will still be made by the chairman of the arbitration council.

That is an experiment we should try. At this time I would not even go so far as to make them voting members, if I were asked for my opinion. This will be negotiated, because there is no point in having a scheme that will not be satisfactory or largely satisfactory to the people concerned. On that basis the Seanad should accept the section as it stands. It may be we shall find some other way of introducing the common good into all these schemes, but we have a long way to go and the beginning of the long road is the changing of attitudes, and I do not see any great sign in the higher levels in more secure employment of improved attitudes towards the sharing of incomes. But I have not lost hope, and, as I said before, this country has overcome enormous difficulties in the past and this seemingly impossible one can be solved if we just set ourselves to behaving as rational human beings. It was, I think, a former Minister of Labour in Britain who said: "I can only give you the facts. Only God can give you sense." We are at about that stage in these matters: until we get the sense, I suggest the Seanad accepts this way of doing it.

Question put and agreed to.
Senators Dooge, Quinlan, Alton and Ó Conalláin were recorded as dissenting.
SECTION 10.
Question proposed: "That section 10 stand part of the Bill".

I am a bit puzzled by this section which refers to agreements that have been made, agreements which presumably affect employees as well as employers. Subsection (1) provides:

If an employer or a trade union representative of employers affected by a registered employment agreement complains to the Court that an employer affected by the agreement has failed or neglected to comply with the agreement, the following provisions shall have effect...

Nowhere in the section do I see any right granted to an employee who, presumably, could be affected by the agreement.

There is an explanation. The employee's right is already in the Principal Act.

That being so, I am a little puzzled by subsection (3). It provides:

If a person affected by a registered employment agreement fails or neglects to comply with the agreement, the person shall be guilty of an offence...

The first subsection allows complaint to be made only by an employer or a representative of employers, but subsection (3) refers to "a person" and prescribes penalties.

That is needed. If the employment agreement drawn up covers a sufficient number of employees in a particular type of employment then the Labour Court can make it apply to all employees. Now the 1946 Act gave the right to a trade union to complain if an employer was not living up to the requirements of the agreement. The difficulty of an employer who lives up to his commitments, knowing that another employer across the road is not living up to them, comes to mind immediately because the employer across the road may be getting cheaper work and competing with the man honouring the agreement. Because of the way in which the Act was worded, giving the right to complain to the workers, such an employer could not complain; he had to go to the trade union to complain. Under this provision he can make his complaint direct. The right of the employee or the trade union is already established.

I should like to follow up the Minister's point. As I understand it, under the 1946 Act the position was that an employer could only complain about a trade union; he could complain about the action of a trade union in regard to the promotion of strike action in contravention of an agreement. But here we have the position, as the Minister said, of an employer affected by an agreement. The Minister's explanation made me realise I had read section 10 rather carelessly. I had interpreted it to mean that the person who could complain was the employer who was a party to the agreement, but I see now that this is far wider. In fact, it would now appear on the face of it that a person need not be a party to the agreement in order to claim that he is affected. One wonders how directly must he be affected by the breach of the agreement to entitle him to be heard on this particular matter.

He does not have to be affected at all demonstrably, but an employer who does not live up to a negotiated agreement would in practice be able to compete at an advantage with an employer who is living up to the terms of the agreement. The agreement is one which has been negotiated on a voluntary basis and, when it is negotiated, a statutory application goes to the Labour Court and, if both agree to registration, then the agreement is registered. That is the position if there are two parties. If there are more than two parties there must be substantial agreement among all the parties involved to the terms of the agreement. Now the agreement will require an employer to behave in a certain manner in certain circumstances. If he does not behave in that manner, under the 1946 Act the employee, or his trade union, can complain. We have had experience of employers living up to their agreements who were at a disadvantage because other employers did not live up to the agreement and who were compelled to go to the trade union to complain about their competitors. Naturally they would prefer to complain of those competitors directly. They do not have to prove they are at a disadvantage. All they have to prove is that a certain employer is not living up to the terms of the agreement.

We are concerned with this question of registered employment agreements. As I understand it, there are several forms of agreement. Some might relate to an individual firm. Some might be industry wide and some might be the result of agreement at a joint industrial council. I wonder if the Minister could give us some indication as to what is the proportion of the different types of agreement. Are most agreements on an industry wide basis?

I could not answer that without asking the Labour Court.

There are, I think, relatively few registered agreements.

Subsection (1) (a) provides:

the Court shall consider the complaint, and shall hear all persons appearing to the Court to be interested and desiring to be heard,

Has the court all the powers of a civil court? Or does this provision limit the court? It could be so construed.

The court will have to hear those who offer themselves as witnesses.

Who offer themselves, but can the court order witnesses to attend?

Or those who do not desire to be heard?

They have that power, but they do not normally use it.

This subsection would seem superfluous then.

The power is in the Principal Act: section 21 provides:

The court may for the purposes of any proceedings before it under this Act do all or any of the following things——

(a) summon witnesses to attend before it.

Could this be taken then as limiting the court?

No. The power to summon witnesses lies with the Labour Court in any proceedings under the Industrial Relations Act. The onus on the Labour Court is that it shall hear witnesses who have a right to be heard. This does not in any way limit the power of the court to summon witnesses, which is the power under the main Act.

It specifically mentions certain things the court "may" do and which apparently it could do in any case.

No, this is enforcing the court to hear witnesses who want to be heard. That does not limit the power of the court to summon witnesses the court wishes to hear.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 11.
Question proposed: "That section 11 stand part of the Bill."

Section 11 refers to fair employment rules. I think we have a departure here in so far as these fair employment rules can be made after consultation with organisations which are representative of any class, type or group of workers and of their employers. There is not a restriction as to their being a trade union of workers or a trade union of employers and I should like to ask the Minister is there any particular reason why it is being broadened in this particular case? Is it a new departure or does it correspond to something in the Principal Act?

It is an entirely new provision. It is along the lines on which we were talking earlier, giving initiative to the industrial relations officers. Previously the initiative lay with the registered employers' organisations, the joint labour committees and so on, and this is intended to get the industrial relations officer into the picture, promoting the development of rules of fair employment. It is experimental and it is in line with our feeling that the officer should be going out and promoting agreements.

As such it is very welcome.

I am a bit disturbed about this, too. I am not quite sure to what point these rules can apply. In paragraph (a) of subsection (1) we are told that the court may "make rules which apply to" and so on, the number of workers, et cetera, and they are to be called, according to subsection (2) “fair employment rules”. In the Explanatory Memorandum the last sentence of the paragraph relating to section 11 says that “The rules would have legal status with penalties for contraventions”. I cannot help wondering whether we are not giving to the Labour Court the powers of Parliament, legislative powers. They will have legal status with penalties for contraventions. I should like to know whether the making of such rules will be considered an Order under the Act and consequently under section 22 will have to be laid before the Houses of the Oireachtas. Will the Order be an Order within the meaning of section 22? As I say, I am not quite clear to what extent such rules might go. Suppose, for the sake of argument, fair employment rules were to be made in relation to a particular industry that all workers were to be in a trade union or in a particular trade union. Would it be conceivable that the power we are devoting here would vest with the Labour Court to make such a rule? I think it unlikely that they would because of the implications, but my feeling of disquiet is that we are giving quite a lot of legislative power here. I am not even sure that the power we are giving might not be considered unconstitutional, to make large scale directions and rules and fair employment rules in relation to workers in any industry and in relation to employers.

Paragraph (a) of subsection (1) states that rules may be made to provide for fair employment conditions and they have to be "approved of by organisations representing a substantial number of the workers of that class, type or group and organisations representing a substantial number of those employers." I am sure the Senator will have every sympathy with the problems of workers who are in low paid industries and with poor conditions and where it is very difficult for the trade unions to organise them and to get recognition from the employer but where nevertheless it is desirable that something be done to give them minimum conditions. This is one way of doing it, by the industrial relations officer taking the initiative. In so far as getting such people organised in trade unions there would be full consultation with the trade union concerned and consultation with the employers concerned and after all that, and with agreement with the bulk on both sides, they would make these minimum conditions which would have to apply then to all the people concerned. In other words, it would bring into line the bad employers who would be exploiting people and who are able to get away with it under present circumstances. I am sure Senator Sheehy Skeffington would have every sympathy with that position.

This is so, of course, but this is one type of case that might arise and there are other types. That is why I ask to what extreme do these powers extend? I can remember a case in Dublin which occurred over a quarter of a century ago and which related to the transport industry. What occurred was that there were workers organised in three or four different unions and when the time came for the renewal of their contract a considerably better agreement was made between the company and one of the unions which exerted tremendous pressure on all members of the other unions to join that union and in fact they succeeded in crippling them for a time. Would it be possible under such power to decide in the interests of a substantial number of the workers aforesaid, with agreement with one or other of the organisations, to force workers by fair employment rules to go into a union which had succeeded in making such an arrangement with an employer, as took place on that occasion, to the detriment of some of the unions? In other words, it would not only be for the benefit of the less well off workers. Are we, in fact, not conceding too much legislative power both as to the lives and freedom of the ordinary workers by granting this power which in the memorandum is said to have legal status with penalties? I think it goes too far.

What I visualise, and what I think would arise out of the section, is the improvement of the conditions of employment of workers generally in an industry, not members of a particular trade union. First of all, I would like to say that the first example which the Senator gave would be unconstitutional. You cannot force people into a trade union. They are entitled not to go into it. We have a case of that already. People are free not to join as well as they are free to join.

The Minister promised a Bill to rectify that and he has not carried out his promise. We have that in writing.

(Interruptions.)

The agreement was that a Bill would be introduced and sent to the Supreme Court for a decision as to its constitutionality.

I think it would not be constitutional. The second point is that I cannot see rules of fair employment being applied to members of one trade union. Events over the last few years show that workers regard other workers as persons to be protected and most of the strikes we have had, often to the great disadvantage of the majority of workers in a plant, have been carried out with the co-operation of those put at a disadvantage by a picket. So, I do not think you could ever get a sneaky type of job done where one trade union would operate to the disadvantage of workers in another union.

I had not thought of anything but a benefit coming from employers to workers generally classified according to what they are doing rather than membership of any trade union and I wanted these industrial officers to have the power to go out and promote this. It is necessary to go to some employers and shake them up and say to them that they ought to consider drawing up a set of rules and obeying them so that the workers would feel that they had these rights established and would not feel insecure. Any rules they draw up would have been approved by a substantial number of the people affected as well as the organisations representing them and they would have to have regard to any representations made by people not of the substantial group affected but affected by the rule.

I should like to try it. I think the Constitution would protect any individual from abuse of it and certainly modern practice in relation to trade union activity would preclude the danger the Senator points out. Certainly, if it were used in any way to the disadvantage of workers, then we should do away with it but I cannot see it being used in that way.

I am inclined to accept the Minister's view (a) that there is a lot of good to be derived from this and (b) that the probabilities of its being abused are small, perhaps negligible, but I would feel happier about it if instead of saying that the court may make rules which will have legislative power we would say something like "The court may recommend that the Minister shall make an Order" and then this Order would be brought before the Houses of the Oireachtas and in nine times out of ten or 99 times out of 100 it would be implemented, would not be annulled but, at least, the Minister would be answerable to Parliament for it and could be questioned on it.

I feel that the Oireachtas is giving away a bit of its legislative power if we simply say that the court can make an Order and there would be penalties attached but nobody in Parliament will have a right to examine it or even the right it will have in relation to other Orders made under this Act to annul it, as under section 22.

The Orders made under, say, joint labour committees, are made by the Labour Court, not by the Minister concerned and I think this has had distinct advantages. The parties to these agreements bring them into being and then bring them to the court for an Order to be made and they do not come to the Minister at all and the penalties are penalties to be applied by the ordinary courts, not by the Labour Court. There is probably a small point that by allowing the Labour Court to do this they are, in fact, legislating but I cannot see them drawing up rules that have not been evolved from the people concerned and affected by them and the type of rule which they will make will have to have a broad area of agreement and would be more acceptable than any legislation providing such specific points and rules made by the Parliament. There is quite a suspicion of Parliament in this area of activity and most people would prefer to develop their own procedure and rules, not to have them imposed on them by Parliament. I can see the point but I think the way we are doing it is the best way.

Perhaps it will make the Senator a little happier if I point out that the court is obliged under the 1946 Act to make an annual report to the Minister and that a copy of the annual report has to be laid before each House of the Oireachtas.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 12.
Question proposed: "That section 12 stand part of the Bill".

I should like to ask the Minister whether in regard to this inspector who has the right to enter at all reasonable times any premises, et cetera, and to require the production of wages sheets or other records of remuneration, et cetera, is there any obligation upon such inspector to produce his credentials to prove to the person whose premises he is entering that he is an inspector?

They all do it and I presume they would not be allowed in without them.

Is it included in the main Act?

I will have a look.

Very often in a case like this it is specifically stated. If it is in the main Act, that is fine, but if not, I should rather like to see the person whose premises are being entered having the right to ask the inspector who he is and to prove it.

That is in section 51 of the Principal Act:

Every inspector shall be furnished by the Minister with a certificate of his appointment and when exercising any of the powers conferred on him by this Part shall, if so required by any person affected, produce such certificate to him.

That is extremely satisfactory. I am quite satisfied.

Thank you.

The Minister referred briefly previously to the relative roles of the industrial relations officers, the inspectors and the rights commissioners. I wonder if he could indicate to us, under the operations of the Principal Act, how many inspectors are operating at the moment under his Department in regard to this type of function?

As distinct from the specialised inspectors?

We have about six of these dealing with this type of activity.

Is it intended to increase the number on the passage of this Bill?

There is no problem there. They can be appointed from the staff. I can increase the number if needs be. I do not need to have any power in the Bill.

I appreciate that.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 13.
Question proposed: "That section 13 stand part of the Bill."

I would ask the Minister if he could possibly at this stage expand a little on how he anticipates that the rights commissioners may act and their relationships to the court and its various officers. Does the Minister anticipate that the appointment of a rights commissioner will be essentially an ad hoc business or does he anticipate that the same individual might be appointed in regard to more than one case and that certain individuals might be, as it were, continually employed or appointed under this section?

This is totally new and while I have had several cases where I thought a man with a bit of common sense brought in to deal with people who would accept an outside recommendation could have stopped a grievance developing into a major dispute, I have kept it completely flexible as to how it will work out. I think what I will do is, say, appoint one man in Dublin and have him there as the recognised rights commissioner and, perhaps, then, appoint them in other centres throughout the country. It may be a start to the decentralisation that the Senator mentioned earlier. As I said before, we have examples of discipline or dismissal and a variety of things affecting what a worker would regard as his rights. It does not matter whether that right is in an agreement or is a custom or is something that he has in his mind as a right but if that right is affected the workers can down tools and we have the common experience of everybody walking out. This can be a hot-headed action. The number of man days lost through this type of strike is not great—about 23 per cent of the man days lost —but the number of strikes is more than that.

The proportion of these strikes relating to interest is more than that only they do not last that long—but they last long enough: they can involve the Labour Court. Very often, we have the ridiculous situation of an enormous strike for one little grievance which has blown up and which could be solved if somebody came in and offered a solution. It is based totally on acceptance of an outsider's saying: "Look here, you are both angry and both wrong. Why do you not do this?" More often than not, an employer who has acted hastily, perhaps, would be very glad to accept a recommendation. I am sure trade unions do not want to bring all the power of the strike weapon into a case that could be settled by some quick and, perhaps, private recommendation. You cannot be dragged before a rights commissioner: people can be dragged before the Labour Court. You have to agree to have him. If his finding is not acceptable then they can appeal it to the Labour Court—but on the basis of arbitration.

The Minister looks on this, initially, as involving somebody acting continuously for a rights commissioner although it will not necessarily be a permanent appointment.

I should like somebody established as a rights commissioner. One would imagine that flexibility here would be important. So often, the dispute would be in a field in which people on both sides would respect a particular man. I am keeping it flexible in order to see what we need, from our experience. He would be appointed on a fee basis.

The Minister is wise in approaching the problem in this particular light. If the rights commissioner fails then the matter goes to the Labour Court. This would tend to preclude, possibly, I think, the Minister's calling on anyone who had any connection with the Labour Court to appointment as a rights commissioner. Here, perhaps, we may be running into some difficulty. We are all agreed that industrial relations officers have a great deal of experience: that will be still more so in the future. We may find ourselves unable to draw on that particular experience and expertise in regard to this type of rights problem which arises. I do not know if the Minister sees a problem there, as I see one, and if he thinks there is any way around it.

The type of dispute I visualise would not be one which would involve conciliation—the usual activity of a conciliation officer's bringing the two sides to common ground. Something flares up and positions are taken up. Everybody is fighting the good fight and there is nothing left but their tails. The whole thing is nonsensical to the outsider or to the man who is not excited. We are giving them a chance to realise that this can be solved by an outsider, without anybody going in if we accept the rights commissioner. This has been done in private. I am doing it in public.

It will be a great relief to the various Lords Mayor who have to intervene in disputes.

Would the Minister take a look at the wording of subsection (2) of this section? It reads as follows:

(2) Subject to the provisions of this section, where a trade dispute (other than a dispute connected with rates of pay of, hours or times of work of, or annual holidays of, a body of workers) exists or is apprehended and involves workers within the meaning of Part VI of the Principal Act, a party to the dispute may refer it to a rights commissioner.

In other words, any dispute in connection with whether a worker has got his proper pay or his proper overtime payment for a week or the proper holidays as provided under his agreement cannot be dealt with by the rights commissioner. This is the problem I was referring to earlier. It seems to me that to bring the interpretation of an agreement to the court is like taking a sledge-hammer to crack a nut. I do not think the Minister really means what he is providing for in this subsection. It certainly is not in line with what was understood to have been agreed at the working party. I am sure the Minister will understand what I mean. There is the question of rights and the question of interest—rights, in the sense of a worker wanting his rights under an agreement or under an established practice: interest is that maybe they would be wanting a betterment of their conditions. Here, we are talking about rights. The question, now, of the man getting his proper rate of pay is certainly a very big right. The question of whether he should have been given public holiday pay for Whit Monday or August Monday is certainly a matter of right which could properly, I think, be dealt with by a rights commissioner. Here, we are preventing these sorts of things from going to the rights commissioner. I do not think that was intended. Anything in connection with rates of pay, hours, times of work or annual holidays is taken out of the field: they cannot be dealt with by the rights commissioner. Would the Minister clarify the provision for me? I think there is something wrong here in the drafting of the section.

I was trying to deal with the small case that can cause big trouble. Generally speaking, at this stage I should like rights commissioners to deal with cases involving individuals.

There is no mention of "individual" in the subsection.

This exclusion is a body of workers—a dispute connected with a body of workers. I should like the Labour Court to deal with the big rights as well as the interests and, for the beginning of the career, that the rights commissioner would deal with the individual case.

In the next line it is still plural—"workers". I am trying to construe this. The Minister is making the point that, if it is a dispute about one individual's right on pay, it can be dealt with by the rights commissioner. But if it is a dispute about a body of workers, it is appropriate to the Labour Court. I understand that point. Then it says here "and involves workers": it is plural there. That would seem, on the other hand, to exclude the individual worker. Does the Minister understand the point I am trying to make?

I think a dispute seldom rocks the world if there is only one person out.

That is the type of thing we want to deal with.

There can be a big crowd of workers out because it is contended that the rights of one person are infringed. Consider the case where an individual wants an outsider to come along and make a decision on what he regards as his rights being diminished in some way. Up to now, when this happens, we have had cases that all the workers were out. However, if a body of workers of substantial size wants a decision on rights or conditions, interests, then I think the Labour Court should deal with that.

I agree but the section does not really deal with that.

It allows what I want to happen. I am excluding the big job from the rights commissioner and giving it to the Labour Court.

Supposing some fellow finds he is docked on pay for some day on which he said he or his wife was ill or something like that, instead of his raising a row and everybody stopping work, it would be very good if this sort of thing could be dealt with immediately by a rights commissioner but it cannot be because it involves a worker, it does not involve workers. The section says "... and involves workers within the meaning of Part VI of the Principal Act." What we want here is something to deal with the individual grievance quickly.

It is a definition. It does not mean a number of workers. It means when disputes affect people who are workers within the meaning of this Act. It might affect one of them.

I will get a BL degree before I come to the Seanad again.

Question put and agreed to.
Sections 14 to 16, inclusive, agreed to.
SECTION 17.
Question proposed: "That section 17 stand part of the Bill."

In section 17 there seems to be a somewhat dangerous position. Subsection (1) provides for giving access to the Labour Court to unestablished State employees on their being identified or designated by the Minister for Finance. On the other hand, subsection (2) appears to give an opportunity for defeating the purpose of the section by withholding designation at the request of any Minister for any reason. For instance, in regard to workers on the State farms who may be dissatisfied with their hours—and they are pressing for a reduction to 42½ hours from between 47 and 50 hours per week—the Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries might whisper in the ear of the Minister for Finance behind the scenes: "Do not designate these workers or I will be in trouble." The same position could apply to any other Minister or any other Department for any reason.

I would, on this point, like to ask the Minister if a trade union were to request the Minister for Finance under subsection (2) (a) to give the necessary designation, could we have an undertaking that such designation would not be refused? This would remove suspicions which have arisen on the section.

I think I could give that assurance. The whole idea behind all this is to get the court into the various areas of negotiation and settlement. I would like to get the court into all the conciliation and arbitration schemes. Certainly the intention here is that workers who have not access to a scheme of conciliation and arbitration nor to the Labour Court should be given access to the Labour Court. To try to list them out would be perhaps to tie it rigidly and the purpose of allowing the Minister to define the people who would have access is to make it flexible, so that no case would arise that would not be on our list. In other words, the intention is that those who have not machinery through which they can go should have access to the Labour Court and there should be no difficulty about having a Minister accede to a request by a trade union.

The Minister does see what I mean, that a Minister could stop the designation if it would affect his Department?

I do not think it would arise. We already have a 1955 amendment which brought in a number of people. We could have a list. This list is brought in by this amendment but then a Minister under this Act could say "I will not name this group". However, I cannot see any public representative doing that. The purpose of putting it this way is to allow it to be flexible enough to bring in groups to the Labour Court.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 18.

I move amendment No. 1:

In subsection (1), page 8, line 39, to delete "the parties to the dispute" and substitute "the workers concerned in the dispute or their trade union or trade unions".

In this section we are changing somewhat the initiative of the Labour Court to intervene in disputes and go before the public for the hearing. As the Minister has already pointed out, this Bill as a whole has been the subject of very detailed consultation with both sides of industry but we are providing here that the court shall not investigate a trade dispute unless the parties to the dispute have requested it to investigate the dispute and, as well, that it has been the subject of examination by the industrial relations officer. Again, I wonder, did the Minister intend this because it is my understanding that what was agreed at working party level was that, where the trade union asked that the court should investigate the dispute and it had previously been the subject of an examination and report by the industrial relations officer, then the court would investigate the dispute.

I feel we are being unnecessarily restrictive here. We could have a situation where the employer would say: "I am not agreeing that the matter should be investigated by the Labour Court" and the Labour Court would therefore be precluded from doing so, unless under subsection (2) they would think it was a matter of serious concern. I think what was intended, and certainly what was understood by Congress, was that, if the trade union after going to conciliation level asked that the court should investigate the dispute, then the court would investigate it, that they would not have to seek the agreement of the employer concerned to have the court intervene and investigate the dispute.

I feel it would cause difficulties if it were to be made obligatory that both sides would have to make the request to the court. As far as I know, that was not intended. I should like to hear the Minister's comments about it. The amendment is to rectify the situation and bring it back to what was understood as having been agreed by the working party, namely, that if the workers concerned in the dispute or the trade union asked to have the court investigate the dispute then the court would investigate the dispute.

I am not quite sure what is the difference between our thinking.

It says: "The parties..."

The section provides that the court will not investigate unless the parties ask the court to investigate it. The amendment would appear to provide that if the parties have failed at conciliation the court will not investigate the dispute unless the workers ask them to investigate. I keep working in the hope that someday both sides in any dispute will see that settlement is the objective and, if they have negotiated, that they will continue to negotiate with the conciliation industrial relations officer.

That would be quite normal.

Does this section not give power to the employer to prevent the dispute going to the court?

The Minister knows that there were difficulties in recent years with some insurance companies who did not recognise the trade unions. As far as I can remember they did not appear at the Labour Court. There is one notorious employer here—a quasicharitable organisation—that does not recognise the trade union. I am not clear as to whether they have refused to go to the Labour Court but there have been instances and there will be instances where an employer will not attempt to negotiate. It is not always the fault of the trade union. Here, the employer is being given the power to prevent the Labour Court investigating a dispute. There are often very good reasons why the Labour Court would wish to investigate a dispute but here the Minister is giving a whip hand to the employer who does not wish to negotiate, who does not wish to recognise the trade union and who does not recognise the Labour Court. That is certainly not what was agreed at working party level.

Perhaps I set out thinking that the Labour Court has had its share of ill-treatment. The last time the employers brought a dispute to the court the trade union could not go. When introducing the Second Stage I said that the Government are not committed to having a court that is rejected. Not to accept the court as having some force in its recommendation is to continue to have a court which is demoralising to everybody by being treated as a pawn in the game. I must say that I do not see any sense in the court not being able to investigate if workers refuse to go to it or if employers refuse to go to it. If workers will accept the recommendations of the court then the court will hear the dispute.

Section 1 (b) covers the point.

It depends on what is meant by "exceptional".

The court is entitled to go in on its own initiative if the workers ask it and say that they will accept the recommendation, otherwise, both parties will have to agree or the court would be used as a pawn in the game. In the long run this would undermine the whole idea of negotiation and conciliation and the searching for a solution.

I see the point. It is in section 20 where the trade union can have it investigated by binding themselves in advance to accept the recommendation. That is fair enough but that is placing the trade unions in a worse position than they are at the moment in dealing with these recalcitrant employers. There was a recent dispute in the Minister's own constituency——

We solved that one.

A trade union placed in this position will always be rather weak because if an employer is refusing to recognise the trade union there will generally be some employees who will try to sit on the fence and the fight for recognition is something that may not be regarded as being terribly important. Up to now, the Labour Court could help in a situation where they could investigate disputes but the Minister is now saying that, without the employers' agreement, the Labour Court cannot investigate the dispute unless the union binds itself to accepting the recommendation.

I left a discretion to the court to go in. What we are trying to do is to establish a normal procedure. The usual happening now is that the different stages go on and the court is used as a stepping stone. As I have said, more than half the workers rejected last year's recommendations. If this continues the whole concept of the settlement of disputes and of the Labour Court will be undermined and discredited. It has been discredited to a great extent already by this behaviour. People should approach the Labour Court after they have tried hard at negotiations. If the Senator and I were in dispute and if we asked somebody to come in and help solve it we would have a moral commitment to accept the recommendation. If an employer refuses to go to the court it could happen that he would be forced to go by the workers agreeing to accept the Labour Court's recommendation.

There is no obligation on the employer to accept and implement it.

The record of refusals is on the other side.

We are talking about an employer who will not recognise it.

He can be forced to the Labour Court. That is as far as we could go by an Act of Parliament. We cannot force an employer to grant what the Labour Court recommends. There would be an investigation. That is as much as we could legislate for. If the dispute is such as to warrant intervention by the court in spite of the employer, the court can decide to go in on its own. There are two ways. One way is that the workers accept the recommendation and the other is by the court saying: "We had better go in there".

It would go in if there was a likelihood of a larger dispute.

They would use their discretion. They are nominees of the employers and of the unions. You would expect them to act when there is need for intervention. You cannot force a man to go before the Labour Court. There was one big case which has been settled now and the union has been recognised. That was investigated by the Labour Court at their discretion. If such a situation arose again the Labour Court could investigate it on its own initiative. All possible angles are covered. An attempt is made to establish the Labour Court as being somewhat effective in having its recommendations accepted.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section agreed to.
SECTION 19.
Question proposed: "That section 19 stand part of the Bill".

Section 19 is welcomed as another move towards flexibility in the court.

Question put and agreed to.
SECTION 20.

I move amendment No. 2:

To delete subsection (3), lines 25 to 28 and substitute:

"(3) An investigation under this section shall be given such priority over the other business of the Court as the Court considers reasonable."

This is something which is a bit dangerous. We are talking here of an investigation by the court at the request of the parties. Where the trade union binds itself to accept the recommendation in advance the court shall investigation it and shall give it priority. It says that the investigation shall be conducted in private. I think that a consequential amendment is necessary here following upon the amendment of section 8 in the Dáil.

It started off in the Dáil with it being "hearing being in private". That was amended, too, so that they could be in public or in private according to the wishes of the parties. Here, again, where a trade union decides it will, in effect, bind itself in advance we are saying that in such cases the investigation must be conducted in private. Personally, I am in favour of this sort of thing being conducted in private but other trade union officials have different views. We are trying to encourage the view of accepting private hearings in order to get a dispute dealt with quickly by the Labour Court. We are trying to build up an atmosphere of confidence in the Labour Court, so that trade unions would say: "We will submit it to the Labour Court who are bound to give it precedence and we will have a recommendation pretty quickly". This is a new aspect of industrial relations here. I myself have never been worried about arbitration in my own dealings. On many occasions I have suggested that the matter be dealt with by arbitration but I found the employers not accepting arbitration. There was a general argument that arbitration is not general in the trade union movement here. The employers felt that unless everything was subject to arbitration they would not have a particular item subject to arbitration. An atmosphere of confidence must be built up. There is suspicion and fear of arbitration. If the Minister could get all small matters submitted to arbitration and see how it works out over a period it would be a step in the right direction.

The Minister is asking the trade unions in a situation like this to say: "We will put our necks on the block. We are taking a risk going to the Labour Court saying in advance we will accept their recommendation". It would need much selling to the workers involved. They must be led. If, as well, there is a situation that the hearing must be in private there will be still further suspicion. Personally, I would prefer these things dealt with in private but it will be necessary to try and sell the idea to the body of workers concerned. They will feel hesitant to accept the idea of disposing of the matter quickly by putting it to arbitration having bound themselves in advance to accept the Labour Court's recommendation. They will feel that the Labour Court would deal with it quickly and they would have to accept the recommendation. If they are told that the matter will be dealt with in private they will say that they will not know what is going on at all. There would be no reports in the newspapers. I feel that some of the newspaper reports must be harmful, but there should be discretion in a matter like this. It is a matter of choice in the ordinary hearings of the Labour Court whether the hearing is in public or private. There should be a choice in a question such as this. If the trade union decides to go to arbitration the hearing should be in public if the union thinks it desirable to have it in public. This provision is not going to add anything to the Bill. It would be of benefit if this was left in such a way that the hearing could be public or private, as in the earlier section. I urge the Minister to look again at this section. It adds unnecessarily to the difficulties of encouraging people to submit a matter and bind themselves in advance to accepting the Labour Court's findings.

Senator Murphy is correct in assuming that the proposals are in the nature of a first step into unmarked territory. I do not know to what extent parties to a dispute might prefer to commit themselves beforehand to accepting the recommendation of the Labour Court. My experience to date does not encourage me to think that they are prepared to do that.

A start must be made somewhere.

We should try it. I would inquire what kind of Labour Court investigation would be acceptable. Do they believe the Labour Court is detached enough or neutral enough?

I often thought it would be worth the community's while to accept the president of Congress or a representative of a trade union as chairman of the Labour Court if they would accept the recommendations beforehand. I think it would pay us as a community to allow them to have their own court because I honestly believe the workers have more commitment to the welfare of this country.

Hear, hear.

They have more at stake. When things go wrong they lose more. Certainly, I would not expect, from my experience of them, any irresponsibility from such a person —whether he would be accepted after a few decisions related to the needs of the economy and the needs of the future, and that includes the welfare of the workers, which must be the prime consideration in our mind.

Again, I would say I would like to hear from anybody who is representative of the workers or who knows the workers' minds what kind of Labour Court they would accept in the context of committing themselves beforehand to accepting recommendations? I think it is worthwhile to try to provide for a development. The human race has evolved, with short periods of altruistic behaviour over the years, for centuries, for thousands of years, and there is no doubt we are going to become more rational as we go along. We may have our occasional lapse but we should set our sights on the development of a rational and reasonable approach in this field.

I have great faith in the commonsense of people but also I know good judgment comes from bad experience and we have to go through quite a bad experience before we all agree. Not just the odd Minister, trade union official or employer but everybody agrees it is time we did this properly. Therefore, it is worth while providing for a development in the direction of accepting the Labour Court decisions before commitment to acceptance of the investigation. Normally the court would not, under the new legislation, be required to issue a recommendation. We changed it so that it may issue the recommendation, but in those cases it must issue a recommendation as quickly as possible. In the case of subsection (1) again we will assume normality of behaviour.

Disputes would not be normal.

Normality of behaviour in a dispute situation. Anyway, we expect they will have negotiated themselves, or perhaps with the help of the conciliation service, and that they have been working away in private. I am a great believer, although it is not politician's normal thinking, in what goes on in private. I think you can do a lot more work that way.

I agree.

They have done this negotiation and conciliation and after that they are on to the gamble. I hope this gamble will be worth taking, this gamble of the workers taking a chance and committing themselves to accepting a quick court decision. Again, I make the offer to them to suggest what type of court they want. It will be their choice and, as I say, I simply do not know what the workers will do. All I know is that I think if you have this private atmosphere, where they have been negotiating privately and have had the conciliation officer, the main aim there of the more forward-looking people—and I include in this management and workers—is to seek a solution. If they continue on the basis of a private hearing quickly given, the gamble might come off. They might take it that way. If you go for formal submission, a public display of the powers of argument and the satisfying of every constituent——

Which is sometimes very good, you know.

It is very good, but I think this would not come off in certain circumstances. I have no hope in big cases that it would come off in the beginning. If it is ever to get off the ground it will be in the small cases. When you have a major wage disputes this type of thing would not work at all. You have to have the full explanatory exposures. If it is to work it will be in the small cases, where people have been working hard in private and negotiating. As I say I am taking a gamble that other people will become reasonable too. You cannot forever go on preaching reason and have nobody listening to you. I think the people will become reasonable and somewhere somebody will do it this way.

All I can hope is that it will work to their advantage. One of the troubles about our industrial relations scene is it has always worked to the advantage of the man who is willing to pull down the house or blow up the building and I should hope that those committed people who wish to accept a recommendation would not suffer from that. I presume if they have any ideas of the type of court which would not make them suffer they will send them to me. I am thinking of the parties in this issue, whether it is a whole issue or part of it, who will enter the court nice and quietly and have it solved quickly. It is more likely to happen in private.

I am sorry the Minister will not accept the amendment. I am not going to burden the Seanad by having to trot through the Lobby. I am still of the opinion that it would have been better to leave this question about whether it would be public or private to the discretion of the responsible parties in disputes like this who would say, rightly, they would go to arbitration and accept the findings and bind themselves in advance in this matter. They should be trusted to decide whether they will have the hearing in public or in private. To compel the hearing to be in private might only add to suspicions that would normally be there anyway. Perhaps I can appreciate the Minister not wanting any amendments at this time, but he will have another opportunity, or somebody else will have another opportunity, of further amending legislation on industrial relations.

The Minister threw out the question of what sort of a Labour Court we would like. Again and again, the Minister today has been making the point about the number of recommendations which have been rejected by the workers. I think the said an increasing number have been rejected by the workers. I might say, in passing, that we should all recognise that in fact the majority of disputes are disposed of and settled at conciliation level without going to formal Labour Court hearing at all. If the Labour Court recommendations have been rejected in increasing numbers recently it might be no harm to just consider whether in fact those recommendations were good ones or not. Of course, I do not profess to being neutral in this. I am trying to find the section in the original Bill where I think it says that in making a recommendation the court shall have regard to all the issues involved. I have made a note of it somewhere.

That is a change from the main Act.

There is a reference to the public interest, a reference to industrial peace—and this is what I want to stress—the prospects of acceptance of the recommendation. In other words, the court in making a recommendation after investigating a dispute must gear their recommendations, among other things, to the possibility of the recommendations being accepted. It seems to me that the judgment of the court is falling very short of what is required if we have so many recommendations rejected. It is probably unwise for me to say it but it seems that in some way they have not had their finger on the pulse of recent developments. They had been making recommendations which again and again, as the Minister said, have been rejected by the workers' sides. One would think they would learn a lesson by this where there is a serious dispute and would under the law as it stands in making their recommendations have regard among other things to the possibility of the recommendation being accepted. We would like to see a court which would issue recommendations which would have a better chance of acceptance by the workers.

There must be a name for that type of court.

Strangely enough, in this Bill we are deleting all reference to having regard to the possibility or desirability of the recommendations being accepted. They can no longer have regard in making up their minds on a recommendation to whether what they say will be accepted or not. That is a bad situation. One of the real difficulties of the Labour Court and the trade unions dealing with the Labour Court is the situation in which a new pattern or a new standard has to be established. We have had national rounds of wage increases. It is relatively easy for the Labour Court to operate in circumstances where there has been a national agreement between the employers and the trade unions on the level of that round. But in many rounds there has been no national agreement and the round has to be established and the court is in great difficulty and is, indeed, lost in dealing with that sort of situation. In dealing with the merits of a dispute it will tend to have regard to existing standards, rates of pay in comparable industries, et cetera. But what is at issue in a matter like that is a completely new standard, a real betterment. That is where the court is in real difficulty and I do not know how they will be got out of it under this measure. The Minister asks what kind of court we want and I am giving him a simple answer which he may not like and which the court may not like. We want a court which will issue recommendations which will have a better chance of acceptance by the workers.

The Senator wants the referee as well as the players.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section agreed to.
SECTION 21.
Question proposed: "That section 21 stand part of the Bill".

Section 21 provides for the dissolution of the two tribunals for the ESB. In doing so the Bill carries out one of the recommendations of the Fogarty committee on industrial relations in the ESB but it is only proper, as we enact this section, to draw attention to the fact that this was only part of the proposals of the Fogarty committee and that little progress will be made in industrial harmony in this industry unless theremaining recommendations are also carried out—recommendations in regard to a change in attitude on the part of management in the ESB, a move towards proper worker participation in the industry itself and some measure of rationalisation regarding representation of workers in the ESB.

I take it that there will now be set up some negotiating machinery inside the ESB with ultimate recourse to the services of the industrial relations officers of the Labour Court and finally recourse to the Labour Court. One fears that if there is not an immediate improvement in conditions within the ESB from the point of view of getting a greater sense of identification between the employees and the managers one of the new divisions of the Labour Court which we are setting up by this Bill will be kept continually employed with the ESB business. I think the ESB is an example of a particular body which has been extremely efficient in the carrying out of its technical functions but which has been a distinct failure as a working unit.

The Minister spoke earlier in discussing section 9 of the particular sense of responsibility which the professions have brought to their attitude to industrial relations as well as other problems. I think it is, perhaps, a symptom of what can happen due to failure of management to appreciate problems of industrial relations and also of the loss of confidence by professional workers in regard to their conciliation machinery that at the present moment many engineers in the ESB are contemplating not merely joining a union but joining a militant union based outside this country. We have here the sort of development that may spread to other bodies and which, indeed, may be the result of the implementation of section 9 of this Bill if in the implementation of the section the very sensible ideas outlined by the Minister earlier are not carried out. I do not want to speak at length on the problems of the ESB but this body seems to have lost its identity. I think one of the serious problems is that in these latter years the ESB has not felt that it has a proper role of its own.

The position has arisen that top management appears to look on the ESB as merely an extension of the Civil Service—and to treat the ESB as belonging to the public sector in the narrowest sense of the word, of thinking that it has no proper function to justify its status as a semi-State body. This is a very undesirable thing to have to come about. I worked in the ESB for 12 years and I saw, even during that time, over ten years ago, a decline in the morale of the employees in the ESB which, indeed, has been accelerated in more recent years. There is no one aware in the public sector or in the semi-State bodies of what can occur if due attention is not paid to the industrial relations field.

We shall have time again to consider proposals on the implementation of the report of the Fogarty investigation into the ESB. This was, indeed, one of the recommendations and even before the investigation I felt there was something wrong where there was a rigid statutory provision which said that these tribunals, two of them—one the manual workers' body set up in 1942 and the other for the general employees set up in 1949—are required to determine disputes. There is no corresponding requirement on anybody to accept what they determine and even if the Labour Court heard a dispute, that the Labour Court recommendations should go back to the tribunal to be implemented. The whole thing is rigid.

I believe there has not been any meaningful attempt at industrial relations in the organisation. Not having the tribunals must, as a consequence, force the people involved to get down to work on this aspect of their affairs— the trade unions and the ESB. The investigation did expose a lot which might not be acceptable to the people concerned but it is some basis on which to improve the whole thing. The interim report of the Fogarty body suggests an alternative machinery but their final recommendation was that there be no machinery but that there be procedures negotiated.

I hope the ESB will work quickly to have satisfactory procedures for negotiating with their employees. Somebody objected recently to their being called employees since all of them are workers in a State body which is owned by the people. But those in management in the ESB should so arrange their house that they will be able, and make themselves willing, to get down to real negotiating. They have enormous problems because of the rapid growth to such an enormous size of the organisation, but it is the duty of management to overcome problems of this nature, and we would expect them to do so. Another day may see further improvement in the situation.

Question put and agreed to.
Sections 22 to 24, inclusive, agreed to.
Schedule agreed to.
Title agreed to.
Bill reported without amendment.
Agreed to take remaining Stages today.
Bill received for final consideration.
Question proposed: "That the Bill do now pass".

On the passage of the Bill, I should like to commend the Minister for what is in the Bill. I know he would have liked to have put much more in it and, of course, it is not appropriate to talk about that at this stage. The Bill has, indeed, much that can be a source of benefit. The flexibility which is built into the Bill really allows for a moderate amount of experimentation in this very important field. Realising the excellent work done by the Labour Court in the past 20 years we look forward to another 20 years of even greater achievement by the Labour Court towards the service of the community.

As a representative of a teachers' organisation, I welcome the Bill. It contains many forward looking sections and I should like to commend it. However, I wish to comment on one statement made here about the present salary dispute having been caused by the Ryan Tribunal and its composition.

Acting Chairman

It is not in the Bill.

It is a comment on section 9 which deals with representatives of the Labour Court. I should like to say that there were two representatives of the Labour Court on the Ryan Tribunal but that they were not responsible for the present crux. It should be put on record that this is not the case. It is what happened to the Ryan Tribunal's findings subsequently that has caused the crux.

Acting Chairman

The Senator is out of order.

I wanted to put that on record——

Acting Chairman

The Senator has been given an inch but I will not allow him a mile.

It is the interference with the principles set down by the Ryan Tribunal that has caused the crux and not the composition or the findings of the tribunal.

At this stage I should like to join in the commendation to the Minister for his tact, courtesy and his general approach. It is something we value and it has set a headline that I hope will be remembered in this House.

I thank the Seanad for their great help not alone in this Bill but, as somebody remarked, in the presentation of future legislation. There are areas of reason, if people are in dispute, where we can expect a detached view to be expressed and I still have the hope that if those who are detached and reasonable continue to express themselves publicly we will find a way to solve our disputes. We have to go through a fairly bad experience to bring home to everybody that the haphazard way of doing a thing is wrong.

I have said so often that legislation is not the answer, but still I hear people say: "The Government should do something about this." I have heard people suggest that it is because the Government are afraid to pass legislation that we have all the troubles. Again, I should like to say that there was a time some weeks back when I could have got the Dáil and, I am sure the Seanad, to pass, by a majority anyway, any legislative proposals put before them to solve the problem but I did not do it because I know that legislation affecting the lives of big numbers of people must be accepted by these people as reasonable and fair.

Apart altogether from the fact that I do not wish to see a State here run by enforced legislation, I should like to repeat to those who present themselves as strong people, strong men, that legislation which can be passed by the Oireachtas but which fails in the first confrontation, brings the whole idea of democratic government into disrepute. Every contribution made here has subscribed to the point of view that we must approach legislation in the field of industrial relations on the basis of finding what is acceptable to the vast majority of the people. The Seanad have behaved very well, and I thank them.

Question put and agreed to.
The Seanad adjourned at 10.10 p.m.sine die.
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