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Seanad Éireann debate -
Thursday, 4 Jul 1974

Vol. 78 No. 11

Northern Ireland Situation: Motion (Resumed).

Debate resumed on the following motion:
That Seanad Éireann notes the critical situation in Northern Ireland and requests the Government to outline its policy of reconciliation and the steps it intends to take towards a political solution.
—(Senator West.)

Before we adjourned last night I referred to the desirability of an integrated educational system in Northern Ireland. I would appeal to the Hierarchy of this country to do all in their power to bring about such a system. We all have come to the conclusion that the solution in the North is a long-term one. Education plays a vital part in any such type of solution.

It has often been said that we in the Republic are ignorant or careless in our attitude towards the problems of the people in Northern Ireland. This is correct to a certain degree. We are, by and large, fairly well informed of the situation and have been over the years. We have regularly complained about the treatment the minority get. I should like to draw the attention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to a prime cause, in my opinion, of the present disastrous situation. It is not the lack of knowledge which is possessed by the people in the Republic: it is the complete lack of knowledge which exists in the minds of the British people.

The feelings of any group of people is reflected in the attitude of the politicians who represent those people. This is well known to us who are active politicians. The ordinary man in the street in Britain knew little or nothing of the set-up in Northern Ireland until 1969 and he cared less. I know that from experience, having lived and worked in Britain for some years. This extraordinary ignorance and lack of desire to learn what was happening has brought about the present impasse, in my opinion. The politicians of Great Britain were willing to condone and to allow blatant discrimination by the Unionist Party. Discrimination by the Unionist Party in turn bred violence on the part of the minority and then again counter-violence on the part of the Unionist majority.

I would appeal to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Government at any time not to let the British escape out of the mess into which they have brought this country. They should not let the British public and politicians get away with snide and insulting remarks about the Irish and how they should be left to murder one another. The fault lies 100 per cent, in my opinion, at the door of the British people and the British politicians. Some of them are sincere enough to admit this but far too many of them would like to abandon Northern Ireland and let the Unionists rule the roost in whatever manner they wish. We know the manner in which they would do this if they again get the opportunity.

The British Government have a grave obligation. Just because the Executive have collapsed and Sunningdale is no longer an effective agreement, they should not be allowed to be intimidated by the Loyalists who have intimidated them of late. As I said earlier, the people in the South have got quite a good knowledge of the happenings in the North—maybe not as extensive a knowledge as they should have. If there is anything which is designed to continue to help the campaign by the IRA in this country as a whole—the armed campaign in the North and the supporting campaign which comes from the South at times—it is the loose talk by many people in this country and their apparent willingness to subscribe to the ideals of the IRA. They have complete lack of conviction when it comes to voting at elections, be they general or local elections.

Unfortunately, in recent years it became fashionable to advocate the policies of violence. This is a most unsatisfactory state of affairs. Those people are giving moral support to men of violence and this type of support is far too widespread. Not enough public representatives or public figures denounce the utterances of those people. We hear them in the streets and in public houses. They are given far too much latitude, in my opinion. We must all be of the one voice in denouncing violence. It is not enough to lambast the British and the Unionists. We must also reject any illegal and violent organisation such as the IRA in this part of the country.

In conclusion I should like to pay tribute to those politicians in Northern Ireland of moderation who have done their utmost in recent years to bring about a just solution and to bring about reconciliation in Northern Ireland. I refer in particular to the SDLP, probably the most intelligent, certainly the most articulate and definitely the most courageous group of politicians that this country has ever seen. They and people like the members of the Alliance Party and certain moderate members of the Unionist Party deserve a great amount of praise——

Hear, hear.

——for the efforts they have made in trying to bring about civilised democratic government to Northern Ireland. I hope that their work will not flounder at this stage. I would ask the Government, and Deputy FitzGerald in particular, to back these people to the hilt because that is where the salvation of the North of Ireland lies.

In this debate I want to deal, in so far as it is possible for me, with realities and with the realities of the present situation in the island as a whole. Here we are faced with a particular problem in that the realities with which we are dealing include people's hopes, fears and emotions. If history teaches us anything it is that hopes, fears and emotions are among the most intractable of realities. They are among the things with which it is most difficult to deal and among the factors most difficult to resolve.

I think we can start with the first major reality, which is that the power-sharing Executive in Northern Ireland has gone and that many of the aspects of the agreement which was drawn up at Sunningdale have also gone. I must say, as somebody who for quite some time has had a modest interest in Northern Ireland and studied Northern Ireland politics not in a very specialised way, that I was struck after the Sunningdale Agreement by the length to which the Unionist negotiators at Sunningdale had gone in order to accommodate, in their point of view, the aspirations and the attitudes of the Government in Dublin and of the British Government. When I say this I am not, I hope, making the mistake of saying that these were concessions that should not have been made.

Looking at it in a purely political sense, I think it is obvious that when the Unionist leader, Mr. Faulkner, went back to Northern Ireland from Sunningdale he went back with very little in his pocket. It is always a very dangerous thing for a politician to come back from a conference like Sunningdale with very little in his pocket, particularly if he has at his back a large and vocal minority of dissident supporters who are prepared to believe that whatever he came back with he did not come back with enough. I think subsequent events have shown quite clearly that he did not come back from Sunningdale with enough. You may say Sunningdale was a free agreement, freely arrived at. If he did not come back with enough, if he was subsequently unseated, that was his problem and not ours. My belief is that this is not necessarily the case. We had a responsibility towards the completion of Sunningdale and towards the maintenance of the power-sharing Executive, and this demanded more of us than sticking to the letter of the Sunningdale Agreement.

I believe that there are many possibilities that we could have undertaken after Sunningdale to help strengthen the position of the power-sharing Executive in Northern Ireland and to help to improve the chances of Sunningdale being accepted. I believe that we did not undertake these. Sometime after Sunningdale I wrote to the Taoiseach congratulating him on the work he and his team had done at that conference and suggesting that in view of the very volatile political situation in Northern Ireland he should make some unilateral gesture on top of Sunningdale to strengthen the position of the Executive there after the agreement. I am sorry to say that no such unilateral move was made by us. We are under no legal obligation to make any such move but I believe firmly that if Sunningdale and if the power-sharing Executive had a chance it would have been immeasurably strengthened by such action on our part at that time.

Looking back, I think we can say that our fences down here were taken too quickly, that we set so much store by Sunningdale that we failed to see that an undue insistence on Sunningdale, that a legalistic leaning on the letter of the Sunningdale Agreement, was putting the whole power-sharing Executive in jeopardy. I think it is true to say that power-sharing has been sacrificed, it has been sacrificed on the altar of Sunningdale. In many important respects we are back further than the position from which we started.

One of the other realities with which we have to deal and with which I would argue other people have to deal is that we in the Republic of Ireland have a legitimate interest in conduct of affairs in Northern Ireland. This is all the more so and is largely based on the fact that a substantial number of people in Northern Ireland share to some degree the aspirations which is evident to a greater extent in this part of the country for a united Ireland. In so far as this aspiration in Northern Ireland is not treated as a legitimate aspiration and in so far as it involves any form of discriminatory activity against the people who hold it, then I think our claim to have a legitimate interest in the conduct of affairs in Northern Ireland must be sustained.

The third reality with which I should like to believe everybody involved must come to terms is that the unity of Ireland itself is a legitimate aspiration. It sounds strange to stand up in a House of the Oireachtas in Dublin and say this as if it needed to be said, but it is a legitimate political aspiration. While I stress its legitimacy, I think we must also accept that it is no more than an aspiration. For many people in this island it is not even an aspiration; it is something of a threat. We must beware of mistaking aspirations for concrete facts and that however much we may claim and proclaim our aspirations for the unity of Ireland we must not fall into the trap of thinking that it actually exists already in some concrete way which only needs to be uncovered in order to be recognised by all men of goodwill.

If anything is obvious after the events of the last few years it is that the unity of Ireland does not exist today. That unity is an aspiration. The unity of Ireland is something that will have to be created by long and difficult and dangerous work by public leaders generally.

I think we can say also to people of the Unionist persuasion in Northern Ireland that although they have done things that we would consider reprehensible in the past, that although they may in certain respects be doing things that we consider reprehensible in the present, we like to believe that there is a place for them in a united Ireland and that in so far as they may feel that our society down here is in need of improvement we can assure them that there are people in this society who want to improve it and who would be very glad of their help.

Here, I think, we should make an important distinction. There are Unionists and Unionists. There are at the moment, it is true, two Unionist political parties in Northern Ireland. There are very many more groupings who would consider themselves Unionists and I would deprecate any public statement by politicians, by newspaper writers, by whoever in the South, who would lock all Unionists together as if they were tarred with the same brush. People who do that are saying in effect to people I know in the North—those honest people, teachers, insurance salesmen, politicians, businessmen, trade unionists—"I see no difference between you and the people who are going in the name of some mystical Unionist ideal and who machinegun all the people in public houses. I see no difference between you and the people who are intimidating non-Unionists out of their homes. I see no difference between you and the people who want to wreck the Northern Ireland economy".

If we want to make things worse in Northern Ireland I think one of the best ways we have of doing it is to follow the pretence that all Northern Ireland Unionists are exactly the same, that if you scratch an Alliance man you find the UVF man under the surface. One of the most extraordinary things that has happened in Northern Ireland in the past few years has been the emergence of Unionist groupings which are by definition not allied to the wilder shores of Unionism except by their name, who are very often only looking for some sort of support from us in order to strengthen their position. One of the tragedies of the last few years is that we in the South have not given a slowly emergent minority the sort of helping hand they were entitled to expect.

Another reality to which I think I should draw the attention of the House is that we cannot and should not expect the British Government and the British people to do our dirty work for us. That has been a very traditional attitude in this country—it is Britain's responsibility, let Britain sort it out. This to me is a reprehensible attitude. Certainly Britain has a role in Northern Ireland. Certainly Britain has a role in the resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict and, by extension, of the Irish situation as a whole. I do not think anybody in Britain—least of all any British politician and certainly no British Prime Minister in the last five or six years—would deny these statements.

Yet we have people on this side of the Irish Sea who believe that all they have to do is to sit down and wait while Britain twists the arms of the unfortunate Unionists in Northern Ireland in order to frogmarch them into some sort of forced marriage with the Republic.

We say we are against force in the solution of the Northern Ireland problem, but the people who advocate the latter course of action are very definitely in favour of coersion. I know it is very difficult in politics to draw the line between coercion and persuasion, but to my mind many of the people who see Britain as the only effective agent in the solution of the Irish problem are guilty of asking Britain to use a degree of coercion on the Northern Unionist population which is not acceptable to people who believe in the need for consensus and for going about things in a democratic way.

This simply is not good enough. It is an abrogation of responsibility on our part and it is something which the British—for the information of anybody who might not be aware of it up to now—certainly will not do and is also something to which the Unionists will react even more strongly, I suspect, than they have ever reacted to any overtures from the South. They will react very strongly because they will suspect, and they might be right, that Britain is attempting to do this simply to be rid of them because they suspect that the case for unity on its own does not stand up. They will ask: "If the case for unity is so strong, why do we not see it? If the case for unity is so strong, we would have been united years ago".

Now, all right, there is a certain over-simplification in this attitude. There are people in the North who will blink for themselves to a lot of good things that are happening in the South just as there are people in the South who will blink for themselves to the several positive aspects of Ulster Unionism. But if the Unionists feel that they are being pressed down by Britain into a united Ireland, their hostile feelings towards the idea of Irish unity can only be intensified with disastrous results.

I believe that our policy in this country for the future should be more modest than the one adopted in the heady days after Sunningdale. I believe nevertheless it should have a thrust to it. It should have a momentum, but it should be more pragmatic, more cautious, more realistic, more ready to accept the changes needed in Ireland's society. In the long term, one of the best things we can do in order to advance the cause of Irish unity is to build a society down here of which we can be justly proud, a society that will attract the allegiance and the loyalty of people who at present may be hostile to or suspicious of it.

I think we should at this point realise that even though we have not got sectarian conflict in the Republic in the way that it exists in Northern Ireland, we do have crazes of sectarianism in our society still. We have in a sense tried to solve the Catholic-Protestant problem, which is an all-Ireland problem, by generosity. It is not so long ago since Deputy Lynch, when he was Taoiseach, answering a question on American television about alleged discrimination against Protestants and our educational system, said that there was no discrimination against Protestants in the educational system of the Republic, that we treated them better than we treated the Catholics. In other words, he was saying that the Republic discriminated against Catholics, and in a sense that is what has happened. We have attempted to allay the fears of our Protestant minority in the Republic by being overgenerous to them, but as Protestants, the fact that it takes three times as many electors to elect a Member of this House for the National University of Ireland as it does for Trinity College, Dublin, is a statutory and constitutional expression of this willingness to bend over backwards. The problem of bending over backwards is that it tends to institutionalise the divisions which should be removed. This is something we have not fully come to terms with yet in this scoiety.

The Senator has two minutes left.

The whole education system is a drastic example of this. We have institutionalised many of the divisions between Catholics and Protestants in the Republic by building them into our educational system. It is true to say that we have not treated Protestants too unfairly in our educational system but we have treated them differently. If we treat people differently because they are of different religious denominations we are to some extent, with whatever honourable motives, institutionalising the divisions we want to abolish.

Senator Deasy spoke of the need for integrated education in Northern Ireland. There is need for it down here as well, at least on an experimental basis. I welcome the remarks by the Leader of the Opposition and by the present Foreign Minister in the Dáil. It seems to me that limited experiments at first in integrated education in the South would be very warmly welcomed. It has been my experience from talking to my constituents that they would welcome such a development. It is now the moment to countenance any form of experimentation in this area. They are very substantially behind the goodwill and feeling of the majority of the population. They are not calling for a completely blanket new system of education. There is a need—in its own right— and a symbolic act towards resolution of the Irish conflict—for a gesture like this.

I believe the best contribution that we can make in the long term towards Irish unity is the reinforcement of those elements of our society of which we are proud and the improvement of those elements of our society which we think need to be improved and the creation of a society of which we can all be proud and which would attract the loyalty of the entire Irish people.

Listening to the debate on Northern Ireland it comes to one's mind that it is not immediately evident in the full extent of the implications what the problems that exist in Northern Ireland today are. It is not really evident to every Member of this House. Very often it is not evident to the public generally, even those who live in Northern Ireland and are closely associated with it in business or politics. Looking at the whole matter in that spectrum the Government are very often misunderstood in what appears to be their action in regard to the official attitude in this part of the country.

If we look back on the structure of the Northern Ireland entity we find that originally perhaps because of direct allegiance to the British Crown —the option was afforded in the Treaty of 1921 to the people of Northern Ireland to opt out—they took that right to opt out. Subsequent to that we had 50 years of one-party rule. We had 50 years when every son and daughter of a Unionist for two generations had the idea impressed on them that an unholy religous christian sect obtained in the South of Ireland and where the liberties of the people of Northern Ireland were likely to be curtailed, eliminated or tramped on if unity ever prevailed in this country. That is the unfortunate circumstances in which hundreds of young Protestants grew up. That is the notion that was fostered in their schools; it was handed down to them by the members of the Orange Order.

On the other side difficulties were presented to the sons and daughters of what we now call the minority in Northern Ireland. The difficulties then presented to these young people were that they would be denied employment in any responsible position in the administration of the country; they would be denied the right to participate as politicians in the Government of the country; they would not be allowed to have any part in the sharing of power; they would not have the right to be a member of the Government. What befell their predecessors and posterity for 300 years—this single-party sectarian rule —would be launched and continuously applied.

These are the circumstances under which the Government in Northern Ireland have worked for 50 years. It was a one-party Government—a resentful minority—which represented one out of every three people. People were denied the right to participate and the right to their national aspirations. The evidence of the application of that sort of thinking is very well-known to us all. That was made clear at various times of the year when certain excesses were indulged in. We all know about these things. We have at one time or another come close enough to experiencing them. The outcome of it all has been the "boilover" in the last four or five years of the minority sections of the community and the consequential efforts of those who had the one-sided administration embedded in their bones. The people who have been holding on to this sectarian type of Government put their feet on the ground and prevented any coming together or any recognition of a right to participation, or anything in the nature of a recognised standard of citizenship as was evidenced by the resentment that was expressed in opposition to Lord O'Neill when he was Prime Minister. He was thrown out of office and squelched immediately by the Orange Order because he accepted that injustice had been inflicted and unfairness on the Catholic minority and that they should have equal rights as citizens. He showed that he was going to promote something along those lines.

Later, in succession to him came Major Chichester-Clarke and he met with the same fate. We had violence and hatred to excess. I want first of all to condemn violence without any equivocation, whatever may be the justification of it. I condemn it wholeheartedly on every side and from whatever side it comes. It is the responsibility of the people of this part of the country to oppose violence as a solution to the Northern Ireland question. Violence became more serious and more than 1,000 lives were lost.

Then we had Sunningdale. We saw the efforts of the previous Government and the statesmanlike approach of the Leader of the present Opposition, Deputy Jack Lynch. We had a well-designed, smooth, purposeful approach in the light of all these circumstances to bring about something that would set up a situation where the minority would have a right to participate in power sharing and where everybody in Northern Ireland would be able to see themselves as being citizens of a society which was prepared to assert the right of its fellow man or woman. It was designed to show that because of one's religion, one's walk of life or one's social position one would not be barred from equal rights and proper opportunities to participate in the furthering of social and economic progress for himself, his family and his country.

We have seen that situation in Northern Ireland but when the Government set out to seize this opportunity we had the Sunningdale Agreement. There was then on the side of the extreme Nationalists a determined effort to break Sunningdale. It is significant that all the violence that sprang from the extreme Republican side came after the Sunningdale Agreement. From that side now we see no violence once the Sunningdale Agreement has been broken. Once we are back again as we were in so far as Northern Ireland is concerned in 1972 the issue appears to have cooled somewhat.

Earlier on we had problems. I want to say this in no disparaging sense but I am referring to difficulties which arose between ourselves. These were difficulties that created a problem that has not healed in 60 years. There was provision in the Treaty for Northern Ireland to come in but we gave them a great excuse to stay out because we were fighting a civil war amongst ourselves. That is past history. That is something that we must recognise as being a tragedy. It is something that was regretted by everybody who participated in it. I do not want to be the one to cast an aspersion as to who was responsible or to say that any particular person was responsible.

It is a tragedy that the Sunningdale Agreement could not be permitted to come into operation. The British Government which professed down the years to being the custodians of a structure of democracy that afforded everybody equal rights, that Government which masqueraded in every nation in the world as the custodian of democracy have retained for over 50 years a situation in Ireland such as I have just outlined. That same Government stood by and permitted in 14 days a revolt against law and order by which the complete structure of Sunningdale was swept away. In the aftermath of that revolt we are examining whether a structure may come out of what the Government are trying to achieve for us in these very difficult circumstances.

The Government have an extraordinarily difficult task in front of them. I believe they will be able to confidence in the application of their judicious opinion and consideration in relation to the Northern Ireland question. The bipartisan approach which has been characteristic of the attitude of the South to Northern Ireland should be retained and accepted. The bipartisan approach should be involved to the extent that the Leader of the Opposition might be taken into the confidence of the Government prior to any further deliberations in regard to Northern Ireland. Having gone that far on this occasion we will not be seen to be the voice of a majority party and a majority party only in regard to Northern Ireland. If we are seen to be the voice of all the democratic parties in this country then the British will not be able to say: "this is the voice of 50 per cent of the people; there are 50 per cent more—or 45 per cent or 48 per cent—that do not subscribe to this view, and therefore, it cannot be something that must be accepted by us British as the view of the various people".

I have absolute confidence in the Taoiseach and the Government to do the right thing, the wise thing and the appropriate thing. I would appeal to every politician to participate to the greatest possible extent in supporting the Government to achieve something for the people of Ireland. They should try to achieve something not only for the North but also for the rest of Ireland. I speak of peace in a big measure. I speak also of economic progress. They should try to achieve something for all the people of Northern Ireland, the majority as well as the minority, and to achieve a system of Government perhaps in association with British and Irish interests. We have to recognise that power sharing may be more restricted. We must subscribe to a unified view on the right of the Government—and only the Government of this country and not any section of the community who have taken to themselves the right to speak on behalf of the Irish people. We must accept that the Government have that right.

Let us hope that what will ensue from any of the deliberations that are to be pursued will be something that will bring everlasting peace where everybody, irrespective of what that person is, where he prays or where he lives, will be regarded as an Irishman with an equal right to our standards. I want to say especially, that the right of the minority in Northern Ireland to standards must be seen, guaranteed and supported by the British.

I have heard observations made about the difficulties here. I accept that a person of a particular creed may see difficulties. If I was of that creed myself I might see those difficulties. What is being said here in that context is a very poor echo of what is said across the Border. All our thoughts about what was wrong with our fellow Irishmen, North and South of the Border, should be put away forever. Let us pray that God will enlighten the Government, the politicians and the people of Ireland to make decisions that will achieve all the things we, as Irishmen and Irishwomen, hope for.

I shall be very brief because I realise that time is short and that the terms of the motion are very specific. The motion says:

That Seanad Éireann notes the criticial situation in Northern Ireland and requests the Government to outline its policy of reconciliation and the steps it intends to take towards a political solution.

I will confine myself as strictly as possible to the terms of the motion.

There are one or two crucial questions I want to ask of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. These are primarily concerned with Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, their role in the entire situation in Northern Ireland, our attitudes towards them and the possibility of the clarification of the Government's view in regard to our claim of sovereignty over Northern Ireland, whereas in Article 3 we are recognising the de facto existence of the State there. This is one of the things our politicians have strenuously evaded of late and it is one on which I should be very grateful to hear the Minister comment.

The situation that has arisen with measure up to it. We can have regard to Northern Ireland is really an extraordinary one in the sense that it went through an extraordinary phase that could be described in terms of a pattern beginning with the clamour for civil rights. This clamour for civil rights was put down by institutional violence. This institutional violence reached its crescendo in August, 1969, with the burning-out of 500 homes in the Falls. We then had the coming into being of the IRA, particularly the Provisional IRA, the arrival of the British Army, the intensification of hostilities between the British Army and the IRA and then the possibility of a truce and settlement thrown away by the total ineptitude of both sides, but particularly in that situation by the IRA itself. Next came the settling down to a vicious, horrible war and ultimately a strike caused by Britain's extremely callous decision, made by Mr. Health last February, to call a general election which had the effect of wrecking Sunningdale, which had been the one great hope and the one great diplomatic achievement of our Governments in five years. We had the failure of England to take on that other kind of violence caused by the strike and now ultimately the total reversal or return—and a far more malignant return—to the initial situation—a triumphant and triumphalist Unionism, and a Nationalist population that has been decimated, humiliated, frightened out of their wits by terrorists on every side. This is a situation which seems almost completely insoluble now and which elicited from the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs in the Dáil the other day, when the debate was taking place, a final statement that the only thing we can do about Northern Ireland is to leave it alone. This seems to me to have been a very tragic pattern, a pattern which has ended up in the bleakest possible impasse. This is the impasse to which our Government have to address themselves.

Side by side with that there was a series of policies—if you could call them that—or responses to the situation from the two Governments that have been in power since the beginning of that spiral of violence. It really began with: "We shall not stand idly by".

One phase of our policy could be defined in those terms. We had the placing of the field-hospitals near the Border and Dr. Hillery going to London and speaking about the cancer of Orangeism which would have to be rooted out before any solution could be achieved. At that stage we seemed to have a very genuine policy. We seemed then to have been quite aggressive in our demands for national unity and in our criticisms of what was happening in the North and of the inequalities there. It looked at that stage as if we were, in a sense, winning. The British Government gradually began to open their eyes to the situation and to accede to our requests in the matter. It looked, indeed, as if the Unionists themselves, particularly with the prorogation of Parliament and the White Paper, opened their eyes to the situation. At least it seems so to me now in retrospect. Hindsight is a luxury which I admit I can avail of, but the men in Government cannot. There is an unfair advantage involved in my speaking in this sense. At that time there was a rather aggressive, or at least firm, decision on the part of the Government in the South that they would not allow the Catholic population in the North to be humiliated, persecuted and murdered. Their firm determination was that they wanted unity and that there was a will to unity because it was a historic right and there was a geographical backing for it. They felt that justice was involved. Also behind it was the sense that we here in the South had formed what was certainly a civilised state, a peaceful state, and had done so in an extraordinarily short time. It was a state in which civil and religious liberty, for a young country recovering from a revolution, was unusually fine. I do not think there are very many examples in the present world to equal the tolerance and wisdom with which the State grew up, particularly in those crucial ten years of Mr. Cosgrave's Government in the early phases.

We had that kind of moral situation and we were pressing it. It was at that stage that the tragedy of our inaction struck us. The tragedy of that inaction was twofold. First of all, we had ignored Northern Ireland just as blatantly and as culpably as England had for 60 years. We had, for instance, committed the incredible gaffe of allowing three of the most depressed counties opening on the Border to look like derelicts in comparison with their counterparts on the other side of the Border. A Northern Irish Protestant looking south at Cavan, Monaghan or Donegal was looking at a kind of wasteland. If we had had the right kind of attitude towards the North and the proper will to unite them to us in terms of peace and of economic persuasion, those counties should have been the showpieces of the country; instead they were the most run down.

That is just a small example, but it is an example of how we failed to live up to the aspirations embodied in Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution and to our constant and repeated slogan of republicanism and of unity. I believe we have lived on these slogans for 50 years and that these slogans have not been held up to rational scrutiny. Now we are holding them up, probably at the worst time in our history to rational scrutiny.

Our policy changed then from that kind of fairly aggresive republicanism, that is in our sense that we should have an Irish Republic, a 32-county Republic. It changed then to an insistence on peace through reconciliation. I think this in a way is a kind of slogan in itself, because there seems to be very little real hope for peace through reconciliation. It seems to be a pious ejaculation really, which over and over again southern politicians keep repeating. It is very hard to be reconciled to a man who has his boot on your neck, to a man who really does not want to listen to you at all. Northern Unionists do not. This is a point that is being recognised. On the other hand, throughout the five years, the Catholic community in the North have increasingly been the recipients of the entire agony and suffering.

I am not laying the blame on any particular faction in this. For instance, clearly the IRA have to bear much of the blame. On the other hand there was a period in the early stages when most of the South were behind the IRA—take the burning of the embassy, Bloody Sunday. These were moments when huge flows of sympathy went towards them. In the fall of 1969 people were shouting "Where are the IRA?" It is clear that the entire curve of opinion has turned against them and, I think, very properly turned against them. The unique opportunities they were given to act politically were scandalously squandered. They and their opposite numbers, the UFF and the UDA in the North, have increasingly created the situation where rational discourse becomes almost impossible and where despair begins to supervene.

I often feel however that the kind of rhetoric that was used both in the North and the South with regard to the terrorists has been mistaken in the sense that, over and over again, you find politicians condemning them as animals, as pigs, savages and brutes. You get this endless rhetoric. In fact, many of them are very deluded fellows who got caught up in the whole affair during moments of great passion. I would much prefer the rhetoric of Bishop Cathal Daly, in the sense that he has addressed them in the rhetoric of charity. He has assumed that there are some good men there and that there is an underlay of Christian motivation. Among our politicians the one who has been most coldly vituperative towards them is the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs. I think we would achieve more by at least recognising that there may be some goodness there and that that goodness should be appealed to. Verbal violence begets violence. If I might quote from Menenius in Coriolanus he says: “That is the way to kindle, not to quench...” It seems to me there has been too much of this, and too much smugness in the matter. I would like to focus now on where the smugness arises.

For instance, what has been the role of Articles 2 and 3 in our Constitution? I am putting these points forward in order that the Minister may answer them and that we may get some clarification of policy. Could it not be argued that Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution represent constitutional violence? From the very beginning is that statement, as read by a Northern Unionist, not seen as an act of constitutional violence against his situation? I should like to know whether the Minister regards that as a fair or an unfair question, whether he thinks it is true or not. If it is true that these Articles of the Constitution are a kind of constitutional legalistic violence against the majority in the North, it means that that kind of initial violence has helped to beget their intolerance and their violence. Their intolerance and violence begot the intolerance and violence on the other side. Therefore I would call in question the right of a southern man, politician or otherwise, unequivocally to condemn anyone in that situation for being violent if he accepts that these two claims towards sovereignty are a kind of act of aggression. Personally I think that these two Articles are justified and ultimately I would like to see a united Ireland. But it would be a very sad situation if we were holding on to those two Articles in the Constitution because we did not have the moral courage to reexamine them.

For instance it seems to me implicit in what the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs is saying of late that we should get rid of these Articles. If there is any likelihood that the people of Ireland want to get rid of them, there should be a referendum on them very quickly. There is no doubt that, if they were got rid of, it would remove some of the heat in the North. I do not want to be misunderstood in this matter. I am not myself in favour of their removal. I am talking about a situation where all the blame for violence is being laid on one side in the South, whereas the South itself is not taking a good deal of the moral responsibility that perhaps it should take. If we do believe passionately that those two Articles of the Constitution should stand, then our policy should have been a continuation of the policy of Deputy Lynch when he said we would not stand idly by, or of Dr. Hillery when he spoke about the cancer of Orangeism. We should have continued that aggresive, firm pressure on the Unionists to bring about a more just society in the North and to establish our own consistent will for unity. That would have put into the hands of the English politicians and statesmen a far stronger weapon than they had.

Our constant lack of policy and refuge in pious ejaculations, so to speak, have made it very hard for England to make up her own mind. If our wish for unity was sufficiently strong Britain could constantly say to the Unionists in the North: "The South is a force to be contended with. We really cannot do that. Deputy Lynch or Deputy Cosgrave will not buy that. They are insistent on their historic claim to the integrity of the national territory." Instead, you have an uneasy triangle and field of force—the force in the North changing between the Catholic and Protestant causes, the force in England constantly responding to that fluctuation and we ourselves taking up what seems to me a weak and very ambiguous position in the whole situation.

My view is primarily the view that Ireland should be integrated. I believe that if we had extended that notion of developing the Border counties and if for the past 50 years we had set up the salutary links with Northern Ireland that we should have set up, there would not be nearly so great a problem facing us now. The fact is that the average Unionist in the North has hardly ever been consulted. By and large they think we are far more depressed and priestridden and far more theocratic and intolerant than we are. They think our gestures of electing Protestant Presidents is just sheer cynicism on our part. We failed in the peace offensive and also in the diplomatic offensive of the past five years. This brings us to a situation which seems to me dreadful: that the past five years have raised a generation of teenagers, men under 25, who have been imbued with the most poisonous kind of militancy. The two boys of 17 who were blown up by bombs the other day in Derry were 12 when this violence broke out. They have known no world except a world of violence. That is an enormous tragedy. It certainly does not seem to me to be the moment at which to disengage and say: "The less we say about the North, the better. Let the North solve its own problems. They want rid of us." We cannot shrug them off now. We certainly cannot shrug them off when we have been a party to the creation of that intolerably violent and terrible situation which exists there and which we have watched deteriorate in five years. Consequently I should like to see from the Government at this stage a most honest —they are a Government who claimed a moral position more than once— statement about Articles 2 and 3. I would like an answer to the question: Have Articles 2 and 3 down through the years played a large role in the trauma of Northern Ireland?

The final thing I should like to protest about is that there has not been much creative thought from the Government itself.

They are getting it from the Seanad today.

I should like to know the Minister's reaction to Liam de Paor's article in The Irish Times of 1st July. His analysis is a very good analysis. He says it is not just that the Nationalist people in the North are so passionately concerned with being part of a united Ireland; they are more concerned with not being part of Britain. It is not true that the Unionist people in the North are passionately concerned to be united to Britain; they are passionately concerned not to be united to the Republic.

If this is so, there is a logic that follows from it. Perhaps Britain and the South should express a positive and benign interest in creating a third state—call it Ulster or whatever you like—a state, he suggests, with a red hand as its primary national emblem and underneath it the other two, the Tricolour and the Union Jack. Suppose we expressed a mild interest in that and said: "Let us create that new entity and decide in the end whether it wants to go left or right. Let it have its own identity with a bill of rights and every possible financial and moral help from its two neighbours" What is the Minister's reaction to this?

That is what I said yesterday.

One of my greatest regrets is that I did not hear Senator West's speech.

It was one of the best ever.

I am certain it was. It seems to me that we need more than what the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs is at present articulating. Let us move away from it altogether. Do not exacerbate the situation. What we need is an extraordinarily creative interest in an affair in which, I think, we have been far more guilty than we have ever admitted. I think we have far more blood on our hands than we have admitted. Therefore, if that blood is to be washed away, we have to take an extremely creative interest in the whole situation in the North, one of the most tragic in the history of the world, where so many good people have been tormented, bent and twisted by an incredible eruption of violence, violence that seems ineradicable and that comes from sources that seem ultimately so simple. With that, I will end my remarks. I look forward very much indeed to hearing what the Minister for Foreign Affairs has to say.

In view of the time restrictions on us I have truncated my own speech to consideration of what I believe to be the immediate policy considerations that should exercise our minds in the next 12 months or so. I agree to a certain extent with what the previous speaker has said: that one of the first rules of policy is the acceptance of truth and the embracing of reality. Admittedly, it is not a very comfortable starting point and to many in the Republic it is politically dangerous and is therefore an unacceptable principium of policy. It is of no help to the solution of this crisis that those who describe cant as cant in this search for truth and who distinguish between reality and fantasy and who express truth openly and honestly as they see it, should be told to shut up. A society that cannot subject itself to the cold shower of truth breeds within itself the seeds of violence and in fact the violent overthrow of democracy.

Some of those who say "Shut up" to those who are expressing the truth and who are engaged in analysis or who express that sentiment more elegantly would be the first to suffer if there was silence and if, instead, the fires of fanaticism were constantly refuelled to an ever-increasing extent.

The second starting point for us in terms of policy must be the acceptance of the fact that on this island there are one million people who do not wish to be united with us politically. It is not a conspiracy inspired by Whitehall or financed or sustained by them. It is a sociological fact verifiable by common experience and supported by common sense. These people are prepared to go to quite extraordinary lengths to prevent political annexation by the Republic, including that of separation from Britain, if that should be necessary. We should recognise now that their primary loyalty is to themselves and their sense of separate identity. Any policy that begins by believing this feeling to be only a temporary aberration is, in my view, in itself an aberration.

Until quite recently much policy was posited on the proposition that there was no such thing as a Protestant backlash. Protestants, it was said, were so imbued with the philosophy of law and order that they would never step outside the law. It was said they could not organise; it was said they would never confront the United Kingdom Government. The myth that Protestants can be beaten or their backs broken by continued bombing and disruption underlies the military strategy of the IRA: in some mysterious way Protestants are seen to be less tenacious in their prejudices, their loyalties, and their aspirations than we or other people are.

The UWC strike and the recent bombs in Dublin and Monaghan have only too tragically countered that myth, and all forms of policy based either on violence within the North or coercion through sanctions imposed externally by the British Government must now be as dead as the victims of a bomb blast. The Protestants will not break any more than we broke under duress or coercion.

The third principle must be that peace in both parts of the island is the immediate and overriding objective now. To that end we must do all that we can to combat terrorism and to assist in restoring the fragile structure of power sharing because these two components underpin peace and they are interdependent. It is my belief that the on-going campaign of violence by the IRA following the inauguration of the power-sharing Executive destroyed the Protestant willingness to give time to the Executive to prove itself. For that reason with the security forces in the North in doing whatever is necessary to extirpate men of violence from our we cannot shrink from co-operation midst. There should be no reticence either about overt co-operation with them at any level in doing this.

Lasting peace cannot be created without a return to power sharing because Northern Ireland is not a political entity like the Republic or Germany or France in the composition of its electorate. The Westminster or the Paris model of parliamentary democracy is inoperable there. Any attempt to return to it must be clearly stated by our Government to be fundamentally unacceptable because it means the permanent exclusion of the minority from power, their reduction to second-class citizenship and it is the surest guarantee of continuing instability and recurring violence in the future. It is the road to anarchy and oppression. The only avenue towards peace—and it is not readily acceptable at the moment—is power sharing. In itself power sharing is not a unique or undemocratic system as the Loyalists would contend but neither is it a sure-fire guarantee of success.

Belgium and Holland have been suggested to us as analogies for Northern Ireland and their structures have been recommended for study and some imitation. Both have evolved complex constitutional arrangements to accommodate widely differing cultures and sectional aspirations but neither is infected with the cancer of hatred that eats away at the heart of Northern Ireland. As Bob Cooper said two weeks ago on RTE radio, we in the South do not appreciate the extent of hatred in the North or understand its political manifestation. The nearest analogy to the North of Ireland might not be Belgium or Switzerland but rather Cyprus, which is in itself a chilling thought. It takes hatred of the most vicious, venomous and inhuman variety to stab to death a man like my departed friend, Senator Paddy Wilson. It is no normal society in which this type of thing can happen and be repeated. It takes a hatred of a most vicious, venomous and inhuman variety to shoot two teenage brothers through the head and leave their bodies on a lonely roadside. It is no normal society in which that can happen. That, too, whether we like it or not, is a reality with which we must contend.

So, the fourth principle of our policy must be a commitment to search for a new formula for power sharing and that commitment has, in fact, been given. Some commentators have criticised the Government for having no policy, as they allege, in the aftermath of the power sharing collapse, as if some alternative to power sharing could be produced as a viable proposition. There is no viable alternative to power sharing if what one seeks is a political structure that reconciles to the optimum two fundamentally incompatible sets of aspirations. There is no alternative but to say: "Let us begin again." To say that and actually do that is, in my view, the firmest expression of policy since it repeats in the face of the greatest adversity a belief that power sharing is possible somehow, because in the last analysis what is good in the human spirit will triumph over evil and hatred.

Despite what was said by the previous Senator there is a very clear vision within the Government of what they consider desirable, of what they believe will work and of what they will not accept. There is also a haunting vision of what they fear might happen. There is no need for apology when one begins anew having been defeated once or even twice or three times. There is no poverty of policy when one tries again and again to achieve what one believes is desirable but which so far has been unachievable. Neither is there a change in policy when one plays for time consciously and deliberately in the belief that tempers must be cooled, particularly amongst the Loyalists, before one can resurrect the possibilities of power sharing.

Angry men will not engage in compromise and mutual comprehension which are the fundamentals of power sharing. The Loyalists are both angry and excited and triumphant at the moment. They are in no mood to be conciliatory or placatory. We who believe in power sharing are in the position of a boxer who has been knocked to the canvass and who gets up and back peddles from his opponent simply to gather the strength to renew the fight later. We are, as it were the Gene Tunney's of Irish politics. This hiatus in the evolution of power sharing must be used for critical self-examination as well as to discover where we went wrong so that the same mistakes will not be repeated next time. This, again, has occasioned criticism from some commentators at a time when they themselves should be involved in spelling out to the Irish public the options that are open to us now in the light of our first failure.

For example, the Council of Ireland concept was overburdened with significance and functions in the Sunningdale communique. I cannot claim to have been alert to that possibility at the time but I am conscious of that defect now. It became the focal point around which partisan fears of hard-core Loyalists could crystalize. Some of their political opponents spurred on this hostility to the Council of Ireland by describing it as a stepping-stone to Irish unity. Tactically the Loyalists should never have been given a rallying point but they were given it by the presentation of the Council of Ireland as the Trojan horse of Irish unity.

On the next occasion all-Ireland co-operation needs to be expressed in a less formalised relationship and the two sovereign Governments need to adopt, in my view, a lower profile in arranging and agreeing the final package. There has been currency for the idea that the two sovereign Governments could fix up the whole problem between themselves. Now there is a realisation that the primary actors are not the Governments in Dublin and in London but the political forces in Belfast, because neither London nor Dublin can impose a solution that has any chance of general acceptance in the North.

In future both Governments should lay down the limits of what is acceptable to them, should commit themselves to supporting fully whatever is agreed within those limits and they should act as catalysts in the discussions and negotiations but they should not be the high contracting parties which decide for Northern Ireland its own institutional framework. That, I understand, was the burden of the position recently advanced by the Taoiseach. It appears to me to be firmly grounded in a logical analysis of what went wrong last time. I do not understand how it can be translated into a policy of withdrawal from Northern Ireland, as has been suggested by some commentators. Clearly, there cannot be any policy of withdrawal from Northern Ireland even if one wanted it. As the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs has repeatedly pointed out, the two parts of this island interact on each other continually and cannot be separated from each other politically, economically or socially, although there is a prevalent Unionist myth that they can. They cannot.

Our future in the South is inextricably bound up with that of Northern Ireland. For that reason alone, even though assuredly it is not the only reason, there has never been any contemplation of a Chinese Wall policy on the North. It has been alleged, because there is a realistic reassessment of the Council of Ireland concept, that the Irish dimension is being dropped or minimised by the Government. To me, power sharing in the North is the epitome of the Irish dimension because it institutionalises the two political traditions in this island. It gives them equal recognition and it puts them in constant contact with each other within an institution. In such an arrangement the Catholic aspiration towards Irish unity is legitimised and the Protestant aspiration for separateness is recognised.

Power sharing, however arrived at in the future, means that the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy is rejected in favour of a structure that takes into government as of right those who aspire to Irish unity and whose range of vision encompasses the whole of this island. That, to me, is the epitome of the Irish dimension.

In my view the Council of Ireland belonged to the second phase of communal co-operation in the North. Power sharing comprises the first stage and on its success there can be built in an organic fashion the second and any subsequent phases which could ultimately result in inter-community reconciliation on an all-Ireland basis. One will grow from the other.

The fifth principle must be to extend as far as possible the period during which fresh negotiations take place on a new Administration in the North and the postponement for as long as possible of any Assembly elections there. If there were elections there now or in the foreseeable future the result would be a sweeping victory for the Loyalists and the decimation of the forces of moderate Unionism. There would be an Assembly with about 55 to 60 per cent majority in favour of the Loyalists. That majority would not accept the constraints of the Constitution Act and would reject power sharing with Catholics, with real living Catholics as distinct from the mythical breed that inhabit only their agitated minds. They would assuredly use the Assembly to elect their own Government, to legitimise their own security forces as we once did. They would begin to impose their writ where pressure of numbers would ensure that it ran.

East of the Bann virtually the entire Catholic population would be at risk. In the rest of the province authority would lie with those who could exert the greatest force and mount the greatest terror. It is a chilling scenario; yet I know that it is one that is accepted and anticipated in the circumstances I have outlined by sombre men, North and South of this Border.

Concern for the safety of the Catholic population east of the Bann is the sixth principle in my analysis of policy as it has been, I am sure, for the present and previous Governments. This overriding anxiety for the safety of these people who are hostages of geography places limitations on our policy here and on our expression of policy, because we must not do anything or suggest anything that would endanger 200,000 lives directly and every other life on this island indirectly.

As a corollary to that principle, but requiring independent expression, is the seventh point that we in the Republic do not have the capability to prevent massive civil disorder or communal slaughter should they happen in the North. We are enjoined not to admit this possibility publicly, although to his credit the Leader of the Opposition spelled that out explicitly on radio last Sunday. When we are told that we must ask ourselves which is the better course in the real interests of all the people of the North and indeed of the island—to pretend that we can act as their second guarantor in some police capacity, even in the Catholic ghettoes of east Belfast or north Antrim, or to tell the truth? It is better to tell the truth and so assist in the evolution of policies based on realities which will prevent a situation arising in which our bluff can be called, with tragic consequences all round. I know that the deepest failing which has dominated the mind of my party leader and of our party spokesman on the North, the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, has been the safety of these people east of the Bann and I know it is a consideration that dominates the mind of Gerry Fitt—and I know his mind very well, indeed. It should be the starting point of those who have substituted infantile posturing and calls for British withdrawal in the place of reason and, indeed, even common sense.

There remains in the end the attitudes of the two communities on this island cast by history into two different political entities, both of them threatened by forces whose roots go long back into history. Neither can expect the other to abandon or to dilute their aspirations. Our aspirations, North and South, towards a communal and geographic unity of this island will not be dampened by events or by time and our instinctive fellow feeling for the minority in the North will not disappear or diminish, but neither will the self-identification of the Unionists wither away. It is a task for statesmen rather than for politicians to create now the foundations of peace and eventual unity in the face of one of the most intractable political problems in the world today. I recognise such men in the present Cabinet and I am happy, despite criticisms, to repose my trust in them and in their policies.

First, I should like to join with several other speakers here in expressing my regret and disappointment that the Sunningdale Agreement was not successful. I think everybody agreed that it was an arrangement into which a great deal of thought and hard work had gone. It seemed to have every prospect of giving success in the future and of creating a reasonable atmosphere in the North of Ireland. Consequently it is most regrettable indeed that it was not given a chance to succeed. On the other hand, whereas we must regret the collapse of the Executive, we should not regard it as being a total collapse of the Nationalist situation in the North. There has been a tendency to over react in regard to the collapse of the Executive. It has not really changed the basic facts of the situation in the North. There remain 35 per cent, approximately, of the population who are Nationalists, who have their own aspirations and who have the strength which goes with the support of 35 per cent of the people. You have, of course, on the other side the 65 per cent who have other points of view and other aspirations. But my point is that we should not overact to the collapse of the Executive and in regard to the situation which has developed as a result of that collapse.

It is not correct to say that the Unionists are in any appreciable way stronger than they were before the collapse of the Executive. It is not correct to take the view that the power displayed by the Ulster Workers' Council, a power which they displayed in the strikes which took place, has radically changed the situation in the North. It is true that the strike was very effective on this occasion. But it must be remembered that the strike weapon is certainly, to say the least of it, a two-edged weapon, because even that strike caused economic disruption in the North. It has given an example of what can be done by this kind of weapon, but it has also frightened many people in the North as to the effect on the economy of the North of this kind of weapon. Should the strike weapon be used again it would cause economic chaos and if it were used twice or three times more, there is very little doubt that the economy of the North would collapse entirely. It can be regarded possibly, if this is not too dramatic, as something like an atomic bomb. It can be regarded as the ultimate deterrent. But it is not something that can be used regularly. Consequently, in so far as people talk about the Ulster Workers' Council and about the power of the unions to dictate terms in the North, it is not a realistic assessment of the situation. It is not something that can be used more than once or twice in the future if the whole economy of the North is to survive.

That being so I do not think we should overestimate the power of the extreme Unionists in the North and, on the other side, we should not underestimate the strength of the Nationalists in the discussions which will take place within the next few months. The Nationalists, as I say, have much the same voting strength, much the same power as they had before, and there should be no question of their going into discussions during the next few months on the basis that they are appreciably weaker than they were before the collapse of the Executive.

In discussing this matter we should try to distinguish between the aspirations of the people, the various factions in the North, and political arrangements. Aspirations are one matter; political arrangements, political mechanisms, are another matter entirely. The aspirations of the Unionists in the North are for membership of the United Kingdom and a return to something of the nature of a Stormont parliament. The aspiration of the Nationalists are for something with an Irish dimension and for power sharing. Everyone knows that these are the aspirations of the two main factions in the North. Nobody believes that they are going to change these aspirations. Nobody believes that the leopards are going to change their spots. In fact, if the Unionists stood up and said they were no longer interested in being in the United Kingdom, or if the Nationalists said they were no longer interested in the Irish dimension nobody would believe them. It would only cause suspicion. It would only cause complications in the situation and would hinder rather than help discussions.

In these circumstances I find it difficult to understand those people who are constantly suggesting to the Nationalists that they should abandon their aspirations and that they should abandon talk about an Irish dimension. It is not only the Unionists who are asking for this because we have certain politicians in this part of the country suggesting that the Nationalists should abandon their aims, abandon their aspirations, these are doing far more harm than good. They are doing something which is really inexplicable. It is, to say the least of it, most unhelpful in achieving some kind of agreement, some kind of acceptable political structure in the future.

It is rather curious that nobody expects the Unionists to abandon their aspirations. Nobody suggests to the Unionists that it would be a great help in achieving peace and stability in the North if they should stop talking about wanting to be in the United Kingdom, if they should stop talking about Stormont. Why is it all right for the Unionists to have their aspirations, to talk about their aspirations and to continually press for them, but on the other hand, dangerous and wrong for the Nationalists to talk about their aspirations without necessarily saying that they are insisting on achieving them immediately or achieving them in full? Rather than suggesting to the Nationalists that they should abandon their aspirations, I think it is important at the present time that these aspirations should be stated and that the Nationalists should hold fast to them as long-term aims. They should do that by making clear that they are quite willing to negotiate and make concessions in order to achieve some settlement appropriate to the present time.

There can be compromise on details but there is no necessity to make concessions on basics or on the question of what may be ultimate aims and aspirations. On the contrary, where there is any tendency to make such concessions, to suggest that Nationalists have changed their long-term aspirations or are now so weak that they no longer have any hope of achieving them, one finds the position immediately whereby the Unionists are insisting that there should be no further talk of an Irish dimension, where they are saying there should be no question of power sharing as existed in the Executive. This has gone so far that only yesterday we heard of John Taylor dictating to the Nationalists in the North as to what kind of party they may belong, dictating to them they may not belong to the SDLP; that they may belong to the Alliance—in other words, that they may belong to parties approved by the Unionists. This is an example of what happens where the Nationalists either state or seem to be agreeing that long-term aspirations have been abandoned.

Senator Lyons criticised Senator Lenihan for having no realistic approach to the negotiations on the future of the North. He said that Senator Lenihan's only pose was to wrap the green flag round him and adopt an attitude of 50 years ago. I think Senator Lyons must have misunderstood Senator Lenihan because what Senator Lenihan said was quite clear and I agree fully with him. We must in the present circumstances consider every possibility for a solution in the North. Every possible solution for a peaceful means must be examined. We must look if necessary, for new solutions. We must make reasonable concessions where these are necessary. Compromise will be necessary to stop the loss of life in the North.

It will be necessary to eliminate the appalling violence in the North and it will be necessary if we are to have lasting peace in the North. This is necessary and must be done. Where compromises are being made it is dangerous not to make them against a background where a long-term solution and long-term aims are clearly defined. Unless these long-term aims are defined and unless the aspirations of the Nationalists in the North are clearly defined then compromise can be dangerous. There must be something against which compromise and concessions can be measured. Unless there is a yardstick of this kind, unless on the one hand we say this is what we like and what we eventually hope to have, unless that yardstick is there to measure the concessions, concessions and compromise can merely be a slippery slope down which the Nationalists could go further and to which there would be no end.

It is very important at present that the Government and the Opposition in this country should give the SDLP every possible support and encouragement. That does not mean that one has to agree with everything that the SDLP say but basically they should be given encouragement. They are representative of the vast majority of the Nationalist people in the North of Ireland. They are extremely well-informed because of their connection with the Nationalist opinion in the North. They are both representative and informed. They should be and must be supported by the parties down here.

The next move in the North is not clear to any of us in this part of the country. The Government have not put forward a positive policy as to what should happen next. I am not saying that in a critical way. I mean that they have not put forward a clearly defined policy as to what the next step is. Because of the fact that no clearcut policy has been adopted it is all the more important that we should support the SDLP, that we should give them encouragement at least in the interval until we know exactly what they are suggesting and whether those suggestions are reasonable. The apparent attitude of some Members of the Government to the SDLP in recent times has been not only unhelpful but dangerously unhelpful at the present time. The SDLP in the years since they were formed have made very few mistakes. in their approach to the situation in the North. If they are given support and encouragement at the present time it is unlikely that they will make any mistakes in the future. Consequently we must not only encourage them but the Government and the Opposition must be seen to give them every possible support at present.

I would ask the House to put into perspective the aims and strength of the Unionists in the North. We constantly talk of a majority in the Six Counties but one must remember that although there are 1,000,000 people there who have strongly-held convictions and views about their future, opposed to that there are 3,500,000 in the rest of the country who have an opposite point of view and that there are 50 million in the UK who have expressed their views in Westminster very clearly. They have indicated their view that there should be a reasonable approach and solution to the position in the North—a solution which would entail an Irish dimension which would entail power sharing and which would entail a reasonable evolution towards a united Ireland by consent. Consequently, whereas the views of the Unionists must be given careful consideration and concessions must be made we should always bear in mind the perspective in which they are expressing their point of view.

We must always bear in mind that the vast majority—no matter which way it is looked at—of the people in this country, in the UK or in both islands combined, have expressed the views that the resolution should include an Irish dimension. It should include power sharing and entail a solution which would eliminate violence once and for all. This perspective must be borne in mind. It is not a question of using 53,000 people as against 1,000,000 people. It is a matter of keeping the perspective in view and bearing it in mind because there is far too much talk about the fact that there is a majority in the Six counties for a certain point of view. One must remember that that is a majority in a very small part of this country and a very small part of the UK and of the two countries combined.

In conclusion I would say that there should be less talk in the negotiations ahead. There should be less talk of our abandoning our aspirations towards a united Ireland. There should be less talk of the Nationalists abandoning their aspiration towards power sharing and an Irish dimension. There should be less gloom about the situation which exists after the collapse of the Executive. The situation is certainly disappointing. It is certainly one which will need a great deal of thought and it will be very hard to build anew on the wreckage of the Executive and the wreckage of Sunningdale. Nevertheless, as I said earlier, the basic position has not radically changed and there is no reason to believe that the nationalist position is significantly weakened by the collapse of the Executive.

There must be a great deal more thought and more willingness to compromise and more willingness to see the other person's point of view. That, of course, will have to come from both sides of the negotiating table. We must make concessions but these must be against the background of achieving, in the long-term some kind of united Ireland by consent and against the background of having in the meantime some kind of Irish disension which will satisfy those people who believe that this is something which must come. Everybody who looks at this problem in any detached way, with any objectivity, not only believe this is the long-term solution but are convinced that sooner or later —it may be very much later—it will eventually be the solution to the problem of partition in this country.

Such of this debate as I have listened to has been of such a quality as to make me feel extremely humbled in joining in the debate at all. I shall merely offer a few reflections stimulated by what I have heard here this morning but I do not claim any particular originality for these reflections.

We have a common case—being brought to the edge of a great catastrophe and we look fearfully to what the future may hold for all our people. We must ask ourselves how we have come to this edge, how we have reached this fearful stage. There seems to have been a note common to the speakers here today that this has been due to our failure as a people to recognise the realities under which politics must here be framed and the Government be conducted.

The outstanding reality which has led to what Senator Ryan said might be an over-reaction in Dublin which was overlooked, particularly by the leader writers in certain newspapers, that is, the reality of Protestant power, the reality and the danger of Protestant backlash. This was recognised by one particularly prominent Minister and I think he must be given great credit for recognising this.

We should ask ourselves why we failed to recognise this reality. Part of the failure was due to the very success of our winning, establishing, maintaining and developing successfully, Irish independence. We have tended to think that there was something inevitable about that success when, of course, there was nothing inevitable about it at all. That success was due to patience, constant acceptance of compromise, constant recognition of the daily realities we had in the building up of that independence. A fact which we now must look at and recognise and which our people are looking at and recognising is that nations have historic claims which they do not always realise. Our people have tended to think, our politicians have tended to think and have tended to teach the people to think, that there would not be real success for the Irish people unless in this island there was one Government, one State representing one nation. We tended to fail to recognise the political reality that there were those lying outside the Irish nation. Whether that political reality could itself be determined a nation or not is beside the point and a matter of academic consideration. There is nothing inevitable about these matters. There are ruins of States in Eastern Europe which conducted their affairs on the basis that their historic claims were due for realisation and would be certainly realised. There is built into this philosophy a weakness in relation to foreign policy which is a consequence of its very strength in regard to domestic policy.

Nationalism is a splendid instrument for uniting a people with a common memory, a common experience and a common hope but that nationalism tends to make the people blind about those who lie outside this experience and who do not share this memory and do not have this hope. Reality is now beginning to dawn on us and I must say that Senator Martin made one point which I thought valuable. It is related to our whole attitude to the IRA. We do not face the problem which we have in the IRA by saying that these people are murderers. These are not all murderers. These may be men having, as I believe, a delusion about the genuineness of the worthwhileness of their ambition but it is a delusion which has been shared by many others in this State since its foundation. It is partly connected with the fact that we have here tended to assume too much that force has achieved things in the past.

I wonder whether we should not face those honest people in the IRA who claim that force only can be successful in dealing with the British, by asking the IRA in their terms what has force, in fact, achieved. In their terms it has achieved nothing because all it has achieved is a State without legitimacy, a State divided, a State truncated, a State paralysed by the very philosophy which they subscribe to, that is the philosophy of force in relation to the realisation of the true unity of this island.

On this question of unity we have this whole question of reality. There is another reality—people who are now faced with the reframing of policy here have, helping them, a recognition of the reality of Northern Protestant power. They, too, must recognise the reality of the emotions, the reality of the political tradition which has been subscribed to by various political parties since the foundation of the State. They, too, must recognise that the restatement of this will be an immensely difficult task. The whole question of the nature of unity has got to be carefully considered and has got to be carefully reframed. It is a phrase that no man is an island. Well, no island is an island in the sense that there is no island which, geographically, necessarily implies political unity. What an island may be is an economic and a social unit, a moral unit. What it requires is the achievement of peace within that geographical area. There is no island which has any right—Senator Martin used the words "the historic right" but in these matters rights do not arise and the language is doubtful and extremely questionable and I ask Senator Martin to reflect on that particular point.

In this whole question of nationalism there are two elements which are causing great trouble for us. First of all, there is a mysticism, which is an inevitability about success. There is no human achievement which is certainly going to be brought about. There is nothing inevitable about it. There is no right to anything other than what you can manage to get in your pursuit of justice.

This question of the unity of Ireland is a unity which will be achieved no more successfully than the unity within a nation is ever achieved. It is something which is a constantly recurring ambition of any wise statesman to make the people experience, through unity, an achievement which is not always certain of success and which is never fully achieved. This is true also of the moral unity of this country.

With regard to the question of the objective and also the question of the means, we must make our people question their belief in the power of force in so far as it has brought about our achievements or brought about our successes. Our successes have been very great. Take, for example, the party system which is destroying Britain at the moment, which paralysed Britain in the attempted solution of its own great problem—the moral unity of the British Isles, the establishment of political ethia. This was caused by the operation of the party system, this curious ideology about the party system, which has been with great common sense rejected by the politicians of this country.

I will end by striking an optimistic note. I believe that the Irish are a very great political people. They have had amazing political successes in America. Much of the political achievements of modern America have been due to the work of Irish politicians. Politicians here have been very successful too. They have operated the party system immensely sensibly. If we in this country were faced with the problems that Britain is faced with today I do not believe that the two major parties here or the two groups that are in Government would be facing each other with hostility of the kind which is blinding British politicians at the moment and preventing them doing good.

The true politician is the man who recognises his daily reality, and among the daily realities that we have to recognise is the historic experience of our people who have been deluded by voices from the past, voices of the heroic whose heroism does not absolve them, does not discharge them from the delusion of their messages. "England's difficulty is Ireland's opportunity." The reverse is the truth. Many of these clichés are untrue. That no man can set bounds to the march of a nation is the message written up in O'Connell Street. Of course, this is rubbish, mystical rubbish, and it should be stated to be such by our people. One of the things that is valuable about the Seanad is that we can stand up and talk about this kind of stuff.

I hope The Irish Times will again this week attribute some of Senator FitzGerald's remarks to me.

The quality of this debate has been most marked. Having had the occasion to attend the debates in both Houses I will make no comparison because comparisons are invidious and would be, I think, out of order. All I can say is that this has been a remarkably fine debate. What criterion do I apply to it? In a way the underlying criterion I apply is that I look on these debates, and indeed on all that has been said here, from a curiously ambivalent viewpoint as someone half-Southern and half-Northern. All my life before I entered politics I suffered the frustration of hearing people wholly Southern talk of Northern affairs with what seemed to me to be a total lack of understanding of them and in a manner that continually gave offence to Northern Ireland and which widened the gap which was created in 1920 or 1922, according to one's historical perspective.

I went into politics with several ideas in mind and one of them was to make some contribution to the changing of public attitudes here. I do not think I have achieved anything in that, but the attitudes have changed, changed indeed because of the tragic situation, and changed enormously. This is visible in the debate here today. How little of the debate here today could have taken place five years ago? How few of the things would have been said? Let us be honest with ourselves. How few of us would have made the speeches we are now making? Would I have made the speech I am making now? I doubt if I would have spoken then in the terms I intend to speak in now. I think this is true of many others.

Somebody during the debate talked about recent change of policy or suggested that there was a recent change of policy. There has not been a recent change of policy but there was a fundamental change of policy in 1969 initiated in my own party and in the Labour Party at that time which joined with us and, I think, influencing the attitude of the Fianna Fáil Party, which for historical reasons had more difficulty in re-evaluating their policies but which over this period have tried to do so and have done so under the leadership of the present leader of the Opposition, then in Government and more recently in Opposition, with great courage.

That change of policy is the one thing that makes possible a solution of the Northern problem—that change of attitudes, the recognition that the old idea that it was Britain's duty to hand over the North to us whether the North wanted it or not was a disasterous, imperialistic, colonialistic type concept which could only produce the kind of reaction that one produces in countries where one tris to colonise or threatens to colonise.

That, thank God, is gone. Now we are facing these issues realistically. Because of that realism, expressed so well by so many speakers in this debate, there is hope and there is not the need for the total pessimism that some of us almost have been tempted to feel in recent weeks because of the turn of events at the end of May in Northern Ireland.

Senator Robinson stressed the need to see all this in a wider context. I thought that a very valuable point and I think it is one about which we need to think further. We tend to think very much in introverted Irish terms, but of course the problem of Northern Ireland is the problem of the whole of Ireland. The problem of the whole of Ireland is a great problem for the United Kingdom as a whole and for the British Government. The problem of these islands, posed by the situation in Northern Ireland, is a major problem for the countries of Europe and is seen as such. I know this because I have been talking to my colleagues who are the Foreign Ministers of other European countries. It is one which threatens European peace and which could become a very serious danger indeed and is seen as such in European terms.

It is right that we should look at this wider context. It is right that, as Senator Robinson said, we should consider how British policy is likely to evolve, given Britain's economic situation, given Britain's political situation. We should not look at our own affairs in isolation. We should try to see them in the wider context.

Senator Harte, I think, put the question of policy very clearly and pointedly. He spoke of the difficulty of simply producing a policy to order as if all we had to do was to announce a policy and all would be well. He pointed out that the situation is not one under our control. Therefore to suggest that all that is necessary is for us to have a policy as if there were no impediments to its execution, as if we could then go ahead blandly having announced and assumed that that would settle everything, is nonsense. This was a very realistic point and one which I think needed to be said.

There have been accusations of lack of positive thought but those who have spoken of that, in this House or the other House, have not validated their criticisms by importing into what they said very much positive thought. I would exempt from that criticism the Leader of the Opposition who in the other House endeavoured to put forward a number of constructive ideas, although, as I pointed out gently in replying to the debate there, the constructive ideas he put forward are ones which unfortunately are not likely to yield results in the short or medium terms. Meritorious though they were, and most of them were worthy of great support, they did not produce a positive policy likely to yield immediate results.

Therefore whatever criticism there has been of the Government in this respect is misconceived because in fact the Government have had the duty to give very serious and deep thought to the present situation, have thought out what they intend to do and how they intend to proceed in the interests of Northern Ireland and in the interests of Ireland and are clear on the line they must take.

There has been, I think, among the Government's critics an unfortunate confusion between three different things which are treated as if they were all one. First are the aspirations that we all hold; second, the objectives we pursue for the foreseeable future; and third, the presentation of our policy and the tactics to be employed. These are all put into one. Speakers in both Houses have talked as if the expression of an aspiration is a policy, whereas the presentation of a policy and the way it is put or not put at a moment in time is itself the whole of that policy. We must clearly distinguish between these three different things.

On the question of aspirations, all of us share an aspiration to Irish unity. Few of us perhaps could express in specific terms what the core and centre of that is. Few of us now, especially after the events of the past five years, are sure enough of what our considered aspiration is to put it in concrete terms, to say precisely what would constitute the kind of unity we regard as the ultimate objective. But we all share the feeling that in some form, at some time in the future, the relationship between the people North and South must be differently organised in a way that will be more harmonious, and that will mean we will be working for common objectives. Those who try to express this in constitutional terms have thought up different solutions. I do not think it is helpful to think in constitutional terms about unity at the present time.

Clearly what people envisage is a situation in which there will be great potential for common action—at one level perhaps common action outside this country in the joint interests of North and South; at another level common action at home in solving problems that are jointly North and South. I do not think we should go beyond that, as our aspiration. I do not think we can go beyond that. But that aspiration in some form we all share.

The expression of that aspiration, even the attempt to clarify it, is not a policy to solve the present problems in Northern Ireland. Indeed if we were to spend our time dwelling on this subject and discussing academically what we mean by unity and what kind of unity we envisage eventually, we would impede the achievement of the objectives that lie immediately ahead of us. No one, I think, believed that the achievement of unity is any of the senses in which people use that term is a policy objective attainable in the foreseeable future, and it is the foreseeable future we have to deal with at this stage.

If dwelling on these aspirations or defining them will stand in the way of achieving immediate policy objectives of vital interest—in the literal sense of the word "vital", life and death interests to the people in this island—then we should not dwell on them or spend our time promoting them or announcing that we hold particular attitudes in regard to this question of unity. Our job is not to satisfy ourselves and not to satisfy even the people who elect us by saying things we think may be popular with them on this subject. Our job is to say or not say just what will be conducive to achieving the immediate objectives that lie ahead of us of securing the peace of this country and the lives of people. Already lives have been lost in great numbers and will be lost in still greater numbers in the future if we do not tackle this problem constructively.

One of the speakers remarked that everything we say is parsed and analysed—parsed and analysed in a manner which would do justice to the text of scripture at times, rather than to the passing utterances of politicians. I am sure that all of us, speaking as we all speak ex tempore—we do not read out our speeches having written them out carefully and examined every word—must at times use phrases which in some way could be criticised by people who analyse them as closely as some of this analysis is carried out. But I think most of us are clear on what lies behind what has been said. Most of us know that it is not particular words that matter —it is the thought and intent behind them.

Let me now say what are these objectives which we are pursuing and in the expression of which pursuit we may not always manage to convey sufficient precision in our throughts. One of the difficulties in setting out these objectives and geting them across to people is that so many people, in the desparate situation in which they live in Northern Ireland, read what they expect to read and hear what they expect to hear. I have noticed, in listening to the account given to me in Northern Ireland about what people have said down here, that the account involves some kind of substitution of quite different words.

I have had to point out that so-and-so did not in fact say that, he said something else. "Oh, yes. I know that," and then they revert to using the words alleged to have been used, because in the situation the people are in, they have such preconceived ideas of what our attitudes are that even if one says and means the opposite to what one is alleged to hold, nobody will listen. It is very hard to communicate through this kind of barrier. Sometimes we fail to do so. Let me try to communicate now.

Our primary objective is peace. Our primary objective in Northern Ireland is the preservation of peace there, the return of peace. And because in Northern Ireland, and above all in east Ulster, those most at risk are the minority, our primary aim is the protection of that minority who are most at risk. Everything we do, say and do not say is directed towards that aim. There should be no question of abandoning that aim, no question of setting it to one side. On the contrary, recent events have convinced all of us that this aim is one in which we must be totally involved. No other consideration can stand in the way of this. Our whole hearts and minds and efforts must be given to trying to restore peace and trying to ensure the protection of lives in Northern Ireland —lives of Protestants and lives of Catholics. Because the danger is greatest for the Catholic minority in east Ulster, our particular concern must be for them, not necessarily because we share religion or particular philosophies with them, but because their lives are most at risk. As far as I am concerned, if the problem were one of a Protestant minority in Belfast surrounded by Catholics, I would feel just as desperately and just as strongly and be just as concerned as I am about the Catholic minority in Belfast at this time.

I recognise that in concerning ourselves with this problem, in deciding what we will say and what we will do and must say, at times people who are living in a state of almost despair may misunderstand our motives or our intentions. At times it is perhaps hard for us to convey our motives or our thoughts. Indeed there are times when, if one said everything one felt, one might do more harm than good. That has to be recognised.

Our objectives, given that situation and danger, are, first, to ensure that British policy keeps a steady even course and that it is not deflected from that course by recent events— that the aims of British policy as set out two years ago are maintained, that Britain's involvement is fully maintained with a view to achieving the twin objectives of power sharing in Government and an Irish dimension. That is the primary aim of Anglo-Irish policy at this time.

What of the North itself? Our primary aim there must be to seek to persuade the majority in Northern Ireland that this is the only solution that will work, the only one which will bring back peace to them and give them, again, the full share in Government which that majority are entitled to, just as the minority are entitled to their share. Our job is to seek to persuade them of this. This persuasion involves direct communication with them.

I think it was Senator McGowan who said that the Government should not send Ministers to the North to undermine the minority. An interesting concept, one fortunately not held by the minority, as he would know if he had had any acquaintance in the last few days with Northern politicians or indeed read papers or heard the Irish news. The fact is that the minority in Northern Ireland do recognise that it is only by our action with the British Government and by our attempts to get across our true policies and attitudes to the Northern majority that we can help to secure that position. We have to clear misunderstandings and reduce fears among the majority. That cannot be done except really by direct contact.

I know that our media of communications, newspapers and television, and occasionally The News-letter, may print a few sensible words from a Southern spokesman, but not terribly frequently. At times word can get through the media in that way. Frequently we can get through on television, The Belfast Telegraph and other papers. You can get your words across, but I do not think they carry the full conviction. That can only come from personal contact. Personal contact is something which we, with all our talk of a united Ireland, have sedulously avoided in the South in the last 50 years. Because of my own personal contacts and connections, constantly moving between North and South during much of that 50 years, I have always been conscious of that and frankly bitter about it.

Hear, hear.

Hear, hear.

Therefore, our first task is to clear misunderstandings and to reduce fears, to try to get across that we are not seeking to impose anything on them, to try to destroy some of the myths they have about us—myths that are unbelievable to us but real to them —like a group of Loyalists I met last year in a particular part of Belfast who told me with absolute conviction and allegedly from personal experience that there were three firms in the Republic which had notices on their walls saying "No Protestants need apply". I need say no more than that two of the firms were Guinness and Jacobs to show you the curious myths that exist in Northern Ireland. The hilarity with which I greeted the statement carried such conviction that I understand from my contacts they sent somebody down to see could I possibly be telling the truth that such notices did not exist on the walls of Jacobs and Guinness.

These myths and beliefs exist. They can only be demolished by direct personal contact and by creating trust and confidence. This we have not done and this is what I have tried to do and other Ministers and members of the different political parties here have tried to do in the last few years, both in Opposition and now in Government.

We must also get to grips with the political problem by talking to them directly about the political issues and by trying to explain to them the realities of the situation. There are very many Protestant political leaders in Northern Ireland who are totally unconscious of the reality, extent and economic significance of the financial links with Britain, who write these off and through wishful thinking ignore what, in fact, they signify for Northern Ireland. We can help to convey some-think of that reality but only by direct contact.

We can try to persuade them also on the issue of power sharing. When one discusses this with them it is interesting to see how defensive we sense they are on this issue. Certainly the people I spoke to showed no sign in conversation with me of any willingness to share power with the SDLP, but in the form and type of arguments they put forward I could detect a defensive ness which suggested to me a certain insecurity and uncertainty of their own position. Their argument is based on the idea that majority Government is the norm in democracy and why should they not have majority Government? They close their minds to the past and the significance of the past 50 years for the minority. They close their minds to the recognition that exists here, in Britain, throughout Europe and the world of what those years meant to the minority and they close their minds to the fact that no Government here or in Britain or, indeed, world public opinion would accept that there should be a return of one group to the perpetual exclsion of another.

The kind of speech reported in the papers this morning referred to by Senator Ryan in which John Taylor listed the parties to which Catholics might belong if they wished to share power in Northern Ireland demonstrates an attitude of mind which it is certainly difficult to get through to, but we must not despair of getting some measure of reason across. We have to help to make it clear and join with the British Government in doing so that there can be no solution to Northern Ireland that does not involve genuine power sharing for some time to come. Hopefully, that will not be necessary indefinitely. Hopefully, if power sharing can be got to work for a long period, as it worked so well for a short period earlier this year, then the political structure would cease to reflect the absurd divisions which are now basically religious in origin and which divide the people in Northern Ireland. Hopefully, a normal political system would emerge in which parties would not be related primarily to religious allegiance and as a result of which, therefore, it would not be necessary to have power sharing because with a normal system in which people belong to political parties bridging political differences the issue of power sharing would cease to be relevant.

Power sharing of course, is a system which by definition is temporary in character and would only last until a normal political situation evolved in Northern Ireland. For that period it had to exist, not with the people whom the John Taylors and others choose, not with the parties they choose, but with whatever group the minority choose to represent them. No one has the right to choose other people's leaders for them. That is a principle in politics which all of us at times find difficulty in accepting: we would all love to choose the leaders of other people's parties and decide whom we would negotiate with but we have to accept the reality that each group of people who would band themselves together for any political purpose must choose their own leaders and we must deal with them when they have been so chosen democratically.

The people who have been chosen as the leaders of the Minority in Northern Ireland are primarily the SDLP, a party with, as has been said in this House, an outstanding and extraordinary record in recent years because of the ability and wisdom of their leaders and because of the way in which they have been able to bring the minority of Northern Ireland, after that long period as second class citizens, to reverse the old sterile abstensionist nationalist policies, to involve themselves in politics and to stand up and be counted and seek their rights, democratically and not by force and violence.

That achievement of the SDLP is something which will stand in Irish history and no one has a right to say that the minority may not be represented by this party. The Members of this party hold the honourable aspiration that at some point in the future the Irish people will be united with the consent of a majority in Northern Ireland. They have a right to hold that view and the holding of that view cannot and must not debar them from a full share in the Government of Northern Ireland. So long as the politics of Northern Ireland are divided on a community basis, and only for so long as that is the case, power sharing will be necessary.

The third thing we have to try to get across, in direct contact as much as possible with the leaders of the Protestant majority in Northern Ireland in the different groups, is that there has to be an Irish dimension, not because we ideologically demand it, not to satisfy, half satisfy or quarter satisfy an aspiration of ours, but simply because living on this island together and sharing this territory, there are mutual problems—the problem of violence that overflows backwards and forwards and, at a totally different level, problems like animal and plant health which cannot be divided by any border.

With an institutional structure, with common churches—even Ian Paisley's church is an all-Ireland church—with common sporting organisations, a single Congress of Trade Unions and a single Banks Standing Committee, with all these institutions, to talk of one part of the country as being foreign to the other and to suggest that it is not necessary to find an edequate expression of this special relationship, is to fail to face reality.

In talking to Unionist leaders it is possible to put to them more directly than one can by indirect contact through the media the realities of this, to point out to them that within the European Economic Community there is, in fact, a new Irish dimension that did not exist before; that within this Community common interests emerged between Ireland, North and South, interests which are distinct from and at time opposite to the interest of Britain. This is something which did not exist in this way before the formation of the European Economic Community and our membership of it.

It is possible to point that out and get that message across, because some at least of these leaders recognise economic realities. It is possible, too, to get across to them that whatever was the case before 1969, certainly today the security problem in Ireland cannot be tackled without some new relationship of a kind that did not exist in the years before 1969, a new relationship which you will find expressed in measures such as the common law enforcement legislation.

These are realities which we can get across to people by direct contact so that we can try to persuade them to face realities that they will not now face. For the moment Unionists seem to set their hearts against power sharing with the SDLP. They will find out, it will take time, that this policy has no future and that there will be no such Government in Northern Ireland, no internal Government in Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom which will give them a monopoly of power. It is a harsh reality for them which they will have to face. We must help them to face it not by hectoring them but by trying to explain the realities to them and trying to get across to them why these things are necessary and why they will, in fact, be beneficial to them in bringing back peace and order and giving them back the voice they are entitled to and which they do not at present have in the running of their own area and in securing a constructive and beneficial relationship between North and South of a kind thas has not existed in the past.

This will take time. Time is needed now for the tensions to die down and for these realities to sink in. During this time we must not try to dictate the details of a solution. The principles are clear and we must make it clear that we stand by these principles.

The British Government must make it clear too that they intend to stand by these principles. Our determination and the British Government's determination must be given time to sink in so that the reality will be faced. While that is happening it gives us time to re-examine our own position, to re-examine how we order our own affairs and to consider whether in fact the way we order our own affairs is in the manner most conducive to good relations between North and South, to closer relations between North and South or to our long-term aspiration to unity. It is time to see what changes here would reduce tensions in Northern Ireland. The question of Articles 2 and 3 has been raised. I do not propose to comment on them because the all-party committee is considering them and hopefully will reach some view——

Before very long. Indeed, I think it has so determined. I hope that view can be a joint one. It would be of immense importance to the future of this country if a consensus could be found on changes here which express the genuine rethinking that has gone on in our country and provide a basis for a stronger and better relationship with the North.

It could well be that within the next 12 months there will be negotiations in which our ability to secure a strong Irish dimension and secure, of course, power sharing in Northern Ireland, will be strongly influenced by whether we have been able to find a solution to the psychological barrier posed by these Articles.

After all, seven years ago another committee of a similar kind found a formula they could agree on. I am not sure that I would regard that formula as necessarily satisfactory. I am not saying we should be tied to it by any means. On the contrary, we should probably look at it again. I do not think that anybody is entitled to get up and say it is impossible to reach agreement when agreement was reached on something. We must look at this again constructively. I hope something can come out of that which will be agreed.

It is enoromously important to preserve the bi-partisanship which has existed because of our concensus on the essentials of policy, a bi-partisanship which neither at present nor before March of last year prevented criticism by the Opposition of the Government in the way it handled things. It should not prevent that. It does not need to. That bi-partisanship means that we have been agreed on the essentials.

I hope it will be maintained. It should certainly never lightly be departed from. It should only departed from if at a certain point it emerges that the only way forward in the view of the Government and, perhaps, the majority of the Irish people in a way forward which one part of the political system cannot accept. I hope that never happens. It would be very serious if it did happen. Certainly bi-partisanship should not be lightly cast aside unless there were the most serious grounds and unless doing so represented, in the view of the Government, the only way ahead, the only way to peace and the only way to find a solution.

In the meantime I hope that we can preserve this relationship which, I think, has been of great value and which, as I have said, has fortunately never inhibited criticism of the Government by the Opposition.

Various speakers in the debate have raised issues in relation to education and other matters which raise basically religious issues. It is not customary for politicians to discuss these issues.

That is a pity.

That is the problem. We have been afraid of it.

That, perhaps, has been part of our problems. They have not been faced. The problems are, however, not purely political, they are partly religious. They concern the churches and they concern politics. As they concern the churches they concern each of us as individuals.

I must say that I cannot accept because I happen to be a politician, and at this moment a Minister, I should be precluded from expressing my view as to how my church should act in various matters. All of us have a duty as part of the churches to which we belong to contribute to the evolution of thinking in these churches, quite separately from the political sphere. Looking back over the record of the past five years I think that on the whole the political system and politicians have emerged with credit. We have re-thought our positions courageously. We have not on the whole—and this is true of both sides of the House—been impeded unduly by concern that we will lose support if we say what needs to be said.

The debate that has taken place on Northern Ireland has been, on the whole, of a high standard and courage in leadership has been given, sometimes in a remarkable form. I recall the rebate three days after the burning of the British Embassy. Senator Martin took the view that the majority of the Irish people supported the IRA at that time. I do not know what was in the hearts of the Irish people; I know what was in the hearts of the legislators—it was in that debate spontaneously and without hesitation. Every single speaker from all the three parties spoke in terms of moderation and of damping-down the anger that had arisen. They tried to hold people back and tried to re-establish the relationship that had previously existed with Britain and to prevent what had happened from standing in the way of a good relationship and, indeed, of a solution. That was a remarkable exercise in responsible action by politicians, not one of whom in that debate—apart from the four Independents who were there and who are now reduced to one—responded to the emotion of the occasion. Every one of those spontaneously and without any preconcerting between them gave leadership.

The record of politicians has, on the whole, been good. I do not feel, frankly, the record of churchmen has been as good. There have, of course, been frequent denunciations of murders and violence. There have been joint statements and joint appearances. These, however, are not enough. What people have felt as individual christians to be lacking has been the kind of leadership which would give witness to christianity and which would be concerned primarily with christian witness rather than with institutional positions.

Hear, hear.

I have often thought that the difference between politicians and the clergy is the clergy have security of tenure so that they can give witness to christianity without fear of losing their jobs. We have no security of tenure. Consequently, we must be responsive to the will of the people. That is as it should be. Both of those are as they should be. There is a contrast between, if I may say so, the courage of politicians in speaking out despite the danger of losing their jobs and at times the absence of christian witness in the churches. I know there are good reasons for this. I know that individual churchmen feel that their primary duty is pastoral care. They must concern themselves, especially in Northern Ireland, with those who are under their care. If they stand up and denounce uninhibitedly what is evil they may lose in some way the support and sympathy of their flock. On that they place a very high importance.

I felt—and I said this before in another place—that there are times when just as a politician must speak out even if he is going to lose support so the clergy need to speak out and act in a manner dictated by their duty of christian witness rather than by their duty of pastoral care.

In the institutional churches there is a defensiveness on both sides, a curious fear of the other, which is perhaps even more curious in the Roman Catholic Church in view of its size in the country than in the other churches which is divisive. As a christian, I have sometimes wondered whether the performance of institutional religion in being unwilling to shift its position in anything or respond in any way to any of the issues on which it has been dug in for so long on both sides, and this failure to respond, may not threaten christianity and christian belief in Ireland. I am an optimist; I think not.

Most Irish people may not feel they get the leadership they want in institutional churches but I do not think it makes them less christian. In fact, the remarkable thing about the last five years has been the way in which genuine christianity has emerged and the way in which people have been moved to act in a christian manner and to come closer together against the bigotry which has grown up. In this debate things have been said which could be denounced from pulpits as secularism. They were not motivated by secularism; they were motivated by christian love and concern. I think that that needs to be said.

Finally, as I must finish, I want to put directly to the two groups in Northern Ireland the message which I would like to give and the Government would like to give to the minority; we put your safety and your just treatment above all else. There can be no disengagement or disinvolvement. Our duty is clear. Everything we do or say or do not do or do not say must be directed towards that aim and will be so directed. If, at times, the reason for what we do or do not do or say or do not say is not entirely clear, I ask the minority to understand that that is the sole motivation in our action or inaction, in our words or in our absence of speech. To the majority: I say in trying to get the message across; we reject any attempt to constrain you into a united Ireland. We seek only friendship and common action in the common interest of this island.

If that can be understood and if they want to test us out on that, I think we will stand the test. If they test us they will find that we are willing to give practical witness to the fact that that is what we are after—nothing more or nothing less. The old idea that we could in some way constrain them to come into a united Ireland against their will, or commoner still and more ignoble still, perhaps, if we could get the British to constrain them for us which still exists in some minds has been exorcised from Irish minds. Apart from a small minority of fanatics, we are the victims of our history. The people of the Republic have no such feelings with regard to the majority in Northern Ireland. We seek only a friendship. We seek only common action in the common interest of this island.

I have pleasure in summing up this debate. I think I should say first of all, how pleased I am with the quality of the debate and the very many and varied contributions, views, suggestions and different angles which have been put forward. As I said on the three occasions on which I made a short speech trying to encourage the Government to have this debate, I think we have fulfilled our function. We have done something which could not be done in the political heat of the other House. We have justified our existence in dealing with this particular problem. There are lots of other problems we should deal with, but we have definitely done our duty on the subject of Northern Ireland. I have no question about that. I just would like to say that it has been made particularly easy and pleasant for us by having a receptive Minister, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. As we know, some Ministers are receptive in the Seanad and some are less receptive, to put it charitably. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has taken an interest. He shows he is influenced by the suggestions we make and he has responded to them and we are very grateful to him.

It is the "old boy" network.

Even though it is from the other University I think it is the "old boy" network. However, I think that there has been a commendable absence of the sort of bellicose statements which Southern politicians used to make, who had rarely been further North in this country than the bar of the Burlington Hotel. We are beginning to face realities more. Although we are not able, perhaps, to make many suggestions here that would change the course of events we can expose our feelings to those people who wish to know about them. Sooner or later—in fact, it is happening now—the Northern people—the majority and the minority —wish to know what we feel. What this debate achieves is that we put ourselves on the line. We express our deepest feelings, We show that we do not all agree, which is fine. Why should we all agree on a difficult situation like Northern Ireland? There should be a consensus, but I do not think there should be total agreement. We have shown this. We have shown sensitivity. We have put ourselves on the line. This is what this debate is about. This can be done in the Seanad by members of the various political groups whereas people could not put themselves on the line in the other House so easily without the fear of party point-scoring and political recriminations.

There is one pity about this debate and it is the timing. The British White Paper is due out this afternoon. My fellow-Independents and I, who have initiated this debate, when we have seen the White Paper, will consider putting down a further motion for discussion on this topic. The Seanad have shown this morning and yesterday that it is a body in which there should be constant reviews and discussions. When I say "constant" I mean with reasonable intervals between these reviews, discussions and debates, but at intervals which must be shorter than the interval since which we had the last debate, which was in August, 1971. That was the last debate on Northern Ireland. It was a rather restricted one. We should ask, in a courteous way, that the Government should give us the opportunity—and give themselves the opportunity which they have well-taken, I might say— of the Northern Ireland problem. We for constant discussions in this House can show the sensitivity here, but it is not so easy in the Dáil.

I should just like to refer briefly to the prospective contents of the British White Paper, and I would say there are some encouraging features about it. It is clearly going to differ from Sunningdale in that it is not going to be a British-imposed solution, which was the last solution. It is an attempt by the British Government to state certain basic conditions, and then say to the Northern people "you take it from here". I like that idea because the Northern people have got to be trusted. They have got to be given autonomy as I said. The only other thing I would like to say is what I have said already that the guarantee should be underwritten by both Westminster and Dublin in a political and, also in an economic way.

We should be bearing our share of the responsibility both for the political development and for the economic development. I would like to see our Government putting pressure on Britain to achieve this and to see that our role is even more fully acknowledged than this. The Minister did not refer to this but we can have further discussions on it. I think that is an important point that was made by Senator Martin. As I said, we cannot expect to have a hoped-for Unionist withdrawal from Westminster if there is not also a pull-back from the SDLP to stand on their own feet. They are a talented, brave political party who should be able to stand on their own feet and make their decisions independent of Dublin. As Senator Martin said and as I said already, we should be emphasising Ulster's identity. Let us set up a stable situation with a power sharing system in which we and the United Kingdom use our sanctions—particularly economic sanctions—to ensure that the basic guarantees are fulfilled and then let the North develop. I have no doubt myself in which way that development would come. It might be slow. I think we can expect slow progress, but it will come.

I would like also to refer to another point I made which I felt was missed by Senator Lenihan, who got the headlines this morning. I was a bit annoyed about that! He certainly got stuck into this "aspiration for unity". There is a danger here that personalities may become more important than policies. Senator Lenihan made a vigorous attack on the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs. In some sense the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs has this coming on him because of his venom in attacking the Opposition. We want to be very clear. The danger here is that we will start attacking personalities and not examining clearly what they have said. I would like, if I might, to put Senator Lenihan's remarks this morning in perspective. I apologise, a Leas-Chathaoirligh, I have to leave my place because the tome I wish to consult is so large that it will not fit into the normal reading position in front of me. I want just to read an article from The Irish Times. Senator Lenihan is reported in The Irish Times of 5th June, 1968, as saying that freedom for the Scots and the Welsh would be ill-advised. He advised them against any nationalist aspirations and he said if only the British Parliament had backed Gladstone and given his Home Rule a limited form of self-Government a lot of bitterness between this country and Britain would never have happened. It seems to me that on reading this celebrated statement that it is more moderate in tone than his pushing the idea of “aspirations for unity” last night. I aspire to unity. I think everybody in this House has shown that he or she does too. The manner in which one put this point over is crucial. He is indulging here in party politics.

The Minister for Posts and Telegraphs is also guilty of this. The idea which the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs is putting over is one worthy of reflection and real consideration. We share various different strands of feeling in this part of the country. It is a good thing to make these clear. We share this aspiration for unity. The point that the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs is trying to make is that there is no way at the moment in which we can create all-Ireland political institutions. We should get that out of our minds and begin to get sense on this particular thing. I see the creation of all-Ireland political institutions as a very far-off goal. It is not something we should be presently aiming for.

I would remind Senator Lenihan that the former Leader of his party, the late Mr. Seán Lemass, made progress by playing down the aspiration of unity and getting on with the concrete and realisable task of economic and social co-operation. He made the first real breakthrough. This was continued by the Leader of the Opposition when he was Taoiseach. We have got to realise, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs said, that it is not just the policies we hold but the way in which we put them over that is very important.

I support Senator Robinson's plea that something be done urgently about the all-party committee on the Constitution. It should either be sacked or else it should report within a short time. We have to tackle the problem of religious involvement in our legislation. The Minister has raised this. He was too charitable to the politicians and to the church leaders in my opinion. I quote from the most perceptive article I have read on the religious problem in this country. It was produced by Pro Vita Mundi. It was reproduced in The Furrow, volume 24, No. 9, September, 1973, and read:

On the side of the politicians in particular, however, there need be no illusion: no nettle has yet been grasped that was not already withered and none will be if not by them.

I wonder whether the nettles are withering or stinging in the Dáil this afternoon. I wonder how the plant is flourishing. This was written by Pro Vita Mundi which is a Belgian Roman Catholic organisation. On page 567 it talks about Orangeism. Senator Martin referred to Orangeism. As a Protestant I detest the manifestation of Orangeism probably even more than he does, although I must confess to liking some of their tunes. It talks about reviving the attitude towards the division and the Orange-extreme Catholic tension.

It would have to begin by recognising that Orangeism is a more truly derivative force than either its champions or the objects of its hatred could comfortably acknowledge; that in fact it draws its strength and its life from none other than its mortal enemy; that in certain respects it can be said to be one of the most natural (and in the local circumstances, perhaps inevitable) by-products of Roman Catholicism itself as it has been well or ill-known in Ireland and out of it for some hundreds of years. Just as Protestantism as a whole is a protest which could not have been made, much less sustained, if vast numbers of normally reasonable people had not thought they saw reason for protest, so Orangeism is a local version of that protest, drawing singular energy and virulence from singular circumstances not all of its own creation or of its own imagining.

Once it is seen historically that it is not possible to have this kind of Catholicism without provoking and reinforcing this kind of Protestantism (at least not within the tight circle of cause and effect which Ireland has inherited), the way is clear for asking more searching and more theological questions.

I commend this article on our religious predicament to all church leaders and politicians.

I greatly fear a breakdown in our bi-partisan approach. There should be more consultation. Deputy Harte in the Dáil debate and Senator Kilbride here made this point very clearly. There are constant rumours of breakdowns in consultations between the Leader of the Opposition and the Taoiseach. We must put the national interest before party and personal interests.

Senator Robinson asked for a revaluation of what we mean by unity. One of the things that would be a symbol of Irish unity for me—a very strong and meaningful symbol—would be when we could put into the field one soccer team that would win the World Cup.

The Minister talked about the problem of developing identity in Northern Ireland. The Minister and I, and perhaps some other Members of the House and Members of the Dáil, are supposedly spending the week-end in England—unfortunately—discussing this particular problem under the auspices of an association called the British-Irish Association. At the last meeting which I attended in Cambridge a bit of sanity was brought into the whole affair by Mr. Sammy Smyth who is a prominent Loyalist spokesman. He demanded that the association be called the Ulster-British-Irish Association.

Question put and agreed to.
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