I move:
That Seanad Éireann hereby disapproves of the Rules for the Government of Prisons, 1976 (S.I. No. 30 of 1976).
I am glad of the opportunity to urge this House to disapprove of the proposed amendment to the Rules for the Government of Prisons and so to prevent this statutory instrument from coming into force. I propose to begin by quoting the relevant parts of the statutory instrument. It is the Rules for the Government of Prisons, 1976, Statutory Instrument No. 30 of 1976, and provides:
1. These rules may be cited as the Rules for the Government of Prisons, 1976.
2. Notwithstanding anything in the Rules for the Government of Prisons, 1947, the Minister for Justice may, where he considers it necessary in the interests of the security of a prison or of the State and for reasons related to the particular person, direct that a person (including a prisoner's legal adviser)
(a) shall not be admitted to a specified prison or (b) may be admitted to a specified prison only on such conditions or in such circumstances as the Minister may specify,
and any such direction shall be complied with by the Governor of the prison concerned.
3. The powers conferred by Rule 2 of these Rules shall not be so exercised as to prohibit or restrict visits from so many members of the legal profession as to deny to a prisoner a reasonable choice of legal adviser and legal advice given by such adviser in the sight but not in the hearing of a prison officer
I believe that these proposed prison rules would allow a serious encroachment on civil liberties in Ireland, that they would undermine the independence of the legal profession and that they would confer on the Minister for Justice an arbitrary power which goes far beyond the particular problem which it is sought to resolve.
There are four basic arguments for rejecting these rules. First, I believe they are ultra vires the authority of the Statute they invoke, in other words, the Prisons (Ireland) Act, 1877. Secondly, they contravene Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which Ireland has signed and ratified—and there can be no derogation from Article 6 of the Convention—and they also contravene Rule 93 of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners under the United Nations resolution of 1955. Thirdly, they contravene the fundamental rights provisions of the 1937 Constitution, both in the way that they curtail the rights of an individual prisoner and in the way they affect the livelihood, professional standing and good name of the particular legal adviser who may be blacklisted by the Minister under powers exercised under these rules. Fourthly, these new rules would confer on the Minister for Justice a far-reaching and arbitrary power which goes much beyond the immediate ills it seeks to cure. The Minister would be judge and jury. He would be able to blacklist members of the legal profession and to curtail the rights of individual prisoners with no appeal from his exercise of this power, with no requirement of a hearing in the matter, no due process of law in relation to the exercise of this power. These are the four main reasons why I would urge this House to exercise its function and to disapprove these rules so they do not come into effect and do not become part of our law.
I propose to deal with each of these four grounds in turn. Firstly, the ultra vires argument. The Minister in the statutory instrument cites his authority for making the new rules, I propose to read this paragraph:
I, Patrick Cooney, Minister for Justice, in exercise of the powers conferred on me by sections 12 and 13 of the Prisons (Ireland) Act, 1877, (as adapted by the General Prisons Board (Transfer of Functions) Order, 1928) hereby make the following rules...
Therefore, the Minister clearly states that the statutory authority on which he is basing these rules, which is sections 12 and 13 of the 1877 Act. But there is nothing expressed in sections 12 or 13 which would confer any such power, and therefore the Minister is interpreting the provisions of sections 12 and 13 and I believe he is interpreting them contrary to the clear text in particular of section 13. Section 12 provides for a general power in this regard. It provides that the General Prisons Board— and now the Minister—may:
...from time to time after the commencement of this Act, by rules to be made in manner hereinafter described, alter or repeal the bye laws in force for the time being for the regulation of any prison and for the duties and conduct of the Governor and other officers of the said prison and for the classification, diet, clothing, maintenance, employment, instruction, discipline and correction of all persons confined therein and may repeal rules so made and may make new rules instead thereof.
That is a general, overall power to make rules relating to prisons. The relevant part of section 13 is subsection (2). Section 13 provides that the Minister may make and when made, may from time to time repeal, alter or add to special rules in paragraph (ii), it states:
...with respect to communications between a prisoner, his solicitor and friends so as to secure to such prisoner as unrestricted and private communication between him, his solicitor and friends as may be possible, having regard only to the necessity of preventing any tampering with evidence and any plans for escape or other like considerations.
Therefore the Minister has power to regulate the conditions in which a prisoner sees his solicitor; not to decide, as the Minister would try to do in these prison rules, who will be the solicitor in question, not the prisoner's solicitor but the Minister's designation of whom the prisoner's solicitor will be—"No, you cannot have a certain person; you may have anybody else or a restricted list of other people and if you wish to see people on a blacklist you must do so under conditions which contravene the minimum requirements for prison rules."
Not only is there no express power in either section 12 or section 13 of the 1877 Act for these prison rules, but I would maintain that the clear intention of section 13 is to guarantee that the prisoner will have access to his solicitor and friends but that there will be a power in the Minister to regulate the conditions to some extent but not to undermine the guarantee of unrestricted and private communication between the prisoner and his solicitor. I would maintain that the rules are ultra vires the particular section, that the Minister is trying by means of a statutory instrument to take unto himself very far-reaching powers—I will go into the nature of the powers later—without any express authority and in a manner which appears to go against the text of these two sections on which he relies and their clear intention that a prisoner will have access to his choice of solicitor.
Secondly, I should like to develop the argument that these rules are contrary to the European Convention and contrary to the United Nations Minimum Rules for the Regulation of Prisoners. The Convention is, of course, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which was signed and ratified by Ireland and the relevant Articles are Articles 1 and 6. Article I provides:
The high contracting parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in section 1 of this Convention.
and Article 6 falls within that section 1. It provides for due process for persons accused of a criminal charge. The relevant part of Article 6 is section 6 (3), which provides that:
...everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimal rights——
subparagraph (c)
——to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance to be given it free when the interests of justice so require...
"To defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing," not of the Minister's choosing, not of the choice of the Executive by blacklisting certain members of the legal profession but legal advisers of his own choosing.
I think it is ironic that this country is bringing the United Kingdom before the European Court of Human Rights for breach of the Convention on Human Rights in relation to treatment of prisoners, and yet in this House today we have a choice whether to disapprove or whether to approve of prison rules which contravene Article 6 of the Convention, which go contrary to the clear wording of Article 6 from which there can be no derogation. It must be emphasised that there can be no derogation from the Articles contained in this part of the section. Therefore, I think it might be true justice indeed if Britain brought us before the European Court of Human Rights for contravention of the Convention if we pass these Rules. I think it is nothing less than hypocrisy for us to bring another member state before the European Court and yet table in our own Parliament a statutory instrument which is in direct contravention of Article 6 of the convention.
I have also said that these rules would be in contravention of the United Nations resolution of August, 1955—the reference number is UN Document A/CONF/6/1 and X1 (a) —and it is entitled Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. This was a resolution adopted on the 30th August, 1955, of which Rule 93 is the relevant provision. It provides:
For the purposes of his defence an untried prisoner shall be allowed to apply for free legal aid where such aid is available and to receive visits from his legal adviser with a view to his defence and to prepare and hand to him confidential instructions. For these purposes he shall if he so desires be supplied with writing material. Interviews between the prisoner and his legal advisers may be within the sight but not within the hearing of a prison or institution official.
This is a clear statement of the minimum standards for the regulation of prisons, not the maximum but the minimum standards in a civilised society for the regulation of prisons.
The next line of argument against these prison rules is that they would appear to be contrary to the 1937 Constitution: contrary to Article 40, section 1, which provides that "all citizens shall, as human beings, be treated equally before the law." If one prisoner can have the legal adviser of his choosing and another prisoner cannot, then, I would maintain, that that is not treating vulnerable individuals, individuals who are in prison and who do not in any case have a full range of civil rights, equally among themselves, equally as a class before the law. Obviously, by the fact that they are in prison, prisoners could not expect to have the full range of fundamental rights which those outside prison have, but they could expect to have the same range of fundamental rights as other prisoners have. The invidious nature of these rules is shown by the fact that they would treat prisoners unequally in relation to their access to legal advice.
Also, I would maintain that these rules contravene Article 40, section 3, subsection (1), where the State guarantees in its laws to respect and as far as practicable by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of a citizen. In a case which I shall refer to later—the recent decision of the Supreme Court, in Walsh and McGowan against the governor of Mountjoy Prison—the Supreme Court accepted that the personal rights of a citizen included a right to legal advice and a right to be represented in legal proceedings. That case did not, in fact, turn on the constitutional issue which is before us; it turned on an interpretation of the prison rules as they exist at the moment. But a unanimous Supreme Court upheld the right of the two accused to their named solicitor and I presume that it is for that reason among others that the Minister has introduced this amendment to the prison rules which is before the House today.
The personal rights then include the right to a legal adviser, and I would maintain include a right to the named legal adviser if that named person is a legal practitioner, a solicitor or barrister qualified and entitled to practise in this country. That is the constitutional issue from the point of view of the accused, the prisoner and, of course, that is a very key perspective. There are also the constitutional rights of legal practitioners in this country and indeed the issue of the independence of the profession. The Minister by taking power to blacklist legal practitioners undermines their capacity to earn their livelihood; he undermines their professional standing; he undermines their good names. He does so, as I say, as judge and jury of the issue. There is no hearing; there is no opportunity for the barrister or solicitor in question to defend himself, to put up an alternate case to counter the arguments of the Minister. It is the Minister's opinion which is the final determinant, and the effect is to deprive a solicitor of full scope in earning his livelihood, to undermine his professional reputation in a very serious way indeed without any due process of law, without any rights to any hearing, without any recourse once it is done. If these rules come into effect and a prisoner is barred from having access to a named solicitor that named solicitor has no recourse from that. He has no way of vindicating his innocence, of establishing that the Minister is quite wrong in any opinion he may have that there is a security problem involved.
Therefore, I think this is very far reaching and that it is contrary to the personal rights of the citizens under the Constitution, and contrary to the guarantee that all citizens should be allowed to earn their livelihood as far as the practitioner is concerned; tantamount to depriving a person of his professional reputation without any hearing and depriving him, to some extent of his livelihood, without any opportunity of being heard in the matter. It is contrary to natural and constitutional justice to that extent. Fourthly, I believe that these rules would give the Minister an arbitrary and invidious power which goes beyond the particular problems which the Minister is trying to resolve. I believe that the power is much broader than what will be argued to be necessary to cope with the particular security risks. The power is one which allows the Minister to exclude certain legal practitioners and to limit the choice of prisoners as to the legal advisers which they may have. It becomes a permanent part of the law of the land if it is approved by the House today and comes into effect after the passage of the relevant time.
The individual who is deprived of his choice of lawyer will have no recourse. The facts that an individual is told: "No, you cannot have Mr. So-and-So as your legal adviser" presumes that the particular prisoner was going to abuse the relationship with his legal adviser either to pass out information or in some other way, and it is very hard to see how this is compatible with the presumption of innocence. I will come later to the security problem, which I acknowledge, but I think we must be very careful that we do not give as wide and as potentially arbitrary a power as this in circumstances where it could and might very well be abused in operation.
Having said that there are these four lines of argument on which the prison rules could be challenged, I should like to look at the background and at the motivation for bringing in the particular rules. The Minister will have an opportunity of giving a more accurate and fuller account of his motivation in bringing in these prison rules and I will have an opportunity then of replying to the points he makes. I should like to make it clear at this stage that I agree, and indeed all Senators would acknowledge, that it is a very difficult time in Ireland, that there is a serious security situation, that our democracy is to that extent at risk, that these are not "normal times", that it is a time when certain measures which would not be desirable or acceptable in so-called normal times have to be introduced. I fully acknowledge that fact, and I have sympathy with those who have responsibility in relation to security in Ireland at present because the problem is extremely difficult and extremely serious. However this is also a time for vigilance, a time for care that our civil rights are not unnecessarily eroded, that they do not become—as they might have with these prison rules—eroded without our knowing it. These rules might have gone without any debate in either House; they might have gone by default and have become part of the law of the land. Therefore, we need vigilance and we need to distinguish carefully between the steps which can and should be taken which are different from what would be acceptable in normal times. For example, anybody travelling on an airplane now submits to searchings, to body searches and restrictions. He does so in the knowledge that these are necessary, that they are part of the world we live in now. I do not believe that the problem which I shall discuss more specifically necessitates the exercise of the sort of discretion, the wide power which the Minister is looking for in these prison rules.
Indeed, if the Minister were to examine seriously the Prison Rules, 1947, there would be a great welcome in this House for a substantial reform of the prison rules. In his judgment in the McGowan and Walsh case, the Chief Justice, Mr. Tom O'Higgins, made this point. He felt that the prison rules should be amended and reviewed after being in operation for nearly 30 years. I would endorse that. The unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court on the interpretation of the rules as they stood at the time of the Supreme Court decision—and as they are now prior to this order possibly coming into force—was that the existing prison rules guaranteed the right to an untried prisoner of access to his choice of legal adviser provided that the govenor of the prison gave permission for him to see the legal adviser; (a) he could see his own named legal adviser and (b) he could see that legal adviser as provided in Article 210 of the Prison Rules, in the sight but not in the hearing of the prison officer.
The real danger of these new rules is that they would encroach on these two essential guarantees which are contained in the minimum rules and which are part of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. It is clear from the proposed new rules that the Minister might either ban a person entirely, or, alternatively, impose the condition that the consultation would take place in the hearing of a prison officer.
If we acknowledge, as I freely do, that there is a very real security problem with our prisons at present, a high security risk and so on, what then are the alternative measures which the Minister could have taken instead of the proposed new prison rules? First of all, it would be open to the Minister to initiate proceedings to have a solicitor struck off, or if it is counsel, to have counsel disbarred and then the appropriate procedure would take its course. It has been claimed that this procedure is cumbersome and slow, and so it should be, because if a solicitor is struck off or a counsel disbarred it deprives somebody of their livelihood. It is right that there should be deliberation about this; it is right that there should be a hearing and that the person involved should have an opportunity to present his case. What is wrong with these prison rules is that the Minister could short-circuit all those protections and ban a person from exercising his livelihood, from being a legal adviser, without any of these safeguards.
Secondly, the Minister could prosecute, for breach of the prison rules, if there is evidence of such breach.
Thirdly, if there is evidence to justify it, the Director of Public Prosecutions could charge the particular legal adviser with offences under the Offences Against the State Act—for example, if there is a charge that the level of involvement is such, with the offence of membership of the IRA, with possession of incriminating documents, with whatever is the appropriate charge in the circumstances. This would result in a full hearing in open court, in the necessity to present evidence and the necessity to establish the particular allegation.
Apart from these possible alternatives in the form of bringing charges against somebody whom it is alleged has contravened the ethics and code of his profession it is unnecessary to say that any practising barrister or solicitor must deplore the fact that it could be alleged in Ireland that barristers and solicitors may have, in the opinion of the Minister, been in breach of their professional code. The Minister would get the support of the House for measures such as, for example, the erection of a total physical barrier between a legal adviser and the high security prisoner. As it is, legal advisers visiting security prisoners submit quite voluntarily to being searched because they understand that this is one of the necessary requirements of the present time. So it would be open to the Minister to have a total physical barrier erected between a prisoner and a legal adviser through which they could communicate in the sight but not in the hearing of a prison officer. This would prevent any passing of documents or other matters which it is alleged may have taken place.
It is through measures of that sort that the Minister might have coped with the problem. Although it is a serious problem, although it is one which must particularly concern both branches of the legal profession in Ireland—I know they have expressed concern as they have expressed great dismay at these proposed prison rules—members of the legal profession would co-operate with the Minister and would welcome proposals which were not arbitrary and invidious in the way these rules are, proposals which would not allow for blacklisting of members of the legal profession, which would not allow differences between individual prisoners so that these prisoners would have their rights to their own choice of legal adviser curtailed, they would have a right to only a second or third choice of legal adviser under the conditions specified by the Minister.
The real problem is that this amendment to the prison rules gives a power to the Minister which goes far beyond the admittedly serious, but at the same time relatively uncommon—let us hope—problem of what is alleged to be a breach of the professional relationship between a legal adviser and a prisoner.
The Minister mentioned on a radio programme over the weekend that possibly three persons were involved, but at the same time he is seeking enormously devastating powers; he is seeking powers which genuinely could undermine the independence of the whole legal profession. If a barrister or solicitor is representing somebody in court and is not satisfied with the evidence, or wants to create a fuss in the interests of his client, will he be deterred from doing this out of fear that he may be put on a blacklist because he has created a disturbance and a nuisance to the authorities? I am not alleging that this Minister or any Minister would deliberately do this, but it is within his powers under these rules because the powers themselves are so far reaching.
I believe that at a time of great difficulty such as this in Ireland we need to approach the problem in a very different way. We need to reinforce the democratic structure and the democratic laws of the State. We need to create respect for our laws, respect for our prison rules, respect for the way we treat prisoners. This would go a long way towards genuinely improving the security situation. The time is ripe for radical new prison rules which would treat prisoners in a much more humane way, which would improve the access across the board to legal advisers. The general experience of legal practitioners is that it is far too difficult to visit prisoners—bureaucratic inconveniences are put in the way, letters may not be replied to, appointments are made for a particular hour and senior counsel sit around for two hours in the waiting room in Portlaoise with no explanation as to why they cannot see the person they have been briefed to represent. It is too difficult for prisoners to get access at present to their named legal advisers and I would urge this House, for the four points of the argument I put, to disapprove these prison rules.