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Seanad Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 6 Jul 1976

Vol. 84 No. 10

Adoption Bill, 1976: Second Stage.

Question proposed: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

Before the Minister introduces this Bill, may I raise one matter? We have this afternoon in this House passed through all Stages, two quite important Bills. I would ask that the Minister not ask for all Stages of the Adoption Bill this evening. It will be preferable, to have time for consideration of amendments, to have a separate Committee Stage. I would welcome the Minister's view on my introductory remark.

The Senator is aware of the urgency of this Bill to cure the position revealed in recent court proceedings. The urgency arises from the need to cure that position, but even more importantly to reassure people who are needlessly worried because of that decision and who think it might affect them when there is no chance of it affecting them. It arose from what was probably an unique combination of circumstances and consequently there is no need for worry. Nevertheless, the worry exists, and that is why I am extremely anxious to have this Bill on the Statute Book as quickly as possible. I appreciate what the Senator has to say and I am aware of her interest in this subject. Perhaps we could start the Second Stage debate without committing ourselves to when we will take the next Stage. As the debate goes on, the Senator might like to have it finished this evening. If she has strong objections, I would certainly give way to her in regard to having a later Committee Stage. My anxiety is to have the Bill law as soon as possible.

I would ask the Minister to consider that request also. I think it is unlikely that the Second Stage will be finished this evening, and if it is finished at all, it will be only a matter of a few minutes before 8.30, so I think we could have the Committee Stage tomorrow.

As the House rises at 8.30 p.m. we will have the Committee Stage another day.

In a case decided early in June the Supreme Court declared an adoption order made in 1971 to be invalid and awarded custody of the child to its natural parents. The court decided that the board had not discharged the statutory onus that is on it to be satisfied that the mother of the child was informed of her right to withdraw her consent to the making of the adoption order up to the time the order was actually made. The fact that the board did not ensure that the mother was aware of what in one of the judgments is called the date of the hearing was also criticised by the court. The point also arose that the mother did not know or may not have known her rights and that she was entitled to know them.

The Chief Justice in his judgement emphasised that the combination of factors in the case decided by the Supreme Court was very unusual. Nevertheless, some of the defects on which the decision of the court was based may have been present in some of the adoption orders that have already been made. The intention of the Bill in this regard is to validate all of the orders concerned to the extent that they may be invalid by reason of the defects in question. I hope, therefore, that the Bill will be accepted as an adequate response to the immediate problems that have been raised. The Bill, as introduced, was designed to do no more than this. It was of necessity prepared quickly to meet an urgent need.

The first substantive provision in the Bill, section 2, is that—provided a consent was duly given—the board shall be deemed to have discharged the onus I have mentioned notwithstanding that it had no evidence that the persons who gave their consent were aware that they could withdraw it at any time before the adoption orders were made or that they knew the dates on which the board proposed to make the orders. I might add that the board's practice not to seek information in respect of these matters was based on the assumption that it was unnecessary for it to do so. A further provision in the Bill, linked with the first, proposes that the fact that a person who gave consent to the making of an adoption order was not aware that he could withdraw it up to the time the order was made or was not aware of the date on which the board proposed to make the order or of his right to be heard by the board shall not invalidate the order.

As regards future cases, the problems that arose in relation to the case recently decided probably could be completely avoided by changes in procedure on the part of the board but the difficulty is that the changes in procedure that would appear to be necessary if the board were to be sure that it was fully complying would be changes that virtually everybody involved in adoption work would undoubtedly regard as very undesirable. Consequently, the Bill has to authorise the board to adopt procedures which the present law, according to the court's decision, would not allow. The main difficulty arose from the obligation which, on my reading of the judgments, the Supreme Court consider lies on the board under the existing legislation to inform a consenting party of the date of the hearing. I think I should explain at this juncture, that there are, in fact, no procedures before the board at which the various parties to an adoption arrangement are present or represented. The board's practice is, first of all, to scrutinise the formal documents namely, application form, consents, and so on, and then to seek and study various social reports on the placement. These include reports from welfare officers who have visited the home, and so on. Towards the end of the procedure, all going well, the board interviews the prospective adopter or adopters. This interview takes place in all cases. If any other interested person has indicated his wish to discuss the case or if the board wishes to interview some other person, the interview takes place on a separate occasion. The board, for obvious reasons, wishes to maintain this practice. The intention is to permit the board to continue its practice in this regard but section 3 provides for the giving of additional information to persons who consent to the making of orders.

Section 4 provides that the board may authorise suitable persons to make inquiries on its behalf and may act on the basis of their reports. It would appear from the Supreme Court decision that it is not sufficient for the board to have before it the sworn affidavit of consent and that, even if the consent from were to show on its face that the person giving consent fully understood the nature and effect of an adoption order, and of the consent—including the fact that he or she may withdraw the consent— it would still be necessary for the board to have that fact confirmed independently.

The provisions I have mentioned are intended to deal with the problems raised directly by the decision of the Supreme Court. There are, however, two further provisions which deal with wider issues connected with adoption orders and determination of custody. Section 5 provides that in proceedings for a declaration that an adoption order is invalid, the High Court, having regard to the interests of the child and to the rights under the Constitution of the persons concerned, may decline to make the declaration if it so thinks proper, and section 6 is intended to ensure that if, nevertheless, in a particular case an adoption order is declared invalid, no order relating to the custody of the child will be made without adequate notice to the adopter or adopters and then only on the basis that the decision will be made in accordance with the provisions of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, which specifies that the welfare of the child is to be the first and paramount consideration.

I accepted a suggestion made in the other House for the inclusion of a provision relating to the status of adopted children. As appropriate provision which has nothing to do with the Supreme Court decision has been included in the Bill as section 7. It has been thought prudent in a number of enactments, notably under the tax code and the social welfare code to stipulate that an adopted child shall be regarded as the child of its adoptive parents for the purposes of the Acts. Section 7 will render this provision unnecessary in future legislation. A further proposal which I introduced in the other House by way of amendment is contained in section 8. This section proposes that if an application is made to a court for the disclosure of information in the board's records, or in the index kept by an tÁrd Chláraitheóir which makes traceable the connection between entries in the adopted children register and the corresponding entry in the register of births, the court may make an order granting the application only where it is satisfied that the best interests of the child concerned require that such an order be made. As far as I know, this situation has never arisen in practice.

As I mentioned already, this Bill was primarily designed to do no more than respond to the immediate problems raised by the Supreme Court decision. I recognise that there are other areas in the field of adoption that merit consideration but I think that the present Bill serves a useful and necessary purpose. I should like to remind Senators that I have announced that the Government intend to bring forward proposals for an amendment of the Constitution to ensure that in any adoption situation the best interests of the adopted child shall prevail. This is intended to ensure that no matter what the facts of a case may be, the interests of the child alone will determine whether or not an adoption is upheld. I am not, at this stage, in a position to give particulars of what the proposed amendment will contain. I ask the House to give its approval to the Bill.

I believe that there is no reason to go into all the details of the Bill before us because it is well summarised where the Minister has said that the intention of the Bill in this regard is to validate all the adoption orders concerned and finally in the last paragraph where the Minister said that the interest of the child is of primary importance. This is a very excellent explanatory memorandum. Already all sections of the community have welcomed the fact that the Minister has acted so rapidly in bringing this Bill before us. It retains the main objective which we went through in the various debates in 1972 and 1974, that is, to the extent that the good of the child takes precedence over everything else.

We all regret the circumstances that have brought about this Bill, and with the Minister, I sympathise with the adoptive parents who have been greatly upset and worried since this verdict from the Supreme Court. Indeed, some of these parents who are excellent people have been greatly hurt by reckless statements to the Press and reckless articles in papers that do not show up the Irish people in their best light. The very fact that the public have reacted so spontaneously to this case is in itself a tribute to our adoption bodies. Here I would like to pay tribute to all these voluntary bodies, both Catholic and Protestant, who have given such wonderful service down through the years. This fact is admitted by the Adoption Board's report, which tell us that 80 per cent of adoptions are arranged by adoption societies. I know that health boards also arrange for some adoptions but girls in trouble favour the voluntary agencies more than any other source.

I must refer to statements that have been made and the criticisms we have seen in papers. I suspect these criticisms have been made just because there is a nun and a priest involved in this adoption case. At present many people and groups in our society avail of every opportunity to have a crack at both nuns and priests who served nobly in the fields of adoption and education when very few of these who are so vocal today were in the least concerned about either adoption or education. The nun and priest in question were two highly qualified and widely-experienced people. I deplore the fact that, while their names were not mentioned, they have been dragged into this in the way they have been. The court itself paid tribute to the way the case was handled before and after the woman's pregnancy. I cannot understand why that situation was not highlighted in the media.

I have here before me something that I deplore and I am very sorry that it is a woman Senator who said it, that in this country adoption societies are like adoption factories and are operating as such. It is most uncharitable and uncalled for and it cannot be substantiated.

I was glad to learn recently that a survey will be done on adoptions to date. I hope it will cover the mothers who did not consent to adoptions and opted to keep their children. When we spoke about the adoption code here in 1972 and 1974 we all admitted that it was one of the finest pieces of social legislation that we have on our statute books. Nothing has happened since to change our opinion of that.

Every section of our society has been worried about the Supreme Court decision. I welcome the Bill because it is designed to give more precision and strength to our adoption boards and societies. I am also glad that there is to be a constitutional amendment and if there are any more loopholes in the adoption code I am sure the Minister will take immediate steps to close them. I wish to pay tribute again to our adoption societies and to deplore the fact that they have been described as adoption factories which is most unkind and unfair and cannot be substantiated.

We must ensure that once an adoption order is made it may not be challenged within a specific period, say six months, without the assent of the Attorney General. Everyone believes that a limiting clause like this is necessary because of the uncertainties that might be there for adoptive parents. Many thousands of children have happy homes from adoptive parents. In every society you have people who do not conform to accepted standards. We have this in our families; there are family homes that are not all that they should be. I do not think everyone should be slammed because of the exception. I am glad the Minister has acted so promptly and I think everyone in the country is thankful to him.

I just want to say a few words on this. This Bill really comprises a very natural and worthy reaction, but necessarily a very hasty reaction, to the Supreme Court decision referred to. Within the time available to them, and having regard to the fact that the reaction was necessarily a hasty one, the Government and the Minister have done an extremely good job in the preparation of this Bill. I do not think the Minister claims—and I am sure the Government would not claim—that this Bill is or can be the last word on adoption laws or procedures in this country. The Bill must be regarded in the context of the concluding sentences of the Minister's introductory statement where he referred to the fact that the Government have also decided to introduce a Constitutional Amendment Bill which, of course, will come for discussion before the two Houses of the Oireachtas.

I have, in one sense, a reservation regarding the Bill and the constitutional amendment but I think the provisions which are written into section 5 of this Bill meet the point of view which I have in mind. It is very important that we should regard the family as the primary and fundamental unit of society. That is laid down in the Constitution. If we are to have a healthy society, we should continue to give primacy to the family unit. At first when I read this Bill and saw the proposals in it, I could see all the justifications for the various points that were urged on the Government following the Supreme Court decision. I wondered if a declaration in the Bill that the rights of the child concerned were to be of paramount importance and if a constitutional amendment designed to bring about that situation in relation to adoption would not give rise to something in the nature of a conflict between what I believe is the ordinary Irish concept of family life and the family unit as the fundamental unit in society, and the position of adopted children.

I felt that the position of the adopted child should be viewed in the general family context, in the context of the welfare, not merely of the adopted child but of the family unit of which, by reason of his or her adoption, he or she has become part and this was a question I certainly could not—I do not believe anybody could—give a glib answer to. It is a deep question and one, to my mind, for very weighty consideration.

In section 5 of the Bill the Minister has provided that an adoption order shall not be declared invalid by a court if the court, after hearing any person who, in the opinion of the court, ought to be heard, is satisfied (a) that it would not be in the best interest of the child concerned to make such a declaration. If it were left simpliciter there it would mean that virtually the sole deciding factor would be the question of the interest of the child. The section goes on to provide in subsection (b) that it would be proper, having regard to these interests— that is, the interests of the child—

...and to the rights under the Constitution of all persons concerned not to make such a declaration.

Subsection (b) coupled with subsection (a) does take into account the kind of thoughts and concepts that are important in Irish life, important having regard to what I might describe, without appearing to be nationalistic or chauvinistic about it, as the Irish view of family life.

Having regard to the urgency of the matter and the haste with which they necessarily had to deal with the situation the Government and the Minister have done a very good job in a short time in trying to allay the fears of adoptive parents and remedy a situation which, through no fault either of the natural parents or the adopted parents—it is certainly no fault of the child in the case in question and I feel quite sure, having regard to the Minister's speech, no fault of the Adoption Board—came to light in this case. The Government have done a good job. I would like then to see the next step being taken where we can consider the question of the Constitutional amendment.

This is the third Adoption Bill to be debated in this House in the last four years. The first was a Private Members' Bill— the Adoption Bill of 1971 put forward by Senator John Horgan, Senator Evelyn Owens and myself— which was withdrawn in June, 1972, because of the Government promise to bring in legislation. The second Bill was a Government measure—the Adoption Act of 1974. The third Bill then is this Bill arising out of the particular tragic circumstances referred to by the Minister and by other Senators.

I share deeply the concern expressed by the Minister and by other Senators to have the position with regard to adoption clarified and the law amended. The particular tragedy of that case evoked horror and dismay that our adoption law could lead to a situation where a child, who had formed a family relationship with an adoptive mother and father, would now be taken out of that environment and returned to natural parents who had not seen the child for five years. This shock and dismay have rightly prompted the introduction of urgent legislation to correct the particular deficiency and to amend the law. However, it would be wrong for us to regard the need for change in adoption as confined to responding to particularly serious symptoms when they occur from time to time. I am afraid that there is a danger, because of the urgency of the present situation, that it will be treated as one particular, difficult symptom to which we must quickly respond and then feel confident that otherwise the situation is all right and there is no necessity to delve deeper. There is every necessity to delve deeply and to examine, with responsibility and with great seriousness of purpose, the reasons why we have an adoption law which could lead to such a tragic event. How was this possible under a system of adoption on which we apparently prided ourselves? We have certainly had successive Ministers for Justice and a number of Senators priding themselves on having "the best adoption system". How was it possible then that there could be such a tragic circumstance which shocked not only the public in this country but also shocked people outside this country to discover that our laws could lead to such a situation?

Like other Senators and, as the Minister has stressed, I am aware that this Bill is an urgent one. I am personally very aware of the heartache, the apprehension and the sleepless nights that are being suffered by a very considerable number of adoptive parents and prospective adoptive parents. Because I have been involved in trying to get reform of adoption law I have been more aware than the average Member of this House of the situation relating to adoption and of the particular problems, such as they are, in regard to our adoption system. I am very substantially aware of the vulnerability of the whole procedure and of the necessity for clarity and certainty and humanity in our adoption law. However, that sense of urgency and seriousness should not prevent us from considering responsibly and seriously and in depth the adoption system we have and whether this particular Bill is an adequate response to the immediate case and an adequate response to the general need for reform.

I am glad to see that a good part of the public reaction to the Supreme Court case was to reinforce the fairly-widely held view of those involved in adoption work that there is a substantial need for reform and not just in regard to adoption but in our general law relating to the rights of children. I am glad to say that those involved in the community take a broad and serious attitude towards the need for reform. The viewpoint has been very well expressed in a proclamation on children's rights. This proclamation was sponsored by an organisation known as "Children First" and supported by other organisations. It was adhered to by a very considerable number of voluntary organisations concerned with the welfare of children and by a large number of individual members of the public.

I would like to put the text of this proclamation on the record because I think it is a background against which we should consider this Bill and any future legislation to amend the Constitution in this respect.

The proclamation reads as follows:

We the undersigned, representatives of organisations concerned about the welfare of children, on this National Children's Day, June 13th, 1976, demand that the Government take necessary action to ensure maximum protection, security, and happiness for the children of the State.

The United Nations' Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959) states:—

"The child shall enjoy special protection, and shall be given opportunities and facilities, by law and by other means, to enable him to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually, and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity. In the enactment of laws for this purpose, the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration."

We demand that legislation be introduced to provide that, in any case in which the care and custody of a child is at issue, the welfare of the child shall be the first consideration. In the event that the enactment of such legislation is thought to be repugnant to the Constitution, the Government should take steps to have the Constitutional issue decided, and, if repugnant, to make the appropriate Constitutional amendment.

Special attention must be given to the following matters:—

1. The interests of a child require that he receive continuous, loving care in a family. He should remain with this caring family, and it should get support where necessary. Particular attention should be paid to helping single parent families.

2. The State must protect the interests of a child whose family cannot or will not provide the care he needs. To this end, a comprehensive child care system incorporating adoption, fostering and residential care must be provided. Each child should receive the care that is appropriate to his own particular needs. Legitimate children should not be precluded from adoption.

3. In order to support family care, the State should ensure that its policies with regard to income maintenance, housing and education should take account of the special needs of children, particularly deprived and handicapped children.

4. Children should not be accountable under the criminal law. Any system for dealing with young offenders should protect their interests and take account of their needs as children.

5. In any situation in which a decision is taken about the welfare of a child, he should have appropriate representation in his own right.

6. The Government should give priority to the implementation of the recommendations contained in the Interim Report of the Task Force on Child Care Services.

There was a recent letter in the national newspapers giving an indication of the degree of support; something like 28 to 30 broad based countrywide organisations have signed this proclamation and have lent their names and support to its implementation. Therefore, although we discuss this Bill against the background of one particular tragic case, we also discuss it against a background of an increasing pressure and call for reform in our law relating to children. There is a very serious onus on us in this House to be aware of that public disquiet on a much wider basis than just in relation to the Supreme Court case, and of the need for broad based reform on the lines emphasised in that particular proclamation.

I should like to consider now the particular case which gave rise to the fact that we have an Adoption Bill before us today. In that case it appears that the Supreme Court found that the Adoption Board had not discharged their legislative responsibilities in ensuring that there had been real consent to adoption by the unmarried mother in the case, and that the adoption order was null and void in the absence of that real consent. The Adoption Board had not expressly informed the single mother in those circumstances that after she had given her consent by signing the appropriate form she could at any stage, before the adoption order was finalised, withdraw that consent. Neither was the single mother informed of the date of the hearing in relation to the adoption proceedings.

The Chief Justice, in the course of his judgment, of which I have only been able so far to read to newspaper report, is reported to have said that this was a most unusual case but, in fact the practice and procedure adopted by the Adoption Board in relation to those two matters was the standard adoption procedure. It was standard practice not to inform the single mother that she could withdraw her consent at any time before the adoption order had been completed and it was standard practice not to inform her of her right to appear at a hearing. It was not an unusual case, it was an overall finding by the Supreme Court of an inadequacy and an imbalance in our adoption code. Hence the necessity for emergency legislation: first of all to validate existing adoption orders, secondly, to cater for the situation of adoption applications in the pipeline and thirdly to provide for the future in relation to this type of procedure.

It is important to focus on that element of the situation, the fact that the practice condemned by the Supreme Court of not ensuring the real consent of the single mother was the standard procedure by the Adoption Board in discharge of their responsibility under the Adoption Acts, 1952 to 1974. I think the Adoption Board felt that they were discharging, in all good faith, their responsibilities under those Acts and their role and function in relation to adoption. I think the members of the Adoption Board are as conditioned as are the vast majority of the people of this country and also Members of both Houses of the Oireachtas, by the broader Irish society in relation to the whole question of adoption and of the position of a single mother who wishes to keep her child. Since 1952 I think there has been a very decided imbalance in our adoption procedure and the board only reflected this imbalance in implementing the legislation and procedure. They have discharged their responsibilities carefully and with due intent to perform their functions properly, but they are totally conditioned by that background.

The recent decision of the Supreme Court only highlights this imbalance. It does not create one single anomaly; it just highlights a continuing imbalance in our procedure. The reason for the imbalance is that since the original Principal Act of 1952 was introduced there has not been a serious fundamental appraisal of the whole system of adoption, of the position of the single mother or of a child who may be going to be adopted. There has never been a proper fundamental appraisal of the rights and interests of all parties concerned and of the appropriate and proper approach of society to these problems. Despite the urgency of this Bill and the fact that some of us have been involved in this House for several hours this afternoon on other legislation—it being that time of year—I think we should take time to carry out that fundamental examination.

What are the basic principles underlying a just and fair adoption procedure? I believe it is necessary for us to identify them and to promote them in the legislation. The first principle is the welfare of the child. When the last Government Bill was introduced, the Adoption Bill, 1974, I moved an amendment in this House, and I was supported by Senator Horgan, to insert a section into that Adoption Bill which would provide that the welfare of the child was the paramount consideration. Although the Minister had not shown very much enthusiasm for the proposed amendment on Second Stage of that Bill in that he felt it was not necessary, he nevertheless accepted it. I venture to think that he is probably glad now that he accepted that amendment and had that section written into the 1974 Act.

That assertion in the statute is a guidance to a court when exercising jurisdiction to interpret the law. It was not sufficient, as we saw, in the case of the particular, tragic recent Supreme Court decision to prevail upon the Supreme Court to place the welfare of the child in a paramount position, probably because of the constitutional provisions, which do not appear to place the welfare of the child in the same paramount context. Saying that the basic principle is the welfare of the child and writing in a provision to the 1974 Adoption Act to the effect that the welfare of the child should be paramount in adoption proceedings is not sufficient. The welfare of the child must be predominant in deciding on what will be the future of that child. That child must not be discriminated against by a choice of its future. This point brings me to one of the neglected aspects of the subject, not so much of adoption procedure but of the single mother with her child who decides that it is in the best interests of her child not to place it in adoption.

At present, because the welfare of the child is not the paramount principle there, that child will be disadvantaged legally and disadvantaged economically and socially. If the mother's conviction is that she should keep her child with her and bring it up in her family context, her child will suffer the slur of illegitimacy, the legal disadvantage of illegitimacy. The child will be at a considerable social disadvantage in our society and the single mother, like any other single parent with a child, will have economic difficulties in providing for that child. We have not yet got a society where the first principle has been safeguarded, namely, that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration. If we had that principle, then we would have a different sort of attitude, both towards adoption and towards the single mother who keeps her child.

I think things are moving in that direction. There is a great deal more sympathy and understanding of the aspirations and of the role of a single mother with her child. Some very encouraging evidence of this attitude was shown by a contribution to a seminar in November, 1975, by CHERISH, the organisation of single mothers, in a speech by Dr. Éamonn Casey, the Bishop of Kerry, on that occasion. The seminar was on helping the unmarried parent and child and it was held in Cruises Hotel, Limerick on Sunday, 2nd November, 1975. At that meeting Bishop Casey referred to attitudes towards the single mother with her child. I quote from a Press release issued by Bishop Casey, which incorporated his interpretation of his remarks at that meeting. Under the heading "Attitudes" he says:

There has been always an ambivalence on the part of society and the Church to the unmarried mother. On the one hand they responded in charity to the needs of the unmarried mother and her child but on the other hand they did not want to appear "too accepting". Evidence of the response of the Church is clear in the many Religious Sisters who devoted themselves to this work by establishing and running homes for the unmarried mother and setting up adoption societies. He wished personally to pay tribute to those Sisters and to the Adoption Societies without whose help he could not have resolved the difficulties of the hundreds of unmarried mothers who came to him in his Pastoral work. He wished also to pay tribute to his many fellow priests both in England and Ireland to whom nothing was an inconvenience when contacted to help in these matters.

There was also, however, a hesitancy to appear too accepting lest it might (1) undermine moral standards, (2) threaten the stability of the normal family, (3) or even create a climate in which too many children would be born outside of normal wedlock. This ambivalence, this hesitancy, however, was not justified since the rights of an unborn child are paramount, particularly in a Christian community where so much stress is laid on the uniqueness and dignity of the human person, created by God in love and in His Own Image. He thanked God this ambivalence is passing and a true accepting attitude is becoming evident both in society and in the Church. Evidence in the change in attitude in Society is to be found in a survey of 300 people representing all social classes in an Irish town. The respondents were asked the question about different groups of people, such as the old, the poor, etc. including the unmarried mother and her child, as to whether they should be given help with conditions, without conditions or not at all. Eighty-seven per cent of those people replied that the unmarried mother who keeps her child should be given help without conditions.

This is from the Public, the Client and the Social Services by Dermot Clifford M.S.C.

This change in the attitude of the State is evident in the granting of the allowance to which he had already referred. The statement on Family Law Reform published by the Council for Social Welfare which is a Committee of the Catholic Bishops' Conference is evidence of a more accepting attitude in the Church.

He goes on in his Press release to quote the statement of the Council for Social Welfare which recommends a change which would, for the first time, reflect in our laws the constitutional principle that all persons are equal. The particular quotation from the report of the Council for Social Welfare provides as follows:

We are concerned with the rights of all children and that they shall be treated equally. We regard it as unchristian that children born out of wedlock should, as a result of the actions of their parents, be victimised by legal distinctions between them and children born to married parents. Consequently, we wish to urge that the legal disabilities imposed on these children should be removed.

They then go on to make specific recommendations to that effect.

I hope that Bishop Casey is right and that attitudes throughout Ireland are changing in relation to the welfare of the child being the right to equality in considering the future of that child, whether it be a future with adoptive parents or a future in remaining with the single mother. If we enforced that basic principle and had the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration by removing all legal discrimination against that child and removing any social or economic discrimination, which might ensue, if the range of choice is exercised in relation to that child, then we would have gone a very significant step towards having a fair and balanced adoption law and procedure.

The second principle in relation to adoption is that it can only work if it is based on a genuine choice. At present far too many single mothers have been forced by economic and social pressures and without any real consent or desire on their part to hand their children over to be adopted. Our society has been slow to help a young Irish girl faced with that particular problem. During the pregnancy she has to cope with the very considerable difficulties and tensions, the problems of being pregnant and unmarried. She has to think of the future of the child that will be born and what is best for that child. In present circumstances she has probably resisted the temptation to go to England and have an abortion. So she has decided to have the child, and she is faced with the responsibility and choice as to the future of that child. Of course we think of the single mother as the only party in the circumstances. But, as we know—at least at the present stage of things—it requires two parents for the child. It would be unfair to leave out the unmarried father from the circumstances.

In far too many cases the unmarried father has been the mystery man in Irish society. We seem to have an increasing number of mothers but we do not seem to have a significant number of unmarried fathers. They are the unknown quantity, the shirkers of responsibility, the children of our society in a pejorative sense. They are the adults who never grew up; who are probably in many ways conditioned by the attitudes in their own family, particularly by the role of the mother in traditional Irish society. They have not been educated and encouraged to face up to their responsibilities. For the single fathers who do accept responsibility and acknowledge parenthood there may be the same sort of response to the situation as faces the single mother in thinking of the best interests of the child.

The single mother gets very little assistance from our society. There is no adequate counselling for a single mother in those circumstances. There are one or two minor exceptions to that, but on the whole there is no proper network of State agencies that the single mother can go to and know she can get the sort of counselling and support that she should be entitled to receive from our society. I know that very much from Cherish the single mothers organisation, which on a voluntary basis fills a very significant gap in our social services in this respect. The number of people coming to this organisation is evidence of the need for it. Yet, as a voluntary body, it could not possibly cover all the demands made on it and it is not a replacement of a state involvement. It has a role to play as a voluntary organisation but should be supported and paralleled by a proper service to the single mother, a proper service of counselling and help with her particular situation. The tendency is to think that the single mother in those circumstances can go to an adoption society for advice, but the very fact of going to an adoption society is foreclosing the options. An adoption society will be disposed to advise on adoption in almost all circumstances.

Reference was made by Senator Aherne to an apparent quotation. I appear to have been quoted as having referred to adoption societies as factories. I have not seen the particular newspaper from which she was quoting. If in any way I suggested anything of that sort, it was only in the qualified sense that adoption societies are there to promote adoption of children, so they necessarily have that background consideration. Even the most equitable, fair and responsible adoption society is there for the purposes of adoption and needs a turnover of babies who are going to be adopted. That is the whole purpose of it. I am very much in favour of a good and fair adoption system. I commend the good adoption societies and the very good individuals concerned with adoption here; but an adoption society is not the place that a single mother should go to before she has made up her mind about what she wants to do with her child. She should go to an agency where she will get a more balanced range of advice and support in coming to her decision and this she certainly does not get in Irish society.

Apart from that, the pregnant girl has to cope with an incredible range of reactions, even within herself. She is a very vulnerable person because she is a woman in Irish society and, therefore, she starts off with considerable disadvantages if she is going to have a separate existence with responsibility for a dependant. The sort of job that she can hope to get will be lower down the scale than her male opposite number. She will have the problem of trying to provide economic support for the child and at the same time look after the child. She will try to do this in a society where we have not yet sufficient support for working mothers the facility of creches and other support which would make this a reality. There is also a very significant psychological problem for an Irish girl in those circumstances; that is the fact of being Irish, the mother of a child and unmarried. It is a situation where the particular individual has all the disadvantages of being a single Irish girl trying to make her way in society.

I am not sure if I am making any sense to a relatively empty male Seanad on this subject, whether it is possible to convey the subtle discriminations against the single girl in Ireland who wants to make an independent living, who wants to be an adult member of that society, who wants to take on the responsibilities of citizenship, just the simple, normal earning of a living, setting up a home. They are very considerable and very deep for a single Irish girl who wants to go it alone and avoid or break out of the strong conditioning. This conditioning points to the norm: that her future is to have a job for a short while and then to get married and devote herself entirely to the home, her husband and children. It is difficult for a single Irish girl to break out of that. It is difficult for a single Irish girl to do the same things that are not at all difficult for her male counterpart—to acquire a home, be it a flat or a house or whatever it may be; to enter into mortgage arrangements; to set herself up in business and so on.

If that single girl is pregnant, or if that single girl has a child to look after, then the difficulties become even more substantial. I think that the first important process that the single mother has to go through is really a process of coming to terms with herself as a single girl in Ireland in these circumstances. If she does come to terms with this and wants to keep her child with her, there is the gravest responsibility on our society to provide economic and social support and to remove any legal discriminations or disabilities that exist.

This is something that has not been considered openly in the various pieces of legislation that we have considered recently. Is it possible to conceive of a society that would deliberately disrupt a mother-and-baby relationship and take a child away from its natural mother in preference to leaving that child with its mother? I think it is a very fundamental question which we should pose for ourselves. There will be circumstances where a single mother will not want to keep her child, and will want to place her child out for adoption or fosterage; but if the single mother wants to keep her child, then what sort of society have we if that society does not facilitate, encourage and support the single mother in her choice about keeping the child? Yet, that is something which has been considerably blurred and is not as clear as it might be in relation to the attitude of society towards a single mother, and indeed, in the attitude of the public towards adoption. There has been a very considerable bias in favour of adoption which undermines the relationship of the single mother with her child, particularly the single mother who wants to keep her child.

If the balance were better, if the welfare of the child were paramount, if the consent were a real one based on counselling, based on a genuine sense of choice, a genuine help with coming to terms with the psychological and other problems that the individual faces in those circumstances, there would undoubtedly be a drop in the number of children being offered for adoption. But, also there would be a much better, fairer and balanced adoption procedure. That is another aspect which our society has to face. There is, in this country, as there is in other countries, a queue for adoption. There are more prospective adoptive parents than there are children available for adoption. Therefore, there is a certain pressure to keep up the level of the flow of children coming into adoption societies and becoming available for adoption. It would be better for our society to envisage the possibility of fewer children becoming available for adoption in this country but of an adoption code where the paramount consideration was genuinely the welfare of the child and, secondly, where there was real consent based on a free and well-counselled choice by the single mother in the circumstances.

A third principle of an adoption code would be that it should operate evenly and with high standards and strict controls throughout the country and in relation to all adoption societies.

Debate adjourned.
The Seanad adjourned at 8.30 p.m. until 10.30 a.m. on Wednesday 7th July, 1976
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