Seanad Éireann debate -
Wednesday, 23 Mar 1977

Vol. 86 No. 6

European Communities (Amendment) Bill, 1977: Second Stage.

Question proposed: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. FitzGerald)

The Bill before the Seanad provides for the enactment into Irish law of the treaty amending certain provisions of the treaties establishing the European Communities and of the treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities. When it is passed Ireland will be able to proceed to ratification of this new treaty which is, broadly speaking, designed to increase the powers of the European Parliament or Assembly, as it is called, in respect of the budget of the Communities. It will also affect some rationalisation in auditing procedures by establishing a Court of Auditors to exercise the powers and jurisdiction at present conferred on the Audit Board of the European Communities and on the Auditor of the European Coal and Steel Community.

I might say a few words first about the form of the legislation. Initially it was considered that we might be able to proceed to ratification of this new treaty without the necessity for any domestic legislation to give effect to any of its provisions. However, after consulting the Attorney General, I decided that this solution would not be desirable. Having enacted all the existing Community treaties into Irish law under the European Communities Act 1972, it would be anomalous and illogical to treat an amendment differently. Unlike our British neighbours, we are not able to enact amendments to the Community treaties into Irish law by a statutory instrument under our existing legislation so this Bill is required. Its effect will be to put this new treaty in the same position in our domestic law as the other Community treaties itemised in the European Communities Act, 1972 as from the date of its entry into force; that is to say, it will be part of the domestic law of the State under the conditions laid down in the treaties governing the European Communities. The Minister for Foreign Affairs will have power to make regulations to give effect to it, regulations which will of course be subject to the annulment procedures contained in the European Communities (Amendment) Act 1973.

As Senators are no doubt aware, the treaties which established the three European Communities—that is, the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community—provided the European Parliament with very little power in relation to the budget of the Communities. This situation came in time to be regarded as generally unsatisfactory and, in order to bring about some improvement in the position, the member states on 22nd April, 1970 signed a treaty amending certain provisions of the original treaties so as to increase the powers of the Parliament over the Community budget. This treaty, which is generally known as the Budgetary Powers Treaty, came into operation on 1st January, 1975 and its provisions remain in force today.

Although the 1970 treaty undoubtedly represented an improvement in the budgetary powers of the European Parliament, it did not, however, entirely satisfy the wishes of the Parliament itself or, indeed the wishes of a number of the member states which felt that the powers granted should have been more extensive. Because of this, it was agreed that in due course the Commission would make further proposals in relation to the Parliament's budgetary powers which the Council would examine.

The Commission submitted its proposals on 9th June, 1973. The proposals, following some revision after the Parliament had given its opinion on them, were discussed at length by the Council during the months which followed. In due course, the Council agreed joint guidelines on a "package" of proposals at its meeting of 4th June, 1974. Before finally committing itself, however, the Council heard further the views of the Parliament which were delivered during the course of two consultative meetings in June and October, 1974. When the procedure was complete and after the proposals as finally agreed had been drafted into treaty form and the Parliament had been formally consulted, the Council, acting in accordance with article 236 of the EEC Treaty and article 204 of the Euratom Treaty, delivered an opinion on 22nd July, 1975 in favour of calling a Conference of Representatives of the Governments of the member states. This conference proceeded to sign the new treaty on the same day.

It is that treaty which is the subject of this Bill and whose provisions I now propose to outline in some detail. Essentially the objectives of the new treaty are twofold: to increase the powers of the European Parliament over the budget of the Communities and to establish a European Court of Auditors.

I shall deal first with those provisions of the new treaty which concern the budgetary powers of the Parliament. The most important of these provisions is undoubtedly that which recognises the right of Parliament to reject the draft budget in toto. Until now this particular question has been the subject of dispute between the Parliament and the Council with the Parliament holding that its power under the existing treaties to adopt the draft budget also implied a right not to adopt it—in other words to reject the draft budget. The Council has never agreed with this view and has insisted instead that the Parliament has the right to adopt the draft budget only but not to reject it. The new treaty will remove all sources of dispute over this matter as articles 2, 12 and 20 specifically provide that the Parliament, acting by a majority of its members and two-thirds of the votes cast, may, if there be important reasons, reject the draft budget and ask for a new draft to be submitted to it. Should Parliament exercise this option of rejecting the draft budget outright and, if for this or other reasons, the budget remained unadopted at the begining of the financial year, it would be necessary to fall back on the system of “provisional twelfths”. This is the system whereby, under the existing treaties, if the budget is not adopted by the start of the financial year, a sum equivalent to not more than one-twelfth of the budget appropriations of the preceding financial year may be spent each month.

There is also provision under the new treaty for increasing the power of the Parliament over "obligatory expenditure" by making it more difficult for the Council to reject changes to this type of expenditure proposed by the Parliament. In the budget of the Communities expenditure is divided into two types: "obligatory" expenditure which is defined as "expenditure necessarily resulting from the treaties or from acts adopted in accordance therewith" and "non-obligatory" expenditure. Obligatory expenditure relates to matters such as the Regional Fund and expenditure of the common agricultural policy and accounts for about three-quarters of the current budget. Non-obligatory expenditure includes sums available for staff salaries, the Social Fund and so on. The essential difference between the two types of expenditure is that the Council has the final say over obligatory expenditure while the Parliament has the last word over non-obligatory expenditure.

The Parliament, under the existing treaties, has a right to propose changes, or modifications as they are called, to the figures for obligatory expenditure established by the Council but unless the Council accepts these modifications by a qualified majority—that is by 41 votes out of 58 as laid down in the treaties—they stand rejected. In practice, modifications proposed by the Parliament are almost invariably rejected.

Under the new treaty such rejection will be made much more difficult where modifications do not increase the overall expenditure of an institution, that is in cases where a proposed increase in expenditure would be offset by a reduction elsewhere. This is because the new treaty provides that in such cases in future modifications by Parliament will stand accepted unless the Council votes by a qualified majority, namely 41 votes out of 58, to reject them. The existing arrangements whereby modifications proposed by the Parliament stand rejected unless adopted by a qualified majority, will continue in all other cases.

The new treaty also takes account of the fact that control over the way the budget has been implemented is an essential element of budgetary power and seeks to extend the Parliament's prerogatives in this regard by providing that in future the European Parliament alone, acting on the Council's recommendation, shall give a discharge to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the budget. The power of discharge, which amounts in effect to a power to declare the accounts for the previous year finally and duly closed, is currently exercised jointly by the Parliament and the Council.

Finally, the new treaty will make it obligatory for the Council to consult the European Parliament and to obtain the opinion of the proposed new Court of Auditors before it makes financial regulations relating to the management of the budget of the Communities. The Council, at present, may make financial regulations without consulting either the Parliament or the Audit Board.

In addition to strengthening the budgetary powers of the European Parliament, the new treaty also contains provisions designed to ensure a more effective management of Community finances through the establishment of a Court of Auditors to replace the existing Audit Board and the Auditor of the ECSC. Although the functions of the Court of Auditors will be essentially the same as those of the Audit Board, it is hoped that by specifying the powers of the Court of Auditors in detail in the treaties rather than, as in the case of the Audit Board, mainly in a financial regulation, the new body will have a greater independence and authority and thus reinforce the financial audit of Community revenue and expenditure.

There has in the past been a feeling that the Audit Board has not been as effective as might have been desired. This was not due to any deficiency on the part of its members, all of whom were extremely conscientious and expert in their fields, but rather reflected some inherent defects in the conditions under which the Audit Board was expected to operate. Not only were the members of the Audit Board part-time but there were certain inhibiting ambiguities in the various texts governing its operation. The new treaty is designed to remedy this situation.

In the first place, the nine members of the new Court of Auditors will be full-time and will no longer have to carry out the onerous task of combining services in their own national administrations with service on behalf of the Community. Articles 7, 15 and 23 of the new treaty specifically forbid members of the court, during their term of office, from engaging in any other occupation, whether gainful or not. Members of the court will thus devote all their time to the Audit of Community finances.

In the second place, the new treaty will remove some important ambiguities which in the past have tended to inhibit the Community audit procedures. The most important of these relates to on-the-spot audits. Under the existing treaties, the right of Audit Board to undertake on-the-spot audits in the member states is not specifically provided for and for a number of years certain member states—not including Ireland—were reluctant to allow such audits to take place in their territories. In fact, because of the difference in views over this matter, the Audit Board was not able to undertake an on-the-spot audit in a member state until 1975. Prior to this on-the-spot audits were confined to the institutions of the Communities. Since 1975 there has been a significant improvement in the situation and on-the-spot audits have been carried out freely in the member states. The new treaty will guarantee beyond dispute this right to carry out on-the-spot audits in the member states. Article 8, 16 and 24 provide that "The audit shall be based on records and if necessary shall be performed on the spot in the institutions of the Communities and in the member states".

The new treaty will also guarantee the right of the Court of Auditors to undertake audits before the accounts for a particular financial year have been closed. Although in practice the Audit Board in recent years has been able to do this, again its rights to do so was not specified in the treaties. This position is now to be rectified in the new treaty which provides in article 8, 16 and 24 that the "Auditing of expenditure shall be carried out before the closure of accounts for the financial year in question".

Another purpose of the new treaty is to ensure that the Court of Auditors will have access to all the information it may require in order to carry out its task. Under the existing treaties the powers of the Audit Board in this regard were not spelled out in detail and there was always the possibility that the board might not, in practice, have been able to obtain all the documents and other information it needed. This is in marked contrast with the position of national audit authorities. In Ireland, the Comptroller and Auditor General can ask for any information he needs and is given that information as a matter of right. The new treaty will seek to ensure that the powers of the Court of Auditors will be comparable with those of national audit authorities by providing at articles 8, 16 and 24 that "The institutions of the Communities and the national audit offices or, if those do not have the necessary powers, the competent national departments, shall forward to the Court of Auditors, at its request, any document of information necessary to carry out its task".

A further effect of the new treaty will be to rationalise the Communities' institutional arrangements for carrying out audits. At present the Audit Board is responsible for auditing the accounts of all revenue and expenditure except for the non-administrative revenue and expenditure of the European Coal and Steel Community which is carried out by the auditor of the ECSC. The new treaty will abolish this duality. All audits will in future be carried out by the Court of Auditors.

Despite their technical nature, the provisions of the new treaty have the clear purpose of ensuring a greater and more democratic control over the finances of the European Communities. This is a development which has the full support of the Government and which I also feel sure will have the full endorsement of this House. The Bill has already been passed unopposed by the Dáil and I would hope that the Seanad will also give it a full approval. In this way Ireland will be enabled to take the necessary steps towards ratification of the new treaty and thus help to bring its provisions into operation at an early date.

I commend the Bill to the Seanad.

Mr. Dolan

Ba mhaith liom a rá go gcuirimíd ar an dtaobh seo den Tí fáilte roimh an mBille seo. Ach tá rud amháin nach dtuigimíd ró-shoiléir agus is é an moill a bhí ar an Rialtas an Bille seo a thabhairt os comhair na Dála agus a thabhairt isteach ins an Teach seo. Measaim féin—agus tá an tuairim céanna ag a lán daoine eile— go bhfuil tábhacht ar leith ag baint leis an mBille seo. Ba cheart don Rialtas an Bille a thabhairt os ár gcomhair beagnach bliain ó shin mar, de réir an rud atá scríofa ins an mBille féin, sílim go raibh gach rud réidh chun é sin a dhéanamh sa bhliain 1975. Os rud é go bhfuil an Bille seo chomh tábhachtach sin ba chóir go mbeadh sé os ár gcomhair.

B'fhéidir nach gcuireann a lán daoine an oiread sin spéis i bParlaimint na hEorpa agus ba chóir dóibh a chur. Is mór an díomá é sin. Táimid ceangailte anois leis an EEC agus dá bharr sin ba chóir go mbeadh gach eolas is féidir a bheith againn ar an slí ina n-oibríonn an Parlaimint sin. Ní h-amháin sin, ach ba chóir dúinn mar Stát cuidiú leis an bParlaimint san obair atá roimhe.

I would like to say at the outset that we on this side of the House welcome this Bill. If we had any fault to find with it it certainly would be that there seems to have been an undue delay in introducing it. According to what we were told the machinery for doing so was signed about July, 1975, and it has taken almost two years to bring it before the House. Anybody looking at the Bill will see that it is very short; it does not contain many sections and it would not have taken superhuman effort on the part of the Government to have had this legislation here long ago and passed, because we on his side of the House certainly would not have opposed it.

Any legislation dealing with the European Parliament is of tremendous importance to this country. We have been in the EEC for quite a while and we are in the peripheral region; we certainly do not belong to the inner circle. It does not require any stretch of the imagination to realise from what we read and hear that there is a very high influential lobby at the centre of affairs as far as the European Parliament is concerned. Perhaps it may not be deliberate or intentional but it is an undeniable fact that many of the countries which comprise the EEC are organised communities. In some of them up to 80 per cent of the population live in large cities and towns. Consequently, many of these people are always considering themselves with a view to securing the cheapest food they can get. Small blame to them. If a policy such as that is allowed to continue and if representatives from countries such as Ireland are not on their toes in this matter we will find there will be a great lobby against us out there and we will eventually find ourselves in the unhappy position that our manufactured goods, and in particular food produced in this country, will be scaled down each time to the detriment of our workers and farmers. When we joined the EEC we had hoped to benefit from the FEOGA grants and from the various other aids that were coming from the EEC.

Our situation is far removed from the centre and transport is very difficult and very dear at present with prices escalating each year. All these things are tending to price our commodities out or put them at a very high level indeed. This might not be properly understood by the industrial countries, in particular Germany, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and, indeed, England. It behoves our representatives in the European Parliament on every occasion and at every level to try at all times to put our point of view. We are not going into the European Parliament as beggars or as people craving for something; we are only looking for what we feel is our just share in a Community of which we are a very important unit.

The Bill sets up this Court of Auditors and I think that in any institution it is important to have auditors and people who will scrutinise and who will examine accounts. Even the individual has now come around to that, and certainly small companies have, and it is only right that in the case of a big institution such as the European Parliament, all moneys there would be properly audited and proper accounts presented. It can happen that discrepancies arise; we often read of financial scandals in various countries. It is important, because the European Community is still young, that there be strict supervision on the financial arrangements from the very beginning. Setting up this court of auditors is a good idea because, as the Minister has rightly said, they will now be wholetime rather than part-time as they were in the days gone by and anybody will realise that people working on a part-time basis would not be able to give the same attention to the job as if it was a wholetime occupation.

Another very important feature I see in this Bill is that it increases the powers of the European Parliament. Certainly, at a time such as this when we are only 12 months away from an election to the European Parliament, it is of tremendous importance to this country. Let me say that it is of bedrock importance that we would have the best possible team representing us when it comes to selecting representatives for the European Parliament. They should have a good back-up team and they should be people who would project the image of our country and work as a team rather than work in individual groups. We can have our local politics here in our own Houses and in our own county councils. It is not a bad thing but when we go abroad it is of vital importance that we should have a united front when making decisions that effect the lives and livelihoods of our people.

Quite recently they had an election in the European Parliament for President. Most of the Members here know of the dedicated service that Senator Yeats has given this House and they know of the esteem and regard in which a man of his calibre and learning is held abroad. The name Yeats is know the length and breadth not alone of Europe but of the world, especially in literary circles. It was a pity that certain members from our country did not vote for our nominee for that very important position. They may not have been issued with a direction from their own party as to what they should do—I do not know. So far as we are concerned as a country it would have been a tremendous asset to us to have a man of that calibre in Europe. It is not often we obtain these positions. Despite what we might think of the person who occupied a previous position as a politician, we were all glad to see the present Minister when he became for six months president some years ago presiding at a meeting held in Dublin. Things like that bring a certain renown and give publicity to our country. It is important that we would not lose sight of these things.

I have no fault to find with the Bill. There was undue delay in presenting it to us. Such an important piece of legislation does certain things which are very necessary and for that reason, we on this side of the House are not opposing it.

Mrs. Robinson

As was pointed out by the Minister, this treaty was signed by the member states in July 1975 and the proposals in it were considered by the Joint Committee on EEC Secondary Legislation in May 1975 when they were still in draft. The Joint Committee reported on 7th May, 1975 in a way which showed that it favoured the proposals in the draft treaty subsequently adopted. It welcomed the increased powers of the European Parliament. The relevant passages are in the conclusions in paragraph 16 under the heading "General View" of the Joint Committee's report on the budgetary powers of the European Parliament. They said:

In general the Joint Committee welcomes moves to extend the budgetary powers of the European Parliament and views these developments as reinforcing the case for early direct elections to that body.

The report goes on at paragraph 20 under "Other Changes" to say:

The Joint Committee supports the proposed new Conciliation Procedure, the projected establishment of a Court of Auditors and the proposed conferring of power on Parliament to give a discharge to the Commission in the implementation of the Budget. It believes that these would be conducive to the Parliament's exercising an increasing influence on the financial affairs of the Community.

It is clear that even before the final signing of this treaty in July 1975 there was an Irish parliamentary view in favour of the proposals contained in the treaty.

One preliminary comment I would like to make about the treaty is that it is a very difficult document to locate! After much effort, I managed to get a copy of the treaty published by the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Communities. The treaty contains the provisions for its ratification and for its coming into effect. Article 29 provides:

This treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the Italian Republic.

Article 30 goes on:

This treaty shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the deposit of the instrument of ratification by the last signatory State to take this step.

If the treaty enters into force during the budgetary procedure, the Council shall, after consulting the Assembly and the Commission, adopt the measures required in order to facilitate the application of this Treaty to the remainder of the budgetary procedure.

So this treaty depended on co-operation by the various signatory states in having it ratified and adopted in order to come into effect. It is very sad that Ireland appears to be at the tailend of this ratification process.

Dr. FitzGerald

Around the middle. On the wrong side of the middle.

Mrs. Robinson

I do not think we are in the middle. In the Tenth General Report on the activities of the European Communities the Commission made reference to the ratification procedures. At page 30 of the report it says:

Ratification procedures for the Treaty to strengthen the budgetary powers of the European Parliament and set up a Court of Auditors have been completed or are nearing completion in Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. By the end of the year instruments of ratification had been deposited by Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom.

I understand that certain other states who were in the process of ratification have ratified. It is sad, because, as this Bill to ratify according to our constitutional procedures shows, ratification is not really a very difficult exercise. Ireland should be pressing strongly for any development towards improving the democratic structure and base of the Community. It is very important. It is a principle we talk about, and it is one we should exert ourselves to establish. It is regrettable that this Bill is only coming before us today and that it did not come before us in September or October, 1975, when we could have shown our interest and anxiety to improve the democratic base of the European Parliament. It is regrettable that the immediate past President of the European Parliament had to draw attention to the fact that Ireland had not set in motion the national ratification procedure.

This treaty will make an improvement in the budgetary powers of the European Parliament. This legislative improvement is accompanied by a considerable improvement in the Parliament's own capacity to exert a control. This is one of the things which has been quite noticeable and quite impressive in the evolution and development of the European Parliament itself in the last year or so. There has been much more concern about expenditure and about the budget of the Community. As I understand it, the control sub-committee of the budget committee is now exerting a considerable influence over the budget of the Communities. This is a very important priority for the Parliament and so it should be.

Therefore, I welcome the amendments and the improvements in the budgetary control, particularly as regards "obligatory" expenditure. But the reality of the situation is that the Parliament still has very little real power. Having control over the budget does not give it real legislative power. It is vital, if the European Community is to evolve as a democratic Community, and to have any significance as a real Community, that this point be retained and remembered; that the Parliament still does not have a legislative voice in the instruments which create the budgetary proposals afterwards. The fact that the Parliament does not have a power of co-decision in these legislative instruments is a key factor in undermining the place of the Parliament in an institutional framework. The Parliament was set up as a consultative assembly. It has tried—it has renamed itself the European Parliament; it is still officially called the European Assembly—it has tried to exert power through pressure for both increasing its budgetary power which has now been achieved by this second treaty following the Luxembourg treaty of 1970; and it has also pressurised for and has got a decision on direct elections which will reinforce the democratic base of the European Parliament but it still has not got anything like the powers of a real Parliament and it will not have them when this treaty is adopted by the various member states and comes into effect.

This is particularly serious because I believe there has been a diminution in democratic control and accountability as the European Community has evolved. Member states have lost a degree of democratic control over what was decided at the national level to the European level, but the democratic control has been diluted at that level. This is a very serious development, and as more important decisions are being taken at the European Community level it is going to become less and less acceptable.

I should like to refer to proposals that were made as far back as 1972 by a working party established by the European Commission and of which I was a member. The Vedel Committee, as it was called, was the report of the working party examining the problems of the enlargement of the powers of the European Parliament. This committee, which reported in March 1972 prior to the summit in October 1972, recommended a two-fold increase in the powers of the Parliament, in particular, and with greater emphasis, the giving of a power of co-decision in legislative measures to the European Parliament and secondly, an increase in budgetary powers of the Parliament. The Vedel Committee came down very strongly on the side of the necessity to increase the legislative role by giving a power of co-decision, since otherwise the budgetary power, because of the composition and nature of the European budget, could never be a very real power.

I would like to refer first, to the proposals in the Vedel Report. The proposals were to recommend that the Parliament be given a power of co-decision in two stages, and in the first stage the Parliament would have a power of co-decision in relation to certain key areas of the Treaties. I quote from page 39 of the Vedel Report under the heading, "Fields and stages of extension of the powers of the Parliament":—

In this context, the Working Party recommends that the law-making powers of the Parliament should be increased in two stages. Apart from the problem of political timing which would be raised by the need for the consent of the Member States to a broad and very rapid expansion of the Parliament's powers, a transitional period should be foreseen in the course of which the Community institutions would adapt steadily and by trial and error, each in its own field and in its relations to the others, to the new system which is recommended.

In the first stage, Parliament would be given the power of co-decision (according to the procedures set out under S.4 below in the following matters, which, for simplicity's sake, are hereinafter called list A:

—revision of the Treaties;

—implementation of Article 235 of the EEC Treaty and analagous provisions in the ESCS and Euratom Treaties;

—admission of new members;

—ratification of international agreements concluded by the Community.

Besides this and still in the first stage the European Parliament would be given a greater power of consultation consisting of the right to ask the Council to reconsider a subject and hence a suspensive veto in the following fields (called list B.

List B includes the main legislative areas, the harmonisation of law, Common Agricultural Policy, Common Transport Policy, European Social Fund and so on. It is envisaged that in the second stage this list B would give the Parliament a general power of co-decision. It is very important to keep in mind that the present Treaty is very much a compromise which falls far short of the proposals put forward by the Vedel Committee in 1972. It does not give a power of co-decision to the European Parliament. It proposes a very involved structure of co-operation between the council and parliament which still comes down very strongly in favour of the Council of Ministers. It is a power which, I think, will be appreciated by the members of the European Parliament at present because it will give them a certain degree of influence in relation to the "obligatory" expenditure of the Community, but it is still, as I say, very limited.

As the Parliament proceeds towards direct elections—and I am becoming pessimistic about the date when these may take place but, nevertheless, it will presumably be before 1980—it will be seen that the actual power exerted is very limited. This could have a very bad effect on people's attitude towards the European Parliament. It could exacerbate the feeling of alienation, the feeling that the Community is not representative of their views and is not representative in the real sense that the people elected to the European Parliament do not have a real power of decision in the legislative measures of the Community. There is far too rigid a straitjacket proposed. If the Commission can fix each year the maximum expenditure then how can the European Parliament influence, in a real way, the development of redistributive policies at the European Community level? How can you have the European Parliament play a real role in determining the size of the regional policy, social policy, or, if there is to be an integrated common policy a unified Fund of the European Community, to prevent disparity between regions? There is no flexibility to allow for this in the present very tight system proposed. This is one of the major defects.

I should like to refer briefly to an article in the issue of New Europe of Spring, 1976, entitled “Towards a People's Budget”. It was an article which resulted from the work of a study group which involved certain officials working on the European Parliament staff and some academics. It criticised the proposals contained in this Treaty much along the lines I have mentioned. It showed that it would be necessary to have much more real power and involvement of the parliament if it is to have the right to call itself a real parliament. It talked also about another aspect which I think is very important—the complexity of the budgetary procedure at the European Community level. I do not believe it is necessary to have such a convoluted and complex budgetary procedure in order to decide on priorities and policies. It is unnecessarily confusing, and if people are confused they are put off by a particular procedure. It would be better to devise a system for having a Community budget which did not have this artificial distinction between “obligatory” and “non-obligatory” expenditure. I find it very difficult to understand, for example, why aid to developing countries is classified as obligatory expenditure? Why should there be this very legalistic and very narrow distinction? The article that I am referring to starts on page 52 and it makes this point:—

Many of the aspects of the budgetary procedure are difficult to comprehend, not least because on contentious matters like the fixing of the maximum rate of expenditure (which affects Parliament's right for increasing expenditure) and the classification between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure, there is at present no mechanism for producing a convergence of views when the institutions disagree. Cases of disagreement are not clearly covered by the present provisions of Article 203. To resolve this problem, "gentlemen's agreements" could be made which would go beyond but not in any way against the letter of the Treaties at present. Whatever could be achieved in this way would need subsequent incorporation within the Treaty which could then apply, at the latest, to the 1979 budget.

So there is a need for greater flexibility and for the Parliament to be involved in determining priorities. In a sense, and perhaps the Minister will emphasise this point, it is fair to say that the type of budgetary power that the European Parliament has compares very favourably with the budgetary powers of a national parliament. But the national parliament is involved in a much more real way in the processing of legislative measures than is the European Parliament. I do not want to denigrate or to underestimate the significance of increasing further the participation of the Parliament both in the scrutiny of expenditure and also its budgetary powers, particularly in relation to "obligatory" expenditure, but this must not allow us to be deflected from the fact that the European Parliament has not got real legislative powers, is not a real Parliament in that sense, and that this is a very unsatisfactory situation which will not be remedied by direct election. It will be aggravated and will lead, I hope, to an unanswerable groundswell for participation in a democratic sense in decision making at the European Community level.

The proposal for a Court of Auditors is an improvement on the old audit board procedure. It is very important that there be a body with clear statutory—or treaty—authority now to carry out its functions. It is necessary, in view of the attitude of certain member states, that it should have very clear treaty power. The existence of this body will help to allay some suspicions of how certain parts of the budget are arrived at and are spent.

I would be interested in the Minister's views on the possibility of the European Parliament having a full-bodied public accounts committee which could exert a useful scrutiny over the court of auditors. This, again, would be a welcome development. I know that the control subcommittee of the budget committee was formed as an effort at being half way towards that. It would seem desirable that there would be a full-bodied public accounts committee somewhat analagous to the public accounts committee of the Oireachtas.

That is all I wanted to say on this particular measure. It is one that I obviously welcome. I would have welcomed it 18 months ago when we might have demonstrated our conscious interest and involvement in improving the democratic structure of the European Community, when we might have bolstered the credibility of our constant calling for a more democratic Europe.

Ireland is too small a country to exert very strong power or financial sway in particular areas, but we can have a very important moral role, and a very important role in insisting upon the re-enforcement of the democratic structure. This is particularly necessary in view of the attitude, for example, of countries like France towards the powers of the Parliament. The French Parliament have made it clear that the powers of the European Parlimeant must not be increased, and this appears to have been given some support by the recent opinion of the Council of State in France on the question of the constitutionality there of the Treaty on Direct Elections. So, in the face of this sort of attitude, particularly in large and powerful member states, Ireland should insist on being in the forefront in promoting any measure which will reinforce the democratic structure of the Community.

Professor Quinlan

At the outset it is my pleasant task to welcome the Minister back from his recent illness and to see that he is in good form and is ready for work again. We are all really delighted with that.

Secondly, we can welcome the Bill before us as a step in strengthening the democratic structure and base of the Community. We are all quite concerned at the apparent weak democratic structure that has been the EEC and also what seems to be the rather excessive powers at two extremes, both the Commission on the one hand, who seem to be all powerful, and the Council of Ministers on the other. So anything that tries to strengthen the Parliamentary role is to be welcomed, although what is here appears to be a relatively small step concerning control over a certain amount of what is called non-obligatory expenditure. It allows some slight beginnings of discretion to the European Parliament in that regard.

We are concerned about the democratic structure. What does a democratic structure mean? What does it mean in this country? It means that an area in rural Ireland should be able to have its voice heard in this Parliament and that the Parliament should show itself responsive to its needs. This can be translated to European level; the whole EEC arrangement should be responsive to our needs and we should, in some way, be able to get our viewpoint across, but especially we want to ensure that we get as much help to develop as we need. Our main problem is that we are the least developed of the nine member states. Anything that would help to bring that home to the EEC is to be welcomed. That is why the parliamentary forum and its opportunities are to be welcomed.

I confess to being very disappointed with the performance by the Government since our accession in strengthening in a real practical way this democratic structure in so far as it effects us. I am not trying to reform Europe but I am concerned with our part in Europe and with our influence there. I will take it under three headings. Firstly, we have, since we joined the EEC three years ago, the constant spectacle on television of Ministers going to and coming from Brussels. We can sympathise with the tremendous burden that the EEC places on them. The Government have, as yet, taken no steps to alleviate the burden on the Ministers. If a certain number of Ministers were capable of doing the national task in pre-EEC times, it is obvious that the same number are not capable of doing it today and that it is dereliction of duty on our part not to take cognisance of that simple fact and to increase the numbers accordingly. It is only by providing facilities and ample representation that we can ensure that our viewpoint is expressed to the maximum effect. I fear that by placing such a great burden on the Ministers the home front is suffering and has suffered very considerably in that the Ministers have less time to devote to their home tasks. Therefore, there is more and more of it passing into our bureaucracy, which of course is a small bureaucracy compared with the Eurocracy. Yet it is creeping bureaucracy, and that, to my mind, is the wrong development for a country developing in democracy.

It should mean devolution of responsibility, less bureaucracy, more to the regions rather than more centralisation. I call again for the Government to quickly actualise some of the vague hints we have got now. This is urgent. It will require at least 50 per cent addition to take account of the EEC work. Frankly, I do not know how the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Agriculture stand up to the enormous burden that is placed on them. It is not fair that that burden should be placed on them. Not alone is it not fair, but if they were given further assistance they would be able to do an even better job for the country than they are doing at the moment. I mention those two Ministers in particular.

I see no effort whatsoever on the part of the Government to familiarise our legislators with the European institutions. I would have thought that with accession to the EEC there would be a planned programme to get Members of both the Dáil and the Seanad to visit the European institutions, to study them, to spend periods there in order to become familiar with them and in turn to be involved in local committees at home in the areas in which they wish to specialise in European affairs. Specialisation in European affairs is required. That should be something which parliamentarians should be encouraged to do.

I endorse Senator Dolan's plea to send the best team possible to Europe. We want the best team at home also. I am sufficiently parochial to believe that we have a man-sized job in trying to run this part of Europe and that this should not suffer talent-wise from the attractions of Europe with the type of salaries that make socialists forget their socialism very easily as they become attracted by the immense salaries which are so lightly taxed as to seem to be an affront to any idea of equality. These are only some of the tasks which exist. I would hate to think that the national scene would take second place for talent to the European scene. I should hope that sending a team to Europe will not mean that most of our potential Ministers are carted off onto the gravy trail.

Senator Dolan pleaded for a united approach. That plea is timely. I was listening to an interview with Mr. Burke recently when he had some strong and timely comments to make on the disgraceful conduct of our national papers in their campaign of vilification of him in the months in which the question of his appointment as commissioner was in the news. A great disservice was done to the country and to Mr. Burke personally by that campaign, which was totally and utterly unfounded. One of the first developments in getting a democratic structure going here is to get a responsible press and not the type of left-wing dominated press that we are being fed with today, where the left can do no wrong and anyone who is classed by them as being on the right can do no right. I want to avail of this opportunity to endorse Mr. Burke's protest at the treatment he received. Mr. Burke hopes that at least no Irishman would be subject to the same calculated campaign of vilification that our national press, to our national disgrace, indulged in during the winter months. I do not think we could have got a better representative to go to Europe than Mr. Burke. I cannot think of anyone, even the present Minister, who was a greater loss to the national scene than Mr. Burke has been. I have not the slightest doubt that he will distinguish himself in Europe. The work he had been doing here is now becoming recognised and is beginning to bear fruit.

I ask the Minister to use his influence, to look at the home scene and to begin the process of broadening the democratic structure to enable us to avail of the opportunities that may be in Europe, at least the opportunities to enable us to develop the potential that we have and to enable us to play a role in Europe that will spring from a strong democratic and economic base in this country, which has agriculturally and otherwise probably the greatest potential of any comparable area in Europe.

Ruairí Quinn

I should like to make a couple of points and to seek some clarification on some of the Minister's speech and also some of the workings of the Parliament as outlined in his speech. First, as a member of the Labour Party and as somebody who campaigned against our entry into the EEC I accept—one does not have much alternative but to accept—the vote of four or five to one that emerged from the referendum. In accepting that—as far as I and my colleagues in the Labour Party are concerned—there is an over-riding obligation now for us to ensure that the loss of democracy which was implicit in going into the EEC is somehow or other restored by the strengthening of the European Parliament. My colleague, Senator Robinson, correctly said that it is really a misnomer to describe that assembly as a parliament. To the extent that this measure will strengthen those powers I think nobody on any side of the House can but welcome this measure.

I certainly endorse the comments that have been made both by the other Senators and by the Minister in his opening remarks. I would, however, like to hear him reply to the request for the explanation as to why it has taken so long to bring this Bill before the Seanad. Even if we had passed it in the autumn of 1975, as Senator Robinson suggested, we still would be depending on other countries and therefore it would not have gone ahead. Nevertheless my view is that we have seen some of the effects of free trade in a very real and savage sort of way. To that extent the Common Market has contributed, undoubtedly in my view, to the speeding up of the free trade process and to the subsequent closure of many industries. Dublin, contrary to the popular opinion that is around the country, has suffered extremely badly with regard to redundancies and unemployment. The kind of unemployment problems that we have within the Dublin area are not caused directly by our accession to the Common Market—that would be a very naive and simplistic view to put forward—but they have been aggravated in a very real way by the implication of free trade. My view would be that the European Parliament must increase its powers so that its members are free to argue for the redistribution of wealth on a proper European scale as individual Deputies representing constituencies of European electorates rather than members of national delegations, despite their party affiliations still to all intents and purposes as far as one can see, acting largely as national delegations.

The kind of plea Senator Dolan made with regard to Senator Yeats, for whom we all have a lot of respect, simply reinforces this kind of nationalist attitude towards positions in the European Parliament, without wishing in any way to be disrespectful to Senator Yeats. Indeed, my colleagues in the Socialist Group in the European Parliament supported Senator Yeats as a second alternative after our candidate did not secure election. I do not think that is the way we are going to get the sort of redistribution out of the European Parliament that this country, as a part of the peripheral Europe, needs. It needs it no less than the peripheral parts of France, for example, such as Brittany, or the peripheral parts of Southern Italy who are equally distressed and disadvantaged structurally and culturally by the golden triangle of London, Paris and the Ruhr. We must, in passing this Bill and disposing of it quickly this afternoon, urge the Minister for Foreign Affairs to exercise his considerable influence and respect within Europe to bring this measure in as quickly as possible and exercise his influence on the other member states who have not yet ratified it.

My concern was with the extent of the powers the Parliament will have in precise clarification. Perhaps the Minister could explain if it will mean a change in powers over obligatory expenditure where the Parliament cannot accept the draft from the Council. If that obligatory expenditure, for example, caters for the Regional Fund, by deduction will the Parliament have the power to demand an increase in the size of the Regional Fund? Will that go back to the Council of Ministers and will they, in turn, get into some direct bargaining with the Parliament?

This kind of measure is only of value as far as myself and other members of the Labour Party would be concerned if it does transfer some power, however small, to directly-elected members of the European Parliament to increase or modify the size of the Regional Fund in particular. I mention the Regional Fund because it is the most obvious area of significance as far as Ireland would be concerned in terms of redistribution of wealth within the Community generally. It was a fund that was puffed out of all recognition prior to the referendum, and after we had voted and the Fund came into existence, it seemed much smaller than most people had hoped for. Similarly, the Minister might care to explain why the Regional Fund is contained within the obligatory sector and the Social Fund is not. Similar arguments could be applied equally to the Social Fund as to the Regional Fund. That is something that I do not understand.

Regarding the comments of Senator Quinlan about the current Irish Commissioner, it is fair to say that everybody in this House wishes him the best and welcomes the comments that he has recently made in trying to secure the maximum for Irish interests. My attitude is that Commissioner Burke, in his own statements and his actions so far, has given every indication of a very serious and professional intent with regard to the job of Commissioner.

I do not think Senator Quinlan's comments about a left-wing dominated Press are either helpful or factual with regard to the malicious campaign. For example, I do not regard Tony O'Reilly as a left-wing member of our society, nor indeed, do I regard Major de Valera as such. Both of them are significant shareholders of the two major newspapers. The Irish Times perhaps is sui generis but its circulation would not suggest that it is a magnificent influence to the extent Senator Quinlan regards it.

Professor Quinlan

I should like to know what colour the Irish Independent is now.

Ruairí Quinn

What matters is who owns it. and there is no doubt who owns it. With regard to the campaign he referred to and the remarks of the President of the IFA with regard to the Commissioner-designate and his comments generally on Irish politics, the last thing he could possibly ever hope for would be the description of left-wing.

Professor Quinlan

And he was equally wrong.

Professor Quinlan

And to criticise purely on the basis the Senator did was inaccurate and not helpful.

That is an addendum to my comments on the Bill. I wish the Bill well and I hope the Minister can go back to the Council and get the other member states to ratify it as quickly as possible. In line with what Senator Robinson said, we should try and get some firm commitment on the date of the European elections because, obviously, the direct elections are directly involved with the taking up of these powers.

Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. FitzGerald)

I accept that the delay in bringing the Bill before the House requires some explanation. It is not, however, the fact that our inaction has held up ratification. The latest information I have available is that there are three other countries in respect of which we have had no notification of ratification. That means that if they have done so they have only done so in the last couple of days. The three countries are Belgium, France and Italy. We are far from being the last and we have certainly not held up ratification. Having said that, I accept that it would have been preferable had we been earlier in the field. Part of the reason for the delay was the legal doubt as to whether legislation was required. One of the problems we had with a number of EEC Acts, Treaties and so on, has been to try to establish clearly in our minds what are the correct procedures constitutionally.

There are areas of doubt here and we are anxious to act correctly in relation to the Community's Acts and in regard to the EEC and, above all, to act correctly in accordance with our own Constitution. The grafting arm of the EEC legislative process to an Irish legislative process under a Constitution enacted decades before the EEC was thought of has given rise to some difficulties, doubts and uncertainties. These have taken the kind of time to resolve which legal matters are inclined to do. That has been a large part of the problem in this instance. I accept that that is not sufficient justification. It would have been better if the Bill was before the Dáil sooner, and I accept the validity of the criticisms made.

On the question of the powers of the European Parliament, one should not—and Senator Robinson made this point at the end of her remarks—play down too much the significance of the powers the Parliament has. It has not got a legislative power—I will come back to the question of its legislative influence—but it has, in the financial area—now greatly enhanced by the Treaty we are dealing with here—very significant powers. They are, as Senator Robinson recognised, powers which go beyond those which we are accustomed to here as far as either the Dáil or Seanad is concerned. They go beyond the powers of the British Parliament or the French Parliament. I cannot speak for others but it may be that there are other parliaments in the EEC which have the power to increase expenditure. Under our system, and also under the British and French systems, the power to propose expenditure is uniquely exclusively that of Executive. Parliament's power is to reject it or reduce it but not to propose additions.

The European Parliament has won for itself a significant function in the earlier Treaty, and in this one now, in regard to expenditure of a kind which none of the Executives in any of the three countries I mentioned would easily concede to Parliament. This is an important power not to be minimised. The power also exists to reject the budget. That is an important power which has not yet been used, but it is far from certain that it will not be used in the future. If there is a major conflict between Council and Parliament on some issue it is open to the Parliament to reject the entire budget and force the Council to start the process again.

I have heard it suggested by good Europeans, some of them even good Europeans in Government if one does not regard that as a contradiction in terms, that Parliament should consider more seriously the use of this power in certain cases where it wishes to assert itself. It is, perhaps, in some ways an excessive power, and the reason it has not been used is that it is such a blockbuster just as the power to dismiss the Commission by a two-thirds majority is such a blockbuster. Sometimes if one gives too big a power it is not going to be used because it seems disproportionate to the offence against which it is directed. These powers exist and I would not exclude the possibility of Parliament rejecting a future budget in order to assert itself against a Council of Ministers which in its view was not acting in the interests of Europe as a whole. There are those major powers. Then there is the power to increase expenditure. Senator Quinn has understandably asked for an explanation of the distinction between "obligatory" and "non-obligatory" and how, and why, the regional and social funds are separately treated in this regard and for some indication as to how in fact the system works. They are fair questions and ones on which whenever I am likely to be asked them I need to refresh my memory on the detail because, in fact, this is an area of some complexity. As regards the distinction between the two it is, in fact, unclear. The definition in regard to obligatory expenditure is one which really begs too many questions and leaves room for ambiguity. In my speech I said that obligatory expenditure was expenditure defined as necessarily resulting from the Treaties or Acts adopted in accordance therewith.

The "Treaties" is clear enough, but "necessarily resulting from Acts adopted in accordance therewith" leaves a fair amount of room for doubt. What it does not seem to me to leave much room for is putting the Regional Fund on one side and the Social Fund on the other. Frankly, I never understood any rational basis for that distinction. It was not a distinction we favoured. My own view is that the Regional Fund should have been treated as non-obligatory but it was decided otherwise in accordance with the procedures of the Council of Ministers.

Among the reasons given at informal discussions for treating the Regional Fund as obligatory is one which is highly significant and one we should think seriously about, that the Regional Fund, and the amount thereof, was decided at the highest level by the European Council and this so bound the hands of everyone that it must be regarded therefore as obligatory.

I find this viewpoint utterly inconsistent of a number of heads of Government in the Community that the European Council has a role motor, a role of pushing things along, but, of course, that it merely gives general orientations and does not take decisions. If European Council's orientations are to be so binding as to be more obligatory than a decision or a regulation of the Council, then there is some confusion of thought here. My view is that the psychological reason for the Regional Fund being classified as obligatory was one which was not fully justified in legal terms and one which raises a basic ambiguity with regard to the role of the European Council about which certainly in this country we are concerned. Deputies who are, indeed, familiar with the Taoiseach's memorandum which he submitted before the European Council took place in Rome in December, 1974, will be aware of some of the views of the Irish Government on the general subject of the role of the European Council and the possible problems it raises in regard to the exclusive competence of the Commission in the area of proposing initiatives within the Community.

On the question of how the system works, in so far as obligatory expenditure is concerned what is open to the Parliament is to substitute for one part of obligatory expenditure proposed by the Council an equal sum of money under some other heading. They cannot add to the total obligatory expenditure but they can switch. It would for example, be open to the Parliament to decide that rather than spending money on some part of the Agricultural Fund for FEOGA, or some part of the Social Fund that that money would be deducted and replaced in addition to the Regional Fund.

There is no limit to the amount of substitution that can be proposed but it is substitution, not an addition to the total amount of obligatory expenditure. If that is done then that comes back to the Council of Ministers and, under the new procedure as distinct from the old one, it will be necessary for a significant majority of the order of 70 per cent of the Council of Ministers to reject that proposal. In other words, supposing we have a situation where in the Council of Ministers two large countries, or one large and two medium sized, or one large and three small, to give three examples, took a viewpoint as a minority as to what the pattern of expenditure should be in the budget and were defeated in the Council of Ministers on that issue, on a qualified majority vote on the budget in respect of which qualified majority voting does and always has taken place, it would be open to those countries to drop a few hints in the European Parliament—that is that if their defeated proposals could be endorsed by the Parliament and come back again, they could use their minority power to enforce them by voting against an attempt to turn down what Parliament has proposed. This does open up real possibilities in certain areas. From our point of view, unfortunately perhaps, all these three Funds are of such importance to us that it is not easy to see circumstances in which it would be in our interest to take something off one and put it on another, because we tend to benefit to a significant degree from all three.

It is possible to conceive circumstances in which we, and some other countries, might find certain aspects of expenditure less helpful to us and, though a minority, would be able, having failed in the Council of Ministers, to suggest that the Parliament should take action on it, and then to use our minority power to block a qualified majority decision against that in the Council. This is now a real possibility under the new proceedings. In so far as the non-obligatory expenditure is concerned, in so far as one can distinguish between them, and the distinction, as I have said, is highly artificial and dubious, there the Parliament's power is a real power to increase expenditure. What happens is that each year the Commission fixes what it regards as an appropriate maximum increase in expenditure, taking into account increase in GNP, rates of inflation and needs of the Community. The Council of Ministers then fixes a budget which can be up to that figure, not more if I understand correctly, but will very often, and if not normally, be less because the Council of Ministers tend to be less generous to the Commission where the Community budget is concerned.

In so far as there is a difference between the two that difference can be bridged, and, indeed, even exceeded, because in those circumstances it is open to Parliament to add the equivalent of one-half of the maximum expenditure as additional expenditure. For example, if the figure fixed by the Commission for maximum expenditure is a 20 per cent increase and the Council of Ministers, with its customary lack of generosity, voted 15 per cent, Parliament can come along and add 10 per cent to the 15 per cent making it 25 per cent. That is, add half of the Commission's proposed 20 per cent increase.

That power is exercised effectively and I believe usefully from this country's point of view. The additions to expenditure the Parliament has proposed are ones which we on the whole have welcomed and from which we have benefited. At the moment the position is somewhat clouded and obscured by the fact that the Parliament never accepted the definition by the Council of Ministers of the Regional Fund as obligatory expenditure. This means that the base on which one is working in adding on each year to expenditure, calculating maximum expenditure, is itself disagreed. For the moment what has had to happen is that each year a pragmatic solution has to be found in which the Council of Ministers and the Parliament try and arrive at some agreement which is more than the Council of Ministers think proper of its interpretation of the Regional Fund as obligatory and less than what the Parliament thinks proper on the base of its definition of the Regional Fund as non-obligatory. It is untidy and unsatisfactory, but it is the compromise that was worked out during our presidency. It at least enabled the system to proceed and prevented it breaking down. I, as President, had the somewhat unhappy task of defending to the Parliament in repeated consultations which went on a number of occasions and for long hours, the viewpoint of the Council of Ministers, with which I found myself in disagreement, and trying to arrive at some compromise which was eventually arrived at.

The Parliament recognised that, while I hope doing my duty loyally by my colleagues on the Council of Ministers and not letting the side down at any point, nonetheless I did endeavour to find a solution satisfactory to Parliament. Recently, the European Parliament was good enough to recognise this by awarding a gold medal to me in the light of this presidency. Considering all the trouble I caused them when fighting the battle for the Council of Ministers that showed great tolerance of their part. That then is roughly speaking the way the system works. It is somewhat complex and, at the moment, confused by this dispute, which continues and has not been finally resolved, about the status of Regional Fund expenditure.

I agree with Senator Robinson and others about the need for the Parliament to gain a legislative role, and I think that the Videl Report proposals, while they clearly went far beyond what many Governments would accept at that time, were on the right lines and the whole idea of a gradual process of moving towards co-decisions is the right kind of approach to this. We have to be realistic about this. It is not accepted by other Governments and we have the constitutional decision, as I understand it, in France under which direct elections were found to be constitutional but so long as no additional powers were given to Parliament. This is a decision which obviously makes difficult an expansion of the powers of the European Parliament in future, certainly there are difficulties in giving it legislative powers because that would require that the French Government, if I understand the French Constitution correctly, would initiate a referendum and get it through the French electorate.

Ruairí Quinn

Their Constitution may be in difficulties sooner than that if the Left win the next election.

Dr. FitzGerald

The Senator is entitled to his view, but I am afraid that in France lack of enthusiasm for the EEC is to be found on both sides of the political spectrum, at the Left and at the Right, and those in the middle find themselves at times somewhat constricted in their freedom of action as a result.

Our own position was made clear in the Taoiseach's memorandum of November, 1974, in which he said the Irish Government believe that in addition to having the roles suggested earlier in approving the appointment of the European Commission, Parliament should have powers conferred on it in a legislative sphere without which the process of direct elections in 1978 may fail to evoke an appropriate interest amongst the peoples of the Community. We stand quite clearly on that issue, but we cannot be too optimistic about the speed of progress in this particular area.

On the question of the date of the direct elections which has been raised, we are hopeful that the deadline will be maintained. Certainly we will do out part in that respect. Difficulties may arise in other countries. I am not familiar with what has been happening during the course of the day in London and cannot therefore make any predictions as to whether one possible obstacle has been removed or aggravated during the course of the negotiations carried on between parties there today. It could be that arising out of what is happening in London today a possible obstacle could be overcome, and if that were the case it seems to be unlikely that serious obstacles would arise elsewhere. I think we should therefore gird our loins for European elections some time around the second half of May, 1978. We have a certain amount of preliminary loin-girding to do in the domestic sphere in the interval between now and then.

On the question of working as a team nationally within the European Parliament which Senator Dolan raised, I agree with what has been said by Senator Quinn on this. If, in fact, it were the practice of the Irish Parliamentarians simply to work as a national team in the sole interests of Ireland rather than seeking to join in the whole exercise of creating a democratic European legislative system, they would simply succeed in being out-voted by something like 40 to one, whatever the proportion is, or 20 to one at present. Such a procedure would be a great mistake. The correct thing for us to do, and what largely speaking we have done, is for the parties here to associate themselves with like-minded groups in the Parliament and to seek within each of these groups, among other things, to advance the interests of Ireland and to explain why certain proposals which these groups may favour need to be modified in order to protect the interests of this country, and in that way through the groups in Parliament who are relevant bodies to influence the decisions of Parliament. I think all the Irish representatives have in varying degrees sought to do this and in varying degrees have succeeded in doing this on different occasions. That is the only effective way in which we can, in so far as it is proper and suitable—and it is proper and suitable at times— seek through the Parliament to advance the national interest.

Deputy Dolan's party has associated itself with another party, strictly with two other parties, as there is one representative from Denmark, but mainly with another party in the European Parliament, the party which in its country represents an expression of nationalism in a very pure form. This has given rise to some difficulties, because while it is one thing to associate in a group with people of a similar broad socio-economic ideology. Christian Democrat or Social Democrat, or—though we have not such a group in Ireland—Liberal Democrat, there is an obvious difficulty—clearly observable even at this distance from Strasbourg—in two groups associating who are concerned with their respective national interests, and it has to be said that on occasions like the vote on fish the impact of this on the way in which members of Deputy's Dolan's party have had to act, has not necessarily worked out to our advantage. Where there is a divergence of national interests as between Ireland and France in the case of fish it is too much to hope, with all the efforts made, I am sure, by Deputy Dolan's Party, that they could persuade the much larger number of French nationalists to accept a view which is in the Irish national interest. That particular team do not seem to find it as easy to work in harness with other groups possibly. I do not want to become controversial, but as he raised the question I thought I was entitled at least to make those comments.

On the question of the audit board, I am particularly pleased that we have reached this stage. The very first meeting I attended of the Council of Ministers was one at which something came up as having been agreed already in respect of the powers of the auditors. The agreement which had been reached was one which seemed to leave them with so little power that I sought to reopen the issue which had up to that point been agreed, but with reluctance, may I say, on the part of Britain and Germany. Although it was too late then in reopening it to effect a change and to give the then auditors effective powers, I think that in reopening the matter at that stage and raising it, it contributed to the development of thinking in this area, so that we now have this body—court of auditors— with more effective powers. Among the defects in the old system was that the part-time auditors could not, in fact, employ staff except ad hoc and for a stated period, and if the staff they employed for three weeks to go and do a job found that the job took three weeks and three days they simply had to stop and not complete the job and the audit would not be done at all. This was an absurdity in the old system which I identified and denounced today at that first meeting. We now have full-time auditors with real powers and there is no longer any obstacle to their examining the accounts within the nation states. This is very important, because a very large part of Community funds are disbursed by national Governments as agents of the Community. If abuse occurs, because of the sheer volume of funds involved being distributed in that way, it is more likely to occur within a national system than in Brussels, and any system of control that does not enable the court of auditors to examine thoroughly the disbursal of funds by national Governments as agents of the Commission is ineffective. The changes made there are, I think, of considerable importance and ones that we can strongly support.

I think that covers all the points that were raised. If there is anything I have overlooked, perhaps Deputies will remind me of it when I sit down. The mood of the discussion here is one which the Government must take account of, and I am sure that the Taoiseach at the European Council which we will be attending on Friday and Saturday will bear in mind the general mood of the House in its approach to the development of the European Community.

Question put and agreed to.