I move:
That Seanad Éireann notes the significance of the report and recommendations of the Brandt Commission contained in ‘North-South: A Programme For Survival', and calls on the Government to respond positively both through Ireland's own approach to North-South issues and also by promoting initiatives in the European Community and the United Nations along the lines recommended in that report.
I welcome the opportunity to discuss the Brandt report properly entitled "North-South: A Programme For Survival". I would like to thank the Leader of the House for arranging that the debate would take place in the Seanad this afternoon and for fixing a definite time for it so that the debate could take place in its entirely this evening between now and 8.30 p.m. I welcome the presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs here for the debate. As a former Senator he is familiar with this House and possibly appreciates for that reason the usefulness of debates particularly on reports of this sort being held in the atmosphere of the Seanad, in particular because they are debates on the record. This enables all of us to make the contribution which we feel the report warrants and to examine the implications for Ireland. It also enables the Minister, speaking for the Government, to express a view on the Brandt report and, if he so wishes, to give us the Government view and hopefully a Government commitment on the implications of the report itself and indeed in the whole area of development aid and development co-operation.
I would like to speak first of all to the initial part of the motion. The motion notes the significance of the report and recommendations of the Brandt Commission contained in the report. Then there is a second part which I will deal with in the second part of my contribution which calls on the Government to respond positively both through Ireland's own approach to this area of development and also by promoting initiatives in the European Community and in the United Nations along the lines recommended in that report.
I suggest to other Senators that these are two distinct aspects of the motion that are before us on which we should each contribute, first, the report itself and its significance and, second, the Irish responsibility, the implications for Ireland and Ireland's whole approach to development policy.
Let me turn to the first part of the motion, the significance of the Brandt report. It was the result of a study by an independent commission established in 1977 under the chairmanship of Willy Brandt to examine and report to the Secretary General of the United Nations and to the world at large on the whole range of issues under the heading of North-South issues. The report was completed in December 1979; it was presented to the Secretary General of the United Nations in February 1980; it was published in March 1980 and became available in this country, after some time lag, around about April or May 1980. It is described by the chairman, Willy Brandt, in his introduction as not intended to be a technical document. This is important to emphasise. The members of the commission were not so much experts who had been involved directly in Third World issues for a number of years and who compiled the report out of that expertise, they were chosen more for their experience and their prestige as politicians. A number of them were former Prime Ministers; a number of them were very significant people in the developing countries who lent their own names and reputations as well as their time and energy to being part of this independent study and part of the ultimate report which now bears the name of its chairman, Willy Brandt.
There have been criticisms of the proposals in the Brandt Report, criticisms that it is not innovatory, that it is not radically new in many of its recommendations, that it resembles the Pearson Report in 1969, and that even its more far-reaching proposals are matters that have already been the subject of discussion either in an agency of the United Nations or in some other forum. Indeed, I took part in a very interesting and stimulating meeting here in Dublin last night organised by Comhlámh on the Brandt report in which there was a criticism, for example, about the concept of "mutuality of interest" between the developed and developing countries, questioning some of the assumptions, questioning what precisely is meant by that mutuality of interest and is it perhaps more the self-interest of the developed world. I welcome this criticism. I think that criticism is an important part of the response to the Brandt Report. It is not something that needs to be accepted in a blanket and unthinking way.
But some of this criticism can tend to overlook what I believe is the first basic significance of the Brandt Report: that it constitutes on an authoritative document which any of us can purchase and read and, indeed, thanks to the good offices of the Department of Foreign Affairs, we have deposited about 20 copies so we have no excuse for not reading it. We did not even in the end, have to put our hands in our pockets to purchase it! The first essential feature of the Brandt Report is that it is a process for creating awareness among all of us, politicians and people, of the order of magnitude of the problem of the relationship between developed and developing countries, of the issues of the Third World, of the order of magnitude of the steps that need to be taken to avoid the reality of catastrophe, of starvation on a massive scale, perhaps of ultimate war in the world.
The first phase then is the analysis and report contained in this book. It does not worry me that it is not terribly innovative because it is sometimes more possible to get political will to accept a report which is not too surprising and too completely different from what has gone before. That is not to say that the proposals in the Brandt Report are not extremely far-reaching in their thrust, and would not radically change the world as we know it if they were implemented, and do not involve a transfer of resources to the Third World of a kind and on a scale that has not been before. It is extremely far-reaching in its implications. Part of that process, then, is the raising of consciousness. That is phase (1) of the report. But we have too often seen important reports only reach phase (1) and sit on a shelf, whether they be Irish reports by Irish expert bodies, for example, the Law Reform Commission, or international reports.
What we must address ourselves to here in this debate is stage (2), the phase of implementation, of seeing how it is possible to move to concrete measures, in other words, the crunch. Here it is fair to say that the Brandt Report has not been very helpful in itself. It has not advocated or suggested the steps for implementation. Indeed, the only references in the rather long and very interesting introduction by Willy Brandt to measures of implementation are his recommendations of the need for a summit for survival, a summit of a number of world leaders who would be representative of the developed and developing world, to discuss the issues as a matter of urgency and his personal appeal to a whole range of different audiences, to world leaders of specific, named countries like the United States, Russia, Japan and other European Community countries and also — and I think this is an important element in the report — an appeal to the public generally, to women, to youth, to the trade union movement, to individuals to read and reflect on the issues raised and to respond.
Apart from addressing himself to these different audiences, neither the chairman nor the report itself gave a natural structure of implementation. As a result of that, the response to the Brandt report since it was published last March has been rather unstructured, uneven and unpredictable. Undoubtedly, at the international level, the most important step was the special session of the United Nations in New York in August where the Brandt report and its implications were discussed and where there appears to have been an encouraging measure of agreement on the need for a new international development strategy for the eighties. I do not think there was formal agreement on this but there appears to have been a political concensus on it. Perhaps inevitably the blockage or the problem occured when it came to discussing the procedures necessary to launch global negotiations between developing and developed countries, and also on the issue of the role of the central body, the United Nations, and of the specialised financial agencies like the World Bank and the IMF. As I understand it, the discussion on these issues has been postponed, possibly until January, when there will be further attempts to launch these vital global negotiations.
What about the reception of and the consideration of the report here in Ireland? I accept that there will be an inevitable time-lag between the publication of an international report of this kind, even in a Pan Paperback which is intended to be more accessible to the general readership. But I also feel that this time-lag can be, and in this case should have been, shortened by Government action and leadership. There should have been more concern by the Government to recognise the importance of this report and to create public awareness and debate on it. I contrast the position of the Irish Government in this regard with the comparable position of the Dutch Government, because in the Netherlands, two months after the report was published, from the 15-18 may 1980, there was an extremely important symposium held in The Hague. It was sponsored and promoted by the Netherlands Government and the Netherlands Minister for Development took part, also the Chairman of the Brandt Commission Willy Brandt himself, and the majority of members of the Brandt Commission participated. So also did leaders of political parties — Joop den Uyl spoke for the socialist group; leaders of the trade union movement, of the employers, leaders of the Churches and 2,000 members of the public out of 8,000 who wanted to come, because they could accommodate only 2,000 people.
I have no doubt that by the 19 May 1980, it would have been difficult for anybody who was following current affairs matters to be unaware that there was a Brandt report, what it dealt with, what the Netherlands Government thought of it — because an official reaction of the Netherlands Government was given — what sectors of industry thought of it, what the ppolitical parties thought of it, what the Church leaders thought of it.
I have here a summary of that Netherlands symposium and some of the remarks were critical. It is possibly more difficult to be critical to commissioners to their faces, as the Dutch were to Willy Brandt and his team, but they were very constructive and very worthwhile criticisms.
The point I am trying to make is that, in contrast, here in Ireland the information and the lobby, such as it is, drawing attention to this Brandt Report has really been those involved in Third World agencies, those involved in working, whether researching or actively working in the field for developing countries, bodies such as Congood which has produced an excellent summary of the Brandt report which has been circulated to Members of the Oireachtas — indeed it was specially prepared for the information of Members of the Oireachtas — Comhlámh, who organised that meeting last night and who have had others and will be having a public seminar shortly involving representatives of the political parties on the Brandt report, and the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace whose report on Ireland's performance in the Third World, a study of Irish Government aid which I will be referring to later, have been responsible for raising public consciousness. But there has been an absence until now of formal Government response, and that is why I particularly welcome the presence here of the Minister this afternoon.
Before dealing with the substantive issues in the report I turn now to the rather sharper may be and less comfortable subject of Ireland's record on official development aid. I would like to begin by contrasting with the official record the response by individual Irish people and by voluntary groups, and communities, in Ireland to appeals for subscriptions for aid for developing countries whether it be in the aftermath of some particularly severe famine or drought or flood in a particular country or whether it be, over time, the consistent appeals for voluntary subscriptions from the large number of agencies which deal with these bodies. There is always a generous response. It has been surprising to see the figures that have come in that way from Ireland to be transferred to Third World countries, We also have a record that we can be proud of in voluntary service overseas through various agencies. This is something that Irish people are proud of. But the problem is that this is allowed to blur the harsh fact that our official aid, our politically structured aid, if I can put it that way, has never been adequate and has now begun to be cut back in a manner which has been described elsewhere, and I repeat that description, as shameful.
If we look at the figures — and I am going to look at them now — there is no other word that can be used. There is something very Irish about this. We are generous in a voluntary emotional ad hoc way. We do not think things through. But development aid requires a structured political response; it requires a development policy; it requires a carryover from year to year and it cannot be one of the first things cut during a particularly harsh year. If we do nothing else this afternoon, we should address ourselves to the need for more emphasis on the structured political response by this country in terms of its official aid, whether it is bilateral or multilateral, to developing countries. We must not feel comfortable or complacent about our voluntary contribution. That is no substitute; it is a very important addition and I do not wish in any way either to denigrate or undermine it; it is very important that there should always be this parallel, voluntary response and voluntary commitment and voluntary work done as we would expect from our record down the years and as we will expect into the future. But it is no substitute for what is done in the name of the state by the Government for the time being on behalf of the citizens of the State. In that respect I do not believe that our record is distinguished or even reasonably satisfactory.
I would like to refer the House to very clear and depressing documentation of Ireland's poor performance contained in this publication prepared by the development research unit of the Irish Commission for Justice and Peace and entitled "Ireland in the Third World: a Study of Government Aid". A copy of this was sent to Senators and is certainly available in the Library of the Oireachtas. This report documents and details, particularly from pages ten to 12, year by year, the amount of official aid in the budgetary allocations. I should not start, as I was going to do with the present Government's performance, the post-June 1977 Government. I will go back to the Coalition era where clearly the figures show that the Coalition Government reneged on promises to achieve half the United Nations official target of aid.
The official target of the United Nations is .7 per cent of GNP and the Coalition Government committed themselves to reach .35 per cent by the end of 1979. It was clear in the latter part of the term of office of the Coalition Government that they were falling behind on that, that they were cutting the contribution; that it was becoming more difficult for that target to be reached. That has to be faced up to by the parties that were in the Coalition. However, during that period official targets had been properly fixed for the first time. That is something that credit can be given for.
Since 1977, since the present Government took office, the picture becomes even more bleak. It is interesting to tabulate in particular the statements made by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Michael O'Kennedy, during 1978, concerning the United Nations target and the aim to achieve 0.35 per cent by 1979 or 1980, and then to note the gradual forgetting of that target, even though it had been set "regardless of budgetary considerations". That is very well tabulated. Then there is a heading on page 14 which is under a question: "What remains of the target for Irish official development assistance?" This paragraph summarises the thrust of the very detailed, very particular, very embarrassing figures of Ireland's promise through its Government for the time and failing to meet that promise in its budgetary allocation. It says that, beginning in the '70's, without any target whatsoever, the financial year 1973-74 saw the initiation of a development co-operation programme paralleled by the enunciation of its specific aid target; that the next six years, 1974-80 were years of making and breaking promises by politicians, of restating and reformulating commitments and because of or in spite of this, official development aid did increase in an erratic, unplanned way by a factor of five when expressed as a percentage of GNP from the very low base of the early 1970s. It says that what has become perfectly clear in the last ten years is the absolute necessity of an unambiguous and clearcut development assistance target formulation combined with appropriate institutional arrangements which would ensure that the target would automatically be complied with from year to year. That is a point I made earlier. It is a vital point in assessing Ireland's approach to development aid. We cannot afford to continue on an ad hoc basis from year to year because of the pressures that are there. The Minister may refer to these pressures. We do have economic recession; we have very high unemployment; we have very high inflation. As is clearly demonstrated elsewhere in this valuable analysis, a great deal of Ireland's aid of an official sort is first of all obligatory — 65 per cent is obligatory through our membership of the EEC, of the United Nations and of the International Development Authority. As far as bilateral aid is concerned a great deal of it is tied aid. It is tied to the purchase of services or the purchase of materials from Ireland. The real cost to Ireland is much less than the apparent statistical cost. So we are meaner than we appear, if one looks at the overall statistics. Yet we have been cutting down in real terms on the allocations and we are further away now from achieving the minimum standard which the United Nations have set as a target for 1990.
I would like to consider briefly the question: why should Ireland, after all, one of the poorer countries of the European Community and in some ways a developing country, want to set a target to achieve the minimum which the United Nations feels is morally required from developed, industrial countries to developing poor Third World countries? That is worth considering because Ireland likes to exert a moral influence in this area. Irish Ministers when they go to the United Nations like to speak for developing countries and to say that, as a former colony, Ireland seeks justice and fairness and peace in the world. Within the European Community Irish Ministers would like to exert a moral influence. Also the Irish people want their Ministers to exert a moral influence in these areas, want Ireland to play a role, albeit as a small country, but nevertheless a role of setting values. The problem is that we do not have the legitimacy or authority at the moment to play that role. We have not put our own house in order. Our own record of official development aid does not entitle us to lecture others and I do not think lecturing is really what we are talking about. What we are talking about is moral persuasion, persuading the developed world to assume the responsibilities and even the commitment necessary for the survival of the world itself for future generations.
If the Irish people fully understood how inadequate we are in our official development aid they would be critical of successive Governments for not giving leadership in this respect, of not being willing, even in a way that may hurt, to ensure that we reached the minimum target. That target has been exceeded by some of the European Community countries, certainly by the Netherlands and by Denmark.
I have spent a good deal of time talking about the importance of the Brandt Report as a process of creating awareness. I have not dealt at this stage in detail with the recommendations of the report. I hope that the Minister will comment in some detail on them because they include extremely far-reaching recommendations for an emergency programme, an action programme for the poor countries; for financial mechanisms which could be very significant in ensuring the transfer of resources; for an order of magnitude of response by the developed world which is somewhat equivalent in a rough way to a Marshall plan, following the second world war, that the United States implemented in Europe.
It is different from the Marshall Plan in that it is meant to be a very interdependent approach where the countries of the south would bear a major responsibility, have a major role to play and a major voice in it. They would not be the recipients of some kind of charity but rather work in mutual co-operation on the basis of this mutuality of interest. I hope the Minister will say, first of all, what Ireland's response is to the Brandt report generally, to the detailed recommendations of the Brandt report and, secondly, how is this response to be matched, first of all in putting our own house in order in regard to development aid and, secondly, in trying to further, if we accept them, some of the approaches and recommendations of the Brandt report.