The object of this Bill is to amend the law relating to rape and also the penalties for indecent assault on women or girls. On rape, it restricts the admissibility of evidence of any sexual experiences of the complainant with men other than the accused. It also prohibits, as a general rule, the publication of the identity of a rape complainant, and also the name of the accused unless and until he is convicted. The Bill increases to ten years the maximum penalty for indecent assault on women or girls.
Before commenting on the detailed provisions of the Bill, I should like to make a couple of general points. The provisions of this Bill go further, in practical terms, in protecting a complainant in a rape case even than the proposals that were put forward under the auspices of the Council for the Status of Women and I do not think that anybody would suggest that the council would be less than wholeheartedly committed to the protection of victims of rape. Similarly, the proposals go further than the corresponding ones in the Private Member's Bill that was before this House.
It would seem, if one may judge from some published comments, that some of those who supported the Private Member's Bill do not yet appreciate how much further the Government Bill goes on key issues than the Private Member's Bill did, but I have no reason to doubt that the Council for the Status of Women accept and welcome the fact that we have, on major points, actually gone further than what they had suggested even if we have not accepted their view on every point.
I am claiming no special credit on behalf of the Government for the fact that we have gone further than what was contained in other proposals. The point I am making is that, far from coming in with a milk-and-water Bill that is far weaker than had been proposed by interested organisations, as has been suggested in some quarters, we were not prepared just to accept as sufficient those proposals that had been put to us. We have put a great deal of additional work and thought into some of these proposals and, on points of critical importance for the protection of women, I believe that that work and thought have paid off, for the proposals that are before the House should represent a major benefit.
The two issues that over a period had become a source of growing concern were, firstly, the question of unfair and irrelevant cross-examination of the complainant and, secondly, her fear of publicity. If one excludes the extreme and plainly untenable proposition that cross-examination about her sexual experience with other men should never be permitted, the Bill now before the House is substantially stronger than other proposals that had been made. Similarly, it is stronger on the question of publicity because it ensures that, at a stage where the question of admitting certain evidence is in dispute and remains to be settled, the nature of the evidence is not mentioned in open court.
The only point on which there could be any room for serious argument as to how favourably the Bill compares with other proposals is the fact that it does not propose to introduce the concept of rape within marriage. I shall have more to say on that later.
At this point, I would just like to make the passing observation that there have been recent attempts in political circles to suggest that this is a simple and straightforward proposal with which only the most backward-minded people could disagree. Those attempts reflect, I would suggest, a certain surprise that the Government's Bill is so positive in dealing with the problems it covers and a feeling that, since the Bill does so well on those issues, it is necessary to look around for some other issue on which to attempt to denigrate it.
In recent years there has been growing criticism of certain aspects of the present law relating to rape. As I said in the course of my Second Stage speech in the Dáil, the question of introducing a Bill on this important matter has been under consideration for some time. The objective of producing a Bill as quickly as possible had to be balanced against the objective of producing the best proposals we could — proposals that would be likely to provide real benefit and not just ones that might look adequate on paper.
This brings me to another general point on which I would like to touch briefly for the information of the House. It was suggested in the course of exchanges on the Order of Business in this House on 19 June 1980 that a decision to introduce this Bill rather than to accept the Private Member's Bill was a reflex action — by which was meant a tendency to dismiss automatically, and without regard to its merits, any Bill that is not a Government Bill. Not only on this but on other occasions the underlying suggestion — indeed it is sometimes openly stated — is that if the Government were serious they could accept the Private Member's Bill as a basis and proceed to put down amendments on Committee Stage.
Without going into the matter in any detail, I would like to take this opportunity to make it clear that if a Bill is opposed instead of being accepted on the basis that it could be amended, it is not because of any hostility to the Private Member's Bill but because it is those very amendments that would have to be put down that present the difficulty in preparation. In concrete terms, if at that time the necessary amendments concerning, for instance, the admissibility of certain evidence could have been put down, the Government would have had their own Bill introduced before then.
Rape is one of the most reprehensible crimes known to the law and its victims deserve every protection the law can properly give. One major problem exists, however, and it is one which some people overlook. That problem is that, at the very time that the criminal law is being applied, it is not necessarily known that a rape has taken place at all. If the law had to take account only of situations where rape unarguably took place and where the only issue was whether the accused man was the culprit, the problems about evidence, cross-examination and the like would be much simpler to deal with — indeed there might be no problems. The fact is, however, that the law has to take account not only of the fact that rape is a reprehensible crime but also of the fact that false allegations of rape are both possible and, unfortunately, not unknown. The law must take account of that fact and must ensure that every accused person gets a fair trial. I believe that a proper balance between the two objectives — the protection of the complainant and justice for the accused — has been achieved in this Bill.
Section 2 of the Bill provides for the first time in law a statutory definition of rape, which is now a common law offence punishable with life imprisonment. The intention is not to change the law as to the meaning of rape but to make clear what constitutes the offence. I think this is desirable. for example, to judge from her Bill, Senator Hussey seems to be of the view, which may be shared by others, that rape means intercourse by force against the will of a woman. I should like to emphasise, however, that force is not a necessary ingredient of the crime.
There has been some criticism of the fact that the Bill does not propose to change the law as to the meaning of rape. Two specific changes have been requested: first, that the definition of rape should be extended to include certain other acts of a depraved nature against women and, second, that a husband should be made liable generally to a charge of rape on his wife.
The first suggestion was made by the Council for the Status of Women and was fully considered by the Government when the present Bill was in preparation. The reason behind the suggestion was mainly, I think, the feeling that the law did not take a sufficiently serious view of certain aggravated sexual assaults on women. The approach of the Government has been, I am satisfied, the logical one, namely, to look to the penalty provided by law for such offences rather than to confuse the offences with the well-established and separate offence of rape.
What the Bill proposes is to increase substantially that penalty so that there can be no doubt of the seriousness with which these assaults should be viewed. The new maximum penalty proposed is ten years, which is a substantial punishment by any standard. The Government consider that this is the proper way to deal with this problem. Rape, as at present defined, is a distinctive crime which has been so recognised for centuries.
It is clearly established in the public mind and is rightfully viewed with abhorrence by all. To alter the definition as suggested could only have the effect of diluting or reducing the stigma which rightly attaches to rape and, far from being a protection for women, would be likely, if anything, to have the opposite effect. I may add that the Heilbron Committee in England rejected a similar proposal to change the definition and the English Criminal Law Revision Committee, in their recent working paper, shared the view of the Heilbron Committee. I know of only one jurisdiction, namely South Australia, which has abandoned the traditional definition of rape.
The use of the word "unlawful" in the definition of rape indicates that the Bill does not propose to change the present law under which a husband cannot be convicted of the rape on his wife except in exceptional circumstances. There has been criticism of the Bill in this respect, both inside and outside the Oireachtas, but Senators will recall that when the subject was discussed during the debate in this House on the submission of the council for the Status of Women a number of Senators also expressed strong views in favour of retaining the existing rule.
Let me say at the outset that there is often an implication, in the suggestion that the rule should be changed, that because the law does not in the normal course allow a husband to be convicted of rape, the law permits a husband to use violence against his wife in order to force her to have sexual intercourse with him. To imply such is grossly to misrepresent the position, and could mislead women into thinking that there is no legal action that can be taken in such circumstances. Of course the law permits charges to be brought in such cases—not charges of rape but charges of assault.
It has been suggested, from time to time, that there is a principle involved here, that the law regards a wife as the property or chattel of her husband, that rape is a crime against property and that this is the reason why a husband cannot be convicted of rape on his wife. I am advised that there is no shadow of a foundation for that view. Historically, the reason that has been most usually advanced to explain the husband's immunity is that the wife on marriage gives an irrevocable consent to intercourse during marriage. Whatever reason was advanced for the rule, it seems more likely and more reasonable to think that the underlying reason was a reluctance to have the law intrude into the intimate affairs of married people and a recognition of the enormous practical problems which would be likely to arise. The problems that would be likely to arise from hasty allegations, if it were possible for wives to bring charges of rape against their husbands, should be obvious to everyone.
There is no point in saying, as some have done, that while the difficulties of proof would be great, the possibility of bringing a case and proving it should be left open. The problem is not with the difficulties of proof—it is with the ease with which allegations could be made.
This question of legal intrusion into the intimate affairs of married people is, I believe, very important in this area, as in other areas of law dealing with the family. I have indeed heard some comments on the approach of some interested persons to this issue in the context of this Bill and the Bill to abolish criminal conversation, now before Dáil Éireann. If we say, in effect, that it is wrong for the law to facilitate the airing of marital differences in a civil action for adultery, is there not a similar issue in relation to the concept of rape within marriage? It seems to me that the Government's approach, as reflected in the two Bills, is both consistent and correct. It gives due cognisance to the principle of avoiding any unnecessary interference in such affairs.
It should not be necessary to stress that to say this is not to dismiss the ugliness of what is in question, but I am suggesting that sexual intercourse without consent as between married couples cannot be equated with the heinousness of rape as traditionally understood and I suggest that any attempt to equate them is likely to diminish the seriousness of rape in its ordinary sense. As I have said, if a husband uses violence, he is liable to be prosecuted for it.
I mentioned earlier that in the normal course a husband cannot be convicted of the rape of his wife. There probably are, however, exceptions to the rule. The only guidance we have as to the extent of such exceptions comes from cases in England where courts have held a husband liable. There are no Irish cases on the matter but it is likely that Irish courts would adopt a somewhat similar line to that taken by English courts and accept that a husband can be liable to conviction in certain circumstances. These circumstances would almost certainly include the situation where the court has granted a judicial separation or where a separation agreement exists.
It might be suggested that we should spell out clearly in the legislation the circumstances under which a husband could be held liable. There would be some merit in doing this if the matter were otherwise free from difficulty. The issues involved in this area of the law are, however, much more far-reaching than the relatively straightforward examples that I have already given. Not only would there be the difficulty of listing all those circumstances which should be punishable as rape, but questions would inevitably arise in relation to other circumstances, such as, for instance, where the marriage had been annulled under Church law and not under civil law and also cases in which there was a barring order—though such an order might be of a temporary duration only.
Moreover, to enact a provision which defined exceptions would prevent a further development of the law except by statutory intervention. I should add that the English Criminal Law Revision Committee in their working paper which appeared after the publication of this Bill pointed to the drafting difficulties that would be involved and felt that there was no satisfactory way of listing all the circumstances in which the charge of rape might be brought against a husband.
I should mention also that some commentators on the subject have stated that the Criminal Law Revision Committee have recently recommended that the husband's immunity from a charge of rape on his wife should be removed. It is worthwhile examining the facts a little more closely. First, the recommendation was a provisional recommendation only, not a final recommendation. Furthermore, it was not a unanimous recommendation—the committee were very much divided on the matter. Thirdly, and very significantly, because of the obvious ease with which a charge of rape could be brought and the problems this could entail for the family, those who favoured the recommendation did so on the basis that a charge should only be brought with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. But that is not all. For the director, himself a member of the committee, is recorded as saying that he did not know what criteria he could use to decide whether or not to bring a charge. So here we have the very man who would be charged with the duty of deciding, publicly saying that he does not know how it would work in practice.
The provisional recommendation was made in a working paper for the purpose of getting comments and public reaction. It is interesting to find, from a London Times report of a few weeks ago, that one national women's organisation—the Conservative Women's National Advisory Committee—have come out against the recommendation. I assume that it will be conceded that a women's organisation, even if it has the word “conservative” in its title, is unlikely to take a stance contrary to what it regards as the best interests of women.
The legislation in South Australia, to which I have already referred in a different context, is sometimes quoted when this subject is being discussed. However, those who refer to the Australian legislation in the context of rape within marriage usually fail to mention that the relevant provision is substantially qualified by provisions to the effect that the act of intercourse must be accompanied by violence or acts of serious degradation. I wonder why it is that those important, indeed major, qualifications are omitted by people. Is it fair to suggest that they may be concerned more with a propagandist slant than with a balanced look at the problem?
The subject of what some people call marital rape is a subject on which strong opinions will continue to be held. This is understandable. On occasion, the reality can be a very ugly one. I certainly do not seek to suggest otherwise. What I do suggest, very strongly, is that the remedy does not lie in a charge of rape.
Before I leave section 2 I would like to refer to subsection (2) which is a re-statement of the present law in relation to the defence sometimes advanced against a charge of rape that the man believed that the woman consented to the intercourse. Following fundamental principles that are applicable generally in the criminal law, it recognises that it is not necessary, for the defence to succeed, that the belief should be based on reasonable grounds but it makes it clear, and this is the important point, that the presence or absence of reasonable grounds for the belief is a matter to be taken into account by the jury in deciding whether the defence should be accepted, that is whether the accused is telling the truth when he says he believed at the time that the woman was consenting to the intercourse.
I will now pass on to what is probably the most important change in the law on rape proposed in the Bill. That is the provision in section 3 which is designed to deal with one of the main criticisms made of the existing law on rape concerning the rules and practice under which evidence may be adduced and cross-examination of the complainant permitted in order to show that she had had sexual relations with men other than the accused.
Before I go into detail about this provision I would like to refer to the statement attributed to Senator Hussey after the publication of this Bill, that in this matter and in some other respects we have followed the provisions of her Bill. She was quite mistaken. In so far as the provisions are similar, neither she nor I can have any proprietary claims since we have borrowed from an English statute. What is important is not the similarity but the differences, because there are fundamental differences between the two Bills. For example, the Private Member's Bill provided simply that such evidence would not be admitted except by leave of the court on application made in the absence of the jury. Since no guidelines or tests were provided as to when such evidence could be admitted, the provision, if enacted, would ordinarily be interpreted as meaning that evidence could be admitted simply at the unfettered discretion of the court and that would be the case unless or until some higher court has set down guidelines.
This is obviously undesirable. It is a type of solution to the problem which in an American legal journal, a commentator on the law of rape has characterised as a "reform effort well meant but ill-conceived, (which) poses more dilemmas than it resolves". I might add that, unlike the Private Member's Bill, the Government Bill does not apply the relevant provisions to trials of offences under section 3 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885 and sections 1, 2 and 4 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1935. It does not do so because it would have no relevance in practice. In none of the 1935 Act offences does the question of consent arise since consent is not a defence. The 1885 Act offences relate to procuration to which it would not be appropriate to apply the provisions of this Bill. In rape trials it is the fact that absence of consent is a central issue that causes difficulties about the introduction of this evidence.
I have referred briefly to the British legislation, the Sexual Offences Act, 1976, on this problem, and let me again acknowledge our indebtedness to the text of that legislation.
Subsection (2) (a) of section 3 provides that the judge shall not give leave to adduce evidence or cross-examine a witness as to a complainant's previous sexual experiences except on an application made to him in the absence of the jury. Under section 6 of the Bill the public will also be excluded while the application is being made and dealt with.
We believe that there is an overwhelming case for excluding the public from the court when the judge is hearing such applications. To enable the judge to assess the merits of an application it will frequently be necessary for counsel for the accused to indicate in some detail the nature of the evidence or of the cross-examination and since one of the main reasons for restricting the freedom of the accused to cross-examine or to adduce evidence of this kind is to protect the complainant as far as possible from the ordeal that this would entail — and indirectly to reduce the risk that this would deter other women from reporting rape — to allow applications to be heard in public — even in the absence of the jury — would be inconsistent with this basic objective and would greatly reduce the protection it would afford to complainants. Since the evidence may not be allowed by the judge, and may even be irrelevant, or indeed quite simply false, an application which refers to it should not be heard by the public. If the evidence is relevant and allowed by the judge, it will be heard by the public in the course of the trial proper.
The next important provision of the Bill is contained in section 7. That section will prohibit, subject to exceptions, the publication of any matter likely to lead to the identification of a complainant in a rape case. While the news media at present generally refrain from publishing the complainant's name, there has been at least one case in the recent past of failure to do so and women may be in fear of publication in any particular case. We are satisfied that the inclusion of this provision in the Bill is desirable in order to protect them against distressful and potentially harmful publicity.
Some anxiety has been expressed in relation to subsection (4) of section 7 which provides that if at a trial for a rape offence the judge is satisfied that the effect of the prohibition of the publication of particulars which might lead to the identification of the complainant is to impose a substantial and unreasonable restriction on the reporting of proceedings at the trial and that it is in the public interest to remove or relax the restriction, he shall make an order to that effect. There is no need for any such anxiety. This provision is designed to deal with the situation in which the identity of the complainant may be a matter of public knowledge owing to the circumstances surrounding the offence or the subsequent investigation of it or the relationship between the people involved, in which case there would be no point in requiring the press to continue to conceal her identity.
Having decided to provide for the anonymity of complainants, we considered that, on grounds of fairness alone, the accused, unless and until he is convicted, should also be protected from having his identity published and that is provided for in section 8. Provision is made in both sections 7 and 8 for seeking a relaxation of the restriction on the publication of identifying particulars where this is necessary to induce witnesses to come forward. Undoubtedly such applications will be rare. The provisions permit the judge to allow only a partial lifting of the restrictions where this would be sufficient. It might not be necessary to allow publication of the names of the complainant or defendant. Both sections also specify the persons who will be guilty of an offence in the event of a publication or a broadcast in contravention of the provisions of the Act
Before I leave these sections dealing with the anonymity of complainants and accused I would like to refer to two other points that have been made. It has been contended that the complainant should have the right to have her anonymity lifted. The Bill only proposes to give an accused this right and there is a very valid reason for this distinction.
The question at issue here is whether allowing a complainant to have her anonymity lifted in a particular case might not cause confusion in the minds of women generally and, as a result, frustrate one of the main objects of the Bill. For instance, if in a particular case the name of the complainant in a rape case were to appear in the media, the reason for such an occurrence might not be clear to the public, and an erroneous impression might be created. One such case might be sufficient to create doubt among women as to the position regarding anonymity for complainants. Also it seems to me that a woman might feel under pressure — indeed might be put under pressure — to allow her identity to be published. I have no doubt that if the identity of some complainants were published and the identity of others not published the protection to be afforded by the section would lose much of its force.
The question of extending anonymity for the accused beyond the time of conviction until the time for appeal has passed has been considered. There is a public interest in having cases of serious crime reported. It would be unrealistic to expect that newspapers would report the trial as it takes place, including the result, but would give the name of the accused only after a long time lag. The time of conviction seems a reasonable point at which to stop.
There is the further consideration that not only can there be an appeal from the Central Criminal Court or the Circuit Court to the Court of Criminal Appeal but there can, in some cases, be an appeal to the Supreme Court. To continue the ban on the publication of the name of the accused until the time for appeal has passed, and, in cases where there is to be an appeal, until the determination of the appeal, would for all practical purposes be tantamount in many cases to a permanent ban on publication. This of course, would be undesirable.
Sections 4, 5 and 9 apply the relevant provisions of the Bill to preliminary examinations in the District Court, trials of juveniles and courts-martial respectively.
I have already referred to the proposal in the Bill to provide for an increase in the penalty for indecent assault on a female. Under section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1935, the maximum penalty for a first offence is two years and for a second or subsequent offence five years. The maximum penalty will now be ten years. This is a high penalty in modern terms — even taking into account the standard remission of one quarter — and reflects the Government's concern about certain types of aggravated sexual assaults short of rape which have been mentioned in comments and debate about this Bill.
I might mention that the English Criminal Law Revision Committee, who were equally concerned with these types of offences, recommended that the penalty for indecent assault be increased to five years, only half the penalty which this Bill proposes. The provision will give power to the judge where he is satisfied that the offence is of a particularly obnoxious nature to impose a sentence commensurate with the crime.
The penalty for publishing or broadcasting unauthorised matter in contravention of sections 7 and 8 where there is a conviction on indictment is laid down in section 11, and section 12 contains provisions for the summary trial of an offence of indecent assault on a female or of an offence of publishing or broadcasting unauthorised matter.
Section 13 contains the Short Title and the necessary transitional provisions, including a provision that the increased penalty for indecent assault is not to apply to an offence committed before the commencement of the Act. I referred earlier in my speech to certain aspects of Senator Hussey's Private Member's Bill which we find unacceptable or inappropriate for inclusion in this Bill. I have already dealt with some of these matters during the course of my remarks so far. I will now deal with the other matters in question, some of which have also been the subject of proposals from the Council for the Status of Women. The fact that the Bill does not deal with those matters does not necessarily imply that the proposals, at least in substance, are not valid. The basic reason is that, irrespective of merit, they are not matters that could properly be, or that should be, specified in the criminal law.
The Private Member's Bill contained provisions in relation to the duties of a Garda superintendent following a complaint that rape has been committed. It is a general principle that administrative matters should not be included in legislation and this is particularly so in the case of the criminal law. It is totally inappropriate to use this Bill to impose obligations of an administrative nature on gardaí. Apart from that fundamental point, one of the suggested provisions was that a ban-gharda should be present during the taking of any written statement given by a rape complainant. What, for instance, would be the approach of the courts if for unavoidable reasons in a particular case a ban-gharda was not available when the complainant's statement was being taken? What would be the position where the first garda on the scene and able to give all assistance was a male member of the Garda? I ask these questions so as to give an indication of the problems and difficulties that could arise if provisions of that nature were included in the Bill.
The Garda have detailed instructions on how to deal with rape complainants. The instructions include an instruction that the complainant's statement should be taken by a ban-gharda where possible and in the great majority of cases this will be possible. There may, however, be the occasional instance where it might not be possible depending on where and when the rape takes place. It will often be the case that the complainant will be accompanied by a close relation or friend. The ideal situation is, of course, for a ban-gharda to be present and this will happen if at all possible.
In regard to the suggestion that the complainant should be informed of her right to be examined by her own doctor, the position is that she can be medically examined at all only by consent and she always has the option of nominating her doctor. In most rural areas this will normally coincide with the garda choice. The suggestion that Garda stations should be equipped for the type of examination necessary is impracticable. In practice the complainant is taken either to the local hospital or to the the doctor's surgery.
The Private Member's Bill proposed that a copy of the complainant's statement be supplied to the complainant before the trial. It has already for some time past been the practice to supply witnesses—not just in rape cases but in criminal cases generally—with a copy of their statements on request. It was also proposed that the complainant be referred by the Garda to a social worker or other person experienced in the counselling of victims of rape. While generally speaking there would be no objection to the Garda advising a complainant as to where counselling might be available it would be inappropriate to make it mandatory on the Garda to refer the complainant to a social worker or other counsellor. It would be interfering, in effect, with the freedom of the individual to seek whatever advice she personally desired. And there would at times be a problem also in that the Garda might have reason to doubt that the complainant was bona fide.
As it happens, the Garda instructions in relation to rape complainants are at present under review. The Garda recognise that particular problems arise in relation to rape complaints and that procedures should be kept under review to take account of these problems. I repeat, however, that these are not matters which should be included in the Bill.
Various people have proposed that at a trial for rape there should be at least four female jurors. Some of those making this proposal have referred to the fact that it was made by the Heilbron Committee in England but I do not know if they are aware of the fact that the Heilbron recommendation was rejected in Britain. As I said in the Dáil, the proposal, if accepted, would create serious problems of principle. One of the reasons behind the proposal appears to be the allegation that some defence counsel object systematically to women jurors in rape cases in the belief that all-male juries give an accused a better chance of acquittal. If the remains of such a practice still exist, it will I believe very quickly die out because the evidence suggests that male jurors are certainly not less disposed to bring in "guilty" verdicts in rape cases than female jurors. The opposite may in fact be the case if one were to go on the statistics in relation to rape trials in recent years. In the two year period 1979-80, 23 trials for rape took place. Although one must be cautious about drawing conclusions from so small a number of cases, the verdicts in these cases considered in the light of the composition of the juries suggest that the presence of women on the jury does not increase the likelihood of a conviction.
Finally, the Private Member's Bill had a provision that the Director of Public Prosecutions and the courts shall take all possible steps to ensure that rape and other sexual offences are brought to trial without delay. Such a provision, too, would be wholly inappropriate in a statute as well as having no precise meaning. The position is that, while there still are delays in the hearing of cases before the Central Criminal Court, there are no such delays in criminal trials in the Circuit Court either in Dublin or throughout the country. The problem in the Central Criminal Court is that many rape trials are transferred to it from the Circuit Court, principally from the Dublin Circuit Court. This problem should end shortly. I have introduced an amendment to the Courts Bill, 1980, which is designed to do away with the existing right of transfer of criminal trials from any circuit to the Central Criminal Court and to replace it with a right of transfer from any provincial circuit to the Dublin circuit, subject to the same conditions as obtain with the existing right of transfer. This proposal, I feel sure, will remedy the problem.
This Bill has been designed to deal in the most effective way possible with those aspects of the law on rape which have been of most concern. As I have said the main difficulty has been to strike a proper balance between, on the one hand, the right of the accused person to a fair trial and on the other hand the need to protect the complainant. I think that we have achieved this objective. Senators will no doubt agree with me that the existing penalty for indecent assault on females is totally inadequate to deal with the aggravated cases of indecent assault that we hear and read about and will, I hope, also agree that the proposal to increase this penalty is the proper way to deal with these cases.
I commend the Bill to the House.