I will give a quick run through section 4 and explain why some of the subsections might give rise to difficulty. I am not going to repeat what I said about the whole concept of detention, even though this is an appropriate place in which to do it. To agree to section 4 we are, in fact, agreeing to the question on the process of detention and when the question is put, anybody against the process of detention will in logic have to vote against section 4. A number of problems have arisen with regard to the section and I would like to confine most of my comments to those. The Minister is aware of my views on detention. I do not think there is anybody in the House who is not aware of them at this stage. There will be absolutely nothing to be gained by repeating them. If only increases my blood pressure and wastes the time of the House.
Subsection (1) has already been considered as consequent to an amendment we discussed earlier on. Subsection (2) gave rise to a problem. I was going to attempt once again to explain to the Minister the problem that I see with the wording of subsection (2) as it now stands, as distinct from the amendment which I proposed at an early stage which the Minister kindly agreed to look at. I was trying for a different way of explaining what I mean. There were Members in the House yesterday who had no idea of what we were talking about. For example, one Member who is quite familiar with the Bill indicated to me that he did not realise that it was only cases where persons can be arrested with out warrant that were involved. He did not, therefore, understand the discussion which took place earlier along those lines.
In regard to subsection (2) — I am trying to be helpful to the Minister — suppose there were no powers to arrest without warrant at all and one had a subsection (2) which read as follows: "Where a members of the Garda Síochána arrests without warrant a person whom he with reasonable cause suspects of having committed an offence...", if there were no power to arrest without warrant known to the law or if it had been abolished — I believe that would be giving power to the Garda to arrest without warrant in respect of an offence falling within subsection (1).
I would like the Minister and his officials to consider the problem in that light. If arrest without warrant does not exist, what then would be the proper meaning where a member of the Garda Síochána arrests without warrant? The only power of arrests at the moment for the purpose of our discussions is arrest with warrant. It would appear that that subsection would be creating a new power. This new power would be the power to arrest without warrant in respect of offences falling within subsection (1).
The Minister can come back and say that there is such a thing as arrest without warrant at present and I accept that. What we are trying to see is whether the superimposition of subsection (2) on the existing powers creates a new power. It is sufficiently uncertain for the Minister to make an amendment at a later stage along the lines I suggest or some other lines. It is very important that this would be made perfectly clear. There is no matter of principle whatsoever. It is merely a question of tidying up the legislation.
One of the reasons that I am against the prospects of detention as outlined in section 4 and to which I have not referred previously — it is appropriate to refer to now is because it will be administratively impossible to operate. Judicially, it will not work. It will give rise to a succession of lengthy trials within trials.
To help the Members who are not familiar with the concept of a trial within a trial, basically what it means is that where a legal submission is being made of which the judge is the sole arbitrator, he would request the jury in such a case to withdraw and would make a submission on the legal point. A very good example of that is the admissibility of a statement taken from the accused. On any statement taken from an accused obviously it is possible to challenge that it was taken voluntarily, to argue that it was taken in breach of constitutional rights, or in some other oppressive manner. This is done by getting the jury to withdraw. The question to be answered in that section of the trial is if the statement was voluntary or subject to the alleged irregularity, or should it be introduced in evidence in the trial. The jury are not present there. In that legal discussion by the defence, normally, with the prosecution helping, witnesses may to called to aid or abet their case. The discussion between them and the judge forms the basis of a trial within a trial. Ultimately, the judge says, "I rule this statement to be admissible." The jury come back and the statement is put into evidence. They do not know what has been going on. They have been kept incommunicado in doing that. This is what a trial within a trial means.
This section as drafted will permit trials within trials of inordinate length and uncertain outcome. That is a major criticism of the legislation. There has already been major criticism of the concept of trial within a trial and of the problems to which it gives rise. One of the offshoots of the trial within trial phenomenon is that there is a movement growing up to do away with the prospect of trial by jury.
An article recommending that course of action was published recently in either the Garda Review or the Garda News which are sent to us free through the post. It was published without comment. I am not saying that it was the view of the gardaí themselves but it was certainly a view which they considered significant enough for double page treatment. The reason that this view is developing is that the important element of a trial is becoming a trial within a trial. A great many contested prosecutions are based on confessions. The Commissioner of the Garda Síochána, as well as people in the other House have suggested it is as high as 80 per cent. I do not know if that is so. This is a very high percentage. The crucial element of a trial is becoming the admissibility or otherwise of the statement made by the accused.
It is interesting to note that the Ó Briain Report had something to say with regard to that point.
Consideration of this Bill will give rise to the following areas which could be proper for examination as to whether the rights of the accused have been violated. I should explain to Members — and this is by no means interesting material — that there are differences between irregularities in statements. Statements taken in violation of what are called the Judges Rules, may or may not be admissible but statements taken in breach of the constitutional rights of the accused are always ruled out. In other words, if some administrative procedure is not followed, the statement may or may not be admitted, but if the statement is taken in breach of the constitutional rights of the accused, except in the most extreme circumstances, that statement will be excluded. There is no power under law to arrest a person and to hold them for questioning, and the Minister has confired that that is the case. The only power that will exist is the power contained in this Bill. To get any statement the accused has made ruled as inadmissible, his counsel will only have to show that that statement was taken in breach of his constitutional rights, in other words, that some procedure laid down in the Act was not followed because when that happened he was no longer in lawful custody.
Approach this from the point of view of a lawyer defending somebody who says he have a statement after 11 hours in Garda custody. The lawyer then says that he must try to get that statement rendered inadmissible. The following will have to be shown by the prosecution in the trial within the trial — first, that the garda who made the original arrest had reasonable cause; because if he does not have reasonable cause, the arrest is unlawful. Second, it will have to be shown, in what the Minister said about the use of "may" and "shall" yesterday, that the person was taken to the Garda station for a good reason. Third, it will have to be shown that at the time of arrival at the Garda station, the member in charge had reasonable grounds for believing that the detention was necessary. The arresting garda will have to be present; the garda in charge of the station will also have to be present and he is going to be subject to cross-examination as to why he arrived at the conclusion that there was reasonable grounds for believing detention was necessary.
Senator Durcan indicated a difficulty that might arise in that regard. He indicated that this could be read to mean that immediately on arrival at the Garda station, the person would have to be of that opinion. I do not know if that is right nor do I know if the courts are going to adopt the attitude that if the Garda who made the arrest tells the member in charge that he has reasonable cause for believing the person has committed a crime, that in itself will be reasonable cause for the member in charge. If that is the case, we could leave out the member in charge altogether. Surely the test must be objective? He must arrive at a separate and distinct conclusion for separate and distinct reasons from the person who made the arrest. That is another ground which will have to be tested.
The next consideration is that the person was not detained for longer than six hours. If the detention lasted longer than six hours, it is going to have to be shown that it was done with the permission of the superintendent. We will have a superintendent present who can give evidence that he approved of the extension. It is possible that some of these people might give evidence by written statements, if there is an agreement between both parties, but if the case is hotly contested, I doubt very much that there will be agreement between both parties, The defence counsel will demand his right to cross-examine the superintendent involved. That is another step that will have to be taken. In addition, the superintendent must have reasonable grounds for believing that further detention is necessary. Not only will the superintendent have to say he gave approval for the extension from six hours to 12 hours, but he will have to say that he had reasonable cause for doing so and give the reasons. That is another point that will be subject to examination by the courts. Some Members might say that that is only lawyers' talk, but the people who will be representing the accused in court are lawyers and that is the way lawyers talk. That is what will happen in the court.
A problem would arise about what stage the garda had enough evidence to prefer a charge in respect of the offence. That is going to give rise to a problem under subsection (5). There is also going to be a problem if the 12-hour period includes anything after 12 midnight. In those circumstances, if questioning continued the written agreement of the defendant is going to have to be produced and presumably that written permission will be subject to challenge as to whether it was voluntarily given or not. That, too, will be subject to examination. They are the kind of items which will be the subject of examination in the trial within the trial.
Anybody who has attended a trial in the Special Criminal Court will realise that it is a tortuous process and that the trial within the trial portion of that is indeed very tortuous. It is only suitable for consideration because of a number of factors. It is normally in respect of the most serious offences that this kind of trial takes place and if they take an inordinate length of time, then the seriousness of the crime and their relative rarity is proportionate to the amount of time taken for the examination for the case. Another thing that makes it particularly suitable is the fact that there is no jury. The judges do not have to dismiss themselves and put on a different hat. They are considered sensible enough to be able to do this without difficulty, but we are proposing to do this at Circuit Court level, which is already overloaded. We are proposing to have trials within trials of inordinate length. The whole system will "gum-up" very shortly. It is just not practical. After the system has "gummed-up" there will be suggestions that the only way to solve the problem is to do away with the right of trial by jury. That will not solve the problem but it would shorten the trial procedures.
Outside the question of whether it is objectively right or not to have detention, the actual length of time that trials will take in the Circuit Court will be colossal. That is also a consideration because justice delayed is justice denied. If a person has committed an offence it is important that he would be punished reasonably soon after the commission of the offence rather than years and years later. In that way the operation of the section is going to be administratively impossible, and that is one reason that I consider the Minister to be, in theory, making the detection of crime more administrative, but he is giving the lawyers a whole new area of investigation, of contention, for the purpose of serving the best interests of their clients. I will not be doing it because I do not represent these people, but lawyers will be doing it. That is their job.
A normal trial in the Circuit Court which is based on a confession — as I am told are 80 per cent of all the crimes which are solved — will strentch out to double or treble the length of time at present involved. They might say that Circuit Court judges will be able to short-circuit that. Of course they will try to short-circuit it but if they try too hard the short-circuiting of the arguments put forward on behalf of the defendant will in itself become the subject of an appeal. That is another reason why section 4 will not work.
Senator Robinson mentioned another important fact. Section 4 is defective because it does not give the power to question at all. It may be that the power to question is automatically there. Really it mentions questioning only in section 4 (6) (a) when it says "the member in charge of the station is of the opinion that any questioning of that person for the purpose of the investigation should be suspended". That is the only right to question that is given. It is very foolish to introduce this concept in such an offhand fashion. Consequently the rights of the citizens with regard to questioning are being overlooked by reason of the fact that the questioning is not laid out clearly as to the circumstances in which the questioning can arise.
Another matter which I should bring to the Minister's attention arises from the same subsection. Is the Minister aware that the suspension of the questioning between midnight and 8 a.m. must be the subject of a consent in writing? Will the Minister inform us what administrative procedures he proposes to ensure that that consent is given in a voluntary way? I have already referred to the matter of being capable of being questioned at the trial. Would the Minister inform us what procedures he proposes to adopt to ensure that the consent is given in writing? It is important that the consent would be given. Is the consent to be given to the garda in charge of the station, or to whom is the consent to be given?
Regarding section 4 (10), the Minister has stated on a few occasions that we are not considering the Offences Against the State Act here but he has considered it necessary to include a subsection to the effect that nothing in the section shall affect the operation of section 30 of the Offences Against the State Act, 1939. Therefore, we are considering whether it will affect section 30 of the Offences Against the State Act, 1939. The Minister has not answered at all the criticism that the recommendation of Mr. Justice Barra Ó Briain with regard to the introduction of a period of detention in his chairman's addendum also included the following recommendation:
This power to "detain" in order to question is already provided for in the Offences Against the State Act, 1939, and I would recommend that the six hours mentioned above be adopted as the norm in all cases, with certain powers for a District Justice or a Peace Commissioner
—the much maligned peace commissioners—
to extend the normal period for a strict and limited time in respect of cases covered by that Act and the Emeragency Powers Act, 1976, rather than the lengthy periods now set out in these two Acts.
The standing foundation on which the Minister claims justification for the introduction of detention is the chairman's addendum to the Ó Briain Report which itself includes a recommendation that simultaneously the Offences Against the State Act should be amended, and this subsection specifically rules out the bringing together of the time limit in both Acts. As I said in my Second Stage speech, which no doubt the Minister has read carefully, the Offences Against the State Act should have been considered at the same time as this, and this change should have been brought about, because what we are getting is the hard parts of the Ó Briain Report. We are getting those that appeal to the macho instincts of the law enforcers but we are not getting the controls that balance it. Therein my major criticism of this section lies. We are getting the parts which give the extra power but we are not getting anything like the safeguards which we are entitled to. We are getting the additional powers of detention but we are not getting the reduction of the powers under the Offences Against the State Act.
It is quite clear that the Ó Briain Report and the chairman's addendum to the Ó Briain Report are only valuable hallstands on which the arguments can be hung from time to time as suits the occasion, and from time to time the Ó Briain Report and the chairman's addendum can be completely ignored. For that reason section 4 (10) is objectionable.
They are the five points that I want to make — the question of detention itself which I have already spoken about at length, the inadequate power to question and because of the power to question is only implied no real safeguards with regard to the power of questioning, the fact that an arrest without warrant is not made clear in the section as I proved by the supposition that there is at least a doubt in that regard, the fact that trials within trials are going to be of inordinate length, a question to the of inordinate regard to the procedures for the consent in writing, and a protest that the Offences Against the State Act is not being amended as was recommended by Mr. Justice Barra Ó Briain in his addendum. They are the major points I would like to make at this stage of our discussion on section 4.