The Government's decision to open a debate in this House within days of a very full and constructive debate in Dáil Éireann, is a clear indication of the importance which they attach both to the opinion of the Members of this House and to the successful outcome to the Maastricht European Council and to the issue of European Union.
I am aware of the close interest which this House takes in all aspects of European Affairs. It is, therefore, fitting that on the eve of a meeting of such fundamental importance for the future of the European Community and for Ireland that there should be full and open debate on all the main issues which so directly affect the interests of our people. I look forward to hearing the views that will be put forward in the course of the debate and of learning of the particular concerns of Senators on the various aspects of the negotiations.
It is important that the contributions which will be made here in the course of the next two days should be seen as part of a broader and fuller debate throughout the country, so necessary for public understanding of the issues at stake at Maastricht. As this House will be aware, the Government intend to put the outcome of the two intergovernmental conferences on economics and monetary union and political union to the people in a referendum some time next year. Only one other member state, Denmark, is due to do the same.
Debates in the Oireachtas make a positive contribution to informing people who do not have to deal with the European Community on a day to day basis but who, nevertheless, have strong views about what they feel the Community can and should contribute to the quality of their lives and about what in turn we in Ireland should contribute to the Community. The Government will publish, in the new year, a White Paper which will explain the background content and implications of the provisions of the new union Treaty. In this connection, I would hope that these debates, the White Paper, and public comment and analysis will assist the electorate in making an informed judgment in the forthcoming referendum.
Before addressing the issues which will be discussed at Maastricht and outlining the approach which the Government have taken since the beginning of the negotiations, I should like to refer to the view which always seems to be present in any discussion of Ireland's approach to Community membership. It is the perception that our commitment to membership and our belief in the necessity of further European integration is determined solely by the level of financial transfers that can be won from Brussels.
I am especially dismayed that the expression "begging bowl approach" has been used by commentators to refer to Ireland's attitude to Europe. I heard it again this morning on the "Morning Ireland" programme. It is an expression that is as inaccurate as it is derogatory. In my experience the view which our Community partners have of Ireland and our contribution to the development of the Community and to the role and influence which it plays in the world, is overwhelmingly positive.
We are a small member state, we are one of the less prosperous regions of the Community and we have a number of economic and social problems — unacceptably high unemployment, emigration, location on the periphery of the industrialised populous centre and an underdeveloped infrastructure. These compel us quite rightly to look to the instruments of Community policy for the kinds of assistance which they were designed to provide.
Our approach is not unique. It is shared by all the other members of the Community who, in defending their interests, seek the best response from the Community and its member states to their particular concerns. It is so often forgotten that the cement which binds the Community structure together is a shared solidarity and a common objective. An example of this was the Community's contribution to the process of German unification.
Our approach to the present stage of European integration is the same as it was since we joined the Community. In applying for membership to the Community in 1961, the then Irish Government saw and understood what our European partners were about. Even at that relatively early stage, Ireland wanted to be part of it. We wanted to join in building on common values and a shared culture. There has been an underlying continuity of approach to the Community. This is nowhere better reflected than in the manner in which the Government have set about presenting their case and defending their interests in the present negotiations.
When we embarked, almost a year ago, on the process of further European integration by agreeing, along with our partners, to convene two intergovernmental conferences on economic, monetary and political union, we set ourselves four basic objectives: first, to contribute to the negotiations on the basis of a coherent and constructive set of principles which would draw on our experience of the Community over the past 18 years, reflect our concerns about the scope and impact of policies operating in the Community today, and signal our aspirations for the future of the Community at a time of great change in Europe; second, to protect the institutional balance of the Community by agreeing to changes in the structures and roles of the key institutions of the Community which would enhance the effectiveness, transparency and operation of the Community; third, to ensure that the substance of the innovations and modifications being made to the Treaty had at their core the interests and well being of the citizens of the Community; and fourth, to argue for a reinforcement of the commitment of the Community towards the economic and social development of its less prosperous regions, through the strengthening of specific instruments and through the operation of all Community policies.
On the eve of the Maastricht European Council, the Government have reviewed the state of the negotiations and measured, against the background of the objectives which I have just described, the extent to which the concerns which we articulated throughout the negotiations have been accommodated.
Our conclusion is positive. Certainly in some areas we might have wished for more, while in others we could have lived with less. Nevertheless, and taking into account the very different approaches of some of our partners, I believe that it should be possible to reach an outcome acceptable to all.
Senators will have seen the text of the new union Treaty. The overall shape of the Treaty, made up of three separate but linked pillars, reflects the evolving nature of the union and is one which we can accept. It will be a disappointment to some of our partners and to the European Commission in that the Treaty does not go further in putting shape and form on the federal vocation of which it talks.
Nevertheless, the three pillar approach is a sensible and logical compromise. The central pillar corresponds to the existing Community procedures as enshrined in the Treaty of Rome. The other two pillars represent the two areas where co-operation will remain for the moment intergovernmental in nature, common foreign and security policy on the one hand and home affairs and judicial co-operation on the other. When the time is right it should be possible to bring all three pillars together in one integral Community structure operating according to accepted Community procedures which have served the Community and Ireland well. Before examining the substance of the changes which are being proposed, I wish to say something about the principle of subsidiarity. This is a principle which will be at the heart of Community development in the years ahead. It can be defined thus. The Community will only act to carry out tasks which can be undertaken more effectively by the member states acting together than separately.
From the early stage of the negotiations some of our partners sought to enshrine the principle of subsidiarity in the Treaty. We recognised that there were areas where it would be in our interest to have the principle apply — social policy and the environment, for example. However, we argued that the application of the principle should be subject to two basic imperatives: avoidance of anything calling into question the Community's achievements and of anything detracting from the degree of integration brought about by the Community; and maintenance of the effectiveness of the Community decision making process. These two concerns constitute the basis of our approach to the incorporation of subsidiarity into the Treaty. In effect, our concerns were that the inclusion of the principle of subsidiarity in the Treaty should not impede the dynamic development of the Community. I am satisfied that as it now stands the article in the Treaty fully meets our concerns.
I wish to refer next to the provisions which have been included in the new Treaty concerning European citizenship, which I know will be of particular interest to the Members of this House. The concept of European citizenship in political union has been introduced and provides for rights of movement and residence; rights to vote (and to stand) in local and European elections; arrangements for mutual assistance or Community citizens in third countries; formalisation of the existing arrangements for petition to the European Parliament and the establishment of a Community ombudsman.
In addition, a development clause has been agreed whereby additional rights may be added to those provided for in the new Treaty. This will be done by the Council acting by unanimity on the basis of a proposal from the Commission. Decisions taken in this area would then be recommended to the member states for "adoption in accordance with their constitutional rules".
The establishment of rights provisions in the Treaty represents a major qualitative change in the basic law of the Community. Ireland welcomes this step which will have considerable implications for the future development of the union.
I wish to turn now to some of the key elements of the union Treaty and to outline their significance for the Community, for the member states, and for this country. The scope of Community action and the areas of policy where it will operate are being both deepened and expanded.
I will mention three areas which I know will be of particular interest to Senators — education, culture and the provisions relating to social policy. Ireland proposed a chapter on education. We received broad support from other delegations. This is, after all, an area where the Community should have an interest in developing its activities further. Education is fundamental to its economic and social development.
In the field of Community education, Community action, among other things, will be aimed at developing the European dimension in education. It will concentrate particularly on the teaching and dissemination of languages; the encouragement of student and teacher mobility and — this is of central importance — the encouragement of the mutual academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study. Youth exchanges and co-operation between educational establishments as well as the development of distance education will be areas where co-operation within the Community could be enhanced for the benefit of all.
The provisions in the Treaty relating to vocational training have also been considerably expanded. This, of course, is an area where the Community has already developed a fairly advanced policy. The elements which will be of particular importance for Ireland will be those providing for continuous training in order to facilitate vocation integration and reintegration into the labour market.
The rich tapestry of Europe, the diversity of its peoples, languages and traditions, is nowhere better encapsulated than in its cultures. The protection of national and regional cultures is now accepted as a basic ingredient of European Union. Ireland has a strong and vibrant culture. It is mixed and generous, spanning all fields. When, together with the European Commission, we put forward a draft article on culture there was considerable support for our text. We selected four areas where we felt co-operation could be stimulated — knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples; conservation and safeguarding of the cultural heritage of Europe; cultural exchanges and artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector. The more we understand and appreciate the history and cultures of our neighbours the easier we will find it to work and live together.
Social policy is one of the key issues in the negotiations. We argued strongly, and with success, that policy formulation in his area must be consistent with the overriding need to strengthen economic and social cohesion and to promote employment. We also felt that aspects of social policy should be closely tailored to the distinctive circumstances of individual member states. Wherever possible, the Community should avoid intervening in social matters that can more appropriately be dealt with at national or local level, or through the collective bargaining process.
We attach great importance to the development of the social dimension, which we regard as an integral part of the move to complete the Internal Market. We were, therefore, prepared to consider, on their merits, appropriate proposls to amend the Treaty, including changes to the decision making arrangements, in order to facilitate this process.
We argued, however, that employment should be specified in its own right as a major social policy objective of the Community. In our view this would be in line with the stipulation previously agreed in the Community that employment development and creation must be given top priority. As a result of our efforts there is now a reference to the promotion of employment at the very beginning of the chapter on social policy.
I have chosen to highlight these three areas as an illustration of the ways in which it has been possible to use the intergovernmental conference to improve the substance of the provisions that already exist in the Treaties.
A new chapter on development co-operation has also been introduced. This is an area where the Community plays a leading role on the world stage through the operation of the Lomé Convention and its extensive food aid and humanitarian assistance programmes. The new provisions of the Treaty on development co-operation will have among their stated objectives that of fostering the lasting economic and social development of the developing countries and most especially the disadvantaged among them; the smooth integration of the developing countries into the world economy, and the campaign against poverty in the developing countries.
I know of the interest and concern which many Members of this House have shown in relation to the Third World. I would consider the chapter on development co-operation a major advance in the level of commitment which the Community and its member states have made to assisting the developing countries.
At the heart of the changes which are being introduced in the areas of competence is the move to greater use of majority voting. The speed at which the legislative programme for the Single Market has been adopted has encouraged us to look more seriously at the way in which the Community functions and to assess whether there was not scope for a radical improvement in the decision-taking process. We concluded that it would be impossible to make political union work properly unless the operation of the Community and its institutions was improved and the decisions taken were made more effective. We began, therefore, by looking at the way in which decisions were taken.
The success of the Single European Act owes much to the fact that the vast majority of decisions have been taken by qualified majority vote. The acceptance of the greater use of majority voting is now seen as a necessity without which important decisions would be delayed indefinitely or possibly not taken at all. This, everyone agrees, would have serious consequences for the viability and evolution of the Community.
There will remain, nonetheless, areas where it would be imprudent to abandon altogether the principle of unanimity in areas of particular sensitivity. Such areas include taxation, certain aspects of social and environment policy, as well as the adoption of common positions or joint action in the fields of foreign policy and judicial co-operation.
The role of the institutions in the day-to-day operation of the Community has been an important part of the negotiations. The efficiency and effectiveness of the Community and its institutions were among the main questions to be considered under this heading. There was broad agreement on the need to make the institutions of the Community respond adequately to the new challenges which will arise following the implementation of the internal market, the attainment of economic and monetary union and the expansion of the Community into new areas.
The European Commission, the guardian of the Treaties, will be nominated by the member states under the new Treaty. The Commission will be confirmed as a body, by the European Parliament. The President of the Commission and individual Commissioners will still be nominated by the governments of the member states.
There is also a proposal that the number of Commissioners should be reduced to one per member state from the present seventeen members. This proposal has received considerable support. As the Community grows with the accession of new member states, it would be unwieldy and less effective to have an over-large Commission.
If I might now turn to the European Parliament, the democratic legitimacy of the Community is one of the most important aspects of the negotiations and concerns the need to ensure the democratic accountability of the Community institutions. For the majority of delegations this implies an increased involvement of the European Parliament in the legislative process and in the field of external relations. The reasons for enhancing the Parliament's role as part of the present process might be summarised as follows: the inconsistency of the Parliament's present limited powers with its status as a directly-elected and representative Community forum; the possible imbalance brought about by a situation in which Parliament feels itself unable to exercise adequate control over the decision-making powers of the Council of Ministers, particularly where this will have significantly widened and deepened its areas of activity and powers; the consideration that the absence of a greater role for the Parliament will continue to give rise to a sense of frustration which could ultimately undermine the decision-making effectiveness of the Community; and a continuing awareness that the role of the Parliament will need to be enhanced if electorates are to take the Parliament seriously and vote in significant numbers at future European elections.
A number of member states, including Ireland, were reticent about increasing the power of the Parliament at this stage of the development of the Community. Their arguments were: the consideration that member states — and this applies particularly in the case of the smaller member States — cannot exercise through the participation of their representatives in the work of the European Parliament the power and influence which it is open to them to exercise through their participation in the work of the Council of Ministers; the decisions taken by the Council of Ministers generally result from a genuine negotiation involving an effort to accommodate the interests of each member state. In the European Parliament, on the other hand, the political complexion of the Parliament will help determine the nature of the positions taken by Parliament; and the decision-making procedures of the Community are already cumbersome and any movement towards co-decision between Council and Parliament must be so structured as not to introduce significant delay into the decision-making process.
The negotiations on this central issue have been among the most difficult of all. However, there is growing agreement on the mechanism which will allow Parliament to have the right to reject the Council's position on Community legislation. This will involve, in essence, at the end of the procedure, the establishment of a conciliation committee made up of equal representatives from the Council and the Parliament who would meet to try to find solutions to any disagreements on draft legislation.
Decisions would be taken by qualified majority on the part of the Council and simple majority on the part of the members of Parliament. The outcome would be referred back to the plenary of both Parliament and the Council. Parliament would have the right to reject the legislation by a majority of its members if it continued to be dissatisfied with the degree to which Council had accepted or rejected its amendments.
It has always seemed to be that one can regard the European Parliament as having some of the characteristics of a Senate, for example the limited right of rejection of legislation. The consultative function of our Senate, which is the primary reason for its complex electoral system, is also mirrored by the right of the European Parliament to comment on Commission proposals and to suggest amendments.
I welcome these provisions which will mean a greater involvement of the Parliament in the Community decision-taking process.
The role of national parliaments in the scrutiny and consideration of Community legislation and developments generally must be reinforced. There is a proposal put forward by France to establish a regular meeting of representatives from the European Parliament and national parliaments which would hear reports on the State of the Union from the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission and would consider major issues affecting the Union.
If this proposal is agreed, next Monday or Tuesday, the influence of national parliaments taken together with the important work already carried out by the respective parliamentary committees of the member states — including our own Joint Committee on the Secondary Legislation of the European Communities — will be significant. I do not fear, therefore, that the voice and contribution of national parliaments to the construction of the Union will be diminished or lost.
I wish to turn now to the question of economic and social cohesion. This is an issue which is central to our relationship with the Community and was the one on which we have devoted very considerble effort and energy. I would recall that in its influential report on Ireland in the European Community, the National Economic and Social Council stated:
...if Ireland is to argue that regional convergence is a shared Community objective and responsibility, and to advocate that Community policies to achieve it be adopted on a realistic scale, then Ireland itself must be capable of making a leading contribution to the formulation of those policies. Both the objective and the policies to achieve it must be advocated by argument of the highest quality.
This is precisely what we have done since the negotiations began. We were the first member State to table proposals on cohesion. We placed it among the central issues of the conference.
This is an approach Ireland must take given the importance of cohesion to our economic development. We have benefited from the operation of the funds and they have been put to good use here. Cohesion is a Community principle based on the concept of solidarity between the member states. We make no apologies for pursuing Ireland's interests in the area as part, of course, of a coherent overall policy on the Community.
Our fundamental strategy in presenting the case for cohesion has been to broaden the debate beyond the size of the Structural Funds, by emphasising the need for the principle to be at the very heart of all the policies of the Community. We have also emphasised the link which exists between the Community's clear commitment to European Monetary Union with its inherent implications for national control over central economic and financial policy areas and the dangers of an ever widening of the disparities between regions and member states.
We maintain that proper policies to encourage positive integration must be put in place together with appropriate levels of fundings to allow the less prosperous regions to cope with the financial impact of implementing Community policies as well as meeting the stringent conditions of economic and monetary union.
We have emphasised that, in addition to Treaty language, we will require commitments on increased resources for cohesion and flexibility in the operation of the funds. We have also supported a Spanish proposal that there should be a greater element of progressivity in the operation of the Community's own resources system.
In parallel with discussions on political union the member states have also been considering the provisions on economic and monetary union. At Maastricht we will consider the outcome of both IGCs. This will set in place an overall framework for European Union.
European Monetary Union will proceed in three stages. Stage one began on 1 July 1990. This first stage involves increased co-ordination of economic and monetary policies. Stage 2 will begin on 1 January 1994. It will be marked by the setting up of the European Monetary Institute, the forerunner of the European Central Bank. The framework for the co-ordination of economic policies will be strengthened with special provisions against monetary financing and excessive budget deficits. Before the end of 1996 the member states will consider the date for the beginning of stage 3.
This decision will be based on an assessment of the degree to which member states have fulfilled the conditions for transition to the third stage, which is the final step towards economic and monetary union. Some member states might be given a derogation, that is to say, they might postpone their entry to the third stage, if it is considered that they have not yet fulfilled the conditions on, for example, inflation. Ireland intends to be among those who join this stage from the beginning.
Economic and monetary union will involve close co-ordination of economic policies. In the final stage it will involve the establishment of a single monetary policy which will be administered by the European system of Central Banks, and a single currency, the ECU.
European Monetary Union is a challenge, but it is a challenge we are in a position to meet. For the last four years we have been successfully applying the kind of economic and budgetary disciplines required in economic and monetary union. European Monetary Union will bring benefits to the Community as a whole, and to Ireland as a small open economy, in removing barriers to trade in goods and services within the Community and in reducing transaction costs for businesses and individuals.
I have described the gradual — but confident and committed — approach to European union favoured by Ireland. Such an approach is especially appropriate in the field of foreign policy. The original six member states appreciated that there were many sensitivities in this area arising from differences in traditional interests and priorities — in a word, from history. It is no accident, therefore, that the founding fathers of the Community those first to forge economic interests in common and to allow foreign policy co-operation to grow naturally from this.
European political co-operation, as a process of regular consultation and co-ordination, began only in 1969, 12 years after the signature of the Treaty of Rome. EPC was formalised, and brought within the range of member states' Treaty obligations, by the Single European Act.
Over the 20 year period since 1969, considerable experience has been gained. Before describing the arrangements which will be under discussion at Maastricht, I would like to reflect a little on that experience, if I may.
A growing economic integration, of itself, encourages closer co-operation on foreign policy. As the Community develops, the member states come to have an increasing number of interests in common. The more cohesive and integrated our Community, the more natural it will be to turn a common profile to the outside world.
In addition to the natural influence of economic integration, it is, of course, relevant that many aspects of the member states' external relations fall directly under the Treaty of Rome, for example, external trade policy, economic assistance and development policy. I mentioned a few moments ago the greater definition which the new Treaty will give to the Community's development policy. Other Community arrangements, such as association and co-operation agreements, and the new, so-called "Europe" agreements with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, form part of an overall pattern of co-operation with our neighbours and with the wider international community.
This factor is more relevant than ever as Central and Eastern Europe, often in circumstances of some turmoil, come to terms with the task of building viable democracies and engaging in the difficult transition to market-oriented economies. Simply by achieving a deepening of the Community and the greater stability that this will bring, we will already have made a contribution to the welfare of our neighbours. They will be able to rely on the Community as a prosperous, forward moving entity on the European stage. Any suggestion that the Community was having difficulty in sustaining its own development would have the contrary effect.
A second lesson from the experience of European political co-operation is that a gradual approach, based on constant give-and-take, the development of shared ideas, the undertaking of common inititive, has served EPC well. Differences have narrowed, an instinct for co-operation has grown, but perhaps the most remarkable feature of the Community's efforts to develop a common foreign policy is that, quite apart from any intentions of our own, other countries look to the Community to assume greater responsibilities on the international stage.
There are many examples of this. When EPC began, one of the most important ventures on the political horizon was the CSCE. It took some three years to negotiate the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which in its time was a high-watermark of co-operation and mutual understanding on this continent, and influenced, in its own perisistent way, the dramatic changes we have since witnessed in Eastern Europe. Co-operation within the CSCE was one of the first priorities of EPC. Our experience there showed that united action by the Community — a strong sense of our Community identity — did not distance us from our neighbours but, on the contrary, worked to the advantage of rapprochement throughout Europe.
In the aftermath of the changes of recent years, as the traditional confrontation between East and West has disappeared, there has been something of a political vacuum in CSCE which has been filled to a considerable degree by the Community's leadership. As Members of this House know, the Community played a major part in drafting the Charter of Paris adopted a little over a year ago — in November 1990. When the Taoiseach went to Washington during Ireland's Presidency of the EC he reached agreement with President Bush on a new procedure for political consultations between the European Community and the United States. The significance of this was that a country as important in the international scene as the United States saw the Community as a dialogue partner on political as well as economic subjects. The pattern has been repeated in many other cases — with Canada, Japan, the South American countries and so on.
An example of the political role of the Community on the international stage is the part which it is being asked to play in the Middle East Conference co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. One of the pillars on which this remarkable peace effort is built is the awareness that the constructive involvement of outsiders can be of great assistance to the parties more immediately concerned in the conflict. The Community is determined to maximise its contribution to this peace effort by speaking with one voice.
Other examples of the efficacy of the Community in international life are easily found. Since the middle of the eighties we have played a facilitating role in Central America. The regular visits of European Ministers to the region and the equivalent meetings in Europe — most recently here in Dublin in 1990 — have been an occasion for bringing all sides in that troubled region together and fostering solutions based on political dialogue and respect for human rights. Once again the economic model provided by the Community has had its part to play.
Nothing more clearly illustrates the qualitative and quantitative leap in the Community's involvement in foreign policy issues than the efforts we have been making to bring peace to Yugoslavia. Our instruments of action have been more varied than ever before — an active diplomacy, a peace conference, EC monitors. The Community's role in Yugoslavia has had the support of both the CSCE and the UN SEcurity Council.
It is reasonable to see our attempts in the Community to speak with a single voice on international issues as a leading example of something which is happening in different parts of the world — a tendency for countries of medium or small size to aggregate their influence so as to take part more effectively in dialogue at the global level.
Regional co-operation is one way in which small countries as well as large can play their part in broader international developments. Such co-operation in particular areas of the world — be it the Community, South East Asia, North Africa, or South America — can be a building block in efforts to undertake effective action at the level of the United Nations, which I think all of us agree should be one of the principal objectives of the international community in the nineties. The absence of a co-operation among European countries or in other parts of the world, or even the resumption of historic rivalries, would prejudice the hopes which are now being expressed in all quarters that the United Nations can fulfil its original objectives — to become the vehicle for a more rational world order more responsive to considerations of justice.
I have gone into some detail in describing the practice of European political co-operation because it is against the background of practical experience of this kind that the foreign policy provisions of the Treaty are being negotiated.
Against this background — which is one of success, and a success welcomed by other countries with whom we deal — Ireland has no difficulty with the broad objective of replacing the EPC provisions of the Single European Act with a more ambitious arrangement for foreign policy co-operation, the common foreign and security policy or CFSP which has been taking shape in the conclusions of successive European Councils and in detailed negotiations with the Intergovernmental Conference.
The CFSP is best understood as building on or enlarging the arrangements that already exist. It will be based on stated objectives which are very much in line with our own approach to international relations. It will involve a strengthening of institutional arrangements in the foreign policy field. The separation between the Council and EPC ministerial meetings, which we started to overcome during the Irish Presidency by convening meetings which brought a more coherent approach to the Community's external relations, will finally disappear. The Commission will acquire a right of initiative alongside the member states. Other administrative changes will follow. While CFSP will remain one of the pillars to which I referred earlier, it will be closer to the Community pillar than were the EPC provisions of the Single European Act.
The draft Treaty envisages that the objectives of the CFSP will be pursued in two ways: one of these will be by establishing more systematic co-operation between member states. Broadly speaking, this is a continuation of present practice in EPC. Several partners have been urging that an explicit reference be made to the responsibilities of EC member states which are also members of the UN Security Council. In addition to systematic co-operation, the draft Treaty envisages the gradual introduction of what is now to be described as "joint action" in the conduct of areas of foreign policy where member states have essential interests in common.
The essential quality of joint action is that it would commit member states in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity. Whenever the Council, on the basis of general guidelines from the European Council, decides on the principles of joint action, it will lay down the specific scope of joint action, the union's general and specific objectives in carrying out such action, is duration, and the means, procedures and conditions for its implementation. That is to say joint actions will have a carefully defined scope which can be reviewed as the action proceeds. We have sought to ensure that in agreeing to joint action in any area the Council should have specific criteria to guide it in its decisions, including in particular a requirement to define the scope of the action. This was accepted at the ministerial meeting this week and I am confident it will form part of the final Treaty.
On decision making we have taken the view that for joint action, which is being introduced into the Treaty for the first time, all decisions on matters of policy should be by consensus. We have contemplated the possibility of majority voting for limited implementing matters provided adequate safeguards can be built into the Treaty. Several of our partners would like to go further and provide for majority voting in a wider range of cases. We consider it essential that at this stage of the Community's development, any compromise formula should ensure that substantive decisions, where matters of principle may be at stake, should be taken by unanimity.
The Intergovernmental Conference is also considering the question of security and defence. Some of the most complex issues in the negotiations arise in this field, so much so that even after the two day meeting of Foreign Ministers on Monday and Tuesday, a number of questions remain unresolved.
The background to the discussion is clear. Today all European countries are trying to come to terms with the new landscape which the fall of the Berlin Wall and other momentous changes have felt in their wake. The Warsaw Treaty Organisation has disappeared. The Atlantic Alliance has reviewed its policies and strategy and adopted a wider view of security that encompasses political, economic, social and environmental aspects. A new institutional relationship of consultation and co-operation has been established between NATO and the Soviet Union, the Eastern European countries and the Baltic States which envisages regular meetings between NATO bodies and these countries on security and defence matters.
What is also clear is the very strong tendency towards the view that the political union which we are bringing about can only play its appropriate part in European developments if it develops its own perspective on security questions and, in the longer term, considers the formulation of a common defence policy.
Looking to the future, and in the light of our profound commitment to the Community, we have accepted this idea on the understanding that the other provisions of the security chapter of the draft Treaty are settled to our satisfaction.
We accept, therefore, that the issue of a common defence policy can be taken up in new intergovernmental conference negotiations in five or six years' time with a view to a new Treaty or amendments to the existing Treaty. This would leave the nature and content of a common defence policy to a future negotiation and would be in accordance with our long standing commitment to partners that if the Community were to develop its own defence arrangement for its security we would consider participating in these arrangements. The outcome of any future Intergovernmental Conference on this issue would, like the present IGC, require unanimous agreement among the member states.
In the meantime, the security role of the union should be considerably broadened. It could include areas such as arms control and disarmament, arms transfers, peace-keeping and non-proliferation of chemical and nuclear technologies. The limitation imposed by the Single European Act that co-ordination should take place only on the political and economic aspects of security could be removed.
It follows therefore that I see merit in agreeing that security considerations in the widest sense could be taken into account in the discussions under the co-operation provisions of the Treaty agreed in Maastricht. This would permit the Twleve to develop their identity in those many policy areas — some of which I have just mentioned — which fall into the category of preventative diplomacy. It would also permit the Twelve to assess the potential implications for their security of situations such as the Yugoslav crisis.
It may be that certain of the policies defined under the CFSP will have operational consequences which could usefully be taken up by the Western European Union. This is why the Intergovernmental Conference is considering whether a link with the Western European Union might provide a way of establishing a framework within which a defence role for the Community might be developed.
There are differences of approach among our partners as to the manner in which the Western European Union link should be defined. Some partners see the Western European Union as an integral part of European union with organic links to the union. Others would prefer it to stand in an autonomous relationship but taking guidance from the Union. Some have concerns about the implications of all this for NATO. I believe that these differences will be resolved in a manner satisfactory to us.
The steps I have just described would represent a substantial advance in the way the Community deals with security issues. It is a step which we are glad to support in the interests of a coherent, well-rounded approach to the whole field of external relations.
I would point out to the House that the draft Treaty under negotiation would not involve Ireland in a mutual defence commitment. Nor would it oblige us to become a member of a military alliance. Moreover the draft on the table recognises our traditional position with regard to the military alliances, as agreed at the second Rome Summit in December of last year.
From Ireland's point of view, we intend to bring to the discussions in the union those values based on our tradition and experience that we have always brought to the international conference table. We will emphasise that security requires many different kinds of action, including action to address such causes of instability on the arms race and underdevelopment. We are convinced that here in Europe, which has seen so much suffering and destruction in war, military considerations will disappear more and more from the foreground of political action.
It was partly with this very objective in mind that the Community was founded. And as we develop our common foreign and security policy, we are called on to remember that men like Jean Monnet aimed not only to end conflict among the member states of the Community but also to be open to other European countries and to ensure that the Community would be an example and an influence for those far beyond our borders.
The next decade will mark a major advance in the march towards European union. The Community will see the accession of new members and will develop its policies and institutions in order to allow it play the role which is expected of it by its citizens and by the rest of the international community. The objective of European union to which Ireland is fully committed remains to be elaborated in all its detail, but the policies which are now being formulated and the complex network of international agreements which the Community is concluding will constitute a firm and stable foundation for the final construction.
Ireland will continue to play a full and active part in the elaboration of those policies and ensure that they serve not only the interests of the Irish people but the people of Europe as a whole. Our commitment to European construction and the ideal of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe is, and always has been, enthusiastic and wholehearted. We will put the same dedication to the task of designing and constructing the new Europe to which all the people of Europe — both East and West — now aspire and to which they have a right.
