At the outset I thank Senators opposite for their remarks on my appointment. With regard to Senator Costello's comments about the absence of the Minister for the Marine, the Minister is on official Government business outside the country. That point has to be made.
The Minister for the Marine has been informed by the board of Dublin port of their decision today to present a petition to the high Court on Friday, 20 March 1992 for the liquidation and winding up of their wholly-owned subsidiary company, Dublin Cargo Handling Limited, this decision is primarily a matter for the board in accordance with their statutory duties.
The Minister for the Marine, however, fully supports the board in their efforts to develop a viable and competitive port service in the deep sea section of Dublin port. This is vital for the future of the port generally but it is also critical to the future economic development of the Dublin region and to the competitiveness of Irish trade and commerce.
With the serious financial losses which have built up and with the major and growing diversion of trade to other ports, the existing position of the deep sea section of Dublin port is unsustainable. The issues involved must be faced sooner or later. These problems have evolved over a long period and it may be of help if I explain the background.
The importance of our commercial seaports to Ireland's economy cannot be over stated. The level of the State's total trade in both volume and value terms handled by Irish seaports, including Dublin port — 79 per cent and 64 per cent respectively — underlines the importance of ports to the economy and expansion of trade. Commercial ports handled almost £17 billion of our total trade of £26 billion in 1990 and over £9 billion of Ireland's total export trade of £14 billion in the same year. It is clear that ports must therefore operate as efficiently as possible and service their customers in a cost-effective and competitive manner.
Dublin port is of vital importance in terms of its throughput of trade and its contribution to freight traffic in the central corridor. In 1991 its trade throughput by all modes of freight was 7.7 million tonnes with the deep sea sector accounting for some 2.1 million tonnes. In value terms Dublin port accounted for £8,692 million or in percentage terms 64.3 per cent of the £16,753 million trade handled by Irish sea ports. The total port revenue for Dublin in 1991 amounted to £25.2 million with the deep sea sector accounting for some £6 million of that revenue.
Dublin port, and all other ports operating under the Harbours Act, 1946, are expected by the Government to operate efficiently, economically and competitively and provide the level of service demanded of modern ports today. I should, however, stress that port management and in particular industrial relations matters and the rationalisation of stevedoring services in Dublin port and other national ports is primarily the responsibility of the port and docks board and harbour authorities and the companies and employees involved. In the case of Dublin port, I am advised that the board decided that it was absolutely essential that the operational structures, including those for the dock labour force, be streamlined so as to provide a modern competitively priced service.
The establishment of Dublin Cargo Handling Limited in 1982 was an initial attempt to rationalise labour in the deep sea sector because of a chaotic situation which had arisen with nine stevedoring companies operating independently of each other and their financial viability being quickly eroded by rigid labour practices. Dublin port held 50 per cent of the shareholding in Dublin Cargo Handling in 1982 with the remainder held by the then largest stevedoring company in Dublin port, Associated Port Terminals.
Dublin port was left with a 100 per cent shareholding in 1985 following the withdrawal of Associated Port Terminals in the face of heavy losses. Dublin Cargo Handling have continued since then to suffer heavy losses. From their establishment to end 1990, accumulated losses, together with redundancy payments of £7.6 million, reached a total of £16.2 million. Dublin Cargo Handling incurred losses of approximately £1.5 million in 1991.
In the face of these continuing losses the board and management of Dublin port and Dublin Cargo Handling took the view that the loss making situation in Dublin Cargo Handling was not sustainable. Dublin port considered that a quality service could not be provided for customers unless restrictive practices were eliminated and normal industrial working conditions introduced in the port. A major study was therefore commissioned by Dublin port in 1990 on the organisation of stevedoring in the port and was completed by Stokes Kennedy Crowley in May 1991. The study recommendations were adopted in principle by the board including proposals on a labour rationalisation programme.
The Stokes Kennedy Crowley report concluded that the effect of Dublin Cargo Handling's losses limited the capacity of the port authority to fund capital development and discouraged the growth of trade through the port. I should mention that in order to deal with the financing requirements of its dock labour rationalisation programme, Dublin port has had to defer expenditure on its £8 million plus South Bank Quay Lo/Lo Terminal development project. The settlement of the rationalisation programme could facilitate an early resumption of the suspended capital works. The Stokes Kennedy Crowley report identified a range of problems including, overstaffing at all levels, high absenteeism/sickness, low average utilisation of dock labour, inefficiencies, poor labour allocation systems and no prospect of profitability. The lack of choice for ships which have to use Dublin Cargo Handling and the high cost of services were also highlighted.
The need for a more efficient port infrastructure was clearly identified in the recently published report of the industrial policy review group. As an island nation dependent on its ports, inefficiency puts all the nation's firms at a disadvantage. The competitiveness of Dublin port was a matter of serious concern to the review group with low frequency of services and short opening hours being particularly highlighted. The report cited the loss of business to ports in the Republic and pinpointed the considerable costs imposed on Irish industry, relative to what is clearly attainable if the efficiency of Larne could be replicated in Dublin.
The requirements of port users is also a key factor in any restructuring of stevedoring operations in the port. I understand that Dublin port had extensive discussions with representatives of all current Ro/Ro operators, with representatives of the Irish Ship Agents Association and with Dublin Chamber of Commerce in order to fully understand their needs. These discussions highlighted port users' concerns on costs and service and disclosed a profound lack of confidence in the existing stevedoring structures. This lack of confidence on the part of port users is reflected, in the diversion of traffic from the central to the northern corridor and the benefits, estimated at £56 million in lost trade, accruing to northern ports such as Larne.
In view of the history of the port, the extent of losses incurred in the ports cargo handling operations since 1982, the deficiencies identified in the Stokes Kennedy Crowley study and reiterated by the industrial policy review group and the serious disruptions of trade, it is disappointing that recent discussions under the auspices of the Labour Relations Commission have failed to yield progress.
There have, as is well known, been ongoing industrial relations difficulties at Dublin port for some considerable time. Both the Labour Court and the Labour Relations Commission have been actively involved on numerous occasions in resolving various industrial relations issues at the port. The more recent difficulties centre on the need to bring operations at the port into line with modern practices so as to ensure the future viability of the port in the face of stiff competition.
A six week unofficial strike took place at the port last December and January. Arising from intensive discussions between both sides, involving the Labour Relations Commission, a formula for a return to work on 20 January was agreed.
This return to work formula involved provisions for further discussions between the parties, with the help of the Labour Relations Commission, to bring about a negotiated settlement to the issues of increased flexibility, involving a restructuring of stevedoring operations. In view of the fact that little progress in these talks was being made, the Dublin Port and Docks Board decided on 19 February that Dublin Cargo Handling should be put in liquidation from 18 March unless the situation could be resolved. The Marine Port and General Workers Union has served strike notice on Dublin Cargo Handling in the event of the liquidation proceeding. As stated earlier, the Board of Dublin Port decided today that a petition will be presented to the High Court on Friday 20 March 1992 for the liquidation and winding up of Dublin Cargo Handling.
Further intensive discussions took place at the Labour Relations Commission between Dublin Cargo Handling management and the dockers union in recent days but no agreement has been reached to date. Even at this late stage and with the liquidation of Dublin Cargo Handling imminent I would urge the dock labour force and its union to think again. The port clearly cannot continue to suffer losses in its cargo handling operations and to ignore the drift away of freight traffic to more competitive and efficient ports including ports outside the State.
The issues involved are complex and historic but, having regard to all the implications, I would call on the parties to make further efforts, even at this late stage, to reach a settlement. In this regard, the services of the Labour Relations Commission and the Labour Court remain available to all parties.