Nuclear safety is a matter of concern to all Irish people and is one issue about which there is consensus across all political parties. That consensus ought to be reflected in the various parties co-operating in what is after all a national attempt to remove the direct threat imposed on the Irish people by the UK's nuclear industry.
Since radioactivity was discovered almost 100 years ago, it has come to be realised that the benefits it offers to society are also attended by the potential for serious damage. Nuclear weapons and nuclear power accidents like Chernobyl are at the upper end of this scale of concern. The recent report of the breakdown of the safety culture at the Wylfa nuclear plant in Wales bought home how close we in Ireland could be to a radiation accident. The House will be aware the ESB has no plans for the generation of nuclear powered electricity in Ireland. Public opinion in Ireland is firmly against nuclear energy. Our national nuclear policy objectives therefore place a heavy emphasis on nuclear safety and radiological protection.
While recognising that certain countries have retained nuclear energy as an option for power generation, we remain totally opposed to any expansion of this industry, especially as certain serious problems remain unresolved. These include the reprocessing and transport of nuclear materials, problems relating to radioactive waste disposal and the decommissioning of reactors which have reached the end of their useful life. There is also the ever present risk of a major nuclear accident whether due to safety or human failures.
My Department's role in nuclear energy is to encourage the development and application of the highest safety standards in the nuclear industry worldwide. Our main focus is on issues of nuclear plant safety and radiological protection. We participate in international organisations in the nuclear field to progress issues of safety and protection. My Department is assisted in that role by the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland.
The RPII's statutory role and functions are contained in the Radiological Protection Act, 1991. Generally, the institute has regulatory, monitoring and advisory responsibilities to the Government in the area of ionising radiation. In particular, the RPII concerns itself with hazards to health associated with radiation both from nuclear plants and medical uses. It monitors radioactivity throughout Ireland, on land, sea and in the air. The RPII also assist in the development of national plans for emergencies arising from nuclear accidents and in the implementation of measures to deal with radiological emergencies.
In addition to the extensive range of services I have already referred to, the institute is also undertaking a national radon survey, which is due to be completed in 1998. Radon is a naturally occurring radioactive gas originating from the natural decay of uranium. It has no taste, smell or colour. It is found in soils and rocks, although the amount varies from place to place. Radon which surfaces in the open air is quickly diluted to harmless concentrations, but a problem arises when it enters an enclosed space, such as a house, where it can build up to unacceptably high concentrations.
The purpose of this survey is to identify those existing houses with radon concentrations above the reference level and identify areas at particular risk from radon. The Department of the Environment and the planning authorities can then be advised on the need to incorporate radon preventative measures in future buildings. Radon measurements will be made in over 6,000 homes nationwide and a statistical evaluation of the results will allow the percentage of houses above the reference level of 200 bequerals per cubic metre in each national grid square to be predicted.
The RPII has carried out surveys to date which indicated that about 4 per cent of Irish houses have radon concentrations above the reference level of 200 bequerals per public metre. The institute estimates that in the 1,000 cases where radon levels have been found in excess of the safe minimum, remedial measures have been implemented in less than 50 of them and that by the end of 1996 up to 1,500 houses will have been identified as being above the reference level.
While houses with high radon levels are found throughout the country, there is evidence of a greater incidence of such houses in the west, parts of County Louth and Cork city. Remedial action to deal with unacceptable levels of radon gas is a matter for the householders and property owners concerned. However, I am at present examining ways of assisting householders in addressing this problem.
Over the years, all Irish Governments have voiced their concern about the nuclear installations at Sellafield, focusing on the discharge of radioactive waste into the Irish Sea. They have argued that the only way to resolve Irish concerns about Sellafield is to close the plant. These views have been repeatedly conveyed to the UK Government but as of yet to no avail.
This Government's policy agreement, A Government of Renewal, recognises that Sellafield poses a serious and continuing threat to the health and safety of the Irish people. Other hazards include the ever increasing traffic of radioactive materials on the Irish Sea and the number of ageing nuclear reactors on the west coast of Britain. The agreement sets out a series of proposals which the Government is pursuing on Sellafield and the Irish Sea.
A task force of Ministers was set up by me during the year with other Ministers, representatives of the Office of the Attorney General, the Radiological Protection Institute and other Government Departments. The task force will develop and co-ordinate a concerted strategy for progressing the Government's policy on Sellafield and related concerns about the nuclear industry. This is the first comprehensive initiative taken by any Government to date to address the problems caused by Sellafield. It illustrates the Government's serious intent to pursue all realistic and effective courses of action to safeguard the Irish people. The Government will consider the outcome of the task force's work when completed.
I now turn to the major focus of interest from the Irish people's point of view, namely, British Nuclear Fuels' facilities at Sellafield.
Sellafield, on the west coast of Cumbria, lies about 100 miles to the east of Ireland. It contains British Nuclear Fuels' reprocessing plants, where spent nuclear fuel is reprocessed to extract uranium and plutonium for reuse. The new THORP plant, opened in March 1994, forms part of the complex. There are also four Magnox reactors on the site, called Calder Hall, as well as a vitrification plant for high level radioactive waste. The UK authorities have also identified the Sellafield area as a potential site for a nuclear waste repository or dump to be built around the year 2010.
The Government strongly opposes the continuation and expansion of reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel by British Nuclear Fuels at Sellafield. The main reasons for this are: the increase in risk to the health of the public and of environmental contamination arising from discharges of radioactive effluent; the risk of accidents arising from the reprocessing activity and the storage and transport of nuclear fuels, plutonium and radioactive wastes; the accumulation of large amounts of radioactive waste on one site close to the Irish Sea and to Ireland; the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation from increasing stocks of plutonium; the so far unresolved problems of long-term safe storage and disposal of radioactive waste and because there is no demonstrable economic benefit from reprocessing which will balance and justify the risks involved.
In addition, the four ageing Magnox reactors at the Sellafield site, built as far back as 1956, are considered to have a higher risk of major accident compared to modern reactors. The lifespan of these reactors has been extended by the UK authorities, mainly for economic reasons. Another cause of concern is the radioactive contamination of the marine and aerial environment from Sellafield which should be prevented and ultimately eliminated.
Regarding the new THORP reprocessing plant, two detailed and wide ranging submissions were sent to the British authorities in 1993 as part of a consultation process. Despite objections from this country, other European Ministers and many environmental groups, the British Government decided in December 1993 to grant authorisation to British Nuclear Fuels for the THORP plant to operate and in April 1994 operations began at the plant.
From Ireland's point of view, this decision is highly unacceptable. It increases the risk to the health of the public and of environmental contamination arising from discharges of radioactive effluent. There is also a higher risk of accidents arising from the reprocessing activities and storage and transport of wastes.
Spent fuel reprocessing brings serious hazards from a safety and non-proliferation point of view, due to the growing stockpile and trade in plutonium and other highly active nuclear materials, for which there is no immediate economic use.
The Government shares the Irish public's concerns about the discharge of radioactive wastes into the marine environment. My Department cannot directly monitor the day to day operations of Sellafield. However, the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland monitors the levels of radioactivity in Irish waters to study the distribution of contaminating radionuclides, identify trends and assess the risks to public health. In relation to the Irish Sea, the monitoring programme involves the routine sampling and analysis of seawater, seaweed, sediments, fish and shellfish along the east coast. Samples of seawater and sediments are also collected in the Irish Sea from an area south of Dublin extending northwards to Dundalk Bay.
While the RPII's monitoring programme provides reassurance that there is no significant risk to the health of the Irish public as a consequence of the Sellafield discharges, they continue to cause contamination of the Irish Sea. Such contamination is objectionable and unacceptable and I consider all radioactive discharges should be progressively reduced and ultimately eliminated at the earliest possible date. The international convention on discharges from land based sources places such an obligation on member states so as to prevent pollution of the seas.
While the Government has always been and continues to be committed to legal action against Sellafield if a case for it can be shown to exist, it cannot initiate such action without a firm legal case based on sound evidence. In the past the Attorney General has advised that any such action would have to be based on evidence as to the injurious effects of operations at the Sellafield plant on Ireland.
A member state which is considered by the Commission or another member state to have failed to meet an obligation of the EU treaty may be brought before the Court of Justice. It should be noted that the EU Commission examined the implications of THORP and issued an official opinion on 30 April 1992 that the implementation of the plan for the disposal of radioactive waste from that plant is not liable, either in normal operation or in the case of an accident, to result in radioactive contamination, significant from the point of view of health, of the water, soil or airspace of another member state. However, at the request of the ministerial task force, the Attorney General is re-examining the possibility of legal action against the Sellafield-THORP plant.
An Seanad will be aware that four Dundalk residents have initiated legal action against British Nuclear Fuels Limited regarding THORP. The decision of the High Court last year, establishing the jurisdiction of the Irish courts to hear the substantive case brought by the Dundalk residents against BNFL, was welcomed by the Government. Books of appeal have since been lodged on behalf of BNFL and the matter will be heard in the Supreme Court in January 1996. I can assure the House that, as in the High Court case, counsel for the State will support the Dundalk plaintiffs in the Supreme Court in resisting this appeal.
Although Ireland and the Attorney General are named as co-defendants in the substantive case taken by the Dundalk residents, the Government also resisted BNFL's application to have an order set aside allowing service of the summons out of the State. This is a clear illustration of the Government's commitment to do all in its power to eliminate the threat posed by Sellafield and THORP. The State is also making available to the plaintiffs on a voluntary basis its files relative to the issues they raised.
As the nuclear age enters its second half-century, the question of what to do with nuclear waste has not yet been resolved. The problem is that much of it will remain lethally dangerous for thousands of years and will pose a measurable hazard for a good deal longer than that. The UK Government's nuclear waste authority, NIREX Limited, plans to build a deep underground repository for the permanent storage of its medium level radioactive waste produced by its reprocessing facilities and its 23 nuclear power stations. NIREX's preference is that such a repository should be at Sellafield.
This Government has committed itself to opposing these plans. As a first step I recently objected to the proposed development of a rock characterisation facility to study the geology and hydrogeology of the Sellafield area. I believe the rock characterisation facility is a "Trojan horse"— once agreed, it would be harder to stop a repository for nuclear waste.
After examining a number of locations during the 1980s as a possible site for a repository, in 1992 NIREX finally focused its attention on the Sellafield area as the preferred site. On 29 July 1994 NIREX applied for planning permission to Cumbria County Council to build the rock characterisation facility or "rock laboratory". In December 1994 the county council refused planning permission after considering a number of submissions on the matter, including one from my Department. NIREX decided to exercise its statutory right of appeal under UK legislation against the decision to the Secretary of State for the Environment, Mr. John Gummer, MP, who then decided to hold a public inquiry this year. I have confirmed to the UK authorities that I wish to attend the inquiry. A date of 7 December 1995 has been fixed for my presentation and a comprehensive submission has already been forwarded separately to the inquiry's secretariat detailing my objections to the rock characterisation facility.
We have also seen in recent months reports of potentially serious incidents involving Magnox nuclear power plants in the UK at Wylfa in north Wales and Dungeness in south-east England. In the case of the Wylfa Magnox plant in Anglesey, Wales, the operator of the power station, Nuclear Electric, was fined £250,000 and costs for waiting nine hours before shutting down a potentially dangerous reactor. Nuclear Electric makes an operating profit of around £1.2 billion a year and it is my view that this paltry fine does not in any way reflect a just and lawful penalty for the company's dangerous incompetence. The company pleaded guilty to four charges under the UK Health and Safety at Work Act following an incident in July 1993 when part of a refuelling crane fell into the reactor. Although there was no danger of meltdown, it is my view that in his tough condemnation of the Wylfa operators, Britain's chief nuclear installations inspector placed a huge question mark over the continuous statements emanating from the UK nuclear industry about its safety culture.
Nuclear Electric also shut down a Magnox reactor at Dungeness, Kent on 6 September this year in order to carry out precautionary checks following the discovery of external damage to one of the metal standpipes which form part of the fuelling system. The UK Health and Safety Executive's nuclear installation inspectorate, after completing its investigation into the facts pertaining to this event, was satisfied with Nuclear Electric's response to the discovery of the specific problem. However, these are worrying occurrences because of their proximity to this country.
In September I wrote in the strongest terms to the UK Minister for Energy, Mr. Tim Eggar, MP, and the Secretary of State for the Environment, Mr. John Gummer, MP, expressing grave concern about the safety and reliability of the ageing Magnox reactors and the adequacy of safety in the UK nuclear industry. Some Magnox reactors were built as far back as 1956 and are clearly not as reliable as more modern reactors. I pointed out that some of these reactors are particularly unsafe for a number of reasons, the main ones being, first, the reactors do not have a secondary containment, that is, a back-up system to prevent the dispersion of radioactive substances into the environment; and, second, they are vulnerable to accidents initiated by external events — for example, the boilers for the Calder-type reactors stand in the open and are connected to the reactors by pipes carrying the reactor coolant, which can be seen by passers-by.
I asked the UK Ministers to phase out all Magnox reactors in the interest of nuclear safety and radiation protection. I pointed out that the nuclear operators' closure and decommissioning strategies should be reviewed immediately by the nuclear installations inspectorate and decisions on the de-fuelling and shutdown of individual stations, particularly the Sellafield and Wylfa Magnox plants, should be taken without delay.
The House may be aware that the UK Government recently published a White Paper on the conclusions of its year long nuclear energy review. The review focused mainly on the future prospects for nuclear power, including plans to privatise parts of the UK nuclear generating industry during 1996. The White Paper has confirmed the UK Government's commitment to nuclear power, provided it remains competitive and is able to maintain rigorous standards of safety and environmental protection.
The two nuclear electricity generating companies, Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear, will be merged and part privatised. Eight of the more modern nuclear reactors within those companies, called advanced gas-cooled reactors and pressurised water reactors, will be transferred into the private sector. The older Magnox stations and their liabilities, about which I have expressed concern, will remain in public ownership under a new Government owned stand alone company which will ultimately be integrated with British Nuclear Fuels plc. The White Paper states that there will be no other change in the status of BNFL — it remains publicly owned as well as its facilities at Sellafield.
The White Paper emphasises that there is no case for State intervention or public funds for the construction of new nuclear plants. It also states that payments to Nuclear Electric from the existing fossil fuel levy on electricity consumers will cease at the time of privatisation. In relation to future prospects for nuclear generation, I understand that during the review the nuclear industry argued the case for more nuclear power stations. However, in the White Paper the UK Government concluded that there was no case for State support or guarantees to one form of electricity over another. The review has also concluded that private finance is unlikely to be available at present for new nuclear construction.
However, despite this I have continued to express my concern about the UK Government's proposals for privatisation next summer. I believe that its policy change towards privatisation of parts of the nuclear industry is inconsistent with its statement that safety is to remain of paramount importance. The UK Government should retain the full nuclear industry in the public sector where commercial pressures do not tend to compromise safety to the same degree as they would in a privatised industry. In my opinion, with privatisation there would be increasing pressures on persons and safety, as output and profit become more important to private interests in the long term.
Ireland has consistently, at every international forum, pressed for the closure of unsafe, Soviet designed nuclear power plants in eastern and central Europe, particularly the existing ones at Chernobyl. There are other reactors in Bulgaria, Slovakia and Armenia which are also considered dangerously unsafe by the western world.
As the 1986 Chernobyl accident demonstrated, the distance from Ireland is not a barrier to significant amounts of radioactive contamination reaching us. The level then was not high enough to cause an immediate health risk but it could have had severe and costly implications for food production and exports and, hence, our main economy and export trade. A relatively small amount of contamination of foodstuff, particularly dairy products and meat, can rapidly lead to trade restrictions and the continuing loss of good will and quality reputation long after the immediate effects have receded. The consequences for Ireland with a large food export market are considerably higher than for other countries who supply mainly domestic markets.
Recent European summits and the G7 group of industrialised countries recommended that the Chernobyl plant be closed definitively and as early as possible. An action plan was drawn up involving the closure of Chernobyl, structural reform of the Ukraine energy sector and improvements in safety in the nuclear sector. In May of this year, President Kutchma of the Ukraine gave a commitment to a time table for the closure of Chernobyl by 2000. The Ukraine must be pressed to honour this commitment.
The Irish people's greatest concern about Sellafield and other plants along the west coast of Britain and some reactors in eastern and central Europe continues to be the risk of a large release of radioactivity resulting from a major accident. The Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland has responsibility for the provision of advice on the potential consequences of any nuclear accident and on measures to protect the public.
The national emergency plan for nuclear accidents was published by my Department in 1992. As the Minister responsible for nuclear safety matters, I have responsibility for the emergency plan and for ensuring co-ordination of the responsibilities and functions of the relevant authorities. The plan is designed to provide a rapid and effective response to accidents involving the release, or potential release, of radioactive substances into the environment which could give rise to radiation exposure.
First information of the occurrence of an accident at a nuclear installation overseas would be obtained by the Garda Communications Control Centre through the international notification procedures established after the Chernobyl accident. These provide for early warning of an accident and for exchange of information. The 24 hour national radiation monitoring system would also detect increases of radioactivity directly in Ireland. A further source of information about an accident in the UK is the bilateral arrangement between Ireland and the UK under which the UK authorities notify my Department of incidents involving a release of radioactivity into the environment.
In the case of a possible accident involving a ship containing nuclear material, under the national emergency plan the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland has a liaison agreement involving co-operation and advice arrangements with the Irish Marine Emergency Service of the Department of the Marine — IMES. These arrangements are effected as soon as the IMES receives notification of the marine incident from the UK's coastguard agency through the normal channels.
Under the national emergency plan, measures are in place to assess and mitigate the effects of nuclear accidents which occur in the UK or elsewhere and which might pose a radiological hazard to Ireland. The plan shows how accident management will operate, how technical information and monitoring data will be collected, how information to the public will be provided and what counter measures may be taken for the protection of the public in the short and long term.
In the event of an emergency, this co-ordination would be effected by means of the Emergency Response Co-ordination Committee which is chaired by a senior official of my Department who reports to me. The committee has representatives of the relevant Departments and agencies, the Garda, Defence Forces, Meteorological Service and nuclear and medical experts.
A test of the plan took place in October 1992 involving the main Departments and agencies. The plan was further tested in May 1993 as part of an international emergency exercise arranged by the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD. I am making arrangements for a further review and test of the plan at the earliest opportunity.
Ireland's membership of the International Atomic Energy Agency ensures that we are part of the IAEA's emergency information network which would be of crucial importance in providing the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland — RPII — with early warning of a nuclear accident abroad. The International Atomic Energy Agency is an autonomous intergovernmental organisation under the aegis of the United Nations. It was established in 1957 and, at present, has 113 member states. Ireland became a member in 1970. Ireland's membership of the IAEA does not in any way restrict our opposition to the expansion of nuclear energy, even for peaceful means. On the contrary, it allows us to have a direct say in seeking to ensure that the highest standards of nuclear safety and radiological protection apply in the nuclear industry worldwide.
Since the Chernobyl accident it has been evident that the existing international civil nuclear liability regime is seriously deficient in many respects. For this reason Ireland attaches great importance to the development in the IAEA of an updated and enhanced global international regime on liability and compensation for damage to health and environment in the event of a nuclear accident. Ireland believes that efforts must be directed not only at a revision of the existing Vienna convention for civil liberty but also involve a supplementary funding convention which would attract universal acceptance and provide additional meaningful compensation for nuclear damage, particularly where transboundary nuclear damage occurs. Discussions on an integrated approach involving these two elements are now progressing in Vienna.
The Euratom Treaty is the framework for dealing with nuclear matters within the European Community. At the time of entry into force of the Euratom Treaty in 1958, the European nuclear industry was in its infancy and one of its primary aims was to further an ambitious research and development nuclear programme. The terms of the treaty were based on the assumption that uranium would replace coal as the world's energy source. The founding member states, therefore, considered it important to establish a treaty specifically to deal with nuclear energy. However, it must be noted that the treaty was drawn up some 30 years ago and that much has changed since then. A review and update of this treaty to place a greater emphasis on health, safety and environmental aspects should now be considered.
The Irish member of the EU Reflection Group, which is helping to identify options for discussion at the intergovernmental conference in 1996, has raised the possibility of strengthening the nuclear safety provisions of the Euratom Treaty. Any amendment to Euratom, however, requires unanimous agreement and this may be difficult to achieve given the strong views of certain member states on the use of nuclear power.
The Euratom Treaty encompasses some important provisions for the protection of health and safety of workers and the general public. Article 30 provides for basic safety standards which must be laid down within the Community for the health protection of the general public and workers against ionising radiation. The Radiological Protection Institute and my Department are actively involved in a proposal for a revision of Directive 80/836 which sets out these standards. Through our participation in these discussions, we aim to ensure that the revisions agreed ensure that the highest standards of safety and protection will be implemented to protect our citizens for the future.
Ireland has always been a strong advocate of nuclear non-proliferation and has a unique and long standing association with the treaty on the non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons — NPT — as one of its original proponents. Ireland believes that universal accession to the NPT and full compliance with its deliberations are essential steps towards ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and thus preventing major threats to international peace and security. The agreement, reached earlier this year to extend the NPT indefinitely, is of vital importance. The agreement encompasses five yearly reviews of implementation of the treaty which will make all state parties — now 180 countries in all — more accountable in the future for their implementation of the treaty. The agreed principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament set out, inter alia, a programme of action in nuclear disarmament to which Ireland attaches the highest importance.
With the treaty extended indefinitely, there is a corresponding continuous obligation on all states, particularly the nuclear weapon states, to pursue nuclear disarmament. It was, therefore, with great dismay and concern that I learned of the French Government's decision to resume nuclear testing, considering the near completion of the comprehensive test ban treaty to be signed next year. The Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs urged the French Government, in public statements and bilateral contacts with his French counterpart, to reconsider this decision. He appealed to France to set an international example in support of continued moratoriums on nuclear testing. The Tánaiste particularly emphasised the commitment made by the nuclear weapon states at the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty Review to exercise utmost restraint pending the entry into force of a comprehensive test ban treaty.
I thank Members for their attention to this general exposition of my nuclear safety policy. I will be glad to hear views and suggestions in relation to this very serious topic. The concerns I have related are common to all parties and we must present a united front on this issue. Nuclear safety and radiation protection is not a topic for political point scoring.