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Seanad Éireann debate -
Thursday, 17 Apr 1997

Vol. 151 No. 1

Equal Status Bill, 1997: Committee Stage.

Sections 1 and 2 agreed to.
SECTION 3.

I move amendment No. 1:

In page 8, subsection (2), between lines 2 and 3, to insert the following paragraph:

"(a) that one lives in or is from a particular area and the other lives in or is from a different area (the `residence ground'),".

On Second Stage I asked the Minister if a school could invoke catchment areas as a means of discrimination and he replied that it was not possible because of the definition of reasons for discrimination. The issue of catchment areas should be addressed by the Department of Education but it is not. There are schools which invoke the catchment area excuse and refuse access to children from outside the area. That is wrong — all children should have access to whatever school they wish to attend provided it has places available.

Unless a residence ground is included in the Bill, sporting clubs and other institutions mentioned in the Bill may discriminate against a membership application from an individual who is from a certain residential area. That may not be as uncommon a practice as we may think. There is a possibility that people from inner city areas, for example, might be refused membership of salubrious golf clubs, not for the reasons given in the Bill — gender, ethnic minority status, etc. — but on the basis of the applicant's address.

I should have thought of this in relation to the Employment Equality Bill, 1996, because, whether real or imagined, people who apply for jobs feel they may not be considered for them on the grounds of address. These Bills are related so it might apply through this Bill to employment. I ask the Minister to accept the amendment.

I regret I cannot accept this amendment. Its effect would be to add a new ground, namely the "residence ground", on which discrimination would be prohibited. The Bill is already broad in its scope, but it remains focused. The adoption of a new ground would require careful consideration and, in particular, a thorough examination of the exceptions which are provided for in the Bill to see what further exceptions would be required because of the inclusion of a new ground. For example, one might imagine that there should be an exemptions to allow schools or credit unions to cater for persons in a particular locality.

I regret the Minister cannot accept the amendment. It does not have the same implications as the amendments I proposed to the Employment Equality Bill, 1996, dealing with membership of political parties and trade unions.

After a thorough review the Minister explained why the amendment could not be accepted because of the need to speak with the groups which might be affected. In the case of this amendment there is no group with which the amendment would have to be discussed. It is broad and offers the same force of protection as the other grounds in the Bill. I do not think the amendment would cause difficulties for any of the bodies with which the Minister consulted prior to the publication of the Bill.

I was tempted to add membership of a political party to this amendment. I have had the experience of applying for the use of a room to hold clinics in a certain building and, although the consitution of the institution involved stated that it is apolitical, it did not rule out the use of the building for meeting. However, the board of management of the institution decided that if a room was given to one party it would have to be made available to others. I did not include membership of a political party in the armendment lest I would be accused of delaying the Bill. I selected the residence ground because it would not require wide consultation.

I disagree with the Minister on the school catchment area issue. I do not know if there is a problem with credit unions. Although they are set up on a local basis, I presume that credit unions will take membership from anybody prepared to make deposits with them and abide by their rules.

The amendment has merit and it is unfortunate that the Minister cannot accept it. The residence ground has been used more frequently as a grounds for discrimination than any of the other grounds given in the Bill.

I agree that the amendment has merit but it could not be accepted without exhaustive examination of it implications. For example, the amendment might mean that a health board would have to cater for people from outside its area. Another factor to bear in mind is that it is common for many sports clubs to cater for particular areas. GAA clubs, for example, are based on parishes and that arrangement would have to taken into account. The implications of such a major alteration by the addition of this new ground would need careful consideration. I regret it is not possible to take it on board at this point. The thrust of the amendment could be of merit in many instances.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 3 agreed to.
Sections 4 and 5 agreed to.
SECTION 6.

I move amendment No. 2:

In page 10, lines 16 and 17, to delete subparagraph (ii).

We discussed this matter on Second Stage and I indicated my concerns about this provision. The inclusion of is reasonable having regard to the data, or other relevant factor" gives too much scope to insurance companies. On Second Stage I also expressed concern that this might affect the community rating principle and the Minister indicated that it would not. My party colleague, Deputy McDaid, raised his concerns as a medical practitioner that genetic testing would be used to increase insurance premia. I understand why there is an exclusion and it is not considered discriminatory to allow insurance companies to behave in a certain way. I know that is custom and practice.

I accept the first two parts of paragraph (e): "(I) actuarial or statistical data obtained from a source on which it is reasonable to rely, or (II) other relevant underwriting or commercia? factors", although I have problems with the inclusion of "commercial factors". However, the inclusion of "is reasonable having regard to the data, or other relevant factors" gives insurance companies huge power and does not confer on individuals the type of protection the Bill should confer.

Senator McGennis proposes to delete section 6(2)(e)(ii). This provision requires an insurance company which is treating persons differently because of actuarial or statistical data or other relevant underwriting or commercial factors to treat those persons in a way which is reasonable having regard to the data.

If the subparagraph is deleted we will remove an important safeguard from the customer's point of view. Without the subparagraph, the insurance company could base its discrimination on the data and factors mentioned in the subsection, but would not have to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Director of Equality Investigations that the different treatment in question is reasonable having regard to the information on which it is based. I ask Senator McGennis to withdraw the amendment as it would serve only to provide a wide exception for insurance companies or other providers of financial services.

I accept the Minister's explanation. Who decides what is reasonable? We encountered this question in the definition of sexual harassment. If an insurance company decides it is reasonable to do something, it does not necessarily mean it is reasonable. Perhaps I should have phrased the amendment in the same terms as the provision regarding sexual harassment.

The Minister says that if the subparagraph is deleted the case of the applicant will be weakened. That is not my intention. I am worried that an insurance company might interpret the provision to mean that it can penalise somebody or load a premium because it considers it reasonable in view of factors A, B or C. It gives the insurance companies more flexibility. However, I accept the Minister's response. If the amendment weakens the position of the applicant for a service, I am prepared to withdraw it. I will look at it again.

This amendment applies to insurance companies. I read the Minister's contribution on Second Stage with interest. I could not contribute to that debate because it ended earlier than I anticipated.

I raised this issue in the House a number of years ago in the context of people with HIV and AIDS. At the time the insurance industry was discriminating against such people by loading their premia in merely because they had taken the precaution of having an AIDS test. The then Minister, Deputy Brennan, raised the matter with the insurance companies. Their attitude was that if anybody took a HIV test, unless they needed to have it to acquire a visa to visit certain countries, it reflected a concern on the part of the individual about his or her lifestyle and the insurance companies were entitled to either load the premia or refuse insurance. That is a dangerous policy and I am worried about the margin of appreciation permitted to such companies. I would be concerned about abuse of the limited exemptions if they were used to inhibit people from taking HIV tests. This could have a negative impact on their health and welfare.

On the other hand I accept that insurance is a business, the heart of which is a mathematical calculation on the actuarial sums involved in the projection and costing of a risk. Nevertheless, I am concerned that the vagueness of the phrases "other relevant underwriting or commercial factors" and "reasonable having regard to the data, or other relevant factors" would confer a degree of flexibility on insurance companies if they were unscrupulous — certain sections of the industry have been unscrupulous in the past — and might be abused. That appears to be the thinking behind this amendment. Can the Minister and his advisers reassure me that this situation is covered or that an amendment can be considered on Report Stage which would tighten the provision to meet those worries?

The section is properly drafted. I doubt that the situation mentioned by Senator Norris is relevant. The amendment would have the effect of removing a proper safeguard for the customer. These are not matters of discretion for an insurance company. They are determined by an independent official, the Director of Equality Investigations. The clause "is reasonable having regard to the data, or other relevant factors" is included to aid the customer. Not only must there be actuarial and statistical data on which it is appropriate to rely but it must also be reasonable having regard to the data or other relevant factors. That is an important safeguard for the customer and it should be preserved in the section.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 6 agreed to.
SECTION 7.

Amendment No. 4 is related to amendment No. 3 and the two amendments may be discussed together.

I move amendment No. 3:

In page 12, lines 4 and 5, to delete"marital status".

I mentioned this matter on Second Stage. Regulations introduced by the Minister for the Environment regarding schemes for letting priorities instructed local authorities that catchment areas could not be used as a determining factor and that authorities had to accept applications from anybody who arrived in the area. In my experience as a local authority member, marital status is never taken into account in the case of Dublin city and council lettings when determining an application for housing. Family size is the determining factor. It is balanced with the number of rooms available.

There is no question of a single applicant with three children being treated differently from a family of four which consists of a husband and wife and two children. The letting of houses is determined by the number of people in a family and the number of rooms available in a scheme of houses or in one house that might become available under what is known as "casual vacancies".

When the Minister and I were members of Dublin County Council, the authority positively discriminated in favour of single parents with children because those people were not moving up the housing lists. It had the effect of lone parents with children being treated favourably. The Minister now states that that cannot be done anymore. Applications must now be decided on the basis of family size and housing allocated on that basis and on the points system drawn up by local authorities. There is no reason why marital status should appear in this provision. It would be wrong to send out a message to local authorities that it should be used for treating people differently.

I accept what the Minister said that about trying to ensure a social balance and mix in housing estates. The case was made in the late 1980s about large numbers of houses being allocated to single parents with no social mix or support and it was wrong for that to happen. That may be, but including marital status in this subsection is also wrong. I would prefer local authorities to deal with housing applicants on the basis of need and family size. Marital status has nothing to do with housing applications.

Amendment No. 4 deals with membership of the travelling community. The purpose of this legislation is to ensure travellers are not treated differently to people in society in terms of access to pubs, clubs, educational institutions, etc. Local authorities construct housing schemes specifically for the travelling community; halting sites are also built. That is positive discrimination. The inclusion of membership of the travelling community in this subsection is to ensure local authorities can continue to do that.

However, I know of large numbers of people in the travelling community who are on normal local authority housing lists. The inclusion of membership of the travelling community in this subsection will be used by residents' associations in housing estates who do not want travellers allocated houses within their estates to prevent that happening and the law states local authorities may discriminate against them. I believe the purpose of the inclusion of membership of the traveling community is to allow local authorities to construct specific schemes, but the inclusion of it in this subsection will be used as ammunition by communities who do not want travellers living in their estates. The provision would be used by those communities to stop halting sites, group housing schemes and the allocation of single dwellings in housing estates to members of the travelling community.

I may have worded the amendments incorrectly but it is important the Minister and his staff re-examine this and consider my genuine fears about the inclusion of these terms, the travelling community especially. Marital status does not need to be included as a reason local authorities may discriminate or treat applicants differently.

References in this subsection to membership of the travelling community and marital status, in line with the provisions relating to the other groups specified in the subsection, are positive and necessary. Local authorities must be able to set aside or designate specific types of needs. accommodation to mcet specific types of needs. Custom built accommodation for travellers or elderly people is a clear example of this. References to family and marital status are included to give appropriate flexibility to local authorities so they can take into account the overall social mix of the estate in making individual lettings.

For example, local authorities were severely criticised in the past for having ghettoised single parent families in certain estates. The thinking regarding social housing has moved away from the purely quantitative aspects — the number of houses provided. The need for quality of design and location of social housing is now well recognised, as is the need for appropriate social mix and integration. The provisions of the Bill seek to guarantee appropriate flexibility for authorities in lettings to ensure they are not in future required to return to practices for which they were rightly criticised in the past.

I emphasise that this is an enabling measure and does not oblige any local authority to do anything. It allows them flexibility, where necessary, to organise housing on that basis. In the circumstances, I regret I cannot accept the Senator's amendments.

I anticipated what the Minister was going to say from his response on Second Stage. Housing is not constructed for married or unmarried people but for those in need of it. I refute the need to provide housing for people on the basis of marital status. Even if a local authority wished to reserve houses for six or seven married people, the schemes drawn up by local authorities are based on need and applicants are awarded points based on the lack of facilities such as bathrooms, toilets, shared kitchens or the number of bedrooms. Are we saying a that a scheme of letting priorities drawn up by a local authority, which gives Marian McGennis, married and living in private rented accommodation with three children, 20 points, and Mary Smith, unmarried and living in her parents' home in a box room with three children, 25 points——

It leaves the flexibility with the local authority. It does not oblige them to do anything.

I know what the Minister is saying and that he thinks the provision is positive. I also know that some local authorities which have refused to provide accommodation for the travelling community will not use this positively but very negatively to ensure single parent applicants go to the bottom of housing lists. Housing is built on the basis of need and not on marital status. I accept that specific types of housing are built for specific groups in need. I fear that this provision will mean members of the travelling community who apply for housing will be told they are dealt with differently.

I disagree with the Minister. The provision is there for a positive purpose, but the law can only be read in terms of the wording in the Bill and not on the basis of the intent of the Minister or the reservations of the Opposition spokesperson. It will be interpreted by a judge presiding over a case taken by people to court and I am afraid it will be interpreted very negatively. I cannot accept the Minister's reassurances.

I thoroughly approve of enabling local authorities to engage in a policy of mixed housing to fracture the ghettoisation which happened before. Senator McGennis raised the points system. Dublin Corporation's use of this system had a malign influence on parts of the city. The local community ethos was destroyed when streets were de-tenanted. When the housing was rebuilt by the local authority, people were brought back in on the basis of a points system. The more points one had the more likely one was to get a house. This concentrated the most dysfunctional families in good housing without any sense of community or the restraints which an organically developed community displays. In this regard I applaud the Minister's intention.

However, I have much sympathy with Senator McGennis. I accept her argument that there does not appear to be markedly different housing provided for people depending on their marital status. I would be interest to know what differences are considered in terms of layout or location.

The Minister made an interesting balancing case for the positive use by local authorities of powers to discriminate in favour of the travelling community. If that argument is accepted in principle, is there any reason for not including the sexual orientation ground, as has been done in other sections of this and other legislation? Would the Minister consider this point?

I know of cases where gay people were housed by local authorities. These were mostly men in their late 20s and early 30s. Invariably they were stereotypical gay individuals and easily targeted. Their lives were made unbearable. One individual in Thomas Street had excrement pushed through his letterbox, his home was petrol bombed and he was intimidated and attacked by local people. Eventually, because of the decency of the city manager and the manager with responsibility for housing, I managed to have him rehoused in Donnybrook. The complex was intended for elderly people. I said this to him and he replied that he loved old people. He turned out to be of assistance to the other residents as he enjoyed doing their messages and so on. He had the protection of the kind of housing provided for the elderly.

I have a similar case at present. The corporation's attitude is reasonably helpful in this matter. If one accepts the Minister's argument that there should be positive discrimination for the travelling community, should it not also exist on the sexual orientation ground? There have been a number of cases where special provisions would be very useful in order to protect people from attack in certain local authority areas.

I share some of Senator McGennis's fears of possible consequences if the sexual orientation ground was included. When the AIDS virus first struck there were strident voices in many European countries, such as Monsieur Le Pen, who called for those infected to be corralled so that they could not infect the rest of the population. This is an extreme scenario but I would be worried that it could happen if one had a right wing city manager or council. If the principle can be applied to the travelling community, can it also be applied to the sexual orientation ground?

Senator Norris is suggesting a variation on this section which would make it read something as follows: "Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as prohibiting a local authority from providing in relation to housing and accommodation different treatment to people based on their sexual orientation". A local authority would be allowed to provide special accommodation for people based on their sexual orientation. That would not be acceptable or desirable. It would allow a local authority to avoid the anti-discrimination provisions of this Bill.

Local authorities provide a range of different accommodation types for different purposes. The Department of the Environment points out that to achieve its aim a council would from time to time wish to set aside, for example, houses for the disabled. We have provided for this. Similarly, an authority might wish to promote a balanced mixture of tenants in an estate with the objective of promoting a social mix. Therefore, it might be necessary to set aside houses for categories of persons who might in this instance not necessarily be those most in need on the points basis. We are allowing authorities to do so if the circumstances demand and if they are minded to do so.

The Minister has illustrated the virtue of my case. Perhaps I am not stating my case clearly enough. The Minister seemed to be saying that this provision does not impose an obligation on an authority but merely facilitates it to make special arrangements for the travelling community. Senator McGennis suggested that this might be abused. The Minister replied that it was only a facilitating measure which would be positively used.

When I raised the sexual orientation ground the Minister paraphrased the Bill and said that the effect of my proposal would be to say that nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting a local authority from providing different treatment to different persons. Exactly. I recognise the possible inherent dangers. I am aware of situations where it has been in the interests of gay people to be given different and selective treatment and not to be confined on the basis that one has 23 points therefore one must go to St. Philomena's House, Attracts Mansions or Thomas Street and there one must stay. I have known of a number of people, fewer than ten, placed in local authority housing. However, because of the context of the housing in a fairly tough area in the inner city, these people were subjected to victimisation, assault, threats of assault and intimidation.

The Minister mentioned the travelling community and facilitating flexibility in local authority housing policy. This facilitation could mean that even though subject X, who happens to be gay, does not have the 35 points required to place him in a particular kind of housing because of the difficulties he is experiencing and his sexual orientation, local authorities can breach their own points system. There may be a danger in the Minister's argument for the inclusion of the travelling community, although there is also a positive side to it.

I do not intend taking up Committee Stage of this Bill discussing these points. I know the Minister is anxious to deal with the Bill as expenditiously as possible.

Families are differentiated in this Bill. I know the Minister does not believe this, just like Senator O'Toole will passionately claim the Minister does not support another section. I do not believe there are different types of families. The family unit, whether married, single, composed of children or gay, is a family.

Those of us, including Senator Gallagher, who are candidates in the general election are aware there is a crusade abroad against single parents. I support the policy that grew out of the previous Government, which my party was a member of and which supported lone parent families so they could achieve their full potential. That is the basis of the social legislation and social welfare system that is in place. A head of steam is building up to try to reserve this. The argument is being made that it is all right to pay single parents for one child and one mistake is fine.

Politicians are human and vulnerable. Some of us are weak and some are strong. Who knows what the composition of local authorities or this Parliament will be after the next election? I accept that housing allocation is an executive function carried out by the management of local authorities. However, policy in local authorities is decided by the membership. I do not want to call people right wing — I could just as easily say homophobic. If groups of elected representatives in local authorities are subjected to pressure, some bend and some maintain their stance on an issue. Local authority members can be lobbied sufficiently and hard enough by groups and communities. For example, someone decided to table motions in local authorities throughout the country calling for a referendum on abortion. This was the beginning of the trickle. Every local authority was told to sign up or it would be cast in a particular light.

If a group such as Christian Solidarity asks local authorities to only provide houses to people who are in what are preceived to be normal family units of husband, wife and children, local authority members can buckle and belt. They devise policy. A local authority may decide its housing policy will be that houses being constructed or casual vacancies which arise will only be given to those with a particular marital status. I hope my fear is unjustified and that it will not happen. In the run up to the election, we have seen how we have feet of clay.

We apply to the Minister for the Environment for a couple of million pounds to construct a group housing scheme for travellers. Then it emerges in the media that these houses cost £70,000 when the average cost of a local authority dwelling is £35,000 or £40,000. Those who wish to oppose that kind of development in their area may approach a willing local authority member and ask them to change the local authority member saying that they are fine houses and many families need housing. I have grave fears about the inclusion of marital status and membership of the travelling community in this section. It may be interpreted in a negative manner. I will not pursue the argument further. It is a weakness which may be exploited. I know that is not the Minister's intention.

I want to address an additional question to the Minister. With his legal skill and intellectual dexterity I am sure he will be able to provide an answer. If he does not, I have no doubt his honesty will compel him to confront the situation. My question is a simple test. Can the Minister explain the difference in principle as it applies to the travelling community on one hand and the gay community on the other? There is balance in the argument on one side or the other, but it is the same whether we are dealing with the travelling community or gay people. There is a danger in this amendment and the Bill. Can the Minister explain the difference in principle between the two? He has made a substainable case for his point of view but not one which is absolutely 100 per cent. It is a matter of judgement and I am sure the Minister will agree. There is a potential danger, as Senator McGennis has indicated. What principle is applied and why is it different?

The principle is that housing in the context of members of the travelling community is a matter of crucial; premier and special relevance that perhaps does not apply to any other category of people.

I understand that, but I have had experience of a small number of cases — perhaps three or four — where the situation is crucial.

It is a matter for the Housing Acts and the anti-discrimination provisions in this Bill. This is not a housing Bill.

Amendment put and declared lost.

I move amendment No. 4:

In page 12, line 5, to delete ", age or membership in the travelling community" and substitute "or age". Amendment put and declared lost.

Question, "That section 7 stand part of the Bill" put and declared carried.
SECTION 8.

I move amendment No. 5:

In page 12, subsection (3) (b) (i), to delete from and including "or it refuses" in line 33 down to and including "of the school" in line 37.

I want to address the issues I raised on Committee Stage. I listened carefully to the Minister's Second Stage reply. The best I could say about it was that it was absolutely specious. It made no attempt to address the issues I raised.

I find it extraordinary for a Minister to seriously say that a Member referring to the Constitution quoted selectively from it. I have dealt with lawyers for many years and I checked with two constitutional lawyers to ask if they ever quoted the Constitution in toto in support of an argument. Both said they had not and that the only way to deal with an issue is through selective quotation. The Minister responded by saying that I quoted selectively from the Constitution. There is no other way to refer to it in dealing with specific issues. The only time one can deal with the Constitution in its totality is when comparing it with a constitution of another country. I expected more from the Minister and I felt his response was not a serious one.

The Minister said I apparently wanted Protestant schools to be overrun and swamped. I may offer an interpretation of the Constitution as the Minister has done on a regular basis in court. I presume when he selects from a piece of legislation in support of a client that he does not necessarily agree with what is contained in the legislation, that it is used only as a supporting argument. I would argue about many Articles of the Constitution. I did not write it and have given my views on it on many occasions. Saying that my correct interpretation of the Constitution might create a problem for Protestant or other schools is not addressing the argument. I did not raise that issue or express any desire that that should happen and I am unaware that it would happen. If this is the correct interpretation then the Constitution should be changed if we want a different result.

The Minister asked why I referred only to religious schools and not to schools for those of different nationality or national origin. The only reason I did not refer to such schools is that I could not find any supporting sections in my selective consideration of the Constitution. Perhaps the Minister knows something I do not. Perhaps the entire section needs to be changed rather than simply the two aspects to which I drew attention. Will the Minister say whether I should have referred to the issue of national origin? It was specious of the Minister to raise this issue. It is like the old trick of saying a Senator said something he or she never said.

The point at issue is whether it is correct for the State to legislate along the lines that an educational establishment is not culpable of discrimination "if it refuses to admit as a student a person who is not of that denomination". Can a child be refused admission to a school on the basis of its denomination and where enrolment would be considered a problem? In other words, is it all right to refuse admission to a child on the basis of maintaining the ethos of the school? This involves all sorts of assumptions. I know schools of particular denominations where the ethos has been maintained and respected over generations despite the fact that the teaching staff are of different denominations. I find the idea that the enrolment of a four year old child could damage the ethos of a school most offensive. I would like the Minister to explain how this is possible. I would like to see how the beliefs and background of a child or a number of children can affect the ethos of a school. The ethos is established by the board and the owners of the school. I do not understand how it can be changed by a four year old, particularly when the rules for schools specifically provide for parents to remove their children from religious instruction if they so wish in accordance with the Constitution. If the Constitution and the rules allow this to happen there must be an assumption that the enrolment of pupils differing in denomination from that of the school is not a threat to the ethos of the school. This is the only logical and sane interpretation.

I wish to again place on record my views on this matter. Section 8 (3) of the Bill purports to give schools the right to refuse to admit pupils on the grounds of denomination. This flies in the face of parents' rights to choose the ethos of their children's education and as such, it is unconstitutional. Parents have a right to make decisions about the education of their children. They have a constitutional duty to make the right decisions. The Constitution allows for a Catholic parent to send their children to a Protestant school. The parent can decide on the basis of his or her own experience and educational background whether they want their children to have an education of a different ethos. They are entitled and required to do this. Otherwise, they would be abdicating their duties as parents. Article 42 of the Constitution gives parents that right as primary educators. A Catholic parent can decide that a Protestant education would be best for their child and the State may not introduce legislation restricting that right.

Article 42.2 of the Constitution is also clear and unambiguous. It says parents shall be free to provide education in their own homes, a private school or in schools recognised by the State. This provision cannot be restricted by religious affiliation. The Constitution protects the rights of people to practise and impart their religion. It is unacceptable that legislation should constrain a person's right to participate in religion in any way. It is offensive to more than one Article of the Constitution.

The Constitution says the State shall not oblige parents in violation of their conscience or their lawful preference to send their children to any particular type of school designated by the State. I submit that there is an equal and opposite responsibility on the State to ensure that their choice is not rescinded. The State cannot demand children be sent to schools of a particular denomination. Neither can the State say parents cannot send their children to schools of a particular denomination. This latter position is in line with the demands of the Constitution, although I cannot support the case with legal precedent. However, it has to be the only interpretation.

The State and the churches are interfering with the constitutional rights of citizens. We are going down an extraordinary route. The vast majority of people have respect for religion and religious practice and ethos. Every Member of this House and the Dáil, including myself and the Minister, must have a duty and a sense of duty to protect the right of people to practise their religion. Any interference in that, whether by teachers or anybody else, must be challenged.

Anybody who interprets what I am saying as in some way anti-religion is completely misreading the situation. This issue is about religious freedom and choice and not restricting people on the grounds of religious beliefs. To say to somebody that their child may not attend a school because they are of the "wrong" religion is as bad a form of discrimination as anything we have read or heard about in any other milieu or part of the world. Segregating children on the basis of their religious beliefs, or worse, on the basis of their parents' religious beliefs, can only be described by a word considered by many people to be an ugly one. I will not use the word here but we all know what it is. As a pluralist State, we should be ensuring that children learn and grow together. There is nothing more beneficial to a community than allowing their sense of pluralism to develop and there is nothing more important for children than for them to have a pride in their religion in the same manner as they can have a pride in their culture. Irish people who go abroad may never have used an Irish word in their lives but when they are in Brussels, Berlin, Bangkok or wherever, they feel a very strong sense of Irishness. They will say "Dia's Muire dhuit" instead of "Hello" and they will explain to people what "sláinte" means. They find a new pride in their language in a different context. In similar fashion, I believe religions would grow and become stronger if children and their parents understood other religions.

There are also practical reasons to be considered in relation to this issue. The Minister took umbrage at my references to the North of Ireland, and I think he was incorrect in that. It is fair to say that when children live and are educated together, they will learn more about each other. We think that because we allow every single religious group to practice and flourish on their own, with walls between them, we have a pluralist society. We do not have a pluralist society. Any piece of legislation which restricts interaction between people of different beliefs, backgrounds and political affiliations is bad. The essence of pluralism can be measured not by the freedom to practice but by the quality of the relationships between people of different faiths and religions. To introduce into an Equal Status Bill something which allows schools to refuse entry to a child on the basis of his/her religion is completely wrong.

Wearing my other hat as general secretary of a teachers' union, I can inform the House that it cost my union approximately £3 million to find out what happens when a child is refused entry to a school. Whoever will have responsibility for implementing this legislation and refusing a child admission to a school had better change their property into somebody else's name quickly. They will not have sufficient money to pay for the costs they will incur. I can assure the Minister that it will not be a teacher who will refuse admission to a child on the grounds of religious affiliation. This provision is incorrect; it is a major mistake to allow this into a fine piece of legislation. At the end of the day we will all be ashamed if this legislation is passed. I urge the Minister to accept my proposal that the words which allow a child to be refused entry to a school on the grounds of his/her religion be deleted.

I second this amendment. I have some residual sympathy with the Minister. I can imagine the kind of pressure under which he came from various religious sources. Such pressure is completely misplaced and reflects an insecurity on the part of the religious authorities both those of my own Church — the Church of Ireland — and others. If religious authorities really believed in the ethos which they proclaim, they would have sufficient trust in it to believe it would survive a mixed school situation. I find the proprietorial and territorial approach taken by the churches to be quite offensive and in clear contradiction to the message of Christianity. I am a practising member of the Church of Ireland and am in no way antagonistic to religion. The New Testament is quite clear on these issues. Jesus Christ was unambiguous when he said "Suffer the little children to come unto me"; he did not say "Suffer the little Protestants or the little Papists to come". It is a kind of episcopal blasphemy to seek separate territories because of the insecurities of "their Lordships".

The religious group I admire most in this country are the Quakers. We are going through a period of examining the Famine at the moment. Few groups distinguished themselves during that period, but the Quakers certainly did. One of their immediate contributions on coming to Ireland in the late seventeenth century was to establish educational facilities. For example, they established a school at Ballytore and Newtown school in Waterford. I would be interested to know what the religious profile of the students there is and I would be extremely surprised if more than 15 per cent were Quakers. However, the ethos of that school is clearly a Quaker one and students benefit from that. If the bishops had the kind of confidence the Quakers have in the attractiveness, power and legitimacy of their ethos, they would not be so afraid of opening up their schools to people of different denominations. They would take the view that their ethos would be so attractive that it would spread in the best possible way without any nasty proselytising. The very virtues of their position would make themselves clear to the children.

I support what Senator O'Toole said in relation to the practical concerns of having such a provision in the Bill and the cost that might be borne by anyone who would discriminate in this manner. Why would a court award such substantial damages? A court might well be persuaded that there had been substantial injury to the well being of a child. At the age of four, five, six or whatever children are vulnerable to prejudice. It is nasty to make children feel different. One can imagine the feeling of rejection a child would experience on discovering they had been refused admission to a school on the basis of their religious affiliation. Children are not always universally nice little people and one could also imagine the use that might be made of such a refusal by other children in that environment. To return to the point I was making about the Quakers, I have just returned from Philadelphia where I visited some schools, some of which were Quaker. In one extremely fine Quaker school there are only two Quaker students. Swarthmore is a very large university founded by the Quakers and there are only 15 Quaker undergraduates there. Yet the university flourishes.

I find the parallel with Northern Ireland to be a useful one. The situation is not as extreme in the South as it is in the North. I have no doubt that if there was a greater degree of integrated schooling there, one would not have the kind of polarised sectarian atmosphere which prevails at present. The Roman Catholic Church and the Church of Ireland are equally guilty in the North of Ireland. Everything is about property, ownership, territory, power and domination. The leaders of those Churches should be ashamed, and I say that in spite of the fact that it will lose me votes. I have been approached by senior members of my Church who are very decent people but who perhaps have not really thought out the implications of segregated schooling. They urged me to support the Minister in this Bill. If I am subjected to that kind of pressure on social occasions in Dublin, I can only imagine the kind of pressure the Minister and his advisers must have come under. I urge the Minister to resist that pressure, difficult as it may be to do so.

Senator O'Toole has said he feels this provision is unconstitutional and it may well be. That would be sad, because 95 per cent of this Bill is excellent and a major advance. I do not believe the Minister wishes to discriminate or has shown a desire to so do. He has been at the forefront in the fight against discrimination. However, it may well be that for reasons of political or religious pressure, he may believe that after discussions with these interests this is the best he can do. It is a dangerous best because, as Senator O'Toole said, it may well be subject to a constitutional challenge. I raised this issue in relation to other legislation introduced by the Minister, of which 95 per cent was excellent. My views on whether it was constitutional were not summarily or rudely dismissed, but airily or loftily dismissed. That legislation has been referred by the President to the Supreme Court and this may happen again with this Bill, particularly after the ground work laid out by Senator O'Toole. I would regret that because this Bill is, in essence, excellent, but this is a particular difficulty.

I intended to speak on Second Stage but was too late because I was on the telephone to the Provost and several speakers took less time than I anticipated, which was my fault and not theirs. I went back to my office to complain and bellyache and then went into Senator O'Toole's office where I heard the Minister say Senator O'Toole quoted selectively from the Constitution. I asked — although I am sure he would have done so himself — how else does one quote from the Constitution. What other way can one quote from the Constitution except selectively?

I have a partly mixed educational background. I went to the High School on Harcourt Street, where a considerable number of Jewish children went to school. They added something to the mix for which I am extremely grateful. I am glad it was not only a narrow Dublin middle class Protestant school. I am not decrying the virtues of the Dublin Protestant middle class, working class or upper crust, if there is still such a thing. These children added to the variety of my education. Fewer Roman Catholics than Jewish people attended the school and they were regarded as rather exotic and we were fascinated by them. I am grateful we had this experience.

I would like to put on record something which is in a way marginal but which may have some small significance. I was at a dinner party a couple of weeks ago with educated, well-off cultivated people. To my horror, the Muslim school in Clonskeagh was on the agenda for discussion at the dinner. One of the people complained bitterly about the provision of State funds for this Muslim school. In my opinion, a clearly racist and sectarian attitude was being taken and I was extremely surprised and disappointed. I argued the point with this woman and eventually she closed her argument by asking: why are we paying taxpayers' money when none of our children may attend this school? She also asked if it had an obligation to educate others who wish to attend. I found that very interesting and it fits in with this argument.

I will try to finish on a lighter note. Senator O'Toole said 99 per cent of the people supported the right to practice their religion. I encountered a member of the 1 per cent who do not support this right during a court case I witnessed where Hare Krishnas were being had up for a breach of the peace for singing hymns and clashing symbols. The judge was in a fairly comatose condition on the bench. The Hare Krishnas were unlucky to draw by lot a barrister on the free legal aid scheme who had advanced views on the Constitution. The constitutional defence he entered on their behalf was that they were simply exercising their right to practice their religion, which certainly woke the judge. He sat up in the bench and asked what type of defence was practising religion. He then asked what would happen if everybody did that. It is a wonderful Swiftian question. What would happen if people took the New Testament seriously and started to implement it, as they are required to do under the Constitution? Suppose that we had a Christian foreign policy with advice from the professor of dogmatic theology in Maynooth and other such people. It is a wonderful Swiftian scenario.

It is a modest proposal.

I could not describe Senator O'Toole's amendment as a modest proposal. It is a major alteration to the Bill and I think the most significant amendment which will tabled in the light of our proclaimed belief in religious tolerance, in respect for difference and in cherishing all the children of the nation equally. I know that is contained in the 1916 proclamation and not the Constitution but it forms part of the ethos of the country and should be respected.

Finally——

Another finally.

I am like Dame Nellie Melba making my positively final appearances. My ultimate and concluding remark is that I assume — perhaps I should not anticipate — the Minister's response will be partly along the lines that the school must prove it is essential to maintain the ethos so that it is not given a wide power of discrimination. Let us take the case of the Muslim school. I do not know but it may say this is a profoundly insignificant religious thing and that it honestly believes, without wishing to cause pain to other people, that they are all infidels and to have an infidel in the school would disturb the balance. I do not know if it would say that as I am only speculating.

The point I was trying to make about selective quotation from the Constitution when I replied to Second Stage was that one cannot discern the meaning of the Constitution from the text alone. One must also take into account the relevant case law which exists in interpreting and explaining the Constitution. There is relevant case law in so far as the line of country with which we are dealing today is concerned.

The words the Senator proposes to delete have been included in order to afford protection to minority religion schools. They are intended to cover primarily the situation where a minority school, although taking in all the applicants from its own religion, would lose its denominational character if it accepted all the other applicants for which it had or could make space. It is clear that minority religious schools run a risk of being swamped by majority religion children unless they have such a right of refusal. I have been advised that such right of refusal is necessary to ensure constitutional conformity. It is a necessary concomitant of the entitlement to have a denominational school. Without it, minority religions could not adequately ensure the preservation of the religious ethos in the schools they run.

I am satisfied, having regard to Articles 42 and 44 of the Constitution and the relevant case law, that this wording is constitutionally sound and strikes an appropriate balance between the rights of parents on the one hand and those of the denominational schools on the other. I cannot emphasise enough that this wording does not in any way give any extra rights to schools. Indeed, Senator Norris mentioned this. Denominational schools will now have to demonstrate that a particular instance of refusal is essential to maintaining the religious ethos of that school and the school's reasons would be reviewed by the Director of Equality Investigations.

This Bill does not seek to dismantle the denominational education system of this country. I would point out that representatives of minority religions have made representations about the need to maintain a denominational balance of their pupil intake and have made known their wish that the Equal Status Bill should not have an adverse effect on minority communities.

Senator O'Toole's amendment, if accepted, would be inimical to the interests of such communities and would give entirely the wrong signal to people in Northern Ireland — that in this State we aim to assimilate minorities and that we do not want them to preserve their own identity.

Senator O'Toole has argued that if Catholic parents decided that a Protestant education would be best for their child, and they selected such a school, that is no more than their entitlement. It is their right and the State cannot introduce laws that restrict that right. My response is that a Catholic parent in such circumstances is free to send his or her child to a Protestant school and will remain so. However, such a school has the right at present not to accept that child. They might exercise this right, for example, if they consider that the admission of more Catholic pupils would be inconsistent with their mission of providing education to their own co-religionists in the ethos of their own denomination.

All that section 8 (3) (b) does is to recognise this legitimate right. It gives no additional rights to school management. In fact, it has a potentially restricting effect in that schools may have to justify their decisions to the Director of Equality Investigations, which they do not have to do at present.

He will be very busy.

I can readily understand that the religious ethos of a school could be undermined by a large influx of children of a different religious faith. Over 90 per cent of the people of this State are Roman Catholic. If we accept Senator O'Toole's proposal, in the long-term, or perhaps even the medium term, one could expect that what now are schools serving minority denominations would typically have a Roman Catholic enrolment so large that they could no longer be said to cater specifically for the denomination they were established to serve.

Senator O'Toole does not object to the first part of section 8 (3) (b) (i) which gives schools the right to exercise preference for a co-religionist over a person belonging to another denomination. But this would also be, in the Senator's terms, a denial of the constitutional rights of the parents of the excluded pupil and is a distinction or discrimination based on religion. I do not think his view on this is consistent with his objection to the part of the paragraph which he proposes to delete by his amendment.

I was amazed at the facility with which Senator O'Toole can read out Articles of the Constitution and tell us unambiguously what they mean. This is not a useful way of proceeding. One must also have regard to how the Constitution as a whole has been interpreted by the courts. This is what the Attorney General did in examining this particular provision and he has cleared it.

I am satisfied that these words are not only constitutionally acceptable but absolutely necessary to ensure compliance with the Constitution. They respect the pluralism of our society and safeguard the position of minority religion schools.

In conclusion, I would ask Senator O'Toole to consider further and withdraw this amendment. The section in question was agreed unanimously by the Select Committee on Social Affairs. I have no possibility of accepting the amendment because, apart from the policy aspect, the legal advice I have been given is that it is absolutely necessary from a constitutional point of view.

I am glad the Minister has understood the point of my argument. He may well be right in saying that there is an inconsistency in what I have said about allowing the preferential treatment to remain and only proposing that the other part be deleted. I have said that in relation to the previous Bill where we used the question of religious denomination to be an acceptable or desirable criterion. That may well be the case. I do not know the answer but I left it there for a precise reason. Where one place is left in a school for space, health and safety reasons, and there was a choice between two children — one of the denomination of the school institution and the other of a different denomination — it would be reasonable to allow the authorities to say it was more desirable for them to make this decision, all other things being equal. It was on that basis that I allowed the section on preference to stand.

As regards the fact that the Minister says this has been cleared by the Attorney General, I know it has been and I know the precise terms under which it was cleared. The Attorney General was faced with a copy of the document which was agreed to by the religious authorities about the management of schools. In that there was an agreement with the Protestant religions that they would have "the absolute discretion in determining the admission of pupils". As long ago as last October I pointed out that was unconstitutional. I was told at that stage that legal advice was being taken on all sides by the State and by the Protestant churches and that this was acceptable. It was eventually referred to the Attorney General's Office and, though no public statement has been made about it, and in no formal way has it been communicated to me, I know the Attorney General concurred with me and came back with a clear view that having absolute discretion was not acceptable. He is now putting forward a new line which happens to be precisely what is in this legislation. In other words, "where that refusal is essential to maintain the ethos of the school" has been added to the right to refuse. I am quite clear that that came from the Attorney General.

I have more knowledge of case law on admissions to schools than probably anybody in the country. I have read the advice of various eminent senior counsel as far back as 15 years ago, including the current President of the State, Mr. Justice McCarthy, who was tragically killed some years ago in Spain, and Mr. Justice Barrington. I have discussed this matter over a period of 20 years. I have very good reason to know the case law dealing with this matter as I have had to sign the cheques which paid for mistakes my union made in not recognising it. I take those matters very much into consideration.

I find a number of things extraordinary and I would like to have a clear answer from the Minister on them. The Minister says that currently primary schools have the right to refuse people on religious grounds. I do not know and have never known that to be the case. I do not know where the Minister has found that. I have read it in newspapers but I do not know any rule or legislation concerning it. I have never heard of it happening, although it is something I have heard Members representing the Government — but not the Minister — say at various stages has happened. I asked every religious denomination for an example of where it occurred but they could not find one. I know of no time in the history of the State where a child has been refused admission to a school on the grounds of religion. If the advisers tell me it has happened, I will resubmit this amendment on Report Stage because that is incorrect. I will not allow the House to be misled on this matter because I want honesty. That power does not exist. I have heard commentators say it can happen, but it has not happened. People say there is a right to do it, but no one has shown me that right.

The Minister's interpretation of the impact of children's enrolment in schools is extraordinary. During his reply he referred to the religious ethos and, on two occasions, the religious character of the school. I assure the Minister that the religious character of a school is not determined by the religion of its children. He also said these schools cannot cater only for these children. I did not understand that was the Bill's intention or that the State was working on the basis that schools could cater only for one denomination and that was what we were seeking to protect. That goes against the logic of the Minister's earlier explanation and against parents' right to make a selection.

The religious character of a school is determined at assembly time in the morning, by the local holidays it takes to coincide with religious feasts of the particular denomination, by its response to the Angelus bell and by the religion taught during the religious knowledge class. I could go on ad nauseam about how the religious character of a school is dealt with but I would not be able to say the children's religion had anything to do with it. They are influenced and informed by the religious character of the school; they do not determine it. That is a curious line of logic which does not hold up to scrutiny.

I disagree with the Minister that parents have an additional right in this regard. As regards this Bill and section 37 of the Employment Equality Bill, the community has found an acceptable balance where people recognise and respect each other's needs, where action is taken against a teacher who is undermining the ethos of a school and where problems in relation to the religious character of the school are dealt with.

Over 50 per cent of children in many Protestant schools are Catholic yet they are still Church of Ireland schools. There was a time when convent or monastery schools were determined by the fact that the principal and staff were of a particular religion. When they ran out of numbers, they introduced lay teachers and soon there was only a religious superior as principal of a religious school. The staff and principal in many of those religious schools no longer belong to the particular religious order, yet they are still classified as convent or monastery schools. The Catholic Primary School Managers' Association has a list of schools which are classified as monastery and convent schools on the basis of their character and religious background. Making judgments on the basis of a child's religion does not hold up to scrutiny.

I will not push this amendment to a vote but I will resubmit it on Report Stage. I ask the Minister to take further advice on it so that it can be taken on board. There is no right for children to be refused admission to a school on the grounds of their denomination.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 8 agreed to.
Sections 9 and 10 agreed to.
SECTION 11.

I move amendment No. 6:

In page 15, subsection (1) (a), lines 5 and 6, to delete "nationality or ethnic or national origin,".

While I accept there may be reasons for allowing a club to discriminate on the grounds of religion, age, etc., I cannot understand why "nationality or ethnic or national origin" is included as a reason for refusing membership of a club. Does this mean clubs for white people only will be permitted to continue to refuse admission to anyone who is not white? I do not understand how "nationality or ethic or national origin" could be interpreted as anything other than an apartheid measure. I accept that clubs, such as youth clubs and Catholic boy scouts clubs, might not be considered to be discriminating clubs on the grounds of religion and age, but "nationality or ethnic or national origin" could be interpreted in the worst possible way.

The effect of this amendment would be that a club could not be a registered club if its principal purpose was to cater for persons of a particular nationality or ethic or national origin and if it wished to restrict membership to persons of that group. I am puzzled that Senator McGennis tabled this amendment because her party colleague, Deputy McDaid, proposed an amendment during the discussion of the Bill at the Select Committee on Social Affairs which would have had the effect of exempting from the provisions on registered clubs a club comprised of a recognisable minority such as nationality. In his contribution he said he wished to cover clubs which might be set up for those of French, Italian or Bosnian nationality, for example, so that they would be able to retain their specific identity as minorities without being discriminated against by outsiders. When I assured the Deputy that the existing provisions in section 11 (a) (1) covered this situation, he withdrew his amendment.

It is reasonable to allow people to have registered clubs for a particular nationality or ethnic or national origin. Nationality or ethnic or national origin does not refer to their colour or race. These clubs will cater for minorities and nobody could reasonably object to their existence. We are all familiar with the many Irish organisations which exist in Britain, the US and other countries to which Irish people have emigrated. When Ireland is the host country, we should be correspondingly tolerant of persons of another nationality or national origin, and that is the purpose of this provision.

The fact that I disagree with my colleague in the other House just proves that Fianna Fáil is a broadly based party and we do not agree on everything.

That is a fair point.

If the Minister reassures me that my interpretation of nationality and ethnic or national origins cannot and may not be used to create white man's clubs, I will withdraw the amendment.

It does not refer to colour or race.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment No. 7 not moved.
Section 11 agreed to.
SECTION 12.

I move amendment No. 8:

In page 15, subsection (1)(b), line 38, to delete "that are intended for recreation".

I spoke of sanctions on Second Stage and said that this was the most appropriate way of ensuring that clubs did not discriminate. However, section 12(1)(b) states that "the club shall not be provided with the use of publicly-owned facilities that are intended for recreation". That means that publicly owned facilities which are not intended for recreation can be made available to a discriminating group or club. If the sanction is to be strong and effective, we should delete "that are intended for recreation" and these sanctions should apply across the board.

I am sure that discrimination by registered clubs is a matter on which many people have strong feelings but I do not consider it would be appropriate to prevent such clubs from being provided with the use of publicly owned facilities, irrespective of their nature. The effect of the Senator's amendment would be to deprive such clubs of refuse collection, electricity supplies, postal delivery, telephone facilities, etc. I do not consider that such strong measures are warranted and I regret, therefore, that I cannot accept the amendment.

I do not think this provision would deprive somebody of refuse collection. That argument does not stand up. If they were public facilities, that would be the case but publicly owned facilities are premises. That is what this means to me. It has nothing to do with the delivery of post and the collection of refuse. The Ministers is being ill advised.

I do not think so. I am satisfied that the provision in this section is appropriate and reasonable. Senator McGennis's amendment would push the remedy too far.

My proposal would deprive a discriminating club of the use of premises and not facilities, such as refuse collection and postal deliveries. This is being interpreted incorrectly.

Amendment put and declared lost.
Government amendment No. 9:
In page 16, subsection (2)(b)(ii), lines 8 to 11, to delete
"(ii) on the date of a determination under section 10(9) that the club has not ceased to be a discriminating club,
whichever first occurs."
and substitute the following:
"(ii) on the date of a determination under section 10(9) that the club has not ceased to be a discriminating club,
whichever first occurs."
This is a purely technical amendment which is designed to correct an error of indentation in section 12.
Amendment agreed to.
Section 12, as amended, agreed to.
SECTION 13.

I move amendment No. 10:

In page 16, lines 12 to 30, to delete subsection (1).

I did not intend to delete all of section 13(1). My intention was that section 13(1) would read as follows:

A person shall not sexually harass or harass (within the meaning of subsection (4) or (5)) another person.

I must have submitted an incorrect amendment to the staff of the House and I wish, by leave of the House, to resubmit my intended amendment on Report Stage. In order to do so, will the Chair advise me whether it is necessary for me to withdraw it now?

The Senator should make her point now and resubmit the correct amendment on Report Stage.

This section stipulates who might be the victims of sexual harassment. The Minister stated on an earlier amendment where I wanted to provide for a "residence ground" that he felt he had gone as far as was necessary and that if he had expanded the provision and provided too many other categories, we could go on forever.

It is simply necessary to state in this subsection that a "person shall not sexually harass or harass (within the meaning of subsection (4) or (5)) another person" although the Minister may want to describe that other person as the victim. There is no need to describe the victim as a student who "has applied for admission or avails or seeks to avail of any service offered ...". This Bill deals with educational institutions, social clubs, etc. To keep it tight and complement the Employment Equality Bill, I would keep it simple and not include all the stated categories. If the Minister wishes, he may also include "(the victim)", which would strengthen it.

The sexual and other harassment provisions of this Bill apply to areas generally corresponding to those in which discrimination is prohibited. The prohibition of sexual and other harassment in the Employment Equality Bill is similarly confined to the context of employment. The revised form of the Senator's amendment would have the effect of bringing all sexual and other harassment, irrespective of the area in which it takes place, within the scope of the Bill. This would be outside the scope of this Bill as provided for in the long title. It would duplicate the Employment Equality Bill and would be very difficult to enforce since it would cover sexual and other harassment in all spheres, public and private. I regret in the circumstances that I can not accept the amendment. The sexual harassment provisions relate to the spectrum of issues covered by the Bill and that is standard procedure.

This is a clear and well thought out section. I wish to make a number of remarks in the context of the amendments proposed by Senator McGennis. Section 13(2) states:

A person ("the responsible person") who is responsible for the operation of any place that is an educational establishment or at which goods, services or accommodation facilities are offered to the public shall not permit another person who has a right to be present in or to avail of any facilities, goods or services provided at that place, to suffer sexual harassment in that place.

Could the responsible person use the defence that he or she was unaware of the occurrence of sexual harassment? I can visualise situations taking place in youth hostels, clubs, etc., where such a person may quite reasonably be unaware of the occurrence of sexual harassment.

Such situations are covered by subsection (3).

Acting Chairman

Senator Norris' point is more relevant to the section than to the amendment under discussion.

One point I want to make, to which the Minister referred, involves the definition of "sexual harassment", but perhaps I will not raise it until we come to deal with the section.

I am slightly confused because the amendment, as it was put down, is not what I am seeking agreement on.

Acting Chairman

If that is the case, the Senator can formally withdraw the amendment and resubmit it on Report Stage.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed: "That section 13 stand part of the Bill."

I am concerned about the situation of the responsible person, particularly in the case of a large establishment. Let us consider the case of the director of a youth hostel catering for 200 to 300 people where sexual harassment may have occurred in a shower cubicle, for example, and the director, or the responsible person, may be reasonably unaware of its existence. In such a situation he or she would not have taken practical steps because they were unaware of the necessity to avoid this particular circumstance. Could the fact that he or she took due and good care that sexual harassment did not occur be taken as a defence? I recall an old phrase which states that ignorance of the law is no defence. Would a person in the situation to which I referred be vulnerable on the basis of pleading ignorance of an occasion of sexual harassment. Is such a plea not regarded as a satisfactory defence?

With regard to the general principle of sexual harassment, I did not have an opportunity to contribute on Second Stage but in his contribution the Minister stated:

The definitions of sexual and other harassment were substantially amended in the Dáil following changes to the Employment Equality Bill. The provisions of the two Bills are — in essence, if not in actual wording — the same. Sexual harassment is defined as an act of physical intimacy, a request for sexual favours or an act or conduct with sexual connotations, which is unwelcome and could reasonably be regarded as sexually offensive, humiliating or intimidating, or where a quid pro quo element is involved.

I believe the amendments to which the Minister referred were made in the Upper House. I highlighted the unwelcome nature of acts of sexual harassment and the quid pro quo element involved.

The important thing is that they were incorporated into the legislation.

Absolutely, but from the point of view of the reputation of this House it is important to set the record straight because the Dáil receives credit for everything. I merely wish to place on record that the Seanad made the amendment in question. I do not believe the Dáil should receive credit for our work.

Hear, hear.

Far be it from me to detract from any credit to which the Seanad is entitled. I applaud its work. In my opinion, the Seanad fulfils its constitutional function in an admirable way and has an important role to play.

Perhaps we should make that point by way of a submission to the commission.

With regard to Senator Norris' point about sexual harassment, it would depend on the particular facts in each case. If the owner of a premises had no knowledge that sexual harassment was taking place and could not have been reasonably expected to know what was occurring, the plea of ignorance would be a defence. On the other hand, had there been a sequence of events and the person took no action, even if they were unaware of the occurrence of a particular incident, they could be held to be liable. The thrust of subsections (2) and (3) is that if the responsible person was aware of incidents of sexual harassment and did not take reasonably practicable steps to stop it, the question of liability could arise if a particular incident, of which they had no knowledge, occurred.

Question put and agreed to.
Sections 14 to 18, inclusive, agreed to.
SECTION 19.

Acting Chairman

Amendments Nos. 11 and 12 are related and may be discussed together by agreement. Is that agreed? Agreed.

I move amendment No. 11:

In page 18, subsection (1), line 39, to delete "may" and substitute "shall".

On Second Stage I stated that there had been an extensive lobby by members of the Centre for Independent Living who protested at the gates of this House but could not gain admission to the Chamber because there is no access to the Public Gallery other than the staircase. That made the case for accessible entrances to buildings more graphically than could any Member of the House. The thrust of the Centre for Independent Living's lobby involved access to public transport. As it stands, there is no bus service throughout the country is accessible to people with wheelchairs. The representatives of the centre also made the case that it would be less costly and more economic to operate buses which can be lowered to pavement level to allow access, even for those who are mobile.

Section 19 states that after the enactment of the legislation the Minister may, with the agreement of the Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications, make regulations. I am concerned that use of the term "may" will not give the required strength to the provision and I propose that the word "shall" be substituted. From experience I believe use of "shall" involves an obligation whereas "may" means that the matter remains at the discretion of the Minister.

The amendment would strengthen this section and place an onus on the Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications to cater for the absolute right of people with disabilities to access to public transport. In turn, this would allow them the right to access to employment. Statistics and information about people with disabilities show that they are the most discriminated against in terms of employment. The two are not unconnected, because if one is immobile one has very little prospect of gaining employment. Few people with disabilities are in a position to afford private transport.

I do not want the Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications to retain discretion on this matter; it should be made clear that he or she has a responsibility to ensure the rights of people with disabilities. We are not discussing the replacement of an existing bus fleet; our concern is that, when it falls to be replaced, a certain percentage of that fleet must be replaced with accessible public transport. Rail stations and bus terminals must also be made accessible to the disabled. I will be glad if the Minister agrees to this minor amendment.

I will not argue with Senator Norris, who has been very supportive, but I take issue with comments about the religious aspect of this legislation and the Employment Equality Bill. During the debates on both Bills, Independent Members stated that amendments relating to provisions on religious issues are the most critical, important and substantial.

Acting Chairman

In accordance with the Order of the House, as it is now 1 p.m. I must ask the Senator to conclude.

All the amendments are important. This amendment is as important as the others in the context of education.

Progress reported; Committee to sit again.
Sitting suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed at 2 p.m.
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