There is an error in the printed version of amendment No. 1. The new subsection should be subsection (5) rather than subsection (3). Is the amendment agreed? Agreed.
Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of Witnesses) Bill, 1995: Committee and Final Stages.
Sections 1 to 4, inclusive, agreed to.
SECTION 5.
I move amendment No. 1:
In page 9, between lines 36 and 37, to insert the following new subsection:
"(5) A committee may not direct a witness to give evidence or produce or send to it a document relating to the source of any information required by that committee where such witness satisfies the Committee that—
(a) such information was obtained by him in the course of his occupation as a journalist, and
(b) the objection to giving such evidence or producing such document is reasonably based upon the preservation of anonymity assured by him to the person the source of such information.".
This amendment seeks to protect journalists and their sources of information. Everyone knows this is an important topic. In recent years, many great issues have come to light only because certain sources gave information to journalists, who subsequently communicated those stories to the public. There are provisions in English law which specifically recognise "whistle blowing" in public administration, so that when an official sees something wrong he or she can report it and obtain protection from the State to ensure his or her position will not be undermined. It would be an attack on freedom of speech and all types of journalism if a journalist was forced to disclose to a committee of the Oireachtas the source of his or her information.
The amendment uses the word "and" between paragraph (a) and (b). In other words, it is not sufficient for the journalist to claim such information was obtained by him in the course of his occupation, it is also a prerequisite that the objection to giving this evidence or producing a document is reasonably based on the preservation of anonymity assured by him to the person who was the source of such information. If a journalist is compellable as a witness to a House of the Oireachtas and can be forced, on sanction of fine and/or imprisonment, to reveal the source of information, sources will dry up. If that was the case, the public will be the losers because it is they who benefit when responsible journalists bring important stories — which may have been hidden for many years — to bear on the public consciousness. If the amendment is not accepted, might an investigative journalist — such as the late Veronica Guerin or any other journalist reporting dangerous crime stories — be forced, under pain of fine or imprisonment, to reveal sources which could place the journalist in danger from the source or a criminal third party, or place the source in danger from a criminal?
Under common law and existing statute law journalists do not enjoy immunity and cannot refuse to disclose to a court the source of information. However, as I said earlier, we must differentiate between a court of law and a committee or sub-committee of the Oireachtas. When administering justice a court may decide it is in the interests of justice that a journalist's source be revealed to it. In non-judicial proceedings, is there necessarily a public interest in revealing the source of a journalist's story? From the viewpoint of the Dáil or Seanad, the important issue is that the committee should be aware of the information the journalist has to hand, not its source. The Minister accepted that no judicial function is bestowed on these committees. The public was horrified that the journalist who largely broke the beef industry story was prosecuted because she would not reveal the sources of her information. That happened in the context of a judicial tribunal, admittedly set up by the Oireachtas but administered by a judge of the High Court.
It is in everyone's interest that this amendment is accepted and that a journalist's sources should be protected when a journalist appears before a committee.
I see Senator Mulcahy's point and have some sympathy for his objective. However, his proposal would probably not be easy to implement for one or two basic reasons. If a serious investigative journalist is summoned to appear before a committee of either House of the Oireachtas, it is almost certain that close to half the members of that committee will be very keen on what the journalist is trying to reveal while others will not. There will be an in-built balance in the committee which will almost certainly work against any draconian attempt to force the journalist to reveal his or her sources, especially if it is a bona fide investigation.
The problem is that the Senator's amendment does not differentiate — which it may not be possible to do — between a serious, bona fide, investigative journalist who is pursuing the public interest and has unearthed information which should be in the public domain but who may not be able to disclose his or her sources, and somebody who can make unfounded slanderous allegations of the most base sort against Members of the House. When such a person is brought before a committee of this sort, and although they may have no evidence — or the flimsiest of evidence — and no sources, they can claim the protection of the code of journalistic immunity which, as the Senator said, has no standing in a court of law.
Matters such as these are probably best left to the dynamics of an actual situation where, if somebody feels their case should be made, the common sense and sense of fair play of the committee will probably be sufficient to prevent any draconian measures being taken against a journalist, or any unfairness. I worry that the Senator's amendment would almost confer a sense of total immunity on journalists whom other journalists might not respect and whose motives might not be subject to the closest scrutiny.
I thank Senator Mulcahy for the points he made in his amendment, but it will not come as a surprise to him that I am not in a position to accept it. I also thank Senator Manning for his very reasonable explanation of one of the reasons I am not, and should not, be in a position to accept the amendment and I fully support the case he made.
While I appreciate the concerns expressed by Senator Mulcahy, as does Senator Manning, the subsection to which the amendment refers provides for the protection of sources used by elected representatives. It was framed in the light of the High Court finding on the beef tribunal that such sources could remain confidential. The intention of the amendment is to extend the absolute privilege on protection of sources to journalists as well as Oireachtas Members. As the proposal would put journalists on a par with elected Members and give them a higher level of protection than that of other High Court witnesses, I cannot accept the proposal.
The position in this regard is currently being examined in the Department of Justice in the light of the Law Reform Commission report and a European court case. We all have concerns about protecting the sources used by serious journalists. However, as Senator Manning rightly pointed out, if this provision is made one cannot judge at that point in proceedings who is a serious journalist. There is a balance to be struck here. Any resulting legislation from the Department of Justice will adjust this Bill in line with any revised arrangements introduced for the courts.
We are staying in line with the courts procedure in this regard, rather than going ahead of what the courts may do in relation to the protection of sources, which is reasonable. If, when the Department of Justice, the Law Reform Commission and the European courts put their heads together, the situation in relation to our courts is changed — I am not qualified to comment on whether it will be except to support the general feeling that we should look at this area to ensure what we are doing is right — this Bill will be adjusted in line with those changes. I have no difficulty with that, but I suggest it is not our position to pre-empt any change in the Department of Justice or go ahead of what might be done in the courts.
I thank the Minister of State for saying this section will be reviewed in the light of the general inquiry into the broader aspects of journalistic immunity. However, I am not completely convinced by her arguments or those of Senator Manning. What is the purpose of an Oireachtas committee? I cannot see why such a committee should ever be involved in unravelling minutiae such as who said what to which journalist. That is not the function of such committees.
Senator Manning and the Minister of State referred to the difference between serious and non-serious journalists. There are serious and non-serious members of every profession. Journalists might say there are serious and non-serious politicians.
They do.
That is not a legitimate argument. The matter is either right in principle or it is not. If this amendment is not accepted, a Deputy, Minister or Taoiseach could make an off the cuff remark to a journalist, who could then be subpoenaed to appear before the committee, which could demand to know who had made the remark to the journalist. Will we open the can of worms so that even informal remarks made by politicians to journalists — the famous off the cuff and off the record briefings — will become part of the matériel of Oireachtas committees?
There have always been two sides to the argument on whether journalists should enjoy privilege in regard to their sources. However, I do not believe it can, or should, be the business of Oireachtas committees to inquire to that extent into journalists' sources. That level of inquiry is normally a judicial or quasi-judicial route. The Minister of State said on Second Stage that some Oireachtas committees would have quasi-judicial functions. However, committees do not have such functions. Quasi-Judicial functions are normally specifically set up under legislation to determine disputes, of which there are not many cases.
I do not see how it is the business of those committees to get into that area. However, if the Minister of State says this matter will be reviewed in light of the departmental review, I am prepared not to press the amendment to a vote.
Amendment put and declared lost.
Section 5 agreed to.
Sections 6 to 14, inclusive, agreed to.
SECTION 15.
Question proposed: "That section 15 stand part of the Bill."
I oppose this section because it restricts certain people questioning or expressing an opinion on the merits or objectives of Government policy. It makes a nonsense of some of the primary functions of Dáil committees. If a Government decided not to spend more money on prisons when there were no prison places left it would result in the release of those convicted of serious offences within one hour of being sent to prison. In such circumstances it would not be open for the Garda Commissioner to criticise that policy before a Dáil committee. This would make a nonsense of the committee and the attendance of such a person before it.
The public is able to differentiate between statements on policy made by public servants and the Government. What is the point of bringing members of the Defence Forces or the Garda Síochána before committees unless they can express opinions? The only other reason for their attendance would be to provide information which should be available in the normal course of events. The Oireachtas has just passed the Freedom of Information Bill and all aspects of information regarding statistics on the Garda Síochána and the Defence Forces should be available as of right. In view of this, why are we even allowing members of these bodies to attend committees if they cannot express opinions on Government policy? Members of the Defence Forces and the Garda Síochána are the servants or agents of Government policy and it is their job to carry it out. If the Government considered that it may be embarrassed by utterances published in the media should it not be provided that they may attend committees in closed sessions where Members of this House could quiz them on policy?
This Bill is concerned with the procedures of this House and has nothing to do with the Government. If the House is capable of monitoring and criticising the Government why is it not entitled to ascertain in a committee the views of members of the Defence Forces and the Garda Síochána who may also wish to criticise the Government? There is an unanswerable argument in this regard. It is the Government's job to govern and to ensure that its civil servants are loyal and obedient, as they all are. However, it is the job of the Oireachtas to ascertain if there is a conflict between those who make and those who execute policy. That is why this section should be deleted from the Bill.
I accepted points made by Deputies during the Dáil Committee Stage. While the extent to which the prohibition on civil servants commenting on the merits of Government policy should be specified, I also indicated that the Government decided that the central point of the section should remain. I am strongly of this view and profoundly disagree with much of what the Senator has said. While the text was amended to specify when and how the prohibition was to be applied, I have decided that it will remain.
Public servants have traditionally provided objective, non political advice to their political masters. This section, which I stress only prevents certain public servants from commenting on the merits of Government policy, is designed to protect this traditional and long standing neutrality, which has served this State well. Governments have come and gone over the past 75 years, yet the Civil Service and the public service has managed to serve their political masters, whatever their political complexion, neutrally and in a non political stance. We have been virtually free of any political scandals in the public service over the years, which is a testimony to the practice in force now. The Government will do nothing to weaken that position and it stands fully behind a non political public service and Civil Service. I am surprised at the Senator's suggestion that we adopt another position; perhaps he would reconsider.
It is proper that public servants should be protected from being forced to answer political questions from political sources. They will not be prohibited from answering questions of fact with regard to Government policy. This is the best way to proceed.
The Senator constructed the scenario of the Garda Commissioner or any garda appearing before a committee and not being able to answer points regarding, for example, revolving doors in prisons or inadequate numbers of prison spaces. The relevant Minister is the right person to put that question to in any committee operating on a compellability mode investigating this type of area. If the issue concerned the Garda the Minister for Justice could rightly be questioned on why, for example, the Government was not making sufficient funds available to create extra prison spaces. Similarly, rather than expect Defence Forces personnel to comment on the merits of Government policy, the Minister for Defence should be called before a committee.
No public servant should deal with the merits, as distinct from the facts, of Government policy. They are there to serve Governments, of whatever political complexion, and have done so extremely well. Creeping politicisation of the Civil Service or public service should be nipped in the bud and avoided. The Senator's proposal does not help in this regard. When the Senator considers the implication of his amendment, he should agree with my point on the neutrality and non-political nature of our public service.
I support the Minister of State on this point. One of the great lasting qualities of our public service is that public servants at policy level have the ability to give strong and objective advice. Any decision is political, even if that is with a small "p". Those public servants can give this advice strongly, knowing they are not being called upon to take a partisan political stance in defence of the advice given. They have given their advice objectively — and it is up to Ministers to agree or disagree on it — but they are protected from the charge of being partisan.
This is striking when one goes to the National Archives and reads the papers opened every year under the 30 year rule. That is not so long ago, and it gets nearer as one gets older. Many of those who were then giving advice as young servants went on to become Secretaries of Departments, and some of them are now discomfited, not at the quality of their advice, but that advice they felt was protected is now open to official scrutiny. If the Senator's amendment were accepted, it would seriously damage civil servants' sense that their advice is given openly and honestly without their being charged with being partisan. No matter what advice they give, some political label will be attached to them which could make life difficult for them, building needless suspicion in the subsequent administration that the civil servants were lackeys of the outgoing Government. It might suggest to the Government of the day that the civil servants had a different ideological point of view. The Minister of State has made a very good case and any good arising from the Senator's amendment would not compensate for the harm it could do to one of the most important values of our public service.
We should differentiate between a civil servant, garda or member of the Defence Forces making a politically biased statement of opinion and an opinion on a policy. The Minister of State will agree that it has frequently been the case that senior civil servants have disagreed with parts of Government policy. It should not be assumed that they are always in agreement with Government policy. If that is the case, are Members of the Oireachtas not entitled to know that, for example, the Secretary of a Department is in disagreement with a Minister on a serious policy matter? This amounts to muzzling of civil servants on policy matters.
The Minister of State may be aware of a recent matter relating to an embassy in this country. Certain diplomats in that embassy, under their country's laws, used a procedure whereby they bypass their ambassador to report to their own Department of Foreign Affairs on disagreements with their own ambassador. It is an internal mechanism for them to articulate differences they feel to be important. There may be bona fide differences on policy matters between experienced civil servants and their Minister. Are Members of the Oireachtas not entitled to know about that policy difference?
Put politely, the Minister of State put her foot in it when she said that the Government had decided that this prohibition should remain. The Government should not be deciding on this Bill. It is a Bill for the Oireachtas and the Oireachtas's purposes, not a Bill in which the Government can say what they like or dislike. The Minister of State said several times that the prohibition should remain and also said that civil servants should not get involved in the debate on the merits of Government policy.
Senator Manning was correct to a large degree, but that is the old interpretation of civil servants, which sees them as automatons of Government policy. With the strategic management initiative the Minister of State is working on, civil servants are becoming a more dynamic part of the formulation of Government policy. As Governments and Ministers change rapidly, the Secretary becomes more critically involved in all aspects of Government policy, frequently issuing statements on that policy. That is most frequently seen in cases involving financial institutions such as the Central Bank, the Bank of England or the Federal Reserve. These are civil servants with policies on fiscal matters. Can the Director of the Central Bank, who is presumably a civil servant——
He is not a civil servant. The Senator should know that intellectual pecking order.
There is no need for insults.
Either way.
Senator Mulcahy on the section, and without interruption.
It seems ludicrous that people involved in advising Ministers on serious aspects of policy are to be muzzled by the Government. That is what this section does to civil servants whose opinions may be in conflict with the Government, unless the Minister of State is about to say that such an event does not arise, which I do not accept. In many cases there may be very serious differences of opinion. Why then is it not up to the Oireachtas to decide if we are entitled to hear the views of a civil servant, garda or member of the Defence Forces? Why is the Government saying that the Oireachtas cannot decide what it wants to hear?
There is an important distinction absent from the Senator's argument. If a senior civil servant feels a Minister is behaving improperly, that is a different matter. Then the civil servant has a duty, if the Minister is, ultra vires, behaving improperly, to go public. I agree with that, and there are may ways it can be done.
Policy is a different matter. We had a debate last week on the Universities Bill, 1996. For all I know, there may have been strong differences of opinion between the three advisers from the Department of Education with the Minister. Their views on certain sections of the Bill may have been different to those of the Minister and may have been closer to those of Senator Ross, Senator Norris, a Senator with strong views or the spokesperson for the main Opposition party. Can Senator Mulcahy imagine a situation where the Minister's advisers fed scripts supporting their point of view to the Opposition benches? Imagine the chaos, breakdown in solidarity and distrust in a Department.
A Minister has a right to expect total loyalty from civil servants and in 99.9 per cent of cases, he or she gets it. A Minister also has a right to expect his or her officials to debate the issues openly in his or her presence to devise the best possible policy. This is a political society, decisions are political and are taken in these Houses and at the Cabinet table. The Minister is responsible to the House and to the public and must know that he or she is not being second guessed or stabbed in the back, because that is what it would amount to, and that a careerist civil servant is not trying to carry favour with a party he or she believes may be in Government in the near future or that an opportunist ambitious civil servant is not betraying confidences from within the Department on the basis of policy disagreements.
That can happen now.
There can be leaks and disloyal civil servants but, by and large, there has been a tradition of loyalty and coherence in Departments and of honest advice being given to the Minister even when the people involved disagree with the general thrust of policy. Ultimately, the buck stops with the Minister who must have the backing of Government. The last thing a Minister wants is to fear that one of his or her closest advisers is feeding information to the Opposition and to newspapers betraying confidences all in the guise of a genuinely held difference of view on policy.
It will always be the Government's role to propose legislation and it could not be otherwise. I cannot envisage a system where Opposition, Government and Independents would get together to draft legislation. Given our adversarial and democratic system of Government — wants and all, but nobody has come up with anything better — the only scenario is that a Government drafts and proposes legislation to both Houses where we can discuss the Stages of a Bill and accept amendments on Committee Stage and sometimes on Report Stage, which is as it should be.
With our excellent committee system, nearly all legislation is analysed and teased out in detail by all party committees. After Second Stage in the Dáil, this legislation was sent to the Select Committee on Finance and General Affairs, an all party committee which set up an all party sub-committee comprised of legal minds, if I recall correctly, and chaired by Deputy Jim Mitchell, to tease out every aspect of this technical and complicated legislation. The subcommittee employed an eminent senior counsel to advise it. Amendments were forwarded on an all party basis. Indeed, Government Members of the Select Committee on Finance and General Affairs proposed amendments to me. That is a rational, reasonable and excellent way to handle legislation. When we were not in a position to accept an amendment, lengthy, rational and reasonable explanations were given why they could not be accepted, including the two amendments Senator Mulcahy tabled which were recycled from the Dáil.
The object of the provisions of section 15 is not to try to put a gag on a committee pursuing matters of public concern and questioning a public servant on matters of Government policy. On the contrary, these provisions are intended to facilitate and enhance the working of such committees by providing openly and honestly clear and comprehensive guidance on the reasonable restrictions which must apply. The purpose of these limited restrictions is to preserve the tradition of independence and the non-political character of our public service.
I pay tribute to public servants who have given an excellent service for over eight decades. As Senator Manning said, there is an ethos in the public service which is second to none. The public service is neutral and non-political and can serve Governments of any political complexion. There is no question of an incoming Government having to carry out a witch hunt, to use Senator Mulcahy's words, to identify which senior civil servants or which civil servants at management level need to be moved because they cannot be trusted. Incoming Governments have happily worked with Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, principal officers, assistant principal officers and other civil servants who provide objective and honest advice. That has always been the case. I could not accept an amendment in this House, nor could I in the Dáil a week or two ago, which would weaken that. These limited restrictions are in place to preserve this independence and non-political character and to maintain the integrity of the relationship between Ministers, the Government and public officials.
From time to time civil servants and senior members of the Garda Síochána and the Defence Forces need to give advice or opinions to the Government or to a Minister which may include criticisms of the merits of policy. A public servant who demurs from giving an honest and candid view to a Minister or Minister of State would not be doing his or her job and would not last long in my company. I like an honest straight up objective view. When I do my job as a Minister of State I am pursuing Government policy and am always conscious that I am acting for and on behalf of the citizens. I expect and demand the best and most honest advice available — our citizens deserve nothing less. I do not want to be told what an official might think I want to hear. I want officials who tell it like it is, even if it means having to hear a view which criticises the merit of a policy line to which I am committed. I could not be straighter than that about this issue. Such advice may or may not be right or be accepted but I want to hear it if it is the honest view of the public servant.
Senator Mulcahy might reasonably ask why am I intent on preventing committees having the benefits of the same candour and why will I not accept his amendment. The reason is simple and related to the primacy of the democratic element in our governmental arrangements which must be upheld above all. Over the past two weeks, in the context of the Public Service Management (No. 2) Bill, this House touched upon the ideal cut off point between a Minister's responsibilities and those of his or her officials. However divergent the views we may hold on precisely when a Department's and Minister's role should ideally stop, there is a universal consensus that it must encompass decision making on policy. Allowing an official to comment on the merits of the policy which has been decided at political level seemed to me and my colleagues in Government to at least erode that position, if not destroy it. To do so in what is a political forum — which is what the committees to which the compellability powers apply will be, with all the package of partnership which that implies — can, in practice, alter the relationship which must obtain between Minister and official where a policy has to be implemented. We are not creating a new restriction.
There has long been a convention in Oireachtas committees that civil servants are not asked to comment on Government policy. That convention has been given statutory form in the Comptroller and Auditor General Act, 1993, prepared when Senator Mulcahy's party was in Government, which forbids Accounting Officers from commenting and imposes a like obligation on the constitutional officer, the Comptroller and Auditor General. There is precedent in recent legislation published when the Senator's party was in Government but he appears to be slightly out of step with his party's thinking on this. Further matters which have already led to considerable debate on this Bill concern the compellability of the Attorney General, the Director of Public Prosecutions and their officers; these are separate matters.
I might have been misunderstood or not heard on Second Stage so I again make the case about the honesty I demand, and any Minister or Minister of State serving the citizens of this country well would demand, from their public servants. However, it is a different matter from expecting public servants to enter the political area in which these committees are and comment on the merits of Government policy. They are free to speak on the facts of the policy but not about their personal view of its merits. The Minister responsible for that public servant and that area of policy would comment on its merits, if required. The non-political and neutral nature of our public service should not be compromised.
Question put and agreed to.
Sections 16 to 18, inclusive, agreed to.
Title agreed to.
Bill reported without amendment and received for final consideration.
Question proposed: "That the Bill do now pass."
I thank the Cathaoirleach and the officials in the House. I also thank the Senators, especially Senators Mulcahy, Burke and Manning, for their contributions on Second and Committee Stages. This is extremely important legislation and the work we have done today is important. It will significantly enhance the capacity of Oireachtas committees to investigate matters of public concern. It is a modernising Bill and brings the powers of parliamentary committees up to date and into line with other countries with similar parliamentary systems.
It is a Bill which challenges Members of this House and Dáil Éireann to develop the powers it confers to examine and expose matters which arise from time to time in Irish public life. It is a Bill which, when in operation, can change for the better the way the Houses of the Oireachtas impact on public life. Much of what we do in the Dáil or Seanad often goes unnoticed and unacknowledged by the public. This Bill will change that for the better. I am certain Oireachtas committees, utilising the powers conferred by this Bill, will emphasise to people in public office and the general public the important role of Deputies and Senators in vindicating the democratic rights and procedures of citizens.
I pay tribute to the Members of this House and Dáil Éireann who collectively crafted this important legislation. This is a much changed Bill compared to the original text and is a better statutory instrument as a result of the improvements brought about at various stages of its passage through the Dáil and this House. I assure Senator Mulcahy especially that it is a Bill which is the product of the collective wisdom of the two Houses of the Oireachtas. In that sense it is not a partisan measure or legislation which reflects only the view of the Government. The Bill is a balance between the powers of committees to compel witnesses to give evidence or produce or send for documents and the legitimate entitlements of those witnesses to protection from the consequences. The limited but necessary exemptions and restrictions embodied in the Bill are only intended to make these powers workable.
It was said earlier that the core proposals in this Bill have been under consideration for the best part of a quarter of a century, and that is a fact. Previous Governments of all complexions have examined the issues but this one has bitten the bullet. We brought forward proposals, invited contributions to improve the Bill and stated we did not think our initial proposals were the final word. As a result of the work put into this Bill by Members of both Houses, we now have a workable means of empowering committees to take the kind of action all sides in this House and the general public demand. It is right that representatives of the people meeting in national assembly should be at the centre of the action in matters of great public interest. This Bill makes that a reality and I have great pleasure in commending it to the House.
I pay tribute to the Minister, her advisers and public servants. This Bill strikes a fair balance between the need of the Oireachtas to subpoena witnesses and documents and the rights of people who appear before it not to have their good names taken in vain unless deservedly so. No one envisages that this Bill is a charter for people to judge others. That is not the function of any Dáil committee, which is to find out facts and examine matters of relevance.
This Bill has had a long preparation period. An enormous amount of work was done on Committee Stage in the Dáil and tribute should be paid to Members of that committee for the long hours they put in, as well as the work of the senior counsel who helped them through some of the more technical points. This was a classic case where good legal opinion was essential because many rights — those of the Government, the Oireachtas and those of individuals to their good name — are being balanced in one Bill. I have never seen legislation dealing with so many different and important converging rights. By and large, the balance has been well struck. It is an important Bill because it is vital the Oireachtas, the voice and representation of the people, has this power. For too long committees have been ignored, snubbed and not paid the due respect they deserve. I commend and welcome this Bill.
I join in complimenting the Minister on bringing this Bill to finality. She has been responsible for having some important Bills passed in the life of this Government which will have important long-term consequences in the restructuring of our public and political system. This Bill is one such important measure whose consequences will be felt for decades to come by those who work in this House and are affected by it. It is an important and overdue reforming measure but one which has benefited from the long discussions surrounding it. The Minister has handled the Bill with her usual conciliatory style. She has come a long way from the time she sat on the benches opposite and could call a quorum at 20 minutes past midnight when I would not be around. I compliment the Minister for fine legislation which will stand to her credit.
Question put and agreed to.
When is it proposed to sit again?
At 10.30 tomorrow morning.
The Seanad adjourned at 6 p.m. until 10.30 a.m. on Wednesday, 30 April 1997.