The background to this Bill is that in the tribunal of inquiry under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice McCracken, on 28 October 1997, two issues arose in relation to the matter of costs. The first question was whether the tribunal had power, of its own motion, to order costs to be paid to persons before it by any other person; the second question was whether the tribunal had power to award costs to itself against any person where the tribunal had incurred costs because of the non-co-operation of a person before it.
Section 6(1) of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) (Amendment) Act, 1979, gives a tribunal of inquiry power to order that the whole or part of the costs of any person appearing before it be paid to that person by any other person named in the order, including the Minister for Finance. The tribunal must be of the opinion that, having regard to its findings and all other relevant matters, there are sufficient reasons rendering it equitable to make such order. The costs which may be ordered are those as taxed by the Master of the High Court.
Judge McCracken indicated that, on the basis of the provisions of section 6 of the 1979 Act, he was satisfied that the only persons who can get costs are those persons who have been given representation and are represented by solicitor or counsel before the tribunal. He concluded that he had no power to order a person to pay the cost of any of the tribunal's expenses as such under the Act of 1979.
The solicitor on behalf of the public interest before the tribunal had sought counsel's opinion in the matter and, on the basis of the advice that was given, decided not to proceed with an application to have any person pay some or all of the costs of the tribunal. Judge McCracken indicated his concurrence with this approach. It was also established in the McCracken tribunal that costs could only be awarded by the tribunal on the application of a person appearing before the tribunal and that in the absence of such an application the tribunal had no power of its own motion to award costs to any person.
The Bill takes those findings in the McCracken tribunal into account and strengthens the power of tribunals of inquiry in relation to costs. In framing the Bill, I have also taken into account that two important tribunals, one under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Moriarty and the other under Mr. Justice Flood, have recently been established under resolution of both Houses and the orders governing the work of both those tribunals include reference to the desire of the Oireachtas that:
all costs incurred by reason of the failure of individuals to co-operate fully and expeditiously with the inquiry should, as far as is consistent with the interests of justice, be borne by those individuals.
The Bill also amends and significantly strengthens the power of a tribunal of inquiry to have its orders enforced and it provides for immunity from suit of persons who supply written statements or documents to such a tribunal.
I now turn to the main provisions in the Bill. These are section 2, which deals with the certain immunities I have mentioned, section 3, which deals with the matters in relation to costs, and section 4 which deals with the enforcement generally of orders made by a tribunal.
Under the law as it stands in section 1(3) of the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921, a witness before a tribunal is entitled to the same immunities and privileges as if he or she were a witness before the High Court. However, the Act makes no reference to the position of persons who produce or send documents to a tribunal pursuant to an order of the tribunal. I am, therefore, proposing in section 2 of the Bill to amend section 1 of the Act of 1921 by the insertion of a new subsection (4) which provides that a person who produces or sends a document to a tribunal pursuant to an order of that tribunal shall be entitled to the same immunities and privileges as if he or she were a witness before the High Court.
Section 3 of the Bill substitutes a new subsection (1) in section 6 of the 1979 Act in relation to costs. The new subsection repeats the substance of the existing subsection but provides, in addition, that a tribunal may recover its own expenses and, in making such order, may take into account the terms of the resolution passed by both Houses relating to the establishment of the tribunal or any failure to co-operate with or provide assistance to it, or knowingly to give false or misleading information to the tribunal. I have provided also that the tribunal may, of its own motion, order that the costs of any person coming before it be paid by any other person named in the order. Section 3 will apply to costs incurred after the Bill comes into effect. The section 3 provisions will, therefore, apply to both the Moriarty and Flood tribunals as soon as the Bill is enacted.
Section 4 is designed to strengthen the position of tribunals of inquiry to ensure that their orders can be enforced. The section provides that where a person fails or refuses to comply with, or disobeys, an order of a tribunal of inquiry, the High Court may, on application to it in a summary manner in that regard by the tribunal, order the person to comply with the order and to make such other order as it considers necessary and just to enable the order to have full effect. In framing section 4, I have taken into account section 3 of the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of Witnesses) Act, 1997, which provides that where a person disobeys a direction of a committee, the committee may seek an order of the High Court to have the direction met. Section 4 is a significant advance on the current law in that a tribunal may itself apply to the High Court to have its orders enforced. The current law does not enable a tribunal to apply direct to the High Court in that way. It merely provides that the actions of a person before a tribunal may constitute an offence. The prosecution of that offence may result in delay for a tribunal. Section 4 as now framed will obviate unnecessary delay.
The scope of the Bill is confined to amending the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Acts of 1921 and 1979. The provisions are mainly technical but nonetheless they are an important development of the law in relation to tribunals of inquiry at this time. I thank Senators for agreeing to take all Stages of the Bill today so that it can proceed expeditiously onto the Statute Book. I commend the Bill to the House.