Order of Business. - Containment of Nuclear Weapons Bill, 2000: Second Stage.
Question proposed: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."
Minister of State at the Department of Public Enterprise (Mr. Jacob): Ireland has long played an active role in international fora to further the cause of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The key to this has been the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT. A central provision of that treaty is the implementation of safeguards agreements between states and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the IAEA. This Bill will transpose into domestic law a protocol signed by Ireland in September 1998 with the IAEA which will strengthen our existing safeguards agreement. Safeguards agreements are the means by which the IAEA verifies that states are acting in compliance with their international non-prolifer ation obligations, primarily through the collection and reporting of information in relation to goods and materials related to the nuclear industry.
In addition, IAEA inspectors regularly visit nuclear facilities to verify records that state authorities keep on the whereabouts of nuclear material under their control, to check IAEA-installed instruments and surveillance equipment and to confirm physical inventories of nuclear material. These measures provide independent international verification that governments are abiding by their commitments with respect to the peaceful use of nuclear technology.
A precondition for the implementation of safeguards is a formal agreement with the state in which the inspection is to occur. The current safeguards agreement between the non-nuclear weapons states of the EU and the IAEA and between Ireland and the IAEA has direct operational implications for Ireland only in respect of certain insignificant quantities of fissionable material held in University College Dublin and University College Cork. In accordance with the existing agreement, these materials have undergone inspection by EU inspectors on behalf of the IAEA.
Under existing safeguards agreements, the capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities is limited. IAEA inspectors are not permitted to carry out random searches for undeclared nuclear material or clandestine nuclear activities. Since the early 1990s, and especially since the Gulf War and the consequent revelations of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme which the IAEA was not able to detect, the IAEA secretariat and its member states have been working to introduce a strengthened, more rigorous inspection and verification system.
New measures have been implemented within the legal authority of existing safeguards agreements. In addition, a Model Protocol Additional to States' Safeguards Agreements was approved by the IAEA board of governors in May 1997. The supplementary measures, which include,inter alia, the obligation to provide additional information on nuclear and nuclear-related activities, additional access to locations not subject to safeguards and the use of new verification techniques, are designed to alert the international community more quickly and effectively to the possibility of undeclared nuclear activities and to improve the level of confidence about the absence of such activities.
The purpose of this Bill is to introduce these measures into domestic legislation. It is the Government's strong wish that Ireland ratify this agreement as soon as possible. Early ratification is in line not only with Ireland's long-standing position on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation but also with our position on nuclear safety. The IAEA plays a vital role in promoting nuclear safety worldwide. Over the years it has developed common safety standards in regard to nuclear safety and radiation protection and has fostered information exchange between member states.
In the IAEA, Ireland has been to the forefront in promoting international conventions on the management of radioactive waste and nuclear safety. Ireland strongly supports the agency's nuclear safety and radiological protection activities and is a firm advocate of the contribution which the agency can make to an enhanced nuclear safety culture worldwide. Ireland is due to take a seat on the board of governors in the latter part of this year.
Safeguards agreements are a key element in the NPT. They are the mechanism by which the IAEA and, through it, the international community can be confident that states are fulfilling their obligations under the treaty which is the foundation stone of international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The treaty was inspired by a series of resolutions put to the UN General Assembly by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Frank Aiken, beginning in 1959. It was concluded in 1968 and, since then, the number of states party to it has steadily increased to the point where, today, only four states remain outside it – India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba, although Cuba is party to other international nuclear non-proliferation agreements.
In the treaty, the non-nuclear weapon states agree not to develop or otherwise obtain nuclear weapons, and the nuclear weapon states make an undertaking to engage in negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. The treaty also includes guarantees of the right of states to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and the concomitant obligation to have a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
Initially concluded for a period of 25 years, the 1995 review and extension conference took the decision, as part of an overall package, to extend it indefinitely. Other elements of the 1995 package include a series of principles and objectives for nuclear disarmament, a strengthened review process and a resolution on achieving a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East.
The first review conference since the indefinite extension of the treaty in 1995 will take place this year from 24 April to 19 May. The Minister for Foreign Affairs will lead the Irish delegation. The review conference will take place in a difficult international environment. Senators will be aware of the extremely dangerous developments in south Asia over the past few years and tensions over efforts to alter the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Delays in the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty are also a matter of concern.
Ireland is the initiator of the New Agenda coalition which will present proposals to the conference in the hope of assisting progress. The New Agenda was launched by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Deputy Andrews, along with the Foreign Ministers of seven other countries, in June 1998. Resolutions based on the initiative were approved by large majorities in the UN General Assembly in 1998 and 1999. The New Agenda seeks to capture the middle ground in the nuclear disarmament debate, thereby providing a strong platform to encourage nuclear weapons states to take steps to fulfil their obligations under Article VI of the NPT, which commits them to engage in negotiations in good faith leading to nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control.
The current treaty structure – the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, outer space and under water – has had considerable success in limiting the number of nuclear weapons states. However, that structure left a clear gap by permitting the nuclear weapons states to continue testing new weapons underground. The solution to this problem was found in the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which removed the anomaly by forbidding all nuclear weapons tests anywhere. For this reason, Ireland has long been a consistent and active supporter of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The treaty is a fundamental building block in the step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament in the New Agenda initiative.
States which are parties to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are required to designate a national authority to ensure effective implementation of the treaty and to serve as a national focal point for liaison with the organisation and with other states' parties. The Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland will carry out Ireland's obligations under the treaty. It is important for countries such as Ireland to demonstrate full confidence in the NPT and its mechanisms. Therefore, early ratification and implementation of the strengthened safeguards agreement, which this Bill will enable us to do, is a priority of the Government. The Bill allocates responsibility for the implementation of our obligations under the strengthened safeguards agreement to the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland, which is the national authority for advising the Government on radiological protection and nuclear safety matters.
The relevant Departments will support the RPII in the collection and reporting of material for relevant dual-use products, which are products which can be used for civil or military purposes. The Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment will be responsible for licensing and the reporting of relevant information with regard to products requiring an export licence. The Office of the Revenue Commissioners will conduct the monitoring and reporting with regard to information concerning the import of materials and equipment coming within the scope of the protocol.
This Bill will also provide for the granting of access to international inspectors, including as appropriate managed access to locations, facilities or sites to which the protocol applies. Verification arrangements are of course crucial to the IAEA safeguard system.
Provision will also be made to give the RPII, the Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment and the Office of the Revenue Commissioners powers to appoint inspectors and conduct inspections in conjunction with IAEA inspectors. There will also be a requirement on any person involved in areas to which the protocol applies to provide the prescribed information at the prescribed time and in the prescribed format. The Government also intends to make provision to regulate, by a system of prior licence, the manufacture, acquisition and use of all reportable material as listed in Article 2 and Annexes I and II of the protocol. The purpose of licensing is to facilitate full disclosure and assurance of the provision of relevant information under the protocol.
The threat of nuclear weapons is still with us. If we are ever to rid the world of the threat of nuclear annihilation, we must build an international regime which can, with confidence, detect nuclear weapons development programmes and provide assurance about their absence. The strengthened safeguards which we are seeking to implement through this Bill will play a fundamental role in this.
I propose to table some minor amendments concerning administrative arrangements under the Bill on Committee Stage. I commend the Bill to the House.
Debate adjourned.