I am very pleased to be in the Seanad this morning to discuss on Second Stage the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights Bill 2001. As Senators may be aware, the proposals in the Bill arise from the Government's commitment in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement to bring forward measures to strengthen and underpin the constitutional protection of human rights in the State. The question of incorporating the convention into domestic law has had to be further examined in that context. Before I elaborate on the Bill's detail, I would like to deal generally with its wider background and outline some of the complex legal and policy issues which had to be considered and resolved in drafting it.
The Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was adopted by the Council of Europe in Rome and signed by the then Minister for External Affairs on 4 November 1950. Its provisions were formally ratified by Ireland on 25 February 1953 and the convention entered into force on 3 September that year. At that time Ireland also accepted the articles in the convention which permitted the right of individual petition to the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg by citizens and states against states involving alleged breaches of the convention. States generally were very slow to take up this option. At the time the convention came into force, Ireland and Sweden were the only contracting states permitting such petitions.
The only basis on which the State could ratify the European Convention on Human Rights was that it was compatible with the Constitution. There was no sense in which the State could ratify the convention if it was at variance or inconsistent with the Constitution. On occasion some who should know better seem to think that the convention is somehow superior to the Constitution in Irish law. Nothing could be further from the truth.
It should be acknowledged – something not often done, especially by some who specialise in human rights – that the Constitution is the only republican constitution in the European Union with a set of human rights provisions at its heart which are unalterable except at the insistence of the people through a referendum on foot of parliamentary legislation. It is also the only such constitution with human rights provisions justiciable by the people against the State in independent courts, even to the point of over-riding the legislation of the Oireachtas and any Act of any Government or any aspect of the Executive power of the State. The Irish people are the only people in Europe who have a republican constitution with that mechanism at its core. Sometimes people believe we have an inferior or inadequate system for the protection of human rights.
De Valera's achievement in 1937 was effectively the blending of parliamentary democracy with the American system of court supervision of a written constitution.
That was a huge achievement which should not be devalued. Unfortunately, one reads newspaper articles these days by people who believe the convention contains a different source of human rights for the country superior to the Constitution in both content and legal status. Nothing could be further from the truth.
It is also wrong to imply there is an entire corpus of convention rights wholly distinguishable from the personal rights accorded to Irish citizens under the Constitution. This is also trotted out regularly as the basis for criticism of this Bill, among others – that in some sense we are short-changing the people because we are not incorporating into Irish law a corpus of rights floating around and which only require political will and ambition to anchor and hold for the people of this jurisdiction.
There is only one right to freedom in our law, the right guaranteed by the Constitution. The same applies to the right to free speech and other rights, numerated and unenumerated, in the Constitution. They exist as a matter of constitutional right and entitlement for citizens and do not derive from or depend on the convention. People speak about the convention right to family and marriage. I emphasise that the Constitution deals with that issue also and that the only reason we subscribed to and ratified the convention was that it was consistent with the Constitution, not vice versa.
In general terms, the convention protects what are universally accepted as the basic civil and political rights in any democratic state. These are the right to life; the right to freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the right to freedom from slavery, servitude or forced compulsory labour; the right to liberty and security of the person; the right to fair and public trial within a reasonable time; the right to freedom from retrospective criminal law and no punishment without law; the right to respect for private and family life as well as home and correspondence; the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; the right to freedom of expression; the right to marry and found a family; the right to an effective remedy for violation of rights as set out in the convention and prohibition of discrimination in the enjoyment of those rights.
Senators will note that most of the up-to-date texts of the convention and its four main operational protocols, also being given effect in our law, are appended to the Bill for ease of reference. The 1952 protocol deals with property, educational and electoral rights. The fourth protocol contains, among other things, the right to freedom of movement and also prohibits individual or collective expulsion of nationals. The sixth protocol deals with the abolition of the death penalty while the seventh contains procedural safeguards concerning the expulsion of lawfully resident aliens, the right of appeal in criminal matters, compensation for wrongful conviction and the right not to be punished twice for the same offence, and equality between spouses.
When the State decided to sign up to these international agreements, an important factor to be taken into account was that we were in a position to meet our obligations under them by virtue of having a Bill of Rights under the 1937 Constitution. I make no apology for stating again and again that we are alone among the member states of the European Union and other states on the Council of Europe in having a written Constitution which embodies a system of fundamental rights chosen by the people which are unalterable save by the wish of the people and made superior and justiciable at the instance of the individual over all other law both in theory and in practice.
Our excellent human rights record before the Court of Human Rights, unrivalled in the Council of Europe, is testament to the efficacy of the protection we provided for ourselves before the convention was ever open for ratification. Its hallmark has been its development by the superior courts through the doctrine of unenumerated personal rights and largely by means of judicial review of legislation. It goes without saying an important consideration for any government contemplating taking on board the convention's provisions is the relationship in that government's legal system between international law, as represented by the convention, and its own internal domestic law.
Members would be advised to bear in mind that in the civil law systems in Europe, there is a hierarchy of legal rights and obligations in the majority of cases. Under the civil law system, the constitution comes first, then international treaty and then domestic law. That is not the case under our system because this is a common law state and our system is different. At the top comes the Constitution, then the Oireachtas and its legislation and finally international agreements in so far as they are made part of our law by the Oireachtas. We have a different fundamental philosophy of where international treaty obligations come on the pyramid of the legal hierarchy. It is expressly provided in our Constitution that no international agreement is part of our domestic law save to the extent determined by the Oireachtas, which must act in accordance with the Constitution.
In some states, for example, it is accepted that there is no real separation between international and domestic law and both are regarded as part of a unified system. Under this monist theory, the international rules may well take precedence over national provisions. Other systems, however, including that in Ireland, adhere to the dualist theory and they regard international law and domestic law as totally separate. Under these systems, international law does not become part of the internal law unless it is explicitly made so. What this means is that rules embodied in an international instrument, such as the convention, cannot be enforced in our courts unless and until they are incorporated into our law by an Act of the Oireachtas.
While the convention is law for the State on the international plain since 1953 – citizens were given right of recourse to the court in Strasbourg since then because Ireland was confident it would be fully compatible with its Constitution – its provisions do not apply with the force of law within this State. That does not mean, however, that the convention is merely an academic source of rights protection. By virtue of the State's acceptance of the right of individual petition, cases can and have been on occasion brought to Strasbourg alleging that the State is in breach of the convention in particular respects. The decision of the court in these matters is binding on the State, but, under our constitutional system, it is the prerogative of the Government to decide precisely how incompatible provisions of national law or administrative practice are to be reconciled with the court's ruling.
When I refer to Government in this sense, I mean the Government and the Oireachtas. Examples of how this works in practice may be found in areas of Access to Justice: An Introduction of the Scheme of Civil Legal Aid, advice following the Josie Airey case in the late 1970s and the changes in the criminal law on homosexual offences as a result of the Norris case in 1988.
There are some disadvantages with this method of vindication of convention rights. The process requires that all domestic remedies be first tried and exhausted before the matter is pleaded in Strasbourg. That can be quite a costly, time consuming and lengthy procedure. In all cases, it involves taking a constitutional action all the way to the Supreme Court. Furthermore, with the number of states acceding to the convention increasing all the time, the caseload of the Strasbourg court is growing exponentially and there are longer delays in prospect as a result.
In that context, and against the background of changes already effected in Northern Ireland due the enactment of the 1998 Human Rights Act in the United Kingdom and the obligation on the Government under the Good Friday Agreement, there is now a need to provide that cases involving alleged breaches of the convention should be capable of being pleaded before national courts. That is the purpose of the Bill.
It made sense, therefore, in any examination of the choices open to the Government in the matter of providing how the provisions of the convention could be made applicable in the State, rather than for the State as a consequence of our obligations under international law, to look closely at the sub-constitutional interpretative model in the 1998 Human Rights Act adopted for England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Other possible options explored included direct incorporation of the relevant articles of the convention in the Constitution. This would have to be effected by changes in the relevant articles of the Constitution as agreed by the people in a referendum.
In that regard, the Constitution Review Group in its 1996 report came out strongly against such a course on the grounds that there is already a high degree of overlap between the Constitution's guarantees in the area of fundamental rights and the provisions of the convention. The group was of the opinion that this form of incorporation could very well lead to a diminution in some individual rights in the Constitution. They also believed that this method of incorporation would not have the effect of filling any gaps in human rights protection, since every substantive right afforded by the convention is either expressly protected by the Constitution, or has been recognised by the courts as an unenumerated right under Article 40.3.1 of the Constitution.
Significantly, the group also thought that incorporation of the convention in the Constitution might give rise to new gaps in protection in fundamentally important areas, such as the right to trial by jury. There is one further serious question associated with this option which the Constitution Review Group did not address, whether changes of this order of magnitude in the area of fundamental rights and freedoms would be carried by a sufficient majority of the people in a referendum.
In effect, if the European Convention rights were to be incorporated into the Irish Constitution, in terms, the question would then arise as to who was the authoritative and final determinant of what they meant. Would it be the Irish people, would it be the Irish Supreme Court or would it be the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg? People who have suggested direct incorporation into our Constitution never stress the obvious implication of that argument, that a section of the Irish Constitution would cease to mean what the Irish people necessarily thought it meant, or what the Supreme Court interpreted it to mean. It would mean whatever a court not responsible or accountable to the Irish people interpreted it to mean. That would mean a cession of sovereignty in respect of fundamental rights to a court over which we have no direct influence, in the sense that we have over our domestic courts, independent though they are.
Another solution which at first seemed attractive was for the convention to have the force of law in the State or to make the convention part of the law of the State. This view is held by a number of interested organisations, including the Human Rights Commission, and it deserves serious scrutiny. Most of the debate in the other House – and in the committee of the other House – centred on that particular issue and many amendments were tabled to the Bill accordingly.
However, it was my view when Attorney General, as it is the view of the present Attorney General, accepted by the Government, that the fatal flaw with such an approach is that it would have the capacity to undermine one of the central pillars of the Constitution, namely the doctrine of separation of powers. It would mean the Oireachtas was investing the Judiciary with a new right to invalidate the laws of the Oireachtas by reference to what was decided by the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. In effect, the Judiciary would become law makers, implementing decisions of that court contrary to the exclusive role of the Oireachtas under Article 15.2.1 of the Constitution.
In the final analysis the Government decided on an interpretative approach which is similar to that adopted in the United Kingdom, but it is done for entirely different reasons and not out of slavish imitation. In the United Kingdom the argument offered for the interpretative approach was largely to do with parliamentary sovereignty. In this State, given that it is a constitutional Republic, we have adopted the approach we have because of our doctrine of constitutional sovereignty and the supremacy of the will of the people. I should say it is a happy coincidence that for two entirely different sets of reasons these two jurisdictions, which have a shared role in the human rights perspective as it affects both parts of this island, have arrived at broadly similar conclusions as to how the common law system, which is different from the civil law system, can be fully harmonised with the European Convention of Human Rights. That is why we have done this the way we have.
Believe it or not, it is just two years since my predecessor as Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Deputy John O'Donoghue, presented the Bill at Second Stage in the other House. That was on the 14 June 2001 and the Bill was referred to the Select Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights on that day.
The committee engaged in a wide-ranging consultation process, but the Bill was not scheduled for discussion in committee up to the time of the dissolution of the previous Dáil. Following the formation of the present Dáil the committee as reconstituted in late 2002 gave all interested parties and organisations further opportunities to address it on the subject matter of the Bill. Following the conclusion of that process, the examination of the Bill in committee took place earlier this year on 18 and 19 February, 5 March and concluded on 12 March 2003. Report Stage commenced on 21 May and continued on 10 June, with the passing of the Bill in the other House on 11 June 2003.
Members may be surprised, in view of that lengthy history, to see that the Bill contains just nine sections. It is, nevertheless, quite a complex and controversial measure, and to some extent that explains why it has taken so long to get to this point in its passage through the Oireachtas. As a measure of that complexity, 52 Committee Stage amendments were tabled to the Bill. At Report Stage that number rose to 61. The complexity arises from the fact that, as I have explained, the purpose of the Bill is to provide for the harmonious co-existence of two separate streams of rights and fundamental freedoms. One such stream is the existing one founded on constitutional sovereignty contained in the fundamental rights articles in the 1937 Constitution, Bunreacht na hÉireann. This incorporates our system of judicial supervision and protection of those rights – something as I remarked earlier that is unique among our fellow contracting states of the Council of Europe, and which must remain paramount. The second stream is the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which of itself is not a constitutional document. It was never meant to be a constitution for the contracting states and does not actually require that its provisions be incorporated into national legal systems. It is, nevertheless, an international human rights instrument to which the State is bound in international law, and under which the State has agreed to allow individual citizens the right of access to an international court to determine whether it is in breach of its obligations under it. A further layer of complexity is caused by the fact that under the Constitution, the sole and exclusive maker of laws in this State is the Oireachtas.
How is it possible to preserve these constitutional and legislative prerogatives and yet still provide that the provisions of the convention can be pleaded in and acted upon by our courts? These are the turbulent waters into which we are now moving. I hope to show that the correct course open to us is the one set out in the route map laid down in the Bill which is now before the House for consideration.
Section 1 provides for the definition of certain words and phrases used in the Bill. These definitions, by listing the applicable convention provisions and by defining the term "organ of the State", to which the main obligations in section 3 regarding the performance of functions applies, are fundamentally important. The term "Convention provisions" set out in the Bill includes Articles 2 to 14 of the convention as well as the applicable provisions of the four main protocols to the convention. The full and up to date texts of all of these instruments are set out in Schedules 1 to 5, inclusive, to the Bill.
Two recent additional protocols to the convention, Protocol 12 dealing with the substantive issue of discrimination, which we have signed subject to ratification, and Protocol 13 dealing with the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances – which, following the result of the recent constitutional referendum, we have signed and ratified as well – are not included in the Bill simply because their provisions are not yet in force. Article 1 of the convention is not included but there is no need to do so. This is due to the fact that the obligation to respect human rights as defined by the convention, and to secure them to everyone within the jurisdiction of the contracting states to the convention, has already been accepted by the State since the time it ratified the convention and its coming into effect in 1953. That obligation has been binding on us since that time and that is the reason the Long Title refers to the Bill giving further effect to the convention.
It is worth noting that Article 13 of the convention which provides for the right to an effective remedy for breaches of the convention is expressly included. In this respect we are going somewhat further than the 1988 Human Rights Act in the UK which omitted this Article from its scope. The term "organ of the State" excludes the courts as well as the President, either House of the Oireachtas, or a committee or joint committee of both Houses. There has been criticism over the exclusion of the courts based on the fact that they are expressly included in the UK Human Rights Act. However, the United Kingdom's courts are not bound by a written constitution. Its judiciary is bound by an oath to the sovereign power which is obliged to do whatever parliament says it can do. In that respect it is fundamentally different from the position of our Judiciary. Our judges, by their declaration, are bound to uphold our Constitution, regardless of what Parliament says or does to them – to the extent that Parliament's wishes are inconsistent with the true meaning and interpretation of the Constitution.
The courts are under a duty to administer justice in accordance with the law and the Constitution. Furthermore, as the convention is primarily a vertically effective instrument – by which I mean that it is designed as a means for redressing human rights violations between the individual and the State – the inclusion of the courts could result in their being drawn into its development as a horizontally effective means of resolving rights-based disputes between individuals. I do not want to create a new set of actionable torts consisting of breach of convention rights as between individuals, nor do I want to see a development whereby people, under sections 3(1) and 3(2), would be able to sue the courts in respect of court decisions. I have stated clearly that I am not interested in that kind of experimentation and that I will not go down that road.
It must be stressed that the term "statutory provision", defined in section 1 as meaning any Act of the Oireachtas or any order, regulation, rule, licence, by-law or any other like document made, issued or otherwise created under any statute or by law, also includes every statute establishing the courts and every statutory instrument in which court rules are provided. All the legislation on which the courts are based, subject to the Constitution, and every rule of court which is a statutory instrument is encompassed by this Act. Members will see, as we examine the provisions of the Bill, that the courts are obliged to regard their own establishing legislation and their own rules of procedure, as laid down in statutory instruments, in a manner consistent with the convention to the greatest extent possible.
Section 2 is the first of the three key provisions in the Bill. It gave rise to some confusion in the Lower House so I will provide this House with some further information on it. The section provides that any statutory provision, in the widest possible sense, as well as any provision of the rules of common law – such as the rule against hearsay, compellability of a spouse or any rule of law of that kind which is not found in statute – shall be interpreted as far as possible in a manner compatible with the State's obligations under the convention. This provision applies to laws made both before and after the passing of the Bill. It is both prospective and retrospective and is a thorough and potentially far-reaching interpretative obligation. I remarked in the Lower House that the obligation on the courts to interpret our laws applies to the extent that the failure to do so would be inconsistent with the State's obligations under the convention. This rule applies to all courts – the District Court, the Circuit Court, the High Court the Court of Criminal Appeal and the Supreme Court – at all times and it is subject to the Constitution.
Each court will make its own decision on the question of compatibility. In any ordinary case, if an issue arises as to the compatibility of any law or rule of law with the convention, both the District Court and the Circuit Court are obliged, as a matter of legal interpretation, to do their best and see a convention-compatible interpretation of any law or rule of law before them. Ordinarily, these decisions may be set aside on appeal one way or the other. There is no question of references upwards or downwards, except perhaps by means of the consultative case stated procedure.
Section 3 is another key provision and none of the Bill's critics has ever adverted to it in substance. It provides that every organ of the State, as defined in section 1, must perform its functions in a manner compatible with the State's obligations under the convention. One might ask why the courts, the President or Oireachtas are not included in this regard, but we have a sovereign state and it is up to Members of the Oireachtas to decide how to exercise the sovereign power of the people in given circumstances. One Oireachtas cannot bind another Oireachtas, nor can both Houses of the Oireachtas bind either House regarding how it should conduct its business. This is what is involved in Ireland being a sovereign, independent republic.
If an organ of the State fails to carry out its functions in a matter incompatible with the State's obligations under the convention, section 3 provides a remedy in damages in the Circuit Court or the High Court. There is a time limit of one year, within which such actions may be brought, although this can be extended if the court considers it is appropriate to do so in the interests of justice.
This is a very far-reaching provision and goes much further than the equivalent provision in the United Kingdom. It gives to the High Court and the Circuit Court jurisdiction, in accordance with the levels of damages that those two courts have at present for torts, to award compensation to anybody who claims that any organ of the State, as defined in the Act, has infringed his or her rights under the Constitution. It provides for what could be described as a new tort, and the level of compensation envisaged is not what I would term convention-related compensation which, in accordance with the provisions of Article 41 of the convention, is not regarded as being overly generous.
This remedy is not available in the District Court, but there are reasons for that. The District Court is charged with dispensing summary civil and criminal justice, which it does, and it has a considerable volume of work to do. Convention-based cases, by their nature, are complex and require considerable attention. As Senators will know, the District Court does not have jurisdiction in equity or defamation cases, injunctions or applications for judicial review, principally because these cases require a huge investment of time to process properly.
Section 3 does not refer to the other remedies which may be relevant in cases of this type, such as injunctions, declarations, what used to be called certiorari, quashing orders and orders like mandamus, all of which are now called judicial review. It is not necessary to refer to them. If a person wishes to injunct a State body from carrying out a function of one kind or another, one does so in the High Court by means of orders for judicial review. There is no need to replicate in large measure the law relating to judicial review and convention issues will be melded into judicial review law. Contrary to some of the criticisms that have been expressed about this particular provision, if one takes into account our existing law on judicial review and the far-reaching effect of the requirement in section 2 whereby the courts have to do their utmost to bring about compatibility of interpretation, one will find that this Bill represents a very robust system of enforcement of convention based rights.
Section 4 deals with the technical issue of judicial notice and interpretation of convention provisions and the jurisprudence of the convention court. I accepted an amendment in this respect on Report Stage in the other House.
Section 5 is the third key provision in the Bill. It deals with the making of declarations of incompatibility by the superior courts and the consequences of such a decision. Due to the fact that the particular statutory provision which may be found incompatible with the convention may also be entirely valid under the Constitution, difficult jurisprudential issues arise. Under our Constitution, this House, the Dáil and the President form the Oireachtas, in which the sole and exclusive right to make laws for the State is vested. It is not a paper-based monopoly, but the outward expression of sovereignty on which Irish republicanism is based, that is, the right of the people, through the Legislature and subject to the Constitution, to determine their laws.
We have a system in which our courts interpret the law and they do so subject to one overriding rule, namely, that every organ of the State, including the Oireachtas, is bound to uphold the Constitution. While the people are free to amend the Constitution through referendum, the bodies with the ultimate right to decide what it means are the High Court and the Supreme Court on appeal. Nobody else's interpretation of the Constitution is valid or coercive as a matter of law. Neither House of the Oireachtas can direct the courts to interpret laws by reference to the decisions of a third party, such as the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
There have been ten occasions over the past 50 years when the Irish courts have been found by the European Court of Human Rights to have failed to vindicate a person's rights to the extent required by the convention. This represents one case every five years. Sometimes we engage in self-flagellation over such matters, but, compared to many other states, some of which would regard themselves as the cradles of democracy, and others of which bestow similar epithets upon themselves, our record is remarkably clear of breaches of the convention.