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Seanad Éireann debate -
Tuesday, 2 Mar 2010

Vol. 201 No. 4

Criminal Justice (Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing) Bill 2009: Second Stage.

Question proposed: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

The main purpose of the Criminal Justice (Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing) Bill is to transpose the third EU money laundering directive into Irish law and to comply with the recommendations of the financial action task force third round mutual evaluation report on Ireland. The Bill will also give effect to certain provisions of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. The aim of the Bill is to combat the attempts by criminals to conceal the origins of the proceeds of criminal activity and to prevent the channelling of money obtained lawfully or unlawfully for terrorist purposes.

This is a Bill which, rightly, has been the subject of a great deal of consultation with a wide range of stakeholders who ultimately will be affected by its provisions. The consultation process initiated by my Department began some years ago and has been ongoing, even up to this point in the proceedings in the Oireachtas. I have sought to ensure my officials have actively engaged with those covered by the legislation to ascertain their views on the proposals while ensuring the Bill accurately transposes the third money laundering directive into Irish law.

The Bill was considered on Committee Stage in the Dáil in January last and on Report Stage on 17 February last. In light of comments made by Opposition speakers on those Stages and in response to issues which have been raised by interested parties, I intend to table further amendments to the Bill on Committee Stage in this House to reflect these views and to introduce certain drafting and technical amendments which may be considered necessary. I will refer to some of these proposed changes. The first of the amendments concerns section 7. I propose to table an amendment in regard to the payment of reasonable legal expenses which a person may incur in the context of criminal proceedings.

Most significant crime involving money or property will inevitably involve the concealing of that money or property from the lawful authorities. The proceeds of crime will be laundered to conceal its origins. The problem of money laundering has been with us for a very long time. The increasingly sophisticated nature of criminal activity and the increasingly international dimension to a great deal of crime has had the effect of making the crime of money laundering more prevalent and, in this electronic age, far more difficult to detect.

This is a lengthy and complex Bill. While it transposes the third European Union money laundering directive into Irish law, it also repeals and consolidates the existing Irish anti-money laundering legislation which is contained primarily in the Criminal Justice Act 1994, as amended. The House should be aware that we have effective money laundering legislation in place in this jurisdiction. This Bill will update and strengthen those provisions.

The Bill is divided into five Parts. Part 2 deals with the main offence of money laundering occurring inside and outside the State. Careful consideration was given to this Part in an effort to improve the potential for detecting this crime and for prosecuting those engaged in this activity. It is an offence under the terms of this Bill for someone to conceal or disguise the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement or ownership of property, including money which is the proceeds of criminal conduct. It is also an offence to convert, transfer, handle, acquire, possess or use such property. It also makes it an offence to remove the property from the State or to bring it into the State.

The offence of money laundering applies to a person who knows or believes or is reckless as to whether the property is the proceeds of crime. A reference to a person knowing or believing that property is the proceeds of crime also applies to a person who knows or believes the property is probably the proceeds of crime. The penalties for money laundering reflect the seriousness of the offence. For example, a person convicted on indictment could be jailed for up to 14 years or given an unlimited fine, or both. The penalty for a person found guilty on summary conviction is a fine of up to €5,000 and a term of imprisonment of up to 12months.

Those covered by the provisions of this Bill are referred to as "designated persons". The list of designated persons is extensive and includes credit and financial institutions, that is, banks, building societies, credit unions, insurance companies, bureaux de changes, payment services businesses and An Post. Independent legal professionals, such as barristers and solicitors, and members of the accountancy profession are also designated persons for the purposes of this Bill. All of these groups must have regard to the provisions of the Bill as they apply to their daily activities. In that context I will examine again the provisions of the Bill regarding membership of professional bodies and the appropriate references for such bodies and the professions involved.

The term "designated person" also incorporates trust or company service providers. This category is defined in section 24(1) and includes company directors. However, the Bill applies only to persons who act as company directors by way of a nominee of a third party and by way of business. I am considering an amendment to section 24 in regard to the term "occasional transaction" which occurs in a number of places in the Bill to explain the meaning of this term. Another feature of the Bill is the inclusion of private members' gaming clubs and those who effectively direct such clubs as designated persons for the purposes of the Bill. The Bill will apply to the gambling activities which take place in such clubs, but only in the context of the requirements for money laundering.

The provisions of the Bill also apply to a category known as dealers in high value goods, that is, traders who receive payments in cash of at least €15,000 in a single transaction or in a series of transactions which appear to be linked. The Bill gives the Minister power to add other classes of persons who could be covered by the provisions of the legislation by way of regulation. Senators will note the wide range of designated persons covered by the requirements of this Bill. Senators will also note, however, that the requirements of the directive which are reflected in this Bill and set out the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing are not the same in every case. The Bill is not intended to place an undue burden of administration on designated persons in dealing with their customers. The Bill recognises, as does the directive, that designated persons can apply a risk-based approach in dealing with their customers.

A key element of this Bill is the application of more extensive anti-money laundering legislation in the application of customer due diligence measures on the part of designated persons covered by the Bill. Under section 33, these measures require the identity of the customer to be verified and also require the identification and the verification of any beneficial owner. I intend to table amendments on Committee Stage to sections 33(1)(b) and 33(1)(d), the first of which is consequent on an earlier proposed amendment while the second relates to the concept of existing customers. Both will have the effect of clarifying the wording in each of the subsections. I also give notice of two further minor amendments to sections 33 and 35.

The directive provides that customer due diligence provisions shall be applied to existing customers at appropriate times on a risk-sensitive basis. The Bill is intended to reflect this requirement. The identification and verification of customers is required in every case but simplified customer due diligence is provided for in appropriate cases. Clearly, certain situations present a greater risk of money laundering or terrorist financing than others. Although customers must be identified and verified in every case, the Bill provides for enhanced customer due diligence in circumstances where more rigorous procedures are necessary. For example, an individual who is not physically present when opening a bank account would come into the category whereby enhanced due diligence is required.

The Bill introduces the concept of the politically exposed person, PEP. This refers to someone who holds, or has held, political office or other senior posts in public administration and who is resident outside the State. The directive requires that enhanced customer due diligence must apply to this category. Such measures also apply to the immediate family members and close associates of the politically exposed person as defined in the Bill and these provisions are set out in section 37. I put Senators on notice that I may introduce further amendments on Committee Stage to this section that are intended to give greater clarity to the provisions of subsections (2), (4) and (8) of this section.

Other circumstances where enhanced due diligence also applies are when a credit institution, namely, a bank, enters into a correspondent banking arrangement with another credit institution situated outside of the European Union or outside of a state which is recognised as having equivalent requirements.

The term "designated persons" refers to those categories covered by the requirements of the Bill. The Bill also provides in Chapter 8 for the role of competent authorities. These are the supervisory bodies for each of the designated persons covered by the Bill. For example, the Financial Regulator is the competent authority for the credit and financial institutions and the Law Society is the competent authority for the solicitor's profession. In the case of a designated person who is a barrister, the competent authority is the Bar Council. For accountants, auditors, tax advisers and trust or company service providers who are members of a designated accountancy body, that body is the competent authority for those persons.

We recognise that not all the designated persons covered by the Bill will necessarily have a competent authority in place to supervise their activities. Therefore, designated persons covered by the Bill such as trust or company service providers, tax advisers and dealers in high value goods who are not subject to supervision by any other competent authority will be monitored by my Department for the purposes of money laundering. A unit within the Department has been established specifically for this purpose. The function of a competent authority for the purposes of the Bill is to monitor the designated persons for whom it has responsibility and to take the measures which are reasonably necessary to secure compliance with the provisions of the Bill. It may be necessary for a competent authority to report to the Garda Síochána and the Revenue Commissioners any knowledge or suspicion it may have that a designated person for which it has responsibility has been engaged in money laundering or terrorist financing.

The existing anti-money laundering legislation provides for the compilation of guidance by competent authorities for their members in respect of the operation of this legislation. Courts can have regard to this guidance in considering matters relating to a prosecution for money laundering which may come before them. This Bill contains a similar provision and also provides for the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform to approve such guidance in consultation with the Minister for Finance. Nothing in this Bill will limit the matters a court may have regard to in determining whether a person took all reasonable steps and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing an offence. In preparing this legislation, my Department has worked closely with the Department of Finance on all relevant aspects of the Bill.

This Bill contains not only criminal law provisions but also many provisions relating to changes in financial regulation in so far as they impact on the question of money laundering and terrorist financing. Many of the provisions of the Bill relate to the provision of financial services and other matters which are within the remit of my colleague, the Minister for Finance.

This is a lengthy Bill containing 122 sections set out in five Parts. The largest, Part 4, is divided into ten separate chapters. It would be far too lengthy a process to provide Senators with details of each of the sections. However, I wish to outline to the House the salient sections in each Part and indicate changes to the existing law where these are being proposed.

Part 1 sets out the Short Title and commencement provisions, the interpretation section, the regulatory powers conferred on the Minister and the expenses arrangements. Senators should be aware that section 4 provides for the repeal of the existing anti-money laundering provisions contained in the Criminal Justice Act 1994.

Part 2 deals with the main offence of money laundering. The drafting of this Part was subject to the detailed advice of the Office of the Attorney General and is different in certain respects from provisions currently contained in the 1994 Act. Our intention in preparing these provisions is to ensure a more effective statute to improve the prospects of prosecutions for the offence in court. I am confident it will do just that. I mentioned the penalties for the main offence of money laundering which are set out in section 7. These penalties reflect the seriousness with which we regard the crime of money laundering and, by the standards of other EU member states, are relatively high. Part 2 also deals with the aspects of the offence which may take place outside the State. Penalties for the offence committed outside the State are identical to the penalties which apply in this jurisdiction. The question of the application of jurisdiction for an offence occurring outside the State is a feature of many criminal law statutes. It is especially apt in this case as money laundering is a crime which very frequently has a cross-border or international dimension.

Part 3 deals with directions and orders in the context of an investigation of the offences covered by the Bill. Section 17 provides that a member of the Garda Síochána not below the rank of superintendent may direct a person not to carry out a service or transaction for a period of up to seven days. A judge of the District Court, if satisfied by information given by a member of the Garda Síochána that the service or transaction may comprise or assist money laundering or terrorist financing, may order a person not to carry out the service or transaction for a period not exceeding 28 days. The Bill also provides that a judge of the District Court may revoke a direction or order if he or she is satisfied the circumstances envisaged under section 17 do not or no longer apply. Section 20 provides that a judge of the District Court, on application by any person affected by a direction or order, may make any appropriate order in respect of any property concerned to enable the person to discharge the reasonable living expenses, including legal expenses or expenses in regard to legal proceedings, which are or are to be incurred in respect of the person or his or her dependents.

Part 4 is the longest and most extensive and is divided into ten chapters covering sections 24 to 109, inclusive. This Part is concerned with a range of provisions relating to the financial services industry, professional service providers and the application of the all-important customer due diligence, CDD, measures. The various degrees of customer due diligence which apply in different circumstances are also set out in this Part. There are four categories of CDD: basic customer due diligence, simplified customer due diligence, enhanced customer due diligence and monitoring of customer transactions. Chapter 1 deals entirely with the interpretation of the various terms which are essential to the Bill as a whole. Section 24 defines a number of the key terms, including beneficial owner, business relationship, competent authority, credit institution, financial institution, designated person, professional service provider, tax adviser, trust and company service provider. An Post was also included within the definition of both a credit institution and a financial institution by way of amendment on Committee Stage in the Dáil.

I have outlined to Senators the meaning of the term "designated person". This is set out in the Bill in section 25. The term refers to all individuals or bodies to which this legislation applies. Section 25 also gives the Minister powers to prescribe a class of person as a designated person if he or she is satisfied that any of the business activities engaged in by the person may be used for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing.

Section 28 defines a trust as one that administers and distributes funds. A beneficial owner in respect of a trust for the purposes of this Bill means any of the following: a person who is entitled to a vested interest in possession, remainder or reversion in at least 25% of the capital of the trust property, whether that interest is defeasible; a class of individuals in whose main interest the trust is set up or operates; any person who has control over the trust; and any person who is the beneficial owner of a body corporate that is entitled to a vested interest of the kind referred to in section 28(2)(a).

Section 29 provides that a beneficial owner in respect of an estate of a deceased person in the course of administration means the executor or administrator of the estate concerned. Section 30 states that a beneficial owner in respect of a legal entity or legal arrangement with some exceptions means someone who benefits from the entity or arrangement to the extent of at least 25% of the property, persons who benefit from the entity or arrangement in whose interest that entity or arrangement is established or operates, or a person who exercises control over at least 25% of the property.

I referred to the concept of customer due diligence, CDD, and, as I said, it relates to the identification and verification of beneficial owners. Chapter 3 of Part 4 sets out the procedures which designated persons must follow if they are to identify adequately and verify their customers, including existing customers. In most cases, the measures set out in this Part of the Bill are to be applied before the establishment of a business relationship.

Section 33 provides for the identification and verification of beneficial owners and the application of certain aspects of enhanced and simplified customer due diligence. This section also sets out the particular measures which should be applied, for example, the kinds of documents or information which can be relied upon to confirm the identity of a customer. This includes documents from a Government source or a prescribed class or combination of documents.

Subsection (4) sets out the measures which should be applied where a customer is not physically present. It contains a provision for verification to be made during the establishment of a business relationship rather than prior to it, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that to do so before then would interrupt the normal course of business. However, this should be done only where there is no real risk.

Section 34 provides for exemptions from the requirements in regard to customer due diligence. Such exemptions will apply to the beneficial owner of money held or proposed to be held in trust in a client account. The section also provides that a credit institution may apply the exemption in regard to the money held in trust in a credit institution if satisfied that the information on the identity of the beneficial owners is readily available.

Section 35(3) relates to the monitoring of a business relationship, including scrutinising transactions with the intention of obtaining information reasonably warranted by the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing. Section 36 provides that a person may be exempt from the requirements of section 35(1) if there are grounds to believe the customer or the product concerned is a "specified customer" or a "specified product". A "specified product" within the meaning of section 34 is a life insurance policy having an annual premium of no more than €1,000 or a single premium of no more than €2,500 and an insurance policy in respect of a pension scheme that does not have a surrender clause and cannot be used as collateral.

Section 37 provides for enhanced customer due diligence for politically exposed persons residing outside the State. This section provides that a designated person shall take steps to determine whether a customer or beneficial owner residing outside the State is a politically exposed person or an immediate family member or a close associate of a politically exposed person. The steps to be taken in regard to this provision are reasonably warranted by the risk that the customer or beneficial owner is involved in money laundering or terrorist financing.

Section 38 sets out the conditions under which a credit institution shall enter into a correspondent banking relationship with another credit institution, in a place other than a member state of the European Union or a state with equivalent anti-money laundering requirements.

Section 42 requires a designated person to report to the Garda Síochána and the Revenue Commissioners any knowledge or suspicion which he or she may have that a person is engaged in money laundering or terrorist financing. Section 45 enables information included in a report to be used in an investigation into money laundering or terrorist financing.

Section 46 provides for an exemption from the reporting requirement in respect of a relevant professional adviser in regard to information that he or she may have obtained in respect of a client in the course of ascertaining the legal position of that client. This provision is similar to the position which already exists in regard to privileged information contained in our existing legislation. The present draft of the Bill does not alter the situation with regard to such privilege in any way. The situation which currently applies under the existing anti-money laundering legislation will continue to do so.

I should mention to the House that I am considering a further matter in regard to privileged communications between tax advisers and the Revenue Commissioners and whether an amendment on Committee Stage may be required.

Sections 48 to 53, inclusive, deal with the prohibition on "tipping off" by a designated person as well as with defences to a charge of "tipping off' in particular circumstances. Section 49 prohibits a designated person from making any disclosures likely to prejudice any ongoing or future investigation into money laundering or terrorist financing. Subsection (3) of that section sets out the penalties for failing to comply with this provision.

Chapter 6 of this Part deals with internal policies and procedures as well as training and record keeping. Section 54 directs that a designated person shall have policies and procedures in place in regard to his or her business to prevent and detect money laundering and terrorist financing. That section also provides that the designated person shall detail the type of policies and procedures to be implemented.

Section 55 requires a designated person to keep records of the procedures applied and the information gathered in regard to each customer. Since the Bill passed all Stages in the Dáil, further consideration has been given to section 55 and the Parliamentary Counsel has been consulted in regard to the drafting of the section. I give Senators notice that I intend to introduce an amendment to this section with the aim of bringing greater clarity to the section and outlining exactly what is required with regard to the retention of records by designated persons covered by the Bill. I will, of course, provide the House with a detailed explanation of the proposed changes on Committee Stage.

Chapter 7 deals with special provisions applying to credit or financial institutions. Section 56 requires that a credit or financial institution have systems in place to enable it to respond efficiently to inquiries from the Garda Síochána in regard to its business relationships.

Section 58 prohibits the setting up of anonymous accounts or the provision of anonymous passbooks by credit or financial institutions. Anonymous or numbered bank accounts or passbooks have not been a feature of the Irish banking system, though they have been a feature in some other jurisdictions. The purpose of section 58 is to transpose the requirements of the directive. It also complements and reinforces the customer identification requirements of the directive. Section 59 prohibits a credit institution from entering into a correspondent banking relationship with a shell bank.

Chapter 8 deals with monitoring by competent authorities. Section 60 explains the meaning of the term competent authority. Subsection (2) lists persons or entities that may be considered a competent authority and subsection (3) provides that, in certain circumstances, the Minister may prescribe a competent authority for a class of designated persons.

Section 62 lists the competent authorities which may be referred to as State competent authorities and provides the circumstances in which the Minister may prescribe a competent authority as a State competent authority.

Section 67 permits, at subsection (1), a State competent authority to direct a designated person to provide information or documents as specified by written notice. Subsection (2) of that section sets out the penalties for failure to comply. Subsection (4) of that section provides that the State competent authority shall specify the manner and time in which the information is to be furnished and that a person should only furnish documents in his or her possession or documents which can be obtained lawfully.

Section 68 provides that a State competent authority may direct a designated person to furnish an explanation in regard to any documents provided to the authority under section 67 or lawfully removed from the premises under section 78.

The remainder of this chapter details the powers which may be exercised by a State competent authority. These include the appointment of authorised officers, the general powers of officers to enter premises and the entering into residential premises with permission or with a warrant. Section 81 stipulates that nothing in Chapter 8 requires a person to answer questions if to do so might tend to incriminate them. Section 82 provides that nothing in Chapter 8 requires the production of any document or information that is subject to legal privilege.

Chapter 9 deals with the authorisation of trust and company service providers. Section 84 provides for the authorisation and registration procedures for persons carrying on the business of a trust and company service provider. For the purposes of this section, a trust and company service provider does not include a member of a designated accountancy body, a barrister or solicitor, or a credit institution or financial institution.

Section 85 specifies certain matters which would disqualify a person from being considered a "fit and proper person" for the purposes of authorisation as a trust and company service provider. These include a person who has been convicted of any of the following offences: money laundering; terrorist financing; an offence involving fraud, dishonesty or breach of trust; and an offence in respect of conduct in a place other than the State that would constitute an offence of a kind referred to above if the conduct occurred in the State.

Chapter 10 deals with other matters including, in section 107, the approval of codes of practice or guidelines by the Minister to which, as I mentioned earlier, courts may have regard in considering whether a defendant took all reasonable steps and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing an offence. Section 109 provides that a person who is a designated person in the context of section 25(1)(h), that is, a person directing a private members’ club, shall register with the Minister in accordance with procedures as may be prescribed or otherwise imposed by the Minister. Subsection (3) of that section provides that particulars shall be entered into a register established and maintained by the Minister for the purposes of this section.

Part 5 deals with miscellaneous matters. Section 110 sets out the requirements in regard to the service of documents. Section 111 relates to offences which have been committed by a body corporate or an unincorporated body where a director, manager or other officer may be taken to have committed the offence. Section 112 provides that the disclosure of information relating to a suspicion of an offence to a member of the Garda Síochána or another person concerned with an investigation into money laundering or terrorist financing shall not be treated as a breach of disclosure of information imposed by any other enactment or rule of law.

Sections 113 to 122, inclusive, comprise mainly consequential amendments to a number of statutes. However, section 114 will enable the Financial Regulator to inquire into and impose administrative sanctions for breaches of Part 4 of the Bill by credit and financial institutions as required by the directive. Section 115 amends the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961.

This is a very important Bill. It is important that as a responsible and committed member of the European Community, this directive is transposed by Ireland without further delay. It is important for our reputation as an international financial services centre that we have the best possible anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing legislation in place. It is most important for the ongoing fight against organised crime and the threat of international terrorism that we have updated and modernised legislative safeguards to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. I commend the Bill to the House.

I agree with the Minister on the importance of the Bill and that as a responsible and committed member of the European Union, Ireland needs to transpose this directive and to do so without delay. The reputation of this country and of the International Financial Services Centre makes it imperative to have the best practice standard of anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing legislation. However, if this is such important legislation why have we delayed so long? This directive was to be transposed into Irish law by 15 December 2007. There have been two judgments against Ireland in the European Court of Justice, one of 1 October 2009 and the other of 19 May 2009. In the latter judgment the court declared that Ireland had failed to comply with its obligations under EU law because of the failure to implement this directive. This judgment records a reply given by the Government to the European Commission on 19 March 2008. The Irish authorities indicated to the Commission that approval had been given for the drafting of a Bill and it would be subject to public consultation. It was anticipated the legislation transposing the directive would be published in summer 2008. More time elapsed and it was published in July 2009, almost two and a half years late. However, the delay by the Government and the Minister in bringing this legislation to a conclusion is very embarrassing for this country, considering the two judgments made against us and the fact that Ireland is still in default with regard to this legislation.

The Minister in his contribution outlined the importance of this legislation and of Ireland being a good member of the European Community, the reputation of the financial services centre and our role in the fight against organised crime and international terrorism. It is very difficult to understand and to stand over the inexcusable delay in the completion of this transposition by the Government of the third money laundering directive.

This is crucial legislation in dealing with the issue of organised crime, terrorism and white collar crime. This Bill consolidates, streamlines and broadens the scope of the anti-money laundering legislation. A broader group of individuals will have responsibility to notify authorities of suspicious transactions. The Bill responds to the financial action task force recommendations and in particular its report of 17 February 2006, which evaluated Ireland's situation in respect of these matters. This report found that Ireland had a sound legal framework in place to combat money laundering although the number of convictions for money laundering is somewhat low. As regards relevant non-financial businesses and professions, for example, accountants or real estate agents, certain measures have been put in place but these need to be extended and preventive measures could be improved by providing regulatory authorities with the power to apply an increased range of administrative sanctions directly for breaches of any money laundering and counter-terrorist financing obligations. To a certain extent these matters have been addressed in the Bill.

I appreciate the Bill has been vetted by the other House. I note the Minister may bring forward some amendments on Committee Stage in this House, following further consultations. I will reserve my position regarding amendments I may wish to make on Committee Stage.

This legislation is important in that it fulfils our obligations under EU law. I refer to the importance of the financial services centre for the economy. It is a source of disappointment that this legislation has not been put in place to date. The International Monetary Fund has estimated that money laundering accounts for between 2% and 5% of the world's gross domestic product, or between €500 billion and €1.5 trillion. It is an important issue in this country, given the financial flows.

The three stages in the process of turning illicit proceeds into legal money or goods are placement, layering and integration and provide the background to this legislation. It is recognised that this problem can only be dealt with at an international and European level and this co-operation only began in the 1980s with the Vienna convention, the United Nations convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances in 1988 and the Council of Europe convention on laundering, tracing, seizure and confiscation of proceeds of crime 1990. These were the initial efforts at Community level. The financial action task force established by the G7 in 1989 was fundamental to this effort. The European Commission joined that organisation and its membership has since expanded considerably. Its 40 recommendations and the additional eight recommendations more recently adopted, have been adopted by 180 countries, with the United Nations, World Bank and the International Monetary Fund playing their part. Best practice at world level has been identified by this organisation along with a process of assessment of compliance and effective implementation. I have mentioned the assessment by the FATF of the process of mutual evaluation which was carried out in Ireland in 2006. The importance of this legislation in criminalising the activity of money laundering and in preventing money laundering cannot be understated.

The first EU money laundering directive was introduced in 1991, the second in 2001 and the third, the subject of this discussion, in 2005. It is interesting to consider how the manner in which this issue has been dealt with at EU level has changed. Initially, it was dealt with under the first pillar of the EU treaties. The passing of later treaties and the advent of greater co-operation in the criminal law area have made it possible for it to be dealt with under the appropriate legal base. No distinction is drawn between what have traditionally been third pillar issues and first pillar measures.

It is important for Ireland to be fully involved in co-operation at EU level in the area of criminal law. Our opt-out in this area was introduced by the Government in the context of the Lisbon treaty. This legislation highlights the importance of EU measures that deal with the combating of crime with an international cross-border dimension. The first two EU money laundering directives have been replaced by the third directive which reflects the recommendations of the FATF. There is an emphasis in the Bill on the threat of terrorism. The sources of funds can be legitimate, in many ways. Moneys that come from non-governmental organisations or charities can be used for illicit purposes. The third anti-money laundering directive captures this, as does this legislation.

The definition of "money laundering" in this legislation is a revision of that used in the Criminal Justice Act 1994, the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 and Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005. The definition of "criminal conduct" is broadened under this legislation in order that it is understood as "conduct that constitutes an offence". The 1994 Act specified that such conduct should constitute an "indictable" offence. The definition of "designated person" is being expanded, as are the obligations with regard to customer due diligence. The designated bodies and institutions which will be responsible for reporting suspicious transactions, as well as the level of due diligence that will be required on the part of such parties, are well set out.

The Bill provides for the identification and verification of the identities of customers and beneficial owners on the basis of reliable independent data. Bodies and institutions will have to be satisfied as to ownership and the control structure of the customer and will have to obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship. The legislation also provides for ongoing monitoring of that relationship, including scrutiny of transactions, to ensure consistency with the customer's business, risk profile and source of funds.

The provision in the Bill in respect of persons who are "politically exposed" is an important one. That concept is to be introduced in Irish law. The decision to deem politically exposed persons who constitute a particularly high risk group and who are more likely to be implicated by political corruption is in keeping with the risk-based approach to anti-money laundering measures adopted by the FATF and in line with the third money laundering directive. This welcome development in Irish law may be of domestic and international application. In accordance with the general provisions, designated persons must take "such steps as are reasonably warranted by the risk that the customer ... is involved in money laundering or terrorist financing". In the case of the immediate family members or close associates of a politically exposed person, section 37 requires designated persons to "determine the source of wealth and of funds involved in the proposed business relationship, or in the transaction or series of transactions" and "ensure that approval is obtained from any senior management of the designated person before such a relationship is established".

The issue of legal and professional privilege which has arisen under the third directive is dealt with in the Bill. Perhaps we will discuss it further on Committee Stage. UK jurisprudence on the issue has found that the language of the UK legislation in this regard is not to be construed as over-riding legal professional privilege without explicit provision to that effect. It is important that the offence of "tipping off" which was provided for in the Criminal Justice Act 1994 is also included in the Bill.

The Bill is very welcome but overdue. It captures most of our obligations under EU law and our international obligations in respect of the FATF recommendations. I welcome the additional obligations which will be placed on designated persons and the extension of the scope of application of anti-money laundering legislation. In general, the Bill has my full support. I will reserve my position on the amendments the Minister intends to propose. I may propose some on Committee Stage also.

I welcome the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform. I also welcome the Bill which is another bow in the armoury of those fighting organised crime, with which we have to deal. As the Minister said, the main purpose of the Bill is to transpose into national law the third EU money laundering directive which was introduced in 2005 and the associated implementing directive. It should be noted that the Criminal Justice Act 1994 provides the foundation for our money laundering laws. Obviously, this updates and brings it into line.

I remind Senator Regan who was critical of the delay in introducing the Bill that the most important matter is for its contents to be as correct as possible. The Minister has said it is likely that he will table amendments in this House on Committee Stage or Report Stage. That is an indication of the ongoing, fluid nature of this process. It is not something solid that cannot be changed.

The Bill will also ensure Ireland complies with the recommendations of the third mutual evaluation report on Ireland of the financial action task force, FATF. The Bill also proposes to repeal and re-enact the current anti-money laundering provisions contained in other statutes, principally the provisions relating to money laundering contained in the Criminal Justice Act 1994. To highlight the difficulties faced by not just the Legislature but the Garda and those dealing with criminal terrorism, I note from the House of Lords European Union Committee 2009 report on money laundering and the financing of terrorism that the "acquisition of the wealth and property of others is the ultimate objective of every serious criminal; those assets are also the lubricant of criminal activity, and so the motivation for further crime". It is a serious worldwide issue.

The significant work done by the Minister in addressing drug smuggling must be noted. Historically, Ireland has been used as a gateway to Europe for the importation of drugs. Significant and frighteningly substantial volumes of drug shipments destined for the British and European markets have been intercepted off the west Cork coast. The first case off Mizen Head led to the jailing of four individuals. Some of those who planned the shipment but fled from west Cork when it failed have been captured and will face the rigours of the law in another jurisdiction, England. Such detection is to be welcomed.

The claim that only 5% of what is smuggled through Ireland is detected is often trotted out in the media and debates. The truth is that it is far closer to 40%. While we cannot take our eye off the ball in combating drug smuggling, it must be recognised that in recent years, especially under the watch of the Minister, the Garda, Customs and Excise and the Naval Service have had major successes in the detection of drug smuggling.

Drugs naturally are sold for cash only which in turn fuels money laundering. The Bill's objectives will impose additional responsibility on designated private sector bodies, in particular the financial sector, to carry out due diligence measures on customers, identification of politically exposed persons, etc.

I recall in the 1980s, in the infancy of my solicitor's practice in west Cork, a European client arrived at my office at 5.15 p.m. on a Friday with a case containing £150,000. Having spent an hour counting the money, the client wanted me to sign an undertaking to take responsibility for his suitcase of cash for the weekend. My office safe at the time was meagre. A couple of strong criminals would have easily lifted it away. I refused to give him the guarantee despite his severe protests. While I had no reason to suspect his motives, I was nervous about the undertaking as the banks were already closed and I did not have the financial backup to deal with the sum involved. On Monday, I was regretful the individual had vanished and that I may have been too strict. In time I realised, however, I was fortunate that I had not taken on the undertaking. In the 1980s, there is no doubt that accountants, solicitors and financial advisers were used by others to launder money. There was a time when these professions would not dare ask someone where they got the large sums of money with which they were asked to deal. That the Bill will tighten the requirements of these professionals to prevent money laundering is to be welcomed.

As Senator Regan pointed out, it is frightening that between $590 billion and $1.5 trillion of the world's gross domestic product is estimated to be laundered each year. While I am not normally taken to studying the proceedings of committees in the House of Lords, its European Union Committee's 2009 report on money laundering was interesting. It stated:

Serious organised criminals invest in property, shares, trusts, and pensions as well as accumulating high value goods, such as jewellery, vehicles, art and other collectable items. These assets may be held in the names of friends or family to conceal the true ownership. Investment in private and commercial property, including overseas, is especially attractive because it appreciates in value over time.

It shows the sophistication of money laundering and the extremes taken by the criminals involved in drugs, racketeering and terrorism. From the CIA, FBI and international police force investigations into the events of 11 September 2001, there is no doubt a network like al-Qaeda has access to billions of dollars internationally. Much of this is laundered nationally and internationally. The atrocious disaster of 9/11, its planning and other international terrorist atrocities came from money laundered in different ways in countries. We must deal with the situation in Europe and we must comply with European directives. No doubt this legislation will comply with same.

Senator Regan referred to the processing and placement of illegally derived funds into the financial system. We learn something new every day. Another aspect is the layering and integration. This is a sophisticated system and for those on the receiving end it is worthwhile. It is intriguing and there is no doubt money laundering is very complex. Money laundering takes place and even with the implementation of this legislation, while I wish I could say that in 12 months or two years money laundering will be a thing of the past, regrettably that will not be so. The measures in this Bill and the measures taken by our financial institutions and our professional groups will help to curtail the effects of money laundering. That is not before time.

Section 37 refers to enhanced customer due diligence for politically exposed persons or parties. Perhaps the Minister can further elaborate on this point on Committee Stage or Report Stage. I am glad to see colleagues welcome the thrust of this Bill even though they are critical of the delay since 2007. I lend my support to this Bill and I hope it gets speedy passage through this House. If the Minister introduces amendments on Committee or Report Stage I am sure they will be well thought out and I am reasonably confident such amendments will be scrutinised by the Opposition. If these are seen as appropriate and strengthen the Bill, they will receive a substantial welcome.

I welcome the Minister of State. Those who have spoken and who will speak do so with far more expertise in this area than me and it was interesting to hear Senator Regan and Senator O'Donovan speak about experience of money coming into his office. I also look forward to hearing Senator Bacik. I speak without that expertise but my interest originally comes from political subversives, particularly in respect of Northern Ireland, and seeing where the money came from and the manner in which it was laundered. I assumed this Bill was introduced with the enthusiasm of the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Deputy Dermot Ahern, who has shown a particular interest in this matter because he comes from an area so close to the Border. I have since realised he has covered a far wider area in this Bill.

On Monday, it was reported that Russian investigators broke up a crime ring that had laundered more than €1.6 billion since 2007 for companies and individuals in and around Moscow. In the EU, we have massive problems with money laundering and this Bill will go a long way to addressing them. It has been just reported that the OECD is planning to list tax offences as a form of money laundering. This would obviously hit Switzerland as the country's banking secrecy laws would not hold in arguing against assistance to foreign tax authorities, as the rule cited in money laundering cases. A Swiss newspaper reported on Sunday that if tax offences were reclassified as money laundering, lawyers, tax advisers, accountants and bankers implicated in such offences could be sentenced to up to three years in jail. Does the Minister support such a move by the OECD? Does he believe Switzerland is the weak link in the fight against money laundering?

On-line gambling is also a problem that arises when it comes to money laundering. At present there are no EU rules on on-line gambling. Several countries have tried to ban cross-border on-line betting but the European Commission launched proceedings against them for breaking internal market rules. I have been involved in Brussels in the past few years with regard to retailing and the efforts made to enhance retailing across borders are quite difficult to effect because each country wants to implement its own laws on matters such as VAT. The effort to have an internal open market is not easy to achieve. It did not dawn on me that on-line betting would be included in this. Does the Minister think on-line gambling should be regulated? Let us consider the extreme example in the US, where the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 has effectively banned Internet gambling in the United States but has been delayed until 1 June 2010. As on-line gambling is conducted by a verifiable credit card and betting companies are doing everything to ensure their profits are legal in order to keep their licence, is there any need to reduce further regulations?

Ireland will implement the third EU anti-money laundering and counter-financing directive through this Bill. The Government is already years late in implementing the directive, which was supposed to have been fully adopted by December 2007, not 2008 or 2009. Last October the European Court of Justice ruled Ireland had failed in its duty to transpose the law. Given that it will take some time before Ireland implements the directive fully after this legislation has been passed, when does the Minister believe the legislation will be fully introduced? Will it be before December of this year in order to avoid EU fines? This is particularly relevant in light of the proposal of the Minister to introduce amendments in this House. Will these amendments delay the Bill further and will another deadline be missed?

An interesting idea is longer prison sentences if criminals do not pay back the proceeds of crime. Related to the problem of laundered money is how to punish those involved in such activities. In Liverpool a prominent drug dealer was the mastermind behind a gang that posed as booze cruisers to bring cocaine into Britain from the Netherlands on passenger ferries. He was found to have benefited to the tune of nearly £1 million. However, the UK courts could only order him to pay back £600,000. Now a new UK law means that criminals will have longer prison sentences in the UK if they do not pay back the proceeds of crime. I was not aware of this and found it very interesting.

The drug dealer in question had an extra 4.5 years put on his 13-year sentence for failing to pay the £600,000. Another millionaire UK gang leader who housed and employed illegal immigrants on Merseyside was jailed for ten years after refusing to pay back £1.4 million. The UK police said that even if someone goes straight, he or she will owe that money and it can all be taken: "We cannot force them to sell a car or a house, but it is up to them to find the money to pay off the value of it because we have proved it was bought with the proceeds of crime". I wonder what the Irish situation is in that regard. We have done great work with CAB and other countries have followed our example, but I am not sure of the situation in that regard.

I would be interested to get the Minister's view on this. Does he believe that if a criminal does not pay back the proceeds of crime, he or she could serve a longer sentence? Would he consider introducing legislation to this effect? Could communities benefit from criminal gangs through a cash back scheme, as it were? I believe we should look at new ways of helping communities which have been so affected by criminal gangs. Communities in Merseyside can benefit from cash back from criminals as millions of pounds seized in assets, much of which is laundered money, are to be spent on worthwhile projects nominated by members of the public. A £4 million community cash back fund has been made available for local schemes in the UK. Successful bids have to show how the local community is involved in proposing the project, demonstrate good value for money and how it would be related in some way to tackling anti-social or criminal behaviour locally. Merseyside Criminal Justice Board is able to submit project proposals for funding up to a maximum of £95,000. These are the areas affected by criminality and the communities benefit rather than the money going into a big pot somewhere else.

Given that we too have communities that are similarly affected by criminal gangs, could we not help them in a similar way? I realise the selling of criminal assets is the norm and the CAB has worked very well in this regard, but how about diverting at least some portion of these moneys back into the communities to help them stop gangs from getting stronger? I would be interested to know whether the Minister would consider such a proposal. I support the legislation and the direction in which it is going. I am not quite sure I understand the amendment the Minister of State plans to introduce on Committee Stage, but I believe the Bill is well worth supporting and that it will achieve its objectives. I am sure we will need more legislation later. No matter what steps we take in this area, someone finds a way around them and we have to do more later.

The extension of legislation in the area of money laundering is to be welcomed and the fact that it fulfils our requirements in terms of the third money laundering directive is sufficient reason for it to be put on the Statute Book. Previous legislation has concentrated very much on the identification of the individual in opening bank accounts. While this has proven to be an inconvenience for many, it has been a necessary measure in terms of the wrongful use of bank accounts to channel the proceeds of crime and, in an Irish context, the use of such money for terrorist activities.

Not only is the legislation informed by the European experience through the need to transpose the third money laundering directive, there is also the fact that recent experience such as the raid on the Northern Bank in Belfast revealed a nest of intricate financial devices as well as an element of farce, much of which seemed to be linked to the constituency I have served in the other House, in terms of the individuals involved and the types of business activities being funded in that manner. Also, some peripheral players were eventually foundburning much of the money in question, which I suspect does not even come close to money laundering.

It is not money laundering, but it is burning money.

The present, almost post-terrorist, situation justifies the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform pointing out the willingness of 150 or so people on this island to engage still in terrorist activities for nefarious political ends. To date they have proved incompetent in achieving their goals, but as we have seen from previous atrocities, they need be lucky only once. Money laundering in funding such terrorist activities needs to be heavily regulated and legislated against.

There is also the more prevalent post-terrorist situation wherein many former activists have decided to use their expertise to involve themselves in criminal activities. Traditional terrorist activities are being practised by a small number of people as well as some now involved in the criminal trade who previously had been terrorists. I hope this legislation closes as many loopholes as possible.

Ultimately the law can only go so far in terms of regulating accounts in financial institutions. The additional powers for seeking information and asking the necessary questions when large sums of money pass through individual accounts are important for both the Garda and the courts and should help identify the type of actions that can be defined as money laundering. The wider area of money laundering now needs to be addressed, however, concerning which we need information on how the proceeds of crime are being invested into seemingly legitimate business practices such as the purchase of property and investment in shopfront businesses. While the proposed legislation goes some way down that road, it is an area that needs to be addressed further. The Criminal Assets Bureau identifies much of that activity and helps to use the proceeds it garners more proactively.

The co-operation and involvement of the financial institutions is very important in the proposed legislation should it be enacted. Whatever about the difficulties of the financial institutions, with which we are dealing every day, the previous legislation has been implemented very diligently and fairly by the institutions in question. The introduction of new legislation amounts to further impositions but society benefits and ultimately the financial institutions benefit too by not being exposed unduly to these moneys, which has, sadly, been the case too often in the past.

I welcome the legislation, as have most of the contributions made in the debate. I look forward to whatever tweaking is intended on Committee Stage and I believe the Oireachtas needs to be involved in an ongoing debate on how this legislation may be updated and strengthened continually.

Like the other speakers, I welcome the Minister of State and the Bill. I believe it was welcomed on all sides in the Dáil too on Second Stage in November, followed by the Committee and Report Stages in January and February, respectively.

Like Senator Regan, however, I am somewhat critical of the Government in terms of the delay in bringing forward this legislation which we all agree is needed. The main aim is clearly to transpose the third EU money laundering directive of 2005, which was supposed to have been implemented by 15 December 2007. By late last year Ireland was one of only three countries in the European Union that had fallen behind in implementing the directive, with Belgium and Spain being the others. As Senator Regan and others have said, we were heavily criticised at EU level and were subject of court judgments because of this delay. While I acknowledge we need time to debate such legislation, it should have been introduced earlier to enable us to have time for the full debate that is required and to enable us to meet our obligations.

It is not just that we need to be seen to be good Europeans as Senator Regan said. Ireland's credit rating is low because we are seen to have failed in the regulation of our banking and finance systems generally. Important legislation such as this adds substantially to our reputation as an ethical and sound place in which to do business. The Minister, Deputy Dermot Ahern, has acknowledged — it was acknowledged in the Dáil earlier — that the Bill is important for our reputation, apart from being important in a substantive way in terms of redrafting offences, etc.

It is worth talking about that more general context on a day when almost all contributors on the Opposition side and also some on the Government side called for a debate on banking. We are seeing the cost of the bailout of Anglo Irish Bank, in particular, rise at an alarming rate. We see the great concerns about the costs we will incur through NAMA. We have seen Postbank going to the wall. It is worth reflecting on our failures to regulate efficiently and effectively in the past to ensure our banking sector did not get carried away in the testosterone-fuelled orgy of lending to those who should not have got loans, which we all now acknowledge.

I wish to mention the more general issue of enforcement regarding white collar crime. When Edwin Sutherland, the American criminologist, first developed his thesis on white collar crime he could not get a publisher for his study of corrupt, illegal and fraudulent practices in a range of different professions, which makes a very good read even today. Owing to fears during the McCarthy era, publishers were unwilling to take anything that named big business as being complicit in fraud. Of course, the book was eventually published and went on to be one of the leading criminological texts and put white-collar crime on the map.

Unfortunately, in this country for far too long we had a similar view to the McCarthy era potential publishers of Edwin Sutherland's work in that we have been afraid to name the shady practices that were going on in our banks. For example, we were fearful about raising concern about interbank lending, which we now know was going on among financial institutions, seeking to hide an outflow of deposits from Anglo Irish Bank, in particular. We are now told the regulators were telling the banks that they had to wear the green jersey. We are told that people who talked about this were talking down the economy and being in some way unpatriotic. As a result, we saw fraudulent practices among banks being treated at arms' length and not undergoing the full rigours of the criminal process to which they should have been treated. We saw fraudulent practices that were not investigated or prosecuted in the way they should have been. For far too long we turned a blind eye to this sort of high level crime or fraud.

We have not used the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act, which remains the leading Act dealing with offences against property, including offences of fraud. We have not extended that Act in practice to cover offences of money laundering and offences involving millions and billions of euro rather than the petty crime that is routinely prosecuted every day involving shoplifters, burglars and so on under that Act. I have previously quoted the famous words of Jeffrey Reiman who said: "The rich get richer and the poor get prison". Sir Kenneth MacDonald, the former British DPP, was quoted in the Dáil debate on this Bill referring to somebody who steals a small amount and gets caught going to prison, but somebody who steals a large amount from pension funds or people's savings ending up getting a yacht rather than prison. There has clearly been a disconnection for far too long between the crimes of the powerful and the crimes of the powerless.

Senator Ross's book on the bankers points out in very graphic terms how many shareholders — ordinary pensioners who had invested their life savings in what they saw as gold-standard stocks and shares in the banks — lost their lifesavings as a direct result of the reckless risk taking of those at the top in the banks, yet those men at the top in the banks — they were mostly men — walked away with golden handshakes, large bonuses and enormous salaries. It has been said before that if Lehman Brothers had been Lehman sisters this would not have happened and certainly might not have happened to the same extent. It is probably no coincidence that in Iceland the people turned to women to restore some sort of sense to its economy when the crash came. We have not, unfortunately perhaps, taken that route yet.

Certainly everybody now acknowledges there was an orgy of reckless lending. It is not something for which we are all to blame. The Labour Party believes blame should fall squarely on the Government. For 13 years it failed to regulate the banking sector and failed to ensure some stop was put on the mad over-reliance on construction. It was not that people did not know about this. I clearly recall in 2007 both major Opposition parties, the Labour Party and Fine Gael, stating there was an over-reliance on construction, which was not healthy for the economy, and that the lending and spending spree had to be reined in, yet Fianna Fáil and its junior partners in government at the time kept insisting that the fundamentals were sound and that we were talking down the economy, and as a result they were re-elected in 2007.

We have all seen the extent of the crash since. However, there has still been a tendency on the Government benches to blame international causes. Undoubtedly the international climate contributed, but when one considers the Irish economic collapse compared with other countries, we see that here it is also very much our own Government's policies that brought about the extent of the collapse and the extent of the rise in jobless figures and so on. Shareholders who have lost their life savings and pensioners of Waterford Glass and other places who have lost their pensions also know this was a crisis caused as much by national policies and national failures as much as by international ones. Future generations will also know this as they are saddled with the NAMA debts and saddled with bailing out zombie banks like Anglo Irish Bank. However, we are still being told these are of systemic importance. The myths are still being peddled.

I have digressed from the point of the Bill, but it is worth considering the context. The Bill deserves a welcome because it takes white collar crime seriously. All sides of the House agree for far too long in this country we have not taken white collar crime seriously. Although the Bill is long overdue, we welcome it. It recognises one of the truisms of the international financial system on which Deputy Higgins commented in the Dáil. A great failure of the international financial system is that it has chosen to be silent on the issue of the transmission of dirty money in the world. With his characteristic eloquence he describes what others call "hot money" as "dirty money" — money that is being laundered. He pointed out the enormous cost of dirty money and unregulated financial corruption to the developing world. Senator Quinn rightly focused on Switzerland as a country where for far too long there was far too much fraud and corruption in banking and far too little regulation. The complicity of Swiss banks in corruption is usually blamed on African countries. Deputy Higgins rightly pointed out that Nigerian corruption is seen as an African problem and yet for every Nigerian dictator who has impoverished his country, there has been a Swiss bank in which he could lodge his billions. There has been an enormous cost for developing countries. Figures have been quoted. For example in Russia €20 billion was looted out of that country in the two-year period 1988 to 1989.

An analogy which I believe is useful and which was mentioned at the justice committee recently is the enormous cost to the Exchequer and internationally of cigarette smuggling and the complicity of the big tobacco companies in facilitating this to happen and not regulating it enough. Similarly, the transmission of dirty money, as Deputy Michael D. Higgins has described it, is being done with complicity by western banks and the western banking system. This EU initiative we are now transposing into Irish law is an important step in the process of trying to change that and restore some sort of ethical compliance within our banking system as much as within the European banking system. It is about restoring our international reputation as a place in which financial services are conducted in an ethical and reputable manner but it also plays a much bigger part in restoring confidence generally within the European Union.

In the time remaining I will examine the specifics of the Bill but I also want to make a general point about the principle of consolidation. The Minister referred to the consolidating nature of this Bill. It certainly refers to a great deal of earlier legislation and repeals a large number of regulations under the Criminal Justice Act 1994 which until now was the main legislation on money laundering. It is somewhat regrettable, however, that the opportunity was not taken in the Bill to do a proper consolidating or codifying job as was done in the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001 where an attempt was made to try to bring every statute dealing with theft or fraud offences against property into one piece of legislation. Unfortunately, in this area of money laundering offences and terrorist financing we still have a range of legislation dealing with it. The Bill amends various provisions of the Criminal Justice Act but it does not repeal the Act in total and, in a way, that is regrettable. A former Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Michael McDowell, had a pet project of codification of the criminal law. I am aware work on that is ongoing but this could have been an opportunity to codify at least one area.

The timeframe might have been an issue.

I accept the Minister of State's point that the timeframe was an issue.

I wish to speak briefly about the specifics of the Bill. I welcome the broader definition of "criminal conduct" and "proceeds of crime" in section 6 and the cross-border dimension. I note, and the Minister highlighted, the interesting mens rea requirement for the crime of money laundering, namely, that it can be proven where a person believes the property is probably the proceeds of crime. That would be useful in prosecution.

I note also the extensive powers given to the Garda under section 17 but that there is a recognition of their extensive nature in that a superintendent can effectively close a business for seven days without recourse to a judge. I am glad there is an opportunity under section 19 for a person to come back to the district judge to revoke it. That is important.

Time does not permit me to go into too much more detail but I have some concern about the vagueness of certain definitions. The Minister has indicated some areas on which he will come back. Section 35 which deals with the definition of a politically exposed person is too vague. I ask the Minister to look at it again. Section 24 which deals with the definition of a property service provider is also too vague. Many ordinary individuals under the Celtic tiger years could easily now be described as property service providers. Will all of the onerous obligations under section 55 which deals with record keeping and section 54 which deals with internal policies, procedures and training apply to them? I see there is an opt-out for the training provisions but they will still be required to keep policies and procedures and to be liable for criminal prosecution if they do not. I ask that this might be looked at again.

I beg the Chair's indulgence. There are two interesting models elsewhere. In Britain a five year strategy has been adopted in conjunction with its legislation on anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing. In Belgium the legislation is to include a question and answer form for evaluation of clients' risk profile. That would be a useful model for us to adapt in this legislation.

I have more to say, particularly on the monitoring issues——

Unfortunately, the Senator does not have time.

——and whether it is appropriate for the Minister to act as monitor for designated persons but I look forward to discussing all of those issues and more on Committee Stage.

I do not want to chase red herrings introduced by Senator Bacik too far——

Can one chase a red herring?

——but she could be reminded that most economists and objective reporters across the globe recognise that what we are encountering is a global recession almost on a par with what happened in 1929 which gave rise to the Great Depression in the 1930s. Obviously, one hopes we will avoid a similar recession. When the history books are written, we will see its genesis was in the sub-prime market in particular and over leveraging, which was a significant part of what happened in the United States and certainly was a significant issue here in that it gave rise to the property bubble and the consequent banking crisis with which the Government is challenged to come to terms.

Senator Bacik has a point when she says white collar crime is an area on which greater emphasis should be laid. We have had many debates in these Houses, and comments in the news media also, about people who are incarcerated for offences involving small monetary amounts or values while, on the other hand, very significant scams go almost with impunity. It is not just an Irish phenomenon. It applies elsewhere as well but it is something with which these Houses and the Executive must come to terms.

The Madoff case in the US involved amounts in the order of $50 billion or $60 billion. Those amounts of money are almost inconceivable to most people. That fraud could be perpetrated at that level and go undetected for so long must bring into question the legal, monitoring and detection systems in place, not to mention the regulatory systems.

If we consider what has gone wrong in the banks on this side of the world, be it here, in Britain or Europe generally, it would be fair to say the pursuit of policies which may or may not have been illegal and in many cases probably were not illegal, would be regarded as perhaps irresponsible but in many cases would have been unethical. There is a need for us to inject into the whole commercial and business area a greater adherence to good corporate governance and in particular good ethical standards. As humans we all fall short of meeting ethical standards from time to time but the State and the mechanisms we have in place should be a constant reminder and a strong incentive to encourage us to pursue this.

This is the third EU money laundering directive. We had one in 1991 and in 2001 and they have been transposed into law. There has been some delay in committing this directive to the Statute Book. I am aware that a wide process of consultation has been undertaken; that is always welcome in the case of any legislation but particularly so in the case of legislation of this nature. It is also important that we are not seen to be dragging our feet in implementing directives, particularly ones of this nature. I am aware it involves more than just banks but others who deal with financial services such as accountants, lawyers and various other bodies. I see gaming clubs are also involved in the whole process. Consultation is continuing and I hope it will ultimately enhance this legislation when enacted.

The State responded to recognising the value of following the money trail after the sad and unfortunate murder of Veronica Guerin, on foot of which it created the Criminal Assets Bureau which has been effective. Whether it has been as effective as it could be is a question for another day but we must recognise that it has had some success as a result of pursuing the trail of money and funds, which reflects the objective of the legislation.

Money laundering has been practised for a long time. Given the trans-frontier nature of crime, whereby borders are not recognised by criminals, it is essential that there be co-operation and that the initiative be taken at EU level. We are including in a legislative framework directives that will apply right across the European Union.

It is important that jurisdictions that emphasise totally the privacy of the banking world and specialise in having strong banking industries co-operate with others. Many were surprised when the issue of the Cayman Islands surfaced. It was but one of a number of jurisdictions in which trusts had been entered into, often with the purpose of evading tax rather than engaging in other criminal activities. We now see that there is a heavy emphasis on the criminal side.

The fruits of crime, including drug dealing, are considerable. Where there are such incentives for people to engage in illegal activities, it is imperative that states join together to tackle the problem. The adage that crime does not pay may be challenged to some extent in reality; therefore, responsible countries must bring to heel those which have had a code of secrecy associated with bank accounts. Switzerland comes to mind in this regard. If the proposed regime is to be effective, it must be regulated and policed properly and effectively.

If anything is to be learned from the global difficulties we have been encountering, it is that the almost laissez-faire approach to regulation must be tackled. I was especially critical of this approach in Ireland. It is not just the Financial Regulator that was at fault, although it probably had primary responsibility, because the Central Bank and the Department of Finance were also involved. The same problem arose in the United States. It seems to be an international phenomenon which cannot be allowed to continue. Those who are paid good salaries to do jobs and have responsibility must deliver. Such a job is not a promotional step with an enhanced salary to enhance one’s pension on retirement but a very responsible one given by the State. The duties involved must be exercised. The same applies to the legislation before us. The duties in this regard involve the policing and enforcement of the directives and the legislation we are putting on the Statute Book. If we succeed in this regard, we will ultimately meet the objective set out in the EU directive that the State is endorsing.

I am not an expert in this field by any manner or means. I come from an area close to the North where there are always insinuations or feelings that we could be surrounded by criminal activity. Sometimes one notes people who do not seem to have any credible means but who own a lot of property nevertheless. The border between County Donegal and Northern Ireland is very fluid.

At the recent meeting of the British-Irish Parliamentary Assembly we were very happy to learn that the Garda Commissioner, Mr. Fachtna Murphy, and the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Mr. Matt Baggott, were working very closely. I met some of the police inspectors in Derry city who were working on the cross-Border element of organised crime. I acknowledge the tremendous work involving both the Garda and the PSNI.

I once asked the two police forces about cross-Border crime. As it was a little while ago, their answers might have changed since. Last Monday I asked the Garda Commissioner the same question. I did not get an answer, although I received answers to all of my other questions. In the North the authorities are very organised with regard to who is assigned to addressing cross-Border crime, be it associated with drug dealing or other activities. The PSNI is specific on who should attend each meeting. The Garda seems to be a little more relaxed about it in that one garda attends one meeting, while another attends the next. This causes a problem with regard to continuity and the building of relationships. While we cannot direct the Garda Commissioner, I would like to believe he could be encouraged to assign specific staff to deal with cross-Border crime, if he has not already done so. This would ensure continuity and the building of cross-Border relationships.

The Criminal Assets Bureau was one of the main steps forward in trying to deal with money laundering, illicit monetary gains and the financing of terrorism. When criminals discovered their money and property had been confiscated, it was a tremendous step forward in trying to deal with very serious crime.

I asked the Chief Constable and the Garda Commissioner last week the simple question as to whether we needed to revise the limits pertaining to criminal assets. Are we able to focus on the smaller criminal? This legislation can tackle the problem very high up or very low down the criminal chain.

In County Donegal there are many people driving around in Northern Ireland registered cars. There are hundreds, possibly thousands, of such cars. The drivers are not being challenged and the necessary resources are not being given to Customs officials to deal with them. I am told one drugs haul would be worth quite a few cars but my attitude is that if people get away with minor breaches of the law, they are more inclined to attempt major breaches. If we do not address the issue of cars, we must ask how serious we are about tackling those who are breaking the law to a slightly greater extent but perhaps not to the extent of the top criminals covered by this legislation.

Crime knows no borders. Prostitution, the smuggling of drugs, cigarettes, alcohol and diesel, and other activities that provide ill-gotten gains that fund terrorists involve the crossing of boundaries and borders. It would have been interesting had we linked up with the Northern equivalent of the Criminal Assets Bureau. However, the Northern Ireland authorities have moved on to the Serious Organised Crime Agency, with which I am not sure the politicians are very happy. Perhaps it is now bedded down. When changing the system was first talked about, the politicians were very unhappy about it.

Deputy John Curran is the relevant Minister of State in this area. I watched a programme recently on cigarettes being smuggled through ports and airports. I am sure these practices occur along the Border. Customs officials said they had put a massive effort into dealing with this smuggling but when a case got to the court, a fine of €200 was imposed or there was a dismissal. It is so petty one wonders why anybody would bother. The products from which people make money are cigarettes, diesel, alcohol and drugs. I have seen other television programmes on cross-Border diesel smuggling. It appears to any reasonable person who looks at these programmes that the people involved can carve up a nice deal and get off with a relatively light monetary or custodial sentence.

The Bill provides for significant fines and penalties for money laundering. I accept the separation of powers between the Judiciary and the Oireachtas but somebody must have the capacity to ask the Judiciary to examine the sentences being imposed. Perhaps the Judiciary might agree that certain things need to be updated. I am not seeking to interfere but I ask people to look at the penalties imposed in many of these cases and consider whether they are reasonable in the context of the sums of money involved in these activities. Ten years ago I doubt anybody would have guessed the levels of money involved. Consider the amount of cigarettes in the recent seizure. We are talking about massive amounts of money. A few years ago that would not have been possible and might not have been logistically possible either.

Interaction with the North is one issue; interaction with the Judiciary to ensure the penalties are proper is a second. Another is interaction with Customs to ensure it is supported. One hears anecdotes about Customs officials being threatened. They are told: "We are doing this, so turn a blind eye or else." There is serious money and territory involved. It has serious implications. I am concerned that those at official level dealing with these challenges on our behalf are supported in their work. Senator Walsh has said it is very important that these are policed but the police must also be protected and supported.

The issue I am most anxious to discuss is bureaux de change. A bureau de change is one of the designated persons referred to in the Bill. This is linked with the issue of greater customer due diligence for people operating bank accounts. If one takes money out of an account in the Republic and tries to lodge it in an account in the North and if the amount is more than £100, one will be asked where one got the money. That is not a risk sensitive amount, but the figure is set at that level. When I started teaching in England, I was not able to open a bank account there until I had three forms of identity to prove residency. However, as I had only moved to England, I was not able to prove residency, although I had cheques to lodge. I had to get the school principal who had just given me a job to write a letter for me. One of the other teachers also had to write one for me. I had to get letters from everywhere just to open an account to lodge money. That was a long time ago but the United Kingdom was ahead of the game in that regard. I could never understand why I could go to any bureau de change along the Border with money from anywhere, change as much as I wished, drive away and return later that day. I am open to challenge that what I am saying is incorrect but there was no requirement to prove identity and nobody asked where one had obtained the money. There also did not appear to be a limit on the amount of money. Given that it is included under the designated persons provision, I hope the level of regulation for a bureau de change will be as strict as it is for banks. I cannot see a role in this day and age for bureaux de change, as I am not a bureau de change user, but it is important that all of these agencies be subject to the same level of scrutiny. There has been a gap in that regard for some time.

I did not expect to have as much to say on this subject and I am sure there is much I did not cover, but the Chair cannot give me more time. I wish the legislation well and hope it will yield what we require, that is, minimising the amount of criminal activity and the gains people make from laundered money. It is in the interests of everybody that this issue be addressed. I hope the necessary support will be given to the agencies involved. Cross-Border co-operation is at the core of this also.

I welcome the Minister. I have been asking for a debate on crime, law and order and justice matters for the last 12 months but we still have not managed to hold one. The Leader suggested I raise the matters during a debate on a Bill but that would be an abuse of the privileges of the House. Therefore, I do not intend to do what the Leader suggested. I will confine my remarks to the Bill.

I commend the Senator for saying he will confine himself to speaking on the principles of the Bill.

I will do what I always have done in that regard.

Like other Members, I wonder what was the reason for the delay with this legislation which should have been introduced in 2007 or 2008 at the latest. Why was there such a delay in producing the Bill? As has been said, it consolidates our money laundering legislation in a single statute. That was needed and I welcome it.

Like Senator Keaveney, I have often spoken about the activities of subversive organisations in the State and the threat they continue to pose. I welcome the Minister's suggestion in the past week that the threat is as high now as it has been in the past 30 years. I have been saying as much in the House in the past six months. These so-called republican organisations are actively recruiting in many counties. They approach young people whose families have never been involved in such activity. There is no question that they are recruiting. Several Members are aware of their recruitment efforts which must be tackled.

Every resource must be given to the Garda to build intelligence on these organisations to ensure we can put a lid on them. They are a threat to the institutions of the State and the hard-fought for peace secured on the island. We all hope we will be able to live in peace with our neighbours in Northern Ireland for a long time to come, without the threat of terrorism and the activities we witnessed for such a long period. However, recently we have again witnessed subversives in action with the attacks on the barracks in Newry and members of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, PSNI. Any right thinking person will hope we can deal with the subversives who pose such a threat to the State. Without a home or haven for the ill-gotten gains of criminals, they would not exist. The type of co-operation on a European and world basis which we are discussing is a necessity to tackle the type of crime and criminals we are discussing. Do we have the necessary resources? I listened with interest to Senator Keaveney. We have only two scanners for ports which is totally inadequate to detect contraband, cigarettes and other, more sinister things coming into the country in containers. The issue of scanners should be addressed. There should be greater resources for the Garda, the Defence Forces and Customs.

The punishments and penalties must fit the crime, which is not the case. Senator Keaveney also mentioned this. One sometimes wonders about the penalties administered to people who commit these crimes and smuggle cigarettes and other things into the country. It is something which will have to be tackled in legislation. We will have to have proper penalties for these types of crimes because we are not giving enough attention to them. Smuggling and money laundering are all part of criminal activity in this country and throughout Europe.

I commend this very good Bill. It is late in coming but we welcome its provisions. Those of us on this side of the House will support anything which will prevent money laundering and tackle the criminality which is rife in this country. I will not detain the Minister of State nor resort to what the Leader of the House said I should do, namely, dealing with all the other matters to which I referred. We will support the Bill. We understand the Government will table a number of amendments on Committee Stage and we will be interested to see what they are. We will reserve our comments on those and wait to see what the Government has in mind.

The ability of the Senator to observe procedure in debate is always most welcome.

I thank Senators from all sides for their positive and constructive contributions to the debate on this Bill. A number of interesting and relevant points were made and I will deal with as many of them possible as we conclude proceedings. Some of the points will also appear as amendments on Committee Stage, to which Senator Cummins alluded, and during further debate. I am glad the Senator spoke on the Bill because it is to it I am confining my remarks.

Some Senators mentioned the delay in getting the legislation to this point and underlined the seriousness of any further undue delay in transposing the third European Union money laundering directive into Irish law. I agree wholeheartedly with much of what has been said. It is time we transposed the directive because it is an important measure and I hope I will have the constructive contribution of all sides of the House in bringing the transposing legislation before the House to enactment without any undue delay.

The Bill is a significant legislative proposal on the part of the Government and is important for the reputation of this country as a financial services centre, a point echoed by Senator Bacik. Effective anti-money laundering and terrorist financing legislation is also important in combating not only the offences set out in this Bill but also the kinds of criminal activity which depend on money laundering to further their ends. It is essential we put every possible impediment in place to combat the activities of criminals engaged in other most pernicious kinds of crimes, such as drug dealing, bank robbery and human trafficking. These kinds of crimes cannot prosper unless the proceeds which derive from them can be disguised as legitimate earnings. This is the purpose of money laundering.

Senators will be aware this Bill deals not only with money laundering but also with the financing of terrorism. International terrorism is an activity which cannot take place without making use of the financial system. The measures contained in this Bill, in particular the requirements for enhanced customer due diligence for certain high risk categories of customer and the requirements for the reporting of transactions to the Garda Síochána and the Revenue Commissioners where there is a suspicion of terrorist involvement will significantly strengthen our existing anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing regime.

When the scheme of the Bill was published in 2008, the Government decided a consultation process with all the interested parties should be undertaken to ascertain the views of the various stakeholders. A series of meetings involving the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Department of Finance were held with representatives of the legal and accountancy professions, the financial services sector, the Financial Regulator, many of the major corporate law firms in the State, the Garda Síochána, the Revenue Commissioners and others. While it was not possible to accommodate all the views of these bodies in this Bill, their views inform its contents and the very constructive contribution of stakeholders to the process is much appreciated.

The Bill attempts to balance the requirements of the directive and the recommendations of the financial action task force with the practical requirements of those designated bodies affected by the legislation. We do not wish to create an unnecessary level of regulation and compliance simply for the sake of it. We have no intention of gold plating the directive but we must have legal certainty in what is a criminal law provision concerned with a serious and increasingly sophisticated aspect of criminal activity.

Senators Bacik, Regan and Cummins, among others, raised the issue of the delay in introducing the Bill. This is lengthy and complex legislation, as Senators can see. When addressing this issue we decided to repeal and re-enact the existing anti-money laundering provisions which have applied since 1994 and combine them with the new provisions required by the main directive and the associated implementing directive which was agreed in 2006. As the provisions of this Bill apply to the practices of a wide range of bodies and professions, the Government decided to initiate a consultation process with the stakeholders. There were many positive responses to the initiative and a series of meetings took place between officials in various Departments and stakeholders. Written submissions from interested parties were invited and received. This process may have delayed the final drafting and completion of the Bill but it had the effect of taking into account, where possible and appropriate, the views of many of the bodies which ultimately will be affected by the Bill. While many Senators indicated there was a delay, it is important to acknowledge a significant piece of work was taking place with those who will be charged with implementing the legislation.

Senator Regan asked what would happen if there were any further delay. If we were to fail to transpose the directive and the matter was again referred to the European Court of Justice, there would always be a possibility that Ireland could be fined which would involve a substantial sum of money. We are not contemplating such an eventuality because we are determined to conclude the legislative process in which we are engaged in order that no further action on the part of the European Commission will be necessary.

Senator Quinn raised the issue of the timeframe of the Bill. It is proposed the legislative process in these Houses will be completed by the end of this month and a further three months will be required for full implementation. We do not envisage any further difficulties with the European Commission in that regard.

The Senator also raised the issue of on-line gambling. The Minister has initiated a wide-ranging review of gambling with the purpose of providing Government with options for a new and comprehensive legal and organisational framework for this area. In the meantime he has decided that private members' clubs at which gambling activities are carried on should be included in the Bill. As a result, those clubs which fall within the definition of "designated person" will be required to comply with the obligations and the proposed legislation and will be monitored by a unit within the Department to ensure compliance with these provisions. The Bill provides that such clubs will have to register and that failure to register will be an offence. It does not, however, alter the status of the clubs vis-à-vis our gaming laws. Any regulation of such clubs must await the outcome of the review under way.

Senator Bacik raised a point regarding definitions. Section 25 which lists designated persons includes a property service provider as defined in section 24. The term "property service provider" has been used to reflect the terms used in the Property Services Regulation Bill 2009 which provides for the establishment of a new statutory body, namely, the Property Services Regulatory Authority which will control and supervise providers of property services and improve standards in the provision of these services. When the legislation is in place, all auctioneers, estate agents, letting agents and property management agents will require a licence from the authority.

Senator Bacik raised another point concerning politically exposed persons. The enhanced customer due diligence measure set out in section 37 applies to a customer or beneficial owner who resides outside Ireland. The measure applies not only to the politically exposed person but also to an immediate family member or close associate of the person as defined in the Bill. The definition arises directly — I believe this was what the Senator intended — from the requirements of the third EU money laundering directive and the implementing directive.

Senator Keaveney raised a point specifically concerning bureaux de change. Although many bureaux de change are part of other financial institutions, where a bureau de change business operates on a stand-alone basis, it requires specific authorisation from the Financial Regulator and is regulated with specific reference to money laundering and terrorist financing risks.

Senators Keaveney and Cummins noted that it was good to have this legislation but wondered what were the penalties involved. Senator Keaveney is right. There is a clear distinction in powers between Members of the Oireachtas as legislators and the Judiciary. However, under this legislation, the penalties are severe. The penalty for money laundering on indictment is a term of imprisonment of up to 14 years and-or an unlimited fine. On summary conviction there is a sentence of up to 12 months imprisonment and-or a fine of up to €5,000.

That covers most of the main points raised during the debate. I again thank Senators for their contributions and support of the Bill which is very significant. Other issues that arise will be dealt with on Committee Stage.

Question put and agreed to.

When is it proposed to take Committee Stage?

Committee Stage ordered for Tuesday, 9 March 2010.

When is it proposed to sit again?

At 10.30 a.m. tomorrow.

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