Section 4 provides for the making by the court of an interim barring order pending the determination of an application for a barring order. Such an order can be made ex parte. One of the conditions with which the court must be satisfied is that there is an immediate and serious risk of significant harm to the applicant or any dependent person if the order is not made immediately. The effect of Deputy Keogh’s amendment would be to dilute that condition; in other words, the court would not be required to examine the immediacy of the risk or the significance of the harm.
I would like to make a number of points in relation to the significance of section 4. The Law Reform Commission in its report on child sexual abuse recommended that as far as children are concerned a power to grant an interim barring order should be given to the courts. However, in paragraph 3.35 of that report the Commission states: "We emphasise that if removal of an alleged abuser by a barring order made on an ex parte basis were to be contemplated, it could only be in the most extreme circumstances.” The report also states that the grounds for removing an alleged abuser on an ex parte basis should be the same as the grounds for an emergency care order. In this context, the Child Care Act provides that before the making of an emergency care order there must be reasonable cause to believe that there is an immediate and serious risk to the health or welfare of the child.
Given the effect of an interim barring order, one must ensure that the circumstances of the case in which it can be granted are extreme. I am sure Deputies will appreciate why it is necessary to provide in the Bill that an interim barring order be made only where there is immediate risk of significant harm. An interim barring order ex parte is an extreme measure to meet extreme circumstances.
For these reasons, I am unable to accept Deputy Keogh's amendment.