Our extensive discussion on this amendment on the last occasion, dealt, in particular, with the definition of "public policy" as opposed to "public order". The Minister of State at the Department of Justice, Deputy Burton, undertook to examine the matter in view of the serious concerns expressed by Members so I ask her to resume the debate on these amendments in the names of Deputies O'Donoghue and O'Donnell.
SECTION 4.
Debate resumed on amendment No. 3:
In page 6, subsection (2), lines 17 and 18, to delete "in the interest of national security or public policy(’ordre public’)” and substitute “for compelling reasons of national security or public order”.
— (Deputy O'Donoghue).
I wish to express my disappointment that when Deputy O'Donnell raised this matter in the Dáil she misquoted the Minister. That was unfair to the committee. If we are to be treated seriously, we must deal with our problems here and not run like school children to the master for help.
The Minister gave an undertaking and the committee adjourned to give the Government time to assess the difficulty in this matter. The difficulty raised had been supported by all Members and, similar to what happened in the case of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act, 1994, it was a matter which needed political direction from the Cabinet. I felt it was in order to bring the matter to the attention of the Taoiseach because it was before the House and other Members, who are not members of this committee, were unaware of it. It was just as well I did because I think the Taoiseach was unaware of it also and the matter needed to be addressed by the Cabinet before we resumed our proceedings today. I stand over my actions on Thursday when I brought the matter briefly to the attention of the Taoiseach on the Order of Business and I was in order.
We are a serious committee and I would like to think that we can manage our own affairs. Ministers always consult attorneys about issues and nobody raises such matters in the House or asks how they were getting on or whether they found the Taoiseach's door open.
There is no prohibition on me from doing so.
It is good publicity but it does not help the committee.
A Government Deputy, Deputy Shatter, who is abroad at present, received more publicity out of it than I did.
In the circumstances, I can do no more than echo the views of the Ceann Comhairle, who takes my place when the matters are raised in plenary sessions of the Dáil. He made it clear that business of the committee can be best decided by the committee either in public or private session and I would hope we will deal satisfactorily with the matter today. The Ceann Comhairle made it clear that it is not within his jurisdiction to entertain any matters which relate to a committee. He said, in no uncertain terms, that it is a matter for the committee to deal with its responsibilities under its terms of reference as laid down by the Dáil.
I am anxious to proceed because there are more than 200 amendments to the Bill. Although it was important on the last occasion to deal comprehensively with the amendment, I ask Members to bear in mind that we must proceed as expeditiously as possible in the hope that we can conclude Committee Stage this month. I have received representations from some outside interested bodies to the effect that they would like to see the Bill enacted at the earliest opportunity. I would not like a feeling to become widespread that our deliberations are anything less than important and we are not dealing with matters expeditiously.
As far as the timescale is concerned, Members have requested that we adjourn for the Order of Business at approximately 4.20 p.m. That is not an unreasonable request. Is that agreed? Agreed. At that time, we can agree as to when we will resume. I understand the Minister is available this evening and tomorrow afternoon from approximately 2.30 p.m. I suggest we make ourselves available then but we can decide that before adjourning this afternoon.
First, on the matter being raised in the Dáil, I want to repeat for Deputy O'Donnell's benefit what I said to the committee last week. I said that I approach this committee in a spirit of openness to hear what Members have to say about matters which were of some importance to them and not, essentially, to indulge in cheap political point scoring which I think was what was happening when it was raised in the Dáil. I said:
I can again speak to the Attorney General specifically about the legal advice which was given on the definition of the term "public order". While we have clear legal advice, I am happy to again consult on it.
The adjournment, as far as I recall, was moved by the Chairman of the committee. Ministers approach committee meetings with an open mind, and are ready and willing to consult when Members raise important points. I do not think consultation should be held as some kind of difficulty. I listened seriously to what Members had to say and, in that context, I agreed to consult. The policy and advice which we received on the matter was clear and I was happy with it but I was prepared to consult. I reiterate that for the benefit of the Deputy.
On the consultation and advice I obtained, there are a number of points I want to draw to the attention of Members. Our obligations under Article 32 of the UN Convention permits the expulsion of a refugee on national security or public order grounds. Deputies have made much of the use of the term "public order" in the Convention and I have already pointed out that the French text of the Convention, which is equally authentic, uses the term ordre public, which has a broader public policy meaning; the expression meaning the ordering of society.
The discrepancy between the English and French terms was recognised and debated extensively by the body which drafted the Convention. I should like to quote the following from a memorandum of the Executive Secretary of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries which adopted the Convention relating to the status of refugees on 25 July 1951 on the term "public order" as it was also a matter for consideration then:
The Secretary General considers that the use of this expression raises serious questions of substance and consequently feels obliged to draw the attention of the Council to the following legal considerations.
First, it should be observed that the English expression "public order" is not the equivalent — and is indeed substantially different from — the French expression ‘l'ordre publique' (or in Spanish, ‘orden público'). In civil law countries the concept of ‘l‘ordre publique' is a fundamental legal notion used principally as a basis for negating or restricting private agreements, the exercise of police power, or the application of foreign law.
The common law counterpart of ‘l'ordre publique' is not ‘public order' but rather ‘public policy'.
It is this concept which is employed in common law countries to invalidate or limit private agreements of the application of law. In contrast to this concept of public policy, the English expression "public order" is not a recognised legal concept. In its ordinary legal sense it would presumably mean merely the absence of public disorder. This notion is obviously far removed from the concept of l’ordre public or public policy.
This is taken from the Travaux Preparatoires analysed, with a commentary by the late Dr. Paul Weis. I can give the committee the references if its members wish to consult it.
The English translation clearly gave rise to these difficulties from early on which is why Ireland, in acceding to this convention in 1956, specifically declared that it understood the term "public order" to mean "public policy". Accordingly, the correct interpretation of public order as used in the convention is public policy. That is what we declared it to be in our 1956 declaration.
The problem is by no means unique to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees. Other international agreements where there is use of a similar drafting technique include Ireland's double taxation conventions, the majority of which contain a provision allowing for the exchange of information. Such provisions contain a clause limiting the obligation to exchange information where the disclosure would be, among other things, "contrary to public policy (ordre public)”. There are in excess of 20 such agreements in force at present, all of which would have been approved following the passing of a resolution of this House — the most recent agreements have been approved in the latter part of 1995. I am not aware that the public policy ‘ordre public’ issue was a cause of concern in the approval of the orders implementing these agreements.
Most telling of all is the fact that Article 36 of the Treaty of Rome, the founding treaty for the establishment of the European Union, translates the term “l’ordre public” as public policy. It is clear from these uses of the French expression in the English texts that the drafters of the instruments were conscious of the inadequacy of the English phrase “public order” to encompass the depth of meaning of the French expression “ordre public”.
The phrase "public policy" and the concept which it designates are well recognised in common law jurisdiction. The concept is regularly invoked by the courts as a basis for invalidating a contract or a clause of a will and in various areas of family law, such as the recognition of foreign divorces. There is, for instance, the former rule of public policy which dictated that a sane murderer should not benefit from his victim's death. This is now enshrined in statute in this jurisdiction. The courts in England have held to be void, on grounds of public policy, the provision of a will which made a bequest conditional on the beneficiary, for example, not being a Roman Catholic on reaching a particular age.
The following quote from Lord Justice Asquith in the 1951 King's Bench case of Monkland v. Jack Barclay is of interest:
Certain specific clauses of contracts have been ruled by authority to be contrary to the policy of the law, which is, of course, not the same thing as the policy of the Government, whatever its complexion. . . . The courts should use extreme reserve in holding a contract to be void as against public policy, and should only do so when the contract is uncontestably and on any view inimical to the public interest.
Two important conclusions can be drawn from this: first, the absolute distinction between public policy as a concept and the policy of the Government of the day and, second, the emphasis on the great caution to be exercised by the courts in applying the public policy concept except in the clearest of circumstances.
Following last week's committee meeting and the queries raised, I discussed the matter with the Attorney General. He has confirmed that "public policy" is the correct term in accordance with the convention and he has assured me that, on the basis of what I have just said, it is. I have also asked him for guidance on the practical implication involved in the use of the terms. Accordingly, I will now explain what I understand these implications to be.
The term "public order" is usually interpreted in a "law and order" sense — so a person who disrupts the law and order of the State by bandit-like behaviour or provoking riots and upheaval would fall into this category. "Public policy", on the other hand, is a much broader term which involves the fundamental interest of the State or the common good. It does not mean, as Deputies might have interpreted it to mean, Government policy; it is something quite different from Government policy. It is a concept which derives from the common law: in other words, it has been developed by the courts. It is concerned with the interest of the State or the community. It includes public order but it would also include, for example, principles recognised by the Constitution such as protection of the family, the right to free speech and respect for human rights. It gives recognition to the fact that there are interests of fundamental and abiding importance to the State. Government policy may come and go and change as Governments change but public policy does not have such volatility.
As I already indicated, "public policy" is a term which is commonplace in international conventions. It is universally recognised that fundamental national interests must be protected and that without such protection, national Governments could not undertake to take on board the obligations involved in these international agreements. Deputies have pointed out that this term is not defined and its interpretation depends on the circumstances of any particular case or issue. This is broadly true, although there are indications from case law as to what might and might not qualify as public policy, including principles recognised by the Constitution. In addition, there are also strong indications that the courts will only stand over the invoking of "public policy" in exceptional cases where harm to the public is incontestable.
The Attorney General has pointed out that such harm could arise, for example, if an ex-dictator from South America, a notorious war criminal from Bosnia or an international dealer in drugs or illegal arms were to avail of the right to seek refuge in Ireland, because any or all of those people could have a well founded fear of persecution. Of course, it could be seriously damaging for Ireland internationally if we were to give refuge to such people. The advice I have received is that, in the absence of the public policy exception, Ireland could conceivably become a retirement home for dictators.
In terms of instances where we have invoked the public policy grounds for excluding people from our country, I cannot give the committee many examples of such exclusions because they are so rare. There are only two cases where persons were excluded from the State which might serve as examples which potentially might have come within the concept of public policy as used in this Bill. Two orders prohibiting persons from landing were made in the period 1975 to date. One was in respect of a convicted Nazi war criminal and the other in respect of a former colonel of the South African police whose unit was implicated in violence aimed at the destabilisation of South Africa. They are the only examples we can find of instances where public policy might apply in relation to applications to land here.
Such instances clearly show that even if this concept is rarely invoked, there are compelling reasons we cannot afford to decide that we will never need to avail ourselves of its protection. Deputies must remember that although we have international obligations and moral obligations to asylum seekers and refugees, we also have, first and foremost, an obligation to protect the fundamental interests of this State. There is not a country in the world which will fail to defend its fundamental interests. We have no right to decide on behalf of the community that we will not defend such interests. Indeed, we have, as legislators, an absolute obligation to ensure that we do not enact any legislation which could serve to limit that fundamental interest.
Part of that interest is in the type of society we want, its fabric and values. Even genuine refugees may engage in practices which endanger that fabric. For example, if a refugee availing himself of the protection of this State should choose to use that protection to promote racism or xenophobia, to engage in the promotion of paedophilia or trafficking in people or children for prostitution or other such unacceptable practices, people would rightly say that the State should be able to withdraw that protection in such circumstances. There is a significant risk that the courts might decide that the term "public order" is not wide enough to allow that protection to be withdrawn where a person is promoting such illicit activities. The people of Ireland can only in such circumstances say that we as legislators have failed them.
There are many areas where potential public policy, as opposed to public order, issues arise. Unfortunately, these may not be obvious until the problem surfaces. In accordance with section 18, a refugee is entitled to bring his or her spouse to Ireland. Deputies rightly pointed out on Second Stage that refugees may come from countries where child marriage is legal. If we do not have a public policy exception to the right to bring in a spouse, we will have no right to refuse the right of a 50 year old man to bring into Ireland his 11 year old wife. Similarly, a refugee could use this provision to bring in a spouse who would be excluded from the protection of the convention because of war crimes or crimes against peace or humanity. I do not think from last week's discussion this is the objective of those who contributed to the section.
I am also concerned that Deputies appear to be of the opinion that this exception clause will be abused. Deputies quoted attitudes taken with regard to the admittance of Jewish people in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. I hope we have come a long way in terms of public awareness and consciousness since those days. Proof of this is that the Refugee Bill is now before the Oireachtas. This does not suggest complacency but recognises certain realities about the real Ireland and our right to protect the society we all try hard to ensure is mature, aware and caring.
The exercise of powers to exclude or remove persons from the State where the public policy principle in this Bill is invoked is carefully circumscribed. Such powers can only be exercised by a positive decision or order made by the Minister for Justice. These are not matters within the deciding powers of civil servants. All such decisions and orders are judicially reviewable by the courts and the Bill has provided in the case of deportation that a person is given 30 days notice which will facilitate an appeal to the courts. In the case of a revocation of a declaration, a specific appeal to the High Court is provided for.
I am not unaware of the worries Deputies expressed last week but a fair balance has been achieved between protecting the interests of the State and the interests of the individual. I draw the attention of Deputies to a further fundamental safeguard in the Bill. Section 5 gives effect to the important non-refoulement principle found in article 33 of the convention. This principle provides that a refugee shall not be returned to a country where his or her life or freedom could be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
This principle has been construed in a very liberal way in section 5. Article 33 of the convention limits this protection to refugees but section 5 gives the protection to all persons who are immigrants to this country. Article 33 provides that the principle need not apply where a person is a danger to the security of the country but section 5 makes no such exception. Accordingly, even if the Minister decides to expel a refugee or asylum applicant from the State on national security or public policy grounds, the Minister cannot send this person to a country where his or her life or freedom would be threatened. The Minister would have two choices: to find a safe country to take the person or let the person stay in Ireland. I hope Deputies see that this Bill is not, as some of them have suggested, undermined by the exceptions which can be made on grounds of national security or public policy but that it contains limited safeguard clauses which can be invoked in exceptional circumstances, only by the Minister as part of an overall fair procedure reviewable by the courts.
With regard to amendments Nos. 40 and 41, the UNHCR has raised certain issues with me regarding section 9 (15). This provision deals with circumstances in which persons can be excluded from the State and from the opportunity to make an asylum claim. Although the provision is based on the provisions of the convention, the UNHCR has recently expressed concern to me concerning the procedures provided for in this subsection. Because I am concerned to ensure that everything in the Bill is fully in keeping with both the letter and spirit of the UN convention, I have agreed to discuss the provision with the parliamentary draftsman with a view to introducing, if necessary, a suitable amendment on Report Stage.
I have dealt with these issues at great length because Deputies expressed a variety of concerns and I felt I should give a comprehensive answer.
Thank you, Minister, for that comprehensive answer which has certainly answered the concerns raised by Deputy Browne and others. The Minister has given her views on why she opposes amendment No. 3. I call on Deputy O'Donoghue to state his stance having heard the Minister's arguments.
I thank the Minister for her comprehensive reply on the issue of public policy. Last week I pointed out there is a difficulty in that public policy can change from time to time and the Minister has accepted this. I fully acknowledge that in framing legislation such as this, the common good must be taken into consideration. It is as important that the common good be protected as it is that the rights of a refugee be protected.
Section 4 deals with whether the Minister would issue a travel document. It states that the Minister may in the interests of national security or public policy refuse to issue such a document to a refugee. The Minister said the proposed exclusion of the words "public policy" could result in a dictator from South America or a Nazi type criminal coming to this State and that this would be against the common good. There is no doubt this would not be in the interests of the common good.
Section 2 defines a refugee in general terms and goes on to specify who is not a refugee. A person who has committed a war crime or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provisions in respect of such crimes, would not be a refugee. A South American dictator who had committed offences against his own people would, accordingly, not be recognised as a refugee and this would mean that the question of issuing him with a travel document would not arise.
A person who has committed a serious non-political crime outside the State prior to his or her arrival in the State cannot be deemed to be a refugee. Section 2 also recognises that a person guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations is not a refugee. In these circumstances it is difficult, if not impossible, to envisage the scenario, which the Minister paints, of the country being opened up to war criminals, dictators and general undesirables. Her argument, therefore, falls down.
The Minister is correct that there are certain definitions of public policy in law and that it is a recognised term. That much being said, many of these definitions relate to other areas of law. While the Minister made her point well, I am left with some reservations, which I have outlined. Section 4 specifies "national security", which gives the State considerable protection from any people who may upset the organs of the State being issued with a travel document. It is true, whether we like it or not, that public policy will often be defined by the Minister of the day. I accept it is appealable and could be challenged, but public policy will change as Government changes.
The common good must be protected and "public policy" is extremely broad. Many believe the meaning of this term is different from "public order" in law and that the translation of “ordre public”is not “public policy”. Many also feel that the use of these words in many sections of this legislation will give the State the opportunity to opt out of its obligations under the Geneva Convention.
I fully accept the Minister's good faith in this matter and it would be wrong of me not to do so. However, I wish the Minister could have found a different formula to achieve this objective, which she outlines as being the reason for inserting these words.
The Minister mentions section 5 and the prohibition of refoulement as offering a form of protection. At section 5, ministerial discretion, which is superimposed by the Minister utilising "public policy", is buttressed by using "in the opinion of the Minister" in section 5 (1). The Bill sets up a decision making and appeals procedure of its own. One then begins to wonder why it should be necessary to contain the subjective opinion of the Minister about the prohibition of refoulement in section 5.
I thank the Minister for her comprehensive response to the concerns expressed. The Minister shared and understood our concerns and came back to us with a detailed and useful response of the judicial interpretation of public policy in the State.
The Minister said that "public policy" was interpreted by the courts as not meaning Government policy but as covering a much wider area, including the common good and the general good of the citizens. This argument has put forward the idea that "public policy" does not have the volatility we feared.
I also note, and some satisfaction can be drawn from this, that these matters will not be determined by officials but will fundamentally relate to the decision of the Minister and there will be a judicial review of that determination. Therefore, there will be some reining in of the use of "public policy" because it could be subject to judicial review and, of course, an appeals system.
The English translation of the convention' s definition is "public order". The Minister said we signed up for this in 1956 and declared that "ordre public” means “public policy” for our purposes. The Minister outlined today, in terms of the legislative intent of the committee as the legislation goes through the Dáil, that the exact meaning of this term is important to have on the record. The courts will look, when interpreting this term, to our deliberations and will see if it remains in the text of the Bill that it was the clear legislative intent of this committee and the Dáil to define “public policy” as not meaning Government policy. That volatile term can change from Government to Government and from party to party, depending on who is in Government. I am relieved by some of the issues the Minister covered in her response.
However, it is clear, as the Minister outlined, that using "public policy" instead of "public order" is a deliberate decision. Section 9 (8) (a) uses the term "public order", as distinct from "public policy". The parliamentary draftsman intended to use "public order" instead of "public policy"——
In the law and order sense.
That is when an immigration officer is dealing with the matter, as distinct from a Minister's decision on public policy.
I am glad the Minister will review the section about which the UNHCR has expressed concern. The fact that it has been comprehensively dealt with in two sessions of this committee shows that its legislative intention of defining "public policy" according to the court's deliberations and not on Government policy with all its variables, is a useful exercise and I thank the Minister for that.
However, I am still not wholly convinced. There is a danger that it might be misconstrued and it still flies in the face of the English translation of the convention. However, I am happy the Minister has explained the position and many of the concerns we expressed at our last meeting have been dealt with so far.
I do not have any reserved happiness. I congratulate the Minister——
Overwhelming happiness.
——for not alone introducing a detailed report but for giving it in non-legal language which was simple to understand. Even a rustic like myself could understand it in detail. Our debate the last day was not in vain as many problems were raised. I understood from the discussion then that public policy was simply the Minister deciding at the drop of a hat what he or she thought should be done for the sake of the party, perhaps, whereas it is the reverse position. We were confusing public order and public policy and for that reason the debate the last day was extremely good. The Minister has clearly outlined what exactly public policy means.
Deputy O'Donoghue worried about the phrase "in the Minister's opinion". In some years — this is a very stable Government — the Deputy may be a Minister; we should never knock ourselves. Ministers are entitled to their views, in the long run Ministers must have views. Who will decide matters? We can give the decision to a judge or to somebody else but as politicians we should rely on Ministers who have to make decisions on occasions and who have all done so over the years. I welcome the Minister's contribution. It has clarified the situation we were worried about.
I congratulate the Minister on an extremely detailed response to the genuine concerns raised by people at the last meeting when, I must confess, the concept of public policy made no sense to me. We could not identify where it arose, its source and what controls were required in its operation. A valuable lesson has been learned in the explanation. I look forward to seeing the printed details because I am sure they will contain much valuable information on public policy which will be useful in future. It may need to be developed for application in other areas to address concerns expressed at the last meeting. There may be a misunderstanding in the public arena as to what this Bill is. It is a very progressive Bill which has been welcomed by most people. In that context we must highlight this discussion and I hope this explanation will further enhance this Bill.
This has been a very thorough examination of the issue. The Minister has presented a very wide-ranging document on it here today which will be of value in the future.
The Deputy gave her good training.
Deputy O'Donoghue was trying to have the measures as open as possible so that they are clear, can be seen and quantified and reasons given. There is certainly a fear — it comes from the operation of the system generally, not just in relation to refugees but in relation to applications for passports and the rights of people to come here or to bring relations here — that somebody is making decisions which do not seem logical to Deputies. We come up against that quite frequently; I have come up against it a good deal and I cannot understand it. Sometimes you will get reasons but on other occasions you do not and you do not know what you are dealing with.
The Minister has put this one in a particular category and section 2 of the Bill defines the kinds of people fairly well, but this is more or less a hold-all, an extra, it will cover any other eventuality which might arise which might relate to public policy generally as the Minister has defined it. I have listened to the protests about this and all the long explanations since 1975. The extraordinary thing is that in over 20 years there have been only two cases. This is an extraordinary contrivance to cover two cases over that period. Perhaps the openness is not dangerous or harmful and the two cases would have been covered by section 2 which says that people who have committed crimes against peace or war crimes or crimes against humanity would have been excluded.
While accepting and leaving the Minister the extra safeguard which the Government seemed to want and which the advice of the Minister is that you should have, I still have reservation about the need for this and whether it is part of the old system of always having some reason for not being open. Has the Minister any information on how many applications were refused and on what general grounds since 1975? We know now that two were refused on these grounds specifically. On what other grounds were people refused? Other than that I agree with Deputy O'Donoghue that he and Deputy O'Donnell attempted to clarify and specify the matter as far as possible so that people would know very clearly what they were doing, what they were dealing with. At the same time I accept the Minister's ultimate safeguard.
Dr. Woods is an expert on the Department of Justice, having himself been a very distinguished Minister for Justice, so I am sure when he refers to the culture of the Department he is speaking with his usual authority. I am happy it is generally acknowledged that the Department is moving into a climate of — I will not say openness and transparency or the happy tone of the committee might evaporate. The Department is changing its profile in relation to disclosure of information and in relation to the matters the Deputy referred to of people looking for visas, for instance for their relatives to come to Ireland. I have had that experience as has every Deputy in this House.
Those issues are currently the subject of a report, just as the Bill now before us was the result of the first stage of the review of general immigration policy to this country. The consequence of the first part of the report is this very good Bill. Subsequent reports on the area of visa applications and immigration policy in general will, I hope, move that whole area forward and will provide for disclosure of information.
Last week I gave some information to the Deputies about the number of people applying. I do not have the information in relation to refusals going back to 1975 but I can get them for the Deputy. I have information for the last five years. In 1991 there were 16 refusals, there were 22 the next year, 22 in 1993 and 19 in 1994. Quite a lot of applications were withdrawn, I presume this is because people went to another jurisdiction. Some18 applications to be recognised as refugees were granted in the same period. The major problem at the moment, as the Deputy will remember from his time as Minister, is that there are great delays because one has to go to the UNHCR.
It takes some time to examine the files and receive a recommendation. Similarly, the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Justice prepare a report and all the reports are examined carefully. The greatest difficulty at present, as I said last week, is the inordinate delay. When the new system is established and the backlog has been cleared, I hope we will be in a position to deal with applications relatively quickly. This should remove many of the imperfections in the current system, which relate to the type of system rather than departmental reluctance. Happily, the approach to the disclosure of information is changing in all Departments.
Is the amendment being pressed?
I would prefer the substitution of the words, after national security, "in the interest of the common good". However, this will not be done. Public policy does not necessarily always equate with the common good. As the Minister outlined the position so everybody now understands precisely what the term public policy will mean, I will, with reservations, withdraw the amendment.
I am satisfied that the definition of public policy is not the same as Government policy. I am happy with the judicial interpretation of public policy as outlined.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment No. 4 not moved.
Section 4 agreed to.