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Select Committee on Social Affairs debate -
Wednesday, 19 Mar 1997

SECTION 21.

Amendments Nos. 83 to 85, inclusive, are related and may be discussed together by agreement. Is that agreed? Agreed.

I move amendment No. 83:

In page 20, subsection (2)(a), line 23, to delete "2 months" and substitute "6 months".

We accept that a time limit must be imposed but we would like to extend the limit from two to six months. I do not think that is unreasonable.

A different type of complaint arises here as opposed to that in relation to licensed premises. We should give people adequate time in which to make a complaint, particularly where it concerns sexual harassment or where people require time to get over a traumatic event. They should be given the time to think things through clearly.

With regard to licensed premises I am told, for example, that if one takes over a new premises in Dublin and attempts to upgrade it, one can bar in the region of 100 to 500 people in one week. Consequently, the licence holder is at a disadvantage. Given the numbers concerned, a licence holder may not be able to remember what occurred over a protracted period. I am being specific in regard to licensed premises given that it involves a large number of people.

On the other hand, I recognise the need for an extension of the time limit. I ask the Minister to consider the situation in regard to licensed premises. I am talking about people who might be trying to clear out former drug dens and who might actually ban large numbers of people. It may not be possible for a licence holder to remember the exact reason they barred somebody. The shorter the period a person involved in that kind of situation has to make a complaint, the better.

Amendment No. 85, in my name, has a slightly different emphasis. The objective here is to have a degree of flexibility. My amendment states that ". . . . .the Director, if in the exercise of his or her discretion it seems just to do so, shall investigate a complaint notwithstanding the complainant's failure to notify the respondent within the period of time specified in paragrapgh (a)". If the complaint concerns sexual harassment or something of that nature, it would be unjust if somebody, because of particular circumstances, for example, embarrassment, fear, guilt and needing time to get over the experience, was unable to pursue the case. I think that would be unfair. If an element of discretion were allowed I would happily accept any other amendment. It would be useful for the director to have the discretion, where it would be just to do so, to investigate a complaint. That would take on board the reservations which have been expressed.

The two months limit provided for in this subsection applies to the initial notification to be given by the complainant to the respondent. This notification is intended to bring claims of discrimination to the attention of the respondent within a reasonable period of their occurrence and to provide them with the opportunity to take appropriate action. This is necessary in a non-employment context where the contact between the respondent and the complainant is commonly of a transient nature.

The overall limit for bringing claims to the director under the present Bill is, however, the same as that in the Employment Bill where, in certain circumstances, the time limit can be extended by six months. There is, therefore, no need for an amendment to make the Equal Status Bill consistent with the Employment Equality Bill in this respect. I do not accept the amendment tabled by Deputies McDaid and Flood.

Deputy McDaid's amendment No. 84 seeks to restrict the notification period to two weeks in the case of a complaint relating to a licensed premises. In deciding on the period within which the initial notification had to be made, a balance had to be struck between having the respondent faced with a claim of discrimination so long after the event that recollection has dimmed on the one hand and giving the complainant sufficient time to notify the respondent in writing of the alleged act of discrimination on the other. A period of two months was deemed to be appropriate. I do not consider that a two week period would be sufficient to allow the complainant to notify the respondent in writing particularly given that many respondents would be unfamiliar with their legal rights and with the redress mechanisms available under this Bill.

Furthermore, I see no justification for having a shorter period for licensed premises than for anyone else. It is my belief that such special treatment would prompt demands from other commercial interests for similarly short notification periods. Two months is a reasonable time to allow the complainant to notify the respondent about the alleged discrimination. If it were to be extended, a respondent might be faced with a claim of discrimination long after he or she could reasonably be expected to remember the event in question or be capable of remedying it.

The diversity of the amendments proposed here — one, for a lengthening of the notification period to six months another for its contraction to two weeks in the case of licensed premise and one that it be extensible in certain circumstances — confirms my view that a notification period of two months is probably a correct and fair balance.

I accept what the Minister has said and he is probably correct to take the middle course when he cannot satisfy either side. The reason I specified a two week period was that I believed there should be positive discrimination where large numbers of people are concerned. A licence holder, in those circumstances, will be at a disadvantage. The other amendments refer to individual cases but there could be a situation where large numbers from a particular premises——

There could be large numbers of people in a hotel.

A hotel is a licensed premises.

There could also be large numbers of people in a major store; there could be many situations in which this would apply.

I do not think the problem would arise in a major store. I am referring to drug dens and so on where there could be congregations of people passing drugs around.

I do not accept the Minister's response to amendment No. 85. Section 21(3) states that the director may dismiss a claim if they are of the opinion that the complainant does not have a sufficient interest in the subject matter or that the claim has been made in bad faith, is frivolous, vexatious or relates to a trivial matter. There may be circumstances, hopefully few, where a complainant might need to talk to somebody after the event in question which would take up a considerable amount of time. That would mostly pertain to cases of sexual harassment but it is terrible to think that such a person would be cut off after a period of two months. They might be suffering from stress or need persuasion to take action to protect other people or they may be unaware that such a course of action was available to them. In those circumstances, the director should have discretion.

The Deputy's point is valid. However, it cuts across the point argued equally forcibly by Deputy McDaid, that after a passage of time the person loses recollection of an incident which occurred in a crowded situation. That is the reason I have to strike a balance.

Deputy McDaid may think that in the case of a licensed premises a period of two months was too long. However, no extension period is provided for, which balances this to a fair extent. I have no personal hang-up about the two month period and I am trying to be as fair as I can to both sides. The Pavee Point Group would be concerned if the two month period was reduced to two weeks or one month. They and the people they represent need a reasonable period in which to gather their thoughts having suffered a discriminatory act; they may only find out they could make a claim after a certain period but first this legislation must be passed.

In view of the points made by Deputies about the notification periods, I will consider them further. I also ask them to consider the points made. We have to strike a balance between two conflicting issues.

Section 21 (1) applies the provisions of Part V of the Employment Equality Act, 1997, to this Bill, with certain exceptions. The redress procedures are, to a large extent, set out in the other Act. It may be preferable for the convenience of those who will have to refer to this legislation in the future to elaborate the redress procedures fully in this Bill. To this end, I will consider a Report Stage amendment. I may also need to introduce an amendment in relation to the compensation which can be paid for a breach of section 8, which deals with firms, partners, etc. I am sure Deputies agree that if this is feasible, it would be helpful for those who will use this legislation.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments Nos. 84 and 85 not moved.
Section 21 agreed to.
Section 22 agreed to.
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