What does the Statute Law Reform and Consolidation Office do? How does it work?
SECTION 1.
Question proposed: "That section 1 stand part of the Bill."
It is attached to the Office of the Attorney General. It is responsible for the drafting of consolidation and reform statutes. If a programme proposed by the Commission and adopted by the Government involves consolidation, the Office would undertake the work.
In my view, consolidation is most needed in the area of local government law. Has that office done any work in this area?
I agree there is a need for consolidation there.
At the moment is there an office besides the Office of the Attorney General studying questions of consolidation? When a consolidating Bill comes forward, it is referred to a Consolidation Committee of the House. I am not sure if there is a Standing Committee of the House at the moment, but there was such a committee at one time. Is that the position at the moment?
The rules dealing with consolidation measures are laid down in the rules of procedure. It is a matter of practice what happens in the Attorney General's Office on the draftsman's side. If a measure which comes to the office for consideration involves consolidation of statute, it is sent to the Consolidation Office and prepared there.
I am thinking of the Bills passed some time ago—Consolidation of the Income Tax Law, The Permanent Defence Forces Bill, Companies Act—with new material added—and the Consolidation of Fisheries Law.
With an interested Department, such as Revenue, Justice or Fisheries, officials would come to the Attorney General's Office and then that Bill, duly introduced, would come to the Dáil and be referred to a Special Committee of the Houses of the Oireachtas. That is our normal practice.
We should keep that clearly in our minds, because now we are introducing another element. For the staff mechanism of assembling and preparing documents for legislation, the functions of the State Department, particularly of the Attorney General's Office, and the Office of the Minister for Justice, will remain as heretofore. At the other end of the scale, when it comes to actually passing legislation, a Bill will have to go through the House and through the Committee Stage in the House, by Committees of both Houses separately or by a Joint Committee. Here we have an intermediate body. How does this commission function with regard to reforming the law?
In relation to the problem of consolidation, it is envisaged that it will function in this way. It is quite possible, taking a review of the law as a whole, it might decide that in its probable programme of law reform a Consolidation Bill—for example, on local government—should be introduced. The Law Reform Commission could undertake that consolidation job. On the other hand, my suggestion is that in its programme it should not undertake that consolidation job. It should refer it to the office in the Attorney General's Office concerned, with staff in relation to consolidation matters. If that practice was adopted then instead of consolidation measures being drafted as at the moment they would come before the Dáil in the ordinary way and the provisions of Standing Orders 107 to 117 would apply in the normal way. As a consolidation measure it would go to a joint committee. I do not think it affects in any way Dáil procedure.
It is the function of the commission which I do not understand. If there are only five on it, who are not completely wholetime on it, quite clearly they cannot handle the details of doing committee work on any Bill even if they are initiating it. I presume that primarily their function is to study the overall proposals before them and to say what reforms are recommended. The mechanics of putting that recommendation into the form that can come before the Dáil will then devolve on the State Department that recommended it. Is that it?
Yes, except that in certain circumstances the commission might undertake the research in certain areas, but it is unlikely it would be in the area of consolidation.
It might even recommend consolidation.
Of course. There may be a question of priority for consolidation measures which the commission would consider.
A commissioner means a person appointed to be the president or other member of the commission. Is it intended to appoint a judicial person to be president of the commission?
That is dealt with later on.
I understand that, but I wonder if we could deal with it on this particular section. I would like to refer to another matter in relation to section 14. A number of these sections are inter-related, but section 14 is consequential. Will this mean that there will be a vacancy in the High Court?
In relation to the question of who is to be president an amendment has been suggested to the effect that a person who holds judicial office is to be appointed as president. I would envisage that it would be desirable that if a High Court or Supreme Court judge was appointed he be president. If I could anticipate the argument on the amendment I do not think it is desirable to provide by statute that he should be president. It is possible that there might be circumstances, when a judge is appointed, that he may prefer not to act as president. He might be newly appointed and there might be an existing president who has a year to run. It is conceivable that the judge appointed might prefer to let the existing president finish his presidency. It is also conceivable that a judge might be appointed in a part-time capacity and he might not wish to preside. I am saying that I would envisage, although I think it would be extremely unlikely, that if a High Court or a Supreme Court judge is appointed to the commission he would not be president. I would hope in the normal course of events that he would be president but I am suggesting there may be circumstances in which he might not be president. Therefore, I would prefer not to put it in the legislation. On the other point, which was raised in relation to the consequential provisions of section 14, if a High Court judge or a Supreme Court judge is appointed, there is then a vacancy. Section 14 gives power to appoint another judge.
We can take it then that the amendment in the names of Deputy O'Malley and Deputy Collins is unacceptable to the Attorney General, and when this judicial person is appointed to the commission there will be a vacancy in the High Court. Is it the position that a new High Court judge will have to be appointed?
There will be a vacancy in the sense that there will be a change——
In other words, you will have to create a new judgeship.
I would anticipate that.
I agree with the Attorney General that whichever judge is appointed to the commission must be the president of the commission, but I should like to ask how much sitting does he envisage the commission doing?
If the commission act in the way commissions elsewhere have acted, they would be full-time, and if a judge is appointed on a full-time basis, he would be working every day.
I would remind members that we are on section 1—Interpretation.
On the matter of judicial appointments, once more I should like to have as impartial an appointment as possible in the context of this Bill. It has now become clear that the Coalition have been ruthless from the day they took office from this point of view.
They did not even appoint their best hacks.
Now we all know——
I do not want to get into controversy on this. Here we are in the same position as in the Dáil and I would hope the headline was set by the last judicial appointments——
Deputy Enright knows how important it is.
I appreciate that anybody appointed was appointed on merit and merit alone.
Is this a Dáil Committee or a comedy show? Without exception, every appointee since the Government came to office has been a Coalition camp follower and Deputy Enright knows that better than I.
I am disappointed Opposition Deputies are indulging in this type of publicity.
We and the country are disappointed that the Government have indulged in such practices in the past 23 months.
Leaving out the District Court, will the Circuit Court be left out from this judicial office?
It is a point that must be considered. The concept was that if it is possible to get a High Court or Supreme Court judge to act, it would give status to the commission. This is what was done in other countries. We think it is reasonable.
Our party suggested something on those lines.
The reason for this definition in section 1 is because it was felt that if it were possible to appoint such a person, this would give a certain status to the commission.
There are Circuit Court judges, and in some instances district justices who would be eminently suitable, apart from judicial qualifications——
: Is the President of the Circuit Court included in this?
It would be possible to appoint a district justice or a Circuit Court judge, if it is felt desirable. It could be done under another subsection.
If a Circuit Court judge or a district justice were appointed and if he were unable to perform his ordinary judicial functions——
If this happens we would envisage his resignation. The power is there to appoint a Circuit Court judge or a justice.
Where is it?
Subsection 7, page 3.
Would it not be better to broaden the definition of " judicial office "?
I would not think so. We want to indicate that we have in mind particularly for this position a judge of the High Court or the Supreme Court. I would prefer to leave it as it is.
This does not exclude a Circuit Court judge or a justice?
Such can be appointed, but as Deputy O'Malley pointed out, it would involve resignations.
Circuit judges and justices are often more conversant with what would comprise portion of the work of the commission.
I agree they have considerable experience and I would hope the commission would be able to avail of it.
Question put and agreed to.