I will be brief on this. Some Members opposite expressed opposition to section 5 and I must say I am somewhat astonished at their doing so. I was hoping that perhaps today, having had time for reflection, this section could be accepted without a division taking place within the committee. This section has an intention which I assume all members of the committee will support, which is, to ensure that if a couple run into difficulties in their marriage within days or within a few weeks of marriage they do not immediately rush into court and look for a separation decree without at least taking some steps to resolve their marital problems and without having time to consider marriage guidance counselling or to consider obtaining other professional help with difficulties that arise. As a consequence the section provides that, generally speaking, to paraphrase the legal provisions in it, neither a husband nor a wife will be able to apply for a separation decree until at least one year after the date of marriage. The Bill, however, does provide an exception to that in that it allows separation proceedings to be brought if a judge grants an application to do so due to there being marital difficulties of a serious and exceptional nature. For example, if within a few weeks of marriage a wife suffered a very severe violent attack at the hands of her husband and it was quite clear that her safety and welfare were seriously at risk and she was in fear of further such attacks in those circumstances it would be extremely unreasonable to prevent her looking for a separation decree but generally speaking, if there are some difficulties in a marriage I believe a young couple within the first year of marriage should not be encouraged to head into the courts. This Bill contains provisions that will ensure lawyers advise people as to the availability of marriage guidance counselling services among other things and it would seem to me that this is an unexceptional measure. This is a provision put in the Bill to ensure that people do consider the possibility of sorting out their marital problems and in particular that a young couple with little experience of marriage do not immediately rush into court following some initial difficulties in their relationship. I think there are very few young couples who experience an initial difficulty in their relationship who would rush into court anyway but it is a safeguard provision and a provision that most people would regard as worthy of support. I am very surprised that some of the members opposite seem to take a different view and I would hope that we could accept the provisions of section 5 as they are without this committee dividing on this particular aspect of the Bill.
SECTION 5 (Resumed).
Deputy Shatter when dealing with section 5 at the last meeting from what I have been told by my colleagues who were here and, indeed, from what people have been writing about it in the newspapers, seemed to pass off our opposition to this section with a typical knee-jerk reaction and with the usual type of catchphrase that we have been hearing from him. In the process he proceeded to accuse members of my party of political schizophrenia and of generally being inconsistent in their approach to the Bill. He found the opposition to section 5 was extraordinary. As a matter of fact he used that word three times. The objection to section 5 is that it adds unnecessary legal difficulties for those who wish to apply for judicial separation. That criticism of the section on which I will elaborate presently is completely consistent with the approach I and other members of my party took to sections 1 and 2 of the Bill wherein an altogether unnecessary and inappropriate additional ground in the context of judicial separation, that of irretrievable breakdown, is being foisted on spouses who wish to seek judicial separation. Indeed, my approach to the concept of irretrievable breakdown is echoed in an editorial in a recent edition of the New Law Journal. It was commenting on English divorce legislation, on which Deputy Shatter’s Bill is obviously modelled, and concerned a discussion paper on the grounds for divorce. The editorial stated that while irretrievable breakdown is the only ground for obtaining a decree, it is not a ground at all, really there are five it said. It states also that irretrievable breakdown was never really a good ground for anything; it is only a description of a state of affairs produced by somebody else.
I wish to point out that section 5, like sections 1 and 2, makes a nonsense of the statements by Deupty Shatter that under the provisions of the Bill spouses would not have to make allegations against one another in separation proceedings. Section 5 would only be relevant in those cases where one of the grounds for a judicial separation is adultery or unreasonable behaviour. It would have no effect where a judicial separation is sought on the fact of desertion or separation because a period of desertion or separation of at least one year is required in those cases under section 2 of the Bill as it stands. In effect therefore, the grounds in existing law of adultery and cruelty, which essentially is to be replaced by the concept of a unreasonable behaviour, would be made more restrictive not only by imposition of the additional requirement to prove irretrievable breakdown in separation proceedings but also by the imposition in section 5 of a requirement that parties should be married for at least one year.
It is not an answer surely to say, as Deputy Shatter has said, that subsection (2) of section 5 provides that in exceptional circumstances the parties could apply for separation within one year of marriage. He gave violence as an example. There was a similar provision to section 5 (2) in English divorce legislation until 1984 when at that time it was repealed. The result of that provision was that applicants were inevitably advised by their lawyers to set out in detail all the facts, however unpleasant, which could possibly constitute marriage difficulties of a serious and exceptional nature.
The experience was that, so far from fulfilling the aims of good law, it actually caused bitterness, distress and humiliation for applicants. The resulting embarrassment prevented some spouses from applying for divorce and others still were led to exaggerage allegations, with a result that any hope of the parties reaching a settlement were jeopardised. Incidentally I may say that there is no time limitation in England or Northern Ireland as regards applications for judicial separation.
It is difficult to see what good is to be done by requiring a spouse who has obviously been wronged by the adultery or cruelty of another to plead a special case when there are already adequate safeguards in the Bill by which the parties can avail of counselling or mediation if they wish. Section 5 could have the effect of making judicial separation proceedings here more painful, complicated, prolonged and expensive. It is difficult to reconcile it with the view that separation should be achieved with the minimum of bitterness and distress and humiliation and impossible to reconcile it with section 2 (1) (f) which we were told was the cornerstone of the no fault approach to the Bill. Adultery and cruelty should continue to be available as at present as grounds for immediate relief by way of judicial separation. As regards section 2 (1) (f) that provision is so badly framed that I have previously indicated that I intend to pursue again at a later stage the question of its amendment so as to provide more specifically for the case where spouses have actually separated under the one roof and could no longer be regarded as living with each other. In such cases, a period of separation for three years or one year with consent would, of course, apply and in that context section 5 would be of no effect in any event.
I think the points I have made deserve a reasonable response and a sensible response and I say that because of the approach adopted by Deputy Shatter when dealing in committee and elsewhere with my amendments in relation to sections 1 and 2. It is not good enough — and I say this with all due respect — for Deputy Shatter or anybody else, but Deputy Shatter in particular with audacity and irresponsibility to assert recently in a newspaper article written by himself that if the Fianna Fáil members of the committee had been successful in amending sections 1 and 2 of the Bill much of the bitterness and conflict which the Bill is designed to remove from the matrimonial court cases would have been retained and that many of those couples who look to the Bill to help them would be deprived of the legal assistance that the Bill offers.
He also asserted that the Fianna Fáil members of the committee attempted: "to remove the desire to live separately as a basis for establishing that a breakdown has occurred". The Deputy was referring to section 2 (1) (f). I want to make it clear that the assertions he made in that article are clearly false. They are not supported by any argument. They were deliberately misleading and dishonest as well. He chose very carefully to avoid the point that under this Bill and under my amendments three of the grounds are, by their nature, fault based: namely, adultery, unreasonable behaviour and desertion. On the other hand he failed to say that under the amendments spouses could be granted a decree after three years separation or, if they wanted a more amicable separation, they could obtain a decree by consent after one year's separation. He failed to say that under my amendments spouses who are actually separated under the one roof and who could no longer be regarded as living with each other as husband and wife, could also be granted a decree. He did not say that that provision was intended to replace section 2 (1) (f), nor did he mention that his party, when in Government, rejected wording similar to section 2 (1) (f). If during the debate reasonable points are raised they should be dealt with properly and reasonably and not as if they were of nothing more than nuisance value.
This committee has a duty and a responsibility, as legislators to examine every detail of this important Bill. If that takes a considerable time so be it and if a certain number of days are required, so be it. I reject — and it is wrong — the continuous accusation of delay coming from Deputy Shatter and carried by some of those who believe him who are here in a professional capacity reporting on what is being said. The people who have to operate this legislation and those to whom it will provide relief will not be served properly by provisions which are ill-conceived, flawed or unnecessary. We would all welcome a change in attitude from Deputy Shatter. Perhaps from now on we can look forward to discussing the full merits of any matters which are raised in the debate on this Bill. There is no need for section 5 of the Bill. For the reasons I have given we are opposing this section.
The Minister has had his say in respect of matters which were not deliberated on at the table. I know he had to take the opportunity to put his point but I am anxious that we stick to the amendment and to the section we are dealing with.
Chairperson
It was taken in a broad context and it related in an indirect way.
I endorse the Minister's views especially in relation to the fact that this section appears to put expense on any person who has a genuine grievance and whose marriage is in such a state within the year that the initiation of proceedings is indicated. Any legislation which reduces the rights of persons who at present have rights in relation to judicial separation is retroactive and retrograde. We cannot really condone it.
I listened with a certain amount of dismay to the arguments put forward that section 5 will actually help to sort out difficulties and create conditions for reconciliation. This Bill is geared, not for reconciliation, but in a fundamental way, is designed to ensure that people will rush headlong into the separation courts aided and abetted by the fairly strong material incentives built into the Bill which are over and above the incentives available the person with marital difficulties who will seek the ordinary remedy of the barring order, the Act dealing with the status of married women and other various remedies which now exist under fairly reasonable legislation.
The provisions in section 5 are merely the sugar coating on the pill of this incitement to people to rush into the clutches of the courts and, dare I say it, the clutches of the legal profession. In this context it is noteworthy to remember that in the English legal aid system there is dismay that the legal profession, the Bar Counsel and the solicitors organisation are going away from the hallowed tradition of not taking on family law cases on a no foal, no fee basis. Apparently the British legal profession are taking on family cases on a no foal, no fee basis, agreeing to split the proceeds of the material settlement which will result in a split up, whether it is a judicial separation or a divorce. The press in Britain has been keen to point out this very retrograde development. To a large extent this Bill will put the legal profession in this country, who are no less likely to become prey to the no foal, no fee mentality ——
On a point of order, I do not wish to interrupt the Deputy in what he is saying, but at this stage we have gone so far beyond anything that is relevant to section 5 that the Deputy should be brought back to dealing with the section before us. If he wants to discuss the whys and wherefores of the legal profession, particularly dealing with family law matters, I will be happy to do that any day but I do not see how that is relevant to section 5.
I was merely speaking to the fundamental thinking behind the section. I will continue to do so briefly.
The section compels a young applicant or a newly wed young girl or boy who have rights under present law to wait in almost intolerable conditions for the year to elapse or to rush into very costly preliminary applications to the court setting out, possibly in affidavit form, facts which might not necessarily have to be set out to institute proceedings if the section was not there. The putting together of affidavits which set out special circumstances to the court, and making special applications on notice to the other party, involves engaging solicitors and increases expenses. Remember that even the stamp duty on affidavits now is quite a burden. I do not think the Oireachtas should put young couples to this expense merely for the purpose of putting the sugar on the pill of this legislation. It is merely cosmetic and I insist on that point.
A number of points need to be answered. The first is the Minister's reference to the law journal and the suggestion that this Bill is based on UK divorce legislation and that Deputy Shatter had looked at that to draw up the Bill. We must remind ourselves that the Bill borrows not from any foreign legislation but from two reports of considerable depth which examined this whole problem. The Bill addressed itself to the second one which was the report of a committee specifically established in the wake of a referendum decision that said this country could not and would not have divorce for the time being. I honestly think it is not fair — a point I made the last night — that constantly in the contributions coming from the other side this suggestion is made that this legislation is synonymous or linked to or equivalent to divorce legislation. It is not. It is clearly designed to reflect a particular situation in our jurisdiction, that divorce will not exist for the time being and that we as legislators must provide for the interim and that is what I hope we are addressing here.
Deputy Abbott has said that the legislation represents an incitement to rush into court. In fact, again, the legislation is anything but that. It is a remarkable piece of legislation and he must appreciate that as a practising lawyer, if nothing more, where as legislators we are providing for a duty on lawyers involved in marital disharmony litigation that before they can ever come to court or initiate proceedings, there are duties resting on them to take active steps to advise the parties about the possibilities of reconciliation and help them as much as possible — a legislative duty. I do not believe there is provision in any other sphere of professional work or activity whereby legislators seek to impose on the shoulders of persons engaged in professional activity a positive duty to work towards a certain end. So rather than suggest that it is an incitement or anything of the sort, it is not. It is a particularly well balanced piece of legislation seeking on the one hand to recognise substantial marital disharmony and, on the other, seeking to respect the very important nature of marriage within our constitutional society and doing the utmost we can to protect marriage as much as possible. If anything, taking out section 5 is helping the mad rush to court because section 5 is a brake and a very intelligent and sensible provision saying that, in the very sensitive, difficult initial period, as is well recognised, of the first 12 months of marriage, hasty and rash decisions will not be the basis upon which applications can be made to a court. It is an incredible turn-about in the process of debate. I am sitting here almost tempted to support Fianna Fáil in this because we are the liberal side of this argument and your amendment makes the whole thing all the more easy, all the more liberal and all the quicker to get into court if we want to. That is fine if one forgets the overall context of legislation and our emphasis as legislators to ensure reconciliation as much as possible, to ensure rehabilitation of difficulties in marriage as much as possible. So while I am sorely tempted to split the vote your way and get rid of section 5 and make it easier, even on the second day of marriage, to head back into court and say, "Sorry, I am fed up with this notion", I am holding a consistent line of direction and I do not want to deviate from it. There is a balance in the legislation, on the one hand recognising marital disharmony, but, on the other hand, recognising our duties as legislators to protect it as far as possible. So I am not going to support you on the amendment, I am going to be consistent and it would be well if Fianna Fáil could do the same.
The final point I want to make in this reference to lawyers splitting marital material settlement proceeds and the like. I am here from a political perspective and point of view and with a party who are concerned for the vast majority of people out there who need this legislation, who do not have the material means and will not be presenting a material nest egg or hand-out to lawyers to pick from, who are at the moment at a material disadvantage because those who have the resources are going abroad to other jurisdictions and contriving cosmetic divorces and cosmetic separations and are coming home here and getting full recognition for it. It came to my notice recently that the Revenue Commissioners for tax purposes recognise these face value documents that in law on close examination are of no status whatsoever but they are there. The are being used. The Church accommodates it for people who are wealthy and well-off. They are well looked after or are capable of looking after themselves. I am concerned about the vast majority of people of no property, the man of no or moderate means, as a Deputy used the expression in the House on the Courts Bill last evening, those people who come into court and will not be presenting this "pickings per proposition" that you are talking about. I believe this section is consistent with the line that the legislation presents and for that reason I do not accept the Minister's proposal that the section is unnecessary. To maintain the balance that it represents between the two pole interests of marital disharmony on the one hand and separation and the need to secure as much as possible and safeguard the institution of marriage to reconciliation on the other, I believe that this is a very practical, useful and sensitive section and one that I would have thought would commend itself strongly to the line that Fianna Fáil were advancing in the debate on the earlier section. For that reason, I am at a loss to know where you are going at this point in respect of this legislation.
Chairperson
I must ask members please to refrain from the temptation of making Second Stage speeches and to confine their remarks to section 5.
Before I refer to the section, I feel obliged to refer to the fact that again as the Minister said earlier, Fianna Fáil have been accused of delay in relation to this Bill and I feel I have to do so on the basis that——
Chairperson
I would appreciate you confining your remarks to section 5.
I would like to make this point for the record.
Chairperson
We have had that clarified. The Minister is already on record. Everybody is on record.
I sat in that Chair for one meeting in your place and during that meeting we covered as much, if not more, ground as in any other meeting, with all due respect to you.
Chairperson
I know. We had already gone over the controversial section.
I was not at the previous meeting. So I would not have been able to answer Deputy Shatter. In relation to this section, it is a fairly reasonable section. I do not have any grave problem. But I must say, on balance, and we have to look at this objectively, it would be better not to have this section in the Bill at all because it puts a stricture on the whole area of judicial separation. I listened for some time last night to the debate in relation to regulating the number of barristers under the Courts Bill and I think Deputy Colley mentioned that the less regulation the better; let things find their own level. I have to say in relation to this section that the number of applications would find its own level. People are not going to rush in after a fortnight or whatever and ask for a judicial separation but, if they do, it would be quite open for a judge to reject that application on the basis that it was frivolous or that they had not tried, plus the fact that they have all the mediation services to go through before they actually make the application. There is the phrase in subsection (2) that, unless the circumstances are of "a serious and exceptional nature". I would hope that anyone who would make an application would not make it unless it was serious and exceptional and I think a judge would not entertain an application unless it was serious and exceptional. I feel, on balance, we are better off not having this section in and I support fully the stance taken by the Minister on this. As I have said, it is lack of regulation which is the important thing in this area.
Briefly, the attitude of people towards this legislation is grossly inconsistent to say the least. I feel that perhaps Deputy Abbott put his finger on it when he said that this section represented the sugar on the pill. It was an admission by the people opposite that this is a piece of legislation that they are not in favour of and the comments of the members today are in stark contrast to the comments of the Minister for Social Welfare on the opening night of the Second Stage debate when he welcomed the Bill and recognised that there was a problem. Deputy Abbott appeared to suggest that the situation in so far as barring orders are concerned at the moment is quite satisfactory. I would say that that is not the case at all.
There is need for this legislation and so far as the section is concerned, it represents a restriction on the type of applicaiton that may otherwise be made. Reference was made by the previous speaker to people in their first year of marriage. Undoubtedly the first year of marriage is a year in which there is considerable strain.
There are many difficulties and if it was possible for people to make applications to the court without restriction we would have a number of frivolous applications. Deputy Ahern said that if an application was made the judge could throw it out or refuse it on the grounds that it was brought too early but at that stage the parties are in court and have gone through a considerable amount of trauma having regard to section 2 (1) (f) and all that was said about it on a previous occasion. It is a traumatic experience. It would be very difficult for the couple to avail of the type of reconciliation that is implicit in section 5. It is a bar on them seeking an alternative to court action.
Having regard to what was said when discussing section 2 it is incomprehensible that it is being opposed now by those who regard this Bill as opening the flood gates. How better to open the flood gates than by not having any restriction at all on it? I fail to understand the clear inconsistency that is coming from members, in particular Deputy Abbott's "sugar on the pill" statement. It is important that we have a bar on the proceedings so as to eliminate frivolous applications.
The reason section 5 is in the Bill is because section 2 (1) (f) is in the Bill. Deputy Shatter, in introducing section 2 (1) (f) tried to say that he was introducing a no fault system of judicial separation and that the parties could separate if it was reasonable for them to wish to live separately and apart. Having done that, he had to introduce section 5 because if he did not, he felt that within one year of marriage there could be frivolous applications to court for judicial separation. The amendments which were put forward by the Minister simply excluded this requirement and one had to prove one of five separate issues. The basic philosophy underlying section 5 is to counteract what he had hoped to introduce by allowing for frivolous applications under section 2 (1) (f). It is clearly unfair to expect a person to continue in a marriage if in the first couple of months that person is subjected, for example, to acts of great cruelty, to constant adultery or to downright violence of a terrible nature. Is it fair to lock people in that kind of situation into marriage for a full year and force them to live under those conditions? I take the view that it is not right and would not be just to do so.
Deputy McCartan said that this legislation and section 5 does not follow English divorce legislation. This is patently untrue. He says that this legislation follows the Report of the Law Reform Commission and the Report of the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Marriage Breakdown. This is also patently untrue. The Law Reform Commission proposals were closely followed in the Minister's amendments. The Joint Committee on Marriage Breakdown at no stage in their report demanded that one had to prove that the marriage had irretrievably broken down.
Chairperson
Will the Deputy please confine his remarks to section 5, not to section 2.
I noticed that when Deputy Shatter and Deputy McCartan made false allegations that we were being divisive or were delaying matters they were allowed to make those statements with impunity.
Chairperson
The Minister responded on behalf of the party.
When there is an answer to that there appears to be a different attitude. The basic philosophy behind section 5 is to cover up for situations where there would be frivolous applications made to court or, if you like, to supplement section 2 (1) (f). The basic philosophy behind section 5 is that if there is an application for a separation, the marriage has terminated, or to use Deputy Shatter's own words, it is irretrievable but that is not consistent with the meaning of the words "judicial separation". Judicial separation of itself allows for the possibility of reconciliation. Section 5 is quite consistent with Deputy Shatter's own approach which is to introduce a termination process by means of judicial separation legislation. You cannot do that and I do not think that people would agree that you could do that.
I admire very much Deputy O'Donoghue's compassion for people who are locked into incredibly unhappy and even violent marriages and I would ask that he might extend the legislation to allow them to have a second relationship that would be legally acknowledged by the State. That is the least they deserve. Having said that——
He does not have any power over that.
He had power over it and the party had power over it——
We look forward to his support next time there is a referendum. We expect him to stand on his soapbox and tell everyone about his compassion.
Chairperson
Order, please.
You are the ones hiding under the soapbox.
Contrary to what some of our Opposition colleagues think — that the first year of marriage is an extended honeymoon — I deal with a great number of women and couples whose marriages have broken down. Surveys show internationally that a great amount of the conflict and strain arises in the first two years. In fact they are the two most influential years regarding the future of the marriage. We have a certain responsibility to ensure that couples will try to work out their problems in that adapting period without feeling that they had legal separation immediately available to them. A year in the life of a marriage and a long term relationship is not really that great. Section 5 makes allowances and needs to do so. I agree with everybody who raised this, that in a serious and exceptional case where it would be unreasonable and unjust to delay the issue of the application, the judge would have discretion. It is covered there. As responsible legislators, it might be alleged against us that we were not taking that dimension of the need to adapt and try to resolve difficulties encountered within the first couple of years of marriage into consideration if we allowed applications to occur within the first year.
There are two points the Minister made and which I thought were particularly reasonable points on this section. One point he made concerned the separation available to the parties where adultery or cruelty takes place. I believe that the section proposed by Deputy Shatter is making the existing law more restrictive because he is adding to the other sections of the Bill. The Minister also mentioned that there was no time limit for availing of separation in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. I am not surprised that Deputy McCartan is almost going to support us because, in fact, the Minister is making a better situation here in not allowing the section to make the law more restrictive.
We should stick to the issues. There is a general criticism from the other side of Fianna Fáil and what Fianna Fáil members are saying. I agree with the chairperson that we are not talking about the actual section. I am not going to deviate now. If we stick to the issues in the section we will find agreement here that this section is not necessary and that, in fact, the Minister's amendments do provide safeguards. In amendment No. 33 the Minister provides for adjournment of proceedings to assist reconciliation or agreements on separation. We should be going on those lines. This section is certainly making the existing law more restrictive.
I would like to reply to a point made by Deputy Flanagan.
Chairperson
The Deputy has already contributed.
Yes, but I would like to reply to a point made by Deputy Flanagan, that the applications under this section would not be able to be made before a year. The fact of the matter is that anyone who has a marital problem after two or three months obviously feel that they have a serious and exceptional case to make that they ought to get a judicial separation. In effect, this section is irrelevant because everybody will make an application to the courts. So they will be in court anyway, whether this section is in place or not, as you quite rightly say. Why should the section be there in the first place? It should be up to the judge of the court to decide whether the applicaiton is a relevant one.
It is significant that the point comes from a practising lawyer. We have got to bear in mind that when people do experience difficulties, if they realise that they cannot go into a court situation until after the expiry of 12 months, they say, what are the alternatives, mediation, counselling? There are a number of alternatives.
No. The alternatives are in subsection (2).
At the outset I want to put it on the record that I make no apology for the terms of this Bill which, in fact, allow for easier access to the granting of separation to couples who have serious irreconcilable differences. I make no apology for that. That is the great difference between Fianna Fáil and this side of the House.
As a result of making no apology for that and acknowledging that this Bill sets out to make it easier for couples who have great difficulties to obtain separation agreements or separation deeds, there follows a responsibility placed on us as legislators not to allow a situation to develop where court proceedings are taken at the very first onset of difficulties in a marriage. A number of Deputies have said, and we know from quite an amount of research that has been done in this area, that the first year is inevitably the one with the greatest strain on it. It is very easy for couples, because they do not know and have not experienced these difficulties before, to think that this is the end of the line, that they will never get over this hump and that they will not be able to reconcile themselves. In fact, many couples who have difficulties like that after the first year find that they have in fact matured, they have received help, they have been able to come to terms with it. If they had been able to opt out in an easier way at an early stage they would very possibly have done so.
For the sake of those couples we must place a provision in this Bill which does not allow them to rush headlong into court. By rushing into court, anyway, they are going to incur expense. Deputy Abbott referred to subsection (2) as requiring extra expense. Any court appearance will require expense and subsection (2) would add very little to it. Very few cases in fact will be brought in under subsection (2). The difficulty is that those who are experiencing difficulties in marriage, if they approach a solicitor under this Bill or make application under this Bill, will be sent the names and addresses of various people to whom they can talk. That does not guarantee that they will in fact present themselves for counselling or mediation. Certainly, the first year is a very dangerous period and I believe we should put this one year prohibition or rather restriction on it.
It is noteworthy that we are not alone in that. Many other countries make it a requirement that there should be no granting of a dissolution or of a separation for the first year of marriage. It is only recognising what reality is. Again I make no apology for the fact that this Bill makes it easier for people to obtain separations. Up to now it has been appallingly difficult for those who have reasonably put up with an awful lot, who have made great efforts at reconciling and have not been able to do so. They have also not been able to obtain separation deeds or agreements. We are with this Bill making it easier but we are not going so far down the road that we are throwing the sheep to the wolves.
The attitude of the members opposite on this is such as arises from their basic opposition to the expression "irretrievable breakdown". They do not like that expression. That has been made very clear. That is a view and it is fair enough to have that view. It is a perfectly legitimate view to have and they have said that they hold the view that they do not like the expression "irretrievable breakdown". They said that all along at every stage of this Bill — at Second Stage, Committee Stage and so on.
The only thing I would say to them is that there comes a time when you have to say, "very well, we do not like that expression but the Dáil has decided that that it to be the expression". The Dáil decided that at Second Stage. This committee have already decided on that after a very prolonged debate on section 2 and voting on it. So that is now at this stage the prescribed wisdom of the Dáil as expressed by its plenary session at Second Stage and the prescribed wisdom of this committee of the Dáil. It has decided.
Chairperson
Section 5, please.
What I am saying relates to section 5. The accepted wisdom now of the Dáil and of this committee of the Dáil is, that notwithstanding the views of the Fianna Fáil Party on this question, which we all took into account and considered very carefully and to which we gave all the attention it deserves, the notion of irretrievable breakdown is in fact to be the basis of this Judicial Separation Bill. I would appeal to the members of the Fianna Fáil Party to say, "very well, that was our view but we have to accept the fact now that the Dáil has decided otherwise and we now accept the decision". There is no sense on their part, it seems to me, to go on and on after the votes have been taken and still hark back to make points here on section 5 which are relative and perhaps might make sense in another context if the Dáil had gone along with what they advocated. It is a bit like the situation where you put in an amendment and as happened to me yesterday on Report Stage, it is ruled out of order because it is contrary to what the Dáil has decided at Committee Stage, to the main thrust of the Bill. That is what happened here. You have to accept now that the main thrust of this Bill——
This is Committee Stage.
As Deputy Colley said, and taking the words out of my mouth, we have dealt with that in this Committee Stage. It came in under section 2. We debated it there at great length and I think we voted on it. We decided that irretrievable breakdown, whether the Fianna Fáil Party like it or not, is to be the notion and the basis on which this Bill is to proceed. Let us just forget the opposition to that because it is too late now. That is done and finished with. You now relate that to the position we are faced with under section 5. The Minister and Fianna Fáil members opposite — I respect their point of view — say that there should be no limit; that it should be open to a spouse a fortnight after they have been married to go into court and get a judicial separation. We are not talking here about separation agreements or temporary measures. We are talking about court orders and that it should be open to a spouse two weeks or a month after a marriage to go into court and to be entitled, as Fianna Fáil would have it, to get a finality decree of judicial separation. That must surely be totally inconsistent with the notion of irretrievable breakdown because you cannot say that you have arrived at a situation of irretrievable breakdown if the people have been married for one month. I can accept a situation that there might be a breakdown of a marriage after one month. There could be great difficulties in a marriage after one month. There could, in fact, be separation of the parties after one month but it is a very different thing to say that you could possibly come to the conclusion that after one month of marriage you are in a position of irretrievable breakdown. That would require some stretch of the imagination. I do not think it is possible. We have already adopted, in section 2, the overriding condition that there must be irretrievable breakdown. Once you accept that situation — and we have to accept that because that has been adopted by the committee — you have to accept that there cannot possibly be irretrievable breakdown after a short period of a few months has gone by.
Why one year, why not five?
This is a fair and reasonable point and one could argue it. I am prepared to consider the question of why one year. Maybe it should be six months, maybe it should be 18 months. Maybe the period should be different. That is another matter but you have not proposed that. What your amendment is doing is simply knocking out any basic initial period. The Bill puts forward a period of one year. That is probably a fair enough balance to take. I could visualise a situation that a court might hold, on hearing the evidence that irretrievable breakdown had occurred after one year and that would enable the court to grant the decree. Maybe it is the wrong period.
Maybe it should be somewhat more, maybe it should be somewhat less. If you put down an amendment suggesting an alternative period and argue it accordingly I will certainly consider that and hear what you have to say on it. I do not mind debating that issue.
You could be accused of being over-restrictive.
We cannot debate it because you have not tabled any such amendment. All we can do is deal with the situation that we are faced with. We have two alternative possibilities. One is the actual section as it stands which delimits the period of one year as a minimum less that which the court may not grant a decree or the alternative to that is the Minister's amendment which would seek to reject the section out of hand and thereby have no limit at all. On balance, faced with that choice and no alternative period in place of one year, I have little hesitation in going along with the wording of the Bill as it is and agreeing to the provision of one year. I am a bit puzzled I must admit by subsection (3) of section 5 which seems a bit on the strange side. I wonder what the reason for that may be. I would have thought the main thrust of it was obvious. It states:
"If it appears to the court at the hearing of an application for judicial separation presented in pursuance of an order made under subsection (2) above that permission to issue proceedings was fraudulently obtained the court may dismiss the application made for a decree of judicial separation."
I would have thought that if a person obtained a court order by fraud that immediately dismissing the application would have been the least that would have been done and that maybe a lot more serious consequences such as referring the papers to the Director of Public Prosecutions might follow. If one sought to obtain a court order by fraudulent means the question of dismissing it would be an obvious result. I am really puzzled about subsection (3).
It states "may dismiss".
Yes but that is just one part of it. I support the section for the reasons I have stated.
I shall not be drawn by the Minister or some of the Deputies opposite into fighting over irretrievable breakdown or sections 2 (1) (a) to (f). That has been dealt with by the committee. I would make one comment in the context of the overall debate that has taken place. I suspect if section 5 was not in the Bill I would be attacked by the members opposite for making separations too easy and for encouraging people within a week or two weeks of marriage to rush headlong into court to look for a separation decree. Section 5 of the Bill is designed to ensure that does not happen. In the context of that argument Deputy O'Donoghue and others were not slow to talk about "quickly" separations. This is designed to ensure, as Deputy Abbott mentioned, that people do not rush headlong into court. It is designed to ensure that the Bill does not provide, as he so graphically describes if, an incitement to people to rush into court. It is designed to ensure, if there are some difficulties in the earlier months of a marriage that generally speaking, unless there are very serious and exceptionally grave problems within that marriage neither a husband nor a wife will issue separation proceedings. That is a sane and sensible approach.
I fail to understand why the Minister keeps on criticising the Bill on the grounds that it is not identical to divorce law in force in England or on the grounds that it does not comply with proposed reforms made by the English law reform commission for making divorce law even more liberal in England. This is not a Bill that has anything to do with divorce. It is to do with judicial separation. The reality is that this is a Bill designed to deal with the problems we have and does not reflect the legal position as it pertains in England. I am sorry that we are apparently going to divide on a section that I thought everyone would regard as being supportive of marriage and as a protection to ensure that people do not unnecessarily go into the courts. I suspect, and I do not want this to be taken as a provocative remark because it is not intended to be, that the true view of members opposite is reflected in the spontaneous remark they all made a few minutes ago which is that the best year of your life in marriage is the first year in marriage. As someone who has been married for 15 years I have to say that the best years of my life have been the last 15 years. If your view is that the best year of your life is the first year the reality is very few people will bring proceedings during the first year of marriage anyway. This Bill provides a protection to ensure that if people do suffer difficulties they do not unnecessarily head into the courts.
People go to——
Chairperson
Order, please.
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Tá |
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Barnes, Monica. |
McCartan, Pat. |
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Barrett, Seán. |
Shatter, Alan. |
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Colley, Anne. |
Taylor, Mervyn. |
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Flanagan, Charles. |
Taylor-Quinn, Madeline. |
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Níl |
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Abbott, Henry. |
de Valera, Síle. |
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Ahern, Dermot. |
Kitt, Michael P. |
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Collins, Gerard. |
O'Donoghue, John. |
I move amendment No. 33:
In page 6, before section 6, to insert the following new section:
"(1) Where an application is made under this Act to the court for a decree of judicial separation, the court shall give consideration to the possibility of a reconciliation of the spouses concerned and, accordingly, may adjourn the proceedings at any time for the purpose of affording the spouses an opportunity, if they both so wish, to consider a reconciliation between themselves with or without the assistance of a third party.
(2) If during any adjournment of proceedings to which subsection (1) of this section relates the spouses resume living with each other, no account shall be taken of that fact for the purposes of those proceedings.
(3) Where on an application made under this Act for a decree of judicial separation it appears to the court that no reconciliation of the spouses concerned is possible, it may adjourn or further adjourn the proceedings for the purpose of affording the spouses an opportunity, if they both so wish, to establish agreement (with or without the assistance of a third party) on the terms, so far as is possible, of the separation.
(4) If an adjournment has taken place by virtue of subsection (1) or (3) of this section, either or both of the spouses may request that the hearing of the application be proceeded with and, without prejudice to subsection (5) of this section, the court shall resume hearing the application as soon as is practicable.
(5) The power of adjournment exercisable under subsections (1) and (3) of this section is in addition to and not in substitution for any other power of adjournment exercisable by the court.
(6) Where the court adjourns proceedings under subsection (1) or (3) of this section, it may as its discretion advise the spouses concerned to seek the assistance of a third party for the purpose set out in the appropriate subsection.
(7) Any oral or written communication between either spouse and any third party to whom subsection (1), (3) or (6) of this section relates (whether or not made in the presence of the other spouse) and any record of such communication caused to be made by such third party, shall not be admissible as evidence in any court.".
Amendment No. 33 was discussed previously when the Minister was not present. I wonder if we might raise one particular matter with him. There was a question raised to which a response was not obtained.
I understood that our discussion on this amendment had been completed and it was simply a matter of putting the question when we arrived at it.
Chairperson
We have had discussion on the amendment in conjunction with amendment 20. It is now just a matter of putting the amendment.
This is amendment No. 33. It may be that we are accepting the amendment.
Chairperson
It is a new section proposed by the Minister and it is amendment No. 33.
Chairperson
We are moving on to amendment No. 34 which is a new section tabled by Deputy Shatter which has already been discussed in conjunction with amendment No. 20.
Amendment No. 34 is an alternative to amendment No. 33 which has been accepted.
Chairperson
We move now to amendment No. 35 tabled by the Minister. I have been advised that amendments Nos. 37, 38, 41 and 43 are related. These amendments, then, may be discussed together. Agreed.
Amendment No. 43 comes in under section 7, which comes under Part II of the Bill.
I move amendment No. 35:
In page 6, line 41, to delete "(1)".
Amendment No. 37 proposes to amend section 6 (1) of the Bill to provide that where the courts grant a decree of judicial judicial separation it shall no longer be obligatory for the applicant to cohabit with the respondent. One effect of a decree of a divorce a mensa et thoro at present is that it relieves the applicant from the duty of cohabiting with the respondent. This means that so long as it is in force neither spouse can be in desertion. There seems to be no particular reason for the change in section 6 (1) which provides that it shall no longer be obligatory for the spouses to cohabit unless in the context of an application on the basis of separation by consent. While on the face of it it appears that what section 6 (1) proposes is no different in effect from the existing law, I would be somewhat uneasy in case the change proposed might bring about a result which we did not foresee. For that reason it might in my view be preferable to leave the law as it stands on the matter. Amendments Nos. 38, 41 and 43 propose the deletion of subsections (2) and (3) of section 6 of the Bill and their substitution by a new section. Under section 6 (2) of the Bill, the spouses may by consent apply to the court for recision of the decree of judicial separation. However, where the spouses consent and in particular where they are prepared to settle their financial arrangements in a mutually acceptable manner there should be no necessity for a formal application to court to discharge the decree. There are, in fact, English dicta to the effect that a decree of divorce a mensa et thoro would be discharged at present by mere resumption of cohabitation. It should be open also to either spouse to apply to court for the discharge of a decree, that is, such an application should not depend on the consent of the other spouse. While the ground on which either party is most likely to apply for the discharge of a decree of judicial separation is that the spouses have resumed cohabitation, in such a case there would normally be consent to discharge and one can think of circumstances where a requirement to have the consent of both parties to an application might not be appropriate. If, for example, the respondent to the original separation proceedings has new evidence not available in time to enable him to appeal the original decision with which to refute allegations of misbehaviour made about him or evidence with which to prove that the decree was obtained by fraud, it should be open to that person to apply for a discharge of the decree. This may, of course, be of special importance where the court took such alleged misconduct into account when making ancillary orders following the original application for a decree. In any event, the court under the proposed amendment would retain a discretion as to whether or not it will grant the discharge. The effect of subsection (3) of the amendment is that where a separation decree has been discharged, any ancillary order made under Part II of the Bill may be varied or discharged where it appears appropriate to the court to do so. I am also considering whether the court on an application under subsection (3) should be empowered to make other orders consequential on its having made orders under Part II to cater for the case where a simple discharge or variation of the order originally made under Part II might not be appropriate or sufficient. Amendment No. 35 is a small technical change which would fall to be made on acceptance of amendments Nos. 38 and 41.
The Minister's amendment is intended to delete the entirety of section 6 as it currently is contained in the Bill and to replace it with the Minister's own section. I would have to say that I cannot accept the amendment that the Minister is proposing and I cannot accept the new section he intends to insert in the Bill.
Could I ask on a point of clarification on just what Deputy Shatter has said, is amendment No. 35 merely a cosmetic amendment to take out the figure 1?
It may very well be but, as I understand the intention of what the Minister is doing it is that he intends to delete the entirety of section 6 and replace it with his own section.
That is not so. Subsection (1) of section 6——
I just want it clarified in case there is a misunderstanding of amendment No. 35 and what it means.
Chairperson
Is it the intention to withdraw subsection (1) of section 6 in its entirety?
It is the intention as I understand it to leave section 6 as simply incorporating the first three lines and to create a new section 7 simply to keep them apart for reasons within the Bill.
That is right.
That clarifies what the Minister is intending to do. May I first of all take section 6 (1) which effectively the Minister intends to retain, although from what I understood from his remarks it seemed to me that that was not the case. That provision basically, as the Minister correctly says, expressly states what is the current law, which is that it relieves a spouse of the duty to cohabit with the other spouse when a decree of separation is granted. The Minister, as I understood it expressed some reservations about that. If he wishes to retain subsection (1) we are not in conflict about that. He appears, however, to wish to delete subsections (2) and (3). Subsection (2) seeks to provide that following the grant of a decree of separation, a husband and wife can at any future date by consent apply to a court to rescind the decree and that the court will be able to rescind or set aside the separation decree if it is satisfied that a reconciliation has taken place between the husband and wife and they wish to continue to reside together as husband and wife. If that is the case and the decree is set aside as a result of subsection (3) the court will then have powers to make any ancillary orders it deems necessary in the context of other financial property orders that may have been made in the original separation proceedings. That sets out the position clearly. It means, first, if a couple reconcile following the grant of separation decree they can apply to the courts to have their separation decree set aside and, secondly, the courts can unravel the position with regard to court orders made which may have affected property or financial matters in a way which is deemed appropriate in the circumstances.
Subsection (3) deals with the issue the Minister said he was considering dealing with but which is not properly dealt with in his own proposed amendment. The Minister says he is considering introducing an amendment as to whether the court should be able to make other orders. The reality of the Minister's amendment in the context of what would happen after a decree has been set aside is that it is not clear as to what would be the property or financial consequences. It could very well be that property passed from one spouse to another might have been sold and the court would have to look at the overall circumstances as to what orders should be made so that dealings that were taking place with regard to property, following a grant of a separation but prior to a reconciliation were not unravelled and created major problems for third parties. Subsection (3) adequately confers a wide discretion on the court to confront that issue. The Minister's relevant amendment, which would be in subsection (4) of his new section, does not adequately deal with this and that is recognised by the Minister in his comments.
The Minister's proposal is extraordinary for a number of reasons and would create a number of very serious problems. First, the Minister proposes in subsection (2) that where both spouses agree to the discharge of a judicial separation they may jointly execute a statutory declaration to that effect. In other words, the Minister is proposing that despite a court order having been made, a couple could at any time simply by executing a statutory declaration set aside the effect of that court order and, in effect, set aside financial and property orders made which may have affected other people for many years, without any court having to review any of those arrangements at all.
What is even more dangerous about this proposal is the manner it could apply to wives who have been subject to violence over the years and who remain in fear of their husbands after a separation decree has been granted. It would mean that a violent husband who has beaten up his wife for a number of years and who resisted the granting of a separation decree could, following the granting of a separation decree, terrorise his wife into co-operating with him without any judicial supervision, without any protection of the courts, in simply swearing a statutory declaration before some lawyer they may never have seen before and in effect set aside all the protections the courts had granted her.
In the context of any court orders made, I have never come across a suggestion in any sphere of law, be it family law or other areas of law, that two people who had been involved in the granting of court decrees could, by a simple declaration, without judicial supervision and without ensuring that the vulnerable spouse was adequately protected, simply set aside the order privately themselves. That is a most inimicable suggestion and would place at risk many wives who would use this Bill to seek to obtain protections that they may currently not be able to obtain.
Subsection (3) is even more extraordinary. The Minister proposes that if a decree of separation is granted because a marriage has irretrievably broken down, neither the husband nor the wife who has sought the decree would regard that separation decree as bringing some degree of finality to their marital situation unless, voluntarily, the husband and wife can get together and resolve their differences. They would regard the granting of a decree as a degree of security and providing a degree of certainty in their lives in the future. They would regard the granting of a separation decree as the final courtroom or judicial act that recognises the collapse of their marriage and they would hope that such a decree would mean that never again need they involve themselves in contested court proceedings with their husband or their wife.
Under the Minister's proposal, following the granting of a separation decree, it would be open to either a husband or a wife who wished to do so simply because they were embittered or because they wanted to engage in a war of attrition with the other spouse or because they were mentally unwell, to bring, annually, their husband or wife back into court on individual applications to have a separation decree set aside. Instead of resolving matters for all time, subsection (3) could create a situation in which a marital conflict between a husband and wife could never be finally resolved by the courts. It would always be open to either party, following the granting of a separation decree, to apply to the court on a regular basis — on a six monthly or annual basis — to have the decree set aside. A wife or a husband could find themselves embroiled in ongoing court separation proceedings for the rest of their lives, to which there would be absolutely no end in sight. That is the effect of the Minister's proposal in subsection (3).
The proposal contained in section 6 (2), as I have drafted it, is carefully designed to ensure that a couple who have managed to effect a reconciliation can, by consent, apply to court and, where there is a true reconciliation, they can have a decree of separation set aside. It leaves neither of them vulnerable to unilateral ongoing court applications being brought by a husband or wife bent on engaging in a war of attrition. Anyone who has any experience of dealing with family problems before the courts knows that a small number of couples find themselves embroiled every few weeks in court proceedings because one or other spouse is involved in seeking to effect revenge on the party to the marriage who succeeded in getting a barring order or a separation decree.
The Minister's proposed amendments, rather than seeking to help resolve marital problems, could greatly exacerbate the difficulties and would create the unprecedented situation whereby couples who have got decrees of separation could find that, endlessly, one spouse could keep on re-opening the marital battle and rubbing salt into the wounds of a broken marriage. That is a situation that cannot pertain under existing law. Under existing law, if a separation decree is granted it is not set aside by the courts except with the consent of both parties.
You cannot keep on re-opening separation proceedings. The Minister's proposal would allow them to be endlessly re-opened and would create a situation where a number of couples would find themselves before the court annually. This proposed amendment is the most extraordinary of all the proposals the Minister has brought before this committee.
My amendments raise two different issues. In respect of amendment No. 37 which proposes to amend section 6 (1), my only objection in relation to the present wording of subsection (1) is that the change it makes in the law, although appearing to be of no consequence, might have repercussions that we are at present not aware of. That is my only fear. I cannot say where or what those repercussions might be but it is good policy that unnecessary legislative changes should be avoided if at all possible. I do not regard the matter as a major issue and if it is not acceptable then that is fair enough. I am not going to ask you to vote on it.
What difference is there in the language contained in amendment No. 37? Surely all parties, applicant and respondent, to these proceedings must be be spouses. I cannot understand the basis of the need for changing the language. Is it based on some kind of precedent law?
It is a question of avoiding unnecessary legislative changes and the effects they might have. That is all that we are being cautious and careful about. I am not going to ask anybody to go to the line on it but I thought it was an amendment that would commend itself to the committee as a whole.
I agree we want to get the best result. I am still not quite clear of the major point at issue here. The section as it stands deals with a sort of mutuality situation, that each spouse is no longer obligated to cohabit with the other whereas the Minister's amendment simply provides that the applicant is no longer required to cohabit with the respondent and does not provide that mutuality. There is obviously some reason you are putting in that and I am still not quite clear on what it is.
Under the existing law the applicant does not have to cohabit with the respondent but it does not necessarily mean then that the respondent has to cohabit with the applicant. It is confusing.
It seems at first sight a sort of logical conclusion to a decree of judicial separation that neither spouse would have to cohabit with the other. There is obviously some thinking behind the Minister's amendment. Maybe it is well taken but I am just not quite clear on it.
Could we clarify this? It would seem that the Minister's amendment would give rise to a situation where it could be said that one spouse is obliged to cohabit with the other but the other is not obliged to cohabit with him. The effect of the separation decree here, we are saying, is that neither spouse, once the decree is granted, should be obliged to cohabit with the other. That is the provision in the existing subsection (1). It seems to me that that makes sense. There are no legal consequences beyond that that I can think of involved here.
We are not doubting what you say but we do not know whether there will be other things that might be down the road from that; we are not sure of what might happen. It was a question of being more careful and that is all. We are not pushing it.
We accept that there is no great difference. I would suggest to the Minister that his amendment is more dangerous than what is in the Bill
That is fair enough.
It does not oblige the applicant to cohabit with the respondent.
All I am doing is repeating existing law.
It is a bad law.
With regard to the second matter, which is a matter of more substantive nature, first, there will be cases where a couple will agree to come together again. In most of those cases we can assume that they will also agree on any financial matters that would require to be settled between them. We all accept that. It would seem to me that the last thing such couples would want is to have to go before the court again to have the judicial separation decree discharged.
My amendment No. 43 is designed to cater for these cases. As I have already said, it would appear that under existing law a decree of divorce a mensa et thoracan be discharged by mere resumption of cohabitation. My worry is, apart from the cost involved, that a requirement to go before the court might discourage spouses who otherwise might come together from so doing. I would be prepared to consider at a later stage the question of providing extra formalities over and above those contained in the Statutory Declarations Act, 1938, in view of the important effects registration would have in the context of a decree.
Where there is for one reason or another an application to court to have a decree discharged, my amendment, in accordance with existing law, provides that either or both spouses may make such an application. The normal ground on which either of the parties will apply for discharge of decree is, of course, that the spouses have resumed cohabitation and the consent of the other spouse would be a feature of those applications. However, I have explained that my amendment also caters for certain cases where it might not be appropriate to require the consent of the other spouse to the discharge.
My amendment also makes it clear that following on the discharge of the decree of judicial separation, either or both spouses may apply to the court to vary or discharge any ancillary order made under Part II. An application to court would arise if, for some reason, one of the parties wished to have the ancillary order made by the court, varied or discharged, or if there was disagreement between the spouses on the financial terms of their reconciliation but not in regard to reconciliation itself.
On the particular question of allowing one spouse only to apply to court, I do not see and difficulty here as the court would discharge a decree or vary or discharge an ancillary order unless it was satisfied that it was right and proper to do so.
Chairperson
The Minister has concluded. I asked already for people to offer, they were not offering and I asked the Minister to conclude. The Minister has now concluded and I am now putting the question.
On a point of order, this is a Committee Stage and not a Report Stage.
Chairperson
This is correct and I asked for people to respond prior to calling the Minister and nobody offered. I am now putting the question: "That amendment No. 35 be made." Is that agreed?
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Tá |
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Abbott, Henry. |
de Valera, Sile. |
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Ahern, Dermot. |
Kitt, Michael P. |
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Collins, Gerard. |
O'Donoghue, John. |
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Níl |
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Barnes, Monica. |
McCartan, Pat. |
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Barrett, Seán. |
Shatter, Alan. |
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Colley, Anne. |
Taylor, Mervyn. |
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Flanagan, Charles. |
Taylor-Quinn, Madeline. |
Chairperson
Amendment No. 36 is out of order.
Chairperson
Amendments Nos. 39 and 40 are out of order.
Chairperson
Amendment No. 42 is out of order.
Chairperson
We have dealt with amendment No. 43. There is a question as to whether it is consequential.
Amendment No. 43 sought to replace section 6.
Amendment No. 43 is consequential.
Before we proceed to the next amendment, I wish to know if it can be taken because in section 1 it refers to a decree for judicial separation and in brackets (divorce a mensa et thoro). Section 1 was accepted. The Minister in his provision provides that after the commencement of this Act, no action shall lie for divorce a mensa et thoro. We have said that it is primarily called a decree of judicial separation under section 1. The Latin phrase is mensa et thoro.
In section 31 of the Bill we deal at a later stage with the impact on separation proceedings in being. It seems to me that the amendment, because of the way it is phrased, is now inconsistent with what has been accepted under section 1 already and the second part of it is more relevant to section 31 of the Bill than it would be at this stage. I ask the Minister in the context of debating the issue on section 31 if he would consider withdrawing this amendment at this stage and dealing with it under Part IV of the Bill. That might be more appropriate.
I am satisfied that it is in order. We have about two minutes left. We will leave it until the next day when we will deal with it expeditiously.
Chairperson
Is that agreed? Agreed.
The committee adjourned at 6 p.m. until 4 p.m. on Wednesday, 29 June 1988.