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Special Committee on the Judicial Separation And Family Law Reform Bill,1987 debate -
Thursday, 22 Sep 1988

SECTION 10.

Debate resumed on amendment No. 81:
In page 8, before section 10, to insert the following new section:
"14.—If while a decree of judicial separation is in force either of the spouses dies the surviving spouse shall be precluded from taking any share in the estate of the other spouse as a legal right or on intestacy.".
—(Minister for Justice.)

In regard to this issue, I again take the position so well put by Deputy Shatter. It is much more desirable that we should have a flexible approach to this and all the other issues surrounding the circumstances of litigation under this Bill. The Minister's proposal is totally inflexible and is unnecessarily so. The proposed provisions in the Bill allow the court, under section 10 (1) (g), to make an order extinguishing entirely — which is what the Minister believes should happen in all instances — or reducing the share of either party in the estate, provided that at the same time there is a corresponding decision being taken with regard to the disposal of lump sums of money and transfer of property between the parties. That is a much more sensible way to approach this issue.

We are talking about the breakdown of marriage but, thanks to the political manoeuvres of a number of parties during the debate and campaign on the proposed amendment to the Constitution which would have allowed the introduction of divorce, we are left in the position where we are not dealing with the absolute dissolution of marriage. We are dealing with an interim situation that in many respects is fallacious. The Minister used that term in suggesting that this provision in Deputy Shatter's Bill exposes a fallacy about this legislation. If fallacies exist they are primarily the production of the Minister's party, it is because of that that we are in this position. We are trying to achieve legislation that will work as best it can, given the rather ridiculous position of family law in Ireland. Consequently the proposal in section 10 (1) (g), of the Bill, which is related to section 12, is clearly in keeping with the overall intent and direction of the legislation.

As I understand the law, the provisions that are there, reflect closely the existing legal situation under the succession laws, which is something we should seek to achieve. It begs the question: why are Fianna Fáil seeking to introduce this absolute provision into the legislation? The possible answer to that, in part at least, is to ensure that the legislation in the most part would, if passed in the way they now want to draft and construct it, make it virtually unworkable and unusable as far as the non-working spouses of marriages are concerned and, in particular, the spouses of many smallholders in rural areas in Ireland. Think for a moment of the choice a dependent non-working woman would have to make if the Minister's amendment was accepted. She may be living in an unreasonable and unworkable marriage and has to decide whether she can proceed along the lines of the remedies available to her under this legislation but realises that if she does she immediately, irretrievably and irrevocably cuts herself off from any hope of inheriting at a later stage any portion or part of the assets of either the family home — as is the case in many working class areas — or the land as is the case with regard to smallholders and substantially non-productive farms in rural areas.

Not just working class, if the Deputy must introduce class.

I have no hesitation in introducing class but I have no doubt that my concept of class is far more inclusive and embracing than Deputy Barnes' would be exclusive and untenable.

That remark is uncalled for.

(Interruptions.)

Chairperson

Deputy McCartan to proceed please.

We will leave definitions of class outside the room.

Chairperson

Please confine your remarks to the amendment before you Deputy.

I am confining my remarks to the amendment.

Chairperson

Do you want a social debate?

I am trying in some way to assuage Deputy Barnes' concern about my remarks and to hold her with me — or I could stay with her because I think we are ad idem on this legislation. We should try to address our minds to why this very absolute, inflexible amendment is being introduced by Fianna Fáil at this stage. It is well worth examining that as closely as we possibly can, I had noted on my paper the word “pernicious” but Deputy Shatter borrowed it in advance. It is a very clever piece of footwork on the part of Fianna Fáil designed to do down this legislation virtually entirely and certainly to make it impossible legislation as far as non-working dependent wives are concerned wherever they be or from whatever class they come.

Sitting suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed at 2 p.m.

In the constructive climate that we are now working in I will not take up much time. It is important to state that the position Deputies Pat McCartan and Alan Shatter referred to is totally misplaced. It would be particularly threatening for women and would be a grave disincentive to dependent spouses, the majority of whom are women, if they believed that their rights under the Succession Act were at risk. We could actually end up in a very dangerous situation if a woman, even though she desperately needed for her own peace of mind and the safety of her family, proceeded with a judicial separation, lost out on all succession rights. She would remain in what is a totally unacceptable situation. I want to point out to the special committee, and to Deputy McCartan in particular, who referred to certain classes of women, that most women in Ireland, from a traditional point of view and because they did not have the opportunity to work until very recently outside the home, are dependents. It does not matter what stratum they come from, unless they are among the very privileged and very wealthy, of whom there are few, all of them are in that vulnerable position. It is not a matter of class; it is a matter of the dependency of the spouse. We saw that the fears and intimidation of women in regard to their succession rights registered very strongly during the divorce referendum campaign. They were frightened of losing them. This is a matter of absolute essential right and protection for women most of whom are dependent spouses within the home. I want to point out the enormity of the damage that would do to women and the dangerous, difficult and disincentive position it would put them in if they had to try to weigh up losing their rights under the Succession Act against staying in an untenable situation. I know all members will identify with those sentiments.

There is one small point I want to make. This Bill gives the court discretion to allow a spouse to retain his or her succession rights as an alternative to making property orders. The court would exercise this discretion under the Bill, not only where there is no property available for distribution between the spouses on the granting of the decree but even where there is property available for distribution. There would not be the same objection to Deputy Shatter's proposal if the court could exercise this power only where there was no property available at the time of the granting of the decree. In that case, the likelihood of there being property available for distribution at the time of the other's death is only a remote possibility.

My main opposition to the proposal in the Bill is the fact that under it the court is being given a discretion to refuse to make a property order even where there is property available for re-distribution and to allow a spouse to retain a future right to a share in that property, a share which might never be realised for the reasons I have already adverted to. I do not think any of us really expects a spouse to keep his or her estate intact in these circumstances so that the other spouse will realise a share. I believe, very genuinely, that my amendment, if considered as I would like it to be, maturely and responsibly, as a similar proposal by the Law Reform Commission, could very adequately deal with the present situation.

Amendment No. 89 in my name reads:

In page 10, lines 12 to 14, to delete "save in circumstances where a spouse has been guilty of gross matrimonial misconduct".

As section 12 stands the court is given the power to consider whether there have been orders made under section 10 (1) (b), (e) and (f), where the court is extinguishing or reducing a statutory share under the Succession Act. I believe that when the court is considering all the aspects of an application under any of these sections, or subsections, it will take into account, the conduct of both parties. It is unnecessary to include those words at the end of that section. They go contrary to the thrust of the Bill which is not to have orders awarded on the basis of matrimonial misconduct but on the basis of irretrievable breakdown. When I read it, I found that it grated. There may well be a very important reason why it has to be retained. I am not aware of the reason. All I can say is that I do not think it is necessary in this context. It is still open to the court to have regard to the conduct of both parties. Besides that, a phrase such as "gross matrimonial misconduct", is open to all sorts of definitions. It is a very wide phrase which some judges might interpret in a rather narrow way while others might give it a much wider meaning. While I agree with the thrust of section 12 — I will go on to deal with that in a moment — I do not believe that the last phrase, "save in circumstances" and so on should be included because it is outmoded and is not in keeping with the principles of the Bill. I do not intend to say more on that.

In brief, in relation to the Minister's amendment, it is a grave mistake on his part to introduce it. It would be slightly different if he had done so and also introduced an amendment which imposed a duty on the court to make an order in favour of a spouse receiving property, dividing property or receiving a lump sum. In other words, that there would be some allocation to the spouse who is losing rights or could be seen to be in need and is losing rights under the Succession Act. As it stands, the Minister's amendment if it is accepted could force the court to order the sale of the family home where no other property exists. We have agreed that the majority of separations occur in very modest and moderate households. The only asset, effectively, may be the house and it may not be practicable to capitalise that until the death of one or other party. On the other hand, if it is to be the only means of maintaining the spouse who is in need of maintaining, the court may feel obliged if it realises there is no possibility of succeeding on the death of the husband, in the majority of cases, to order the sale of the family home. I do not think that is a progressive move. There is no way to fully protect one spouse from the other one dissipating their assets, or arranging the disposal of property. As Deputy Shatter has said, one can advise on what the dangers are and what the best way around them is, but there is not any way to fully protect. The Minister has stated in his contribution that he believes that under this amendment the spouse in need of maintenance would be fully protected. I do not understand how he can possibly say that. However, I do not think it needs going into in any great detail because a number of us have dealt with it.

Another member, perhaps Deputy O'Donoghue, raised the issue of a partner to a marriage who had disappeared long ago after an agreement or a separation order had been made and on the death of the remaining spouse, appeared again in order to succeed under the Succession Act. All I can say is that if it was a term of the original separation agreement, or if it was a term of the order that the court made, there is no reason to object to that partner coming back. That will have been agreed to by each spouse at the time of the agreement or it will have been ordered by the court. I do not think that is a reason for excluding in every case the right to succession.

In conclusion, I think that while the Bill itself does not protect spouses in the extreme — it simply cannot completely protect spouses — it goes a long way towards making sure that the spouse in need of maintenance gets a fair crack of the whip, a chance to succeed in addition to other property settlements, if that be the decision of the court. The Minister mentioned that the Bill provided that the right to succession was an alternative. As I read it, it is an alternative and an additional right that may be conferred by the court. It is wide enough to include many spouses who will be in need of succeeding under the Succession Act because the settlements available at the time of the court order will simply not be sufficient.

I oppose the Minister's amendment. His amendment is suitable only where you are talking about divorce law because he is implying that a contract is ending and that you settle everything when the contract ends. We are talking here about judicial separation where people separate but the marriage contract is still in place. The provisions included in Deputy Shatter's Bill are sensible, because he is very conscious of the fact that when people separate other people have to continue on living. If you are left in a situation where there is a small family and if the separated spouse dies, what is to happen to the wife and children if there is no income coming into the house? I do not see why because people separate they have to be relieved of any contractual liabilities they may have had when they entered into marriage. Therefore the Minister's proposal is suitable only for divorce law. It is not suitable for judicial separation. Also the provision in section 12 "save in circumstances where a spouse has been guilty of gross matrimonial misconduct" meets the point made by Deputy O'Donoghue. If somebody has disappeared and has ignored his responsibility and if the wife perhaps had something in an estate after her death, that person would not necessarily gain the benefits. That point is covered by what Deputy Shatter has included in section 12, which I think is very sensible.

The last thing to remember here is that, when you have a judicial separation, you do not have the automatic right of remarrying. In divorce law when they settle their affairs and the contract ends, people can go off and get remarried and can enter into new financial arrangements, but that will not happen in this instance. I cannot see the logic in the argument being put forward by the Minister and the Fianna Fáil Party on this. It is not a question of trying to be soft on people who ignore their responsibilities. There are the realities and Deputy Shatter, through his professional experience, has seen that. I would like to compliment him on the amount of thought that has gone into the provisions both in section 10 and section 12. They show a great deal of compassion. At the end of the day when all of these unfortunate events are completed in the courts, people have to continue living. I do not see why somebody should be entitled not to leave any of his or her estate to the spouse whom he or she was separated from, particularly where children are involved. I urge this committee to think very strongly about the Minister's amendment and, rather than have a vote on it, we should recognise that perhaps the idea being put forward by the Minister is not feasible and we should proceed with the Bill on the basis on which Deputy Shatter has presented it.

I should like to respond briefly to two matters raised by Deputy Colley. She was perfectly correct in responding to what the Minister said when he seemed to suggest that a court might allow someone simply to retain inheritance rights as an alternative or as a substitute for a property transfer order or a lump sum payment order. That is not the way the Bill is drafted. It would be quite possible for a court, bearing in mind the overall financial circumstances of a couple, to both make a property transfer order and allow a wife to retain her inheritance rights or a husband to retain his, or to make a property transfer order and not permit a retention of inheritance rights, depending on the circumstances. The way the Minister put it immediately after lunch is not a true reflection of the position as it arises under the Bill.

I do not wish to delay the committee further by repeating other issues raised. Deputy Barrett just now very adequately responded to the point made by Deputy O'Donoghue, and that response is one of the reasons why, in thanking Deputy Colley for her support throughout, I have to say I cannot accept her amendment for section 12 where she proposes the removal of the words "save in circumstances where a spouse has been guilty of gross matrimonial misconduct". The Deputy is correct in saying the general thrust of the Bill and what this Bill seeks to do is to remove in so far as is possible the bitterness and upset that arises when marriages break down and seek to move away from people pointing accusing fingers at each other.

There are, however, very extreme circumstances in which there may not be property transfer orders or anything that can or should be made in which in all equity and justice it would be right that someone loses his or her inheritance rights and Deputy O'Donoghue's example was the classical example where a husband perhaps deserted his wife 20 years ago and went off to Australia never to be heard of again. Under the Bill if it was not possible for the courts to end his inheritance rights under the granting of a decree in the way provided for in section 12 in conjunction with the relevant subsection in section 10, he would retain them. There must be a residual discretion on the part of the courts to deal with very extreme conduct and to end inheritance rights in circumstances where it is not appropriate that there should be any readjustment of property. That is the rationale behind this. In an ideal world when marriages break down no one would be to blame. I suppose in an ideal world no one's marriage would ever break down, but it is desirable that the court should be left with some discretion in this area and, accordingly, I cannot agree to Deputy Colley's amendment to section 12.

Amendment put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 4; Níl, 8.

  • Ahern, Dermot.
  • Kitt, Tom.
  • Collins, Gerard.
  • O’Donoghue, John.

Níl

  • Barnes, Monica.
  • Flanagan, Charles.
  • Barrett, Seán.
  • McCartan, Pat.
  • Bell, Michael.
  • Shatter, Alan.
  • Colley, Anne.
  • Taylor-Quinn, Madeline.
Amendment declared lost.
Amendment No. 82 not moved.

Since amendment No. 81 has not been accepted by the Committee and since my amendments Nos. 84 and 90 are drafted on the basis of amendment No. 81 being accepted, and amendments Nos. 83 and 85 are related to amendments Nos. 84 and 90, I do not propose to move amendments Nos. 83 to 85 or amendment No. 90.

Amendments Nos. 83 to 85, inclusive, not moved.
NEW SECTION.

Chairperson

We move to amendment No. 86 in the name of the Minister. It is a new section and an acceptance of this amendment in conjunction with amendments Nos. 44 and 46 which have already been accepted, involves the deletion of section 31 of the Bill.

I move amendment No. 86:

In page 8, before section 10, to insert the following new section:

"19.—A decree of divorce a mensa et thoro shall, for the purpose of enabling a spouse to make an application under section 16 or 17, be regarded as a decree of judicial separation and those sections shall apply accordingly.”.

The purpose of amendment No. 86 is to allow persons who have obtained a decree of divorce a mensa et thoro to apply to court if they wish, under the new financial property provisions in Part II of the Bill. Under the Bill it would be open to persons who have separation agreements to apply for a judicial separation and any ancillary order as to maintenance, lump sums, and property alike. It is unlikely that a court would upset any financial arrangements freely entered into by the parties by means of a separation agreement or otherwise. Neither is the court likely to change a previous order in separation proceedings for payment of alimony or maintenance except in exceptional circumstances. Nevertheless, there appears to be merit in enabling a judicially separated spouse to make an application under Part II of the Bill for any part of the financial provisions which the court may order under that Part. The amendment would, incidentally, substitute for section 31 (4) of the Bill. That subsection provides that existing proceedings are to be converted into judicial separation proceedings.

It was pointed out by the Minister of State, Deputy Calleary, when dealing with amendment No. 44, that section 31 (4) is against general practice and may well be constitutionally unsound. The amendment which now stands part of the Bill means that actions for divorce a mensa et thoro initiated before the passing of the new legislation may be continued after the passing of the legislation. However, on being granted such a decree, or at any time thereafter, it would be open to a dependent spouse to apply for any of the ancillary orders under Part II of the Bill. Another possibility is that a spouse may withdraw an application for a decree of divorce a mensa et thoro and apply for a judicial separation and any ancillary orders under the new legislation. Under the amendment I am proposing, together with amendment No. 44 which has been accepted, both those who have already been granted a decree of divorce a mensa et thoro and those who are in the process of obtaining one will be in a position to apply for financial and property orders under Part II of the Bill. This would not be the case under the Bill. Acceptance of the amendment in conjunction with the earlier acceptance of amendments Nos. 44 and 46 involves the deletion of section 31 of the Bill.

There is a procedural problem with this amendment, because amendment No. 86 is consequent on amendments that would have inserted new sections 16 and 17 under amendments Nos. 83 and 84 which the Minister has now withdrawn. We cannot take amendment No. 86 because of the reference to sections 16 and 17. Perhaps that could be clarified for me.

Chairperson

Considering that the Minister has withdrawn his earlier amendments, by leave of the committee we can amend the Minister's amendment, to make it relevant to the Bill as it now stands.

I will deal now with the substance of the amendment. There is a problem with this amendment which I will explain. The Minister previously talked about the need for a degree of certainty in people's lives. There was no doubt that what he said about inheritance would have produced a certainty and that nobody, having got a decree of separation, would retain his or her inheritance rights. The type of certainty he was talking about was not a certainty that appealed to me or to the majority of the members of the committee. There is a need for a degree of certainty in people's lives in particular when marriages break down. There is a need to ensure that, many years after a marriage has broken down and a couple have gone to court and had their matrimonial dispute resolved by the courts, it cannot be totally reopened.

The Bill as originally drafted sought to retain the following position. As the law currently stands, a wife or a husband may have attained a decree of divorce a mensa et thoro, a decree of separation, and following the granting of the separation decree, the courts would normally make an alimony order although they may have made a maintenance order under the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act, 1976. It is always, under the current law, open to a wife who has an alimony order or a wife who was not originally given one, to come back to court later on and look for alimony or for increased alimony when there is a change in financial circumstances.

When this Bill is enacted, there will be many couples who, in years gone by, some going back two or three years and some going back 15, 20 and 25 years, could then have got a divorce a mensa et thoro and it may be that the husband is paying a sum of maintenance to his wife by way of support payment. Both the husband and wife would have totally rearranged their lives on the basis of court orders obtained by them long ago. The husband and the wife may each have become owners of property or acquired new property. One or other of them may have different relationships, or one or other may be in different financial circumstances. The protection the current law gives to the wife is that if she is dependent she can still come back to court and look for increased maintenance. She is protected to the extent that she knows that the husband cannot make a claim as against her property during her lifetime. The husband is protected under the law knowing that she cannot make claims to his.

It seems that the problem with this amendment is that it seeks to unravel the impact of all existing court orders and seeks to unravel the lives of every couple in the country who have gone through the court system and who have already attained a decree of divorce a mensa et thoro. The Bill as originally drafted and the particular provision the Minister referred to in the later section relating to the courts, ensured that following the passage of the Bill any wife who had an alimony order would be able under the new provisions of the Bill to seek to vary her maintenance or her alimony order or she would be entitled to go to court and look for maintenance. This amendment would create a position where if, for example, a decree of separation was granted 20 years ago, a wife could now come into court and claim ownership rights in a variety of different properties. It might be a family farm or any property that the husbands had acquired in the intervening period of 20 years when the parties were living apart, alternatively the husband could come in and claim rights in property that the wife had acquired in the intervening period.

With regard to the laws relating to civil damages, some time ago, for example we changed our laws as to the maximum amount of compensation that someone could get for distress caused as a result of injury to a close relation. It is not normally the position that, once somebody has been through the courts, they can go back to court to look for an increased sum because the law has changed. There is a problem with this provision. I could argue that it might be right that in certain circumstances someone should be able to make such a claim as well. It is not all black and white. There is a problem with it. As this provision is currently drafted it means where a decree of divorce a mensa et thoro was granted 20 years ago, one of two people whose marriage ended and who had little or no contact with each other in 20 years, could now go back to the courts and start making claims to the property of the other. The Minister may say that the courts would not necessarily grant those claims. It is correct to say that the courts may not, but under these provisions that is not certain. It could mean that every couple whose marital controversy has been resolved between them under existing law, be it under the law as it was last year or the law as it was 20 years ago, could be put in a position where one forces the other to refight a marital battle. That might be of great benefit to lawyers. Lawyers might start sifting through their files in their offices to see if they could find the names of every husband and wife they have represented for the last 40 years to write to them and say: “You might not have done so well 30 or 40 years ago but we can get you the extra few bob now”. It is a recipe for creating all sorts of problems in the lives of people who have for long resolved their matrimonial controversy. That is why I am concerned about this provision. The Bill as originally drafted preserves the rights to alimony, but it does not allow people whose problems have been, as they understood it, for once and all time resolved by the courts to reopen old wounds. The problem with this is that it goes further than the current Bill prescribes and will, I think, result in the opening of many old wounds.

In all of the representations I have received about this Bill it has not been suggested to me by any group or organisation that it is desirable that this Bill should have that effect, that it will allow people to reopen matrimonial controversies which have long since been dealt with by the courts. One could argue that in some instances it would be just that people should be allowed to do so because this Bill provides for additional protections. There is a problem here. Perhaps we should think about this on Report Stage and allow the courts to consider again the circumstances where decrees of divorce a mensa et thoro may have been made within three, four or five years of the coming into force of the Bill as opposed to allowing people to go back many years. Maybe as a matter of policy we should not allow it to be reopened. What appears to be a simplistic provision could open a hornets’ nest of major family problems for many people. Because of that I oppose this provision. I feel that rather than introducing certainty it will sow confusion.

Finally, it will provide the foundation to give the small number of people who want to engage in an ongoing matrimonial war of attrition with their spouses with an additional excuse to drag distraught wives and distraught husbands into the courts. It may be that at the end of it all those people will not benefit by way of court orders but it will put those distraught wives and husbands through the trauma and expense of refighting old matrimonial battles they thought had long since been dealt with.

With regard to the procedure, can I assume that this amendment, when properly amended further, refers to sections 15 and 16 of the existing Bill?

I presume it will have to refer to section 10.

Chairperson

I understand it would actually relate to section 10. If the committee agrees to amend the Minister's amendment then we can relate it to section 10.

What I was going to suggest, and it might be helpful to the committee, was having regard to what was said by Deputy Shatter and bearing in mind my own position here — my amendment provides us with a desirable provision though not a necessary one — I would be prepared to withdraw the amendment, have a look at it and maybe talk about it again on Report Stage if I think that is necessary.

I welcome that. A median ground should be found here. It is a question of perhaps finding a cut off date to allow for proceedings determined in the relatively recent past to be reviewed in the light of this new legislation.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment No. 87:

In page 9, subsection (1) (m), line 32, after "proper", to insert "or, in the alternative, an order for the division of the family home so as to allow both parties to the marriage to reside there separately on such conditions as the court deems proper.".

The reason I have inserted this amendment is that I do not believe that the Bill as it stands allows for all the possible permutations of a division of property or of the family home. The Bill, at section 10 (1) (m), allows for an order determining which party shall have the right to continue to reside in the family home or to make an order for the sale of the family home. There are cases where the marriage has broken down and the couple wish to live separately but it may be, because of the nature of the property involved, that it is possible to divide it in such a way that they can live separately and that they agree to do so. As it stands it would not be open to the court to make such an order. I am not suggesting that the court should look for such a solution to people's problems but that it would be on the application of either or both parties that the court could make such an order.

I might also add that in some cases it would be very desirable that the parents of children of such a marriage should be in reasonable close contact with their children and such an arrangement might allow for it. Of course it is always within the context that it is agreed between the parties. It should not be open to the court on the application of one party to make an order that the house be divided against the wishes of the other but I think it is reasonable to allow for such an occurrence.

I would like to make two points. I think what Deputy Colley has said is correct. The courts should not be allowed, and it would not be practical for them, to require a couple whose marriage has broken down to divide up the family home and live under the one roof. That is the reason there is not such a provision, as she is now proposing, contained in the Bill. The amendment she is proposing would, in its present form, allow the court to do that. This would be an alternative order that a court could make. As a result a wife or a husband who sought a separation decree could, where a judge might feel that he would like to keep them under the one roof, be forced into a situation where a court order is made to divide up the family home in a way that neither the husband nor the wife may wish to happen. For that reason I would have to oppose this proposal. I think it would create major problems.

I very much agree with Deputy Colley — in a small number of instances I have seen it happen in practice under the current law — that where the husband and the wife may own a large house which lends itself to being converted into two self-contained flats, by agreement they may agree to so proceed. If they do agree to so proceed, even under the current law it is possible to have a consent court order made to that effect. If a couple had issued court proceedings under this Bill and they resolved, by agreement, the financial and property controversies between them and asked the court to make consent orders, there would be no difficulty in the court, by consent, noting that it has been agreed between the parties that the house be divided, making that a rule of court and making it enforceable if one of them reneges on it.

I am afraid the amendment as tabled by Deputy Colley could result in judges forcing people who are clearly incompatible to divide their family home into two self-contained units and to require them to still, in a sense, live under the one roof in those circumstances. I do not think that is workable. What Deputy Colley is trying to provide for will be able to happen as a matter of practice. I think this provision could result in some judges forcing it to happen in circumstances where either the husband or the wife, or in some instances both of them, does not wish it to happen.

Briefly, I can accept the principle of the amendment as moved by Deputy Colley. Paragraph (a) of my amendment No. 84 covers the matter raised in Deputy Colley's amendment. Both amendments would empower the court to make an order for the partition of the family home in appropriate cases. We have no difficulty with it.

In the light of what Deputy Shatter has said I reserve the right to bring it back on Report Stage, have another look at it and see whether I am satisfied that it would be able to be properly covered in the rules of court or whether in some way it could be incorporated in the Bill on Report Stage. I will not press it at this stage.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I move amendment No. 88:

In page 9, subsection (4), line 45, after "section", to insert "unless a party to the marriage wilfully conceals information relevant to the assessment of such property or estate on that occasion.".

This is an amendment to section 10 (4) and the reason I seek to insert these words is that I believe in certain circumstances when property settlements are being made or when orders are being made in court that property or information is concealed and I am not happy that this is properly dealt with in the Bill. The amendment, as I have drafted it, would allow the court in making an order in connection with a judicial separation to set aside the one occasion rule if information is being wilfully concealed and that information can be taken into account if the information relates to property existing at the time — I think that it is implicit in the amendment — and not, as Deputy Shatter referred to earlier, to property that was obtained or accrued after the separation. This would relate to property of the marriage or of the parties to the marriage at the time of the separation. It is important that that should be said. Otherwise the once only rule could be very harsh on a spouse who applies for a judicial separation and obtains a settlement of property or a lump sum in the belief that there is a certain amount of money or property available. The judge would make a decision accordingly and if the spouse finds later on that this was not the case she or he would be very much disadvantaged. I do not believe that that is in keeping with the principle underlying the Bill. Therefore, I feel it is reasonable to include these words.

This is a most helpful amendment. I very much take the point made by Deputy Colley. It may be discovered subsequent to a court hearing that someone has wilfully concealed property ownerships and in those circumstances there could be difficulty in having the matter reopened. In a circumstance where someone has dealt fraudulently with a court there is a general common law rule which would allow you to reopen proceedings and rather than leaving that as an implicit part of the common law I am quite happy to accept this amendment. I think it is a helpful amendment.

The one thing that did occur to me about it, and we might all look again on Report Stage at whether we should add something to it, is whether we should make it clear that where it refers to "unless a party to the marriage wilfully conceals information relevant to the assessment" it can only be reopened on one occasion after such wilful concealment has been established and it does not leave an Open Sesame situation. My view would be that any court approaching it logically would so interpret it. We might look at it again on Report Stage to see if we can fine tune it but I am happy to accept the amendment.

This is a very sensible amendment and one we should support.

In the temporary absence of the Minister I wish to put our view. Subsection (4) of section 10 proposes that the court should have power to make orders in relation to property once only following the granting of a decree of judicial separation. Our view is that subsection (4) is unnecessarily restrictive. Our amendment No. 94 expressly provides for the variation and discharge of all orders in relation to property with the exception of those concerning the transfer of property. Our amendment would empower the court where it thinks it proper to do so, and having regard to any change in the circumstances and to any new evidence, to vary or discharge a property adjustment order for the settlement of property or for a variation of the settlement, an order in relation to occupation of the family home or an order for the sale of the property. However, to allow for the subsequent variation or discharge of property transfer orders would be very undesirable and would give rise to grave problems.

The policy of the law should be that such orders be regarded as res judicata.The same difficulties do not arise in the case of settlements. In effect, what Deputy Colley is trying to deal with are judgments or orders obtained by fraud. This is an entirely different question and one that can be dealt with by the courts under their existing equitable powers of jurisdiction. In the type of case envisaged it would be open to the aggrieved party to seek to have the order of the court set aside and the court could make whatever order would be just and equitable in the circumstances. For those reasons we think it would be better to leave the matter sought to be dealt with by Deputy Colley in her amendment to the courts general jurisdiction which we have just mentioned.

It would probably be desirable to leave it to general equitable remedies, if we did not have this particular provision in subsection (4) of the Bill. We are proposing this amendment to simply try to improve on that subsection, which in itself is somewhat unique.

If we are going to put in this amendment, we would nearly have to put it into every section in all legislation. We have to rely on the court. Ultimately, if it is found out that they have obtained an order by fraud, the court will be more then interested to find out how it was obtained. This amendment is slightly unnecessary.

I understand there are other powers available to the court to deal generally with the fraudulent obtaining of orders. Subsection (4) quite clearly states that the court shall only on one occasion consider and determine whether an order or orders should be made etc. We do not find such an express provision in many other pieces of legislation. Therefore, I think it is quite proper that we insert something that will redress that in cases where there might be some doubt. Deputy Shatter has agreed to support the amendment and I thank him.

In relation to this phrase "on only one occasion", it may very well happen that in future years the court may find it necessary to look a second time at these orders because something has come to light. I am wondering why Deputy Shatter seeks just to include "on only one occasion".

It is not just if something comes to light that I am referring to. It is where one party wilfully conceals information.

It is for the very reason that Members opposite have given in support of other provisions which is that there must be some degree of certainty and finality. The general rule is — and this is the approach taken in practically every other country in the world that deals with this area by way of legislation — that the court looks at the overall financial circumstances at the time it gets notice that the marriage has broken down and makes a decision, bearing in mind the entire financial background of the parties, on whether it is correct to make property transfer orders or not and having had a full disclosure of the various properties and ownerships of the couple then makes orders. They are then both free to deal with their properties for the future and they are not left, as I said earlier, with the Sword of Damocles hanging over their heads that maybe every few months their ownership rights could be reopened. The only areas normally left open to variation are ongoing periodical financial payments, be they monthly or weekly maintenance payments. As a general rule that is why it is provided that the court will only deal with this issue once.

I made the point that the ordinary common law or laws of equity would normally allow where there is proof of fraud someone to reopen it. This measure will expressly contain this provision. I do not see that creating any difficulties and often in the area of family law it is better to express things fully rather than leave it for other areas of law to impinge on them by implication. This often means that people are unaware of the fact that they can reopen things. The way in which Deputy Colley has deliberately limited this provision, talking of wilful concealment, is of importance. Otherwise you could have a position where every few weeks someone engaged in a marital war of attrition would keep on going back to court saying that they discovered something else about their wife or husband. Quite clearly we are talking about grave misconduct in the eyes of the court and that is the only thing that will allow it to be reopened. It is correct in those circumstances that it should, but it should be constrained in the way that the amendment constrains it.

Amendment put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 8; Níl, 4.

  • Barnes, Monica.
  • Flanagan, Charles.
  • Barrett, Seán.
  • McCartan, Pat.
  • Bell, Michael.
  • Shatter, Alan.
  • Colley, Anne.
  • Taylor-Quinn, Madeline.

Níl

  • Ahern, Dermot.
  • Kitt, Tom.
  • Collins, Gerard.
  • O’Donoghue, John.
Amendment declared carried.
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