I propose to take Questions Nos. 106 to 108, inclusive, together.
In a recent response to a Parliamentary Question 13079/13 on 12th March, 2013, I advised that, to provide assurance on the financial information received from debtors and to enhance control over cash flows, particularly rental income, NAMA requires the appointment by certain significant debtors of independent monitors. The remit of these independent monitors is to ensure that financial information provided by debtors is consistent with the underlying books and records, particularly in terms of accounting for all rents receivable by the debtor from property held as security by NAMA and for the proper application of all approved expenses, working capital and capital expenditure and to evaluate and report to NAMA on the achievement of milestones agreed as part of the debtor’s commitment to repay amounts due to NAMA and in turn the taxpayer. These appointments are made by the debtors subject to NAMA’s satisfaction with the appointees and the debtor’s selection process, the level of proposed fees and the completion of a duty of care agreement with NAMA.
In a very limited number of cases, NAMA has also recommended and the debtor has agreed to the appointment of additional directors as a measure to enhance corporate governance. In such cases, NAMA may endorse a proposed board appointee by a debtor but the responsibilities of that appointee are as determined by company law.
NAMA is prohibited under Sections 99 and 202 of the NAMA Act from disclosing confidential information, which is specifically defined to include information relating to its debtors. Accordingly, the provision of information sought on debtor companies to which monitors and directors have been appointed by debtors would be in contravention of the NAMA Act.
