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COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS díospóireacht -
Thursday, 23 Oct 2003

Vol. 1 No. 30

2002 Annual Report of Comptroller and Auditor General and Appropriation Accounts.

Vote 30 - Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources -

Chapter 8.1.

Mr. Tuohy (Secretary General, Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources) called and examined.

Witnesses should be aware that they do not enjoy absolute privilege and be apprised as follows. As and from 2 August 1998, section 10 of the Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunities of Witnesses) Act 1997 grants certain rights to persons identified in the course of the committee's proceedings. These rights include the right to give evidence; the right to produce or send documents to the committee; the right to appear before the committee, either in person or through a representative; the right to make a written and oral submission; the right to request the committee to direct the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents; and the right to cross-examine witnesses. For the most part, these rights may be exercised only with the consent of the committee. Persons invited to appear before the committee are made aware of these rights and any persons identified in the course of proceedings who are not present may have to be made aware of them and provided with a transcript of the relevant part of the committee's proceedings if the committee considers it appropriate in the interests of justice.

Notwithstanding this provision in legislation, I remind members of the long-standing parliamentary practice to the effect that they should not comment on, criticise or make charges against a person outside the House, or an official, either by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable. They are also reminded of the provision contained in Standing Order 156, that the committee shall refrain from inquiring into the merits of a policy or policies of the Government, or a Minister of the Government, or the merits of the objectives of such policy or policies.

I welcome everybody this morning. I ask Mr. Brian Tuohy, Secretary General, Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, to introduce his officials.

Mr. Brendan Tuohy

I am accompanied by Ms Kathleen Magennis and Mr. Brendan Hogan from the finance unit, Mr. Damian Allen, assistant principal officer in forestry, Niall O'Donnchú, principal officer in telecommunications, and Sara White, Deputy Secretary General. I will be joined later by my colleagues, Cecil Beamish, assistant secretary in charge of marine and fisheries, Mr. Maurice Mullen in charge of the marine safety, Ms Úna Nic Goilla Choille, principal officer in finance and Mr. Niall Kelly, head of internal audit. Ours is a large department.

I ask Mr. Hurley to introduce his officials.

Mr. David Hurley

I am David Hurley from the organisation and management training division of the Department. I deal with the administrative budget. My colleague, Mr. Paul Byrne, is from the public expenditure division and he deals with the rest of the Vote. Mr. John Thompson and Ms Grainne O'Callaghan are from CMOD, the Centre for Management Organisation and Development.

I ask Mr. Purcell to introduce chapter 8.1.

Mr. John Purcell

Chapter 8.1 of the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General reads:

Forest Service - Development of IT Systems

Background

The concept of developing a Forest Inventory and Planning System (FIPS), was first considered by the Forest Service in 1993. Following consideration of the results of a pilot study carried out in 1994, the Forest Service, which is a Division of the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources (the Department), identified the continued absence of a national forest inventory and planning system as an impediment to securing optimum economic and social benefit from the forestry sector. In its 1996 Strategic Plan, it committed to developing a comprehensive inventory and planning system to provide geographical and environmental data on the national forest estate, for management, control and planning purposes. It was stated in the Operational Programme for Agriculture, Rural Development and Forestry (OPARDF) 1994-1999 that the compilation of an inventory which would entail identifying the location of forests together with their quality, species mix and production potential would also assist in ensuring the protection of forests from excessive or destructive exploitation. It was also felt that Geographic Information System (GIS) technology was the only realistic way in which Ireland could respond to requests from the European Commission for information on forestry resources, the development of which was largely funded by the Commission itself.

Projects Undertaken

Work on developing FIPS commenced in 1997. Five component projects were identified:

Forest Inventory Project

Classification

Ground Survey

Forest Planning Project - Soils Analysis

Forestry Grants and Premiums Administration System (GPAS)

Pilot Study

Main Contract

The Classification project entailed the establishment of a Geographic Information System using satellite imagery to locate, map, classify and quantify the area under forest in the country. It was envisaged that when this project was completed, digital maps, capable of being produced and read electronically, would be available showing the areas of the country under forest, and in addition would show the broad

categories of trees in each main forest.

The Ground Survey was to focus on the collection of volumetric inventory data to help produce statistically sound national data on, inter alia, production potential and entailed a more detailed analysis in which a representative sample of forests was to be surveyed for a range of information such as standing volume and timber production.

The Soils Analysis project entailed the undertaking of major research to establish the classification and productive potential of forest soils, which would assist in guiding the location and character of future afforestation by indicating the environmental, social, or economic sensitivity of areas proposed for afforestation. With the further integration of environmental data known to bodies such as the Office of Public Works, Fishery Boards and Dúchas, it was thought that the future planning of afforestation in the State would be greatly enhanced.

The purpose of the GPAS pilot study was to test the feasibility of transferring digital spatial data between remote locations, and in particular to integrate the Forest Service payments system/forestry classification system with forestry companies own map based systems, evaluate the results of this integration, and set up linkages with several County Councils.

The purpose of the GPAS main project was to develop a computerised system to pay forestry premiums and grants. The system which was to be map driven and capable of being used in remote locations, would also be compatible with the Forest Classification system through linkages with that system. Furthermore it would allow for the updating of the inventory records of the Forest Classification system by creating digital maps relating to new forests on which grants and premiums were being paid for the first time, which could be transferred over to that system. The system would also be compatible with the Land Parcel Identification System (LPIS) of the Department of Agriculture and Food which shows land parcels in receipt of EU payments in relation to a number of land uses including forage, setaside and arable. It was envisaged that the system when completed would enable the efficient payment of forest premiums, and provide effective controls to ensure that premiums would not be paid more than once on the same area of forest, or in respect of land on which the Department of Agriculture and Food had paid EU area based premiums. It would similarly enable that Department to check, using its computer system, that it was not paying any area based premiums relating to lands which were also attracting forestry premiums. The EU has introduced Regulations requiring the two Departments to carry out such cross checks, known as cross compliance checks, with effect from 1 January 2003.

Expenditure to end 2002 on the projects totalled €9.2m. This comprised costs in relation to contracts, computer hardware and software, licences, consultancy etc. but does not include Department staff costs.

The EU, under the OPARDF 1994-1999, undertook to fund 75% of the expenditure on FIPS.

Audit Findings

Time and Cost Overruns

There were significant time and cost overruns on the four projects undertaken as detailed in Table 8.1 and Table 8.2. The Ground Survey project was not undertaken.

Table 8.1 Time Overruns

Project

Planned Time (months)

Actual Time (months)

Status

Classification

11

53

Completed

Soils Analysis

36

77*

Not Yet Completed

GPAS - Pilot

15

37

Terminated Before Being Completed

GPAS - Main

13

19

Terminated Before Being Completed

*Latest projected time.

Table 8.2 Cost Overruns

Project

Contract Value

Contract Cost to 31 December 2002

€m

€m

Classification

2.00

3.00

Soils Analysis

2.17

2.70

GPAS - Pilot

0.30

0.55

GPAS - Main

0.85

1.45

Failure to Deliver Objectives

There were serious failures in relation to the GPAS project to deliver its intended objectives, and also some failures in relation to three of the other projects as follows:

While the Classification project did succeed in mapping areas under forest planted up to mid-1997, the data was not updated as envisaged, resulting in the Forest Service not having a complete and up to date picture of the national forest estate in digital format. It had been decided to achieve continuous updating through GPAS, but this functionality was not delivered, due to limitations in that system. Updating of the system will not be completed until a more sophisticated digitising component is developed which is being undertaken as part of a project which is due for completion at the end of 2004. While the lack of up to date data limited, to a degree, the use made of the system for planning, compiling reports on Ireland's compliance with environmental obligations, and answering queries from the public and a range of public and private entities, the new system was, according to the Department, a considerable improvement on the inventory records which had existed previously.

Department papers indicated that the completion of the national Inventory project, an integral part of which was the Forest Ground Survey, was considered vital if Ireland was to meet its national and international commitments to manage the country's forests in a manner consistent with the principles of Strategic Forest Management. While it was planned to commence the Ground Survey in 1998, it was delayed because of the transfer of staff resources to other elements of FIPS. Recently, the Department decided to commence the survey on a pilot basis.

The direction of the GPAS pilot study changed when it became apparent that the existing Forest Service grant administration database was not capable of being linked with the private forestry companies' computer systems. The study was terminated in November 2000, without having achieved its objectives. Essentially, it had been overtaken by the main GPAS project, which had commenced in January 1999. While no doubt some useful information was acquired, this fell short of what was expected when the contract was placed, and did not help in the planning and execution of the main GPAS contract to the extent that was envisaged. However the project did deliver a data capture/digitising tool that was used extensively in the main GPAS project.

The contract relating to the GPAS main project had to be terminated prematurely in March 2000 following the rejection by the Government Contracts Committee of a proposed extension to the contract which was estimated to cost €1.4m. The system delivered following termination of the GPAS main project, while capable of processing approximately 15,000 grant and premium payments each year, was limited in its functionality. It had been envisaged that data in the national Forest Classification system would be updated from the GPAS payments system as new forests were planted and as applicants were paid grants and premiums on these forests for the first time. However this updating has not taken place due to limitations in a digitising component, and so the data in the Classification system is incomplete, and cross checks with the Department of Agriculture and Food and the matching of all payments with discrete areas of land cannot be done electronically. The effectiveness of what was seen as a vital and useful payments control check is, therefore, greatly weakened.

The system was not installed at remote sites to enable forest ground staff to access it, and because GPAS is not map driven, environmental constraints must be checked by either referring to hard copy maps or to a separate Departmental computer system known as MAPS.

Furthermore because GPAS does not fulfil all Forest Service data capture requirements, different types of data relating to soils, tree classifications, etc. are held in different systems, which makes access more difficult and time consuming.

Because of the failure of GPAS to deliver its intended objectives a new project has been initiated (IForIS) to develop a computer system capable of delivering most of the original objectives of GPAS.

Following a tender procedure, a vendor has been chosen to build IForIS and contract negotiations are under way. The total cost of the IForIS project, including data migration elements, is expected to cost in the region of €3.5m and to be completed by the end of 2004.

Project Management Control Weaknesses

Because of serious cost overruns and delays experienced on the GPAS project, coupled with the refusal by the Government Contracts Committee to sanction any further extensions to the contract, the Department engaged consultants to carry out a review. The consultants' report identified major project management weaknesses in the handling of the GPAS project in the following areas:

Invitation to tender

Tender Evaluation

Contract Negotiation

Contract Changes

Communications and Reporting

Quality Management

Administration

The main findings of the consultants are set out in Figure 3.

The time and cost overruns and failures to deliver objectives on some of the other projects would suggest that they also were not sufficiently well managed from the point of view of good planning, adequate quantification of required work, deployment of adequate resources to complete tasks, monitoring of progress, and taking effective action to deal with difficulties arising.

This view would appear to be supported by the fact that the Department did not endeavour to enforce penalty clauses on any of the contractors, which would suggest that it accepts that the majority of the blame for the time and cost overruns and output deficiencies was attributable to it.

Procurement Issues

In respect of the GPAS pilot study it was noted that:

Three private forestry companies approached the Department in 1997 with a view to testing the feasibility of transferring data electronically between forestry companies and the Forest Service and other interested parties.

The Department agreed to assign responsibility for managing the pilot study to one of the companies and to provide funding of €219,508.

This proposal was treated by the Department as an application for grant aid and payments in respect of this project management function totalled €239,562 over the period of the study.

As part of the study, tenders were sought from three suppliers for the provision of computer hardware, software and related services. A tender for €54,700 was accepted by the Department.

Between acceptance of the tender and the signing of the contract, the contract sum had increased to €113,000. Thereafter, additional modifications to the contract were made on four occasions. None of these was subjected to competitive tendering procedures.

In total, €303,346 was paid for computer hardware, software and related services.

Total expenditure on the pilot study amounted to €542,908.

Figure 3

Invitation to tender (ITT)

Work was not adequately quantified prior to going to tender

Definitions and quantities in the ITT were sometimes ambiguous and open to different interpretations

Time schedules specified in the ITT were unrealistic

Gross underestimation of the volume of data which had to be captured

Quality and Control procedures for data capture were not adequately defined

Lacked comprehensiveness

Tender Evaluation

Personnel who evaluated the tenders lacked experience and expertise

The scoring system was flawed

Reasons for large variations in tenders were not analysed

Insufficient attention was given to quantifying the time which would be given by the key contractor personnel to the project

Contract Negotiation

A large element of the work was carried out before an agreed contract was in place

Many of the assumptions made by the Department in setting out the objectives and scope of the project were unsafe

Contract Changes

Issues arising which gave rise to contract changes were not documented or reported other than receiving token mentions in project summary reports or Project Control Team (PCT) meetings

Contract change control procedures were not always implemented

Communications and Reporting

Information on progress, the management of changes to the project and revised schedules and deliverables did not appear to have been effectively communicated to senior management

The Department lacked suitably skilled and experienced staff and was unable to evaluate technical statements made by the contractor

Undue reliance on informal discussions and ad-hoc meetings

Quality Management

Adequate quality standards and procedures were not agreed with the contractor

Requirements for standards in data capture were not documented by either the Department or the contractor

Administration

The Department did not allocate appropriately skilled or experienced staff to the GPAS project

There was no Database Administrator in place nor were there suitable candidates for this role within the Department

A high percentage (30%) of grant applications were treated as exceptions to standard Departmental procedures which was likely to make the newly installed system overly complex and costly to develop and maintain

Significant staff resources were diverted from the project to other activities which adversely impacted on the efficient implementation of the project.

Accounting Officer's Response

The Accounting Officer stated that there were circumstances in the Department and the Forest Service in the period 1997-2000 that had either a direct or indirect impact on the FIPS projects.

The Classification project, the GPAS pilot project and the Forest Soils project had all commenced in 1997, when there was a general election, a change of Government and the Forest Service was transferred from the Department of Agriculture, Food and Forestry to the Department of Marine and Natural Resources.

The Forest Service had gone from a situation where it had the support and back-up of a substantial IT division to a Department where there were less than four full-time IT staff available.

In October 1998, the Forest Service moved to Wexford as a result of a Government decision on decentralisation. This move resulted in the loss of approximately 90% of the experienced Forest Service staff and the consequent introduction of new staff with no experience or knowledge of the Forest Service business. Furthermore, the senior manager position had remained in Dublin.

During this period, the IT Unit at the Department of Marine and Natural Resources was significantly under-resourced and under-staffed.

Following the move to Wexford in October 1998, electronic communications structures were poor, and it was late 1999 before an effective e-mail system was installed, and internet mail was available to all staff.

These factors put considerable strain on staff and management in delivering business outputs over the period and, inevitably, had an adverse impact on progressing all of these projects, especially the GPAS projects.

He offered the following responses to a number of specific questions which I put to him on the management of the project:

Time and Cost Overruns and Failure to Deliver Objectives

The main reasons for the time and cost overruns?

In relation to cost overruns the Accounting Officer stated that poor quality national geographical datasets, and limitations in the satellite imagery, resulted in additional costs of €385,000 and €613,000 respectively on the Classification project. The latter increases resulted from the fact that the satellite images only enabled 504,333 hectares out of an estimated figure of 570,000 hectares to be mapped, and so digital maps had to be created from existing printed copies for the remaining area. The purchase of additional equipment and restrictions due to the threat of Foot and Mouth Disease resulted in higher costs of €104,000 and €177,000, respectively, on the Soils Analysis Project.

He stated that there was a delay of two years in formally accepting the Classification system because of bugs in the computer software. Eliminating these bugs represented only 1% of the overall project and skewed the completion date unfavourably. No additional costs were associated with this delay. Further delays resulted from dealing with the poor quality of datasets provided to the contractor by the Department and from making up the shortfall in the area mapped through satellite imagery. Delays in receiving Department of Finance sanction to hire contract staff, movement restrictions due to the threat of Foot and Mouth Disease, and the poor quality of input datasets had caused a delay of about 2 years on the Soils Analysis project.

Why, in view of the cost and time overruns on the projects and the failures to deliver the intended outputs, the contract penalty provisions were not invoked?

The Accounting Officer stated that the invoking of penalty provisions on the Forest Classification and Soils Analysis projects would have represented a risk for the Department, in view of the quality issues with the input data provided. Moreover, the invoking of penalty provisions was considered the option of last resort in terms of resolving what were complex difficulties. Adopting an adversarial approach would have added further to costs and time and the preference was to work through the problems with the contractors and this is what happened. He stated that there were no penalty provisions in the GPAS pilot project contract and in the case of the main GPAS project the findings of the independent review indicated that the invoking of penalty provisions was not an option.

The impact which the delays in completing the projects and the failure to deliver all of the intended outputs has had on the formulation of an indicative forestry strategy, the management and administration of the Forestry aid and plantation programmes, and the ability of the Department to fulfil its EU and International obligations?

The Accounting Officer stated that its ability to undertake its functions in the areas outlined was not materially affected by the delays on the Forest Classification and Soils Analysis Projects.

The development of county-based indicative forest strategies, which could have commenced in August 2000, was delayed by the decision to devote relevant staff resources to the wrap-up phase of the GPAS main project.

While the GPAS project failed to deliver its objectives, the system did deliver a simpler Grant Payment System, which enabled the Forest Service to:

Pay 15,000 premiums per annum

Process approximately 8,000 new applications

Complete the required EU documentation on recipients of grants and premium payments, and enable payment details to be issued electronically to the Departments Accounts branch.

However he also stated that the range of management information available was limited so that, for instance, lack of information on individual plantations has affected the Departments ability to fulfil EU obligations with regard to cross compliance.

Also, in relation to environmental checks, Forest Service staff were carrying out these checks at the present time on an existing Departmental platform called MAPS (Minerals Administration Programme Support Services).

When the Department expects to have a system in place to achieve all of the original objectives set for the FIPS project?

The Accounting Officer stated that the IForIS system, which was currently being developed would, inter alia, deliver a map driven payments system that would enable the Department to process grant and premium payments in relation to over 16,000 customers and amounting to over €70m annually, in a secure database environment which would be subject to the latest national and EU auditing standards. It was expected that the project would be completed by the end of 2004.

Project Management Control Weaknesses

If the Department accepted the findings of the consultants review in relation to the management of the GPAS project?

The Accounting Officer stated that his Department accepted the review findings. In his opinion, the review which was commissioned by the Secretary General at the time, demonstrated an acknowledgement within the Department that there had been project management deficiencies but also demonstrated a willingness to identify these weaknesses, learn from the experiences and take steps to ensure that future projects were better managed.

If the time and cost overruns on three of the other projects, and the delay in commencing another, indicated that poor management control was also exercised over those projects?

The Accounting Officer stated that he would agree that the findings of the consultants in relation to the GPAS project could also apply to the GPAS pilot project.

In relation to the Classification project, he stated that while the quality of input datasets should have been assessed prior to the issue of tenders which resulted in additional costs of €385,000, his Department had no control over the classification results of the satellite imagery which prompted the additional expenditure of €613,000.

In relation to the Soils Analysis project, he acknowledged that it had taken considerably longer than expected and that this was due in part to staff recruitment and data quality issues. However, he also stated that this project was unusual in that it was fundamentally a research and development project, the methodology for which was being revised and developed throughout, and that in all other respects the project had been well managed. Over 90% of original deliverables were to hand and the financial element had been managed very tightly such that the cost overrun has been limited to €400,000 or just over 15% of the original budget.

In relation to the Ground Survey component of FIPS, the reason why this had not been completed was due to the prioritisation of limited Departmental resources. The development of GPAS and the payment of grants and premiums had been designated as a priority over the Ground Survey.

The steps taken to ensure that future projects would be better managed?

The Accounting Officer stated that there had been massive changes in the Department vis-à-vis the structures and the expertise to manage projects undertaken. The Departments Information Systems Division had increased in size from eight people in 1999 to its current level of sixty people comprising twenty management and administrative staff and forty technical staff, which included specialists in database administration, GIS development and project management. The Department had also implemented a Project Management Framework to manage the delivery of IT projects. The Departments Information Systems Steering Group was now chaired by the Secretary-General and it was through this forum that senior management approved new IT strategic programmes and projects, prioritised projects and monitored the progress of major IT investments.

He also stated that the Department reported formally to the Centre for Management and Organisation Development (CMOD) in the Department of Finance, which involved impact statements prior to instigating a new project, and final costs/impacts at the end of the project. In addition, there were discussions with CMOD on technology issues and generally where it was considered that CMOD could add experience or knowledge to resolving issues encountered.

In view of the lack of experience and expertise, which existed in his Department at the time, on the management of complex IT projects, whether advice or guidance was sought from the Department of Finance on the management of the FIPS project?

The Accounting Officer stated that in hindsight it was clear that the GPAS project would have benefited from close consultation with the Department of Finance at both the planning and implementation phases. However, this was not seen at the time because of the lack of experience of staff working on the project, until the wrap-up stage of the project in March 2000. At that stage, CMOD was approached for advice on how to achieve the best outcome in the prevailing circumstances, and a representative of CMOD attended GPAS steering committee meetings thereafter.

As neither the soils analysis nor forest classification projects involved developing complex IT systems and the necessary expertise in forestry existed in-house, it was felt that the Department of Finance did not need to be consulted.

In view of the serious errors and deficiencies found by the consultants to have existed in defining and quantifying the work required to be carried out on the GPAS contract, if consideration was given to seeking redress from the relevant service providers?

The Accounting Officer stated that one of the fundamental errors highlighted in the GPAS review was the omission of a User Requirement Document before the contract went to tender. The document prepared by the advisers was a systems design document which wasnt based on a defined set of user requirements - this was to take place later as part of the GPAS project itself. Once the Department had begun the user requirements definition process, the systems design document became largely redundant as it did not reflect the requirements of the users.

Procurement Issues

Why national and EU procurement procedures weren't complied with on the pilot study?

In regard to project management, the Accounting Officer stated that the records in this case show that the proposers presented the project as, and that it was treated as, an application for grant-aid under the OPARDF and not as a contract for services.

In regard to the provision of computer hardware, software and related services, the Accounting Officer stated that a tender process did take place to procure these services at the outset of the pilot project. However, as the focus of the pilot project changed, so did the financial extent of this element of the pilot project. Additional services were dealt with as extensions to the original contract for hardware, software and related services.

EU Aid

If the aid granted to the projects by the EU was conditional in any way on the projects being successfully completed according to plan and, if so, if it was possible that the cost and time overruns and deficiencies in outputs delivered might result in some or all of the funds having to be repaid to the EU?

The Accounting Officer did not furnish a view on whether it was likely that the EU might impose financial penalties because of failure to complete the project to plan, other than stating that the Department had not made any financial correction to the final claim for assistance because of noncompletion of the project.

He stated that €4.66m had been claimed and received in respect of the 1994-1999 OPARDF.

Chapter 8.1 draws attention to the management of the development of key IT systems for the forest service. Back around 1997 work commenced on a computerised forest inventory and planning system that was intended to modernise the management of our forestry resources and streamline grant payments. It was originally envisaged that the five component subsystems would be implemented within three years, but it did not work out that way. Members will note on page 128 of the report that only one of the five subsystems has been completed. One is ongoing, one has just about started and two others were terminated before completion. The contract costs alone for the four subsystems that went ahead total €7.7 million for what was provided as against contract values of €5.3 million for the delivery of completed systems. When one adds in related equipment and software costs, total expenditure on the project up to end 2002 amounted to €9.2 million. That does not include departmental staff costs, which in the later stages were considerable.

The Accounting Officer explains the reasons for the shortcomings in my report and, therefore, I will not repeat them. I have no doubt that he will refer to them in his opening statement. They suggest that the project was not sufficiently well managed from the point of view of good planning, quantification of the required work, deployment of resources, monitoring of progress and taking effective action to deal with the emerging difficulties.

Members will note that a consultants' report was commissioned on one of the subsystems that was aborted. A summary of their findings is on page 131 and members will note that it is critical. A new system incorporating most of the original objectives of that subsystem has been initiated and the Accounting Officer informed me that it was expected it would be completed by the end of 2004 at an estimated cost of €3.5 million. I am sure he can bring the committee up to date on how that particular new system is progressing.

Apart from project management weaknesses, there were also procurement issues surrounding one part of the project, namely, the pilot study to test the feasibility of transferring data between remote locations. This involved trying to integrate the forest service's system with forestry company systems and evaluating the results. One of the companies that approached the Department with the proposal was assigned the task of managing the pilot study and was paid nearly €0.25 million for this. There was no recourse to tendering as the Department treated the payment for the management service as grant aid to the company.

Over and above the management of this study, it was necessary to procure computer hardware, software and related services. In this case, tenders were sought from three suppliers and one for €54,700 was accepted. Over time there were several modifications to this contract, none of which was subjected to competitive tendering. The final cost of this particular contract was €303,000. This does not say much for the way the work was scoped and ultimately it led to a situation where the principles of public procurement were compromised.

I ask Mr. Tuohy to make an opening statement on Chapter 8.1.

Mr. Tuohy

I have circulated the statement. The forestry inventory and planning system, or FIPS, as it is commonly known, was first conceived in the early 1990s as a system to support the business of the forest service. The strategy for the development of the forestry sector, Growing for the Future, was published in 1996 and identified the need to develop a comprehensive inventory and planning system to provide forest resource, geographical and environmental data for management, control and planning purposes. FIPS has three interlinked elements, namely, an inventory element, a grants and premiums payment element and a planning element.

The Comptroller and Auditor General's report describes five of the component projects: the forest classification project, which is part of the inventory element; the ground survey project, which is also part of the inventory element; the forest soils project, which is part of the planning element; the grants and premiums administration systems, which is a pilot project; and the main project.

The audit examined four of these projects. The ground survey project is currently at planning stage with one county completed this summer by way of assessment. Four discrete projects were examined as part of the audit: the forest classification project, which is part of the inventory element; the GPAS pilot project, which is the precursor to the grants and premiums payment element; the GPAS main project; and the forest soils classification and productivity coverage project.

My purpose here today is not to challenge the general findings of the Comptroller and Auditor General, although I want to clarify some specific elements. Neither do I want to offer any excuses for what has happened. I hope to clarify for the committee the background against which the projects took place, to comment briefly on some of the deliverables and to refer to how the Department has changed and learned from the experience.

In my response to the Comptroller and Auditor General's report I drew attention to the events of 1997 and 1998 which had an impact on the FIPS project. The forest service had to contend with a transfer from the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Food to the Department of the Marine and Natural Resources in 1997. The following year the forest service was moved to Wexford as part of the decentralisation programme. The transfer from the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Food resulted in the loss of the support of a well-resourced and experienced information technology division. The IT unit in the new Department had fewer than four full-time staff available and, critically, there was no experience of systems development. The independent review of the GPAS project, which was commissioned in 2000 by my predecessor, found that the IT unit was not in a good position to offer any significant support to the GPAS team in the forest service. Decentralisation resulted in the loss of experienced staff with a turnover figure of 90% of administrative staff, as stated in the audit report.

These changes took place at a time when the sector was undergoing significant change and development. The levels of private planting began to increase in 1986 and in 1989 they exceeded State planting for the first time. Total afforestation was 15,126 hectares that year and averaged close to 17,000 hectares per annum over the next ten years, peaking in 1995 when 23,710 hectares were planted.

The payment of annual premiums over 15 and 20 year cycles commenced in 1989 and the relationship between the forest service and its customers became an ongoing one. With the increase stemming from private planting, mainly farmers, the forest service saw its customer base increase significantly. In 1990, 833 private individuals established forests. By 2000, a further 14,000 individuals had done likewise. The desire to provide these customers with a good service underscored the need to acquire a robust, secure computer system capable of processing grants and premiums efficiently.

The publication in 1996 of the strategic plan, Growing for the Future, saw an ambitious programme for the development of the sector up to 2035. The stated policy on forest inventory and planning was to develop a comprehensive inventory and planning system to provide forest resource, geographical and environmental data for management, control and planning purposes. The forest service did not have basic data on existing stock. It did not have the ability to forecast production and it did not have the information necessary to guide the optimum location of new afforestation. There were huge pressures on the forest service at the time to acquire the information and capacity to manage a rapidly developing sector.

While I accept that each of the projects experienced failures, it is reasonable to differentiate between the degree of these failures. In the case of the forest classification project, all the above principal objectives were delivered. It was disappointing that the methodology failed to map and classify all the forests. However, because the forest service started from such a low information base prior to the classification project, a digital record of the national forest estate, although it was incomplete, was a huge step forward for the Department. The last inventory of private woodlands, for example, had taken place in 1973 and only mapped estates greater than 40 hectares in size, totalling approximately 10,000 hectares. The forest classification project, on the other hand, mapped forests down to 0.2 hectares and succeeded in mapping almost 200,000 hectares of private woodland. A complete digital record of the national forest estate will be achieved before the end of this year. Some 85% of all new forests have been captured already as part of the new integrated forestry information systems, or the IFORIS project, as we call it.

As regards the forest soils project, more than 90% of the digital maps have been delivered and the outputs are already in use in the formulation of county afforestation plans within the forest service. I am not attempting to belittle the time and cost overruns associated with these projects to a greater or lesser degree, but I draw attention to the fact that the deliverables have proved to be of considerable value to us. In the case of the forest soils project, the outputs have proved to be of immense value to a constituency beyond the forest sector, including ecologists, botanists, engineers and hydrologists. Even in the case of the main GPAS project, as acknowledged by the Comptroller and Auditor General, we took delivery of a system which has enabled us to pay forestry grants and premiums to our customers each year since 2001.

The commissioning in June 2000 of an independent review of the GPAS project by my predecessor, the then Secretary General, represented a turning point for the Department. There was a recognition at the highest level in the Department that the project had gone badly wrong and a determination to find out how that had happened. The outcome of that review, which was available to the Comptroller and Auditor General, constituted a painful lesson for the Department, but I ask the committee to look at the changes which have occurred in the Department since then.

There are now more than 60 people in our information systems division, including more than 40 specialists. There are many projects being done, not just in forestry. There is a project management framework in operation throughout the Department ensuring a consistent, professional approach to project management. Reporting and monitoring takes place from individual project boards through the programme board to the information systems steering committee. I chair the information systems steering committee which, in addition to monitoring progress of the Department's IT programme, also approves new strategic programmes and projects.

With the exception of the foot and mouth crisis on the forest soils project, it is clear that better project management would have ensured a better outcome in the case of all the projects audited. That is particularly true in the case of the GPAS project. To its credit, the Department recognised that radical measures had to be taken in light of the outcome of the GPAS project and the report commissioned in 2000 has had a positive impact on the organisational structure of the Department as regards project management. I will answer any questions Deputies ask.

Having spent €9.2 million, which excludes staff costs, would you agree this has been an expensive educational system?

Mr. Tuohy

I cannot disagree with you, Chairman. As I tried to explain, there are two elements. The first is the delay in the projects. There was no cost associated with some of the delays because it only involved tidying up some of the software bugs, etc. The experience of the introduction of technology in companies has been difficult. What was happening in the 1990s was that the technologies were also changing. The idea of a geographic information system was coming into vogue in the early 1990s. When this was originally conceived in 1993 or 1994, it was conceived in a certain way. In other words, satellite image technologies were used to pick up what was there in the hope that they would be able to identify the specific species and put them on a geographic information system so that the maps were the backdrop to everything. What happened was that enough cognisance was not taken of the project management or the specifications in the sense that people knew what was required up-front. It can be difficult for people to know what they want from the technology before they have it.

As I said earlier, 90% of the administrative staff were switched within the 12 months due to the change in Government and decentralisation. Any organisation which has such a loss of institutional memory knows that new people are on a steep learning curve. I am not blaming the individuals; I am only explaining that they were thrown into the project which was under way. It was an expensive education at one level, but we have got a lot out of it. It has been inputted into the new IFORIS system which will be up and running.

Have you used that experience to ensure the figure of €3.5 million is maintained? Is it on time?

Mr. Tuohy

We are on time. I chair the group which handles the strategic issues and we keep a strong tracking eye on these issues.

At what stage is the new contract?

Mr. Tuohy

The contract has not been signed, although a vendor has been chosen. The Government at its meeting last Tuesday decided to move the forest service back to the Department of Agriculture and Food from 1 January next year. Perhaps as we go through this, the committee will see the reason for it. More of the forestry issue is about land use. My evaluation over the past 12 months, which is shared by the Minister, is that the interrelationship between forestry and land use is so integral that in the Government's view it made sense to move forestry back into the Department of Agriculture and Food.

Is the core of the problem that it was in the wrong Department?

Mr. Tuohy

No. There were a series of events. As I said earlier, when the forest service moved from the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Food to the Department of the Marine and Natural Resources, there was no expertise in its IT sector. It had not dealt with systems development. The expertise was in the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Food. If one considers some of the work we have to do, such as cross-checking between REPS and other agricultural schemes and those on the forest side, more of the work is about compatibility in terms of what the Department of Agriculture and Food is doing. If one looks to the future, particularly in terms of the decoupling arrangements announced recently by the Minister for Agriculture and Food and the increasing use of forestry as an option, there will be greater collaboration between the agricultural and forestry sides. The Government, for its own reasons which I fully support, has agreed that this transfer will take place from 1 January next year.

Given that the contract has not been signed for the new system and that the forest service is being moved to a different Department, is your timescale for 2004 realistic?

Mr. Tuohy

It is. Government decisions do not come out of the sky. We have been watching this and we have not gone ahead. We have chosen the vendor and that will pass to the Department of Agriculture and Food which will be able to pull it together. We have been careful in this regard. The Comptroller and Auditor General's work has been helpful in clarifying some of the issues, particularly as I am new to the area. This brings together some of the problems which have evolved in recent years and which show the close interrelationship between the two Departments.

I welcome Mr. Tuohy to the committee. As regards the transfer of the forest service to the Department of Agriculture and Food, I did not understand why it was moved out of it because trees grow on land alongside other crops. It was a daft decision to move it. I was not aware it would be changed as quickly as the Secretary General outlined. When the former Secretary General decided to bring the forestry sector into this century, he started from the premise that it would cost €5.32 million over the four sectors. Is that correct?

Mr. Tuohy

Yes.

We know it has already cost €9.2 million. Is that correct?

Mr. Tuohy

Yes.

Can the Secretary General quantify how much in terms of Civil Service salaries will be added to that figure? It should be a significant amount of money. It has been suggested that it could be as high as €2 million or €3 million. Does the Secretary General agree?

Mr. Tuohy

I do not have the figures with me because I did not expect to have to go through them.

This is a value for money committee. Given the starting position, we want to know how much it cost the taxpayer. It is only reasonable to expect that there would be labour costs.

Mr. Tuohy

There is always a stage when one moves from system X to system Y. In this case the new system will make things more efficient and it will save money.

I am fully aware of that and I will come back to it. However, how much money was paid? We can talk about the many benefits later.

Mr. Tuohy

I cannot argue with the Deputy's figure of €2 million or €3 million for salary costs.

That brings the figure to approximately €12 million or €13 million, if that figure is accepted. However, the structure we got for that money was of little benefit. It did not deliver the four objectives. The four of them failed to one degree or another in terms of a final conclusion.

Mr. Tuohy

As I outlined in my statement, they did not all fail.

According to the Comptroller and Auditor General's report, the classification project was to be introduced over 11 months, but it took 53 months. In other words, it took five times longer that originally intended. I understand that project has now been completed. The time allocated for the introduction of the soils analysis project was 36 months, but it has already taken 77 months and it is not yet complete. It was planned to complete the GPAS pilot project in 15 months, but it was terminated at 37 months before it was completed. In other words, it was aborted. It was planned to complete the GPAS main project in 13 months, but it was terminated at 19 months. Does the Secretary General agree with that analysis?

Mr. Tuohy

I will give the Deputy the deliverables for each of them.

I am talking about projects started but not completed. We can speak later about how they were used.

Mr. Tuohy

The Deputy is choosing specifics.

That is because it is in the Comptroller and Auditor General's report.

Mr. Tuohy

I will tell the Deputy what has been delivered because that is important from the point of view of how things evolved from the technology side and what happened as changes occurred. As regards the forest classification system, we developed a digital data search showing the precise location and type of forestry growing in Ireland. We also developed a software platform on which to query and view it. We developed a method of updating the data and the deliverables which were compatible with the system in the Department of Agriculture and Food. They were part of the specifications. We now have a complete data set of all the forests. It is important to note that.

As regards the pilot GPAS, we evaluated the performance of the forest service database and the linkage with the private forestry companies. The Comptroller and Auditor General referred to that at the start. We produced a set of procedures for the integration of the forest service database with the companies' GIS systems. We implemented and evaluated those procedures and we set up linkages with several county councils. Although the original deliverables of the project were not achieved, as I outlined at the start, we developed a data capture tool which was subsequently used in the main project. That was important. A major problem in such technology projects, although not only in this area, is the data capture issue. The problem is generally not the technology, but the data capture.

As regards the third element, the grants and premiums administration system, we developed a basic system for delivering grants and premiums. We did not develop an integrated database and premium service done by maps. We do not have that as it stands at present. That is one of the key things which has not been delivered.

As regards the soils project, we sought to deliver a national forest soils map, a forest productivity map and a stability indicators map. More than 90% of all the counties' soils maps have been delivered and the compilation of all maps, according to an agreed schedule, is on target for the first quarter of next year. This was a research and development project and we stated that in the report. There is an element of learning as one moves along.

I accept the Deputy's point about the timescale. Looking at it from the outside, some of the timescales were aggressive. There were not proper project management systems in place at the time. Part of that goes back to the fact that the people had been transferred. Some 90% of the administrative people were new to the area. There was a confluence of a number ofproblems.

The new system, IFORIS, cost €3.5 million. That must be considered in conjunction with what has already been paid. It is trying to do something which some of the other systems either partially or totally failed to do. Does Mr. Tuohy agree?

Mr. Tuohy

Yes and no. I agree in the sense that that is what must happen. However, on the other hand, what has evolved over the time from 1 January this year is that we must have cross-compliance with the Department of Agriculture and Food. Some of the EU requirements have changed as we have moved along. Part of the reason for the Government decision, which I outlined earlier, is to bring these into a singular place. That decision means that the forest project will be dealt with by the Department of Agriculture and Food.

Will the €3.5 million which has been earmarked to complete the system do that?

Mr. Tuohy

Yes.

Is there, or is there likely to be an overrun?

Mr. Tuohy

Not to my knowledge. We have better project management systems in place now, not just in this area but across the board.

We hope it will be finished on time and within budget. Given the original figure of €5.323 million, it appears the entire system cost approximately €15 million. Does Mr. Tuohy agree?

Mr. Tuohy

I cannot argue with what the Deputy said, particularly when one considers staff costs, etc.

That is a 300% increase between the day it started and finished.

Mr. Tuohy

The Deputy is adding staff costs, which would have been included irrespective of anything else.

What would the staff have done if they had not been doing this?

Mr. Tuohy

The idea of the changes was to make it more efficient and beneficial. One cannot add in the staff costs in terms of the increase because they would be included anyway. We assigned staff to do that.

I thought time and motion would be an issue. I understood that what people did with their time would be added to this equation. I am sure people have spent many hours, days, months and years working on this. However, it is only reasonable to suggest, on behalf of the taxpayers, that that would come with a price tag. I am not an IT guru, but I have close links with agriculture. Some 15,000 forestry farmers must now be paid. That can be compared to a figure of 160,000 in the Department of Agriculture and Food. It is able to photograph every corner of the land and it is now able to tell people every rood of ground they own. Why can the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources not do the same? As regards soil analysis, the facility at Johnstown Castle under the old institute of agriculture was the best in the world for many years. Was the wheel invented a second time in that regard?

Mr. Tuohy

Teagasc is involved in soil classification. The Deputy has articulated the rationale for the Government decision. It became clear to me in the past 12 months, since the formation of the Department, that the issues relating to forestry were more integrated with agriculture. The Comptroller and Auditor General's report and the Deputy's comments reiterate that. The Government has responded to that.

It is €15 million later.

Mr. Tuohy

There have been many benefits.

I will come back to that. The original cost of the software for the GPAS pilot study was €54,700. However, that increased to €303,000, which is a huge difference. It is unacceptable that between the tender being accepted and the contract being signed, which I assume took place relatively shortly afterwards, the contract figure increased to €113,000. Can Mr. Tuohy explain how that happened?

Mr. Tuohy

The original contract came from the industry and some of the operators who wanted to work with the Department. It was more of a research and development project. We have been in discussions with the Commission on this issue and on the procurement issue. As opposed to the Department going out to tender, this was grant-in-aid to the companies which had GIS-based systems and which wanted to interface with the Department because it did not have such systems. The Department then assisted the companies to provide the technology. That is from where the figures come. The specifications kept moving as they started work to see what was possible. The problem was that it was not specified at the start as a specific project which we wanted to deliver.

In other words, nobody knew for what they were looking.

Mr. Tuohy

There was an element of that, but it was a response to the industry saying it wanted to deal with the Department electronically because it had the equipment. The Department said it would fund a grant-in-aid for that. It was not the Department going out to tender. The equipment was tendered for subsequently by the company. The Comptroller and Auditor General referred to that in his report. The first phase was a response to the industry wanting to deal electronically with the Department and the Department not being in a position to deal with it. That was how it started.

There has been a huge loss to the taxpayer. I understand that last year farmers applied for grant aid on 23,000 hectares. However, because of various Government cutbacks, only 12,000 hectares were grant aided. In fact, 2,000 or 3,000 of those hectares will be included in next year's Estimates. Does Mr. Tuohy agree that it is unusual economics that the forestry industry, whose main aim is to grow trees, can lose approximately €10 million or €15 million when the grant aid for such trees last year was severely cut?

Mr. Tuohy

It was not as if we got nothing for the money spent. We got a lot of what we looked for. The timescale was certainly longer.

Last year the Department funded 15,000 hectares and this year it will fund about 12,000 hectares. The Estimates for 2004 are not yet agreed and will not be until they are published on budget day. That is not an issue for today. I cannot comment on what will be in the Estimates. However, it saves money having the right information and database to do this and having the right system in place for payments. It is not just the once-off payments; it is the ongoing premia payments as well. I accept up-front that the project management systems in place and the other issues meant that we did not get the best value for money for this project. However, we got a lot from it, as I have outlined.

On the funding programme for forestry, the Department has been endeavouring to work with the industry to make the best use, so that the money goes into funding of new planting going forward. The bottom line is that to plant roughly 1,000 hectares of trees costs approximately €3 million. The problem on the forestry side is that the payments for the existing premia can last for 20 years in the case of the farmer and for 15 years in the case of the non-farmer. There is this continuous payment going forward. Although I do not have it here, I am sure I have a chart which shows that if one was to reach the 20,000 hectares target, one would be talking about a budget line over the next two or three years running close to €150 million to €200 million.

The Government has put close on €700 million into forestry since 1977. There has been a huge investment. There is an issue there, which goes back to the rationale. There is an issue of competition between rural environment protection and other schemes and forestry as regards what farmers decide to do. That is the issue and one of the core planks for putting it back into agriculture where that can take place in a much more informed way within the one Department.

I sincerely hope the IT system will not have to be changed again next January.

Mr. Tuohy

I hope not.

Everybody else hopes not as well.

I wish to take up a point made by Mr. Tuohy that the Department got something for the money which was spent. It must be stated clearly that one of the things it did not get for the money spent was value for money. It was way short of value for money. Considering what it bought, it overpaid enormously for the product or the system it now has. As I understand it, it set out to buy a map-driven system but what it has is a little short of that. It may have arrived at it now but it was certainly way off the mark in the context of the provision of a map-driven system. Moving from the planning of the system to €15 million - in terms of the overall cost - is an extraordinary amount of money.

Mr. Tuohy spoke about the companies, the changes in IT and so on. The Department was dealing with those companies and consultants at a time when everyone was engaged with them in the context of the year 2000 and being Y2K compliant. There was quite a lot of expertise available on information technology not only in terms of what was available at that time, but what was likely to come down the tracks, regardless of what the Department was doing. There was certainly no shortage of advice and consultants. Who set out the detail of the contract - the technical requirement of the contract - in the Department, or was it a consultant? Who had full charge? One person or a group of people would have set down what was required by the Department before it began to speak to technology consultants or companies. Who set that down? Who controlled the overview of the work being undertaken within the Department as it started out on the project? Who took responsibility for the day-to-day management of the project and how many people were involved?

Mr. Tuohy made the case in regard to the over-expenditure being associated with the move to Wexford, the change in Government and the change in approach to IT. Why, at that stage, did the group or the person overseeing the project not suspend it, knowing it was running into the sand a little? Why did they not say there was a difficulty? One of the remarks Mr. Tuohy made was that companies were facing the same problems in the area of developing IT within private companies. I suggest that if private companies conducted their business the way the Department did at that time, they would be out of business. I do not know many companies which developed IT systems internally that have actually closed. The only reason the Department was able to continue was that the money being spent was taxpayers' money. It seems to have been spent in an uncontrolled fashion ignoring all the normal best practice in a Department in terms of the spending of this amount of money. Who was responsible for it at that point?

What input did the Department of Finance have in this? Did it just send a cheque each time one was required, or did it have an opinion on this? The report states, in regard to the invitation to tender, that the work was not adequately quantified prior to going to tender, that the personnel who evaluated the tenders lacked experience and so on. The report is direct in its condemnation of what was a serious problem with management. I cannot understand how experienced people in the Department of Finance did not see what was going on and, given their experience across Departments, they did not say "Stop".

Would Mr. Hurley like to comment?

I have asked questions on the management of this project, to which I want answers. Mr. Hurley can then reply.

Mr. Tuohy

On the value for money issue, I have tried to outline what I thought were the deliverables. I started by saying and I continue to say that I am not happy. I was not involved at the time, although I am now the accounting officer. I introduced certain changes but that aside, my predecessor had already picked that up in 1999 when he brought in the external evaluators. That report was made available to the Comptroller and Auditor General. I am not excusing the lack of project management. I am equally disappointed. I tried to explain earlier that if 90% of one's administration staff move in a short space of time - there is decentralisation and loss of staff - then the system is left hanging. That is what happened - the loss of memory and capability. Anybody involved in change says that the most traumatic thing is moving house. If one is moving a whole division and part of a Department, one ends up with that as well.

Consultants were involved in advising at different stages. As I said earlier, certain assumptions were made about the quality of data, the Coillte data and the information available on that. An assumption was made by Coillte that certain data would be available to a certain quality. That data was not checked by the people in the Department. They presumed Coillte had checked it. One ended up with a situation where the data was not adequate and sufficient. That, in itself, cost a lot of time and money to correct.

Before the Department set out on the project, someone had to set down on what it was embarking. Someone had to decide at that point that the technology and software was available and could be purchased at a reasonable price and that the database or information required was available. It would appear from what Mr. Tuohy has said that none of that was checked and that the Department embarked blindly upon a project about which it knew little or nothing. Were the people who managed the project, those who dreamed it up and who were in charge from the beginning, dispersed as a result of decentralisation? When that happened, why did someone not decide to suspend the project and not waste taxpayers' money?

Mr. Tuohy

The GPAS project was suspended. There was a project management team in place. It was a joint team involving both administrative and technical people. The joint chairmanship of it moved with the change in the Department and the decentralisation. The individual who was involved previously was not involved as it evolved in the decentralised Department. There was that change. To be fair to the people involved, they were trying to deliver a system. I gave Deputies the figures for the massive increase in private planting - the switch from the State being the only planter to private planting. Those in the office in Johnstown Castle were under pressure. They were trying to provide a system to respond to this. Thousands of people were sending in applications with which they had to deal. I, as Secretary General and the accounting officer, take ultimate responsibility, or whichever of my predecessors was there at the time would take ultimate responsibility. I am trying to explain that this was not a normal project because of what happened and the other extraneous issues.

The Deputy asked about the role of the Department of Finance. To be fair, it was involved in suspending the project on the GPAS side. It was very good when it got involved but it had not been invited to become involved up to that point. I do not always support the Department of Finance but in this case, it responded and was very good when it did.

Was the writing not on the wall when, for example, the classification project, which was timed for 11 months, took 53 months to complete? I take it that it is now completed. Did the alarm bells not ring when the soils analysis project, which was timed for 36 months, took 77 months to complete? It is still not completed. The GPAS pilot project, which was timed for 15 months, went to 37 months at which point it was terminated before being completed. The GPAS main project, which was timed for 13 months, went to 19 months and was terminated before being completed.

If the expertise and knowledge was in the Department of Finance, from where the money was coming, surely it must have seen all of this going on. It must have noted that this Department was in trouble, it had been decentralised, there was an election and so on and that it had better step in because of a scarce resource, namely, money. It did not, however, step in. Why did it not do so?

Mr. Tuohy

On the forest classification issue and the extension of the time, as I said earlier, there was not a cost increase during the last two years of that. There were bugs in the system which needed to be sorted out. There were bugs in the system as opposed to waiting for things to be finalised. All the data was there.

On the GPAS system, the Department of Finance got involved at that stage. It was invited in by the Department. To be fair to the Department of Finance, it was not aware until then. There are hundreds of projects going on across the Civil Service at any one time. The Department of Finance cannot be held accountable unless it is told and invited in.

In regard to the soils analysis project, the whole soils issue has become an important one not only for the forestry side, but for the EPA and other organisations. The forest side is doing the western side of the country and the EPA is doing the eastern side. There is now much greater collaboration between them, so one gets a full country-wide package to a common system and a common standard when one pulls them together.

What has evolved in the Civil Service in the last number of years is much greater collaboration on these projects. When this originally took place, individual Departments, not only forestry, responded to their own requirements. What then happened was that more of them realised that they had to share information and that it was about having a common database. Thankfully, that now happens with the different agencies collaborating, sharing and transferring data between them. For that to happen, one had to reach a situation where there was a common system - a common database. That is to what we have been trying to evolve. The soils issue is a classic example.

The figures mentioned by the Deputy are right at one level, but the system has changed and the EPA and others are doing some work in this area. All of that will form the full package, so it is not just forestry.

The report states that the Department did not enforce any penalties along the way and that as a result, it accepted full responsibility for the table of overruns, which run from €5.32 million to €7.7 million. Therefore, the Department is totally responsible. I do not understand this invitation to the Department of Finance to have a look at what was going on because it was funding the project and it would have had some knowledge of the amount of funding being provided for the project and of the increasing amount of money being required to buy something on which the Department had grossly overspent. The Department got something at the end of the day but it paid an enormous amount of money for it. I have no doubt it could have got it more cheaply if proper planning had taken place. The plan seems to have emerged on a day-to-day basis because that is the way it is accounted for here. The Department did not have a plan starting out. It lost personnel along the way. No effort was made to stop this nonsense, if you like, and to go back to the drawing board. The Department of Finance did not involve itself in time to arrest all of the errors. I am not the only one saying that - it is detailed in figure 3 in terms of an independent review of what went on.

The invitation to tender went wrong. Mr. Tuohy said the personnel who evaluated the tenders lacked experience and expertise. Does that happen in every Department? Is the central management and planning section in the Department of Finance aware that this goes on in Departments? Every Thursday we come in here people, whether from the health boards or elsewhere, regularly blame information technology for their problems when, in fact, information technology in the real world - in the private sector - is being credited for saving money, giving better value for money and for efficiencies. The Department of Finance does not seem to be able to achieve that and it certainly ignored it in respect of this Department.

I wish to add to that because it is the fundamental issue. It is our experience here that we are wasting millions of euro on IT. Most of the excuses given in the presentations from the various Departments are that their IT systems have not been up to scratch or if they have been, they have not been adequate for what they were engaged to do.

I have two questions for the Department of Finance and, in particular, the Comptroller and Auditor General. The control system the Garda put in place was inadequate. The Gulliver system put in place in the Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism was inadequate. The systems put in place in other Departments, as Deputy McGuinness said, have been inadequate. Is there not a pool of expertise for all Departments rather than each Department working in isolation and divining its own IT systems? Is there a group of experts with a system which would be compatible with all Departments, although not common to all, so we would know we were getting value for money? Nobody could stand over figure 3 which states that the people in charge of the project did not evaluate it, did not know what the objective was and did not have the experience when it came to the system itself. The whole thing is an absolute shambles. We come here every week and go through the same rigmarole.

Mr. John Thompson

I will begin by briefly mentioning what the system is and will then go on to the specifics of this case. The management of IT projects has been delegated to Departments since the late 1990s. Under circular 16 of 1997, Departments make two returns to the Department of Finance. One return is due by the end of November in which Departments give a brief statement of what is expected to happen on new projects which they are about to start. In the second one - what is called a part 2 return - due by the end of April, they give a more detailed picture. The system is built around that.

In this case, the Department of Finance raised concerns about the project, particularly about project management, in 1998 and again in 1999. In each case, it was given assurances that things were okay. The point was made earlier that a lot of experienced staff had been lost from the forest service and that with the transfer, there were shortages of people with the right experience and knowledge. Part of the assurance the Department of Finance was given was that the Department of Agriculture and Food, which had a much larger establishment in that area, was still involved in the management of, and assisting with, the project. The assurance was given that that potential weakness had been dealt with. Assurances were also given in respect of other problems mentioned.

It became apparent that transfer of the underlying data would be much more difficult than had originally been expected. That happens even with the best planning in the world. When one goes to do something, especially when one is coming from a paper system or an older one, it can be much harder than anticipated, despite the best will in the world. That is the system. As I said, concerns were expressed and, in each case, the Department was able to give assurances that it had taken steps to deal with matters of concern.

On the more general question of IT projects, Deputy McGuinness may be aware that there is some research on the success and failure of IT projects in the private sector which also has its problems. IT systems can provide great benefits but it is possible for them to go off the rails, to cost more than expected, to deliver less than expected and so on.

We hear about systems being inadequate but if that question was asked even a few years earlier, one would be told that this is the most up-to-date system available. The rate of change is fast, about which there is no doubt. Some of the systems become inadequate simply because change is so fast and new systems become possible. People want to move on to the new system. Of course, new requirements are added by ourselves, Brussels or whoever.

Was the expert group, CMOD, not involved? Given that the Department accepted the assurances verbatim, it was amazing that its expert group did not go in and thoroughly investigate.

Mr. Thompson

I should have said that we would have had people with expertise looking at it. It is not just a question of accepting a piece of paper - there is dialogue between people who know the business.

The impression given was that you sought reassurances and that you accepted the assurances given by the Department. Is it not the job of the CMOD expert group to make sure there is total compliance and that it is totally satisfied with work being carried out?

Mr. Thompson

There is dialogue. It is not just a question of getting a letter and saying that is fine. There is dialogue, meetings are held regularly and so on. The assurance was tested and found to be okay.

Would the Department of Finance not have to accept a portion of the blame for condoning and allowing the misappropriation of funds on a system which was totally inappropriate?

Mr. Thompson

As I said earlier, the management of IT projects is delegated to Departments and, naturally, we are happy to advise them. We are available to provide advice. We have people with expertise. We also provide a lot of advice in documentary form which is available for people to consult and so on. The ultimate decision is not ours. I forgot to mention something about which Deputy Batt O'Keeffe asked, namely, whether there is a pooling of expertise. The short answer is "Yes". There is a forum of ICT managers which acts as a conduit for people to get together.

On the last question asked, I would have thought it was a straightforward question to answer. There must be a full sharing of responsibility in regard to this because both Departments fell down. I would like to hear the Department of Finance's view. Having received the information in 1998 and 1999 and the assurances, will the Department comment on those assurances now in light of the report then given on the whole structure of this project from start to finish?

As regards Mr. Thompson's comment on private companies, I do not know many private companies which have made the same scale of mistake or error with their IT because if they did, they would not be in business. The Department of Finance should display the same diligence in the spending of taxes as it does in the collection of them. That is something at which I am amazed. If there is a forum for IT, it should begin to talk to the Garda, the health boards and the list of people who appear before the committee every Thursday and who, as part of their submissions, state that problems are the fault of IT. I do not believe this happens to the same extent in the private sector because if it did, the country would be down the Swanee.

Mr. Thompson

On the issue of the assurances given at the time, with hindsight one could say there were weaknesses which were not seen by us or by the Department. With hindsight one can see that those weaknesses were there. It is easy for us to say at this stage that those who dealt with this then should have seen these things, should have asked other questions or should have realised there were risks which were not covered. Again, I am conscious that the consultants' report makes the point that decisions which in retrospect turned out to be wrong, may well have looked reasonable at the time and that afterwards with hindsight, one could say it was the wrong decision. At the time people who had to make the decision——

I asked the Comptroller and Auditor General to make a general comment because every week he, like us, comments on IT, the lack of expertise and the excessive money being spent on what are inadequate systems. I would like to hear his comments on the efficiency of the systems in place in the various Departments and on there being some compatibility.

Mr. Purcell

I concur with some of the comments made by the accounting officer and by Mr. Thompson. When dealing with large organisations, it is not a simple or straightforward matter to implement a computer system to cover a fairly large range of transactions, particularly with the type of technology we have now. In this case in the forest service there was not an appreciation of how complex and unstraightforward it was. I have read of surveys and research in the private sector on the development of large IT systems. They go awry and run over budget. In many cases it would be argued that if one gets a system approximating to the system one set out to get, even at a small multiple of the price, one has done well. It is not the end of the world if a project starts at €5 million and ends up costing €10 million. Sometimes I might portray that to be the case or it may come across as that, but it is not the end of the world.

There are several problems that are not always appreciated when setting up these systems. It is not as easy as claimed by the consultants or vendors of computers and software. While I do not wish to use the word "naiveté", there is an element of it in commissioning these systems. They require the kind of project management to which the accounting officer referred and has implemented as a result of this debacle with the earlier systems. There is also a problem with data capture and converting the data, in trying to establish and commission the system. It is a problem that is not always identified and seen through.

Finally, there is the problem of the compatibility of the system and the fact that it will have to talk to other systems. The classic case is that of the health boards. The Garda and fines systems were also considered here. It is part of joined-up administration towards which we should move. There is a greater appreciation of that. However, structures must be put in place to facilitate it. There is no easy answer, but in a sense I am trying to convey the kind of difficulties that arise and the kinds of structures that must be put in place to address problems and see them through, ruthlessly and professionally.

It appears the computer systems are unable to speak to each other.

I apologise as I must leave for another meeting. I am somewhat reluctant to join the same line of questioning. If consideration is given to a number of projects in any given area with which we are involved, such as roads, bridges, railways, and the Red Cow roundabout, professionals and the private sector will say that one of the reasons we are in deficit and enduring overruns and, in many cases, poor management is because those in the public sector are afraid to make a decision. They are afraid they will be subjected to this kind of examination, either at this or another committee. It means one cannot get anybody in the public sector to take a risk and make a decision. This is one of the reasons the PPPs have run aground. Four or five years later, they are still not up and running. The private sector may have a vested interest in portraying this scenario, but that is what is being said. I am sure Mr. Tuohy knows that as well as anyone else here. The Comptroller and Auditor General's reference to overruns in the private sector in this particular area of IT systems is also true.

However, this is a shambles. When the Government's contracts committee stopped the funding, the Department brought in consultants. This is the usual resort. A couple of years ago the committee examined the extent to which resort is made to consultants. It is a huge bill. In this instance the consultants identified major project management weaknesses in the following areas: invitation to tender, tender evaluations, contract negotiation, contract changes, communications and reporting, quality management and administration. I am sure other areas were mentioned. The consultants identified major weaknesses in every area.

It does not suit my political perspective to concede on this issue, but I do not know the answers to the questions raised by Deputy McGuinness. At every meeting the committee must deal with serious questions of this kind. For example, the Cork School of Music project, which started with a budget of €12.9 million is now €200 million, not €100 million as misquoted in the newspapers. That misunderstood the 25 year management and the subsequent development of the project as a PPP. It may be a matter for the Department of Finance to propose solutions to this.

I am not sure I can accept that growing and tracking trees is rocket science. Seán MacBride made his name in this area in 1948 when we were not able to do much else. I would have thought it could be done today. Deputy Batt O'Keeffe referred to a number of other areas. Similar problems have arisen in agriculture and social welfare.

The notion that decentralisation or reorganisation of Departments means the rug is pulled mid-stream on projects like this is puzzling. We are all working for the same Exchequer and I am puzzled as to how that can be permitted. If I had time I would like to ascertain how many were dealing with this and how many of them went to Johnstown. Perhaps Johnstown is not a good example, but in many cases involving decentralisation, the civil servants do not transfer. Staff are recruited from other Departments or whatever. Mr. Thompson mentioned in passing that at one point he got a reply advising that the Department of Agriculture and Food was still involved. I would have expected that and that it would see the project through.

This is a shocking sequence of incidents involving mismanagement and waste. Personnel who evaluated the tenders lacked experience and expertise. Is there nobody managing the project? The scoring system was flawed. If the scoring system is flawed in that kind of tender, those who failed to get the contract would normally be able to sue. I do not know if there are legal consequences here. It is profoundly dispiriting if we are to hope that PPPs and other innovations will solve the infrastructure deficit against this kind of background.

Mr. Tuohy

I will go back again to what I said at the start. I am not making any apologies for the structure that was in place for project management. It obviously was not adequate.

On the question of staff numbers, there were 48 staff in the forest service before the decentralisation. Nine of them remained in Dublin and 38 moved to Wexford. People first come in from the different Departments, are then signed in and move down. It creates a space of a number of months - it could be up to 12 months - where people are moving. As soon as people know they are going they focus on their new job, human nature being what it is. That is the reality. It is a traumatic time for individuals when they are moving or when the Department is embarked on a decentralisation move. I am explaining what happened, I am not trying to justify——

Why should a similar problem not arise when the responsibility reverts to the Department of Agriculture and Food?

Mr. Tuohy

The people and functions are already down there. They were not at the time. The Department was centred in Dublin and those with the expertise were in Dublin. A call goes to civil servants advising of a decentralisation to Wexford. People apply for that and come in from different Departments while those in the jobs in Dublin move to those Departments. There is an absolute lateral switch. The majority of people in the forestry area had not been there and there was no memory because all the people had moved right up through the system.

The tradition of decentralisation here has been that once it commences, the full function is decentralised. This means that the people in those jobs either go with the job or do a head to head swap with somebody else in the system. Somebody from the Department of Social and Family Affairs or from any other Department swaps at, say, AP or HEO level. That is effectively what happened. Again, I am not justifying, I am just trying to explain. When the Deputy says there was no expertise to evaluate it, I do not blame the individuals. They were new to the job. They were put in a position where they had to run this project and deal with the day-to-day work of the organisation.

The Civil Service works on the model of a general civil servant, that is, that anybody can do any job. We do not really have specialists in the Civil Service. In the IT area, in the lead up to the millennium bug and in the last decade, there was a massive exodus of civil servants. We were training people and they were moving to the private sector because within the system, we could not reward people who had a certain expertise. Throughout the 1990s, the IT units in Departments were being decimated. We tried to stem some of that in the past year or two and there is a proposal to recruit people from outside. The Civil Service is effectively a one-way valve. People come in, we train them, they leave and they are then sometimes employed as outside consultants in the sense that they join a consulting house at a much increased salary. If the principle of the general civil servant is used, they will be paid the same as a CO, EO or HEO, whether they are in IT or not. That is an issue.

When looking at any project, one looks at the processes in place, the project management processes and the capability of the system to deliver. Deputy Rabbitte raised a very important issue here. One of the challenges facing the country in the next decade is how to enhance productivity in the economy. Since the late 1980s, productivity growth has been at a rate of 3.5% to 4% per annum. Part or most of that was fed by the participation rates of women in the economy, which has changed dramatically in the past year or so since the downturn. The challenge for us is to compete with some of the other economies worldwide - the Japanese and others - where they are getting productivity from the use of technology at the rate of 2% to 3% per annum. The Australian economy does likewise. The challenge for us is to enable the economy to grow through the use of technology. With that comes innovation. There is a challenge for us to encourage people in the economy generally to be innovative in the use of technology. We want to encourage the behaviour where people will innovate and be prepared to try things and innovate around technology to enhance productivity in the economy.

However, as a result of all of this, I would be afraid that people will become introverted and decline to chance anything if there is a risk in it. It means that the economy generally suffers. There was an old phrase, "If you buy IBM you will never be fired", in other words, one would never pick any other make of computer. Deputy Rabbitte raised a very important issue in this regard. It is important that the signals we send out, including management in the Civil Service, indicate that we want people to be innovative in the way they do business and in their use of technology. With that processes and systems must be put in place. I am not saying we do not do that. However, I would hate to lose the idea that innovation is critically important for the future and that technology will drive productivity in this economy for the next decade.

We are not dumping on the Civil Service. We have faith in it. We recognise the need for a complete overhaul and for greater career opportunities in acknowledgement of what is available in the private sector.

However, in this case the wheel was not being invented. I am sure there are many examples of best practice in other countries and other areas of government. That is all that had to be done, but it was not. Instead attempts were made to invent a number of different wheels that failed to turn. It was impossible to see the wood from the trees as the project moved forward.

At virtually every meeting, the committee has to deal with difficulties with IT and computer systems. As a member of this committee, I will never accept that a problem arose because of a fault with the IT or computer systems. Computers and technology are aids to management, they are not a substitute for, or a parallel system to, management. They do not do anything of their own right. A failure in an IT system is a failure of management, not the technology.

Mr. Tuohy said that in June 2000, an independent review of the GPAS project by the then Secretary General represented a turning point for the Department. It was known in 1997 that the forest service had moved from the Department of Agriculture to the Department of the Marine, with the result that most of the IT staff were lost in the transfer. The staff complement is now 60, but after the transfer it was four. The decentralisation to Johnstown resulted in the loss of 90% of the administrative staff and some of the senior staff did not transfer. It should have been obvious then that there was a problem.

It represents a failure at Secretary General level that it took three years to realise there was a problem following the loss of practically the entire IT unit and 90% of the administrative staff. The problem should have been immediately apparent to the Secretary General. It appears this decentralisation was a fiasco in that all the key staff were lost. No company would allow a new branch to be open if it meant the loss of 90% of the staff while expecting outsiders, who had nothing to do with the business, to run it.

Mr. Tuohy referred to a general pool of civil servants, but I would have hoped that a Secretary General would have some control over the release of staff. While staff cannot be forced to transfer, I would be concerned that 90% of staff in a decentralisation programme did not transfer. Have the lessons here been learned for the next round of decentralisation or will this fiasco be repeated, with new offices in various provincial towns staffed by new personnel with no previous involvement in the Department? I hope the next round of decentralisation will operate according to different criteria. How did it take three years to realise there was a problem that should have been obvious from 1997 and have the lessons been learned?

Mr. Tuohy

I was not there at the time. As I saw last year when the new Department was formed following the election of the new Government, it takes time to even get on top of the brief. The day-to-day work goes on. The parliamentary questions continue, people move and a lot of things happen. One of the strengths of the Civil Service for many years has been that the system goes on. However, there is a hiatus during those changes and that is possibly what happened at the time. I am sure many other things were also ongoing. When a new organisation is formed by bringing together different organisations and elements, huge cultural issues arise. No one individual knows the full team in the organisation. These are real challenges in any company and not just the Civil Service.

I am a supporter of decentralisation. It has done much good around the country. Ultimately, the Department of Finance co-ordinates the decentralisation programme. It is not a matter for us specifically, although we have learned lessons. In the main, once people apply for it one does not stand in their way. I am sure my colleagues in the Department of Finance will feed back this message. There is an issue about business continuity, especially as some decentralisation can take place over time. The Deputy's point is well made.

We should be grateful that the country no longer has 80% afforestation. What is referred to as decentralisation is, in reality, office relocation. No specialists were transferred in the move from Dublin to Johnstown and from the Department of Agriculture and Food to the new Department. That appears to be a failure by the Department of Finance, which is responsible for the public service. What are the criteria to ensure there is an appropriate level of specialist transfer when these movements take place, both geographically and between Departments?

To what extent should questions have been raised centrally within the Government rather than the Department? If an IT system was sought to get geological and geographical information it should have been asked if other agencies and Departments raised similar questions when seeking similar systems. Examples might include the Ordnance Survey and the Land Registry. Questions about the possible cross-over of information and savings could have been raised. Are such questions asked in the specialist unit in the Department of Finance and, if not, why not?

Mr. Tuohy

That is more a question for the Department of Finance. I agree with Deputy Fleming's question regarding continuity. Business continuity is critical.

On the question of decentralisation, we have also been trying to decentralise the authority and responsibility. There is no point in creating another localised office, to use Deputy Boyle's phrase, where all the functions, responsibility and decision making remains in Dublin. Ultimately, decentralisation is concerned with devolving responsibility to people down the line. It is not just about physical decentralisation. There is a devolution of responsibility so that decisions can be made there.

In the initial phase of this decentralisation programme, the head of the forest service remained in Dublin while the majority of staff were below. That did not work and it switched over time. It was a huge decentralisation programme, but I think we have learned. We learned lessons and we picked up on some of the concerns raised by Deputies Fleming and Boyle.

Surely questions about getting information on a database about forestry in the country in general is a centralised function.

Mr. Tuohy

It is not just forestry. When it is broken down, forestry emerges as one element. The issue of soils became very important, which led to the issue of geology and ground water, including ground water protection. The technologies, particularly geographical information systems, became available in the 1990s. Approximately 80% of information held by the Government is spatially related, which constitutes a huge amount of spatially-related information.

When people talk about computer systems, they traditionally talk about databases or not even databases. When that is lined to a geographic information system, one is concerned with having layers of information which is spatially related to a specific point, so that each item on it is vectored. There is a point on which information is layered. It goes back to what the Comptroller and Auditor General said. The problem in this case was data collection. Different people had collected things in different ways and there were different systems in place.

A lot of companies in the field back in the 1990s wanted to be the GIAS companies. In the main there were two systems, Microstation, used by the Department of Agriculture and Food, and ArcInfo, which the geological survey and some others have been using. The first part of this went on Microstation and subsequently we are going on ArcInfo for the general stuff. There is competitive tendering between the different companies also, which leads to a kind of conflict.

What needs to happen globally - it cannot be done just within Ireland - is that standards for data transfer become critically important, including how you store your data and how you make it available. Ultimately, if one has to re-work the data every time one gets it, one has a very expensive operation. There was a feeling at the start that by using the satellite technologies, one would pick up a lot of the information. It did not work and was not sufficient and detailed enough. That was a fault of the system and the design.

Mr. Thompson, do you wish to comment on the points made by Deputy Boyle?

Mr. Thompson

The brief answer to the Deputy's question is "Yes". We are constantly on the lookout for things that are common between two Departments, so that, if possible, we will not reinvent the wheel or have people go out and do something again that has already been done. That is something that is always on our minds. Part of the function of our monitoring system, with people coming into us twice a year with their reports, meeting us and so on, is to flush out that kind of thing and allow us to talk to Departments about it and try to ensure we get the best and most economical solution for the Civil Service as a whole.

With regard to the specialist transfer, be it from Department to Department or another part of the country, the criteria seems to be to get a certain number of civil servants into an office. There does not seem to be any criteria as to what specialities should transfer.

We will come to a conclusion on this.

Mr. Tuohy

When the CSO relocated to Cork, many members of staff were specific in that they were statisticians and mathematicians. It took time to build up the system, but they maintained a presence in Dublin over time. There was a small presence in Dublin, but the major operation of the CSO is in Cork.

It goes back to the principle I referred to earlier. The Civil Service has grown up on the basis of generalists. We do not have that many specialists and they are not acknowledged. It is a challenge with which the Civil Service has been grappling in discussions with the Department of Finance. In today's world, it is necessary to have specialists to deal with specific areas. If they are not available the price will be paid through consultants and so on.

On a different matter, an allegation has been made by a person of whom Mr. Tuohy is fully aware that an investor leased land to a farmer who qualified for the farm forestry premium. As we are all aware, there are two different levels of premium, a much higher one for farmers than for investors, which were mostly insurance companies and banks. It has been alleged that, somehow, the higher rate of premium was returned to the investor. Will Mr. Tuohy let the committee know if this has happened, what kind of investigation has taken place and how many were involved? He will appreciate it is very important for the credibility of the forestry industry that the properly placed higher premium should be paid to those who grow the trees. This is an allegation but I am not making it.

Mr. Tuohy

Yesterday, I supplied the committee with a detailed response to the issues raised. A total of 102 cases were raised, of which 82 were resolved and 20 were unresolved. With regard to those that were unresolved, the premium was never paid in respect of six of them. On another there was a question of ownership following a person's death, issues arose in five cases in terms of ownership vis-à-vis the lease details, etc. In one case there was no response to our queries. The people involved in four of the cases will be entitled to premiums in due course, another is entitled to a premium but no correspondence was received because a domestic dispute was taking place in the household. In one case there was no information at all and the premium has not been paid since 2001 and one case involves ownership and entitlement to the premium and that is at stake at present.

In my detailed response to the committee I replied to those points and outlined the position. We are trying to bring the outstanding cases to a conclusion and we see that happening in the coming weeks. I can communicate with the committee in writing when the cases have been concluded, if that would be of assistance.

I thank Mr. Tuohy.

Do I take it that no investor received the higher rate of grant?

Mr. Tuohy

An external evaluation was carried out by KPMG in 1999 and Arthur Andersen also looked at the process. The response I gave to the committee deals with each of the cases and provides details in respect of them. As we bring matters to a conclusion, I can provide a further response. However, that is our information as of now.

Perhaps Mr. Purcell might like to comment on chapter 8.1 before we conclude in order that we can note it.

Mr. Purcell

There is nothing specific on the chapter that has not already been covered. However, I would certainly be concerned if any of the work I bring before the committee would be seen as discouraging civil servants from what might be termed "appropriate risk-taking". That is not the purpose of it at all. By its very nature, my report and the material that comes before the committee is a type of exception reporting. Under the Act, where an issue arises in respect of which I believe that public accountability is required, I am obliged to report on it. I do not have a particular remit to report on what is good and positive about the Civil Service. There are many positives about the service.

It would be wrong for my work to be seen in that light. It is necessary to have public accountability. My function and that of the Public Accounts Committee are as the vehicles through which the public accountability process operates. By and large, it is a very good system. It is acknowledged, by common consent, in all quarters that what we are discussing in respect of chapter 8.1 could have been handled and managed much better. If the latter had been done, even without the benefit of hindsight - which we are obliged to bring to bear on these matters - it is clear that certain things could have been done and public moneys used in a better way.

Appropriate risk-taking is an important part of what the Civil Service does. I do not know if the committee wishes to deal with chapter 8.2 today. That chapter is an example of risk-taking in respect of which we may have to carry a loss but where such risk-taking may have served the greater good. It is not necessarily critical.

On public accountability, Mr. Purcell's report in respect of chapter 8.1 is extraordinary. It clearly outlines the weaknesses that exist in respect of project management. Regardless of whether it is a private or public concern, the question of proper management controls is extremely important. Deputy Fleming made the point that relocation should not mean that the entire body of management skills should move as well. If that was carried forward into the commercial world, the entire retail sector would be downsized. That argument puts forward a negative case for decentralisation. Given that people are investing many millions into the IT sector, the evaluation should have been external and not internal. Those involved in an internal evaluation of an in-house system are often not the best people to adjudicate on its suitability.

I thank Mr. Tuohy, his officials and Mr. Thompson for their attendance. This has been a good debate. If there are no other comments, we will note chapter 8.1. Is that agreed? Agreed. We will now adjourn and at our next meeting on 6 November we will deal with the accounts of the Department of Agriculture and Food for 2002, Vote 31 - chapters 9 and 9.1.

Will we be dealing with chapter 8.2 at a later date?

Yes. It is a major Vote and chapter 8.2 is extremely important. We would not have enough time to deal with it today.

The witnesses withdrew.

The committee adjourned at 1.45 p.m. until11 a.m. on Thursday, 6 November 2003.
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