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COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS díospóireacht -
Thursday, 6 Oct 2011

NTMA Annual Report and Financial Statements 2010

Mr. John Corrigan (Chief Executive, National Treasury Management Agency) called and examined.

I remind members and those in attendance to switch off mobile telephones as they interfere with the transmission of the meeting. I advise witnesses that they are protected by absolute privilege in respect of the evidence they give to the committee. If they are directed by the committee to cease giving evidence on a particular matter and continue to do so, they are entitled thereafter only to qualified privilege in respect of their evidence. They are directed that only evidence connected with the subject matter of these proceedings is to be given and asked to respect the parliamentary practice to the effect that, where possible, they do not criticise or make charges against a Member of either House, a person outside the Houses, or an official by name or in such a way as to make him or her identifiable.

Members are reminded of the provision within Standing Order 158 that the committee shall refrain from inquiring into the merits of a policy or policies of the Government or a Minister of the Government, or the merits of the objectives of such policy or policies.

I welcome Mr. John Corrigan, chief executive officer of the National Treasury Management Agency, NTMA, and ask him to introduce his officials.

Mr. John Corrigan

I thank the Chairman. We have three units reporting this morning - the NTMA, the National Pensions Reserve Fund, NPRF, and the National Development Finance Agency, NDFA. On my extreme right is Mr. Gerard Cahillane, NDFA; Mr. Brian Murphy, Accounting Officer, NDFA; Mr. Oliver Whelan, director of funding and debt management, NTMA; Mr. Michael Cunningham, financial controller, NTMA; Mr. Paul Carty, chairman, NPRF, who is required under legislation to appear before the committee on policy matters; Mr. Eugene O'Callaghan, chief investment officer, NPRF; and Mr. Ciarán Breen, head of the State Claims Agency. I have a short prepared statement.

I will call Mr. Buckley first. Last week at the beginning of our meeting, we were told that officials from the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform would be present at our meetings rather than officials from the Department of Finance. I understand why they are not present today but it would be good practice if an official from the Department of Finance were present. That is important and as we work through a change in Ministers and their roles in regard to the committee, we should make it known to the Department of Finance that, for hearings such as this with the NTMA, one of its officials should be present.

I call Mr. Buckley to introduce today's examination. The full text of the chapters can be found in the annual reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General or on the website at www.audgen.gov.ie.

Mr. John Buckley

The NTMA manages Ireland's borrowing and, in addition, it provides a structure within which certain other services are made available to the wider State system. These central services include the management of insurance claims that have been made against the State; the provision of advice in respect of public private partnerships and, latterly, certain procurement functions; the management of the National Pensions Reserve Fund; the provision of support to National Asset Management Agency; and the carrying out of certain banking functions on behalf of the Minister. From an organisational point of view, the agency has over the years evolved into a complex organisation with multiple functions. Chapter 7 of the 2010 report outlines the changes the agency is making to enhance its governance in those circumstances.

Looking first at the agency's core activity, the net national debt stood at €93 billion at the end of 2010 and the cost of servicing was of the order of €4.2 billion. The salient facts relating to Ireland's public debt are in addition to the debt managed by the agency, new debt instruments in the form of promissory notes were issued in 2010 as part of the bank stabilisation process. These have given rise to further debt obligations of €31 billion over and above the national debt figures I have quoted. When all public debt is combined, the gross amount owed was €148 billion at the end of 2010. Assets within the system at that date comprised €12.6 billion held by way of deposits, mainly in the Central Bank, and €3.6 billion issued to the Housing Finance Agency. Due to the increase in the cost of new borrowing the State withdrew from the market towards the end of 2010 and has subsequently negotiated an external facility of €67.5 billion under an agreement with the EU and IMF - chapter 3 sets out the details. The weighted average interest rate on existing debt as calculated at the end of July 2011 was 4.7%.

Ireland's national debt is projected to increase until 2013 and decline thereafter. The trends up to the end of 2010 were as follows: the gross government debt represented 95% of GDP; the net national debt as a proportion of GDP tripled between 2007 and 2010; at the end of 2010, the net national debt represented almost three times the 2010 tax revenue of the State; and, from a servicing perspective, 11% of taxation was required to service the debt in 2010 compared with 4% in 2007.

In regard to its debt management activities, chapter 11 of the 2009 report sets out the result of a review of its treasury functions. The chapter concluded that it had documented its operating practices and it had a well bedded-in control system and arrangements for reporting on its performance. From an external control viewpoint, the chapter recommends that an approved borrowing limit should exist and that the re-establishment, as part of ministerial guidelines, of a cash limit on the size of Exchequer cash balances would be an effective way of capping the borrowing limit.

Looking briefly at the NPRF, over the years 2009 and 2010 assets valued at €2.1 billion were transferred from the pension funds of 14 State bodies and universities to the NPRF. A total of €3 billion was also contributed from the Exchequer in 2009. The value of its investments was €23 billion at the end of 2010. However, because of the reduction in the value of bank shares held by the fund its net worth has declined throughout 2011. I understand that the agency has updated the committee on developments since my reports were completed.

I ask Mr. Corrigan to make this opening statement.

Mr. John Corrigan

On behalf of myself and my colleagues, Paul Carty, NPRF chairman, and Brian Murphy, the accountable person for the NDFA, I am pleased to have the opportunity to meet the committee. We have forwarded a briefing note updating the committee on recent developments at the NTMA, the NPRF and the NDFA. I propose to make a few short opening remarks highlighting some of the main issues dealt with in the brief.

The NTMA was asked to take on two additional functions - NAMA and banking -as part of the State's response to the financial crisis. In particular, the establishment of NAMA from a standing start in December 2009 to become fully operational with a €30 billion balance sheet by end 2010 was a major logistical challenge. Given the size of NAMA, the NTMA has seen a major expansion in staff numbers since end 2009, rising from 169 to 411 currently, of which 180 are assigned to NAMA. Management of NAMA's operations is a matter for the NAMA board and its chief executive officer who is NAMA's accountable person. I understand he will meet the committee later this month. The NTMA's role is to provide NAMA with staff and business and support services, including HR, IT, market risk, communications and the execution and processing of treasury and hedging transactions.

In March 2010 the Government delegated to the NTMA certain banking system functions of the Minister for Finance related to the oversight and management of the State's interest and holdings in those financial institutions covered by the 2008 Government guarantee. In April 2011, the Minister for Finance announced the creation of a stand-alone unit accountable to him through the Department of Finance to provide State oversight of the banking system and drawing on the resources of the NTMA to carry out its work. The delegation of banking system functions to the NTMA was formally revoked with effect from 5 August 2011 and the NTMA banking team has been seconded to the Department of Finance.

The NTMA banking unit managed the State's capital injections into the banks and engaged with the banks to drive an agenda of burden sharing with subordinated bondholders. Since 2009, burden-sharing measures have delivered €15 billion which would otherwise have had to be provided by the taxpayer. This includes €5.2 billion in burden sharing since 31 March 2011 following the Central Bank's prudential capital assessment review, PCAR. The bank recapitalisation and burden-sharing programme was substantially completed by the end of July. I am pleased that the staff recruited by the NTMA form the cornerstone of the new banking unit in the Department of Finance and that their valuable commercial and specialist skills continue to be utilised by the State.

The EU-IMF programme was designed to meet the cost of running the State on a day-to-day basis and the cost of recapitalising the banks. Of the €85 billion provided under the programme, it was envisaged that €50 billion would be available for sovereign purposes and up to €35 billion for bank recapitalisation. The banking stress tests carried out by the Central Bank in the first quarter of 2011 quantified the additional capital support required by the banking sector at €24 billion. Through initiatives like burden sharing with the subordinated bondholders and the sourcing of private capital for Bank of Ireland, the net amount of this capital provided by the State is now expected to be approximately €16.5 billion. This means that €68.5 billion of the total €85 billion funding under the programme is available to the Exchequer, an amount sufficient to meet our funding needs through to late 2013.

Recent developments in the secondary debt markets have been positive for Ireland. Despite the more general difficulties throughout the euro area, Irish bonds have rallied with yields on ten year bonds falling from approximately 14% in mid-July in the wake of Moody's downgrade to approximately 7.6% at present. The lower interest rates, the longer maturities and the promise of continued support from the proposed changes to the EFSF and the EFSM are also very significant for Ireland.

In the sovereign debt markets, Ireland is a small player with a strong dependence on international investors. Therefore, even though we are out of the longer term markets, we continue to work hard to maintain strong, supportive relationships with key international investors in Irish Government debt and to identify and develop relationships with prospective new investors. Indeed, with the recent downgrading of Ireland's credit rating, the part of Ireland's existing investor base which has credit rating constraints on the bonds in which it can invest is no longer open to it, and a key challenge for the NTMA is to further broaden the prospective investor base.

Since the publication of the results of the bank stress tests under the Central Bank's PCAR, prudential liquidity assessment review, PLAR process on 31 March last, the NTMA has met more than 200 investment institutions in Dublin and in North America, Europe and Asia as part of an intensified investor relations programme. Investors we have met are mostly of the view that Ireland is the best positioned of the euro area periphery countries to deal successfully with the crisis as it has a more flexible open economy and is recognising and taking action to deal with its problems on the basis of the measures set out in the EU-IMF programme.

The clear messages coming out of these meetings are that the key criteria investors will consider in deciding to invest in Irish bonds are continuing progress in meeting fiscal targets agreed with the troika; successful and adequate recapitalisation of the Irish banks; progress on bank deleveraging; further sale of NAMA assets; and action at EU level on the wider euro area sovereign debt and banking crisis.

The NTMA has maintained a low-level presence in the very short-term bond markets throughout recent months. Subject to broader circumstances we hope to expand this programme through the latter part of 2012 by slowly extending the maturity of the debt we raise before beginning our efforts to raise long-term debt. Ultimately, the timing of these decisions will depend on many different circumstances, national and international, and our continued success in implementing the EU-IMF programme. We envisage a phased re-engagement with the markets before we fully resume normal debt raising operations.

The past year has been one of considerable challenge for the National Pensions Reserve Fund as on the direction of the Minister for Finance more of its assets were deployed for bank recapitalisation, including €10 billion made available as part of Ireland's contribution to the EU-IMF programme. Notwithstanding the changing and uncertain environment, the element of the fund managed by the NTMA on behalf of the National Pensions Reserve Fund Commission, namely, the discretionary portfolio, continues to perform well. From the fund's inception in 2001 to 30 September 2011, the annualised performance of the discretionary portfolio was 3.2% per annum compared with a performance of 0.4% by the average Irish-managed pension fund over the same period.

In respect of the National Development Finance Agency, NDFA, education has been the most active sector over the past year. In the period from 2010 to October this year, the NDFA has delivered ten large schools providing accommodation for more than 7,500 students on budget and ahead of schedule via the public private partnership, PPP, model. More recently, the Department of Education and Skills has requested that the NDFA consider acting as its agent for the procurement of a significant number of smaller school extensions on a traditional contract basis, that is to say not public private partnerships.

Funding for PPPs has generally become more difficult, particularly given the absence of international project finance banks from the Irish market. This has reduced the quantum of private debt available for projects and, as a result of weakened credit-worthiness of Irish banks, has created some structural problems which the NDFA is working to resolve for bilateral funders such as the European Investment Bank and the Council of Europe Bank. However, although these factors have contributed to an overall more challenging environment for PPPs, deals can still be done and private equity continues to look for opportunities in the Irish market.

Last week the Government announced that NewERA will be established, initially on a non-statutory basis, in the NTMA. NewERA will carry out the corporate governance function, including the review of capital investment plans, in respect of a number of specified State companies from a shareholder perspective. It will work with Departments to develop and implement proposals for investment in energy, water and next generation telecommunications. Where requested by Government, it will advise on, and if appropriate oversee, any restructuring of State companies and it will work with the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform on the disposal of State assets.

I thank Mr. Corrigan. May we publish the statement?

Mr. John Corrigan

Yes.

I thank Mr. Corrigan for his opening statement and I join with the Chairman in welcoming the delegation to the meeting. Mr. Corrigan touched on a number of issues in his statement and I want to concentrate on several of them. Great foresight was shown in establishing the National Pensions Reserve Fund in 2001. At present, there is one pensioner for every five workers and God knows that by the year 2025 there will be one pensioner for every three workers, so it is crucial that the National Pensions Reserve Fund contains a great deal of money.

At the end of 2008 the value of the fund stood at €16.1 billion. During 2009 and 2010 total contributions to the fund including the transfer of pension fund assets worth more than €2.1 billion from public bodies such as the universities and State boards amounted to €5.1 billion. Will the witnesses confirm that these funds were well invested? Did the National Pension Reserve Fund have to take decisive action to put these investments into higher yielding areas?

Mr. Paul Carty

Certainly the fund declined and the main reason for this was the directed investments into the bank. With regard to the performance of the balance of the fund, this year has been a very difficult year and we are breaking even for the period between 1 January and September. To compare this to Irish pension funds generally, their returns have decreased by 9%. The reason for this is that we took dynamic tactical decisions. When we saw dark clouds following us, we took decisive action to reduce our equity level. We reduced our strategic target level from 49% to 28%. We took some substantial put options. These measures made the difference between -9% and our break-even figure. To answer the question on whether we have got the maximum yield, we have done well in a difficult market thanks to the tactical decisions taken by the commissioners and the unit. My colleague might elaborate on the put options we took to achieve this.

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

The discretionary portfolio for which we are accountable returned 20% in 2009 and 11.7% in 2010. The assets have increased in value. As Mr. Carty stated, we have taken put options this year. They are a two-year protection against downturns in the equity market. We took them out in the third week of June. The contracts give us protection until June 2013 in respect of equity assets held by the fund that are worth €1.3 billion.

The National Pensions Reserve Fund, NPRF, must follow instructions from the Minister for Finance. Had it had a choice, would it have invested so much in the banks?

Mr. Paul Carty

I can only follow directed investments. The commissioners are compelled to act on the Minister's directions. It would not be appropriate to comment on other options. It is a policy matter.

I know, but I am trying to flesh out Mr. Carty's opinion on it. Did he view such a heavy investment as being wise?

Mr. Paul Carty

I can only answer that question in one way. If it had not been done, where would Ireland be now?

There are two opinions on that. I have a different view. Recently, it was announced the funds from the NPRF would be used to finance the new strategic investment fund. Is Mr. Carty happy that there will be enough money in the NPRF to cover pensions in 2015?

Mr. Paul Carty

I appreciate the Deputy's concern. The off balance sheet liability stays and grows.

Mr. Paul Carty

One would like to see the pension fund staying in place and sufficient funds being available in 2025 or 2050 to go partly towards meeting the liability at the least. The liability will be greater than whatever we can accrue in the fund. Am I satisfied? The commissioners will meet next week to address the issue of the current situation, our mandate under the 2000 Act and the strategic investment fund that is coming down the line. The legislation will need to be amended to allow for that fund. Until such time as we meet next week and determine the business plan and how to identify opportunities, I will not be in a position to discuss the matter further.

I appreciate that. There are many concerns. Paramount in people's minds is the issue of pensions. People are getting older. Are we still on track for 2025? What does Mr. Carty expect the fund to be worth then? Will it contain enough money to cover pensions, given that there will probably be one pensioner for every three workers?

Mr. Paul Carty

There was never going to be enough. Even in the good days when we had €22 billion, we would not have been able to cover 100% of the liability projecting out to 2025 or 2050. I appreciate that the Government has addressed the question of longevity. The age of retirement has been increased and everything possible is being done. These measures will help. Although I am guessing, 30% to 50% is the best we can do.

Will it be enough?

Mr. Paul Carty

The 1% GNP funding has been suspended until 2013. Who knows what will happen then? Will the suspension continue? Under recent legislation, the Minister has the power to extend the suspension and make no contribution, in which case we would rely on the markets to generate a return of 5% or 7%. There was turmoil in the markets in 2002, 2008 and 2011. Will this be the trend every four years, for example? It will be a challenging situation. Unless something dramatic occurs, the NPRF will not cover 100% of the liability.

Is Mr. Carty saying that it is like looking into a crystal ball?

Mr. Paul Carty

Yes. It has always been that way, although one had more hope when 1% of GNP was being invested in the fund.

The NPRF wrote off €3.7 billion at the end of 2010. Did this amount include a write-off in respect of 2009? If not, what was written off in the banks in 2009?

Mr. Paul Carty

I shall ask my colleague, who has the detailed figures.

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

There was no write-down in 2009. We held preference share investments at cost. They were invested in early 2009 and held at par at the end of the year.

The total to the end of 2010 was €3.7 billion.

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

That figure is the reduction in valuation attributable to the assets held at the end of the year, but it does not take account of the income and moneys received during the year. Comparing the value at the end of the year with the cash invested, the reduction amounted to just €2.5 billion. It depends on one's perspective of the numbers.

Based on the current stock price, what does the NPRF envision will be written off this year, bearing in mind that the value of the investment fell in July? What will be the loss on the investment at the end of 2011?

Mr. Paul Carty

To date, September 2011?

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

Up to the end of September, the reduction in valuation amounted to an additional €7.6 billion.

What is the total write-off to September 2011?

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

I would not use the term "write-off", as that implies it is gone. The total reduction in valuation is €10.1 billion.

Is it not gone? These are different expressions.

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

It is a subjective term. The total is €10.1 billion, comprising €2.5 billion in 2010 and €7.6 billion in 2011.

I will continue on the banks. Given that the National Treasury Management Agency, NTMA, essentially owns AIB and 15% of Bank of Ireland, how is it managing its investment and when does it expect to see a return on that investment?

Mr. John Corrigan

The banking system functions have been transferred back to the Minister for Finance. He is the owner of the shares in AIB and Bank of Ireland.

Like my colleagues, I will comment on the current valuations. To the end of September, we are looking at a mark-to-market loss of 27% on the directed investment in Bank of Ireland. That investment consists of two elements. The preference shares carry a fixed rate of interest. The valuation of these shares underlying the -27% represents the valuation determined externally at the end of December 2010. These shares are not traded on the markets.

Following the recapitalisation of the bank in March, the investment of external capital and the recent decrease in Government bond yields, it would be a reasonable expectation that the losses on the preference shares reflected in the end of December 2010 valuation would be substantially reduced in the end of December 2011 valuation. Following the recent fall in the Government bonds, it would be a reasonable expectation that the losses on the preference shares reflected in the end December 2010 valuation would be substantially reduced in the end December 2011 valuation. The reduction in the value of ordinary shares is also reflected in that -27%. They represent the current valuation. Those shares are actively trading on the market.

In relation to AIB, the losses on the NPRF capital was, at the end of September, 55%, which is much bigger. This consists of two elements. In the case of AIB, the valuation of the preference shares at the end of December 2010, which is its last valuation date, was 58% of face value. As in the case of Bank of Ireland, we would expect that those valuations would improve at the end of December this year, reflecting the additional layer of capital put in and the fall in Government bond yields.

I should also add that in the case of the valuation of the ordinary shares, which was underlying the -55% figure, that the ordinary shares valuation is a conservative valuation. The shares are currently marked at 4 cent on the market. We have applied a value of 1 cent per share. Because such a thin amount of shares is traded on the market, the advice we received is that we should adopt a conservative approach.

Taking the 4 cents, which is the current trading level, the situation, though quite volatile, is much improved. To suggest - the Deputy may be correct - that the money is written off permanently is not necessarily the case. The European authorities have classified the capital injections in the banks as investments in the expectation that they will see a recovery. The market capitalisation of AIB, based on the 4 cent share price, is up at €18.5 billion. It is a fluid situation, more particularly in respect of AIB because, as the Deputy correctly stated, 97% of that bank is State owned and only 3% of shares are being traded.

Some 99% of AIB is State owned.

Mr. John Corrigan

Yes.

I meant that the money in respect of the write-off is not there now and as such is in effect gone. However, it can come back, depending on the markets.

Mr. John Corrigan

As I said, I would be quietly confident of a mark-up in respect of the preference share element. It would be inappropriate to comment on the traded element given that involves trading on the market.

As regards the €10 billion investment in the two banks, as directed by the Minister, would the NPRF have had €10 billion in short-term investments that ensured it did not pay a penalty for liquidating these assets?

Mr. John Corrigan

The money released by the pension fund for the banks was raised through the selling of fixed interest securities and from cash retained.

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

Is the Deputy asking about the €10 billion invested this year?

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

The money being referenced by Mr. Corrigan under fixed income was primarily the first round of money into the banks. The €10 billion invested this year was largely raised from the sale of equities in the National Pensions Reserve Fund. We have a comprehensive and systematic process for selling large volumes of equities. Having analysed it on a trade by trade basis, the total all-in cost, including the market impact of moving markets, was between 0.15% and 0.2%, which is small and is effectively the normal cost of trading equities. We spread it out across markets to ensure we were not trading significant volumes of the stock at any particular time.

What were the equities?

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

They would have been European, North American, Australian and emerging market equities, amounting to thousands of lines of stock.

Were they sold at a loss?

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

The 0.15% to 0.2% cost is relative to the value of the shares at the time. The day before they were sold is the benchmark, plus the all-in cost including taxes and commissions and any market impact. Whether we sold them at a loss would depend on the time the individual shares were purchased, which in effect all washes out into the fund performance. Some of them may have been sold at a profit and others may have been sold at a loss. Ultimately, however, whether they were sold at a profit or loss is reflected in the fund performance we discussed earlier.

At what rate did Mr. O'Callaghan say they were sold?

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

Between 0.15% and 0.2%, which was the all-in cost of selling them taking account of taxes, commissions and any market impact effects.

At what price were they bought?

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

We would have bought them over time as we built up the portfolio size. While we have data in this regard it would be fake analysis to examine the price at which each individual stock was purchased and sold. Ultimately, the price at which we buy and sell shares is reflected in the performance we discussed earlier.

Did the NPRF have to pay any penalties as a result of this liquidation?

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

No, none whatsoever.

Given that 99.8% of AIB is effectively State owned, what is the NPRF's day-to-day involvement with that bank? Does it engage in regular dialogue with AIB and the Bank of Ireland?

Mr. John Corrigan

Responsibility for surveillance of the State's investment in the banks has passed back to the Department of Finance and as such officials of that Department are responsible for that relationship. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, the banking unit in the NTMA, which consisted of approximately 11 people, has been seconded to the Department to form an integral part of that unit.

I did not realise that until Mr. Corrigan made his statement.

Present today also are Mr. John Palmer and Mr. Eamon Phelan, Department of Finance, who might like to comment on the Deputy's last question.

Mr. John Palmer

We are from the traditional NTMA liaison unit and not the banking side of the Department of Finance. However, we are happy to pass on any questions Members may have for the banking unit.

I would like to know, given we effectively own AIB and have a considerable investment in the Bank of Ireland, that there is communication with the banks.

Mr. John Corrigan

While that is the responsibility of the Department, there is active dialogue on all of the issues in the banking sector, including the amount they are lending and their deleveraging, which is unfinished business in terms of them tidying up their balance sheets. These are all issues which are being handled in the Department but on which there is active dialogue.

People are worried about issues such as whether they will have a pension when they are older, if there will be money available for public service pensions and so on. We must concentrate on ensuring we obtain a good return for our investment.

I have a number of questions. Is it correct that €10.1 billion has been written off by the National Pensions Reserve Fund, NPRF, from its investment in the banks? What is the total investment of NPRF in the banks? I think the NPRF has written down 50% of its total investment. In percentage terms what is the breakdown per bank? What is the total value of the breakdown per bank?

Mr. O'Callaghan referred to €10 billion, how much was paid for the investment on day one, and what did they realise? What cost was incurred to realise the €10 billion so that the investment could be made in the banks?

I address this question to Mr. Corrigan who in his presentation said that NAMA has maintained a low level presence in the very short-term bond markets throughout recent months. Am I to believe that issues, in terms of short-term bonds were made in that market? What is the level of those issues and the rate of interest paid and when one would expect to get back into the market? What rate of interest could Ireland offer so that we could operate in the actual market?

In the EU-IMF deal, will he outline the rate of interest on the three funds, the EFSM fund, EFSF fund and the IMF. It appears that different amounts have been drawn down. As part of the EU-IMF deal, were we legally required to draw down specific amounts at specific times? Do we have the flexibility now to go into the two European funds, the EFSM and EFSF, because of the lower rate of interest, and would we incur penalties in that regard?

I understand that discussions are taking place at European level on the Anglo Irish Bank promissory notes. What precise rate of interest will be charged on the promissory notes from 2013 onwards? It looks to me to be of the order of 8.6% Are we looking to the EFSF to finance the promissory notes? How much do we expect to save and what rate of interest would apply?

Mr. Paul Carty

My colleague, Mr. O'Callaghan will deal with the Deputy's question.

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

In response to the Deputy's question on the breakdown per bank of the mark to market reduction, the €10.1 billion comprises €1.3 billion in Bank of Ireland and €8.8 billion in AIB.

Will Mr.O'Callaghan give me a breakdown?

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

The amount that was invested in total was €20.9 billion, of which €1.1 billion is being recovered as part of the sale of Bank of Ireland to the private investors.

Is Mr.O'Callaghan factoring that figure into the €1.3 billion? Can he give me the figure of the original cost, the write-off, the impairments and the carrying value of the investment in the accounts at the end of September?

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

We spent €4.8 billion in Bank of Ireland, we have got €1.1 billion back so far. We have a value of €2.4 billion, which is €3.5 billion between money back and value, giving a loss of €1.3 billion.

The original investment was €4.8 billion and effectively we have got €1.1 billion back; we are writing off €1.3 billion and the value is €2.4 billion.

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

In respect of Bank of Ireland, after the transaction with the private investor settles - it is due to settle next week but there were delays because of regulatory approvals - that €1.3 billion reduction in value will reduce to €1.1 billion.

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

In the case of AIB we have invested €16.1 billion, we have received back €0.1 billion in fees and things like that. We have a value of €7.2 billion, making it €7.3 billion in total. That means the write-down is €8.8 billion.

That is 55%. Was there an investment in other institutions?

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

The NPRF has invested in just AIB Banks and Bank of Ireland.

To return to the figure of €10.billion, what losses did the NPRF realise? Did the NPRF have to sell all their equity investments?

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

We had to sell equity investments from our discretionary portfolio which at the end of 2010 was around €15 billion and now it is around €5 billion. The assets that we sold realised €10 billion. In fact, we sold our assets at a very good time, given the way the markets have gone this year. We sold €5.5 billion in February and €4.5 billion in early April and the money was banked very early.

The €5.3 billion that is left in the discretionary fund, in what form is that money being carried at present?

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

Broadly speaking, it is being invested across a similar range of assets that the NPRF had always invested in. I will read out the breakdown of that. As of 23 September 2011, we had 34% in equities, comprising both equities and the other options we described; 6% in bonds; 4% in absolute return funds; 10% in property; 20% in private equity; 5% in commodities; 5% in infrastructure stocks and 16% in cash.

It appears to me that Mr. Corrigan is dipping the small toe into the short-term bond market.

Mr. John Corrigan

Yes, Deputy. The NTMA has maintained a presence and continues to maintain a presence in the short-term paper market. This would be Government paper with a maturity of less than 12 months. In fact, most of the paper has a maturity of between one and three months The current value of the programme, which is rolling over is quite modest. It is about €500 million which is €0.5 billion. In response to the Deputy's question on the interest rate, it varies obviously but it would be of the order of 2.5% to 3%.

Is the rate decreasing?

Mr. John Corrigan

Not particularly, what we have seen is a reduction in the long-term rate which is the ten year rate, which is in a different silo, so to speak, in the market and that certainly has come down.

To follow on from that, at what interest rate will Mr. Corrigan advise the Government to enter into the ten year bond market to start raising money independently of the EU-IMF deal?

Mr. John Corrigan

We are funded under the EU-IMF programme up until the end of 2013, that is what our current estimates show. We have a big bond maturity in 2014, of the order of €11 billion to €12 billion. We will obviously have to get back into the markets at the latest in the second quarter of 2013. The ability to get into the market obviously depends on the progress made domestically in implementing the troika programme. The markets generally have given us a lot of credit on that front. We have seen a dramatic fall in the ten year market, which is the benchmark rate, from around 14% to around 7.6% currently. Also the weekly volumes of trading have increased substantially. International factors will be a key issue. How the current crisis pans out in Europe is relevant to the timing of our ability to return to the markets. Our plan, in so far as one can plan these things because it has to be a pragmatic and opportunistic approach rather than writing down something in a definitive manner, would be to try to increase the volume of short-term paper we sell during the course of 2012 and possibly towards the back end of 2012, depending on all the factors I have mentioned, to look at a return to the longer-term market, from, say, the five to ten years.

By the back end of 2012.

Mr. John Corrigan

If we can do it earlier, we will. I know that may people feel that it overly ambitious. So far, so good in terms of the direction of the bond yields, but markets are such that yields do not necessarily go in a straight line. There could be issues which could push them back up again.

What are the certainties that one would look for? They are the headlines in terms of our delivery on the EU-IMF deal. What are the certainties that would have to be achieved for the National Treasury Management Agency to enter the market? It is not just a question of our attempting to re-enter if the rate is right. There are other certainties one would look for. What are those certainties in terms of our domestic economy and Europe? How often does the agency engage with the investor group across the globe?

Mr. John Corrigan

On the latter question, since mid-May we would have met more than 200 institutional investors. We have a team which is on the road, so to speak, from time to time. Certainly I would have met many investors around the margins of the IMF meeting the weekend before last. I would have met upwards of 30 investors in Washington and New York. What the investors are looking for is a reasonable degree of certainty around the stabilisation of the debt. A number of them have obviously taken the view that the projected debt stabilisation at 118% of GDP at the end of 2013-2014, which is the latest troika forecast, is achievable and there has been substantial buying on the back of that. What markets want us to do is to get the debt stabilised. To do that one has to generate a primary balance of +0.1% on the budget. That is to say that in terms of one's outgoings, excluding interest payments, one must have a surplus of 1%. That is the magic number. As we move through 2012, markets will want the comfort that the 1% is achievable. That is the domestic goal we have to achieve. We are not claiming full credit for the reduction in the bond yields but obviously there is a story to be told here and investors, having lost our confidence, have to be convinced. The investor relations side has assumed big importance.

As regards the number, it will depend on market circumstances at the particular point in time. For example, because of the problems in the eurozone in the ten year area, German bond yields are trading at below 2%. That is because of the flight to quality. When, not if, the problems in the eurozone are resolved there will be an increase in German bond yields and a reduction in bond yields elsewhere if the solution is definitive and credible. It would be impossible for me to put a figure on it but the challenge for us will be that the rate at which we go back into the markets is likely to be considerably higher than the rate at which we are getting funds under the troika programme.

Mr. John Corrigan

We are getting them at 3%. The challenge for us is in 2013, when we still have access to funds from the troika at 3% and we will have to run in tandem with that if we are to get back into a market-based funding programme which, on the face of it, may not appear very smart where we are going to pay substantially more than 3%.

Does the NTMA intend to be back in the ten year market by the end of 2012?

Mr. John Corrigan

We would hope to be back in the in the five to ten year market area. Taking into account the Chairman's point about investor demand, obviously we will have to do a great deal of research close to that time to ensure that if we go to the market, there will be demand and that we do not fall flat on our face and, rather than solve the problem, cause an even bigger one by having a failed issue.

So the 1% surplus before the interest charge on the national debt is a key benchmark that international markets will look at.

Mr. John Corrigan

That being achieved in 2014 and the path to that is mapped out. That is the target set out in the troika programme. It is the NTMA adhering to the flight path which will get us to that.

In regard to funding under the EU-IMF deal and the NTMA's capacity to switch between the funds in terms of lower costs, how does the NTMA view the rates being paid to the EFSM, the EFSF and the IMF? What are the relative rates of interest being paid on those funds?

Mr. John Corrigan

We raised this question at the outset because the IMF tranche of the three legs of the funding stool, so to speak, was the cheapest.

Mr. John Corrigan

We are required under the terms of the programme, more or less, to draw the three down, pari passu. One cannot cherry-pick between them. As it turns out the EFSF and the EFSM are cheaper than the IMF programme. They are probably running at around 3%. It is important to note that the maturities of the funds available under those two facilities will be extended out to 15 years and beyond, which is obviously good in terms of the debt profile. Also the reductions in the rates will effectively be retrospective so the funds we have already drawn will benefit. Some of the details in regard to the EFSF have still to be worked out. Europe is slow in these matters.

I think the IMF rate is about 5.8%.

Mr. John Corrigan

The IMF funds are made available in floating rights - special drawing rights - which forms an artificial currency. When one switches from that artificial currency, which consists of the dollar, the yen and so forth into euro and into fixed, it works out at about 5.8%. On the face of it the nominal rate is much lower than in special drawing rights, SDRs, but it would involve a huge uncertainty in the budgetary arithmetic to run with that.

Does the NTMA believe it will have flexibility to go with the lower rate interest funds given that there is a difference of up to 2.5% and 3% in funds from the IMF and the European funds? Does it have flexibility to take more from the European funds?

Mr. John Corrigan

No, it does not. There is some small flexibility in timing intra-quarter, but one could not decide, for example, that one would draw down from the two cheaper ones and then back-end the IMF. That is not what would happen.

Will Mr. Corrigan deal with the issue of the promissory notes issued to Anglo Irish Bank?

Mr. John Corrigan

The value of the promissory notes issued to Anglo Irish Bank and the INBS is approximately €30 billion. Those notes are to cover losses. To return to the problem raised by Deputy Ferris, unfortunately it is absolutely certain we will not see that money again. It is gone. Rather than writing a cheque, which it would otherwise have to do and have had to borrow the cash to honour it, the State gave Anglo Irish Bank promissory notes in an amount of the order of €30 billion, taking the INBS into account. The interest rate on those notes, allowing for an interest rate holiday of two years which applies, is of the order of 8%. I do not have the precise figure, but the cited figure of 8.6% is a little on the high side. It is somewhere between 8% and 8.6%.

It is still very high.

Mr. John Corrigan

It is still very high, and that is the cost to the taxpayer. That is what was demanded by the troika as being technically required to underpin this arrangement. What Anglo Irish Bank does is present those notes at the European Central Bank and get cash in exchange.

The Minister has asked his officials and us to examine whether, in terms of the cash burden which those notes represent on the State, any relief can be obtained by funding them at a lower rater or by extending the maturity in some fashion. Those discussions are at a very early stage yet.

Which fund would this come under? Reports indicate that it would be under the EFSF.

Mr. John Corrigan

The Deputy is right. The EFSF would be the most likely to provide a solution because the remit of that fund has been broadened.

While I do not wish to come up with a problem for every solution in terms of solving the issue, the EUROSTAT rules, which determine how these things are treated from an accounting point of view, are extremely complex. The discussion being held is quite technical, but we are looking at the issue and were a solution to be found, it would provide some relief.

Am I correct to say that the EFSF fund is at a rate of 3%?

Mr. John Corrigan

Yes.

Currently, the rate being charged is 8%, but that is obviously on a reducing balance. If we got the EFSF funding at the 3% rate, what saving would there be for the taxpayer on interest repayments? No doubt, this has been examined. As a committee, we want to see the best value for the taxpayer. Mr. Corrigan stated that the way the promissory notes are being funded is through the national Exchequer, whereas AIB and Bank of Ireland are being funded through the National Pension Reserve Fund, NPRF. The NPRF is a balance sheet and the NTMA has physically written off half of the investment in Bank of Ireland and AIB, 55% alone in AIB. It has written off an amount in the order of €10.1 billion, an astronomical amount. When we put that in the context of the budget for the Department of Education and Skills, which is approximately €8 billion, it is phenomenal money. For the person with the €30 billion on the promissory note, that is gone. It is money down the drain. How do we limit the exposure of the taxpayer? Can Mr. Corrigan quantify the saving for the taxpayer if the EFSF fund is used?

As a country, we have been exemplary in terms of how we have fulfilled the terms of the IMF-EU deal, which has put a huge burden on the taxpayer. Mr. Corrigan referred to the benchmarks being set, which are onerous. I would think that with Europe looking in we would get some relief. We need a break on Anglo Irish Bank and we need a break on the promissory notes. Can Mr. Corrigan put the issue in context. If this was to go under the EFSF, what would the saving be for the taxpayer? It has been stated that the interest costs would be €17 billion. What would he expect the saving to the Irish taxpayer would be if this was done?

I will take that as the Deputy's final question.

Mr. John Corrigan

The rate paid on the notes is part of the capital required by Anglo Irish Bank.

I am aware of that.

Mr. John Corrigan

What we are looking at is whether the funds could be funded by the EFSF. I do not have the figures, but I can come back with them to the Deputy.

I would appreciate that. It is less than half the rate being applied.

Deputies Ross, Fleming, Murphy and Donohoe have indicated that they wish to speak and we will take their contributions in that order.

I will start with the NewERA body for which the NTMA has taken over responsibility in recent weeks. I am somewhat concerned by the appointment of the new director. What procedure was followed for that appointment?

Mr. John Corrigan

The person appointed to NewERA was a member of the senior management team within the NTMA who was reassigned to NewERA.

Was an interview held?

Mr. John Corrigan

It was an internal transfer and there was no interview. There was no change in the person's terms and conditions of service. The person was transferred to the position.

It is a new job and position.

Mr. John Corrigan

It is a new unit, which the Government decided should be established within the NTMA. We are in the happy position that, to date, we have appointed three internal staff to that unit.

Why did the NTMA not try to recruit someone from outside or have a competition?

Mr. John Corrigan

We have competitions from time to time. In the past 18 months, three external appointments have been made to the senior management team in the NTMA. With regard to recruiting people for senior positions, we advertise jobs from time to time, we head hunt and we make internal appointments. As the Accounting Officer, it falls to me to make a decision on the most appropriate method of selection and in this case, the appointment of an internal candidate was the most appropriate method of appointment.

Therefore, we have a person in a key position in a new body where there was no interview, no advertising of the post and no competition. How much is the person paid? How much is the salary? What is the package?

Mr. John Corrigan

The NTMA meets the requirements of the code of practice for the governance of State bodies in that it publishes salary and remuneration details for people at CEO level. There are three persons within the NTMA styled chief executives - myself, Brian Murphy who is chief executive of the National Development Finance Agency and Brendan McDonagh who is chief executive of NAMA. Under the code of practice, that is the requirement. We meet that requirement.

Could Mr. Corrigan tell us here what the package is?

Mr. John Corrigan

It is not our practice to go beyond what is required under the code of practice for the governance of State bodies.

Mr. John Corrigan

Because the business model of the NTMA, which has been a very successful business model, is such that individuals are appointed on individual contracts and those contracts, apart from the contracts for the people styled CEO, are confidential to those people concerned.

So Mr. Corrigan is not going to tell the committee.

Mr. John Corrigan

Correct.

Does the person appointed have any experience in the sale of State assets?

Mr. John Corrigan

I think it would be remiss of me if I were not to say that I fully respect the Deputy's right to ask questions about appointments within the NTMA but the manner in which he has criticised personally the individual concerned, both in the Dáil yesterday and in his column in last Sunday's newspaper, is a source of great disquiet to me.

On a point of order, this is the Committee of Public Accounts. The activities of members of this committee in their other occupations, such as journalism, is not the subject of comment here. I do not think it is the job of Mr. Corrigan to talk about articles which an individual member has written in his capacity as a journalist. We are members of the Committee of Public Accounts. We are elected by the people of Ireland and Mr. Corrigan is a public servant the same as we are. I suggest our remarks should be confined to the issues relating to today's agenda and not issues to do with other occupations. The Chairman may not agree but I think Mr. Corrigan's comment is an unfair comment.

That is accepted, Deputy Fleming. I remind everyone of the Chairman's warning regarding privilege at the commencement of the meeting, that we must not criticise individuals who are outside the House or who can be identified in our remarks. We are walking a narrow line in this regard. While Deputy Ross has a right to ask those questions, Deputy Fleming is correct but Mr. Corrigan also has a right to put his point of view. This is what has happened and I suggest we move on.

I agree. Mr. Corrigan has every right to criticise me in what I have said outside the House. I am perfectly happy with that.

On a very general level, my point is that this is a new specialised job and new skills are necessary. I remind Mr. Corrigan that this is a value-for-money committee and that is the reason for my question. I am concerned that an appropriate interview procedure takes place which seeks the best possible person who has the right skills and that those skills are sought. I do not know what the job specification is because the job was not advertised. From the press release it seems to be very important that experience in the sale of State assets and utilities is a very important criterion for this job. Did NTMA look specifically for such experience and is there evidence for it? I am concerned that the NTMA as a body looked among itself and made an internal appointment without interview, without advertisement, without competition and that it is now not telling the committee what is the job package nor how much the person is paid. This is very opaque. An insider has been appointed and that is my concern. I think I am perfectly entitled to ask whether proper and good procedure was followed or whether this is normal procedure within the NTMA to appoint people from the inside when people outside with the skills should at least be considered. I am sorry if I have offended Mr. Corrigan in the Dáil and I am sorry if I have offended him in my column but I am a member of the Committee of Public Accounts and that is the reason I ask those questions.

Mr. John Corrigan

I fully respect Deputy Ross's right to ask those questions. The individual in question is a person of the highest calibre and is eminently qualified for the position to which she has been appointed. The person concerned has been heavily involved in the National Pensions Reserve Fund since joining the NTMA a number of years ago. The individual concerned has been involved in, for example, the operation of the management of the private equity portfolio within the pension fund and the valuation of private equity investments, for example, is not a million miles from the valuation of an unquoted public utility. In making the appointment I would have consulted with the chairman of the NTMA advisory committee which functions de facto as the board of the NTMA and he was quite happy that we proceed with the appointment. In my view, it is a testament to the strength of the NTMA that we had an internal candidate who could fill this position.

The NTMA did not look outside?

Mr. John Corrigan

We considered looking outside. As I said, in the past 18 months, we have made three external appointments to the senior management group: the head of the banking unit, the chief financial officer and the head of legal and compliance. These are all senior positions and were filled externally. Two of those three positions were advertised and the third was on the basis of a head-hunting exercise because there was an element of urgency attaching to it.

I will move on to deal with fund management. First, I have an incidental question about dormant accounts. The annual report shows a return of 0.4%. Is there an explanation for this figure?

Mr. John Corrigan

Those moneys are invested internally. They are not invested in the markets because it would not be appropriate for us to take any risks on them. This figure reflected the short-term risk-free rate which we got.

This fund is €340 million.

Mr. John Corrigan

Yes.

And the return is 0.4%. per annum.

Mr. John Corrigan

Those moneys are held on deposit. Given the nature of the moneys it is entirely appropriate that we take no risk with those moneys and that is the basis on which the funds are managed. Obviously, the pension fund which attracted a much higher return has a much different investment profile and a much different risk adjusted expected return. Those moneys are held on a risk-free basis.

What does that mean? Where are they put? It is a very low return, even on a deposit.

Mr. John Corrigan

They are held in the Central Bank of Ireland. It is a low return but capital preservation is the watchword in that particular account, in that people have the right to come back and claim that money and we cannot say we took €100 out of their account because it was dormant and that we bet it on the stock market and there is only €50 left.

They are not all going to claim it at once. It could be put somewhere for a little longer term, even on deposit.

Mr. John Corrigan

The sum of €300 million is a small account and the absolute risk-free rate of interest is 0.4% and that is what we got in the Central Bank. This is the approach we took to the fund. In the case of the National Pensions Reserve Fund - no doubt Deputy Ross has his views - our investment credentials, when it comes to investing in higher risk assets, is very credible. However, in this instance, we decided that it was appropriate to take a very low risk approach and to leave the money on deposit in the Central Bank of Ireland.

I shall move on to dealing with the performance of the fund. The rate is 3.2% per annum over ten years. What is the rate over five years?

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

I can do a mental sum for the Deputy. In the last five years there has been a plus 12%, plus 3%, a minus 30%, plus 21% and plus 12%. These are rounded numbers.

It is about the same, maybe marginally less. Does the fund set a benchmark to compare it with-----

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

We do, yes.

-----because the average Irish pension fund-----

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

We are using it in this comparison. If we take that 3.2% for a discretionary portfolio the average Irish pension would be about 0.4% for the same period.

And against inflation?

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

Inflation would have been 2.6%.

There is a net return of approximately 0.6%.

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

Yes.

The fund does not charge any fees and therefore it is not net of fees. Does it take into account the costs of running, say, the pension fund itself? Does it subtract the actual costs before coming to the 3.2% figure?

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

All of the investment manager fees, for example. The only costs that are not included, which are minor, are the costs within the National Treasury Management Agency, NTMA, of the team that runs it.

A total of 3.2% takes into account Mr. O'Callaghan's salary. It takes into account-----

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

No. We outsource the investment management to investment managers around the world and it takes account of all of their fees.

It does not take into account any of the actual overheads.

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

No. The NTMA overheads are about €4 million or €5 million per annum so in the context of a multi-billion euro fund they would have a negligible impact on those numbers.

Mr. John Corrigan

I should also add that the fund is benchmarked internationally against its peer groups under a survey carried out by a Canadian firm which specialises in this. In terms of the overhead of the fund, because the board of the fund wanted to be satisfied that the overhead, which I believe is the point the Deputy is making, compared favourably with peer funds globally such as the Canadian pension plan or the Norges investment fund. We have come out quite favourably in those surveys since we entered them about six or seven years ago, or maybe longer.

That is fair. Does Mr. Corrigan have any comparable-----

Mr. John Corrigan

We can let the committee have the CEM Benchmarking rankings. The actual basis points amount is quite small. Thirty six or 37 basis points is the overall fully weighted cost of the overheads, including the NTMA salaries in that instance.

That would be useful, and I am not blaming Mr. Corrigan, because to compare it with Irish pension funds is ridiculous. Irish managed pension funds are the worst performing funds virtually in the world. Everybody else has beaten them by a mile. It would be useful to get comparable peer groups.

The Deputy's time has concluded. If he wishes to ask-----

I will come back in later.

I will make a brief comment to follow up on the issue of the appointment of the new person we spoke about to deal with EirGrid. The public service comes in for much criticism. People in the private sector believe, rightly or wrongly, that its staff have well-paid, secure positions but when it is revealed that people in the public service can get jobs the salaries for which will not be disclosed, without an interview process, that there is an insider track and no job specification, and the figures for which will not be released when asked by the Committee of Public Accounts, people are concerned. The NTMA is not prohibited from releasing them; it is just not its standard procedure to release them. As perhaps one of the most well-paid public servants in Ireland, and noting all the public servants who are on €500 or €600 per week, does Mr. Corrigan believe it is right for the morale of public servants to have a situation where a public servant can get this type of job behind closed doors with no interview process and for a massive salary that people cannot even dream of? Do he believe it is good for the 300,000 people who work in the public service that such a system operates in the public service?

Mr. John Corrigan

The NTMA was set up to perform, in the first instance, the debt management function which at the time could not be performed within Civil Service structures. The NTMA was set up outside of the public service to perform market effacing functions and a particular model, which represented a hybrid business model between the public sector and the private sector, was at the heart of the NTMA. As I said earlier, in making appointments to the senior management group, and this appointment clearly is a senior appointment, we have used a mixture of internal appointments and external appointments both by advertising and, in a limited number of cases, head-hunting. In this case it was the view that we had a strong internal candidate who was in a position to get this function up and running very quickly. We have a complex portfolio of businesses and we were fortunate to have an individual who could be assigned to that.

If the Oireachtas wants to make a change in the business model that is up to the Oireachtas but we were set up under legislation and the legislation gives me, as Accounting Officer, responsibility for making the appointments. As the Comptroller and Auditor General observed in his report, in the past 18 months we have made considerable strides in improving the governance within the NTMA. We do not have a board for various constitutional reasons but we have an experienced advisory committee and that advisory committee has moved into an area in governance space in which one would expect a board to perform. That is why in this instance I would have consulted the chairman of that which would be normal corporate practice if one had a conventional board structure.

All I can say is that we have a job to do. We were given this function. We do not go out inventing business lines that we want to get into. These are decisions made by Government and by the Oireachtas. We are grateful that the Government had such confidence in us to assign it to us but beyond that we have to do what we have to do.

Who is the chairman of that advisory committee?

Mr. John Corrigan

David Byrne, former Attorney General and former EU Commissioner.

I will not dwell on it. I am not in any way taking from the competence of the person appointed.

Mr. John Corrigan

I thank the Deputy.

However, I am satisfied that there other people with equal competence who could have done the job had they known the job was on offer. It is bad for the public service that senior people are being appointed to senior positions such as that. If one of the banks or other financial institutions, in the general business the NTMA is operating in, tried to pull a stunt such as appointing one of their own internal staff and popping him or her up as the new chief executive without anyone knowing there was a vacancy, there would be uproar. The same applies generally to this post. I am not taking from the quality of the individual.

Mr. John Corrigan

I regret that the Deputy described my performance in this regard as a stunt.

Did I say that? If I did say it I stand over it. I will move on. I said if one of the banks did something like that-----

Mr. John Corrigan

The phrase "pull a stunt" is what the Deputy said.

I was referring to the banks specifically but we will move on. I think Mr. Corrigan gets the point. It is a bad day for the public service that this can happen in regard to such a senior well-paying post.

I have some questions. I have seen these figures produced several times. I refer to the savings being negotiated under the EFSF and the ESM. We will not get into the names because the public are utterly confused about those but charts regularly indicate that over the seven and a half years these new arrangements could yield savings of €8.4 billion or €13.6 billion over a 12 year period. I have raised this issue in the Dáil and I raise it again now. Coming before a committee such as this one with figures on the amount of savings that could be made is akin to somebody going into a shop that has a sale and then telling the person at home that they saved €100. They do not say how much they spent in the first place. Coming in here and telling us how much was saved without telling us how much we are spending on this issue is not a comprehensive way of dealing with it. To achieve savings of €8.4 billion on the seven and a half year model, what would the payments have been during the period? How much is that interest relative to the interest we would be paying? What is the 12 year figure, which seems to indicate savings of €13.6 billion? How much interest are we paying under that module to achieve such savings?

Based on the briefing notes, it is very interesting that the national debt at the end of last year was approximately €94 billion but general Government debt was €148 billion. The difference pertains to promissory notes, the debt of other central government bodies, amounting to approximately €6 billion, local authority debt and other various items. The agency's role is only in regard to managing the national debt, the €93 billion, but no one person has control over the almost €50 billion in other debts that the European Union considers part of our general government debt. Who is responsible for that? The agency should be taking charge of managing the debt of other central government bodies and local authorities because it obviously has expertise.

Let us consider the idea of each local authority being responsible for the funding, financing and management of its own debt. Many have very large debts, amounting to a collective debt of almost €1 billion. No one seems to be managing this centrally to see if we are getting funding. It might come as a surprise to people that a large amount of debt in the name of Irish citizens is not under the agency's remit. With all due respect, I would like to give Mr. Corrigan another job to do by having the agency take on some of that. We may criticise him over some aspects of his work, but I recognise he has expertise in other areas.

Should we advertise that job?

With regard to the Anglo Irish Bank promissory note, the sum in question is being borrowed and paid in instalments over a ten year period. Is Anglo Irish Bank refunding the Exchequer for the cost incurred in funding the promissory note or will it be another cost to the Exchequer?

I see in a briefing note that, in respect of the discretionary property portfolio that was mentioned, there is €492 million in property and €276 million invested in infrastructure. What property is that? Is NAMA helping to manage it? Whose expertise is being used? Why do two different arms of the State agency have separate property portfolios?

Bank of Ireland is to repay €1 billion to the Government this year as part of its investment. Some €238 million has been paid and I believe the balance is due soon. Does that go back to the NTMA or will it go into the Government's current account to reduce the budget deficit for this year? If so, will the windfall soften the requirement for a tough budget?

I have a general question. In view of the fact that the agency is out of the long-term bond market since the end of last year, what are all the people who were dealing with it doing now? The witnesses speak of investor relations and travelling the world to keep people sweet for when we re-enter the market, but the staff must have been doing a very serious job of work. What have they been doing given that this work is essentially done for them as part of the EU package?

The witnesses state we are funded until 2013. According to their annual accounts, almost €5 billion in benchmarked bonds are to be repaid on 11 November 2011, €6 billion in March 2012, €6 billion in April 2013 and €12 billion in January 2014. Funding must be found to roll over bonds worth almost €30 billion. Where do the witnesses expect to get it? Will the funding from the IMF-EU package be enough to continue to roll it over? Will it be a separate issue?

We will take those questions.

Mr. John Corrigan

The Deputy asked initially about the calculation of the saving. The figures he quoted are, I believe, the correct official figures. When calculating, it would have been assumed that, in the absence of these savings, the State would have been paying something in the order of 5.8% to 6% for the money under the two programmes. The reduced interest rate on these programmes, as Deputy O'Donnell mentioned, is now of the order of 3%. The money value of the saving is the difference between 3% and 5.8% to 6%, discounted over the period of the loan.

In the case of the EFSM, I mentioned earlier a lengthened maturity. The lengthened maturity in that case would be 12 and a half years and, in the case of the EFSF, it would be 15 years. Those are the metrics. If the committee wishes, I can read my note on the sum in question.

No, but we need to see the note. Mr. Corrigan need not read it now. We have seen the savings but I want to see the full picture, the gross picture.

Mr. John Corrigan

The Deputy mentioned the difference between the general government debt and the national debt. The main difference is that the general government debt, as defined by EUROSTAT, which measures debt on a gross basis, includes the figures for local authorities and so forth, as the Deputy correctly observed. Local authority borrowing and so on would be controlled either by the Department of Finance or the Department of the Environment, Community and Local Government.

I am conscious of the Deputy's point on seeking further functions for the NTMA, but I note that his observation is really a policy matter for the Minister.

Mr. John Corrigan

The big difference is that the calculation of general government debt does not give us credit for whatever balances or assets we have on hand.

The promissory note is effectively an IOU redeemable over a long period which the Government has given to Anglo Irish Bank to make up for losses that have been incurred. I refer to the hole in the bank's balance sheet, in effect. The cost will not be refunded to the Exchequer by Anglo Irish Bank. That money is gone. It is dead money, to be blunt about it.

With regard to the NPRF property portfolio, I am pleased to say the fund never held any Irish property in its portfolio. We did lose money on overseas property but did diversify overseas and never held any money.

On the Bank of Ireland question, I will defer to my colleague Mr. Eugene O'Callaghan.

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

On the money that is due back after the sale of Bank of Ireland shares, we have received a ministerial direction to remit it to the Exchequer within five business days of receipt.

When was the directive received?

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

It was just before the transaction pertaining to the original €238 million.

When was that?

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

It was at the end of July or early August.

Is Mr. O'Callaghan saying the Exchequer results we saw published yesterday or the day before included the windfall gain of €238 million? I saw no reference to it in any of the statements issued by the Minister. Was the figure included?

Mr. Eugene O’Callaghan

I do not know what was in the Exchequer results.

Mr. Paul Carty

I am advised it is included.

It is. In other words, the Exchequer figures we all spoke about in the past 48 hours included the €238 million from Bank of Ireland. That would appear to be what the witness is saying. It is logical that if it went to the Minister rather than directly to the NTMA, it made the figures look that bit better because of the repayment from Bank of Ireland. Mr. Corrigan is saying that there is another €760 million or €770 million to come this month.

Mr. John Corrigan

With the Chairman's permission, we will have to defer to our colleagues from the Department of Finance who are present.

Perhaps the Department of Finance representatives can answer that.

Mr. Eamon Phelan

My understanding is that there is a line for it in there. I am not working in that specific area, so I would have to confirm it.

I would like to make an observation and I have only one last question. It looks as if there will be a windfall gain in current Exchequer funding this year of €1 billion as a result of the repayment by the Bank of Ireland. The budget figures are beginning to look a whole lot better now with this extra €1 billion in there, so perhaps we will not need to do some of the things that were promised.

My last question is on burden sharing. I see from the annual accounts that some €46 billion has gone into various banks by way of recapitalisation over the years. The figures have been broken down between the various banks. On another chart we see that €15.1 billion has been achieved through burden sharing. Therefore the total cost of the banking problem to the State was in the order of €60 billion. Some €15 billion of that was met by burden sharing and €45 billion will be met by the Irish taxpayer. Can Mr. Corrigan talk us through that? Who negotiated the burden sharing with Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide? Was it Mr. Corrigan's organisation or was it done by the institutions? When did Mr. Corrigan's organisation come into the frame? What information can he give us as to who the bondholders were who took the €15.1 billion hit? Who were they?

Mr. John Corrigan

To recap on the figures, the total direct cost to the State of the bank recapitalisation, including the Anglo Irish Bank promissory notes, is of the order of €63 billion.

Mr. Corrigan is adding in the additional promissory notes.

Mr. John Corrigan

The burden sharing gain of €15 billion is in addition to that. That would have been capital generated by the banks doing what is euphemistically described as liability management exercises. In other words, they would have bought back the bonds at a fraction of the amount at which they were issued. The pricing of those liability management exercises would have involved a heavy input from the banking unit in the NTMA which is now in the Department of Finance. It is fair to say that the institutions would not have been as aggressive as we would have been in terms of the type of haircuts that were ultimately visited on the bondholders.

As regards who the bondholders are, these are all, in the main, bearer securities so it is not possible to say that with any certainty. However, they would have started out as conventional institutional investors and as the problem unfolded, there would have been an increased involvement of hedge funds who would have seen potentially some sort of killing on this paper. In the event, because of the haircuts that were achieved, I do not believe they made the type of killing they believed they would make.

The Deputy also asked what the team does if we are not doing any borrowing. To use that stage hall term, I am glad he asked me that question. We have a very lean team of about 12 people in the funding and debt management area. The investor relations issue should not be underestimated, but apart from that we are responsible for a lot of active debt management. I mentioned the short-term paper programme earlier. We do all the hedging in relation to the IMF loans that are drawn down. There is a considerable amount of hedging transactions involved in the management of NAMA's balance sheet, for example, because about 30% of NAMA's assets are held abroad, so there is a lot of currency and interest rate hedging there.

To give the committee an idea of the volume of transactions within the funding and debt management unit, the turnover last year was €1.2 trillion. There is, therefore, a huge volume of work involving the markets in addition to investor liaison. I can categorically assure the committee that the 12 people who are there are working quite hard.

I wanted to talk about the National Pensions Reserve Fund but we have addressed that in enough detail, so I will talk about the debt burden. In terms of the revenue generated from taxation each year, what percentage or proportion of that is needed to service the national debt this year?

Mr. John Corrigan

Is the Deputy's question about taxation?

Yes. As regards the amount of tax people are paying, what percentage of that in overall terms will go towards servicing our debt?

Mr. John Corrigan

It is 15%.

What would that percentage have been in 2004 or 2005?

Mr. John Corrigan

Obviously, it would have been a lot lower than that. In 2003 and 2004, which would have been the low point when the Exchequer position was much stronger, it was of the order of 5% to 6%. Just to set out the full menu, if one goes back to the mid-1980s, when the debt burden was high and interest rates were a lot higher than they are today, the amount of tax being absorbed by the national debt interest was in excess of 30%.

Can we take the 2003 figure of 5% or 6% to be normal or acceptable?

Mr. John Corrigan

The key question as regards debt sustainability, to which I referred earlier, is the primary budget surplus. In our case, it is the view of the troika that by 2014 if we are generating a primary budget surplus - which is the surplus on the budget if one excludes one's debt interest payments - of 1%, the debt will top out as a percentage of GDP around 118%. In fact, the figure may be a bit lower than that if one takes into account the interest rate reductions on the EU loans.

I was not thinking so much about debt sustainability, but rather the taxpayers' perception as to how much of their earnings they are paying back into the State, which they would hope to go on State services but which are actually going to pay off debt. At the moment, 15% seems incredibly high. I was just wondering if 5% to 6% would be more acceptable vis-à-vis other countries’ levels of taxation that go to pay off debt? Can we look at 2003 as being a base position? That is what I am trying to ascertain. Obviously it is preferable.

Mr. John Corrigan

The technical answer to the Deputy's question is that debt sustainability is the key thing here. In a way, the percentage of tax that should be absorbed by the debt service charge is a political choice. I do not have the figures to hand but Belgium's debt, for example, is at least as high as Ireland's debt and has been for a long number of years. Italy's debt is equally high. I would be surprised if their debt interest as a percentage of tax revenue would be as low as 5%, which might be suggested as the model. The Deputy is not suggesting that.

Is the current percentage for 2011 expected to increase in the coming years?

Mr. John Corrigan

The figure will rise to 20% based on our predictions and will top out at 20% assuming that the debt to GDP ratio tops out at 118%, which is the current troika projection. This may be lowered somewhat in the next couple of weeks.

Is that topping out in 2014?

Mr. John Corrigan

That is right.

That prediction may change in the coming weeks.

Mr. John Corrigan

It may. Obviously, the interest will be lower but the GDP denominator is a source of great debate given the weakening global economy so there could be a pull in two different directions. We will have to wait. The troika mission is due in Dublin at the beginning of next week.

Mr. Corrigan says the percentage is a political decision but it does not seem like it is in our case. It seems that we do not have any choice but to spend that level of taxation on our debt costs.

Mr. John Corrigan

Having incurred the debt, we have no option. In our case, maybe we had no option because we were faced with a shock to the economy. That is where it is at but, in the normal course, the debt would reflect political decisions in that one decides to spend more than one is earning and one ends up with more debt.

That is understood. Mr. Corrigan's opening statement was interesting. He stated he had met more than 200 investors over the past couple of years and most are of the view that Ireland is best positioned of the euro area periphery countries to deal successfully with the crisis. Having been abroad recently and spoken to investors, the message I was given was that Ireland has fallen out of the PIIGS grouping, which would be positive.

Mr. Corrigan also referred to five key criteria investors will consider in deciding to invest in Irish bonds. That is a benchmark for us to measures ourselves against in terms of how we are doing. The first criterion is continuing progress in meeting fiscal targets agreed with the troika. It has been reported we are doing well in that regard. Should we then assume that if we went further than what the troika is seeking, it would make investors even more disposed to looking at Irish bonds?

Mr. John Corrigan

If we were to do better, it certainly would be positive from a capital markets point of view but, again, obviously at the risk of straying into the policy area, that is a political choice.

Is it a political choice that Mr. Corrigan would advise?

Mr. John Corrigan

From the point of view of my narrow perspective in terms of borrowing on the capital markets, it would make my job easier but my job is not what will determine the outcome of that. The main thing is to meet the Troika targets. If we run the risk of being overly ambitious and then start missing revised targets, that could cause us problems so it has to be a very measured approach. There are-----

What about in terms of Mr. Corrigan's advice to the Minister?

Mr. John Corrigan

From the point of view of the capital markets, it would make the NTMA's job easier if we came inside those targets but I have to recognise - I think the Deputy will recognise - that is only one component of the advice that the Minister gets.

The second criterion is successful recapitalisation of the Irish banks. This is quite important when people are looking at different countries. In a way, Ireland moved quickly to deal with this problem and now investors are looking at the larger countries and their potential banking problems. For example, Spain has not moved to address this yet. From the agency's perspective, are we there in terms of the recapitalisation of the banks or is another massive liability around the corner? Will a new round of funding be needed by the Government?

Mr. John Corrigan

Our judgment is that the recapitalisation has been completed and we have drawn a line under it. Our view is that the stress tests imposed on the banks were severe and a number of investors, as I pointed out earlier, have taken that view because they are buying Irish bonds. We have seen the end of the rounds of capitalisation, which, unfortunately, we had to go through.

Did the stress tests take into account the possibility of the abolition of existing leases with upward only rent reviews?

Mr. John Corrigan

The stress tests were imposed primarily in the domestic mortgage area and in the SMEs. It was the position that the commercial real estate book had already been stressed under the NAMA exercise and, therefore, the question of upward only rent reviews is not relevant to domestic mortgages.

Is it possible that if that were to happen, the banks would then face a shortfall that would have to be met by the State?

Mr. John Corrigan

We have to wait and see the shape of that legislation but I do not believe that to be the case. To answer the Deputy's question conclusively, I would prefer to have the legislation in my hand as I gave what I believed was a definitive answer.

The third criterion is progress on bank deleveraging.

Mr. John Corrigan

That is the big challenge and that process has commenced. The purpose of the bank deleveraging is to get the loan to deposit ratio on the banks down to 122.5%. It is achievable but it will be difficult because it is not just that the Irish banks are deleveraging but given the state of European banks, other banks will be trying to sell off assets. That is best described as work in progress.

Is there a timeline for that?

Mr. John Corrigan

Yes, the 122.5% loan to deposit ratio, if my memory is correct, is to be achieved by the end of the troika programme at the end of 2013.

The fourth criterion is the further sale of NAMA assets. Will Mr. Corrigan comment on that?

Mr. John Corrigan

NAMA issued senior debt to the banks in consideration for the land and development loans it took over from them and its mission is to generate enough cash to repay that debt in a timely fashion and to cover its costs generally. So far this year, NAMA has paid down €1.25 billion in senior debt. Although it is a matter for the NAMA board, we expect that figure to be considerably higher than that by the end of the year.

It is fair to say that the rating agencies have recognised that NAMA has had considerable traction in its disposal programme. Standard & Poor's was probably the most sceptical of the rating agencies in regard to NAMA. When it lowered our credit rating some time ago, it did so on the basis of adding the NAMA debt, which is off balance sheet, to the general government debt and not attributing any value to the assets. We met its team in Washington on the margins of the IMF meeting and the same team, interestingly, which handles Ireland downgraded the United States. They are quite happy that we are getting traction on that. Again, that is work in progress but I think we are beginning to see results there and the agencies are happy.

The last question is the chestnut because that is what is causing the dislocation of markets at the moment. When I referred earlier to domestic and international circumstances being right in the context of our potential return to the market, that was probably the main item I had in mind in the context of international conditions. We will get there but it will be a bumpy journey on the way and in the meantime, the interbank market remains severely dislocated.

While I will not continue with this, Mr. Corrigan earlier mentioned something that should be explored further, namely, the possibility that Ireland could be back in the markets and participating in the bailout agreement at the same time. Were that to happen, Ireland would be charged two different rates and the rates we would be paying in the markets would appear quite punitive when compared with what we are getting under the bailout. This committee might explore this further because members would have an opportunity to bring this possibility into the public domain and to go through it properly to avoid confusion and anger about what was going on, were it to arise.

I thank Mr. Corrigan and everyone for their testimony so far. I wish to pick up on a point made by Deputy Eoghan Murphy and which Mr. Corrigan crystallised well in an earlier presentation, which is that if and when Ireland returns to the markets - I believe this will be sooner than many anticipate - it is highly likely it will do so at a higher rate of interest than is now being experienced under the current external aid programme. What implications will this have for the work the NTMA will be doing?

Mr. John Corrigan

I do not believe there will be any particular implications. There is a communications issue in terms of explaining to people what we are at, because the 3% rate at which we are currently borrowing under the facilities represents or reflects the weighted credit rating of all the countries that are underpinning these two facilities. This includes a number of AAA-rated countries, such as Germany and France, which are underpinning it. We are quite low in the investment grade ratings. It would be nice, which perhaps is a strange word to use, if over the next 12 months, the credit rating agencies were to recognise the progress we have made and were to upgrade our ratings. This is something on which we are pressing them and is an issue that will influence the spread between the German rate, which ultimately is the risk-free rate within the euro area, and the rate at which we pay.

It would make our job easier, were the ratings to be upgraded, because in terms of prospective investors, it would enable us to access a lot of conventional investors. For example, many overseas insurance companies traditionally have bought Irish bonds but because of our credit rating, we are outside their investment mandate and they cannot buy such bonds. Were the rating to be upgraded, it would bring our bonds within their investment mandate.

There are a lot of moving parts involved here. It is down to investor relations and, before one actually goes into the long-term bond market, down to having a high degree of certainty that any new bond issue would travel. This is a key issue and from our technical point of view, in many ways is even more important than the rate which we pay because to have a failed bond auction would set us back by perhaps 12 or 18 months.

I accept all that. It was a helpful point to make today that if one considers the amount of political discussion that understandably has taken place regarding the rate of interest on the external aid programme, the overwhelming likelihood is that when Ireland exits that programme, we will be paying a higher rate of interest on the Government debt we will be selling on the bond markets.

Mr. John Corrigan

I made the point it probably will be even before we exit the programme-----

Mr. John Corrigan

----- because we will be obliged to enter the markets for some form of parallel running. Otherwise, were we to run it up to the end of 2013, the markets would see we have a big bond issue in the first quarter and would hold us to ransom, as markets do.

Mr. Corrigan's point is that as Ireland participates in some way in the short-term paper markets to which he referred earlier, we will be paying a higher rate of interest on that debt than on the external aid programme. Moreover, when we go to full engagement with the markets, hopefully in the near future, the rate of interest levied in that regard will be higher than the rate we are experiencing at present.

Mr. John Corrigan

That is a fair characterisation except that other things being equal, I would not necessarily see the rate on the short-term debt being higher than what we are paying under the programme. Obviously however, one could not fund the State entirely on the basis of three-month paper.

I accept that. My point is this is one consequence of the rate negotiation, which will become apparent as we move through the coming years and it is a helpful point to explore in this session.

I have three questions I will touch on in respect of Mr. Corrigan's testimony thus far. One point he made himself today is that the NTMA is unique as a State organisation in that it does not have a board, even though many of the organisations which comprise part of the agency do. Reference is made on page 81 of the Comptroller and Auditor General's report to the fact that Accenture was drawing up a report on governance arrangements within the organisation. What became of that report? Did it make recommendations on which the NTMA has acted?

Mr. John Corrigan

As for the unique position, when the NTMA was set up in late 1990 and 1991, the legal advice at the time was it would not be constitutionally possible to have a board intermediating between the NTMA, as the body responsible for the management of debt, and the Minister for Finance. The advice at the time was there would have to be a direct reporting relationship to the Minister. An advisory committee was set up which, until recently, had mainly concentrated its advice on technical areas of debt management. More recently, given the legal model within which we operate - the Comptroller and Auditor General may wish to comment in this regard - to try to conform with the code of practice for the governance of State bodies in so far as we can, we have moved the standing of the advisory committee, with its agreement, to areas on which one would expect a conventional board to have oversight. Those issues are set out in the Comptroller and Auditor General's report.

In respect of the Accenture report, it was not so much about governance as about what we were faced with on foot of the establishment of NAMA. When that agency was formed under the aegis of the NTMA in December 2009, there was an explosion in the business falling within the NTMA constellation. The NTMA provides corporate support services to NAMA in the areas of financial control, audit, information technology, human resources and risk management. We wanted Accenture to look at these areas to make sure they were fit for purpose, given that huge expansion. I am happy to state that all the Accenture recommendations have either been implemented or are in the course of being implemented. Its report was more in that space and it made many very helpful recommendations.

How many times did the advisory council to which Mr. Corrigan made reference meet last year?

Mr. John Corrigan

Off the top of my head, it probably met five or six times. There have been one or two incorporeal sessions in which particular items have arisen. As some of its members live abroad, we also have used telephone conference calls.

I will turn to the second area, which pertains to investor relations. How many investors would Mr. Corrigan estimate the NTMA has met over the last year?

Mr. John Corrigan

We launched our industrial relations programme in earnest in mid May because we wanted to await the results of the PCAR test on the banks and the Minister's announcement around that so that we could talk to investors with a reasonable degree of certainty. Up until the end of August or early September we would have met more than 200 institutional investors and that number would have been supplemented by the numbers we met the weekend before last in Washington. It is probably 200 to 250.

Has all of that taken place since May?

Mr. John Corrigan

All of that has taken place since May. Yes.

How many of them would be local domestic investors?

Mr. John Corrigan

The domestic investor support for the Irish bond market historically has been low. Certainly we have met what we believe are all of the key domestic investors. We had a presentation collectively for the investors who make up the Irish Association of Investment Managers, who would be the key long-term investors. We had that in the NTMA. We have to obviously have regard to the locals as much as the foreigners, but the key figure is that pre-crisis, 80% of our bonds were held in non-resident hands by overseas institutional investors. That at the time was clearly a strength because it certainly was represented as assuring prospective investors that the price formation in the Irish market was sound because of the large foreign participation. Obviously when the crisis hit us then, the reason bond yields soared is that many of these investors did not see themselves then as natural investors in the Irish market.

I have two final questions. Because our deficit was so low from 2000 to 2008, the primary market for selling Irish debt was very small because we were not at different times selling a large amount of debt in the way that we are at the moment. At the same time the number of organisations involved at home in Ireland in selling our debt shrank considerably. At the start of 2000 I believe four banks or organisations were involved in selling Irish debt. As the period went on it ended up with one or two. Does Mr. Corrigan believe we missed a trick in that period?

Prior to that time our State had considerable expertise in managing debt dynamics and paying off debt as we demonstrated in the 1990s. It appears that before this crisis the quantity of contacts we would have had with the people who were buying our debt radically declined because there was not much need to talk to them. However, when we really needed to talk to people so that they could understand what was happening in Ireland they did not talk to us and they grouped us in with other countries within Europe. During that period the financial markets' understanding of what was happening in Ireland disimproved because we were not dealing with them as much as we used to. That had consequences for us and is still having consequences for us.

Mr. John Corrigan

The Deputy is right in what he is saying about the number of local intermediaries - I think that is what he is referring to - who dealt in Irish Government bonds - local brokers for example. We now only have one primary dealer who is based in Ireland. The primary dealers is the network through which we distribute the paper. However, when he says that we did not talk to the investors in the good times-----

I am not asserting that. I am just asking the question.

Mr. John Corrigan

No. It is not so much that we did not see the need to talk to them because we are of the view that one cannot just be a fair-weather borrower. In other words one cannot just go and meet investors when one needs the money. One needs to keep them continually apprised of what is happening in Ireland. The issue was that because we were not issuing many bonds the prospective investors did not see them as relevant to their business. These people are very busy and it is hard to get an appointment to see them. They are not seeing us at the moment because they are nice guys; they see us because they see an opportunity to make money on the secondary market because clearly anybody who bought bonds at 10% and are now standing at 7.5% has made a substantial capital gain on that. It was more that we became not relevant to them. However, the Deputy is absolutely right in what he says. When we became relevant - putting it another way - we were starting from a standing start. We would have kept the team on the road but the ability to make appointments with senior people in these organisations at a time when one is not issuing paper is much diminished.

Earlier in the year the NTMA published a very helpful two or three-page document giving an assessment of our national debt. Would it be possible to publish such a document again in light of the rate changes and soon that have happened? Our level of national debt is the subject of ongoing discussion and controversy. A report, entitled An Audit of Irish Debt, produced by researchers in the University of Limerick, contends that our level of national debt is €371.1 billion, which is a multiple of what the NTMA submitted to us. It would be very helpful to update the notes the NTMA published earlier in the year to give a gauge of where it stands and why.

Mr. John Corrigan

We would be happy to do that. We work hard on trying to keep our website, for example, up to date. On that report, how they got to that high figure is that they added on to the national debt all of the contingent liabilities, which may never and probably will never crystallise.

It also appears to be missing any of the potential assets on the other side of the balance sheet.

Mr. John Corrigan

Yes. Absolutely.

Nonetheless, it would be very helpful for the public discussion of these issues to provide that it in a fashion that people can understand.

Mr. John Corrigan

We will certainly follow up and take that suggestion on board.

I thank Mr. Corrigan and the other witnesses. I wish to focus on burden sharing, bond yields and the NewERA issue. Is the final figure for burden sharing €15 billion or might there be any more good news on that front? I spoke to some transition year students this morning about ten-year bond yields. Nobody would have thought 12 months or two years ago anybody, including myself, would be having a conversation with members of the public about bond yields; it shows how far we have come. As the Deputy mentioned, people are hearing what the yield is and we are reading articles in the Wall Street Journal, Financial Times and elsewhere. I ask Mr. Corrigan to indicate what point we must reach which the ordinary person sitting at home, who happens to watch these proceedings, can regard as good. What figure should we achieve? What is good news? Obviously we have come down significantly from 14% to approximately 7.6%. While I take his point that it is not all about the interest rate, I ask him to cast some light on the matter.

We all hear about the concern over contagion, particularly from Greece. Mr. Corrigan alluded to these points in his opening statement and they were addressed by Deputy Eoghan Murphy. The first four points are all within the control of the domestic economy. The last item was action at EU level on the wider eurozone sovereign debt and banking crisis, in which we are at the mercy of the gods or at least of other European countries. What are we doing or what can we do to protect ourselves from contagion? What does Mr. Corrigan believe would be the implication of, for example, a Greek default on Irish bond yields?

My next question follows on from Deputy Donohoe's point about lessons learned. If we were beginning again what lessons has the NTMA learned on how the country was portrayed and lumped in with the awful term, PIIGS? Many international commentators are now beginning to realise that the Irish economy is significantly different to the other economies we might have been turfed in with.

In respect of dialogue with credit rating agencies, if Mr. Corrigan had a magic wand and was able to begin again, what would he do differently and what should we do in future?

Mr. John Corrigan

My understanding is that the programme of burden sharing is more or less complete. There may be some small amounts to be done, but it has been substantially completed.

We are pleased with the trend in bond yields. We should be careful that we are not carried away with ourselves, because markets do not move in a straight line. We could all be wringing our hands in the morning due to some international factor which might push the yields back up again. As to what yield we would borrow at when we get back into the markets, we just have to be pragmatic and opportunistic when looking at the state of the world economy at that point. The point I made, and on which Deputies O'Donnell and O'Donoghue focused, is that we will have to go back into the markets during the course of 2013 at the latest, because we have a big bond maturity in 2014. When we go back into the markets, we will borrow at rates higher than what are available under the programme. We will have to run those two activities in parallel, which will no doubt cause some public debate. That is just the reality and there is a communications challenge in that for the NTMA.

Our message to investors consistently has been that Ireland has signed up to the EU-IMF programme. There may be aspects of the programme that we might not have liked, but we signed up to it and we are committed to it. There is no point in us fretting about the Greek situation. Whatever will happen there will happen. By demonstrating a strong commitment to stick to the programme, that is probably the best way of insulating us from the Greek contagion. The fact that we have recapitalised the banks, notwithstanding the pain that we as taxpayers, have endured, the Irish banks are probably some of the strongest in Europe in terms of balance sheet capitalisation. That will certainly stand to us.

In terms of lessons learned, we have looked at the issue of reporting to our advisory committee and board. We came in this year with substantial funding under our belt. We front loaded all our funding in 2010. The pre-funding was an amount significantly in excess of €10 billion, and I am not sure whether we could have done much more. The hole in the banks essentially pulled the rug out from everybody, including ourselves.

We have a good dialogue with the credit rating agencies. We have been very robust in our private exchanges with them, but we have created a good relationship in that we are very open with them and we operate on the principles of "no surprises" with them, which I think is important. It is a fact of life that the credit rating agencies mainly tend to follow markets. The extent of their prescience is something that one could debate. The CDO market would have been one of the trigger points for the Lehman Brothers collapse. Many of the instruments involved in that had triple A ratings from the main rating agencies. The federal authorities in the US are investigating some of those agencies, because within a matter of months of having awarded those instruments a triple A rating, they were downgraded to junk bond status.

We have had great input with the EU consultative process on credit rating agencies. We believe there should be much more transparency with them. For example, they have downgraded Ireland and other countries without issuing what is loosely described as a country report. We would have expressed the view that if there is to be a serious downgrading, then a country report by the credit rating agency should accompany that at the very least. They claim to operate appeals procedures, and we have used these procedures in all cases where we have been downgraded. It is a fact that the same people who award the credit rating in the first place actually review the appeal. That would defy natural justice as we understand it.

There are many issues with the agencies, but nonetheless we have to work with them. We met delegations from Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch over the last fortnight on the margins of the IMF meeting. They are probably the people we love to hate, if I can put it in those terms.

I thank Mr. Corrigan. The information exchange has been very helpful in informing the public on where we are.

I hate to finish on a negative note, but I need to return to this issue of the NewERA appointment. I care not about the individual involved, because it is not about the individual, but I care about the procedure and the process. I accept Mr. Corrigan's assertion that he has the authority under legislation to make the appointment internally. I accept that there might be an issue for the Oireachtas to ensure that all public appointments at or above a specific level are made through open competition. However, Mr. Corrigan had the option of going for public competition as well, and I would like to know why he would have felt that an internal appointment was a good idea, rather than an open competition or even an internal competition. Public confidence is such an important element in this area. We have read much commentary about this and we have heard comments and rhetoric here today, but I would like to know what was going through Mr. Corrigan's mind in deciding to make an internal appointment. I am not talking about the qualifications of the individual, but the process that was put in place. One would always presume that the best individual would win an open competition anyway.

Mr. John Corrigan

I explained that at the beginning.

I do not think we got an answer on why Mr. Corrigan decided to go for the procedure of an internal appointment, rather than public competition.

Mr. John Corrigan

The procedure for appointments within the NTMA is that the agency has the option of making an internal appointment, of advertising the position, or can head-hunt an external individual. There were three other appointments to the senior management team. The team has a limited number of individuals; perhaps nine or so. Three other appointments were made in the past 18 months. Two of those positions were advertised and the third was filled through head-hunting.

There was not a formal internal competition for this post, but a number of people expressed interest in it. I spoke to them and the view was that the candidate who was chosen was the strongest and had strong credentials in this area. As I mentioned, I consulted the chairman of the advisory committee from a governance point of view. He was quite happy with the choice.

We are debating the process rather than the individual. The process has to be tied into the business model and it has conveyed a lot of flexibility to the NTMA. It has worked and continues to work.

I thank Mr. Corrigan.

Can Mr. Corrigan provide more detail on the term "corporate governance" in respect of NewERA? I ask him to flesh out the role of the individual in the NewERA project.

Mr. John Corrigan

The NewERA project will look at a number of State companies.

I realise that. I am concerned with the role of the individual. What is the job description?

Mr. John Corrigan

It is to lead the NTMA's discharge of the function that has been delegated to it by the Government. In the near term there is the question of the valuation of the ESB which is in the public domain. There is a committee chaired jointly by the Departments of Public Expenditure and Reform and Communications, Energy and Natural Resources with which NTMA staff are involved. NTMA staff will drive the process of developing a recommendation on the value of the ESB and the sales process that is most appropriate to selling a minority stake in it.

Does the person appointed to the role have previous experience in that kind of project?

Mr. John Corrigan

Yes.

Even though this is quite novel in Irish terms?

Mr. John Corrigan

I am reluctant to comment, in fairness to the individual concerned, because we will end up discussing an individual. The individual concerned has a very strong background in investment management at a very senior level in the private sector and also a very strong background in private equity in the NTMA and stockbroking in the private sector. That is the judgment.

In addition, I presume the individual has a deep understanding of commercial semi-State companies?

Mr. John Corrigan

The individual has a deep understanding of commercial entities.

As well as commercial semi-States?

Mr. John Corrigan

Obviously, the individual has a deep understanding of commercial semi-States.

I do not want to labour the point on the procedure because it has been made. The manner of the appointment was wrong. I understand Mr. Corrigan does not set the rules and had the discretion to do it.

Mr. John Corrigan

I stress the point I made to Deputy Harris. The key issue in this debate is the NTMA business model, how successful it has been over the years and how it has performed through the banking crisis in terms of bringing resolution to it. It is the job of the Deputy and her colleagues as parliamentarians to decide on that.

Mr. John Corrigan

It is not an item we can discuss in isolation.

I understand the NTMA did not conjure up the business model. I am not laying that at its feet. It had options and, to Mr Corrigan's mind, it legitimately pursued one of them. The advisory committee is chaired by Mr. David Byrne. I note it advises the NTMA on a number of matters including remuneration. A number of NTMA personnel were deployed to the Department of Finance. Were ten deployed?

Mr. John Corrigan

The figure was ten or 11.

Is Mr. Corrigan aware that the Minister of Finance does not know what these individuals earn?

Mr. John Corrigan

I did not hear the question.

The Minister for Finance does not have access to the information on what the individuals earn.

Mr. John Corrigan

They are seconded to the Department of Finance. They remain employees of the NTMA and continue to be paid by it.

Does Mr. Corrigan have a view on the appropriateness or otherwise of the Minister for Finance not knowing what the terms and conditions and rate of remuneration are, given that the individuals are a seconded into the Department?

Mr. John Corrigan

The Minister for Finance announced just before the summer break that he wanted to examine the arrangements, including transparency of remuneration in the NTMA. It is something we are in the process of doing. We have begun talking to Minister.

Clearly, Mr. Corrigan is supportive of transparency.

Mr. John Corrigan

I must respect parliamentarians, particularly the Minister as he is my boss. We are engaging with them in an open manner. The problem I have is that the business model has delivered on results over many years. The pension fund is one area of business which has the closest analogue because there are many pension funds in the private sector. Our results and theirs are published. We both employ common methodology for calculating the performance because there is a standard. The average-----

I accept Mr. Corrigan's comments on the pension fund. The Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform is on the record of the House in regard to his deep unease and anxiety about the fact that seconded staff to his Department are on salaries unknown to him. There is also the opaque approach to the earnings of other personnel in the NTMA. It is on the record. I know Mr. Corrigan does not design the business model but I am asking him, as the CEO and Accounting Officer, how the lack of transparency sits with him.

Mr. John Corrigan

I can understand the Minister's concern about the lack of transparency. However, we have been charged with discharging very complex commercial challenges and briefs. We have to attract the best in class in terms of discharging those challenges.

The pension fund should not be dismissed lightly. I am not suggesting the Deputy is doing that. The performance of the average Irish pension fund in the nine months to the end of September was -9.3%. The discretionary fund managed by the NTMA on behalf of the board of the pension fund had a flat return. We took measures to insure the capital in June of this year ahead of what we saw was likely to be a major shake-out in the markets.

Over the ten years since the fund's inception it has outperformed the average Irish pension fund by nearly 3% per annum compounded. That is tangible value added. If we are going to change the business model, which is the legitimate domain of the Oireachtas, we have to moderate our expectations or change them significantly in terms of the ability of the NTMA to deliver on the type of results it has delivered.

Is Mr. Corrigan stating that in order to attract the right calibre of personnel to the NTMA, it will be necessary to keep quiet in respect of the salary levels? Would a privacy issue arise or are there sensitivities involved? Is it the case that the salary cap for public servants means that the remuneration on offer would fall well below the expectations of those the NTMA would wish to attract?

Mr. John Corrigan

If somebody is working in the private sector and if we are trying to attract him to join the NTMA, one of the elements that goes into his decision-----

Or hers, I presume.

Mr. John Corrigan

-----is his personal privacy.

Certainly. Mr. Corrigan will be aware that the reason I am pursuing this matter is that many people in certain sectors, not least that which relates to banking, were paid vast sums of money on precisely that principle, namely, that there was a direct correlation between their ability to deliver and their level of remuneration. We have seen the results of adhering to that type of principle. What happened in the past was not acceptable and I fully support the Minister in his drive for transparency in respect of these matters. Representatives from the NTMA should be in a position to come before this committee and answer any and all questions on matters relating to salaries, bonuses, etc. In light of the duties and very critical functions which Mr. Corrigan and his staff discharge, that is the very least that we, as parliamentarians, and, more importantly, taxpayers might expect.

I am interested in Mr. Corrigan's depiction of how the capital markets make their assessments in respect of investments. He referred to fiscal targets, deleveraging and recapitalisation. What is the position with regard to the domestic economy? How do the markets view our unemployment rate of 14% and the fact that the domestic economy is flat at present?

Mr. John Corrigan

The fact that the domestic economy is flat and our high unemployment rate are matters of concern to the markets. To consider it in cold market terms, I suppose the overriding concern relates to the fact that someone who is investing assets on behalf of an American or a German pension fund must consider the question of the sustainability of the debt. This is the issue which is at the fore of that individual's mind. Unemployment is certainly a consideration, as is the fact that the domestic economy is flat. All of these aspects are interconnected in their own way. To be blunt, as with any investment those in the markets make, their concern is whether they will realise a decent return or, more importantly, whether they will get their money back. This goes back to the question relating to the sustainability of the debt and the ingredients relating thereto. If the domestic economy was going well - with strong domestic consumption - and was producing the same growth rate in GDP terms, international investors would be quite happy. However, that is not where matters stand at present.

Is the 118% debt to GDP ratio sustainable?

Mr. John Corrigan

That is sustainable if, by 2014, we are generating a primary budget surplus of 1%.

What would be the equivalent ratio if we were to consider this matter on the basis of GNP?

Mr. John Corrigan

I do not have the ratio to hand but it would be higher.

Go raibh maith agat.

Mr. Corrigan forgot to reply to one of the questions I posed earlier. The figures in the NTMA's annual report indicate that approximately €30 billion worth of Government bonds are due to mature between now and January 2014. As stated earlier, a treasury bond worth €4.5 billion is due to mature in November, another worth €5.7 billion is due to mature in March 2012, another worth €6 billion is due on 18 April 2013 and the final one in which I am interested, which is worth approximately €12 billion, will mature in January 2014. Will Mr. Corrigan explain from where the funding to roll these over and cover any short-term borrowings which must be financed in the interim will come?

Mr. John Corrigan

I apologise for not answering the Deputy's question.

That is no problem.

Mr. John Corrigan

When I stated that the troika programme covers our financing requirements up until the end of 2013, I included those bond maturities in that regard. The maturities up to that date are covered by the programme. In the case of short-term debt, the amount rolling over is €500 million. The assumption is that this will continue to roll over. The expectation is that this will grow, although that is not hard-wired into the arithmetic.

Between the EU and the IMF, we are drawing down up to a maximum of €67 billion. Some of the money involved will also come from the NTMA's resources. If €25 billion of this is to be available for the banks, there will be €42 billion left. Mr. Corrigan stated that €30 billion will be used to roll over Government bonds but I was of the view that the balance would finance the current deficits for this year and the next two years.

Mr. John Corrigan

No. The total amount available under the programme, including the amount being provided from Ireland's internal resources, is €85 billion.

Mr. John Corrigan

To use the European term, that was one "envelope". Within that, €50 billion was earmarked for the Exchequer to cover sovereign debt and the other €35 billion was earmarked for the banks. In the event, the banks will require €17 billion and this will lead to approximately €18 billion being released to the Exchequer. This means that the total available to the Exchequer under the programme will be €68 billion.

Mr. John Corrigan

It is from that €68 billion that the maturities of €16 billion-----

So Mr. Corrigan is stating that it is fortunate that the banks might not require what was originally anticipated and that this will be of assistance to the State-----

Mr. John Corrigan

Absolutely.

-----in that it will not, if it so chooses, be obliged to return to the markets as early as might have been the case.

Mr. John Corrigan

Absolutely. When the programme was put in place, it was agreed that the €85 billion represented one envelope. If, therefore, there was an overrun or an underrun on either of them, it could be decanted into the other programme.

Up to 2013, at least €20 billion of the €68 billion will be used to roll over the bonds to which I refer. Will Mr. Corrigan forward a note to the committee providing a breakdown as to how much of the €68 billion will be used to cover deficits on a year-by-year basis between now and 2013?

Mr. John Corrigan

I would be more than happy to do that. In fact, the figures the Deputy requires are published on our website. However, I will forward a note to the committee on the matter.

That is fine.

There are two other matters to which I refer. We are aware that 90% of the work of the State Claims Agency relates to medical claims. In 2010, the agency paid out awards of €63.3 million. The expenses relating to this amounted to over €32 million. Virtually all of this money was paid out in legal fees - those of the agency and those of claimants. Is it still the position that when someone is given an award, the legal fees incurred represent a further 50% on top of the money paid out? Will the representatives from the State Claims Agency indicate the position to date this year in respect of the awards made and the total legal costs incurred? Legal fees amounted to more than 50% of the figure for awards made in 2009 and 2010. I had been of the opinion that we had to some extent brought matters relating to legal fees under control.

Mr. Ciarán Breen

The Deputy is correct. They are running at approximately 50% on clinical negligence cases. That is a combination of all fees. When we describe them as legal fees, we mean legal and other fees. For example, they cover the costs of engaging experts, the cost of the other side in engaging experts, and the cost of counsel and solicitors in individual cases. The general problem with costs for us is that even where we go to the State's taxation of cost system and contest costs, where we robustly contest costs, the results have been very poor for us overall. It is a real challenge for us.

I spoke to my counterpart in the National Health Service litigation authority and we compared figures. Its figures are roughly similar to ours and are a bit higher.

I will ask for the estimate for 2011. If we have paid €12.5 million in legal fees for the State Claims Agency in addition to the €18 million in legal fees for the plaintiff side, with medical expenses of €1.295 million separate from the legal fees, 120 solicitors could have been employed at €10,000 apiece. How much is being paid? I would have thought this is an issue, considering our current times, and an organisation like the agency should have been able to recruit people on a contract basis. I will come to the value of outstanding claims separately but €12 million is being paid per annum on legal fees to the agency's own people. Has the penny not dropped and have people not thought of employing in-house legal expertise on a salaried contract basis at a fraction of the cost to the taxpayer?

Mr. Ciarán Breen

We have an internal legal team but what the Deputy referred to would be impossible given the volume of claims and what is required overall. Outside firms offer a particular expertise, particularly in catastrophic injury cases. There is a combination of our in-house legal team and outside personnel. This year-----

Are the additional legal fees not shown separately included in the €7 million in expenses picked up by the agency? It does not charge back to the HSE the expenses for running the organisation.

Mr. Ciarán Breen

No, absolutely not.

So there is another €7 million on top of the €32 million? We have mentioned trillions today at one stage but we are back to ordinary millions at this stage. How much of the €7 million accounts for internal legal fees on top of the external €32 million?

Mr. Ciarán Breen

The Deputy is correct that we do not charge the HSE in respect of the work done by the in-house legal team. That is captured generally within the overall NTMA running costs, which include salaries. To return to the Deputy's point on legal fees, this year we procured a new panel of outside solicitors and imposed a cap precluding the possibility of earning more than 40% of the plaintiff's solicitor's professional fee. We have capped it further by stating that in the District, Circuit and High courts, one can never earn above a certain figure. With our own costs our projection is to have a decrease of somewhere between 15% and 20% from the costs over the life of the previous panel.

What is expected to be paid in the State Claims Agency in legal fees this year? It was €12.56 million last year. We are three quarters through the year.

Mr. Ciarán Breen

We are hoping the overall turnout for the year will be in the region of 38%.

That is 38% of what?

Mr. Ciarán Breen

The total spend for this year, taking in compensation, damages and cost, is expected to be in the region of €100 million.

That is the same as last year.

Mr. Ciarán Breen

Last year it was approximately €80 million.

I am not getting the feeling from the witness that we will see serious reductions in cost. We are talking about 38% of someone else's cost and there is a vested interest in both sides to have a higher award. The higher the award, the higher the plaintiff's solicitor's fees. That increases the amount which the agency staff get. We are back to the commission lark again.

The issue is not about clinical indemnity. From the comments of the witness it seems that everyone involved in the legal profession has a vested interest in having those awards as high as possible because they are based on a percentage of award. Have we not got past that stage yet? We probably had the same conversation two, three or four years ago with different participants. Given the volume of cases taken on and where the HSE has asked them to be managed in recent years, why have staff not been upskilled to handle the process internally? There is €786 million in claims to be paid out, with almost €400 million in legal fees to be collected by the legal profession working on behalf of the agency and the plaintiff. That must be paid out to resolve what is on the books now based on current projections.

Mr. Ciarán Breen

We have 15 or 16 solicitors in-house dealing with these cases. Some are handling them not as a solicitor of record but as claims manager.

They are just managing the case.

Mr. Ciarán Breen

The institution which sets the standards on fees in civil and clinical negligence actions is the Taxing Master of the High Court. I can do nothing except in cases where impossible bills are presented to us, where we go before the Taxing Master and suggest reasons they might be reduced. On many occasions I have, as director of the agency, stated my outrage at the high level of costs. My understanding is the Minister for Justice and Equality, Deputy Shatter, is bringing a new legal costs Bill before the Dáil with the aim of reducing fees generally.

What has been the success rate in the process? The witness stated there was not much success. Will he give an example of an outcome?

Mr. Ciarán Breen

I will give a specific example. In a catastrophic injury case settling in the order of €4.2 million to €4.5 million, the plaintiff's solicitor's professional fee in that case will tax somewhere around €450,000. If I want to contest that I must go before the Taxing Master and offer reasons for the fee to be reduced. I agree with the Deputy that there is a gravitational pull between the award and the level of the professional fee. This is how the system works and I am trying to countermand this in some way. That is a function of the Taxing Master.

What happens in the process when the case is presented? What is the general outcome?

Mr. Ciarán Breen

Mostly, it has been unsuccessful, although we have had some limited success.

I will correct my previous figures. The €786 million referred to as outstanding claims only relates to clinical indemnity.

Mr. Ciarán Breen

Yes.

The total amount outstanding, according to the accounts, is €885 million. The €400 million in additional legal fees is an underestimate.

Mr. Ciarán Breen

No, it is not. On the employers' liability, public liability and property damage claims side, legal costs tend to be lower because the awards are much lower.

I am absolutely sure we are not getting value for money because every time there is an award granted, the legal fees add 50%. It is too cosy. According to the annual report there were meetings with clinicians, visits to key maternity hospitals and the agency is waiting for a report dealing with possible legislation to spread payments annually rather than handing out €4 million in payments all at once. It might not change the cost of the claim but the payment would be spread over a period. The best way of reducing costs is to deal with cases upfront, fairly, honestly and promptly. What aggravates many people is the denial by the clinicians of medical negligence. Most of these are obstetric cases and the parents and families are distraught. In the small number of cases I have dealt with, that is what aggravates the families and ultimately hardens the attitude. It is not just the legal profession that hardens people's attitudes. People should be upfront with them and say: "Sorry, we made a mistake and we know we made a mistake. It was not a deliberate mistake." The witness said he asks people to come forward with errors. If some of these cases were dealt with more swiftly and in a more upfront manner, I am convinced they would cost less. The longer a legal battle runs, the more hardened everybody becomes.

Mr. Ciarán Breen

I agree. We have a project under way at present with a number of hospitals whereby we have this concept of open disclosure. That is exactly what we are asking clinicians to do. If a mistake has been made, we ask them to own up to the mistake and let it be known. The claim should then be dealt with very quickly, and we do that. We have had a considerable number of cases that we can deal with in a very short period. I can give the committee a statistic. In the National Health Service Litigation Authority, NHSLA, in Britain, the average time from the initiation of a claim to its resolution is 4.7 years. The average time for us is 2.3 years.

Obviously it is not possible to disclose a name but of the claims paid to date and the claims the agency has costed on its books, what would be the highest estimate of claims paid and possibly due that relate to a single clinician - one, two or three? There must be some people who do not have claims against them, while some might be unfortunate and have one or two claims against them. There must be people who have more claims against them than others. Has the agency ever told the HSE it is refusing to cover or deal with a particular individual any more because they have a track record that is costing this level of activity, apart from the human misery to the family concerned?

Mr. Ciarán Breen

We have a process of engagement with the HSE. If we identify a particular clinician who is associated with bad practice generally, and that manifests itself in many ways but claims clearly are a good indicator that something might be wrong, we engage directly with the HSE if that happens. However, in our analysis of all the claims we have settled since the agency's inception, we have not had that difficulty with any clinician. In fact, it can be a combination of things. The thing about health care and its administration, apart from obstetrics which is a particular challenge, is that it is multi-disciplinary. There are many doctors, registrars, junior doctors and consultants involved. It is sometimes not possible to reduce it to saying that one person was to blame. It can often be a combination of things and a deteriorating patient. In fact, some of the things that happen in our hospitals happen in any event where there is a very compromised patient and, unfortunately, something which is negligent compounds the overall disability.

As regards the legal fees the agency will be paying, aside from to the in-house legal department staff, I presume they will be approximately €12 million, which is the same as last year. Is there any way that figure can be reduced through, for example, more competitive tendering or recruiting people from these firms on a short-term basis? The agency is expert at headhunting good people in the financial market. Would it not consider headhunting a few good legal practitioners who are experts in these areas and give them an annual salary instead of this percentage, which is going to the firm they work for in some cases? The agency could headhunt a few people on short-term contracts for a few years instead of paying them on this commission basis, which the agency is still wedded to this year. New legislation might be passed but that will take a long time to come through. Will Mr. Breen comment on that?

Mr. Ciarán Breen

It is in our plan to scale up our in-house legal team. To come back to the procurement issue, in May and June this year we procured two new panels of solicitors both for the employers liability public liability, ELPL, and PD and the clinical negligence side. It was very competitive tendering and we forced down the costs by imposing these caps both relating to percentage and to what one can possibly achieve by way of a maximum fee. We are going to reduce our cost base by approximately 20%, and we have evidence of this because we have done the figures.

The last topic I wish to deal with relates to the National Development Finance Agency. Generally, one would assume there is far less activity. I realise some of the school bundles are ongoing and the witness referred to third level education. According to the briefing note, the agency has a third second level PPP schools project going ahead and a third level institution PPP programme that is well advanced. A preferred tenderer is appointed on each and both will reach final close once the statutory planning process and private debt funding arrangements are in place. These are very difficult to bank now. The agency has been at the stage of having a preferred tenderer previously. With regard to the people the agency brought to preferred tenderer status, how many of them is the agency no longer proceeding with and how many are still live cases? There were some who had reached the point of preferred tenderer, for example, under the decentralisation programme, but the projects collapsed.

Mr. Brian Murphy

The decentralisation programme was cancelled and it was being procured by the Office of Public Works, OPW.

Is that happening now?

Mr. Brian Murphy

It was being procured by the OPW and a number of competitions were cancelled.

Some of them were public private partnerships.

Mr. Brian Murphy

One or two of them were, but they were being procured by the OPW rather than our agency. We are running the education programme and, as the Deputy correctly pointed out, we have schools, bundle three, and third level, bundle one, at present. We expect to close third level, bundle two, and schools, bundle three, in the next three to four months. The financing is being arranged at present.

Aside from these two projects, have there been any others where the preferred tenderers that had been selected are no longer proceeding?

Mr. Brian Murphy

No. The major project we had on our books which was cancelled was the National Concert Hall. That had not reached preferred tenderer stage but had reached the point before that. We had two bidders left in the competition but the Government decided to cancel the competition.

I wish to raise a final point. The Minister for Finance has asked the agency to help with the procurement of traditional school building projects, possibly because of its expertise in that area. These are the traditional projects that were carried out by the Department of Education and Skills heretofore. What is the financial scale of the projects? Will it involve a new contract with the main contractor who gets the job? I am obliged to raise this issue because every Member of the House has met with subcontractors who worked on State funded projects, even under the Department of Education and Skills, and while the projects were completed and the schools were opened, the subcontractors were left in the lurch and not paid. This was because the person who submitted the original tender and was given the original contract knew well he could only complete that project if he left some subcontractors in the lurch. He knew that before he started because his figures could not have stacked up otherwise.

The Department, until now, did not have a mechanism for weeding out people who had done that under previous contracts. Will the agency take that into account or will it continue to give the project to the contractor who wins the competition, regardless of his record? We have to pass special legislation, the Construction Contracts Bill, to clean up some of the mess. Some of these are in the private sector but some are in the public sector. Subcontractors go onto these sites knowing it is a State funded contract and feel a level of comfort that they will be paid. However, sometimes they are not paid. Will the agency deal with this aspect as part of its new brief for the schools projects?

Mr. Brian Murphy

In fact, it is not with the Department of Finance but with the Department of Education and Skills that we are having discussions at present. The Department of Education and Skills is under a great deal of pressure to deliver schools due to developing demographics. We have built a very close relationship with the Department of Education and Skills in recent years because of our work on various bundles of schools.

There are some excellent ones in my constituency of Laoighis-Offaly, as Mr. Murphy knows. They are outstanding facilities.

Mr. Brian Murphy

I hope the Deputy has had the opportunity to look at them.

The official opening of the convent in Portlaoise took place last Friday and the official opening of the CBS school will take place next Friday. Everybody is thrilled with the quality.

Mr. Brian Murphy

Excellent.

(Interruptions).

Mr. Brian Murphy

I was too busy to attend.

I give praise sometimes as well as give out-----

You are a good barrister. You knew the answer before you were asked the question.

Mr. Brian Murphy

We would like to think the experience we have had with the Department of Education and Skills and the relationship which has evolved in recent years has been very positive. The Department approached us precisely because of the expertise we have in-house in procurement and project management. It asked us to assist on the traditional delivery of perhaps 20 to 25 smaller schools and school extensions.

What is the financial scale of the projects about which we are talking?

Mr. Brian Murphy

The financial scale in total will probably be €2 million to €3 million per school, so it will probably be €60 million to €70 million, or something of that order. The discussions are at a very early stage and we will definitely require a change in the legislation governing the operation of the NDFA because the NDFA (Amendment) Act 2007, which gave us the PPP procurement mandate, specifically states PPPs. It does not extend to any other form of procurement. This is traditional procurement.

In regard to the financial robustness of the contractors, we have a very rigorous process for the assessment of bidders. That clearly includes financial assessment which includes an assessment of financial robustness. This is something we apply very rigorously.

There was a situation in regard to school bundles 1 and 2 where one of the major contractors went into liquidation. In regard to school bundles 1, it was the sole contractor but the project was 98% finished, so it did not cause a problem. In regard to school bundles 2, the structure was a construction joint venture and it was structured in such a way, or the documentation was drafted in such a way, that if one contractor got into trouble, the other contractor had to step into his shoes. That happened in regard to school bundles 2 and a number of the schools were well behind schedule when this happened. The other contractor stepped in and took over the whole contract and I am delighted to say all the schools will be delivered ahead of schedule and on budget. Four of the six have been delivered in the past couple of weeks and two more will be delivered in the next four weeks.

In regard to the matter of contractors, when the main contractor got into trouble, some subcontractors were left in the lurch. What is very important to remember in regard to PPPs is that the party with whom we contract is a special purpose company which in turn engages the design and construction contractor. That design and construction contractor in turn engages subcontractors. There is no direct relationship with the State. We deal with the private sector entity which is a consortium usually formed by the main contractor, perhaps an infrastructrual investor and then a facilities management company. We have no direct relationship with the subcontractor and the contractor.

In regard to the programme we will do for the Department of Education and Skills, we will have a direct relationship with the contractor. We will be rigorous in applying the kind of financial robustness criteria to which I referred earlier.

In terms of dealing directly with the contractor, I ask the NDFA to use its business head and not just look at its credit rating. It should check out the previous jobs the contractor did and find out who the subcontractors who laid the tarmacadam, painted the windows or installed the doors were and its payment record on previous jobs. If it has not paid for all the work done on the site, for which it was paid, it should not be given a contract.

I suggest that the NDFA puts a mechanism in place to weed out not contractors who go bust, which is a problem in itself, but those who do not go bust but cause the subcontractors to go bust.

Mr. Brian Murphy

I assure the Deputy that we have the most rigorous criteria and we apply these very carefully.

There is no legal criteria in this regard. That is why we have to bring in the Construction Contracts Bill 2010. The Department of Finance says we have a standard tendering process and the local authorities say we have something else but there is not a mechanism in place. Now that the NDFA is moving into a new area, will it take this into account?

Mr. Brian Murphy

Absolutely.

In regard to the promissory notes, the State has put money into Anglo Irish Bank and it is being required to pay interest to it as well. Are there any circumstances in which it could be argued with Europe that there is no requirement to pay any interest on the promissory notes put into Anglo Irish Bank? At what stage are the discussions?

Mr. John Corrigan

The capital sum of the promissory notes and the interest payable thereon in the round is the amount required to fill the hole left in Anglo Irish Bank. If one paid a lower interest rate on the capital sum, Anglo Irish Bank would have a capital deficiency or one would have to put a bigger sum on the capital note, so one would end up where one started. The question the Deputy raised is whether the ESFS or one of those entities can be used to short circuit the process and give some relief to the Exchequer. The combination of the capital sum and the interest is an integral part of the solution.

When will the NTMA have further discussions with Europe on this?

Mr. John Corrigan

The Department is driving it and we are involved in it. I could not give the Deputy an answer to that.

Is the Department in discussions?

Mr. Eamon Phelan

No, we are not in a position to call that.

Does the Comptroller and Auditor General wish to comment?

Mr. John Buckley

I have nothing to add to the opening remarks.

Is it agreed that the committee notes the 2009 and 2010 accounts of the NTMA, the NTPF and the NDFA and disposes of the relevant chapters in the Comptroller and Auditor General's report? Agreed. I thank the witnesses.

The witnesses withdrew.

The committee adjourned at 1.40 p.m. until 10 a.m. on Thursday, 13 October 2011.
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