Léim ar aghaidh chuig an bpríomhábhar
Gnáthamharc

Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 10 Oct 1922

Vol. 1 No. 20

In Committee on the Constitution of Saorstat Eireann Bill. - ARTICLE 65.

"The Supreme Court of the Irish Free State/Saorstát Eireann shall, with such exceptions (not including cases which involve questions as to the validity of any law), and subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have appellate jurisdiction from all decisions of the High Court. The decision of the Supreme Court shall, in all cases, be final and conclusive, and shall not be reviewed or capable of being reviewed by any other Court, Tribunal or Authority whatsoever.
"Provided that nothing in this Constitution shall impair the right of any person to petition His Majesty for special leave to appeal from the Supreme Court to His Majesty in Council, or the right of His Majesty to grant such leave."

Mr. KEVIN O'HIGGINS

We have embodied in that Article the question of appellate jurisdiction which was held by British Ministers, but strictly according to the Treaty we could be bound with the exact Canadian position as regards appellate jurisdiction. The Canadian position is pretty much what the position here was with regard to the House of Lords, that an appeal lay automatically, and even in domestic legislation, and an appeal could be taken to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Now, what is secured in this Article 65 is the most favourable position, i.e., the South African position. I do not know just how many appeals there have been taken from South Africa since the Union was set up, but I believe the number will be found to be very small. An appeal would not lie in the case of ordinary routine domestic legislation, but only in cases where international issues were raised was permission for such special appeal granted, as provided in this Article. There is no express provision laid down in the Canadian Act as to appeals to the Privy Council, by a section which preserves all existing laws, and which preserves this existing appeal in all cases to the Privy Council. Under the Australian Act the prerogative to grant such a right was reserved to the Crown in Council, and it is expressly preserved provided that Parliament may make laws limiting the cases in which such leave may be asked for, but that such a law shall be referred to the Governor-General for Royal assent. In the South African prerogative the Crown can grant such leave to appeal, and the Crown in Council is preserved in the same way as in Australia, but in effect it went further, being bound with provisions analogous to the first part of this Article. Now I propose to read an extract from the work of Professor Keith, who has been quoted before in this Dáil as an authority on constitutional matters. The extract deals with the question of appeals to the Privy Council:—

"Fresh importance has been attached to the development of the status of the Dominions to the question of the retention of the right of appeal from the Dominion Courts to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. That body itself has shown no anxiety to extend its jurisdiction; it has, on the contrary, affirmed the principle that only in cases of the highest importance will it hear appeals from the Union of South Africa, so that for practical purposes the appeal from the Union is a matter of mere theoretic interest. It has similarily declined its technically valid right to hear appeals from Canada, even in so interesting a case as that of the Winnipeg rioters whose condemnation raised bitter political feeling in the Dominion. It has also shown great reluctance to grant leave to appeal in any Australian case not of the first importance. It may therefore be held that the jurisdiction, though still in active exercise and though still of the highest importance as regards cases on the Australian Constitution, is in process of obsolescence, and that the way is paved for its extinction unless steps are taken to revise the basis on which it rests. The feeling in Canada in favour of the retention of the appeal is growing weaker, as is evinced by the proposal in 1920 of the Ontario Government to secure the abolition of appeals from the Courts of that Province to the Judicial Committee." There is just one further point in this Article. It is perhaps worthy of note, and it is that no cases of law can be made from appeals of this kind. In the very rare cases in which an appeal can be granted to a particular case it would simply be dealt with on its merits and the Courts in Ireland would not be bound in any way to follow such a decision given in such an appeal. It would not be possible to evade that appeal. I have shown on the strict interpretation of the Treaty, we would have been bound to the Canadian position. We have in effect secured a position very much more favourable than that of Canada.

An amendment "To delete the paragraph beginning `Provided that,' and concluding `such leave,' " stood in the name of Mr. Cathal O'Shannon.

Mr. THOMAS JOHNSON

Perhaps I may be allowed to move in his name the deletion of the proviso, "that nothing in this Constitution shall impair the right of any person to petition His Majesty for special leave to appeal from the Supreme Court to His Majesty in Council, or the right of His Majesty to grant such leave." I am sorry that I am not able to argue this case, except from the very common-sense point of view that, after saying one thing, we proceed immediately to say the opposite, and to me it is very curious that we should put in a clause saying that a decision of the Supreme Court must be final and conclusive in all cases, and could not be reviewed by any other Court, Tribunal, or Authority, and then say immediately afterwards that there is another authority which may review certain cases. It is a case of very definite contradiction, despite the case made for the inclusion by the Minister, and I beg to move the deletion of this clause, leaving to the lawyers the job of arguing it out.

Mr. KEVIN O'HIGGINS

The contradiction is apparent rather than real. In the Constitution of the country a certain Court is laid down as the final Court, and in ordinary routine domestic legislation it is, and will be, undoubtedly the final Court. But, inasmuch as we have accepted the King, then we have to accept the special prerogative of that King, and grant, in very special cases, the right of appeal. That is the prerogative that is attached to Kings, at least English Kings, as long as we know them. In the first instance, they heard such appeals themselves in person, but gradually, when that became too much like work, they established a buffer between themselves and the petitioners, and the fiction was that that was the King in Council. It is simply a question of facing the realities of the position that, under the Treaty, we have not been able to get rid of that appeal, but we have reduced it to a minimum, and we have, I feel, reduced it to a position where there will not be two or three appeals in a century, where appeals will only be granted in very special cases, raising matters other than purely Irish interests, raising international issues of the first importance. If Deputies take the trouble to inquire, as I have not taken the trouble, to see how many appeals there have been from the Union of South Africa since that Union was established, it will give you some indication of the proportion on that question.

LIAM de ROISTE

The obvious answer to that question with regard to the existing King, to my mind, is this: What we have accepted is the King as head of the Irish State, and if there is an appeal to the King's prerogative, let it be to the King in Council in Ireland—that is, let there be an Irish Privy Council to appeal to. What is intended here is an appeal to the English Privy Council, and that being the case, I desire to support the amendment of Deputy Johnson.

Mr. KEVIN O'HIGGINS

I may say, sir, in so far as the King has been accepted, I think he has been accepted as head of the Commonwealth of Nations formerly known as the British Empire.

Professor MAGENNIS

Is that last remark of the Minister correct in this case? The King appeared once specifically under that title and once by implication. The oath is one of fidelity and allegiance to the Irish Constitution as by law established. The King as part of the Legislature and the King as part of the Executive is surely included in that. One part of the oath refers to the King as head of the Union of Free Nations. I think the Minister is not quite correct in what he says. I spoke at some length on what is practically the point at issue in this matter a few evenings ago, and I have no intention of repeating myself. But I think it is right to remind the Dáil that when Lord Carnarvon, in 1867, set up the Canadian Constitution as the result of various negotiations between the Provinces of Canada, the Canadians were very anxious, inasmuch as they foresaw that many constitutional questions would arise between the Provinces and the Federal Government, that in case disputes should arise there should be no room left for appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in England. They decided to set up a Federal Court—the Supreme Court of the Federation—whose business it would be to consider questions of that type. But in one respect unfortunately, perhaps in another fortunately, the view that the Canadian Courts took of the relation between the Provinces and the Federal Government under the new Constitution was such as to give judgment invariably limiting the powers of the Provincial Legislature and increasing, at their expense, the power of the Federal Government. So that in a few years there was quite a large number of appeals to the British Privy Council. Now the developments of the Canadian Constitution are all away from making appeal on domestic issues to the Judicial Committee in Westminster; and similarly, in South Africa. And it seems to me highly necessary that our claim should be similar to that put forward by Grattan. We are not independent; we are not what we are supposed to be under the Treaty, if such appeal on an Irish question of law is to exist in any shape or form. Because I do not see how this can be disputed that if any friction arises as to the interpretation of this document, and if any friction arises with regard to the decision of a Court of Law, that the determination of it is to be left to Downing Street. Downing Street is the ruler in the last resort, and no declaration of right, such as in that draft Constitution, or any other documents which might emanate from us, or from any other similar body, will get rid of that actual fact. All the power lies there where the last appeal lies, and I make this plea again to Ministers, as on a similar occasion recently—let us get the last ounce out of the Treaty. Let us show that there is an Irish interpretation of the Treaty, as well as an English. If it involves further negotiations, there is very little harm. At any rate we shall know what is the mind of the British Cabinet on such a very important Constitutional question.

Mr. G. FITZGIBBON

This does not interest me very greatly, but I am anxious that the Dáil, at any rate, should not be led into any error by what has fallen from Deputy Magennis. It is quite true that the Privy Council meets in Downing Street, but the Privy Council that hears appeals from the Supreme Courts of the Dominions is a Privy Council that sits in Whitehall, and it is not composed of a general body of what is usally described as "His Majesty's Privy Council." The Board of the Judicial Committee consists exclusively of selected lawyers of great distinction, many of them, it is true, from England, one or two from Ireland, and several from the Dominions. It was in consequence of dissatisfaction on the part of the Dominions with a Board composed exclusively of lawyers of great eminence, though all English, that the Judicial Committee was augmented by the provision of Chief Justices and others who had held high judicial office in the Dominions themselves. It is to that body that appeals, if there are any appeals to go from this country—which I very much doubt— will go.

Professor W M. MAGENNIS

I am quite aware of that. I said before that I did not want to repeat what I had spoken. I am quite aware, for instance, that Lord Chief Justice Villiers of South Africa was included in the Judicial Committee, and I am quite aware that one of the greatest of the Canadian lawyers was also included in it; but there is no Imperial Council as such, and if any question arises as between one Dominion and another, or as between the Free State of Ireland and the Dominions, there ought to be such a Council. The Dominions themselves are looking forward to the Constitution of an Imperial Commission or Imperial Council, to which such an appeal would lie. Meanwhile, I think it is incumbent on us to assert our Irish position.

Mr. E. BLYTHE

There is really little use in making the sort of speeches that the Deputy who has just sat down has made. In Clause 2 of the Treaty it is laid down that the relationship of the Crown to the Irish Free State shall be that of the Crown to the Dominion of Canada. So that this was specifically accepted when the Treaty was accepted, and there is no use at all in making those high-falutin speeches about Irish interpretations, or saying that we should stand up and assert our rights, and that sort of thing. There is no use in going back, or attempting to go back, or asking for a reconsideration of something that has already been considered. With regard to what Deputy Johnson stated about the apparent contradiction between the last portion of the first paragraph and the proviso, I can hardly believe that it was the existence of the apparent contradiction that made him wish to delete the second paragraph, because if we had only the contradiction to consider, it could have been got rid of in another way. It seems to me that there is value in this sentence, which says: "the decision of the Supreme Court shall in all cases be final and conclusive, and shall not be reviewed or capable of being reviewed by any other Court, Tribunal or Authority whatsoever." And then there is the proviso, which says that "nothing in this Constitution shall impair the right of any person to petition His Majesty for special leave to appeal from the Supreme Court to His Majesty in Council, or the right of His Majesty to grant such leave." Taken together, it seems to me these two sentences provide that no decision of His Majesty in Council shall constitute a precedent for the Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court decides a thing, and if appeals are really carried to His Majesty in Council, and if His Majesty in Council reverses the decision of the Supreme Court, that is an act between His Majesty and the individual applying. It does not bind the Supreme Court for the future; it does not give any sort of twist to the law as passed by the Oireachtas. That seems to me to be the virtue of setting down specifically "that the decision of the Supreme Court shall in all cases be final and conclusive, and shall not be reviewed or capable of being reviewed by any other Court, Tribunal, or Authority whatsoever," in spite of the fact that there is a proviso that in certain cases there shall be special appeal to His Majesty in Council. In all these cases we have to be concerned with realities. If His Majesty in Council were to give a decision that the Irish people thought to be unjust, or that was generally believed here to be unjust, that decision would be a dead letter absolutely, and we all know it.

Mr. THOMAS JOHNSON

I am only tempted to say a word because of the speech of the Minister for Home Affairs. He reminds me of the futility of putting this particular clause by saying it is provided for in the Treaty, and inasmuch as nothing in this Constitution shall be repugnant to the Treaty, then the leaving out of this will do no harm, even from the point of view of Ministers. It rather confirms me in the desirability of deleting this particular clause, inasmuch as it is already provided for in the other parts of the Bill we are now discussing.

The position, as I take it, is that under the Treaty we would have the position of Canada with regard to the Privy Council, while under the Constitution you have the position of South Africa, which is a very much stronger position. I dispute the statement made just now that we are not independent. We are independent. This particular clause with reference to the Privy Council refers to some safeguard with respect to other members of that association into which we have entered by reason of the Treaty. To that extent only is there any cause for this insertion of an appeal to His Majesty in Council to come before the Privy Council. As such we get exactly the same terms as the other nations forming the same Commonwealth. In other words, we have entered into a bargain, we have accepted the advantages of the bargain, and we must be prepared to grant to others the advantages we derive ourselves. To that extent, I think, there is nothing objectionable in that clause, and that most of the criticism alleged against it is criticism that is slightly prejudiced by reason of our experience of the Privy Council here.

Professor W M. MAGENNIS

Surely if what is intended, according to the President, is an appeal to the King in Council as King of England, with the British Privy Council, that was described by Lord Haldane as sitting in a shabby little room at the back of a house in Downing Street—if what is meant is an appeal to the King in Imperial Council, why not say so, and leave no ambiguity? This is not the first time we put in words that allowed the King, in his capacity as King of England, with the British Privy Council, to interfere with Irish liberties.

There is no interference with Irish liberties, as far as we are concerned. I was in Downing Street, and I did not see any Privy Council there. I accept Deputy Fitzgibbon's statement when he said it sits in Whitehall. I do not know whether it is there or not; presumably he knows, and I accept his statement.

Amendment—"To delete the paragraph beginning `Provided that' and concluding `such leave' "—lost on a division, the voting being:—

Tá.

Níl.

Pádraig Ó Gamhna.Tomás de Nógla.Riobárd Ó Deaghaidh.Liam de Róiste.Darghal Figes.Tomás Mac Eóin.Seoirse Ghabhain Uí Dhubhthaigh.Liam Ó Bríain.Liam Mag Aonghusa.Tomás Ó Conaill.Aodh Ó Cúlacháin.Séamus Éabhróid.Liam Ó Daimhín.Seán Ó Laidhin.Seán Buitléir.Nioclas Ó Faoláin.Domhnall Ó Muirgheasa.Risteard Mac Fheorais.Domhnall Ó Ceallachain.

Liam T. Mac Cosgair.Donchadh Ó Guaire.Seán Ó Maolruaidh.Seán Ó Duinnín.Domhnall Ó Mocháin.Seán Ó hAodhaSéamus Breathnach.Pádraig Mag Ualghairg.Deasmhumhain Mac Gearailt.Seán Ó Rúanaidh.Micheál de Staineas.Domhnall Mac Carthaigh.Éarnán Altún.Sir Séamus Craig.Gearóid Mac Giobúin.Liam Thrift.Padraig Ó hOgain.Pádraic Ó Máille.Seosamh Ó Faoileachain.Seoirse Mac Niocaill.Piaras Béaslaí.Séamus Ó Cruadhlaoich.Criostóir Ó Broin.Risteárd Mac Liam.Caoimhghin Ó hUigín.Proinsias Bulfin.Tomás Mac Artúir.Séamus Ó Doláin.Proinsias Mag Aonghusa.Éamon Ó Dúgáin.Peadar Ó hAodha.Séamus Ó Murchadha.Seosamh Mac Giolla Bhríghde.Liam Mac Sioghaird.Éarnán de Blaghd.Uinseann de Faoite.Domhnall Ó Broin.

Amendment No. 4:—To delete in the second paragraph after the words "provided that nothing in this Constitution shall impair the right of any person " all the rest of the paragraph, and to substitute the following words, " to appeal to any Court of Appeal representative of the Commonwealth of Nations, whenever such a Court may be set up by the consent of the Commonwealth of Nations, and according to such procedure as may be prescribed in the constitution of such Court."—Darrell Figgis.

Mr. DARRELL FIGGIS

In view of the defeat of the previous amendment, it is possible that my position, in moving this, is made a little more difficult. But I suggest to the Ministry, and to the Dáil, that whereas if the previous amendment had been carried, it might, indeed, rightly or wrongly, have prejudiced the Treaty, I do not think that this other form of words would prejudice the Treaty, for the reason that this proposal, as it is put forward here, in the words of my amendment, is actually the proposal put forward in the name of the majority of the other co-equal members of the Community of Nations, and in respect of which England herself, when the proposal came up, and was fully discussed in 1917, stated she would undertake this matter and raise it again. It may never be raised again. It is exceedingly likely that these matters may be postponed to a very indefinite date, but whether it is raised, again or not, if it is put in this form of words that I suggest, the position of Ireland is not prejudiced. I wish to state here that the words as they appear in this proviso, as it appears in the Constitution, are not as satisfactory to this country as they should be, because the Canadian practice is infinitely worse than the South African practice. I do not want to go into any part of it now that may affect the whole of the issue very deeply. But the form of words, as is adopted. possibly may extend more widely than some of us imagine at the present moment.

I just put forward this amendment now, and let it take its chance. The Minister for Home Affairs remarked that such appeals would not occur in questions of ordinary domestic routine or domestic legislature, but would incur in the larger issues of the international sort. I venture to suggest to him, that if it did occur in small issues of the routine domestic kind, the appeal would be a great deal less bad than when it occurs on issues of a constitutional kind. It is a constitutional appeal that is the chief thing, not the domestic appeal. There are certain rights that have been written into this Constitution as being the fundamental rights of the people of Ireland. These rights might be questioned. The particular article of the Constitution may be challenged; if they be challenged, it is possible that the challenge may ultimately be carried to the Privy Council, and if that is true, whatever the judgment of the Privy Council may be, it will not become " case law." And although these cases may be infringements, as Professor Keith informs us, this whole process of appeal is obsolescent—nevertheless, any appeal from the provisions of the Constitution is far more injurious to the country than any appeal that could occur in what has been referred to as ordinary routine domestic legislation. With regard to the alternative appeal, the alternative Court of Appeal, which I have embodied in the amendment, and which I am putting before the Dáil now—I would like to say that it was proposed initially by the Premier of the Australian Commonwealth. And when that matter was under discussion the various members there at that Conference delivered certain opinions with regard to this Privy Council appeal, that I think it should be just as well should be known. Mr. Hughes stated himself that the Australian experience of the Privy Council in Constitutional cases has been, to say the least of it, unfortunate. He also quoted a case from New Zealand, and read an extract from a resolution of the Final Court of Appeal of New Zealand, which declared of the Judicial Committee that " by its imputations in the present case, by the ignorance it has shown in this and other cases of our history, of our legislation, and of our practice, and by its long-delayed judgments, it has displayed every characteristic of an alien tribunal." The statesmen of the other States present were equally emphatic. Sir Robert Borden said: "We have had just about enough of Appeal Courts, and I think the tendency in our country will be to restrict appeals to the Privy Council rather than to increase them." Our own case has been stated and rightly stated, according to the South African model. And this is what Mr. Burton stated with respect to South Africa: "In our Constitution we have abolished the right of appeal to the Privy Council as a right. There is no such right with us at all, but the Constitution merely says that any right residing in the King in Council to grant leave to appeal shall not be interfered with." In view of the fact that when these statements were made, and in response to these statements a very lengthy discussion did occur in that body, which was largely a Parliament of the Commonwealth, it was said that a more satisfactory method would be to move for a Common Court of Appeal for the members of the Commonwealth. And when that was set up, that it should be composed of certain members, one half of whom in each case would consist of judges from the country whose case was being heard, and that when every case was being heard the English judges should be in a certain minority. If that were put forward in that form, and represented in that form, I believe that it would stand a very good chance of being accepted across the water. Still, the former wording, as it is here in the Constitution, gives us another line of escape, with which I will not deal at the moment. I merely state that this is the alternative that should be considered.

Mr. GAVAN DUFFY

If there is one amendment more than another that deserves the epithet of mischievous, it is the amendment now before you. Deputy Darrell Figgis comes here and proposes, that instead of a sham appeal in the Constitution, we should have a real appeal in the Constitution, as if forsooth, we in Ireland are not competent to settle our own matters, we are to have a real appeal. We don't want any appeal; I support the amendment put forward from the Labour Benches, because I think this clause about the Privy Council Appeal is insulting to us. The reason I did not trouble about this is that I am satisfied that for other reasons than those given by the Minister, and for legal reasons, the thing will be a dead letter. And the popular view, the very popular view, of this Privy Council business as the worst thing in the Constitution is founded upon a misconception. But here we have Deputy Darrell Figgis—knowing very well that this appeal is a humbug from beginning to end, no one knows it better, and that there will never be an appeal from the Privy Council—coming along and proposing a real appeal. I hope he will be the only person who will vote for it.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

A Chinn Chomhairle, it is very little use flogging a dead ass.

Professor W M. MAGENNIS

As is not unusual in these debates, two things wholly different are confounded, as if they were only one. There is the possibility of two types of appeal—an appeal from the judge on a point of law, in fact an individual appeal, and a second type very different on some decision which brings us into collision with some of the other components of the Union. They are two wholly different things, and the position of the whole Imperial Council reviewed in the amendment of Deputy Darrell Figgis regards one of them. There has been a very extraordinary change made in the Canadian Constitution by the decision of the famous Lord Watson—Lord Watson described as the Privy Council Judge. In one of those appeals to which I refer, he changed the whole tenor and character, and altered the complexion of the original Constitution with regard to the relations between the provincial legislatures and the federal legislature, and that is always possible for a strong man in the Privy Council. It is quite true that lawyers of eminence representing various Dominions may be, from time to time, introduced into it. That leaves the effect as it was. So long as there is an appeal of any sort—there may be an ambiguous one of some kind—Ireland is not independent. There is no use our going over the ground again that was gone over by Grattan. It is the same thing that is at issue— the independence of Ireland. I will not occupy the time of the House arguing it, because I know what the result in fact will be.

Mr. KEVIN O'HIGGINS

Owing to the speech of the Leader of the Left Wing, it might be as well to deal briefly with this Amendment. It proposes an appeal to a Tribunal which the proposer of it says may never come into existence. In fact he feels very confident, in his own mind, it never will; and this is to be substituted for the proviso in Article 65. It is simply another example of that kind of elaborate trifling that we are getting rather inured to. There is no use after having accepted the Treaty, which says that the relation of the Crown to Canada shall be the same as that governing its relation to the Irish Free State, yet here we have, day after day, amendments proposed that the relation of the Crown shall be otherwise. We do not like this Appeal. We tried not to have this Appeal, but we attempt to show here its exact proportion to the whole matter, and it is not worth the time spent discussing it here in view of the existing conditions. Deputy Figgis's amendment proposes a common Court of Appeal for the several Dominions. That is a matter on which he ought, perhaps, to consult some authentic representative of the Dominions. Many leading men in the Dominions to-day have no love for a common Court of Appeal. And, in the meantime, there is a crux that there was all through when we were negotiating this Constitution—the crux that you cannot absolutely sheer off and throw upon one side what is definitely claimed as the prerogative of the Crown. We have been treated in this particular manner more generously than upon the strict interpretation of the Treaty we were entitled to be treated. We have a better position as regards this appelate jurisdiction than Canada.

Professor MAGENNIS

Just one word. The Minister for Local Government used it as an argument against me, that we must abide by the Treaty which gives us the law, practice and constitutional usage of Canada; and the argument of the Minister for Home Affairs is, that we are not getting the same thing as Canada, but that we are getting something better than that in the Constitution of South Africa. On which side lies the trifling? I must say from the beginning here I have spoken with the fullest sense of my responsibility, and I wish that the same could be said with regard to some of the criticisms made by other speakers. "The law, practice, and constitutional usage of Canada," as Deputy Gavan Duffy himself has repeatedly instanced, must be taken through all the clauses in a synthetic sense, and must have a synthetic force. You are not to take the law of Canada by itself, but the law, practice and constitutional usage. And we are well aware that there is a sense of injury, and a very acute sense of injury, among Canadian statesmen in regard to this retention of the appeal, and therefore it is no harm while we are framing a Constitution now to try and keep it in accordance with the Treaty. It is the Treaty position, the same position, namely, as that decidedly assented to in Downing Street—the position recently arrived at for Canada. I see no trifling in this whatever, except it be that any effort to do something in the interests of Ireland is trifling because it is bound to be trodden down by a brute majority.

Mr. DARRELL FIGGIS

Deputy Magennis has touched upon the real essence of this amendment. It is very easy to pour ridicule on this amendment by misunderstanding it. It would be very much more to the point if those who assailed the amendment were to read the whole of the discussion upon which it is based, and if that had been done it would be easy to see, having joined the Commonwealth or Community of Nations, the kind of cases that may be the subject of appeal. One class is cases which are internal, that affect the individual citizens of the State; and another kind of case is that which affects the relationship between one State and another. With regard to the first, under the provisions which we suggest it is proposed that no appeal should come up on an internal matter; but where there is some point of issue between one State and another there was a clear case for the existence of the Court of Appeal for that kind of case, and it was that kind of case I was dealing with here, and any criticisms based upon the first kind of case and brought into the second kind of case are purely relevant, and no one knows that better than the person who made them.

Question, "That the amendment be made," put and negatived.
Motion made and question put: "That Article 65 stand part of the Bill."
Agreed.
Barr
Roinn