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Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 12 Jun 1923

Vol. 3 No. 25

INCREASE OF RENT AND MORTGAGE INTEREST RESTRICTIONS BILL. - DAIL IN COMMITTEE.

SECTION 1.

I beg to move Section 1:—

For the purposes of this Act, except where the context otherwise requires:—

(a) The expression "standard rent" means the rent determined in manner hereinafter provided, which in the year ending the third day of August nineteen hundred and fourteen the immediate landlord of an occupying tenant of the dwelling-house might reasonably have expected under any given contract of tenancy not being more than a term of five years;

(b) The expression "increased rent" means rent exceeding the standard rent;

(c) The expression "standard rate of interest" means in the case of a mortgage in force on the third day of August nineteen hundred and fourteen, the rate of interest payable at that date, or, in the case of a mortgage created since that date, the original rate of interest;

(d) The expression "increased rate of interest means interest exceeding the standard rate of interest;

(e) The expression "rates" includes water rents and charges, and any increase in rates payable by a landlord shall be deemed to be payable by him until the rate is next demanded;

(f) The expression "rateable value" means the annual rateable value under the Irish Valuation Acts: Provided that, where part of a house let as a separate dwelling is not separately valued under those Acts, the Commissioner of Valuation and Boundary Surveyor may, on the application of the landlord or tenant, make such apportionment of the rateable value of the whole house as seems just, and his decision as to the amount to be apportioned to the part of the house shall be final and conclusive, and that amount shall be taken to be the rateable value of the part of the house for the purposes of this Act, but not further or otherwise;

(g) The expressions "landlord,""tenant,""mortgagee" and "mortgagor" include any person from time to time deriving title under the original landlord, tenant, mortgagee, or mortgagor;

(h) The expression "landlord" also includes in relation to any dwelling-house any person, other than the tenant, who is or would but for this Act be entitled to possession of the dwelling-house, and the expressions "tenant and tenancy" include sub-tenant and sub-tenancy, and the expression "let" includes sub-let; and the expression "tenant" includes the widow of a tenant dying intestate who was residing with him at the time of his death, or, where a tenant dying intestate leaves no widow or is a woman, such member of the tenant's family so residing as aforesaid as may be decided in default of agreement by the court;

(i) The expression "mortgage" includes a charge by registered disposition under the Local Registration of Title (Ireland) Act, 1891;

(j) The expressions "statutory undertaking" and "statutory duties or powers" include any undertaking, duties or powers established, imposed or exercised under any order having the force of an Act of Parliament;

(k) The expression "prescribed" means prescribed by the rules made under this Act;

(l) The expression "Sanitary Authority" has the same meaning as in the Public Health (Ireland) Acts, 1878 to 1919, and includes both Urban Sanitary Authority and Rural Sanitary Authority.

It deals largely with the definitions which I expect Deputies have read.

Motion put and agreed to.
SECTION 2.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

I beg to move Section 2:—

(1) The standard rent shall be determined in the following manner:—

(a) If the dwelling-house was on the third day of August nineteen hundred and fourteen let to an occupying tenant under a contract of tenancy not being for more than a term of five years, then the rent at which the dwelling-house was so let, or, where the dwelling-house was not so let on that date, the rent at which it was last, within a period of three years, so let before that date, shall, subject to the deduction specified in the next succeeding sub-section, be the standard rent.

(b) In any case not coming within the provisions of the last preceding paragraph, the standard rent shall be determined by the Court on the application in the prescribed manner of the landlord or the tenant; provided that, pending any such application to the Court, the rent at which the dwelling-house was let on the third day of August nineteen hundred and fourteen, or, where the dwelling-house was not let on that date, the rent at which it was let before that date, or, in the case of a dwelling-house which was first let after the said third day of August, the rent at which it was first let shall, subject to the deduction specified in the next succeeding sub-section, be the standard rent.

(2) Where the landlord at the time by reference to which the standard rent is calculated paid the rates chargeable on, or which but for the provisions of any Act would be chargeable on the occupier, the amount of such rates shall, for the purpose of such calculation, be deducted from any rent by reference to which such calculation is made.

(3) For the purpose of determining the standard rent under sub-section (1) of this section the rent at which a dwelling-house let at a progressive rent payable under any contract of tenancy was let, means the maximum rent payable under such contract of tenancy.

(4) Where, for the purpose of determining the standard rent or rateable value of any dwelling-house to which this Act applies, it is necessary to apportion the rent at the date in relation to which the standard rent is to be fixed, or the rateable value of the property in which that dwelling-house is comprised, the court may, on application by either party, make such apportionment as seems just.

(5) A landlord of any dwelling-house to which this Act applies shall, on being so requested in writing by the tenant of the dwelling-house, supply him with a statement in writing affording any information in the landlord's possession or procurement requisite to enable the tenant to determine the standard rent of the dwelling-house or have the same determined by the court, and if, without reasonable excuse, the landlord fails within fourteen days to do so, or supplies a statement which is false in any material particular, and not proved to have been made innocently and without intent to deceive, he shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding ten pounds.

This Section is an important one. It defines the expression "standard rent," and that definition is important from the point of view of a proper understanding of the provisions of the Bill.

Motion put and agreed to.
SECTION 3.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

I move Section 3:—

(1) This Act shall subject to the provisions of this section apply to a house or a part of a house let as a separate dwelling, where either the annual amount of the standard rent or the rateable value does not exceed:—

(a) in the county borough of Dublin and the Urban Districts in the Dublin Metropolitan Police area sixty pounds, and

(b) elsewhere, forty pounds, and every such house or part of a house shall be deemed to be a dwelling-house to which this Act applies: Provided that:—

(i.) this Act shall not apply to a dwelling-house bona fide let at a rent which includes payments in respect of board, attendance, or use of furniture, unless on an apportionment of such rent under this section the portion of such rent attributable to the dwelling-house alone equals or exceeds three-quarters of the rent, in which case this Act shall apply to the dwelling-house, or at the option of the landlord shall apply as if the dwelling-house had been let at the said portion of the rent so attributable to the dwelling-house alone.

(ii.) the application of this Act to any house or part of a house shall not be excluded by reason only that part of the premises is used as a shop or office or for business, trade, or professional purposes; and

(iii.) for the purposes of this Act, any land or premises let together with a house shall, if the rateable value of the land or premises let separately would be less than one quarter of the rateable value of the house, be treated as part of the house, but, subject to this provision, this Act shall not apply to a house let together with land other than the site of the house.

(2) Any rooms in a dwelling-house subject to a separate letting wholly or partly as a dwelling shall, for the purposes of this Act, be treated as a part of a dwelling-house let as a separate dwelling.

(3) Where a dwelling-house is let, or was let at the date in relation to which the standard rent is to be fixed, at a rent which includes payments in respect of board, attendance, or use of furniture, the Court may, for any of the purposes of this Act, make such apportionment as seems just.

(4) Where this Act has become applicable to any dwelling-house or any mortgage thereon, it shall continue to apply thereto whether or not the dwelling-house continues to be one to which this Act applies.

(5) This Act shall not apply to a dwelling-house erected after, or in course of erection on, the second day of April, nineteen hundred and nineteen, or to any dwelling-house which has been since that date or was at that date being bona fide reconstructed by way of conversion into two or more separate and self-contained flats or tenements; but the rateable value of any such dwelling-house to which this Act would have applied if it had been erected or so reconstructed before the said date shall be ascertained as though the rent for the purposes of section eleven of the Valuation (Ireland) Act, 1852, were the rent for which a similar dwelling-house might have been reasonably expected to let on the third day of August, nine hundred and fourteen, the probable average annual cost of repairs, insurance, and other expenses (if any) necessary to maintain the dwelling-house in its actual state, and all rates, taxes, and public charges, if any (except tithe rent charge), being paid by the tenant.

(6) This Act shall not apply to any dwelling-house provided by a Local Authority under the Labourers (Ireland) Act, 1883 to 1919, or under the Housing of the Working Classes (Ireland) Acts, 1890 to 1921.

(7) Subject to the provisions of this Act, this Act shall apply to every mortgage where the mortgaged property consists of or comprises one or more dwelling-houses to which this Act applies, or any interest therein, except that it shall not apply:—

(a) To any mortgage comprising one or more dwelling-houses to which this Act applies and other land if the rateable value of such dwelling-houses is less than one-tenth of the rateable value of the whole of the land comprised in the mortgage; or

(b) to an equitable charge by deposit of titled deeds or otherwise; or

(c) to any mortgage which is created after the passing of this Act.

(8) When a mortgage comprises one or more dwelling-houses to which this Act applies and other land, and the rateable value of such dwelling-houses is more than one-tenth of the rateable value of the whole of the land comprised in the mortgage, the mortgagee may apportion the principal money secured by the mortgage between such dwelling-houses and such other land by giving one calendar month's notice in writing to the mortgagor, such notice to state the particulars of such apportionment, and at the expiration of the said calendar month's notice this Act shall not apply to the mortgage so far as it relates to such other land, and for all purposes, including the mortgagor's right of redemption, the said mortgage shall operate as if it were a separate mortgage for the respective portions of the said principal money secured by the said dwelling-houses and such other land, respectively, to which such portions were apportioned.

Provided that the mortgagor shall, before the expiration of the said calendar month's notice, be entitled to dispute the amounts so apportioned as aforesaid, and in default of agreement the matter shall be determined by a single arbitrator appointed by the President of the Surveyors' Institution.

(9) Any notice of the apportionment of the principal money secured by a mortgage, if and when the notice becomes operative under this Act, and the award of any arbitrator with reference to any such apportionment may be registered under the enactments relative to the registration of deeds or titles as the case requires.

I move the following amendment standing in the name of Deputy Johnson and myself:—

In Sub-section (1) to insert the words "sixty pounds" after the word "exceed," in line 20, and to delete paragraphs (a) and (b).

There are many cases where a rent is as high in the provincial towns and the country as it is in Dublin, and in my opinion there does not seem to be any good reason why some provision should not be made in those cases as is contained in the provisions made in later clauses of the Bill in its application to the Metropolitan area.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

This amendment, if carried, would involve a uniform limit of £60 over the entire area under the jurisdiction of the Free State. The evidence placed before the Departmental Committee went to show that a discrimination between Dublin and the urban districts of the Dublin Metropolitan area and the rest of the country was advisable. Now, if £60 is the proper limit for Dublin, it is obviously too high for the rural areas. There are those who consider that £60 is, in fact, too high even for the Metropolitan area, and a fortiori it would be far too high for the other areas of the country. I would like, for to get specific cases. I would like, for instance, to have even a rough idea of the number of tenants occupying houses with a valuation exceeding £40 outside the Metropolitan Police area, and to move on from that and ask whether they represent a class of people whom it is, or ought to be, the object of this Bill to protect, because remeber that the Bill was not framed simply to protect houses or tenants indiscriminately. This Bill, and earlier Bills, were framed to meet a definite necessity arising out of very special circumstances. I contend that the class of people who would inhabit a house outside the Metropolitan area with a valuation exceeding £40 are people who do not require the special protection from the State that this Act contemplates, and I contend that the kind of people who would be in competition for such a house may well be left to the free play of that competition. The important thing to remember is that if the rateable value is within the limit, it does not matter how high the standard rent is. The standard rent, I think it is universally true to say, must be higher than the Poor-Law valuation, and it is the rateable valuation that counts. I think that Deputy Davin, in advocating his amendment, showed some slight confusion on that point, inasmuch as he stressed the question of rent.

Rateable value.

In supporting the amendment I do not want to lay too much stress upon it, but it has been represented that in some towns the distinction between the Dublin Metropolitan area and those towns is not at all applicable, especially when one comes to deal with premises which may come into the category of business premises As business premises are brought into the Act, there should be certain considerations when you are speaking of business, trade, or professional premises used for business, trade, or professional purposes. The need for making a uniform limit is fairly obvious, I think. It is not a matter about which we are very intimately concerned, but it seemed to be a case worth making that there should be no distinction, and that if there was a limit required of £60 in the Metropolitan area touching towns like Blackrock or Dun Laoghaire, then Cork, Galway, Waterford, and other towns were just as much needing the same kind of protection as the townships within the Dublin Metropolitan area. The Minister says that they are very few and things of no moment. We are not anxious to press the point. We think some case should be made for the restriction or for the differentiation.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

As a matter of interest, Waterford has been referred to, and the Borough Treasurer of Waterford, giving evidence before the Committee, suggested £40 for the country and £60 for Dublin.

Amendment put.
The Dáil divided: Tá, 14; Níl, 32.

  • Seán Ó Duinnín.
  • Micheál Ó hAonghusa.
  • Domhnall Ó Mocháin.
  • Tomás de Nógla.
  • Liam de Róiste.
  • Tomás Mac Eoin.
  • Seán Ó Ruanaidh.
  • Tomás Ó Conaill.
  • Aodh Ó Cúlacháin.
  • Séamus Eabhróid.
  • Liam Ó Daimhín.
  • Cathal Ó Seanáin.
  • Mícheál Ó Dubhghaill.
  • Domhnall Ó Ceallacháin.

Níl

  • Liam T. Mac Cosgair.
  • Uáitéar Mac Cumhaill.
  • Séamus Breathnach.
  • Darghal Figes.
  • Deasmhumhain Mac Gearailt.
  • Micheál de Duram.
  • Seán Mac Garaidh.
  • Risteárd Ó Maolchatha.
  • Pilib Mac Cosgair.
  • Domhnall Mac Cárthaigh.
  • Maolmhuire Mac Eochadha.
  • Gearóid Mac Giobúin, K.C.
  • Liam Thrift.
  • Eoin Mac Néill.
  • Liam Mag Aonghusa.
  • Pádraic Ó Máille.
  • Seosamh Ó Faoileacháin.
  • Seoirse Mac Niocaill.
  • Fionán O Loingsigh.
  • Criostóir Ó Broin.
  • Caoimhghin Ó hUigín.
  • Próinsias Bulfin.
  • Séamus Ó Dóláin.
  • Eamon Ó Dúgáin.
  • Peadar Ó hAodha.
  • Séamus Ó Murchadha.
  • Seosamh Mac Giolla Bhrighde.
  • Liam Mac Sioghaird.
  • Alasdair Mac Cába.
  • Earnán de Blaghd.
  • Uinseann de Faoite.
  • Séamus de Burca.
Amendment declared lost.

I beg to propose the following amendment:—"In Sub-section (1) (a), line 22, to insert after the word `area' the words `and the urban district of Bray."' I would like to impress on the Minister that Bray is practically a Metropolitan area, and for all practical purposes you may call it a suburban town. A very large number of houses in Bray are over this valuation, and on some of the roads practically every house is over it. I would ask the Minister to accept this amendment.

I desire to support this amendment. On the Second Reading I instanced the case of Florence Terrace, Bray. I might have quoted Quinsboro' Road, which is quite familiar to those who leave the railway station. Most of the houses there are valued at £60 and £65 on the Poor-Law valuation. The Meath Road is almost the same. There are a few also on Herbert Road, and quite a number over £45 in Florence Terrace. What Deputy Byrne has pointed out is unquestionable. When one looks at the map one finds that Shankhill, which is a residential quarter, is not so much nearer Dublin than Bray, yet it is policed by the Dublin Metropolitan Police and included in the Dublin Metropolitan area. The result is that one set of people on one side of the high road enjoy the benefits of this Act, whereas those on the other side, in more need of protection, remain outside its provisions. Those in Shankill who reside in the higher valued houses are for the most part people whose professional avocations do not bring them into the city, whereas Bray is to all intents and purposes, more particularly in regard to the roads I have mentioned, as large a residential suburb of Dublin as Rathgar. The railway companies will bear me out in that in regard to the services they provide. It is merely an accident of topography. I was going to make a slip and say "geography," which would be fatal to my argument—that Bray is not included. A great deal may be said for the inclusion of Howth. But that would be going outside the amendment. I do not know whether I ought not to propose as an amendment the inclusion of other districts and abandon that which is on the paper, but I think it would be easier to speak in favour of Bray. I notice in the report of the Committee, on which this Bill is based, it is stated that they heard considerable evidence. I am perfectly frank in this matter. I am not acquainted with that evidence. I am merely going on representations derivable from a study of the directory and my knowledge of the people resident in the district. In other words, the Deputy and I are putting ourselves as witnesses to the Dáil in opposition to whatever weight of evidence was able to prevail on the Committee. We must admit that we are not in a strong position. On the other hand, it may be allowed that we are more impartial. Men sometimes overlook the fact that because the broad principle can be laid down that the laws are made for general, and not for individual cases, that the individual may be disregarded. Now, whatever may be said on behalf of that in normal situations, I would respectfully submit to the Minister that it cannot be urged in this case, for this is an example of emergency legislation with which we have been dealing of late. This Act would not be necessary at all if it were not that there are individual cases of hardship to be met. The Act is meant for what we may call statutory tenants—that is, those who would not be tenants were it not for this Act. They are tenants by virtue of the Act, and the Act itself is in existence in order to supply the requirements of the very special conditions that when the tenancy of the tenants is determined, and when the lease comes to an end, he is to be allowed to hold over for a period, and restraint is made of the landlord's ordinary right to recover possession. Now, obviously the spirit that dictates such legislation is to relieve individuals. This law is really not a law such as the Electoral Law, which embraces in its scope every citizen of the Saorstát. It is intended to relieve those who, for want of it, would be in extreme difficulties. It is because of that, I think, Deputy Byrne and I are entitled to arrange in individual cases to take the directory and say, "Here are so many houses in Quinsboro' Road and Florence Terrace with a valuation of £65," and so on. I agree it would not be commendable or defensible in other things.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

I do not think I should accept the amendment. I sympathise with the Deputy's desire to bring portion of his constituency inside the charmed circle of the Metropolitan area. Of course, as Deputy Magennis has pointed out, it is only by an accident that it is not inside that circle. It might even be considered a calamity. In spite of Deputy Magennis's contention, the report of the Committee is there. A great deal of important evidence was taken, and they recommended the Dublin Metropolitan area figure of £60, and for areas outside that £40. By running through a Metropolitan Directory it might be possible to show that there were houses outside the area over £40. We quite contemplate there are such houses, but the contention is that houses exceeding a valuation of £40 outside the Metropolitan area are big houses, and the kind of competition there is for them does not require to be limited any more than that for houses within the city of a valuation of £100. Control may disappear by gradual decrease of the amount of this maximum figure, by a gradual lowering of the Metropolitan figure and a lowering of the figure outside. That is merely a forecast which may be thought to be intelligent or non-intelligent, but it is not houses that it is sought to control, and that is my reply to the contention that there are certain houses in Bray above the £40 figure. There are towns within the county of Dublin that are pretty much alike in their general conditions— Howth, Malahide, and so on. I cannot see that the conditions in Bray would differ very much from the point of view of any other watering-place in competition. There had to be some line of demarcation. The Metropolitan Police area was a convenient line. If you go to Bray, why not to Greystones? And if you go to Greystones, you can be tempted further on down the coast, where the valuation is high and there is keen competition for housing, and so on. I must adhere to the recommendation of the Committee in this respect.

Amendment put and negatived.

I move: In Sub-section (1) (a), line 22, to delete the word "sixty," and substitute therefor "one hundred." I am afraid it is useless to attempt to alter the mind of the inexorable Minister. He speaks, I observe, of the play of competition now in the city of Dublin through the enormous competition for houses, and that is not confined at all to the working classes. On the contrary, so far as I can learn, people who are living upon dividends are the people who are most hit at the present moment as regards provision in the city, and the housing with which they are provided is excluded from the operation of this Act in most cases because they are reconstructed houses. They are in flats. So many houses in the better built areas of the city have been converted into flats, and such huge rentals are being charged in those uncontrolled flats, that landlords elsewhere have followed the fashion. The result is it would be very difficult for anyone in the city who was already holding over, and for whom this Act is intended, to come out and find a similar type of house except at a huge increase of rent. So the play of competition being applied would have the effect of hitting a great number of people hard. For instance, I know a case which prima facie anyone would say should not be dealt with in a Bill like this. If you attempt living in one of the most expensive squares it would be absolutely ruinous—in the popular sense of the word ruination—unless the figure in the Bill is raised. I am sure, if one took the trouble, quite a number of these could be discovered. However, I feel that it is useless to argue the matter, because the Minister will rely upon the solid battalions to raise the evidence which the Committee had before it. I am afraid if I were in his position I should do the same.

In spite of the dubious manner in which this has been moved, I desire to support it, and to withdraw in its favour an amendment that appears further down. Deputy Magennis's amendment takes the figure of £100. I have taken the figure of £90. I think that for general purposes £100 would serve the purpose, and I therefore support it. But I would like to take this opportunity, with your permission, to say that I did take the figure of £90 after having worked through certain areas with a view to discovering exactly what the consequences would be. In spite of all the evidence that may have been given—we have not that evidence before us—we have to construct the matter again upon such information as we have before us now, and I believe that if the Minister were to go over the directory in the way that I suggested he would find there are large residential areas over the £60. How did this figure of £60 come to be arrived at? As a consequence of working down from the earlier figure of the earlier Act of £78. How did we come by the £78 given in the English legislation which we took over and which this Bill is to supplant? It was stated that the reduction should be given where the standard rent did not exceed £105 in London and £78 in other parts of England and Wales and Ireland. But actually since then housing has become very much more available in London than it is in Dublin. I recognise the fact. Nevertheless, that £105 is being adhered to in London in the extension of the Bill from which this is branched away. I press it forward also for this reason, not merely because it does inflict an injustice upon a number of people who live in houses over £60, who, if they were not given protection by this Bill, would be thrown upon the tender mercies of the landlord, as I said the other day, but also because of the effect it will have upon people below that figure. They will receive protection, but they will have an increased competition of a sort that I will deal with later on when we come to deal with the question of landlords purchasing houses. There has been a certain practice which I just mention now because it is necessary to the explanation of the point I am now dealing with. There has been a certain protection to persons purchasing houses who are not landlords in any bona fide sense of expression, and it will grow, because they desire to take residence in these houses. If protection is removed over £60, it will react injuriously upon those who are within the protected area, and I think that would be unjust to a large number of people living in conditions in Dublin where there is a definite housing shortage and where actually at the moment the cost of living is very greatly higher than it is in England, that such persons should be removed from protection when, perhaps, the facts are that they need that protection more now than they needed it twelve months or two years ago, because the cost of living in Dublin has not gone down as it has gone down elsewhere; it has increased. I therefore support the amendment moved by Deputy Magennis and withdraw in its favour my own. My own was to carry the limit from £60 to £90, and Deputy Magennis's is to carry it from £60 to £100. In any case, to carry it to that further £10 would, so far as I am concerned in my particular case, having chosen £90 for my calculation from a limited calculation, not very materially affect my point. I think that if protection is kept at the figure of £60. considerable injustice will be dealt to residents in Dublin, and hardship as a whole would be caused.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

I regret, sir, that the Deputy's speech is not likely to appear in to-morrow's papers, and I am sure he also regrets it. He has adduced no new point. Prior to 1920 the figure for the Metropolitan area was £52. The 1920 Act raised it to £78, and we are down now to about half-way between these two figures. I have only to repeat that we are not out for control in any absolute way, but merely where the conditions may be thought to call for it. The people competing for houses of over £60 valuation may be left to their competition. There is very little between Deputy Magennis's selection of £100 and Deputy Figgis's of £90, but we hold that it is absured to control houses in the Dublin area with a valuation of £100 when the case is not there for it, and if the Deputy will think, not in terms of rent, but in terms of valuation, he will realise that it is a very big house indeed in the city that will be of higher valuation than £60. We are not accepting this amendment nor in fact, I may say, to ease the minds of Deputies who have later amendments, any amendment which proposes to amend the amounts embodied in the Bill.

May I point out to the Minister that Section 3, Sub-section 1, reads:—"A house or a part of a house let as a separate dwelling, where either the annual amount of the standard rent or the rateable value does not exceed——" The Minister seems to forget that the standard rent is referred to as well as the rateable value.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

But, I am sure the Deputy does not contend that it is the rent we must keep primarily in mind. The rateable value is always lower. I think that is universal.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

That would be the determining factor.

Amendment put and declared lost.

Amendment No. 4 is not being moved. Amendment by Professor Magennis; In Sub-section (1) before paragraph (b) to insert a new paragraph as follows: —"In the County Boroughs of Cork, Limerick and Waterford sixty pounds, and."

I am afraid, sir, you will have the same fate to record—"the amendment is lost." I wonder do I understand the language "where either does not exceed." I interpret that to mean the larger of the two, but perhaps that is not so; therefore I think it is only wasting the time of Deputies, and as there is more work to be done I do not see why I should keep on pressing amendments that are bound to be defeated. So far as I am concerned, I withdraw this amendment.

I am emboldened to suggest, in view of Deputy Professor Magennis's misunderstanding of this matter, that there may be an improvement made in the phrasing, because I, for quite a time, had the same view, that it was either the rateable value or the standard rent. It might be the higher rather than the lower that is taken into account. I am quite satisfied that the rateable value will be the criterion that is taken, but inasmuch as Deputy Professor Magennis and Deputy Darrell Figgis appear to have been misled probably a judge might be misled. I would suggest that it is worth considering whether you could not so amend the phrasing as to make it comprehensible even to the intelligence of myself and Deputy Professor Magennis, without doubt.

Amendment 5 is not moved.

I will move it for the purpose of adding just a further word to the remarks that have been already made on these words—"does not exceed." I can now see that it is indicated that the lesser of the two is intended, but when three persons such as Deputy Johnson, Deputy Professor Magennis and myself took an opposite meaning on the first reading of it, it is pretty clear that such a meaning is suggested by the words, and the purpose of the wording of an Act surely should be to make its meaning perfectly clear and plain and not to leave an opposite suggestion. I prefer to let this matter go when you are putting it to the Dáil year or nay, and in doing so I do urge that those earlier words which govern all those amendments should be made clearer than they appear to be at the moment.

I do not want to interrupt, but the Minister, perhaps, may have noticed that no one has said a word about this amendment.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

Any words that have been said were by way of apology. Deputy Figgis has made it clear that he misunderstood the Bill. The wording is the wording of the 1920 Act—"This Act shall apply to a house or part of a house let as a separate dwelling, where either the annual amount of the standard rent or the rateable value does not exceed." One possible alteration there would be instead of "does not exceed""is less than," but that would have the effect, which probably the Deputy sees, of excluding the maximum figure.

May I point out that the argument put forward in favour of this, that it is the language of the 1920 Act, sounds peculiar when we read from the Report of the Departmental Committee. "The draughtsmanship of the Act has been severely criticised both by the public and by judiciary as giving rise to much litigation with regard to the interpretation of the Act."

Mr. O'HIGGINS

We were not aware that in the matter of that particular clause there was ever any doubt that it would be the lesser of the two that determined that.

There never was any doubt on that point.

Amendment put and lost.
Amendment 6.—In Sub-section (1) (b) line 22, substitute the word "fifty" for the word "forty."

I withdraw amendment six.

Amendment not moved.

I desire to move Amendment 7. "In Sub-section (1) to delete the proviso (i.)." A number of people, as Deputies, I am sure, know, cannot find quarters except they go into a house or into rooms and pay for that accommodation a very exorbitant or very high rent. The Sub-section as it stands in the Bill, it seems to me, would give them no protection at all, with the result that they would be paying perhaps for the furniture and would find that they got no legal protection against that kind of thing. It is, I am sure, quite within the knowledge of a good many of the Deputies that that kind of thing does occur. For that reason I want the deletion of the Sub-section. It might be, of course, that under another part of the Bill the rent in a case like this could be apportioned, but I am not very clear as to whether that apportionment of the rent would work out to the protection of the tenant, as I will call him in this case, that is the person who takes these furnished rooms or furnished house. Another matter that I am not quite clear about is the third last line of the Sub-section—"at the option of the landlord." Perhaps the Minister would be able to tell us exactly what would be the effect of the inclusion of that phrase. I formally move the deletion of the whole of the paragraph.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

This provision which it is proposed to delete deals with the case of a house let at a rent which includes payment in respect of board, attendance, or use of furniture. It says that "The Act shall not apply to such a house unless on an apportionment of such rent, the portion of such rent attributable to the dwelling-house alone equals or exceeds three-quarters of the rent, in which case this Act shall apply to the dwelling-house, or, at the option of the landlord, shall apply as if the dwelling-house had been let at the same portion of the rent so attributable to the dwelling-house alone." The point to remember is that the Bill is concerned with the control of houses, and it is not concerned with the control of board or attendance, or furniture, and if these elements in the apportionment are found not to exceed one-fourth of the total charge, it is difficult to see that there is a case for interference. I think that the Section is really fairer than the Deputy seems to realise. The expression "at the option of the landlord" there means that when the apportionment of the rent has been made, and the deduction of the amount found to be paid in respect of board, attendance, use of furniture, and so on, takes place, it is open to deal with that under the Bill as if the house were let at the figure which is found to refer to rent alone, irrespective of these other allowances, that is board, furniture, attendance, etc.

The Minister will be aware that some difficulties have occurred and a judgment has been obtained in England under the old Act where house-owners to evade the Act called floor-covering furniture. I think it is not now deemed to be furniture, but if the landlord puts in a table of charges such amount as he wishes for the hire of the furniture and calls it a furnished house the onus then is thrown upon the tenant of going to the Court. The effect of the deletion of this Sub-section would be that any attempt to extort excessive rent by virtue of the existence of furniture in the house would throw the onus upon the landlord, and that is much more desirable. The facts are that there have been many attempts made to evade the provisions of the Act by charging high rent for a furnished house. The question arises at once: What is a furnished house? If a very meagre amount of furniture is left in the house and it is thereby made a furnished house, then the onus, even under this Clause, of going to the Court and getting an apportionment is thrown upon the tenant, and I think that that should not be the case. When we are dealing with house rentals it should be quite easy to deal with them apart from any question of furniture, and the effect of the deletion would be that any claim by the landlord for an increased rent for the use of the furniture would mean that the landlord would have to go and make the claim rather than the tenant.

It seems to me that this is a very fair attempt to meet the difficulties that did arise in the former Act. It is quite true that the landlords did endeavour to exclude tenants from the benefit of the Rent Restriction Act by pretending that they had been let furnished houses, and linoleum and small matters of that sort were relied upon as furniture. The draftsman of this Bill has provided that it is for the Judge to say whether the rent bonâ fide represents payments for furniture or not, and he will hold that it does not unless at least one-fourth of the rent is by him decided to be attributable to the furniture. It does seem to me that one-fourth of the rent of a house does represent payment for the use of furniture or for board or attendance or those other matters concerned. It is fair enough to say that that is not a letting of a bare house and that the furniture is not a mere illusory matter introduced to deprive the tenant of the benefits of the Act. It also seems to me that the onus will come upon the landlord in one way or the other; either he will try to put the tenant out at the termination of his tenancy, whatever it may be, in which case the tenant refuses to go and when the landlord brings an ejectment the tenant says “this is a tenancy to which the Act applies, and I claim to remain on,” or else the landlord will go before the Court and claim to exact an increased rent from the tenant, and the tenant will contend that under the Act he was entitled to remain on at the same rent. Then he can call upon the Judge, in the proceedings which have been instituted by the landlord either to put him out or raise his rent, to apportion the rent and decide whether or not this was a bona fide letting of a furnished house or a bogus letting of the linoleum under the name of furniture. Reading the Bill it seems to me that the draftsman has met the difficulties that were met with in the former Act very well, and I think that a tenant who is holding at a rent which is honestly a rent of furniture as well as a house will be protected by this section.

I was rising to support the Committee's view and the draftman's expression of it but is is now unnecessary to say anything further on that point. I might, however, draw attention to one other item. In this proviso (1) "The Act shall not apply unless on an apportionment of such rent, etc.," it is not until we read the Sub-section 3 that we find that the apportionment is to be made by a Court. This criticism is merely one directed to the verbal aspects of the section. "The Act shall not apply unless on an apportionment"—that apportionment is to be made by a Court, and I would suggest that at a later Stage of the Bill that these two items—proviso (1) and Sub-section 3 might be drawn nearer to each other and might so read that it would be unmistakable that the apportionment is not meant as an agreement or, rather, that what is contemplated in the proviso is not an agreement between landlord and tenant merely. I thought at first that the limitation "or at the option of the landlord" was intended to refer to an agreement arrived at out of Court between landlord and tenant where the landlord would say "Well, I will agree to consider and let you have this dwelling-house or this part of a dwelling-house at such and such a rent; true you are to pay me so much, which is more, but we are to consider that the house is let at this." I had taken that meaning out of this, but as the Minister explains that is not so of course I accept his account.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

Deputy Fitzgibbon has explained that it would not be possible for a landlord to evade this Act within the provisions of the Sub-section which it is asked to have deleted, that he must show that board, attendance, etc., represent more than a quarter of the total rent charged and, if necessary, the Court will, under that Sub-section that Deputy Magennis has quoted, decide the apportionment, but only if necessary. The Court of course will only go into an apportionment or adjudicate on an apportionment if a dispute arises.

Amendment put and declared lost.

I move:— To add at the end of Sub-section (5) the following:—"Provided that, in the case of any house to which this Act would have applied, if it had been erected or so reconstructed before the said date, the tenant may apply to the Court to determine what is a fair rent for the house, having regard to the special circumstances of the case, and the fair rent so determined by the Court shall be the rent payable by the tenant during the continuance of the tenancy, notwithstanding anything in any agreement to the contrary."

The Bill as it stands does not apply to houses erected after the 1st April, 1919, so that there is no protection for the tenants or for those looking for these houses. As houses are, practically, a monopoly now owing to the scarcity, landlords will be quite free to fix the rent at any figure which they think they are able to get in the circumstances. The object of the amendment is to make provision whereby the tenant can get a fair rent fixed by the Court, and get the Court to determine what a fair rent would be in the circumstances. Any landlord or houselord who charges a reasonable rent has nothing to fear from the amendment because it will be the duty of the Court to say what, in the circumstances, is a reasonable rent.

The basis of this Bill is the control of houses built under normal conditions. Houses built since April, 1919, which, by the way, is the date in the Act of 1920 also, do not call for interference, and interference with houses built in these conditions would be definitely dangerous in its tendency. There is admittedly—in fact that is the cause of the Bill—a house shortage, and we have to try to steer a middle course in this matter of controlling houses, between meeting an emergency of the moment and doing anything which is at all calculated to discourage enterprise in building. I feel, and my advisers have felt, that the Deputy's amendment tends definitely to discourage private builders. When you are thinking in terms of simply meeting an actual emergency of the moment, and providing shelter for people, you are strongly inclined, I think, to take drastic steps regardless of their more remote consequences. Now, if we hope at all at the end of three years to have worked away from this position of acute shortage, we must be careful not to embody in the Bill provisions which would be definitely fatal to the private builder who would come along with capital and build houses. To suggest, as Deputy O'Connell does, that for houses built since the abnormal conditions, built since April, 1919, there should be a provision for determination of a fair rent by the Court, and so on, would discourage the private builder. If he is going to feel that he is at the mercy of the Courts to decide what profit he may get from his enterprise, well, then, he simply will not embark on the enterprise. What has happened with regard to housing is that people have caught on to certain tags that started with reference to land, and have endeavoured to apply them, whereas in fact they are not applicable. The land is an appreciating property, and the tenant has put his labour into it year in, year out. He is, if he is any kind of a skilful cultivator or skilful farmer, improving it. That is not the position with regard to a house. Even the most careful tenant would admit that after a year's occupation a house depreciates in value. The house is built on one man's savings from the ground up, and one cannot apply these phrases and ideas that have grown up around the land problem to the problem of houses which is an entirely different matter, and must be dealt with along different lines. We feel that and have seen that process going on for some time. These land phrases and land ideas rush to certain peoples' heads like air to a vacuum, but when they sit down and examine them they will find in fact that there is no reason and no foundation for such application.

The Minister's comparisons are interesting, but inaccurate. The analogy as between house rent and land rents when you are dealing with monopoly value, and when you are dealing with the necessity of the tenant are quite comparative and analogous. The landlord that rack-rented the tenants' improvements was able to do so because of the scarcity and difficulty of removing. There was also the rack rent, which was due to the power to extract rent from the pure site value, apart from improvements, and that is quite analogous to the position of the house owner who may be in a position to take advantage of the necessities of the tenant, over and above what is requisite, to pay what may be deemed to be a fair return on his investment. Where you have a house famine and demand increasing at a greater rate than supply, it is quite a possibility that owners of newly-built houses may be able to extract a rental more than sufficient to cover the cost of building, and pay a fair return on the capital invested. I do not think the chances are very great, and there are cases that I heard of, where landlords are obtaining a rental higher than would be necessary to pay a fair interest on the capital invested in the building of new houses. It may become more necessary to prevent the extension of that practice. There is nothing in this proposal that would militate against a house speculator building, if you have any right to expect as you have, that the Court would take all the circumstances into account. The Minister will not forget that there has been a Profiteering Committee or a Committee on Prices set up whose duty it has been to try and find out where excessive prices have been charged even in articles which are much more easy of reproduction than houses.

Mr. FITZGIBBON took the chair at this stage.

Houses are scarce and are increasing in scarcity, as the demand is increasing faster than the supply, and that makes it possible for house owners to impose a rental which is even exhorbitant, taking into account the expenditure on the building of these houses. And the effect of the amendment would be to prevent a house owner simply taking advantage of the famine conditions for new houses, as he has been prevented from taking advantage of the famine conditions for old houses. It is fair inasmuch as it leaves the judgment of what is reasonable to the Court, and is not intended to limit the rent to an extent which would be less than fair, considering the cost of production. I think the Minister ought to accept this amendment: it would add to the value of building.

There is one weakness in this amendment, and that is there is no indication given as to how a fair rent is to be fixed. Now, the Deputy knows, I am sure, that there is a difference in the price of building from last year and the year before, and this year I expect there will be a smaller price than that of the two preceding years. A man who built in the last two years would naturally have to ask a higher rent by reason of the extra cost than the person who would have built this year. If it was known to any person who is building at present that the rental he proposes to charge was to be the subject of consideration in a Court, I do not think any man who would know it would start building. It is difficult enough at the present moment to get anyone to build. Building is almost, as we know, at a standstill. I think if one was to examine what has been done in the last few years it would be found that the local authorities are practically the only persons who are building, because they are the only people who are prepared to lose money, and the money is not their own. They are getting it vary softly from the Government, so it does not matter twopence whether they are losing on it or not. Now, if there is going to be a demand there ought to be a supply. I do not know whether this amendment would improve the supply, I think it might retard it, and very much more seriously than the Deputy thinks, and anybody interested in building prices knows that a man who builds now passes on his building immediately to somebody else, not for a rental, but for a price. If, as is generally supposed, the cost of building must come down, no sensible man would retain upon his hands, ordinarily, property, the rent of which must be reduced, and the return to him must, in consequence, also be reduced. Then, as far as building is concerned, I think this is the worst possible period—you may call it the middle period if you like—but I think any person building now is doing a great public benefit, a much greater benefit to the public than he is doing to himself, and if he is a wise man, he will not let his house but will sell it, and build more and try and sell them as rapidly as possible. No doubt the Deputy has in mind the fixing of fair rent having regard to the cost of production. A fair rent, even fixed on cost of production, at the present moment would have the appearance of rack-rent—an absolute rack-rent —Is a man entitled to that? If he be he is entitled to a rack-rent, and that is a bad standard to set up. I do not think the amendment ought to stand, and if it did I do not think it would effect the object the mover has in view.

The concluding words of the amendment are worthy of notice, "Notwithstanding anything in any agreement to the contrary." Were this amendment to pass, as I clearly see it will not, you can contemplate the situation that it would give rise to. A enters into a contract of tenancy with B, and agrees to pay the rent which B demands, having in mind all the time that he intends to have recourse to a Court to have a fair rent fixed, which according to his calculation, is going to be very much smaller than what he has agreed to pay to B. If that were to happen, all these lettings would become a mere farce, a sort of ritual intended only to allow the tenant into possession, and once he was in possession—well, then we draw a veil over the consequences.

On the Second Reading I mentioned incidentally what I may dwell upon once more. This is an attempt under cover of a Rent Restriction and Eviction Restriction Act to create a Town Tenants' Act. Now, there is a place and time for everything. If a Town Tenants' Act is necessary, as perhaps it is, then let a Bill for the purpose be brought forward, but, surreptitiously, to introduce under the guise of an amendment to a Rent Restriction Act what is really the setting up, with regard to houses in towns the type of court that had to be set up with regard to tenancies of land, is really stretching things. The suggestive power of association of ideas is almost incalculable. On the former occasion, if it is in order to refer to it, Deputy Lyons treated me to a great deal of strong censure, because he had in his mind associated with the word "landlord" everything that was tyrannical, and everything that was discreditable.

The evictions are tyrannical.

Deputy Johnson, I suggest, should have introduced into the definition clause: "Landlord— a citizen of the Free State who has no rights." There is an enormous difference. as the Minister has just pointed out incidentally, between the creation, for in point of fact it is the creation, of property—the building of a house by the expenditure of brains and energy brought into application by the savings of thrift. If A/B, instead of putting his money into Guinness, or instead of backing the favourite, decided to invest it, I would hold with Deputy O'Connell that it would be a very desirable thing if, in the institutions of the Free State, there were some provision by which we could determine what was a fair rate of interest on the loan of money, or, as I put it, if we were to go back to mediæval times, and have a Christian conception of the limits that should be, by Christian fraternity, imposed upon us for taking advantage, so to speak, of the needs of a brother citizen. Now, in effect, what Deputy O'Connell proposes is that where the form of a man's investment is investment in the building of houses, that there is to be such machinery, a court to fix a fair rent, and that is in effect determining what amount of interest a man is to receive on his investment. Will Deputy O'Connell propose also to set up a Court to determine where, at the shareholders' meeting, it is proposed to allot 10 per cent. and 2½ per cent. bonus on the ordinary shares that someone, let us say, an employee of the company who ought to have got some of that money distributed to him as bonus, for he helped to create this wealth, should have a Court to which he might have recourse, and that court, taking all the special circumstances of the case into account, would determine that the ordinary shareholders must not get more than 7½ per cent. There is no use in proposing the one thing without proposing the other, because at the back of Deputy O'Connell's mind there is something with which I am quite certain I am in absolute sympathy—namely, that legislation and Christian morality instead of having a chasm between them, if they cannot always march on the same lines should at least march on parallel lines, to the same goal. But here what we are concerned with is how, before the 24th June, we are to keep in operation the Act of 1920 and better it in the process without essentially departing from its purpose. That may be done. With all the sympathy that I entertain for the principles and doctrines that are behind Deputy O'Connell's proposal, I cannot see that this is an amendment. The exceptions from the application of the Act include dwelling-houses provided by a local authority. Why? These houses were provided to meet a demand. I hold, and I believe Deputy O'Connell will hold with me, that where public funds are supplied in aid of removing the shortage of houses, that instead of being given to public authorities they should be applied in the form of subsidies to private enterprise for building. Now, unquestionably, the immediate effect of passing this amendment would be to put a stop upon private enterprise in building. We see ourselves, as the President has just pointed out, that where houses are built at the present moment, in spite of the adverse conditions against building, the speculative enterprise of the man who is building hurries to get the new houses off his hands. No one is likely to put his money into the building of new houses, partly because of the higher wages that the cost of living necessitated for those engaged in the building trade, and partly because of rings—it is denied that there are rings, but I know that there are rings —with regard to the provision of building materials. A house in 1914 could be built for X pounds, but it cannot be built to-day for less than 2¼ X pounds, no matter what savings are made, or what care is exercised by the Clerk of Works, or by the investor himself acting as his own Clerk of Works. That being so why are we adopting, as we are adopting, the recommendations of a Departmental Committee that the shortage of houses, as a fact, should be taken into account, and that whatever hardships that would accrue to the citizens because of that fact are to be removed, as far as possible, by the operation of this enactment, and at the same time introducing into it something which will have the effect itself of making the hardship worse.

The main argument used against this amendment is that it will put a stop to private enterprise and that no man who has money to invest will invest it in building or engage in building work, because he feels he may possibly have to come through the ordeal of having a court to sit in judgment upon the amount he proposes to charge as rent. Well, I am not impressed by the arguments I have heard to that effect. I do not see why a builder should be afraid of this supposed ordeal. He can object to that only for two reasons; either that he wants to fix a rent upon his property which he feels is not fair, taking all the circumstances into account, or that he does not believe that the court will deal fairly or justly by it. All that the amendment proposes to do is to prevent the builder taking advantage of the scarcity of the times to put on a rack rent which will be considered a rack rent in view of all the circumstances, and it is supposed that the court will take into account when reviewing the case, all the circumstances that the builder would be prepared to set before it to show that a particular rent was fair.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

My objection to the amendment is, if anything, increased by the discussion rather than diminished. We are confronted with a serious situation in regard to houses; it is a disease in our social system. This Bill is not a remedy, it is merely a palliative. One feels strongly that the Deputy's amendment would prejudice the prospects and seriously prejudice the prospect of recovery inasmuch as it would remove whatever little stimulus there is to private enterprise in the matter of building. I trust we are thinking in terms of ultimate recovery and thinking in terms of expediting that recovery rather than in terms of pushing any doctrinaire principles to the point of acceptance. There is, perhaps, no higher or fuller title to ownership than that which springs from creation. A man built up, by means of his own saving or the application of his savings, a property that did not exist there before; we are asked to say to that man that he should put himself in the position of being hauled into Court and dictated to as to the rent which he should charge for that property. We are not saying that, and we do not propose to introduce any Bill to that effect. We are, as Deputy Johnson pointed out the other day, controlling up to a point, but what we are controlling are houses built in normal conditions and before this special scarcity arose. But with regard to houses built since April, 1919, and to the men who built under an abnormal situation, people who built in the definite belief that their particular property, or the property they were bringing into existence would not be controlled, we say that faith should not be broken with these people up to a point. They built in times when prices were high, and their enterprise was praiseworthy. They took risks out of all proportion to the risks taken by people who built away back in 1910, or 1912 or 1914.

I think to accept the Deputy's amendment would be little short of a betrayal of those people who built in very difficult times. I am not standing for that amendment and I would regret seeing the principle which I believe underlies it embodied in any legislation.

Amendment put.
The Dáil divided: Tá, 13; Níl, 28:—

  • Mícheál Ó hAonghusa.
  • Domhnall Ó Mocháin.
  • Tomás de Nógla.
  • Tomás Mac Eoin.
  • Liam O Briain.
  • Tomás Ó Conaill.
  • Aodh Ó Cúlacháin.
  • Séamus Eabhróid.
  • Liam O Daimhín.
  • Seán O Laidhin.
  • Cathal Ó Seanáin.
  • Domhnall Ó Muirgheasa.
  • Domhnall Ó Ceallacháin.

Níl

  • Liam T. Mac Cosgair.
  • Uáitéar Mac Cumhaill.
  • Séamus Breathnach.
  • Darghal Figes.
  • Deasmhumhain Mac Gearailt.
  • Mícheál de Duram.
  • Seán Mac Garaidh.
  • Pilib Mac Cosgair.
  • Domhnall Mac Cárthaigh.
  • Liam Thrift.
  • Eoin Mac Néill.
  • Liam Mag Aonghusa.
  • Pádraic Ó Máille.
  • Seosamh Ó Faoileacháin.
  • Seoirse Mac Niocaill.
  • Fionán Ó Loingsigh.
  • Criostóir Ó Broin.
  • Caoimhghin Ó hUigín.
  • Próinsias Bulfin.
  • Séamus Ó Dóláin.
  • Eamon Ó Dúgáin.
  • Peadar O hAodha.
  • Séamus Ó Murchadha.
  • Seosamh Mac Giolla Bhrighde.
  • Liam Mac Sioghaird.
  • Earnán de Blaghd.
  • Uinseann de Faoite.
  • Séamus de Burca.
Amendment, as altered, agreed to.

I beg to move the following amendment:—

In Sub-section (8) to insert in line 45, after the words "shall be determined by," the words "the Commissioner of Valuation" and to delete the remainder of the proviso.

I do not think there can be very much contention so far as this amendment is concerned because it does not raise any matter upon which the Minister might bring in the recommendations of the Committee to which he is sticking so rigidly throughout this discussion. The Surveyors' Institution is an unofficial professional corporation. Very many, perhaps the majority, of its members are landlords' agents. The Commissioner of Valuation is an impartial Civil Servant, and he and his staff are Fellows of the Surveyors' Institution. They do similar work in connection with Estate duties. Those are the grounds upon which I move the amendment, and I would ask the Minister to accept it.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

I will accept the amendment if the Deputy will agree to give the gentleman his proper title, Commissioner of Valuation and Boundary Surveyor.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

That is the correct expression.

Question "That Section 3, as amended, stand part of the Bill," put and agreed to.
SECTION 4.
Section 4:—
(1) No order or judgment for the recovery of possession of any dwelling-house to which this Act applies, or for the ejectment of a tenant therefrom, shall be made or given unless:
(a) any rent lawfully due from the ten ant has not been paid, or any other obligation of the tenancy (whether under the contract of tenancy or under this Act) so far as the same is consistent with the provisions of this Act has been broken or not performed; or
(b) the tenant or any person residing with him or any of his lodgers or sub-tenants has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or annoyance to adjoining occupiers or has been convicted of using the premises or allowing the premises to be used for an immoral or illegal purpose, or the conditions of the dwelling-house has, in the opinion of the Court, deteriorated owing to acts of waste by or the neglect or default of the tenant or any such person; or
(c) The tenant has given notice to quit, and in consequence of that notice the landlord has contracted to sell or let the dwelling-house or has taken any other steps as a result of which he would, in the opinion of the Court, be seriously prejudiced if he could not obtain possession; or
(d) the dwelling-house is reasonably required by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself, or for any person bona fide residing or to reside with him or for some person in his whole time employment or in the whole time employment of some tenant from him and in the opinion of the Court greater hardship would, owing to the special circumstances of the case, be caused by refusing the order for possession than by granting it; or
(e) the dwelling-house is reasonably required for the purpose of the execution of the duties, powers or requirements of any Government Department, or of the statutory duties, powers or requirements of any local authority or statutory undertaking;
and, in any such case as aforesaid, the Court considers it reasonable to make such an order or give such judgment.
Provided that nothing herein before contained shall be construed to prejudice the right of the landlord to obtain an order or judgment against a tenant for the recovery of possession of any dwelling-house or the ejectment of the tenant therefrom where such tenant has sub-let the dwelling-house, otherwise than for temporary convenience, to a sub-tenant who, or any person deriving title under such sub-tenant, will be entitled to retain possession of the dwelling-house under this section notwithstanding such order or judgment against such tenant.
(2) An order or judgment against a tenant for the recovery of possession of any dwelling-house or ejectment therefrom under this section shall not affect the right of any sub-tenant to whom the premises or any part thereof have been lawfully sub-let before proceedings for recovery of possession or ejectment were commenced, to retain possession under this section, or be in any way operative against any such sub-tenant.
(3) At the time of the application for or the making or giving of any order or judgment for the recovery of possession of any such dwelling-house, or for the ejectment of a tenant therefrom, or in the case of any such order or judgment which has been made or given, whether before or after the passing of this Act, and not executed at any subsequent time, the Court may adjourn the application, or stay or suspend execution on any such order or judgment, or postpone the date of possession, for such period or periods as it thinks fit, and subject to such conditions (if any) in regard to payment by the tenant of arrears of rent, or mesne profits and otherwise as the Court thinks fit, and if such conditions are complied with, the Court may, if it thinks fit, discharge or rescind any such order or judgment.
(4) Where on the hearing of an application for an order or judgment for the recovery of possession of any such dwelling house it shall appear to the Court that the landlord would be entitled to recover possession of such dwelling-house but for this Act the Court shall, if such order or judgment is refused on the ground that the tenant is entitled to retain possession of such dwelling-house by virtue of the provisions of this Act, make an order declaring that any tenancy of the tenant otherwise than by virtue of the provisions of this Act has terminated, and when making any such order as aforesaid may make an order as to the payment by the tenant of any arrears of rent (whether under the contract of tenancy or under this Act) due to the date of the order, and may on the application of either party at the hearing determine any question arising, or that in the opinion of the Court can there and then be conveniently determined, under this Act.
(5) Notwithstanding anything in section fifteen of the Summary Jurisdiction (Ireland) Act, 1851, every warrant for delivery of possession of, or to enter and give possession of, any dwellinghouse to which this Act applies, shall remain in force for three months from the day next after the last day named in the judgment or order for delivery of possession or ejectment, or, in the case of a warrant under the Summary Jurisdiction (Ireland) Act, 1851, from the date of the issue of the warrant, and in either case for such further period or periods, if any, as the Court shall from time to time, whether before or after the expiration of such three months, direct.
(6) Where the landlord of any dwelling-house to which this Act applies has served a notice to quit on a tenant, the acceptance of rent by the landlord for a period not exceeding three months from the expiration of the notice to quit shall not be deemed to prejudice any right to possession of such premises, and, if any order for possession is made, any payment of rent so accepted shall be treated as mesne profits.
(7) Where a landlord has obtained an order or judgment for possession or ejectment under this section, and it is subsequently made to appear to the Court that the order was obtained by misrepresentation or the concealment of material facts, the Court may order the landlord to pay to the former tenant such sum as appears sufficient as compensation for damage or loss sustained by the tenant as a result of the order or judgment.
(8) This section shall not apply to any dwelling-house let to a tenant during his continuance in any office, appointment, or employment, or for the temporary convenience, or to meet a temporary necessity, either of the landlord or tenant.
(9) Nothing in this Act shall prevent a Local Authority from obtaining possession of any house the possession of which is required by them for the purpose of exercising their powers under the Housing Acts or under any scheme made under those Acts.

I beg to move the following amendment:

In Sub-section (1) (d) to insert after the word “himself” in line 14, page 6, the words “and the Court is satisfied that alternative accommodation, reasonably equivalent as regards rent and suitability in all respects, is available” and to delete the remainder of the paragraph.

This is one of the more important amendments, and it designs to reinsert in the Bill provision which requires the Court to be satisfied that alternative accommodation, reasonably equivalent as regards rent and suitability in all respects, is available before the tenant can be evicted. It is well to note in passing that even the draftsman, acting no doubt on the instructions of the Minister, has accepted this formula in the case of business premises. It is argued that when access to the Court is available, and that the Court is directed to decide where the greater hardship falls, that that is enough. Against that I will repeat what I said on the Second Stage, that there could be no comparison between the amount of hardship that is borne when you try to compare monetary loss with actual dispossession of a house—being thrown out on the roadside. One cannot weigh up in terms of money, hunger or cold, and it seems to me that this suggestion of leaving it to various judges to decide which is the greater hardship is not going to lead to anything like uniformity or justice. It is contended that this provision in the old Act has led to a great deal of contention and litigation.

I presume that it is true, but in any case it is better to have litigation than having people thrown out of their houses without having an opportunity to get another house. I do not know that there is very much need to enlarge upon the arguments in favour of the amendment. The case has been stated on both sides already, and when it was found necessary to insert this provision in the original Bill, I think it is equally necessary now, and the tenants are equally needing shelter as they were then. The fact that the Bill is necessary proves that. I beg to move the amendment standing in my name.

Before the Minister replies there is one aspect of the situation that has been strongly brought to my attention, and I would like to bring it before the Minister. I think it is a pity that some words have not been introduced, but I am not quite sure that I can go quite so far as the amendment. There is injustice to the landlord which the Bill does remedy, but it does not remedy so far as I can see the tendency to or possibility of abuse. Deputy Johnson's amendment does eliminate the possibility of abuse but carries the suggestion rather farther than I myself would care to see it. The evil that is to be feared is that a certain type of house owner will purchase a house, and knowing that there is a very high market value at the present moment for property he will evict the tenant, enter into possession for a short time sufficient for him to have justified his suit in that matter, and then go out of the house and re-let at a higher price and carry on that procedure in one house after another. This is a certain type of person from whom Dublin is not altogether free who would be tempted to do that by the powers given him under the section as it reads at present. I am not prepared to suggest an alternative wording, and I feel that the removal of the words in the old Act does carry the matter very much nearer justice. I am not prepared to agree entirely with all that is carried forward in this amendment of Deputy Johnson's though I am prepared to vote for it rather than for the present words in the Bill. I do suggest that there is a possibility of abuse of that amendment that I have indicated and that the wording of the Bill does not give protection to the tenant against systematic, organised abuse of that kind.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

Deputy Johnson has the picturesque side of this case and naturally he has made the most of it. He drew a picture for us of people being thrown out on the roadside. I notice that when people are speaking on this matter always, they speak of the tenants as being thrown out on the roadside. They never speak of them as being asked to leave. That would be too conventional. They are always thrown out. The fact is it boils down to a question of: who has the greater right to the house, the owner or someone other than the owner? When you look at it in that way the sentiments that have been roused by Deputy Johnson's picture of people being thrown out on the roadside begin to die away, and your ideas of natural justice tell you that after all the owner should have some little say in this matter even if it be only a very little say.

He has built this house presumably from his own savings and it is his property. What is set out here is that when that house is reasonably required by himself for occupation as a residence, or any other person residing or to reside with him, or for some person in his whole time employment or in the whole time employment of some tenant from him, and in the opinion of the Court greater hardship would, owing to the special circumstances of the case, be caused by refusing the order for possession than by granting it—all that is asked under these circumstances is that the Court may give an order for possession to the owner of the house having weighed the facts and decided on the facts where the greater hardship lay. But taking the amendment it is as eloquent in what it claims expressly as in what it proposes to delete from the original text of the Bill. It expressly claims that the Court may be satisfied that alternative accommodation reasonably equivalent as regards rent and suitability in all respects is available. What is struck out in this proposed amendment from the text of the Bill is worth noting—after the word "himself" to insert so-and-so and to delete the remainder of the paragraph. So you are to delete that portion of the sub-section which provides that the owner may get possession of his house for some person who is bona fide residing or who is to reside with him, or for some person in his whole time employment, or the whole time employment of some tenant from him. Definitely, here there is a question of justice, and the amendment challenges that natural justice and challenges property rights quite definitely and expressly, and we have to face the fact that civilisation, as we know it, rests on the recognition of those rights, and until some alternative which we are entitled to examine very critically, is put before us, we would do well to hang on to these mainstays, and to this rudder and compass which have served moderately well all things considered. That alternative accommodation clause that was in the 1920 Act did give rise definitely to a situation which violated one's sense of ordinary justice. This is the kind of situation, for instance: There was occupation of a house and the occupation was originated by reason of employment. The employment ended for one cause or another, and the tenant who had got into possession by virtue of the employment remained there and was able to do so despite the fact that the employment had ended. He was able to keep out from that house another person who had the claim that he had on going in. In other words he was able to exclude from this house which belonged to the landlord a person whom the landlord wished to take up the employment which the first man had left and definitely terminated.

You had that position all over the country, of people with houses situated on their premises which they were in the habit of letting to labourers while in their employment. For some reason or another that employment terminated, and under the 1920 Act it did not lie in the power of the owner of the house to acquire possession. He had to show there was alternative accommodation, and it was easy to put up a case that the alternative accommodation indicated by the owner of the house, was not suitable. It is not a hardship to say that if the owner reasonably requires a house for occupation as a residence for himself he ought to be entitled to get it, and moving on to the next provision that if he can show that it is reasonably required for a person bona fide residing, or to reside with him or for some person in his whole time employment, that under those circumstances he should get the house and the Court would have to say whether the greater hardship would lie in refusing an order for possession than in granting it. The Court will weigh the merits, and each party will have an opportunity of putting his case before the Court, and of saying what the hardships and disadvantages to him would be if the Court were to decide against him. The Court must then decide. The provision of the 1920 Act was tyrannical. It took no stock of circumstances, but simply laid down that in any and every case, utterly regardless of what the private circumstances might be, the owner of the house, before getting possession of it must be able to point out to the existing tenant some eminently desirable residence near by which he must get for the same rent and so on. This is a fair provision. It enables the facts to be brought out in the light of day by an impartial court, and it leaves to the court to say whether greater hardship would be done by refusing the order than by granting it. If as some people say, one man is as good as another, we should legislate on those lines, and say “one man is as good as another,” even if that man happens to be a landlord. This bill is saying that in effect. All citizens, even landlords, have natural rights and have a claim to protection by the law, and they should get it. I am not accepting the amendment.

There was one thing to which I think Deputy Johnson has not given the attention it deserves. His ingenious argument against this was that a court could not very well weigh disadvantages so as to decide equitably as to which was the greater disadvantage, and this is the very court to whose powers of discrimination he appeals. Let me read the amendment, "and the court is satisfied that alternative accommodation reasonably equivalent as regards rent and suitability in all respects is available." Surely if I go before that court and claim that my landlord, if I had a landlord, is offering me accommodation which is not equivalent, I might point out that my aesthetic sense revolts at the prospect from the drawingroom window; I can discern a factory chimney from my bedroom window; the roof is grey; I prefer greenish tiles, and so on; the people next door are musical and they practise upon bassoons and have organ recitals three times a week in the afternoon; the place has an unpleasant name, just like Bloomsbury Square in London, or Irishtown, or some other place redolent with unpleasant associations; I do not like the name of the place; there are all sorts of things which make me feel that it is not suitable in all respects. And the court will have to take that into account if the court also has to take all these other considerations into account. If he is a competent judge in the one matter he is a competent judge in the other. Now, a further consideration which has escaped Deputy Johnson is that all these measures for the protection of tenants are consequential upon the fact that the ordinary right of the landlord to resume possession is restricted and that the tenant is continued. He is, within the meaning of this Act, a statutory tenant. He cannot very well ask to have it both ways. The Act is protecting him from eviction but, subject to certain reservations which are eminently reasonable, namely that if his over-holding creates an injustice which, in the opinion of a court, is greater in its measure than the hurt likely to accrue to him from being removed, then he must go. We are not allowing increases of rent save with certain reservations. That is a great advantage to secure to this overholding tenant and yet he is to yield nothing on the other hand. If we were dealing with this question in the abstract it would really be a contest between sentiment and logic on the one hand, and law and rigid justice on the other hand, but we have had experience of the Act of 1920, and we know that the most preposterous cases were put up in the courts with regard to this question of equivalent accommodation. With that before their eyes the Departmental Committee have recommended this and I think they have met the case exceedingly well and that it would be, not to amend but to put a blot upon the Act, to make the alteration Deputy Johnson suggests.

Deputy Magennis is always very interesting, but I would ask him to use the same argument that he has used on this amendment when he comes to Section 16. In justification of the phraseology of the amendment, I would ask him to turn to page 14, first paragraph, and he will see there that I simply quoted the words of the Minister for Home Affairs, who designs that in the case of business premises the court shall be reasonably satisfied that alternative accommodation reasonably equivalent as regards rent and suitability in all respects, is available. If it is a desirable thing to protect the tenants of business premises from eviction in such a way, surely it is equally desirable to protect the tenant who is merely a resident in a house. He is entitled to have alternative accommodation provided, and if the objection to the amendment is the use of the words "in all respects suitable" and that an eminently desirable residence must be provided—if that is the objection, then I am prepared to listen to suggestions for modification of the phraseology. But I was taking the phraseology of the Minister for Home Affairs. I think inasmuch as it was applicable in one case we had a reasonable right to expect that it was applicable in the other. If the Minister will suggest some modification in the phrasing, I, for one, am a very reasonable person in these matters, and I would be very glad to meet him. I happen to have had experience in regard to the provision of alternative accommodation. It is not quite so simple as the Minister would suggest. It is not always the case that the house owner built a house. In the case that I have in my mind the house owner bought the house over the head of the tenant. He is living in a house within fifty yards, an almost similar house. He got an eviction order, and but for an accident almost at the close of the case, the eviction would have been carried out, and the tenants would have been forced to go out on the streets because no other accommodation was available, unless the jails had been chosen. The accident was the disclosure of the fact that the house the landlord had been saying he was to be evicted from himself was his own house. He simply wanted to change his residence. He had gone through the Courts and got an order for the eviction of the tenant. That is a mild case. There have been many cases where tenants have been in a very much worse plight than the tenant I am speaking of. The tenant ought to be protected by the provision of some alternative accommodation. I will admit at once that there have been cases where tenants may have used their position unfairly to the house owner, but the number of injustices that have been created have been very much greater on the other side, or would be very much greater but for this protection. If one could be sure of uniformity in the judgments of the Courts, that there would be some guidance as to the weighing up of what was the greater hardship, one might leave it, but there can be no uniformity in judgments on such a thing as between the hardship entailed by a tenant forced to leave his house, and the hardship entailed by a landlord who wants to bring in another tenant, perhaps an employee from another part of the country.

Touching the objection that was raised by the Minister on that score employers who are owners of houses in which their servants live have very frequently indeed used the threat of eviction to compel employees to accept conditions that they ought not to accept. The threat of eviction to a tenant where there is no chance of another house is a very serious one, and very often indeed in the past before the 1920 Act came into operation it has been used as a means of tyrannising over their servants. I think the amendment, or some such variation of it as may be suggested, ought to be accepted. I think the amount of hardship upon landlords that would be created by the adoption of the amendment is trifling as compared with the risk of hardship upon tenants that would be created by the Section as it stands. I would press the amendment and ask the Dáil to adopt it.

Would Deputy Johnson, I wonder, extend the application of his amendment to Sub-section (c) also—“that a dwelling-house is reasonably required for the purpose of the execution of the duties, powers or requirements of any Government Department or of the statutory duties, powers or requirements of any local authority or statutory undertaking.” If a Government office wants a man's house, out he must go, although the equivalent accommodation is not forthcoming. Deputy Johnson draws the line of demarcation between the public need of calling for the occupation of a house and the owner calling for it. It would be interesting to discover what principle or doctrine of property is operating in his mind in making that distinction.

I have not made the distinction.

I suggest with all respect that the Deputy has made the distinction because his amendment is purely to (d) and he leaves (e) unamended.

We have not passed from it yet.

I surmise, as it does not appear on the paper and he did not indicate in his speech any proposal that he intended to make later that he was willing to allow the eviction for the purpose of a public office but not for the accommodation of the rightful owner.

We will test your vote on this first.

What Deputy Johnson is alive to is the fact that a workman has property in himself which he is entitled to self-determination in regard to. No one is to exploit his energies, no one is to impose conditions of wages, of work, places of work, temperature of workshop, and so on, that would be unwholesome. All these he is to be protected from because they are his. but when a man creates wealth in the case of a house and it is his, it is not to be his because some sentimental consideration is evoked. I can see clearly that it is very hard in certain cases that a tenant should be evicted on the plea that the owner of the house wants it, but let us not forget that the Court is to be satisfied not merely that the owner wants it but that it is reasonably required by the landlord for certain things. After all the Court is human and the Court is open to feel the impression of all those sentimental considerations which weigh so much with Deputy Johnson and me. It must be shown to be a reasonable requirement of the landlord. He must show bona fides in the matter and the Court has to be satisfied that there are special circumstances in the case, and the greater weight of hardship is to be carefully weighed and carefully estimated by the Court. Therefore in the last resort it is not a tyrant landlord who is ejecting a suffering tenant; it is a tribunal that has considered every aspect of the case, weighed all the arguments that could be advanced in favour of either claimant, and in the name of the community has decided that it is better on the whole that the landlord should have his house. Exactly the same thing goes on unquestionably under Sub-section (e) if a dwelling-house is required for the execution of the duties of a Government Department, and there no quarrel is to be raised.

I promise the Deputy if this amendment is passed I will move a similar amendment for his satisfaction to that Sub-section.

Seeing that the Press is not present now, I suppose we need not be anxious as to how much longer we can carry on the debate, especially after all the long-winded speeches we have listened to. I take this opportunity to support the amendment. In doing so I have in my mind a case that is pending at the moment in Dun Laoghaire, or to be more correct, Glasthule. A man has been occupying a certain house there for a number of years. This particular old man had four sons in the Free State Army, one of whom was killed in an ambush round Blessington. A number of people who are prominent in the local Council, and who are unfriendly to anyone who is supporting the present Government, have gone to the extent of pushing this man out of the house. What I want to deal with is the question of alternative accommodation which this Council, or the people behind them, are going to provide for this man, and which the Court approved of. He has a very big garden attached to the house, and could make a reasonable living out of it under ordinary conditions. The house provided for him under the Order of Justice Molony, to whose Court this case was carried, was one that was condemned six months ago by the sanitary officer, or by the officer of public health to Dun Laoghaire Urban Council. I expect that at the end of another two weeks the Minister's troops, or battallions of police, will arrive at the house to push the man out. I think if there was such a Court as is provided for in the Amendment, that in a case of this kind there would be no possibility of such an injustice. I just mentioned the case to ask the Minister if it is his intention—as I understand the individual is appealing to the Minister, in all fairness—to allow the sheriff or whatever officer is supposed to carry out this pushing out order, or police to assist in the carrying out of the eviction, especially as the local authority has failed to provide what could reasonably be term suitable accommodation. I think a house condemned six months ago cannot be termed reasonable accommodation, especially as there is no garden such as was in the original house. I take this opportunity of drawing attention to the injustice, and to say that if there was a Court of this kind in existence it would not be a party to it.

I am afraid the case referred to by Deputy Davin arises under (E) and is not covered by the Amendment at all.

It is no harm to draw the Minister's attention to the case.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

The Deputy has very cleverly taken advantage of the amendment. He is not going to draw from me, by taking advantage of the amendment or anything else I can conceive, a statement to the effect that Under-sheriffs must not execute decrees of the Courts.

This will be one of your future electors.

Mr. O'HIGGINS

I hope so. The objections to the amendments stand, strange to say, in spite of what Deputy Johnson has put forward in its favour. We think that the text of the Bill as it stands really does justice between man and man, and is a fairer provision than the 1920 Act, which very often did result in cases of hardship bordering on tyranny. But, imposing it as an absolute necessity in all cases to provide alternative accommodation meant in many cases that the owner, no matter how great his need, could not get possession of his house. May I say, in passing, how gratified we all were to see the ease with which Deputy O'Brien found alternative accommodation. We feel there is not the danger that Deputy Johnson says of a biassed court, or even any considerable lack of uniformity as between one court and another in deciding cases of this kind. There will be a kind of rough similarity, at any rate, between the facts in all cases where possession is wanted by the owner of the house, and the tenants' cases will have a pretty general similarity too. Now, it is a serious possibility to weigh hardship in cases of that kind, and to compare hardship. Deputy Johnson said this thing could not be sized up in terms of money. He said there was a sentimental objection to a tenant leaving his home. There is that, but there is the more than sentimental objection of the owner for all practical purposes losing possession of his property. That has to be weighed also, the fact that you are dealing with the owner who wishes to become a tenant, or who may wish to become a tenant, and the tenant who is not the owner, but merely a tenant. Weighing one thing with another one feels that the Courts will take all the circumstances into account, and will come to just decisions, and that the net result will be a fairer deal between man and man than the 1920 Act gave rise to.

Amendment put.
The Dáil divided, Tá, 12; Níl, 27.

  • Domhnall Ó Mocháin.
  • Tomás de Nógla.
  • Liam de Róiste.
  • Tomás Mac Eoin.
  • Liam Ó Briain.
  • Tomás Ó Conaill.
  • Aodh Ó Cúlacháin.
  • Séamus Eabhróid.
  • Liam O Daimhín.
  • Cathal Ó Seanáin.
  • Domhnall O Muirgheasa.
  • Domhnall O Ceallacháin.

Níl

  • Liam T. Mac Cosgair.
  • Uáitéar Mac Cumhaill.
  • Séamus Breathnach.
  • Pádraig Mag Ualghairg.
  • Deasmhumhain Mac Gearailt.
  • Seán Ó Ruanaidh.
  • Mícheál de Duram.
  • Seán Mac Garaidh.
  • Pilib Mac Cosgair.
  • Domhnall Mac Cárthaigh.
  • Liam Thrift.
  • Eoin Mac Néill.
  • Liam Mag Aonghusa.
  • Pádraic Ó Máille.
  • Seosamh Ó Faoileacháin.
  • Seoirse Mac Niocaill.
  • Fionán Ó Loingsigh.
  • Criostóir Ó Broin.
  • Caoimhghin Ó hUigín.
  • Próinsias Bulfin.
  • Séamus Ó Dóláin.
  • Peadar Ó hAodha.
  • Séamus Ó Murchadha.
  • Liam Mac Sioghaird.
  • Earnán de Blaghd.
  • Uinseann de Faoite.
  • Séamus de Burca.
Amendment declared lost.

at this stage resumed the Chair.

I move to report progress.

Barr
Roinn