I beg to move in line 26 to insert the words "or otherwise vary" after the word "increase." I do not think this requires any explanation. It really means that the Court of Criminal Appeal shall have the full power to revise a sentence of the Court below it. I think that is only a reasonable thing for a Court of Appeal.
THE COURTS OF JUSTICE BILL, 1923—THIRD STAGE (RESUMED).
Sections 29, 30, 31, 32, and 33, put and agreed to.
SECTION 34.
The Court of Criminal Appeal shall have jurisdiction to affirm or to reverse the conviction in whole or in part, and to remit, or to reduce, or to increase the sentence, and generally to make such order, including any order as to costs as may be necessary for the purpose of doing justice in the case before the Court.
I would be prepared to accept that amendment.
Amendment agreed to.
Question: "That Section 34, as amended, stand part of the Bill," put and agreed to.
Question: "That Section 35 stand part of the Bill," put and agreed to.
SECTION 36.
The Minister for Home Affairs may at any time and from time to time after the passing and before or after the commencement of this Act, but with the concurrence of the Minister for Finance in respect of any matter affecting public revenue or expenditure make rules to be styled "Rules of Court" for carrying Part I. of this Act into effect (including the hearing of appeals from the Circuit Court and cases stated by the District Court) and may annul or alter the said rules and make new rules. In particular rules may be made for all or any of the following matters:—
(vi) The mode of address to be adopted to the Judges and the robes and official dress to be worn by the Bench and the Bar.
I move in page 10 sub-clause (VI.) at the end of line 10 to delete all words after the word "judges" to the end of the sub-clause. Now, this Section, which is a rather lengthy one, gives certain powers of rule-making to the Minister for Home Affairs, who may, with the concurrence of the Minister for Finance, and with the further concurrence of the majority of the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court, the President of the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland and two practising Barristers, make rules with regard to various items, among others being an item which is the mode of address to be adopted by the Judges and the robes and the official dress to be worn by the Bench and the Bar. I have put down an amendment to sub-section (6). My object in putting down this amendment is in no way to insure the continuance of the existing robes or costume now worn by the members of the Bench or the Bar. Rather, my object is that the determination of the future dress, if any, and I see there is also an amendment on that point, should be at the discretion and in the hands of the Bench and the Bar alone. I really cannot understand what the Minister for Home Affairs has to say to what costume is worn by members of the Irish Bar. Neither can I see at first sight at any rate what the Minister for Finance has to do with the matter, except, perhaps, that he will give the members of the Bar the guarantee that as well as having the supervision and the decision of their costume, he also will make provision for that. There would be something then to be said for his interference in the matter, but, as far as I am aware, the costume worn by members of the legal professions in every country in the world is not controlled by outside bodies, but is at the entire discretion of the members of those professions themselves.
It may be put forward that members of the Bar are privileged to plead in public Courts, and that upon being granted that privilege by the State the State should have some say in the manner in which they robe themselves. As far as that goes, I am in agreement with the principle that both judges and members of the Bar should be decently clothed, but what I do say is this, that apart from that I claim, and I claim it in no trivial manner, the right for the Irish Bar, Bench and Barristers, to determine for themselves the costume that they should appear in. Take, for instance, a similar case. The National University, founded only a few years ago, and which you, sir, so ably represent, was founded by public statute; it is paid for by public money; it is controlled by the State, but there is no provision, as far as I am aware, whereby the State through the Minister for Home Affairs, the Minister for Finance, or any other of its Ministers, shall determine what form of mortar board shall be worn by a Professor of Philosophy, and what form of gown shall be worn by a Professor of Dialectics. No, the National University is entitled in that matter to self-determination, and I claim, therefore, on behalf of the Irish Bar, that they are in a similar position, and that it is rather casting a slur upon that learned profession to place in outside hands the future control of their legal costume.
I might even go so far as to say that when any of us pay our entrance fee at a football match, when we go to Croke Park to see a great football final, we pay our entrance fee and we pay our entertainment tax as well, so I am told.
A DEPUTY
You do not.
We do not?
A DEPUTY
Not at Croke Park.
Well, we do elsewhere. I believe, by the way, that we do at Trinity College, but not at the National University. So I am told. But, at any rate, we pay something, and we pay something towards the bringing about of the entertainment. We have no say—I do not know who has—as to whether Tipperary shall wear yellow, white and blue, and Cork shall wear orange and green, and I do not follow the line of argument that because the State pays for, and because members of the Bar exercise certain privileges allowed them, and granted to them by the State in addressing Courts of Justice, that the State, or any outside authority, should have anything to say to the mode of dress to be worn by that profession. I move this amendment.
Mr. MAHONY
Does not the latter part of that Section imply that the Judges and members of the Bar shall have a decision as to dress? I look upon this as a pure waste of time.
I beg to point out that it implies nothing of the kind. It implies that it must be done in concurrence with the majority of the judges, and two practising Barristers; also the President of the Incorporated Law Society, but that——
Let the Deputy read it, and that will settle it.
Order. The Deputy must be allowed to proceed.
That does not get away from the fact that the Minister for Home Affairs is the person who will be responsible for the making of these rules, and I contend that the Minister for Home Affairs has nothing to do with it, and he should have no more to do with it than the Deputy himself.
This question raised by Deputy Redmond really has more in it than he himself has stated. It seems to raise the question of what is the relationship between the Judiciary—the Institutions of the Law— and the State. Is the Judiciary subordinate to the State; is the Judiciary subordinate to the Ministry, or any part of the Ministry, or is it, as some theorists would contend, and I think with a great deal of sound reasoning, that it is of an equal status with the political institution of the State, and it should be self-governing, subject only to the legislation passed by the Oireachtas, not under the Ministry of the time being in any respect? That is really underlying the proposition made by Deputy Redmond, and while it is only dealing with the subordinate matter of the attire of the officials of this Judiciary, the important question is rather the relations of the Judiciary to the political State. Perhaps one ought to say, if that is the point of view, that this question should have been dealt with, not merely in respect of the robes, but of the whole clause, as to whether the Ministry, through the Minister for Home Affairs, should have this authority, or whether the whole of the job should be taken in hand by the Judiciary itself. If the contention that Deputy Redmond is making is sound it seems to me to apply equally well to the other rules as the mode of address or the robes to be worn. I would like to have heard Deputy Redmond, or any other Deputies that have knowledge of the procedure regarding Courts of Justice, to have dealt with it from that point of view. It is a comparatively small matter what robes or official dress should be worn, or even the mode of address to be adopted to the Judges. I do not know whether it is possible, on this amendment, to discuss that aspect more generally, but if it is I would like to hear some of the Deputies enlarge upon that subject.
I do not know exactly whether the purpose of the amendment is directed towards item 6, "the mode of address to be adopted to the judges, and the robes and official dress to be worn by the Bench and the Bar," or to the general principles underlying this particular section. In the letter which was addressed to the Chairman and members of the Committee, who were requested to report on this whole matter, particular stress was laid upon the fact that it was desirable to set up a Judiciary in accordance with the Constitution, and to mark a considerable difference to what had been in the public mind associated with the late alien Government in this country. I have noticed for some time past that a good deal of criticism has been directed not so much to the particular details of the new machinery, but rather to the purpose of any change at all, and it would appear to indicate to my mind that there was a desire on the part of certain persons, particularly those who criticised this Bill, not to mark the setting up of an independent Government here by interfering at all with the Courts as such. I think it is the general impression amongst the people we have been in contact with that there was perhaps closer association between the administration of justice and the British Government than there was with any other service in the country and the British Government.
I believe it is the desire on the part of practically the entire country that there should be certainly a marked difference between the Courts that have been dispensing justice here for a very long time and the new institution that it is proposed to set up under this Bill. There is, it will be observed from an examination of this measure, all the way through a desire to mark the independence of the Bench, but Parliament is entitled to certain safeguards, and the safeguards that are set down with regard to this particular clause are very light. They do not infringe in any way the independence of the Bar or Bench or the legal profession, but they do secure to Parliament, at any rate, the power to review such rules as would be made which might possibly leave the new institutions, if we do not reserve that power, under the shadow of the allegation that they were exactly the same institutions as it is proposed to change entirely by this Bill. I do not think that a case has been made for removing from the control of the Oireachtas the review of any such Rules as would be made, particularly rules which would not mark that great change which in the general opinion of the people ought to be effected. Therefore, I say, so far as I am concerned, I am not impressed with the advisability of adopting this amendment.
As regards the rule-making authority it is very noticeable that in this report of the Judiciary Committee, which has so often been referred to, that the rule-making authority for the District Justices' Courts is proposed to consist of five District Justices, to be nominated by the general body of Justices, and so on, and no reference whatever is made to the Ministry of Home Affairs. Also in regard to the Circuit Courts, the rules are to be made by an authority which does not include the Minister for Home Affairs; and as regards the rule-making authority of the High Court, strange to say no recommendation has been made, which strikes one as rather ominous. If the rule-making authority in regard to each of these other Courts is not to include the Minister for Home Affairs, I cannot see why the rule-making authority for the High Court should, and it surely is inconsistent that the rule-making authority should be the Bench and the Bar in the one case alone and not in the other.
I quite agree with Deputy Johnson when he states that this amendment of mine raises specifically only a small point, but this point, though it may seem small to the Deputies, is a point that is of considerable importance to the dignity and also to the status of the Irish Bar. I quite agree that it is a minor matter, and I also quite agree that it does raise, as he suggests, the point in regard to the whole section, namely, whether the Judiciary are to be considered as subordinate to the Government, or whether they are to be considered, as they are considered in most other countries, as being independent of the Executive Government of the country. That, indeed, raises a very serious and a very thoughtful issue, but there are further sections in this Bill which also raise that issue, and which, as I intend to dwell upon it much further, I will not trouble the Committee with at the moment. I would like to say, however, that with regard to this particular amendment the members of the Irish Bar at a meeting held sometime ago, unanimously decided that they should put forward their claim on behalf of the Bench and Bar to have the sole right to determine what form of robe should be used by them when addressing one of the State Courts.
I would like to call the attention of Deputies to the method of taking Divisions. Divisions are taken by the procedure laid down in Standing Order 52. Those who are in favour of the Question say "Tá," and those against say "Níl."
The names will be called in alphabetical order, and not by order of constituencies. The names will be called in the form in which they have been given to the Clerk by Deputies themselves. This particular method of taking Divisions is a difficult one with a fairly large Dáil, and I would, therefore, request Deputies to fulfil the terms of the Standing Order by rising from their places when recording their votes, by remaining in the Chamber until the result of the Division has been announced, and by refraining from conversation so that the names can be distinctly heard. This particular method has difficulties which we may be able to get over later on, but for the moment I hope Deputies will rise in their seats and remain until the result of the Division has been made known, and that there will be no talking.
Amendment put:
The Dáil divided: Tá 29; Níl 52.
Tá
- Earnán Altún.
- Pádraig F. Baxter.
- Seán Buitléir.
- Bryan R. Cooper.
- Sir James Craig.
- Darghal Figes.
- John Good.
- David Hall.
- William Hewat.
- Conor Hogan.
- Séamus Mac Cosgair.
- Pádraig Mac Fhlannchadha.
- Patrick McKenna.
- Patrick J. Mulvany.
- James S. Myles.
- Tomás de Nógla.
- Alfrid O Broin.
- Aodh O Cúlacháin.
- Liam O Daimhín.
- Tádhg S. O Donnabháin.
- Eamon O Dubhghaill.
- Donchadh S. O Guaire.
- Domhnall O Mocháin.
- Domhnall O Muirgheasa.
- Tadhg P. O Murchadha.
- Pádraig O hOgáin (An Clár).
- Wm. A. Redmond.
- Liam Thrift.
- Nicholas Wall.
Níl
- Richard H. Beamish.
- Earnan de Blaghd.
- Séamus Breathnach.
- Seoirse de Bhulbh.
- Próinsias Bulfin.
- Séamus de Búrca.
- Henry Coyle.
- Louis J. Dalton.
- Micheál S. de Duram.
- Máighréad Ní Choileáin Bean Uí
- Dhrisceóil.
- Patrick J. Egan.
- Seán de Faoite.
- H.J. Finlay.
- John Hennigan.
- Seosamh Mac Bhrighde.
- Alasdair MacCába.
- Domhnall Mac Cárthaigh.
- Liam T. Mac Cosgair.
- Pilib Mac Cosgair.
- Tómas Mac Eoin.
- Pádraig Mac Fadáin.
- Seán Mac Garaidh.
- Seán P. Mac Giobúin.
- Seoirse Mac Niocaill.
- Liam Mac Sioghaird.
- Liam Mac Aonghusa.
- Seosamh Mag Craith.
- Pádraig S. Mag Ualghairg.
- Martin M. Nally.
- Peadar O hAodha.
- Criostóir O Broin.
- Seán O Bruadair.
- Tomás O Conaill.
- Proinsias O Cathail.
- Conchubhar O Conghaile.
- Séamus B. O Dolain.
- Micheál O Dubhghaill.
- Peadar S. O Dubhghaill.
- Pádraig O Dubhthaigh.
- Eamon S. O Dúgáin.
- Seán O Duinnin.
- Micheál R. O hIfearnáin.
- Aindriú O Láimhín.
- Fionán O Loingsigh.
- Thomas O'Mahony.
- Pádraig O Máille.
- Risteárd O Maolchatha.
- Séamus O Murchadha.
- Pádraig O hOgáin (Gaillimh).
- Seán M. O Súilleabháin.
- Andrew O'Shaughnessy.
- Seán Priomhdhail.
Amendment declared lost.
I desire to move amendment 24 standing in my name; the amendment is as follows:—"In Sub-Clause (vi.), page 10, line 11, after the words `official dress' to insert the words `if any'." The Sub-Section as it is makes it imperative that official dress should be worn, and the amendment leaves the question open, and makes it possible that the Bench and Bar may attend in ordinary walking costumes if they wish.
The Deputy has not made it quite clear that the reservation "if any" refers to "official" and not to "dress."
Does the Deputy desire to leave it optional whether a dress shall be worn?
It is already in the hands of the rule-making authority.
I would not be disposed to accept the amendment. My information is that there is a universal concensus of opinion that the dignity of these institutions is enhanced by having an official dress. I think in most of the pictures or records or descriptions that occur of judicial institutions all over the world, there is reference made to the particular style of dress, and I do not know why there should not be here in this country also an official dress. It is a matter for the institutions that have been set up to make recommendations with regard to that. I think that the last month or two shows that there has been a determined effort on the part of certain persons to ensure that the dress shall be exactly as it was in the old days. There are various methods of ensuring that that will happen, when one gets no information whatever from official sources that such is the case. A man or Minister or official having been approached for information on a given subject does not give any information, refuses to discuss the subject and so on. Then some enterprising journalist immediately publishes what is alleged to be a statement, either of the Minister, the official or the secretary, thinking at once that immediate qualification or denial or affirmation must be issued. I have observed recently many such devices having been adopted, not alone with regard to this particular question of dress, but with regard to other questions. I would advise such diligently minded people not to adopt such methods in the future. It is scarcely fair. There has been no official statement made with regard to the abolition of any particular form of dress, official or otherwise, in connection with the Courts. I think the machinery that is outlined in this Clause provides for what is perhaps the best possible method of deciding what it should be. I think that it should be left there, and the Deputy should not press this matter.
I am surprised at the information that the President has given to the effect that universally, in Courts of Justice, there has been adopted certain official costumes. I thought that was not the case in America, and I think it is not the case in some Continental countries.
It is not the case in America, and I believe it has been abolished in Russia.
I doubt if it is the case in France.
It is.
I accept that. It is certainly universal in these countries which have been held up to us on the one side or the other as being models of propriety because of having adopted this archaic procedure. I think I have heard rather frequently, in the course of the discussions, or I have read statements made in support of the Bill that is now before us, as to the extraordinary success of the Dáil Courts, and of the prestige that they gained, but I had not heard that they were obliged to wear any particular costume, whether sitting as Justices or practising as pleaders. The proposition here, of course, is that we should not decide finally that there must be an official dress, and I suggest that it is very well worthy of discussion whether we ought to lay down that there must be some official dress for those who plead in the Courts, and also as to whether we should leave it as a probability that the distinction between a Barrister and a Solicitor, and between one Court and another, should be maintained. I am inclined to think that the Solicitor appearing in the law Court is just as effective without a wig as the Barrister with a wig. Of course he may not be able to frighten a timid witness as effectively, and after all it seems to me that the purpose of the official robes and dress has been rather to overawe the ordinary, common citizen, who is supposed to be coming into an atmosphere which is far and away above mundane things. I support the amendment, because I think that we ought not to decide here that there must be a uniform for those who plead in the Courts.
Deputy Johnson gives us an example of a very famous and over-used form of sophistry. The Dáil Courts were highly successful; neither Judge nor pleaders in them wore an official costume; therefore official costume adds nothing to the dignity or success of the proceedings. Would it not occur to the Deputy that it was in spite of the absence of these habitual and traditional elements of State that the success was achieved, because they were the Courts of our own people established to supersede the Courts of the alien? Now he appeals to the practice in America. That, I daresay, is because he shares the general belief that to be democratic is to be plain, because regal splendours have become associated with official costumes, then we who advocate democracy must cry out, "Away with all robes and fripperies, they belong to an obselete form of civilisation in which the vulgar and the low and the baser population were to be awed into subjection and obedience by the majesty and state of this artificial type." Well, the same proposal has been made with regard to the ceremonial and services of the Church, and I should like to know where Deputy Johnson proposes to draw the line. Why not do away with titles, with precedents and status, and let us all get down to the dead level of the Fiji Islanders. I have read the new policy of the Labour Party, but I did not read that in their manifestoes at the last election.
Now, we all know what an undignified procedure is followed in some of the Western Courts in America, where the State Attorney borrows a plug of tobacco from the prisoner in the dock and expectorates over the whole Court to add emphasis to his legal argument. I do not think that in establishing new methods and traditions for our country, which we have always claimed was a highly civilised country when certain others, of which we wot, had their inhabitants painting themselves with wold, it is a good thing to recommend to us barbarous and semi-baked communities from which to borrow. Deputy Johnson quoted the case of France. There is an official costume there of very long standing. Of course I plead guilty to a certain amount of inconsistency in upholding robes, because it is traditional with Universities to wear academic costume, and I am afraid that I am sadly wanting in that respect, even on official occasions. That is because the salary of professors is so low and so insufficient that I cannot afford one of these highly-coloured or multi-coloured robes required for academic purposes.
The question of robes is, after all, to be determined by experience, and everyone who has any experience of the Bar practice is well aware that the country litigant feels he has got a great deal more value for his money when the argument was conducted by a man with a wig on his head before another man with a bigger wig on his head. That may be very faulty, very lamentable, and very regrettable, but it is incident to human nature. It is a psychological fact that people are impressed by costume. The clown in the circus might perform to practically empty or unappreciative audiences if he did not wear the robes of a clown. Without his fripperies and his bangles what would be the effect on the other performers? Why, one of the newest stunts in the music hall is for the highly trained acrobat to go through the traditional acrobatic performances in dress clothes and silk hat, which is an unconscious tribute to the fact that the public expect the cermonial to which they were always accustomed.
Now, we are establishing new Courts and new procedure, and it is highly essential that they should succeed, but we should not throw away any of the established machinery by which we are aware trials, especially in country localities, are made impressive. Deputy Johnson will have to change the face of the earth very considerably before he will have created a new race of men whose imagination could not be affected by ritual. If it is the purpose of the Labour Party to replace the present race of humans by a newer race it would be an excellent thing to hear how they propose to set about the removal of what appears to every observer to be ingrained in humanity as such.
To go back to the time of Methuselah.
Deputy Magennis would have it appear that something very revolutionary was asked for in this amendment. The amendment really aims only at what it pretends to aim, namely, to leave the matter optional, not to take, here and now, a decision as to whether official robes should or should not be worn. The President called attention, two or three times, to the necessity— and I agree with him in this—for marking some big distinction as to the Courts to be set up in the Saorstát and those which were in existence for some time, and I think no better way could be chosen than by discarding these official robes. In doing that we would, after all, be only following the example we ourselves have set here. Those of us who were in the last Dáil and who are in this one, must agree that it does not detract from the dignity of our proceedings that our Ceann Comhairle does not get himself up in wig and gown and knee breeches, as the Chairmen of other Parliaments have done. There is, after all, a very wide gap, indeed, between a wig and gown, on the one hand, and the robes of the Fiji Islanders, on the other. It does not mean that we are to go back to the robes of the Fiji Islanders if we discard the wig and gown. I think we should get away from the idea that it is necessary to use artificial means of this kind to add to the dignity or solemnity of our Courts, and I support the amendment, in so far as I think it is not advisable for this Dáil to make it essential that robes should be worn.
After all, times will change and methods will change. If we were sitting in the Parliaments of thirty or forty years ago, I suppose we would all be coming down to the House in tall hats and frock coats, and if we happened to be in the Parliaments of a hundred years we would be wearing full bottom wigs and swords. If that had been enacted at that time, and that we had to dress up in those robes, I think we would have found it most inconvenient now, and everyone would have agreed that a change was necessary. The amendment leaves this matter an open question.
There is one point that I think has been overlooked, and that is that now the Bar is open to both sexes and that there are lady barristers. It seems to me that unless there is some official dress agreed upon and that the matter is not left an open question, as the Labour Party want, the men will simply be extinguished by the ladies. The ladies will simply appear in Court in gorgeous creations, so that no poor male counsel will have any chance with juries at all. I think there is an absolute necessity for some official dress to be regulated by somebody to be worn by barristers.
May I put it to the Dáil that if it be clear that the amendment will be lost, Deputy Nagle ought not to press the matter to a Division, because unless he is sure of carrying the Dáil on his amendment the vote of the Dáil might be taken as a direction to the rule-making authorities that we were determined to have an official dress.
I would like to have some assurance on that point. It seems to me, as things are in the Section, there is no option. There must be an official robe decided by the rule-making authorities.
The wording of the Section, page 9, line 47, of the Bill is: "In particular rules may be made for all or any of the following matters."
I ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move to delete, Sub-section (VII.) ("the sittings and the vacations and the length of such") and to substitute therefor the following: "The commencement and duration of the sittings and the vacations."
As far as I can understand the wording of the Sub-section in the Bill, I think the words that I propose in substitution express the meaning more clearly. There is no change in the substance.
If the language of the amendment is more elegant and distinct, I propose to adopt it.
Amendment agreed to.
That also disposes of amendment No. 26.
I beg to move, in subclause (VIII.), page 10, line 14, to insert after the word "the" the words "fixing and collection of fees and the."
The object of the amendment is to empower the rule-making authority to arrange for the fixing and collection of Court fees.
Amendment agreed to.
I beg to move an amendment in page 10, lines 15 and 16, to delete the words "Section or any of the Sub-sections thereof," and to insert in lieu thereof the word "Act."
The object of the amendment is to enable the rule-making authority to make any general adaptations that may be required.
Amendment agreed to.
I suggest there is some ambiguity about lines 20 and 22 of the Clause on page 10 of the Bill. I take it for granted that the purpose is that the Committee should consist of the majority of the Judges of the Supreme Court and High Court, the President of the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland, and two practising barristers. That is to be one body, and it is their concurrence that is necessary. I suggest that the Sub-section as it stands is open to the interpretation that it may possibly be three bodies, namely—(1) a majority of the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court; (2) the President of the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland, and (3) two practising barristers. I think it might be possible to make that matter a little clearer later on.
Yes. My attention was drawn to this matter previously by Professor O'Sullivan. I will have it examined and looked into before the next stage, and I will bring up whatever necessary alteration there may be in the wording. It is intended to be a Committee of all those mentioned and that the majority of the Committee should decide.
Question, "That Clause 36, as amended, stand part of the Bill," put and agreed to.
PART II.
THE CIRCUIT COURT.
(SECTION 37.)
A Circuit Court of Justice in Saorstát Eireann shall be constituted under this Act consisting of not more than eight judges, each of whom shall be styled in his appointment "Judge of the Circuit Court of Justice in Saorstát Eireann." Such judges shall discharge within the several groups of Counties specified in the Schedule to this Act (which groups are hereinafter termed Circuits) such duties as are by this Act imposed upon Judges of the Circuit Court.
I do not know whether it is in order or not for me to ask you, but if it is I would be grateful to you if I might be permitted to amend my proposed amendment. The meaning that I meant to convey by substituting the word "ten" for the word "eight" is better brought out by inserting after the word "of""a minimum of."
The amendment would then be: after the word "of" on line 37 to delete the words "not more than" and to insert instead the words "a minimum of."
In moving the amendment in that form I desire once again to refer to the report of the Judiciary Committee. On page 16, which is the portion of that Report that refers to Circuit Courts, at the bottom of the page and the beginning of the paragraph, the following words occur:—
We consider that a minimum of eight judges will be required for these Circuit Courts to discharge the duties hitherto performed for the twenty-six counties by sixteen County Court Judges.
That was the considered opinion of this Judiciary Committee, and that being so I do not think that this Section as it now stands, which actually limits the number of those Circuit Judges that may be appointed to eight, accurately, if indeed it does at all, carries out the recommendation. At the present time there are sixteen what are known as County Court Judges in the twenty-six counties. It is proposed under this Section to substitute for those sixteen judges eight judges. That means that the area over which each future judge is to have jurisdiction is to be twice the area over which an existing County Court Judge has jurisdiction. But more than that is proposed, for in subsequent Sections the jurisdiction is proposed to be doubled in most instances, and, in one particularly important instance, it is proposed to be multiplied six times. Therefore, the position which the new judges will find themselves in when appointed will be, that there will be half the number of judges to do in many cases twice the amount of work, and in all cases of contract and tort, which are the great majority of cases, six times the amount of work, and to cover twice the area of country. I do not profess to be a great mathematician, but with these figures at hand I would now leave it to the calculations of the individual Deputies to discover how much more work will be required from new judges who are half the number, who have twice the area to traverse, who have in the most important cases six times the jurisdiction, and in all cases over twice the jurisdiction of previous judges.
I say that the work that is proposed for those judges is not only mentally but physically impossible. The Judiciary Committee recommended that there should be at least eight. It is proposed here that there shall be a maximum of eight. I think it would be most advisable if the Government could see its way to adopt the Judiciary Committee's suggestion and that would be to appoint eight to start with. They will then be able to see for themselves how far eight are able to discharge this colossal task. When one comes to consider subsequent sections it is provided for in Section 46 that temporary assistant judges may be appointed. It is to guard against this very practice of having to appoint temporary assistant judges—whose tenure, mark you, shall not be determined and who will be mere emergency men, who will be possibly appointed by the existing Executive of the day, and who undoubtedly cannot be expected and will not be independent of that Executive—that I now propose that it should be a minimum of eight judges that should be appointed and not a maximum of eight. That is the very question which has already been raised upon a previous Section by Deputy Johnson. I venture to say— I am not going to prophesy; it is a very foolish luxury to indulge in, especially anything in the nature of a public prophesy—that in a very short time indeed, it will be discovered by the Government and by the people generally, that eight judges will not suffice for the almost superhuman task which this Bill endeavours to place upon their shoulders. That being so my object is to secure that the judges of the future shall be independent of the Executive, shall hold their judicial offices without either fear or favour of the then existing Government. That is why I propose that the minimum should be eight, and that there will be no necessity, therefore, for the operation of Section 46 in the appointing of temporary emergency men.
Now, in regard to the task that these Judges have to perform, I do not believe, without casting any disparagement upon my fellow Deputies, that they, for one moment realise what that task shall be. No one, least of all myself, suggests for a moment, that the present County Court Judge has got an arduous task to perform. Many times, in years gone by, I have, in another place, called for the reduction in the number of County Court Judges. No one can gainsay the fact, that in past years in Ireland, a County Court judgeship was probably the softest, and the nicest position attainable, even at the Irish Bar. But that being so does not in any way render it necessary for us, now that we are setting up a new judiciary, to make the task of our future judges an impossible one. What shall bé their task? Has any Deputy considered the area over which they will have jurisdiction? Take one Circuit alone. It embraces the counties Louth, Meath, Kildare, Wicklow and Wexford. A judge starts on his rounds in the County Louth and winds up, presumably, after travelling along the coast, backwards and forwards, in Wexford. At the present time it takes a County Court Judge, with all the rapidity at his command, from at least four to six weeks to do the counties within his jurisdiction. But his area is to be doubled. I say that when a judge starts at Louth, it will be at least two months before he is back in Louth again, and that the litigants and the people in County Louth, who previously might have applied to the High Court for injunctions and for temporary legal remedies, will have to await the return of that judge, after he has done his tour.
I do not know whether any of the Deputies have seriously studied the work of a County Court Judge. Are the Deputies aware, for instance, of the extraordinary amount of work that is done in the Recorder's Court in the City of Dublin? Are they aware that the Recorder's Court, as I saw it stated in the Press only the other day by the Recorder himself, in what I am sure will be generally taken to be a most dignified and judicial leave-taking, as he himself described it, of his great office, that his is the oldest court in existence in Ireland, and that it is essentially an Irish Court, having been set up by an Irish Parliament. But what was the jurisdiction of that Court? It was practically a complete jurisdiction at one time. In subsequent years that jurisdiction came by custom to be limited to the extent of a County Court jurisdiction. What did that jurisdiction comprise?
Let me briefly relate the work that had to be done by the Recorder of the City of Dublin. He had criminal jurisdiction, seven sessions in the year; he had Civil Bill jurisdiction, which is now proposed to be six times increased; he had licensing jurisdiction, valuation appeals, Income Tax appeals, appeals from the convictions of the Divisional Magistrates. He also had to deal with claims under the Workmen's Compensation Acts, and of later years he has had to go into the enormous number, unfortunately, of malicious injury claims for damages. That being so, with his limited jurisdiction, everybody who knows the City of Dublin knows that the Recorder was probably and is, the busiest man in the City. But it is now proposed to increase the work of the judge who is to take his place. I imagine that it will come somewhat as a surprise to some of the Deputies when I inform them of the fact that the value of the decrees in the Recorder's Court in the City of Dublin from the year 1905 to the present time, increasing as they have been in each year, has been, each successive year, more than the value of the decrees obtained in the whole High Court of Justice in Ireland. What is the meaning of that? The meaning of it is that it was the most important Court for the City of Dublin. But it is to be made more so. Its jurisdiction in certain matters is to be doubled. In other matters it is to be sextupled. I have often heard it said that the present Recorder is a super-man, but I say it will require a super-man to do the work of the future judge who is to take his place. According to this Bill one Circuit Judge is to have the jurisdiction in the whole City and County of Dublin. I say that that is an impossibility with his increased jurisdiction, with a natural increase of litigation and the various new legislative enactments. I say that for one judge to get through the work that the Recorder of Dublin does to-day, multiplied as it shall be by this Bill, will be a sheer impossibility.
Furthermore I would say this, in all seriousness to the Government, that I do think that the remarks made by the Recorder of Dublin the other day should carry weight here and throughout the country. He said, in the course of his remarks: "I venture, even though I be the last and the least of the long lines of holders of the eldest judicial office in the country, to assert that the honour and dignity of the capital, and the rights and privileges of its Corporation, demand that a somewhat different consideration ought to apply in their case to that of a country town." I do think that there is a great deal in that remark, and therefore what I would suggest is this, that in regard to the City and County of Dublin, where it will be impossible for one judge to do the task that is committed to him, there should be a separate Circuit Judge appointed for the county, and there should be some such Court set up, in substitution, if not in continuance, of the Recorder's Court for the City of Dublin itself. When I drew attention to the extraordinary amount of work that has been done in the Recorder's Court perhaps it might be no harm also for me to remind the Dáil that at least 90 per cent. of the writs issued at the present time are writs for amounts under £300, and I defy contradiction of that statement.
That being so, what shall be the result to-morrow when we pass this Bill? It will be that practically the whole of the business of this great commercial city of Dublin and the legal questions affecting the commercial community of Dublin shall be brought and tried before a subordinate Judge, known as a Circuit Judge, who will have to look after both the city and county. I think that that, from the point of view of Dublin itself, and from the point of view of its citizens, would be a disgraceful state of affairs as well as, I have already said, to my mind, being one impossible of realisation. Now, these are some of my objects in proposing that the number of Circuit Judges should not be limited to eight. I am confident that when these Judges are appointed it will be discovered that more will have to be appointed, and I think it will be far more honest, far more straightforward, and far better policy on the part of the Government to take power to appoint, if not to appoint at once, a sufficient number of Judges to do the work than to appoint an insufficient number who they know cannot do the work, followed up by appointments of a number of emergency men who will not have the dignity, honour, and independence that go to make an upright, honest and fearless Bench.
It would be plainer to the ordinary Deputy, and perhaps to the ordinary man in the street, to come down to actual facts. We do not want to know the different heads of business dealt with by Judges, or the amount of their decrees, but we do want to know how many days they work in the year, and how many hours they work in the day, or, under the new regulations, which give them extended jurisdiction, how many days they will work, and also how many hours per day. There has been a suggestion from the Labour Benches about overtime, but perhaps they can deal with that later themselves. These are questions that will help us in coming to a decision in these matters, and if we get an answer to them I think we will be very easily able to deal with the matter.
I think the Dáil is indebted to Deputy Redmond for the able manner in which he dealt with this subject, and for the fact that he brought to notice the recommendations of the Judiciary Committee. He is correct in saying that they made recommendations that no less than eight should be appointed Circuit Judges. We had in mind what Deputy Redmond stated when drawing attention to the fact that there were sixteen County Court Judges in Ireland, the administration of whose office was perhaps regarded as a plum by the legal profession. There was little work to do and plenty of time to do it. It was estimated that they had only four months' work in the year, but it is calculated that under this new form they will have ten months' as against four months' work. It is not possible now to do more than estimate or anticipate to what extent, or at what number the Circuit Judges should be fixed, but it is right to say that there was an unfortunate estimate in the case of County Court Judges, an estimate which the Deputy stated he was at the time anxious to reduce. We must take precaution that we shall not act in the same way. If there be work for a greater number, it will be the duty of the Executive to come here and ask for power to appoint them. It is unlikely that any Executive would be in a position to say what number of judges would be required for a very considerable period. We have a big list of business to go through; there is a number of claims under the Damage to Property Act, as well as arrears of work, and so on, and perhaps a larger Bench than eight Circuit Judges will be required. It would be undesirable, in our opinion, now to man that particular section too well, because we have experience that when people are called on, in times of stress and anxiety, and in a crisis, to say: "You used us when you had difficult work to do and it is now for you to find employment for us in the future." I do not know if that would apply if we appointed ten, twelve, or eight Judges and it subsequently transpired that we had not work for them.
It is impossible to anticipate to what extent the work hitherto done by the County Court Judges will be relieved by the Circuit Judges, and the extra work is also difficult to estimate. At any rate, the Finance Ministry, giving very careful consideration to this, made it a condition that the precise number should be not more than eight. If it be necessary to ask for more, we will ask for them.
The Deputy referred to the Recorder. The Recorder of Dublin is a very able Judge—a great Judge. He has discharged his duties since our responsibilities began with very great credit to himself and to this country. He has done his duty fearlessly as a Judge and he is an ornament to the office he holds. I do not know that hard work shortens the days of Judges or lessens their capacity for dealing with work. It is a remarkable fact that, as his work increased, he showed greater form, and I hope that we shall give the new Judges an opportunity also of showing their form.
In view of what the President has said I do not intend to press this amendment, but I would like to know whether it is the present intention of the Government, if they discover that these eight will not be able to perform the task allotted to them, then to apply to this Dáil for an Act enabling them to create new Judges, because, if that should be their intention, I would, in no way, oppose it. I think that would be the proper remedy. But what I do not—I must candidly admit—care for is the proposal in this subsequent Section 46, which I have already referred to, to create from time to time temporary assistant Judges. I would very much like, therefore, if the President could give me any assurance that if the Judges who are appointed are not, in the Government's opinion, able to carry out their duties satisfactorily, the Government will come to this Dáil and ask for a measure enabling them to create new Judges. I would like to know whether they will proceed, under Section 41, to appoint temporary Judges.
I hope the Deputy has not misinterpreted what I said about arrears of work and the large number of compensation claims. I take it, as far as the first year is concerned, and possibly for two years, that we may have to appoint an equal number of Assistant Judges, with the Circuit Judges. If, as soon as this large volume of work is completed, we find eight is not sufficient we will certainly come to the Dáil and ask for more.
I accept the President's statement.
Amendment by leave withdrawn.
With regard to the Section itself, it would be very desirable if the President could bring before this Dáil somewhat fuller details as to the expenditure involved by the State in appointing this number of Circuit Courts. I had a motion down yesterday that this matter should in the first instance be referred to a Select Committee, and my intention was that they should inquire into the recommendations of the Judiciary Committee in order that the Dáil should know what evidence had been heard by that Committee in coming to a conclusion that those Courts should be set up, and, further, that such a Committee might be able to let this Dáil have fuller and more detailed information with regard to this question of expenditure.
The President stated it was going to mean cheaper law for the litigant. Unquestionably, it will mean cheaper law for the litigant, but it will mean greater expense for the taxpayer. It is the taxpayer who is going to be called upon to provide cheaper law for the litigant. Each of those Circuit Courts will have attached to it what will virtually be a High Court establishment. There will be at least eight High Court establishments throughout the country, and each of those Circuit Courts will have to travel over the whole of the area of their jurisdiction. They will have to remove with them all their books, records and paraphernalia. All that is going to cause greater expense. I think, when we are asked to decide a question of this kind with the finances of the country in the state in which they are at the present moment, we ought to be entitled to call upon the President, in this case steering this Bill through Committee, to come to this Dáil and state what the cost is likely to be. We can each work out in a little time how much cheaper law it is going to mean for the litigant and the litigious person. But the litigant is not the only person to be considered. The taxpayer is far more important, especially with the finances of the country in the present position. I therefore ask, before this Section 37 is put to the Dáil for a vote, that the President should tell us what the cost of each of those Circuit Courts is going to be and what the total cost, as compared with that of the displaced Courts, is going to be. It would be desirable if the President would address himself to some of the criticisms that have been made in the country during the past two or three weeks with regard to the effect or the existence of such Courts on the commercial and mercantile credit of the country. We know a statement has been made that the Dublin merchants will be called upon to appeal to juries in the areas where debts may be owing. They may be called upon actually to appeal to friends and relatives of persons who may owe them monies that are being claimed.
There is a great deal of disquietude with regard to it, and the disquietude is very largely justified. An Act was passed not long ago entitled "The Public Safety (Emergency Powers) Act," and Section 12 of that Act states:—
"Where an indictment for a crime committed at any place in Saorstát Eireann has been found against any person, or any person has been committed for trial for such crime, the High Court on an application by or on behalf of the Attorney-General of Saorstát Eireann and upon his Certificate that he believes that a more fair and impartial trial can be had at a court and in a county to be named in such Certificate, shall make an order as of course that the trial shall be had at the court and in the county named in the Certificate."
The Bill was brought before this Dáil by the Minister for Home Affairs. In commending it to the Dáil he stated on the 26th June—I am quoting from the Official Report:—"Section 12 of the Bill provides for a change of venue in criminal cases on the certificate of the Attorney-General that he believes that a fairer and more impartial trial can be had at a Court, and in a county to be named in such certificate." These are the words used by the Minister in commending the Bill, and in commending that provision. He went on to say:—"It enables the venue of a particular trial to be changed in the case of criminal offences. That," he said, "unfortunately, is likely to be necessary." In other words, the Minister came here and stated that there was reason to believe that a fair trial was not likely to be had in the actual area, and before the friends of the person in the area where the offence was actually committed. I put the case to the Dáil and the Ministry in this way. Here are two persons, A and B. One person, A, is robbed of £500 in a certain country town; B is a tradesman in that town who owes £500 to a merchant in Dublin; the Minister for Home Affairs states that in the case of A it would be undesirable for the trial to be held in the town where he was a resident, because it would be improbable that the trial would be impartial or fair. If that be the case, and it is not my statement, but the statement of the Minister for Home Affairs, how does it come about that a fairer and more impartial trial is likely to be had in the same town in respect of the man who would like to escape his liability for paying £500 if he could? There are persons, and I think the President will admit it from his experience as a tax collector during the past twelve months, who would like to escape their liabilities if they could.
No, they are all paying up now.
But there are persons of that sort. If what the Minister for Home Affairs stated was a right statement, and the provision for which he pleaded is now the law of this State, in respect of the person who committed a robbery, a venal offence, against which the minds of jurymen might be more easily aroused, if a fair trial was not likely to be found in a country town against the person who was an avowed robber, how does it come about that a fairer trial is likely to be had for a person who owes money? The matter is taking a somewhat serious form. I had it brought to my knowledge within the past two or three days, and I have asked and procured permission to use this knowledge in the Dáil. It is that certain large English mercantile houses have taken advice of solicitors in this city in respect of clients in country districts in Ireland, because of the possible, the almost certain, passage of this Bill with these provisions embodied into it, that they will, prior to doing business with houses in country parts in Ireland, adopt an agreement, one of the articles of that agreement to be that in all cases of dispute, whether as to money owing or as to fulfilment of contract, a special arbitration clause shall operate, the arbitration in respect of that clause to be held in England, the country of the person supplying the goods. That clause is actually in draft. It is not a very pleasing thing that such a clause should be adopted. I have read the particular clause and I referred to it and spoke of it to a Dublin merchant, who stated that they also felt that in the present circumstances, at least, it was a very doubtful principle to bring cases for the fulfilment of debts before juries that might reasonably be composed of friends of the person against whom the action is being instituted. I put that forward; it is common knowledge that it is disturbing many people in the city of Dublin. I make no plea here with regard to merchants in England. That is their own concern, but I do urge that considerations that do so vitally affect merchants here and that have been ventilated by them, should be dealt with, and that some statement should be made respecting it.
I am aware of the statement made by the Attorney-General two days ago, which is backed by the substance of the Bill, that actions in such cases might be instituted in the High Court in Dublin. It is also true, and he, I believe, did not state it in his communication to the Press, that appeals might be brought back again to the High Court in Dublin. These are, I agree, protection, but in the degree in which they will be adequate protection they remove the argument brought here by the President when he said that the extended jurisdiction of these Circuit Courts will reduce the cost to litigants. Litigants under the present regime are confined to one court, which would be the Court of first instance as well as practically the final Court for them to proceed in. Under the new provisions they may start proceedings in the High Court, continue them in a Circuit Court, and then bring them back again to the High Court, and that, I think, will not mean cheaper litigation. Clearly it will not. But whether it does or does not, two important arguments against this article are these. In the first instance, that it will not help to strengthen the credit of this country; and, secondly, that it will mean very much heavier costs to the taxpayer. It is in order that the second might be met that I desire that facts and figures should be communicated to the Dáil, and I now invite the President to give some information as to the cost. I know that the cost has been promised. He made a statement a short time ago that the Ministry of Finance urged that the words embodied in this Clause should be "Not more than eight Courts."
Now, I think it is fair to infer from that statement of his that the Ministry of Finance has gone into the question of cost in respect of the Courts. That is a fair inference. If the Ministry of Finance has gone into the question, it is reasonable to expect that it should let us know exactly what the cost of each of these Circuit Courts is to be. I venture to say that if that information be given, the President may be able to maintain his statement that the institution of Circuit Courts will mean cheaper litigation for persons litigiously inclined, but it will mean much heavier taxation for the taxpayers.
I only want to make a minor point. By virtue of the passing of this Section the old County Courts will cease to exist. A certain amount of anxiety is felt by some employees of these Courts, men in humble positions, civil bill officers, and people like that. I should like if the President would make a statement as to how these people will be affected, whether it is the intention of the Government to continue them, and whether they have any pensionable rights. I should think myself under Article 10 of the Treaty they would have pensionable rights. I should be very grateful if the President would say something to reassure their anxiety.
Deputy Darrell Figgis, with something of that ingenuity which is so characteristic of him, has contrived to deliver a Second Reading speech, which through some misadventure was not delivered on the occasion of the Second Reading. He demands figures which he knows from the nature of the case could not be forthcoming in a form altogether satisfactory to a critic such as he. It is most important to remember there are quite a host of amendments still await ing consideration. Some of them may be accepted by the Government, and it may prove that the remuneration set down in the Bill for Circuit Judges may be increased, and consequently the Bill in that respect would require a little alteration. But that is not the point I wish to make at the moment on this section of his argument. Let us not lose sight of this, that the public funds are not dipped into for the payment of Judges, so that the taxpayer, qua taxpayer, is not bearing the total costs. As I mentioned, in connection with the Judges of the High Court and Supreme Court, fees paid by litigants add a very considerable amount to the takings of the revenue, and it would not possibly be anything but a very approximate and considerably inadequate estimate as to what the amount of litigation may come to when normal conditions have been arrived at. Remember that a great amount of litigation is a proof of prosperity, and we have confidence in the growth of the Free State and believe, therefore, that there will be recourse to the Courts in greater measure than hitherto, and there will be great confidence in these Courts of our own establishment and in their administration. The whole doctrine of Deputy Figgis is that we should legislate to make it easy for Manchester merchants to collect debts in Ireland.
I must protest against what I will not say was a deliberate but a very manifest perversion of what I said. I specifically said I did not speak on their behalf, but that I was speaking on behalf of the merchants in this city, the capital of the Free State.
Deputy Darrell Figgis in the argument which I was trying to condense reminded me vividly of the famous scene in Bardell v. Pickwick, when Sergeant Buzzfuz, fixing his eye with glaring gaze on the defendant, said: "If the defendant, Pickwick, be, as I am informed he is, present in this court, I would tell him, etc." He made the plea for the Manchester merchants, and then disclaimed any intention of making it for them. We who live in Dublin are all aware that there are agencies for the collection of debts, and it is not an infrequent thing for a debtor with lightning-like rapidity when a writ is served on him to prefer to pay, and he faces an inordinate amount of expense on the writ rather than litigate it. That is a constant and frequent experience. Why should the farmer or small shopkeeper in the country be put at a disadvantage merely because traders across the Channel will want to be facilitated? If Deputy Figgis had taken the trouble to read the amendments tabled he would have seen that one of his objections disappears.
In page 6 there is what I may for convenience call a Government amendment. It is over the name of Deputy Duggan. "Provided also that any party to an action commenced in the Circuit Court, and pending therein, may at any time apply to the Circuit Judge that the action may be sent forward to the High Court, and thereupon in case the action is one fit to be prosecuted in the High Court, and the High Court appears to be the most appropriate tribunal in the circumstances, the Circuit Judge may send forward such action." That is an amendment precisely on all fours but not quite identical with the amendment which I had the pleasure of withdrawing yesterday evening in view of this. There is no difficulty whatever in this matter. It is one of the mare's nests that some Deputies take particular delight in discovering.
I am invited by Deputy Figgis to address myself to four particular subjects. One was the Press references in connection with this Bill; the second was a balance sheet; the third was credit, and the fourth, I think, was certain conditions put in by British manufacturers or traders on arbitration in England. As regards the Press references, I read one letter signed by a very distinguished person, and I said to myself after reading it, to use a vulgarism, "That's wallops." He explained in the beginning that he had changed his mind, and he explained at the end why he had changed it. It reminded me of the earlier period of picture postcards, in one of which there was depicted the father of a family, and I think 10 children in the bed. He turned over and two of the children fell out of the bed. Underneath was written. "When father turns we all turn." I hope Deputy Figgis was not one of the children who fell out.
In this case this man, having changed his mind, and being originally in favour of the Bill, thinks that we should all change our minds at once. That is not an operation easily performed in this country. People do not change their minds so rapidly. I have not had time to address myself to Press references. I have Press references here in piles. I think, sir, it was your intention on one occasion to prohibit the reading of newspapers in the Dáil during the conduct of business. I may say it is the only opportunity that I have of reading the newspapers, and of course I would not like to come under your ban.
Press references have been mainly anonymous, and they are worthy of being anonymous. They have been directed in other places to the one purpose of damaging and endeavouring to ruin the credit of this country—a very serious and a very damnable form of propaganda. The credit of this country is high. It is rendered still higher by this Bill, in my opinion, if I am fit to form any judgment on the matter, and in the opinion of those who have been responsible for making up this Bill, those who advised us in the first instance as to how it should be constructed, and those who have advised us in its construction.
The credit of this country is not fairly described by Deputy Figgis when he puts into contrast the fact that the Minister for Home Affairs took temporary power for the Attorney-General to change the venue of trials. If the Deputy will look at page 6 of the Amendment Paper he will find there is power given to the Circuit Judge, on application, to change the venue if he thinks fit.
Most of the criticism of this Bill that has appeared in the Press is unfair and false criticism, and that is well known to the people who have uttered it; they know it is unfair and it is false. I am asked for a balance sheet, and a balance sheet, as the Deputy well knows, is a rather difficult thing to put before the Dáil dealing with a subject of this kind. In any change there is bound to be an adverse balance for a considerable period, if one has to take into consideration what has to be paid for getting rid of the older form of judicial system that we have had. If the Deputy has that in mind and means to say that in connection with a criticism of this sort, I make him a present of it. We have had the same disadvantage with regard to the police and with regard to some Civil Servants, and we are prepared to pay that price. It is for the benefit of the country, and I believe the country will be satisfied.
I was not referring to that at all; it was merely a comparison of expenditure.
Well, the comparison of expenditure is that it cost £111,000 for the old system and it is estimated it will cost £76,000 for the new system. In that comparison there appear the names of the Lord Chief Justice, two Lords Justices of Appeal, six Judges, and one Judicial Commissioner, half of the Lord Chancellor's salary, the Recorders of Dublin, Cork and Galway, twelve County Court Judges and the bonuses paid to them, forty-six Resident Magistrates, their cost and estimated bonuses, their travelling and other expenses. On the other side, you have the President of the Supreme Court, two Appeal Judges, five High Court Judges and the President, eight Circuit Judges, thirty District Justices and Vacation Justices, making altogether a total on the one side of £111,400, and on the other £76,000. The estimated saving is £35,400, and the balance sheet has not been audited.
In the one case you have the Dublin Divisional Magistrates and the present staff of the Supreme Court, including the Land Registry, at a cost of £150,000. Then you have the Registrars of County Court Judges, Clerks of the Crown and Peace, with their bonuses, and there is added in the paragraph, "in all capacities." Then you have clerical assistants of the Clerks of the Crown and Peace, making a total of £210,000. That is for the present system. For the future staff the total is estimated at £154,000, and the estimated saving is £55,500. The Clerks to the District Courts will not cost more than the Clerks of Petty Sessions.
Then there is a note: "The above is the roughest possible sketch, and the only inference that can be safely drawn is that the new system will not be dearer to the State. The fees all round are too low at present. Several thousands more can be got without hardship to anybody," and that also is unaudited. I would like to give the Deputy all the information he wants on this or any other subject to help him to form fair criticism of the proposed system.
With regard to the British conditions of sale, we will suppose for a moment that that particular condition is put in and there has to be an arbitration in England. Who is to carry it out? An award is made, and we will say they grant a million against you or against me. Who is to carry it out? If it be thought by any people that we are going to see that our independence or our integrity as a State is going to be interfered with, whether or not they are business people, they will find they have bitten off more than they can chew. As regards credit, this time last year we addressed ourselves on many an occasion to this matter. We spoke plainly and harshly, perhaps, but it has had its effect. There has been a remarkable improvement in the collection of debts owing to the State. If you dispute that, I invite your consideration of the Iris Oifigiúil in which you will see the return of Income Tax paid up to date. The Land Commission annuities are being paid much better than last year. The Minister for Agriculture will bear me out when I say the Land Commission officials are busy writing out receipts for rents that are coming in under the Land Act passed last session. The credit of the country is improving day after day, and there is nothing to interfere with its progress towards perfectly normal conditions only those peculiar Press references or despondent cries of certain critics, who apparently have not got a good digestion, or if they have, they do not know how to profit by it.
I think that is all I have to say on the subject. I would say, as regards the imputations that have been made upon juries, that I do not subscribe to them. I believe that the comparison that has been made between the Public Safety Act and this Bill is not a fair comparison. The idea that the Minister for Home Affairs had in his mind when he gave power to the Attorney-General to ask for a change of venue was that a certain terrorism existed which might prevent the normal flow of justice. We know that that is the case, or had been the case, but that is being gradually eliminated from our life in Ireland. I say gradually. It will take a little time. We will have to be satisfied that it is a slow, but a certain departure.
With regard to business, the same thing does not prevail. There are honest juries in the country who will honestly consider those questions. If there are complaints we are making provisions for considering them. But it is not fair that the whole jury system should be indicted here in that fashion, even if there are one or two places, or one or two cases in the country, where it is possible that a little mercy or generosity or something like that would enter into jurymen's minds. It is not right to infer that that complaint has infected the whole country, when we know very well that it has not. We know the juries in the country will give honest verdicts, whether the persons they have before them are Englishmen, Scotchmen, Frenchmen, or of any other nationality than our own.
Section 37 put and agreed to.
Sections 38 and 39 put and agreed to.
SECTION 40.
The age of retirement of Circuit Judges shall be 70 years.
I beg to move as as amendment:—
"To add at the end of the Section, line 51, the words `but the Executive Council may, on the advice of the Attorney-General, extend the age of retirement in the case of any Judge to 75 years."
I hope the Government may see their way to accept this amendment for two reasons. First, it is a purely permissive amendment, and it confers on them the power which they have been too modest to claim for themselves; second, I have taken the wording from Section 12 of the Bill which we have already passed. I think the Dáil will assent to the general principle that lies behind this amendment, and that is that as long as a man is fit to work and anxious to work and the Government is anxious for him to continue to serve the State that he will be allowed to work. This amendment will give them the power to continue the man if they think him still able to do useful work up to the age of 75 years.
There are professions where an age limit is necessary, but I do not think the Judicial profession is one of them. It may be said, as a general rule, that judges, like wine, improve with age. They gain experience and knowledge. Of course there are some wines that will never be improved, and the same may be said of some judges. I tried to make all my amendments fit in, as far as possible, with the general scheme of the Bill. I realise that we are treading new ways, and whatever natural conservatism one has must be suppressed. I put down other amendments, but these also I drew to the best of my ability with a desire to improve the Bill.
AN LEAS-CHEANN COMHAIRLE, took the Chair at this stage.
There are two amendments to Section 40. One is from Deputy Bryan Cooper, and the other is from Deputies Magennis and Captain Redmond. In the one case it is a sort of omnibus amendment, and it will be noticed that we have kept all the three, or I should say four, Courts separate. There are four Courts, I believe. Now the adoption of Deputy Bryan Cooper's amendment would deal with other Judges than those which this particular part of the Bill applies to, whereas the other amendment, I think No. 3, deals with Circuit Judges only. I propose to accept the second, that is No. 3, with a slight alteration. That is to say we accept the principle of it, and will consider about producing an amendment at the next stage. The manner in which I propose to accept it would be that the Government (that is the Executive Council) may, after consultation with the Attorney-General and the Chief Justice, extend the age for retirement. It will, I think, be admitted that a consultation of those two would be advisable because in the case of the Supreme Court it might happen that it would be the Chief Justice's own position that would be in question, and while he would be prepared to give one decision with regard to it, the Attorney-General of the day might consider it would be advisable that he would go on. So we have the benefit of the advice of those two persons, one perhaps to be moved up, and the other to be moved out. In any case I think it would be a better method of arranging for any extension of term of office to have it on consultation with those two. If that were agreeable to Deputy Bryan Cooper I would bring it up on the next stage.
I beg to accept the amendment in the form outlined by the President.
I draw the attention of the President to the desirability of making this clear, that is, No. 3. If the amendment had been accepted in its present form it might apply to the Circuit Judges in general, whereas in No. 2 it is clear it applies to a specific case. I hope the President will bear that in mind.
Yes.
I am perfectly satisfied with the President's offer. In drafting the amendment I copied the wording of the Bill, but I agree that this form is preferable. I withdraw my amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 40 put and agreed to.
SECTION 41.
The declaration to be made by every Circuit Judge on appointment shall be that hereinbefore set forth in Section 13 of this Actmutatis mutandis. It shall be made and subscribed before the Chief Justice.
This amendment stands in my name:—
In line 52, to delete the words "The declaration to be made" and to substitute therefor the words "The Oath to be taken and subscribed," and in line 53 to delete the words "set forth in" and to substitute therefor the words "as prescribed by."
This has been already accepted in its present form. I had a similar amendment with regard to the declaration to be taken by the High Court and Supreme Court Judges. The President was good enough to undertake to bring forward another declaration, and that is set out in the Bill at a subsequent stage, consequently it is unnecessary for me to move it.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Section 41 put and agreed to.
SECTION 42.
Each Circuit Judge shall receive a salary of £1,500 per annum, and on retirement, after 15 years' service or upwards, or owing to age or permanent infirmity, shall be entitled for his life to a pension amounting to two-thirds of his salary.
The following amendment is in my name:
In line 4, at the end of the Section to add the words:—
"Provided that where under the provisions of Section 44 a Recorder or a County Court Judge in Ireland is appointed a Judge of the Circuit Court the person so appointed shall receive a salary not less than his existing salary, and his appointment as Judge of the Circuit Court shall not prejudice any right of retirement or pension on retirement which such person would have enjoyed if he had not been so appointed."
In view of the undertaking given, I beg to withdraw it.
Section 42 put and agreed to.
Section 43 put and agreed to.
SECTION 44.
No person shall be appointed a Judge of the Circuit Court who is not at the date of his appointment a practising Barrister of ten years' standing at least or has not been a Recorder or a County Court Judge in Ireland, but service as a Justice of the District Court of Saorstát Eireann shall be deemed practice at the Bar for the purpose of this provision and shall be reckoned as service within the meaning of Section 42 hereof in the case of a Justice of the District Court who shall be appointed a Judge of the Circuit Court.
I have an amendment to propose:
To delete all after the words "at least" in line 12 down to the words "provision and" in line 15, and to substitute therefor the words:—
"or a District Justice or a Justice of the District Court of Saorstát Eireann of ten years' standing either as a barrister or a solicitor, or who has not been a Recorder or a County Court Judge in Ireland, and service as a Justice in the District Court of Saorstát Eireann."
The object of this amendment is to place District Justices who may have been solicitors on a level in regard to the opportunity for appointment to a higher office with barristers who may be District Justices. I do not know whether there is any intention on the part of the Government in drafting this Bill to give a preference to that section of the legal profession which does the pleading, but the proposition in the amendment is to put both sections of that profession on a level.
The intention is, whether a District Justice, or a Justice of the District Court who has had ten years' standing, either as a Barrister or Solicitor, shall be on a level for appointment as a Judge of the Circuit Court. I hope it is not necessary to argue the case for this equality of opportunity. I know there are certain jealousies between the two professions, and I think it may be well contended that the solicitor who has qualified to act as a District Justice, or as a Justice at all, with his experience, and I think I am right in saying longer training in the preliminary stages at any rate is quite as well qualified to act as a Judge as the Barrister. I would like, as a matter of fact, to have seen the Bill so framed as to make it desirable that the two branches of the profession should be amalgamated, or at least that there should be an interchange between them. But we are not dealing with that now. I am asking that the Dáil should accept the proposition that a solicitor who has been appointed a Justice of a District Court should be on equal terms for promotion, as we would call it, with the Barrister who has acted as such a Justice. I hope the Government will see their way to accept this amendment without further argument.
I notice that towards the concluding portion of Deputy Johnson's remarks, in proposing this amendment, he said he had hoped that an amalgamation between the two branches of the learned profession to which I have the honour to belong should take place. Now, Deputy Johnson is a very guileless person, but surely to goodness he does not expect any of the Deputies to understand that that is not the very object and intention of this amendment. On the contrary, I claim that this amendment, if carried, to all intents and purposes would bring about the object which Deputy Johnson so much desires. Now, there is a great deal to be said in favour of the amalgamation of the two branches of this profession, and like most other subjects there is a great deal to be said against. The experiment has been tried in many countries, notably in some of our now sister Dominions. It was adopted also in the United States of America. Yes, in theory it has been tried, but in practice it has failed, and why? For one reason, and one good reason only, and that is, that no one man can be in two places and do two entirely different jobs at the same time. What I mean by that is this, that you cannot have a man entirely devoting his time to consultation with clients and to the office work necessary for the production and preparation of cases in Court, and at the same time have the same person present that case with the knowledge and with the result of the necessary legal research which he should have gone into in order to be able to present the case.
Deputy Johnson has spoken of equality of opportunity. I would like to ask the Deputy one small question. He is strongly in favour of the amalgamation of these two branches of the legal profession. He is entitled to be so, but I would like to ask him this. Would he be in favour of the amalgamation of joiners with, let us say, cabinet-makers?
Yes.
He would.
Certainly.
Therefore, he is in favour, not of various distinct trade unions, but rather of a jack-of-all-trades sort of artisan.
The Deputy must be living in a past age. These trades have been amalgamated for years.
They may be amalgamated as a union, but what I want to point out to Deputy Johnson, and to other Deputies, is that the question of training, and the question of craft, is in each case distinct and different. An ordinary cabinet-maker might not be a good joiner, and vice versa, but what is not generally understood in the minds of outsiders, and when I say outsiders I use the word in no derogatory sense, but of extra legal people, is that the two branches of the profession are so entirely and completely distinct. Now, what this amendment proposes to do is to render promotion to the higher positions on the bench open to that branch of the profession who have not gone in for the study of the theory of the law, so much as for the practice and procedure of it.
There is no doubt that, among certain sections of both branches, there may be jealousy, but I do not think that Deputy Johnson has made his ground quite safe or sound when he comes here and proposes such an amendment as this without having consulted those immediately concerned. I do not know but he may have the authority of the Incorporated Law Society to speak on their behalf; I do not know whether he has or not. He may have the authority of the Bar Council, but I do not think he has; but he will say that he has the authority of the well-being of the people. Very well. I submit that the community at large would not benefit one thraneen by the change that he proposes to make, because, as I previously stated, one man cannot do two jobs at two places at the one time. I would therefore appeal to the Government, and to the Dáil generally, not to accept this amendment, because if this amendment were accepted it would be altering the whole frame and principle of this Bill; it would be introducing an entirely new element into it, a most controversial element, and an element which has had nothing like universal discussion, or even any discussion at all throughout the country. I think the proper time and place to discuss such a proposal would be by the introduction of a new Bill framed upon the lines of this amendment.
I ask the Government, and the Dáil, not to accept the amendment now before them. Already, in connection with this Bill, I think there is a feeling that the Bar profession is in danger of being lowered. I do not hold with that opinion in the least, but I do say that any alteration in the direction of this amendment would be very detrimental to the whole Bar system. What we have to look forward to, and what is embodied in the principle of the Bill, is a Judicature of the very best quality and the very best material that can be got. The training of the Barrister fits him particularly, or more particularly, for the office of Judge. The natural aspirations of the Solicitor's branch of the profession are not detrimentally affected. The two branches of the profession, general opinion, I think would claim, should be separate. I think litigants would rather have them separate, and, certainly, any question of amalgamating the two professions would have a detrimental effect upon both. So long as they are kept separate there must be an incentive to members of the Bar to get such prominence, and prestige, that they will be qualified to act as Judges in the High Court and in the Circuit Courts, and any weakening of that natural aspiration might be very seriously detrimental to the profession as a whole. I would respectfully ask the Dáil to carefully consider the result of the amendment that they are now asked to pass.
I sympathise with what is in the mind of Deputy Johnson. It does seem, at any rate at first sight, a grievance that a member of the Solicitors' profession is eligible for appointment to the position of District Justice, and that along with him, the Barrister is eligible; and that A, selected from the one, and B from the other, and appointed at the same time, thereafter have two different prospects of promotion.
I think Deputy Johnson is mistaken, if he will allow me to say so, in putting his objection upon the ground of democracy. We are in the habit of invoking democratic principle on behalf of nearly everything we wish to have done, by way of alteration, in the existing system. He appeals to equality of opportunity. Does the preservation of the radical differentiation of functions between the solicitor and barrister preclude equality of opportunity? Let me give a parallel from a sister profession. There is such a thing as the general practitioner among doctors, but what usually happens is that if a man is seriously concerned with regard to the symptoms he has developed, or seems to have developed, he prefers to have the opinion of an expert, and if the expert recommends an operation the patient prefers to be operated on by a skilled and long-experienced surgeon instead of undergoing a mauling at the hands of a man who is apothecary, drug mixer, prescriber, and all the rest. There is no department of activity in which specialisation of functions is so much insisted on as in the trade unions. Fancy a plumber allowing his helper to operate as a plumber. These are two different things. The skilled labourer and the unskilled labourer are not put on the same plane, nor by a parity of reasons, ought a man whose special training has given him particular skill in one department of the law be called in to do the work which is the peculiar function of a man who has undergone a different type of training.
Mr. O'CONNELL
The unskilled man.
Deputy O'Connell is in bad company over there on the Labour Benches, for he is acquiring a habit of sophistication which his earlier education would have taught him to avoid. I am giving a parallel, which is a different thing from a suggestion of identical cases. Deputy Johnson would prefer the two aspirants to the legal profession to undergo the same training. Does he think that would conduce to the greater advantage of the public. It has been tried. Again I appeal to the case of America, which evidently commends itself as a wonderful ideal and model to Deputy Johnson.
Never.
I suspected that in his calmer and more reasonable moments Deputy Johnson would confess that he does not admire American methods. It is notorious that when A, B, C and D are members of the same legal firm, and A operates as a solicitor, and B as pleader in the Courts, that what gradually comes about is this. They monopolise the entire legal business because one of them goes upon the Bench for a period and comes back into his office, and so on, until a situation is contrived that it would not be to the advantage of any one to employ anyone but that firm or they would get an adverse decision in every case. That is not a model that encourages us to have amalgamation of the two professions. The Deputy also spoke of jealousy between the two. Is there jealousy? That is an assumption that I do not pass without challenge. There are many solicitors who much prefer to remain what they are. The profession is much more lucrative. There are lines of practice open to the solicitor which are highly lucrative and do not come within the province of the unfortunate barrister, and his fees are limited. The "two-twos" of the junior barrister do not add up to very much at the end of the legal session. He has no opportunity of serving writs, collecting debts, or of lending money upon mortgage. These are fine things in the solicitor's profession.
As regards equality of opportunity, the solicitor who feels called by predilection to the barrister's profession can become a barrister with facility, and it has happened. The late Mr. Justice Powell, who was an admirable judge, of whom everyone spoke in the highest possible terms, was for a long period a solicitor before he went to the Bar. There are others living, and, therefore, I will not mention them—not that I mean to imply that they are unmentionable. The fact is that in the District Justice Courts' practice it is possible, because of the peculiar work on the civil side that will fall within the operation of the District Justice, that a solicitor may discharge that function very well, and he may in course of a long time develop within him unsuspected capacities that would enable him to become a Circuit Judge. But meanwhile, a barrister who is practising in the court is undergoing a type of training and is having a sort of experience which will far better qualify him for functioning on the higher bench. So if you look at this thing from the point of view of the legal profession, certain solicitors who cannot find room in the country town for their office with any great hope of success would like to have an opportunity of practising at the Bar when occasionally they would visit a Bar centre, and the unemployed at the Bar, the briefless barrister, of whom, unfortunately, there is quite a host, would no doubt be glad to have facilities on occasion to operate as a solicitor. But we have to consider the benefit of the public at large, and not the facilitation of the jack-of-all-trades to put on a robe and wig and call himself a barrister, and then like a quick-change artiste of the music halls throw them aside and function as a solicitor. It is not good for the public, and it certainly would not be good for the legal administration in the long run. It is much better to have one man specialising on the hearing of the client's statement of his case, reducing it to writing, preparing briefs, briefing the counsel, advising counsel, and the counsel then stating what the law is that applies to this and doing the pleading in court. Not only has the counsel, as Deputy Redmond reminds me, to look up the law, but he has to be able to know where to look for it. I can speak from experience in that regard, having worked under one of the present judges when he was a Serjeant-at-Law. What excited my admiration in his regard as a senior, was that he was able to order me to find out a case for him to establish such and such a point and to tell me where to look for that. It was in that that his knowledge of law consisted, and that is a special gift and acquisition that a man cannot attain who is carrying on an altogether different practice in a different line of the profession.
The speeches of Deputies Redmond and Magennis go far, I think, to prove the case for the amendment. They have shown how important it is to be able to plead effectively, but they have not shown in their discussion the qualities of sound judgment which are required in a judge. Pleading is one thing; ability to plead effectively, powerfully, no doubt is a very important attribute, but it is not necessarily the quality which should go to make a judge. I venture to say that the solicitor who has been deemed to be sufficiently wise and judicial in his outlook to become a Justice may—not shall—be qualified also to be a judge of the court if he has shown sound judgment in his administration of the law in the lower court. Deputy Redmond tried, I think, to show that there was some analogy between the position of the cabinet-maker and the joiner, two trades which were apart and distinct, but have been for some considerable time amalgamated as organised bodies. They are in the position that I would like under this amendment the two branches of the legal profession to be placed in. The cabinet-maker and the joiner, both employed for special work, if you like, by the same employer, may if they show special aptitude for a higher quality of work such as foremanship, be appointed as a foreman. The employer is quite at liberty to promote either to the higher office, provided that he shows aptitude. That is what I desire in this amendment. I want to remove that demarcation which I am sure Deputy Good would like to see removed from certain trades. If the aptitude is shown the judgment is proved. Although one man has chosen one path in the earlier days and another has chosen another, both have been allowed to accept office and act as Justices in those questions, very important very often, which the poor average citizen is affected by, and if they show sound judgment they should be entitled on equal terms to advance to the higher Court. I am sure the solicitors in the Dáil and the solicitors outside will not be thankful for the suggestion from Deputy Magennis that they are in the position to the barrister that the plumber's labourer is to the plumber. But really that is not the point. The point is that you have solicitors eligible for appointment to a certain position in the Judiciary and presumed to have the qualities worthy for that appointment who are then prevented from advancement. It seems to me that the case to be made is why there should be such a debarring. It is the business, I would suggest, of those who have promoted the Bill in its present form to justify that exclusion. We have not heard whether the Government is prepared to accept the amendment or not, and I will ask the Dáil not to be misled by the argument of Deputies Redmond and Magennis that this must necessarily entail an amalgamation of the professions. That is a proposition that can be argued and discussed on its merits when it is brought forward. That is not the proposition in the amendment. The amendment is confined to the position of District Justices who have presumably been qualified for that office. I ask that they shall not be disqualified for promotion.
I think the amendment put forward by Deputy Johnson is a very fair attempt to help solicitors, as a body, a little on the upward path. I cannot agree with the arguments put forward by Deputy Redmond and Deputy Magennis. Naturally, in the first place they are biassed, and in the second place they confine their attack to one remark made by Deputy Johnson, that he would like to see the two professions amalgamated. That was the principal object of attack by both Deputies, and got away, to my mind, from the real point. The first thing that struck me on reading Section 44 was that the solicitors had got—at least those of them who had been through the ranks of the District Justices—a chance of further promotion, not as Deputy Redmond said, to the higher office, but only to the Circuit Court. I think if Deputies will look again at Section 44 they will see that at a first glance it might bear that interpretation—that a District Justice who was a solicitor might be eligible for promotion to the Circuit Court. That is the way it struck me on a first reading. In this case I would ask the Executive to accept Deputy Johnson's amendment, because it is unfair that these solicitors should be placed on equal terms with barristers as District Justices, and then could go no farther, no matter what their record may have been, or how well they had done their work. I think they are entitled to go at least one step farther. There is a further point in reference to Deputy Johnson's amendment, and I suggest that he should add to it, after the word "solicitor," the words "including the time served as District Justice." I mention that because a District Justice can be appointed on six years' standing, but a Circuit Judge must have ten years' standing. You might inflict hardship on a particular District Justice who has only six years' standing, whereas if you count his service as a District Justice towards the ten years that are necessary, then you remove that difficulty.
I protest against the misinterpretation, which I know, of course, is unintentional, by which I am represented as minimising or attempting to disparage the solicitors' profession. I repeat what I said. The solicitors' and the barristers' professions are different. They are wholly diverse occupations. That is not to infer that one is inferior to the other. The last Deputy used the words that the path upward should be made easy for the solicitor. Now what is really at the back of Deputy Johnson's mind? If I may be allowed to interpret what he has not chosen to bring up into a clearer consciousness, is the conception of a judge as the Cadi under the tree— any man of common sense, with considerable experience of life, sanity of judgment, and breadth of view is as well able to be a Judge of the High Court as any other man with the same qualification. Now I might as well profess to be an electrical engineer and practise it because electricity was part of my course in physics for the University examination. It all comes down to this—the fallacy that because a solicitor and a barrister are both lawyers, and as a court of law is dealing with law, therefore, they are both equally fit to function as Judges in a court of law. It is not because the solicitor, as a man and brother, is worse by being a solicitor than if he had been a barrister. It is not because he has less ability and aptitude, or that he got a worse education. It is because the line of life of the avocation which he pursues every day is one that fits him in peculiar fashion for the discharge of certain functions, and the avocation of the barrister fits him for quite other functions. Deputy Johnson does not see that practice before a High Court Judge is the fittest apprenticeship for being on the Bench of the High Court. It is not everyone who understands the laws of evidence, what is admissible to be put in evidence, and what is not. All sorts of delicate and subtle questions arise that do not fall into the every-day work of the solicitor. If a client came to a solicitor and put questions about these things to him he would submit a case to Counsel. It is a most important differentiation of functions. Furthermore, I may mention, incidentally, that a disappointed client may take an action against a solicitor for wrongful conduct of his case. The barrister is immune. There is a reason for that.
Hear, hear.
Deputy Johnson finds he has discovered something dreadful, something that proves the barristers' profession a horrible thing. What is the reason? Every Deputy in the Dáil is immune from prosecution for slander, no matter how slanderous he may become. Why? Because in the public interest it is most desirable the risk should be taken that men would abuse their privilege rather than that the privilege should not exist for the free criticism of public affairs. Similarly there is this differentiation. The point really is this: the special apprenticeship for service on the Bench is got in the practise before the courts. To call it pleading, as Deputy Johnson chose to call it, is to lose sight of the more important part of the work Counsel does.
May I just point out that the clause as it stands allows a Justice who has been a solicitor to be promoted. It reads: "No person shall be appointed a Judge of the Circuit Court who is not at the date of his appointment a practising barrister of ten years' standing at least, or has not been a Recorder or a County Court Judge in Ireland, but service as a Justice of the District Court of Saorstát Eireann shall be deemed practice at the Bar for the purpose of this provision." So that, if a solicitor is appointed to be a Justice, and is a Justice sufficiently long he may be promoted, even as the clause stands.
The only question is whether that service shall be as long in the one case as in the other. Again, all I am asking the Dáil to agree to is to put them on a level in regard to their previous training. If the solicitor who is made a Justice can serve long enough under the clause as it stands, he may be promoted to the High Court, so that the effect of the amendment is not to alter the intentions radically at all. It is quite in consonance with the spirit of this clause. It is only altering a detail, and, therefore, I ask the Dáil to accept it.
I am afraid I cannot allow Deputy Johnson's ingenious interpretation of this Section to go unchallenged. He evidently wants to make out that a number of years in the capacity of a District Justice will render a person a barrister. Unfortunately, I will give a free opinion on that subject, and I do so most readily, because, so far as I understand the law of the matter, no one can be admitted a barrister who has not been called to the Bar.
That is only until this is passed.
In reply to Deputy Johnson, much as I think of this Act and what it proposes to accomplish, I do not think it in any way repeals the rules governing the admission of members to the Bar. It is a very deep and difficult subject which he has just raised, because what a barrister is, and where he derives his status, and what that status carries with it, is a matter which we could debate from now probably until this time to-morrow, but at the same time I think it would be treating the matter too lightly to allow a suggestion to go that this Bill purports to create, by a number of years' service, a member of the Bar. I would like also to draw the attention of the Committee to the real fallacy in Deputy Johnson's reasoning. There are two branches of the legal profession, and of that there is no doubt, no possible doubt whatever; but the two branches are as different as, let me say, a plasterer and a bricklayer. A bricklayer cannot go on with his work and has to call in a plasterer when it comes to plastering, because it is a plasterer's job. What I was anxious to convey was that there is an essential difference, not only in the training, but in the actual subject matter of a barrister's and of a solicitor's life. A client goes to a solicitor and states his case. The solicitor may be somewhat of a lawyer or he may not. A solicitor is very often a good lawyer, but probably the better the lawyer the solicitor is the more anxious will he be to secure counsel's opinion upon a case, because the business of a barrister is, first of all, to know as much law as he can, and it is impossible to carry all law about in one's head; but the next part of his business is to know where to find the law, as Deputy Magennis so well said. A solicitor, one may say, knows a certain amount of law and knows where to find it, but has not the time nor the opportunity to do so. He has to see his clients. He has to go to auctions and he has to look after a hundred and one very profitable things which, unfortunately, poor barristers, by their own very rules, are precluded from doing. Therefore, the two branches are entirely distinct, and as for pleading being an essential weapon in the barrister's armoury, it is nothing of the kind. Why, it is a well known fact that some of the greatest lawyers are the worst pleaders, and vice versa. What a barrister has to do is to discover the law in the archives of the law, in the records in existence. He has to search and research, and he has to have the time to do so, which a solicitor never could have if he were to attend to the other branches of his business. Therefore the experience has been, in these new countries, Canada in particular, and, I believe, also in America, that though they have tried the experiment it has been a colossal failure. In theory it is there, but in practice it is dead. Therefore I would appeal to Deputy Johnson once more, if he is so bent on this amalgamation of two trade unions, let him bring forward his proposal by way of a Bill on some future occasion.
I am afraid I cannot accept the amendment. It is not the intention in the Bill that a person shall qualify by practising as a solicitor only, for appointment to a high judicial position. Two questions are raised. The first is whether there is a strong case on the part of either profession for this particular position of a Circuit Court Judge being left open to the solicitors' profession, or, on the other hand, whether in our judgment it would be in the interests of the administration of justice that a solicitor should be so appointed. Our information is that the solicitors' profession as a whole now accept the view which is in the Bill, and are not making applications for this particular privilege, if you could call it such. It is not a matter upon which I have expert knowledge, and I suppose that persons from either one or the other profession are better able to speak upon it than a layman. It has been put to me that while a solicitor practises—and I suppose the word "pleading" comes in— in a District Justice's Court the same facilities are not provided in the other Courts. That has been the practice up to this, I think. Consequently there was association with the judgments given in the District Justice's Court, but solicitors had not the same opportunity in the other Courts. I presume there are cases in which solicitors might be better judges but I suppose that we cannot at once perfect even our judicial machinery. The main question, as it presents itself to us, is that there is no strong case made by solicitors for this particular amendment, and the case in its favour is one more concerning the amalgamation of the professions. There are, I believe, strong views held on that subject, certainly by one distinguished occupant of the Bench, but I do not think that it has attracted to itself any great support. Consequently it would be an experiment on our part if we were to make that departure, and it does not appear to us to be in the interests of the new system that we should adopt it.
Amendment put and negatived.
I move "in line 13, after the word `but,' to insert the words `in the case of a Barrister'." That gets rid of the ambiguity Deputy Johnson referred to.
Amendment agreed to.
I move "to add at the end of the Section the words ‘provided that in the case of any Recorder or County Court Judge appointed a Judge of the Circuit Court, Section 42 shall not apply'." This is comparatively a small amendment, but it enables the Executive to continue some Recorders in their office. I had great pleasure in listening to the President giving such a glowing testimonial to the Recorder in Dublin. We can say similar things of the Recorder in Cork. What I ask you to do is in the interests of efficiency and economy.
I think the farthest I can go is to have the general question considered if it should not be decided to apply the age limit to existing Justices.
This is not a question of age limits, but if you keep on the existing Recorders it must be at existing salaries. It is a question of enabling the Executive to pay those salaries which will be an economy and thereby you will retain the efficiency of those very able Recorders.
There is nothing in the Act to prevent us keeping on one of those if we so desire.
Section 42 reads:—
"Each Circuit Judge shall receive a salary of £1,500 per annum, and on retirement, after 15 years' service or upwards, or owing to age or permanent infirmity, shall be entitled for his life to a pension amounting to two-thirds of his salary."
Surely no one in possession of his senses would expect a man in receipt of £2,500 a year to work for £1,500 when he is entitled to two-thirds of his salary as a pension.
Section 42 was not put or carried.
Section 42 was put, but the amendment was withdrawn.
If it should be decided to appoint any existing Judge, County Court Judge, or Recorder, it does not affect the salary he is in receipt of at the present moment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question: "That Section 44 as amended stand part of the Bill," put and agreed to.
SECTION 45.
The office of any Circuit Judge may be vacated by writing under his hand, and shall be vacated on his being appointed a Judge of the High Court or of the Supreme Court, and thereupon, or whenever the office of any Circuit Judge shall become vacant a new Circuit Judge shall be appointed in his place. In case of the illness of any Circuit Judge, a deputy may be appointed to act in his place, on the recommendation of the Attorney-General, on such terms as to payment of the deputy out of the salary of the Circuit Judge or otherwise as may be sanctioned by the Minister for Finance, provided however that no one other than a practising Barrister of ten years' standing at least in his profession shall be qualified for appointment as deputy of a Circuit Judge.
I move:
"In line 25, to add after the word ‘appointed' the words ‘by the aforesaid Circuit Judge,' and in the same line to delete the words ‘on the recommendation' and to substitute therefor the words ‘such appointment to be subject to the approval of the Attorney-General'."
This Section deals with the appointment of deputies in the case of the illness of a Circuit Judge, and it may be possible, but it certainly is not inconceivable, that the Judge might put in a bogus plea of illness and take a holiday, leaving the salary of his deputy to be discharged out of the public purse. They have wisely guarded against that, but I do not think the drafters of the Bill have taken into consideration the temperament of the hard-working conscientious Judge who would be reluctant to declare himself ill, and would carry on possibly to die in harness.
I think we should not take away from such a man the privilege of nominating his deputy. I can conceive such a Judge being reluctant to hand over his work to a stranger. If possible I would like to secure this privilege for the Circuit Judge in case of illness. Abuse of the privilege would be provided against by making it a condition that such nomination should be approved by the Attorney-General. It is the general principle that I am interested in. Some regard should be had for the feelings of a deserving public servant when he is ill.
I take it that the Clause would then read, "the deputy may be appointed by the aforesaid Circuit Judge." I think the Deputy will admit that that would be contrary to the Constitution.
Nominate, I should have said.
Well, even that, I am afraid, would scarcely be acceptable.
Perhaps I would be set aside with the assurance that in practice where it was possible a Judge, in the event of illness, would be consulted as to his deputy.
I would undertake in the meantime to examine what the practice had been, but as far as I know no County Court Judge did ever recommend to us the appointment of his substitute or deputy in the case of illness.
I was informed that frequently a Judge, in the event of illness, did recommend his deputy. I can see that the privilege could be abused, and I want to avoid that, but I would be glad if the President would look into the matter.
I will look into the matter by the next Stage, but it certainly is not my information that that applied up to this.
I beg to move—In lines 26 and 27, to delete the words "out of the salary of the Circuit Judge or otherwise." What lies behind this amendment is, I am sure, fairly obvious. "In case of the illness of any Circuit Judge a deputy may be appointed to act in his place on such terms as to payment of the deputy out of the salary of the Circuit Judge or otherwise." Let us consider for a moment what the position of the Circuit Judge will be. Deputy Redmond has already enlarged and I need not follow him, on the very considerable increase, not merely in jurisdiction and consequently in heaviness of work for the Circuit Judge, contrasted with the present County Court Judge, but in regard to the area over which his jurisdiction extends, and consequently the increased number of points at which he shall have to sit. No provision is made in the Bill, though it was suggested in the Judiciary Committee's recommendation, that provision should be made to allow the Circuit Judge the expenses of circuit as at present allowed in the case of the County Court Judge, so that the miserable salary—for without rhetoric at all, it must be called a miserable salary—of £1,500 a year is to be chargeable with the cost of the circuit, and also to be liable to be drawn upon for the remuneration of a deputy, if unfortunately the Circuit Judge falls ill and is absent from his work for any period. I suggest seriously that the circumstances of his work will almost inevitably produce at least one annual illness. The work will occupy him, it is calculated, some ten months of the year. He will have no home. If he is a married man his wife and children will have a home, but it will not be within the ambit of his circuit, and that will be a further cost, by the way, an additional charge upon his revenue. He will be obliged for ten months of the year to spend his life in hotels, a large part of the day in a stuffy and unwholesome courthouse, a large part of the night in trying to digest both law and a hurried meal, such as an hotel would be able to afford, and in these circumstances he is always confronted with the spectre that he must not be ill. If he is ill his position will gradually become so bad that he shall have to retire altogether. The Chief Justice, no doubt, will be notified that he is rendered incapable of discharging his duties.
That £1,500 a year, remember, is not only subject to these charges I have referred to, but has to bear income tax as well. It would be easy to make a lightning calculation and show what the effective value of the income would be. Suppose, as I venture to hope, the Government will see that it is to the interests of the administration of law that this great measure by which they decentralise and create Circuit Courts, should carry with it a larger salary to make it worth while for men of competence to take the positions. When they are up to £2,000 and over in income they come under super-tax, so that after all, even an increase from £1,500 to £2,000 would not benefit them greatly, and all the time they would be obliged to provide themselves with the latest law books, a very considerable item of expenditure. Law books, in a country where the Legislature is so prolific in new legislation as the Saorstát has been, go out of fashion as rapidly as a lady's dress or hat. It is said that if a woman of fashion to-day does not get her new dress delivered by express it will be out of fashion before it reaches her. Law books, which are very expensive because of their limited circulation, go out of date very rapidly, and one must buy the last edition. Some astute lawyer pleading before a Circuit Judge will catch him napping if he is quoting from the edition before the last and is misled. It is true that in the Bill as it stands a provision is made for recommending that the State should bear the cost of this, but it is quite possible that the State might harden its heart. Not all Attorney-Generals are like the present Attorney-General, and in future a Circuit Judge may suffer severely from the decision of an Attorney-General who never knew even the pangs of toothache. I suggest, therefore, that this amendment might be accepted. It is conceivable that it would not add a very great burden to the State, and on the other hand it would serve to ameliorate a position that requires all the amelioration that we can provide.
I wish to support this amendment. It seems to me to be extremely unreasonable to expect that a Judge who becomes ill and has to bear the cost of his illness should, in addition to that expenditure, have to provide for the payment of his substitute. I cannot concede what possible object could be behind this provision unless the idea was, as suggested by Deputy Alton, that the Judge might not be over-conscientious and might wish to take a holiday and have a substitute paid. In that case it would be for the authorities or for the Attorney-General to judge whether the plea were genuine or not. If the illness were not genuine he should get no substitute, but if it is, and if, because of the illness, he has to bear much increased expenditure, I think it is only fair that he should not be called on to pay the salary of a substitute. After all, if the substitute is a good man he will require almost, if not the same, salary as that paid to the Judge himself. If that were done, or even if a considerable proportion of the Judge's salary were taken to pay the substitute, it would be a very great hardship indeed on a man who was absent owing to illness.
In support of this amendment, I do not think that any great business concern of any standing insists upon its servant paying for a substitute during a genuine illness, and I think it would be casting a serious reflection on the character and integrity of our future judges if we were to allow these words to remain in the Section. As far as safeguards are concerned one has always the doctor's certificate to fall back upon, and a doctor's certificate can be produced, and as we know that cannot be produced except in a genuine case. Therefore, I do not think for a moment that it will be suggested that the future judges will misdemean themselves to such an extent as would seem to be implied by the words in this Section in seeking to safeguard against it, and I would appeal to the Government to allow this amendment to stand.
There is a rather more important aspect of this, I think, which would induce me to support the amendment. The clause as it stands reads "on such terms as to payment of the deputy out of the salary of the Circuit Judge, or otherwise, as may be sanctioned by the Minister for Finance." The effect of that is to bring a political Minister into a position of authority over the judge, and possibly to make selections and to give favour to one as compared with another. He may sanction in the case of one sick judge, and he may refuse to sanction in the case of another sick judge, and that places him in the position to patronise one in contrast with another, to give favours which should not be allowed, and I think that fact alone is overwhelming in the case for the deletion of these words.
When I first read this I was opposed to it, because I thought of the taxpayer's interest, and I thought it was going to place an additional burden on his shoulders. I have thought it out since, and I am not at all sure that it is not designed to save the taxpayer. Take the case of a judge who was severely ill, say, for a year. If under the Bill as it stands he had to pay a substitute he would presumably have to pay the whole of his year's salary to him. If, on the other hand, at the beginning of his illness, he sent in a certificate that he was very seriously ill and wished to retire he would only forfeit one-third of his salary, and the taxpayer would have to pay his pension for the rest of his life, so that, on the whole, I think this amendment could be supported even in the interests of the taxpayers.
I am sorry I must disagree with the Deputies on this question. It resolves itself into a question of insurance, whether the taxpayer is to be called on to pay the insurance of the judges against illness, or whether they should be called upon to insure themselves. If you once adopt the principle that the taxpayer is to insure any official against illness you are proceeding on the wrong road. We are here in the interests of the taxpayers and not of the judges.
I would like to support the amendment. I think it is an improvement on the Section. As the Section stands it seems to me to lower the status of the judge very much. Apart altogether from the question of remuneration, it is an unnatural thing to say that a man in the position of a judge is penalised because he is subject to an illness. I think that the man who is appointed as a Circuit Court Judge should be secured and insured in his position and emoluments.
I am not altogether satisfied with the case made. We must examine it from two angles. First of all, it is put up that because the salary is £1,500 a year he cannot possibly afford to be ill—and when we say ill we must understand that there are various classes of illnesses—and, consequently, if we give way on this, and that we are subsequently asked to reconsider the salaries, those so concerned get two benefits instead of one. I would suggest that if we are going to consider the salaries, or if it will be put up to us to consider them, in respect of Circuit Court Judges, that this matter at any rate should not be decided now, but should wait until then. I think it should be solved very soon.
In that case, with permission, I withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
When is it likely that the question of salaries will come up for consideration?
I think it is likely to come up on the Report stage. The Minister for Finance, as such, in my experience never considered any question on a political issue. The political side of a question never appeals to the Minister for Finance. As a matter of fact, the ordinary practice in regard to a matter of this sort is that it filters through the Department before it reaches the Minister, and the recommendation is made by persons who never consider the policy of the question at all. It never enters into it. If it were to be coloured by politics at all the man would not be fit to be a Minister. I can assure the Deputy he can disabuse his mind of any bias in that respect.
The President is quite astray if he thinks for a moment that I am suggesting that the Minister for Finance is going to be influenced by politics or political questions. I am not thinking of the Minister for Finance, that we know, but this Bill will deal with the future, and politics may not enter into the matter in the slightest degree, but if there is to be discretion in the Ministry of Finance, if there is to be discretion in the political side of the State as to the payment of a judge, that is a very great weakness and places the judge in a position of subordination to the Minister for the time being, whoever that may be.
Now, there should be no discretion; if there is to be payment for a substitute out of the salary, let it be applicable in all cases, but let there be no discretion in the matter because the discretion as to the amount of salary or allowance or bonus or gifts in regard to judges, if it happens to remain with a Ministry, opens the way to a possibility of favour being shown, and that should not be thought of as a possibility. I hope, if this matter is not going to be decided now, that portion of the Section ought certainly to be deleted. My plea is not on the main question, but on the question of discretion, and I think the discretion should not lie with the Minister or Ministry at any time.
The Ministry of Finance in this case is a different institution to any others. The Minister for Finance has got to have a veto on certain outgoings. He should. It is our experience that in this matter of illness it is usually traded on unless there is some corrective. Granted that clause gets in here, there is no reason why it should be inserted elsewhere. I have no objection, nor has anybody I have ever heard of, to paying for bona fide illness, and I am not satisfied where provision is made for the payment of an illness allowance that it has been a bona fide illness at all, from my experience of administration.
The Judge is not a servant of the State.
He is a servant of the State.
Not in the actual sense, a servant of the State.
Whether he likes it or not any person occupying a public office, or performing public duties, is a servant of the State. He is paid by the State, and the State has a right to see that its money is well spent.
In view of what the President has stated, would it not be better when considering the matter again upon Report, if the fear that he has expressed, that claims of illness may be taken advantage of, should be definitely and specifically provided against?
On a point of order, I beg to say I withdraw the amendment.
I understand the Deputy is speaking on the main motion.
It is only by general agreement that an amendment can be withdrawn. It seems to me that it is very desirable that this matter should be thoroughly discussed.
I understood the amendment was withdrawn.
It could not be without general leave.
Not without agreement. If a Deputy desires to put an amendment and then desires to withdraw it, and some other Deputy desires to pursue that amendment, it is entirely within that Deputy's right to pursue the amendment if he so wishes.
At the time I intimated my intention to withdraw the amendment, no one protested.
The amendment was not put from the chair.
I am dealing with this matter, not because I desire to pursue this amendment, but because the President has stated he will re-consider the matter. I suggest it could then be re-considered in regard to the question of salaries. He has further stated, what everybody knows to be true, that pleas of illness have been taken advantage of. In that case, would it not be better to make specific provision against such advantage being taken of pleas of illness, rather than put a clause in to this effect which, as it stands now in the Bill, means that a person holding so high a position as that of a Circuit Court Judge will be in a worse position than a clerk in an ordinary mercantile house who, if he is ill and if his employer has ascertained that his illness is genuine, will still receive payment of his salary. That is the case with a clerk in a mercantile house, and it is at least just in the case of a Circuit Court Judge. Let the employer in each case ascertain that the illness is a genuine one, and then continue to bear what it is only equitable that the employer should bear, the salary that has been incurred.
Perhaps on the Report Stage Deputy Figgis will propose an amendment to the effect that no Circuit Court Judge shall fall ill unless with the previous permission of the Attorney-General?
I would like just to draw attention to Article 68 of the Constitution:—"The age of retirement, the remuneration and pension of such Judges on retirement and the declaration to be taken by them on appointment shall be prescribed by law; such remuneration may not be diminished during their continuance in office." Now that implies a definite amount of remuneration to be fixed by law. It does not allow, I submit, of chance reductions at the discretion of any political officer. It seems to me that the intention of that clause in the Constitution is, that the remuneration shall be a fixed sum known, and that no authority within the State, without an alteration in the Constitution, shall be allowed to diminish the amount of that remuneration during their continuance in office. I ask the Dáil whether, in view of that clause in the Constitution, this Section should be allowed to pass in its present form?
Unfortunately for the argument the article in the Constitution refers to the Judges in the High Court and the Supreme Court.
"And to all other Courts established in pursuance of this Constitution."
Article 68 says: "The age of retirement, the remuneration and the pension of such Judges on retirement and the declarations to be taken by them on appointment shall be prescribed by law; such remuneration may not be diminished during their continuance in office. The terms of the appointment of the Judges of such other Courts as may be created shall be prescribed by law." This Article refers to the Supreme Court and the High Court. What is applicable here is the terms of appointment of the Judges of such other Courts as may be created, shall be prescribed by law. There is a general provision with regard to Judges of the inferior Courts.
I again would submit that the intention regarding the independence of the Judges is to apply to all Judges, and it is just as important, possibly even more important, that in the case of Judges who are dealing with cases which affect the common people more than the propertied minority, the cases, shall I say, of the majority of the people are more likely to be affected by the administration of justice in the lower Courts than in the higher Courts. If a clause relating to the independence of Judges in the Constitution is necessary for Judges of the High Courts to preserve their independence of the Executive, then even more necessary is it a clause for Judges in those Courts to which a larger number of people are brought into contact, so that they should be equally independent of the Executive. The Section of the Constitutional provision which makes the remuneration a fixed sum ought to have equal weight in respect to the lower Courts.
Would the Government take time to consider that amendment?
They have promised to do so.
I must say that I have never heard of this particular clause interfering with the independence of the County Court Judges.
There has not been the confidence in the County Court Judges hitherto that we desire there should be. That has been argued here several times. It certainly has been the belief that the Judges were influenced by the Executive in the past. Now, this is one way whereby they may be influenced by the Executive, and it is an extra safeguard, and it seems to me a very important safeguard to achieve the end for which the Bill itself was put before us, to remove the possibility of doubt in the matter that the administration of the law in the future should not be suspect.
On a point of order, I would like to have your ruling. Deputy Captain Redmond and I, who tabled this amendment, are quite satisfied with the statement made by the President, and desire to withdraw the amendment. If the Deputies seek to press the amendment, can they do so without moving the amendment, and can they move the amendment without giving notice?
On a point of order, may I submit that once an amendment is moved it is the property of the Dáil, and only by general leave can it be withdrawn. Now, the only question that has arisen which has urged me to keep this matter open was the promise of the Minister, who said he was only going to deal with the question of whether, in fixing the salaries at a later stage, he would deal with the possibilities of this being deducted. I am dealing with the discretion of the Ministry, and if the Minister will promise that that also will be reconsidered, I am prepared to agree to the withdrawal of the amendment.
I am afraid I can give no undertaking.
The Dáil divided: Tá, 9; Níl, 53.
Tá
- Tomás MacEoin.
- Tomás de Nógla.
- Tomás O Conaill.
- Aodh O Cúlacháin.
- Liam O Daimhín.
- Eamon O Dubhghaill.
- Domhnall O Muirgheasa.
- Tadhg P.O Murchadha.
- Pádraig O hOgáin (An Clár).
Níl
- Richard H. Beamish.
- Earnán de Blaghd.
- Séamus Breathnach.
- Seoirse de Bhulbh.
- Próinsias Bulfin.
- Séamus de Búrca.
- John Conlon.
- Henry Coyle.
- Louis J. Dalton.
- Máighréad Ní Choileáin Bean Uí
- Dhrisceóil.
- Patrick J. Egan.
- Seán de Faoite.
- Henry J. Finlay.
- John Good.
- John Hennigan.
- William Hewat.
- Conor Hogan.
- Tomás Mac Artúir.
- Seosamh Mac Bhrighde.
- Alasdair Mac Cába.
- Domhnall Mac Cárthaigh.
- Liam T. Mac Cosgair.
- Pilib Mac Cosgair.
- Séamus Mac Cosgair.
- Maolmhuire Mac Eochadha.
- Pádraig Mac Fadáin.
- Seán P. Mac Giobúin.
- Risteárd Mac Liam.
- Seoirse Mac Niocaill.
- Liam Mag Aonghusa.
- Pádraig S. Mag Ualghairg.
- Patrick McKenna.
- Martin M. Nally.
- John T. Nolan.
- Peadar O hAodha.
- Micheál O hAonghusa.
- Christóir O Broin.
- Seán O Bruadair.
- Próinsias O Cathail.
- Séamus N.O Dóláin.
- Micheál O Dubhghaill.
- Peadar S.O Dubhghaill.
- Pádraig O Dubhghaill.
- Eamon S.O Dúgáin.
- Micheál R.O hIfearnáin.
- Aindriú O Láimhín.
- Fionán O Loingsigh.
- Thomas O'Mahony.
- Séamus O Murchadha.
- Seán M.O Súilleabháin.
- Andrew O'Shaughnessy.
- Seán Priomhdhaill.
- Liam Thrift.
Amendment declared lost.
Question "That Section 45 stand part of the Bill," put and agreed to.
I move that you report Progress, and ask leave to sit again.
I beg to second.
Motion put and agreed to.