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Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 22 Jul 1924

Vol. 8 No. 17

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE. - VOTE 55—ARMY.

I move:—

That a sum not exceeding £2,677,145 be granted to complete the sum necessary to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1925, to defray the cost of the Army.

I circulated two documents giving notes on Army Estimates, and some other particulars in another form dealing with Army organisation. Table B does not, in the present circumstances, exactly represent what the state of affairs is. There is provision there for a General and two Major-Generals. I think there is a mistake in that. The number of Major-Generals is wrong. I cannot say what the exact number is, but I should say it is very much more than two. There is a mistake so far as the number is concerned, because that table was made up some time ago, and at that time General MacMahon was not gazetted. His name should have been gazetted towards the end of the week. I would also like to refer to item AA—gratuities payable on demobilisation to certain officers with prolonged, including pre-Truce, service. That amounts to £25,000. Although the revised scheme did not affect that particular amount, it will be in the recollection of Deputies that general demobilisation took place on the 7th March, and that the sum of £25,000 would be unequal to the charges that would be made in respect of that service. There is also item (U) in relation to compensation for damage or injury. I anticipate that that amount will be exceeded.

Apart from those two publications which have been issued, there is the general question which has been referred to here very often—the Army accounts. I think I mentioned before, in dealing with that matter, that apart from the old accounts there were representations being made daily for payments of one sort or other of accounts going on for a very considerable period. The number of old accounts still to be disposed of is 1,600, and of these nearly 1,200 have not yet been certified, mainly owing to the fact that the officers responsible have been demobilised and information regarding the accounts is not available. Arrangements are, however, being made whereby a claimant may make a statutory declaration substantiating the genuineness of the account. The remaining 400 cases to be disposed of are being dealt with as rapidly as possible. Deputies will recognise that that is terminology that has been used in this connection fairly regularly. Some of these claims are for balances of previous accounts, and investigation of them sometimes involves the examination of monthly accounts for two years in order to establish whether the balances were legitimate reductions for overcharges. Many of the accounts require very close scrutiny, as there is no doubt advantage has been taken of the absence of records to furnish grossly exaggerated, and even fictitious accounts. We have had some representations from areas in the country to the effect that accounts rendered are fictitious. This is one letter that has come in:—

Things have come to a nice pass in this town. Mr. "A." gets a large amount for billetting soldiers, which was planned by Mr. "B." Is this the way the ratepayers have to give their money? If inquiries were made in this case some people would be in jail.

Another letter reads:—

I was in charge of the troops in —— on two dates which are mentioned. I do not remember any troops staying in this house. In my opinion the claim is a concoction.

Quite a number of letters have come in drawing attention to the fact that there have been either gross exaggerations or that accounts have been fabricated. While Deputies may at times feel that this particular branch is slow in dealing with accounts, the fact is that very considerable care has got to be taken or the taxpayers' money may be very easily spent to no useful purpose, and not in respect of legitimate charges.

As to the other item with regard to the Supplementary Grant, something like 1,400 claims have been dealt with up to date, representing a sum running into very close on £120,000. There are some cases still to be dealt with, but the original figure will not be exceeded. In these cases, too, there are complications by reason of the fact that quite a number of references which are necessary are those of demobilised officers, and it is not easy in certain cases to get correct information. In some cases the information is very contradictory, and involves, in consequence, considerable delay in getting at the actual truth of the matter. Beyond that I do not think the Army Estimate calls for any remarks from me, but should any question be raised and I have the information at hand, I shall be very pleased to supply it.

Perhaps the President would answer a question with reference to Army organisation. A certain scheme was being put into force in March last. It was founded upon certain principles of organisation and control. That scheme, I understand, has been somewhat radically changed, and perhaps the President would be able to say what are the principal points in regard to which a change has taken place.

I am afraid that would require a somewhat more technical expert than I am to go into it. It did appear to me when the original scheme was proposed that it was rather top-heavy, and that the organisation through the country was scarcely sufficiently big to warrant such a very large organisation at Headquarters. The new scheme in effect has much the same characteristics as the old scheme with that particular difference. Some criticism was passed here previously about the extra authority being given to G.O.C's. I am informed that whatever strengthening of authority there was, there is no weakening, so far as discipline, control, or administration is concerned. The position of the G.O.C. Commands in relation to the Ministry in the present scheme is exactly the same as in the old scheme, where it is stipulated that G.O.C.'s are responsible for the proper conduct and efficiency of all services in their districts, so far as concerns such duties as the distribution of troops; defence of posts occupied by troops; troops and stores; conduct of operations; intelligence; training of the troops; studying and advising on the military situation; supervision of all military matters; preparation of reports, and any other duties which may be defined by the Ministry. There is a difference in this respect that the G.O.C. is now given machinery to enable him more effectively to discharge the duties for which he is made responsible in both schemes. It has been found in this new scheme that there is no necessity for a Major, in addition to the Colonel, in each of the nine Brigades, and the military authorities are satisfied that the efficiency of the Brigade will not suffer in consequence. In the original scheme there was a Major in each Brigade; there is no Major under the new scheme, so far as the Brigade is concerned.

I feel very great diffidence in discussing the Army on this Estimate, but I feel that it is my duty to make one or two remarks with regard to it. The scheme of organisation has been radically changed, and, as far as I can judge from the headings that are supplied in this book that has been issued recently, I am perfectly correct when I say that the scheme provides us with an Army that cannot move as an Army without creating the most utter confusion to the people that are responsible for it. It gives us an Army, no reasonably large portion of which could move as a piece of military organisation without creating utter confusion. It does not put you in the position of facing a definite military problem. Supposing it was found necessary to send for one of your Generals and to say to him, "A force of 600 men has shown up outside Enniscorthy, and are apparently going to hold together and give battle in regular battle formation. I want to make you responsible for dealing with them." He could not tell you what particular units of the Army he would want to take in order to deal with that situation. Your Army is not organised into what can be readily recognised as, or what are recognisable units of force that would enable a soldier to deal with the military problem that is involved. It is not organised in a way that would allow you to expand it in any emergency without creating confusion. The lines of organisation, and the principles of organisation, are such that you could not reduce your Army without involving confusion and further reorganisation. The details at the bottom of that statement of mine are rather technical, but I am quite convinced from an analysis of the paper, that that is so.

I am also convinced that it does not give your senior soldiers a chance of developing as men who could become technical soldiers, who could size up military problems in a soldierly way. That is a very serious criticism of our Army organisation, but, I feel that it is necessary I should make that statement to the President. That is my opinion on the scheme as changed and that is in our hands in a certain form at present. I want to draw the attention of Deputies to what can be deduced from the organisation of the engineers. If, as I suggest, a certain force found its way into Wexford, and that we were in the position that any bridge across the Slaney had been destroyed, and that we had a force below Enniscorthy who held the upper reaches of the river, there is no unit in this organisation that we could call upon to throw three or four bridges across the upper waters of the Slaney, if we wanted to do so. If the President has any details to show that my argument is incorrect, I think we ought to hear them.

The organisation, apart from the Commands, is made up of nine brigades. There are two in each of the Commands, with the exception of the Eastern Command, in which there are three. There are two brigades at the Curragh. I take it that these two brigades would be available for an emergency such as Deputy General Mulcahy has mentioned. Of course, it might take some time for them to head off the troops in Enniscorthy, but they would be available for that.

Perhaps the President will say what a brigade comprises.

I am not certain, but, I think a brigade comprises three battalions, and that there are 27 battalions, three battalions being in each brigade. I might admit that Deputy General Mulcahy would be right if the facts were not somewhat different from what he states. I think he said that the scheme does not put us in the position of facing a definite military problem. If there was a force of 600 men at Enniscorthy who would give battle, it might take some time, with the best organised institution—even if we were at full strength—to be able to throw out from neighbouring places, such as Clonmel or Kilkenny, a force to meet these men. The Deputy went on to say that the scheme is not organised to allow of expansion in an emergency, and that we could not reduce the Army without confusion. As a matter of fact, we are in this position at the moment that the Army is not up to strength, and as far as I am aware, there is no confusion. I take it that when the Army would be at full strength it would be something like 19,000. There would be no interference with its efficiency. The proposal was that as brigades would be trained at the Curragh they would replace brigades in the various Commands, and that during the 12 months every officer in the Army would go through the School of Instruction at the Curragh and pass an examination. I do not know whether it is a qualifying or competitive examination, but, at any rate, it would necessitate passing one or the other to qualify for whatever commission he would get from the Executive Council.

There is a great difference between a reduced army and incomplete units.

It seems to me that talking on this Vote at this hour is rather wasteful, and that the Minister should move to report progress. Before going very far into the discussion, I would like to have from the Minister, some indication, in this year 1924, when one may look forward to a cessation of conflict, and a period of civil peace, what is in the mind of the Ministry with regard to the purpose of this Army.

In the re-organisation scheme they must have had some picture in their mind as to what the Army was intended to be used for. Is it to repel an invader from overseas, is it to repel an invader from across the present border, is it to repel or to suppress internal trouble, or is it an elaborate police force armed, or what is it? I think that an explanation is due to us as to the principles that have been attempted to be applied in the organisation of the Army, either the original organisation or the revised organisation. As I see it, being a very ignorant man in these matters, unless we know the purpose or at least the main purpose for which this military machine is supposed to be used, we are not in a position to estimate to any degree, even as ignorant men, whether it is likely to be efficient for the purpose. I would have expected that the Minister, in introducing an Estimate of this kind, would have elaborated somewhat what was in his mind. He is asking for a very large sum of money to provide an Army of 20,000 men. What, I ask, does he want them to do? How is he going to train them? Is it for guerilla warfare, is it in massed battalions or what? Are they to be organised in massed battalions for, say, oversea services? I am sure the Minister will say "no." Then let him tell us what the Army is to be used for. That, at least, I think, is due to us. We have been told in the past, since we began to discuss Army Estimates, that the purpose of this Army was to suppress internal enemies in the State. That was the contention, and that was the use to which the Army was put. Now, I ask, is the purpose changed, or is it only intended to meet the possibility of similar activities in the future, or is it to be maintained for any other purpose? Is the Army organised for the purpose of suppressing internal troubles? If so, is this the best kind of organisation for that purpose? These are questions that will at once arise, and I at least hoped that we would have had some enlightenment upon them before we went on to the discussion of the Estimates in detail. I hope that, even still, the Minister will enlighten us on these matters.

That is about the easiest question I could be asked: What is the Army for? I think most people realise what it is for. A Defence Force can be for only one purpose—to meet any National emergency that may arise. That may arise internally. We have had experience of that. It did arise internally before by reason of the smallness of its numbers, to some extent, and perhaps also because certain people who thought they could carry out their bluff had to be undeceived with regard to that. Now, this State must be defended either from external aggression or from internal aggression, and the experiences of the last two years do not, in my opinion, justify such a reduction of the Defence Forces as might invite anything in the nature of a repetition of that particular experiment. Within the last twelve months people who made speeches referred to the fact—some of them constitutionally-minded—that they are "not yet demobilised." Well, if they were to say that they had been demobilised, it would not have had any more effect on me. The fact is that some of them think that their game of bluff may yet again be experimented, and if it is, it is not with a hastily mobilised force that one can meet them with the least possible expense. An efficient military machine will, I think, for some time to come, at any rate, be a national necessity here. The efficiency of a military machine in a country like this depends upon many things. To some extent its efficiency is seriously impaired in this country by reason of the many posts that it has to occupy. I think that Deputy General Mulcahy would admit that whenever, during the last twelve or eighteen months, he drew in soldiers from particular posts, that very many representations were made to him that these posts ought to be left there. Now, it seriously interferes with the discipline of a military force to have a number of scattered posts in various parts of the country, and the idea of the policy, as far as the Army establishment is concerned, certainly for this year, and possibly for next year, should be to have an exceedingly efficient military machine, capable of being used at the shortest possible notice, trained to arms, trained in discipline, and trained in efficiency and a credit to the nation. Young States in every part of the world, from the earliest periods in history, required Defence Forces. We are no different to the rest of them, highly civilised as we are, and with a civilisation extending over many centuries which, I hope, we will continue. But I hope that the civilisation we will have experience of in the future will be an improvement upon the civilisation of the last couple of years.

I move, A Chinn Comhairle, that you do now report progress.

I am quite agreeable, but may I say this to Deputies, and I think it would meet with approval if we took a vote of the Dáil with the Whips off, that we should make a real earnest attempt to adjourn on Friday. We have made two or three attempts already, and have not been successful, although some of them were very earnest. It would be necessary to get through the Appropriation Bill on Friday, and even then it would be necessary to return one day next week in the event of any amendments being made to Bills in the Seanad or in the event of any recommendation in connection with the Appropriation Bill. We have met now for the best part of two years, and I do not think that any legislature in the world has worked so hard in that two years. We have had a great deal of work to do, and I think it would be in the interest of Deputies of all parties that there should be this Recess at the earliest possible moment.

I take it that that is agreed.

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