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Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Thursday, 13 May 1926

Vol. 15 No. 14

PROTECTION OF THE COMMUNITY (SPECIAL POWERS) BILL, 1926—THIRD STAGE.

The Dáil went into Committee on Bill.
Section 1 agreed to.
SECTION 2.

I move amendment 1:—

Before sub-section (2) to insert a new sub-section as follows:—

"Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorise the making of any regulations imposing any form of compulsory military service or industrial conscription, nor shall any regulation made under this Act make it an offence for any person or persons to take part in a strike or peacefully to persuade any other person or persons to take part in a strike."

The amendments I have put down are intended to prevent the use of powers under this Act other than those indicated by the Minister. Inasmuch as the Bill is based upon similar legislation in Great Britain—copied in Northern Ireland—and inasmuch as it leaves out certain provisions which are embodied in the British Act and which are important, I have sought to insert these provisions, not exactly in the language of the other Act but with no material alteration. I think the Minister will probably agree to have these amendments inserted. The amendment I now move is embodied in the British Act. It would be unwise to allow regulations to be made— though those regulations are subject to the consideration of the Dáil—which would have the effect of repealing the existing law.

There is this point with regard to the difference between the Bill before the Dáil and the British Act—that the Bill before the Dáil was definitely limited so as to have to do merely with, and to ensure the due supply and distribution of, the essentials of life. I do not think there is anything in the context of the Bill which would lead anybody to suppose that there is any power given to formulate regulations, say, to make it an offence for any person or persons to take part in a strike or to persuade peacefully any other person or persons to take part in a strike. This Bill, taken in comparison with the British Act, has definitely been combed of any provision which would seem to indicate that there was any purpose of that kind intended. Inasmuch as the British Act has provision of that kind, and inasmuch as there is no intention of having regulations under this present Bill dealing with any of those things, there is no great point in not having the section put in. But I want to point out the reason for any section of that sort being omitted—that everything that seemed to indicate any interference with people taking part in a strike or peacefully persuading any other person to take part in a strike had been definitely combed out of this Bill, so as to make it completely and entirely one for the regulation and supply of commodities and their distribution. There is no great matter in having the provision in, but the reason why it was omitted in the first instance should be stated.

It has not been possible, in the time given, to examine the Bill with the closeness that a Bill of this kind should be examined. But it would be possible, when powers of this kind are given to ensure the supply and distribution of the essentials of life, to restrict accumulation and to regulate and control prices, to make regulations —I am not saying there is any likelihood of it—of a much more drastic kind than are at present contemplated. When powers of this kind are given, it is surprising how widely they can be used and stretched in the use. It is desirable that the Act itself should be limited in purpose to the provision of essentials. There are, of course, certain people who would like to take advantage of powers of this kind, and it is undesirable to give that power, inasmuch as this Bill is not for a present emergency. It is a Bill that will have permanence, and it is only the proclamations under it that will be temporary. The Bill will be always there, and a Bill empowering the Ministry to make regulations should have the limitations that I have submitted in the form of amendments.

Does the Minister propose to accept the amendment?

The Minister spoke against the amendment, as far as I know. I am certainly against the amendment. I think it would alter the character of the measure. It would indicate that there was something in the nature of what Deputy Johnson has said—that is, that we intended to take precautions against a strike, or something of that kind. That is not the intention. The intention is to have an empowering Bill. I do not believe that under the Bill it would be possible, by any stretch of the imagination, to have a regulation imposing any form of compulsory military service or industrial conscription or to make it an offence for a person to take part in a strike or peacefully to persuade any other person or persons to take part in a strike.

Would the President read paragraph E, Section 2?

"Conferring on such persons (whether in the service or not in the service of the State) as the Executive Council shall think proper, such powers and authorities for the carrying out and enforcement of the regulations as the Executive Council shall think proper." I do not know that it would be possible to read into that anything in the nature of a power to impose any form of compulsory military service or industrial conscription.

If the Executive Council should think it proper, they could do anything under that paragraph. They could confer on any person any kind of authority, and that person could act on that authority.

They can confer upon them an authority, but it would not be possible for them to impose compulsory military service without an Act of the Oireachtas.

Quite true.

"Conferring" and "obliging" are two very different terms. I think that this would entirely alter the character of the Bill, that it would create much the same complications as the other measure that has been referred to, and that was not the intention. This is an empowering and enabling section; it would really carry out what is in the key-note of the Bill, that is, in the Preamble. If it were necessary to put in this I would have no objection, but I do not believe it is necessary.

Would the President accept the second half of the amendment?

I do not believe that any court would hold that the regulations made under this Bill could override any rights or authority that are guaranteed at present, and I believe that the right to strike is in the law; I never heard that it was not. But that any regulation that could be made would take away that right is certainly a revelation to me.

I am not able to understand the meaning of these enactments. If we authorise the Executive Council to do anything that the Executive Council thinks proper to achieve a certain desirable end, that gives the Executive Council authority to do things against what, by implication or by common law, are rights. The right to strike may be guaranteed, but it is by practice and judgments of the courts rather than by statute, and if we pass an Act authorising the Minister to make regulations conferring powers on persons to do anything which the Executive Council thinks proper, it might well limit the rights of individuals.

The way to view it properly is to anticipate what has already happened in another place—a general strike. We do not anticipate any such thing. We did not anticipate any such thing when we were introducing this measure. If we were to-anticipate it we would require an Act which would enable the Executive Council of the day to deal with a situation of that kind. It would be a situation of sufficient magnitude to require a special Act dealing with the special circumstance. That circumstance has not arisen; I have not the faintest fear that it is likely to arise. I do not see anything that would give rise to it, and in consequence I do not see that there is any danger to anticipate any such power being exercised, and I do not believe that any power could be exercised under this by regulation which would deal with a situation of that sort.

If I understood Deputy Johnson correctly, I am to take it from him that the right to strike is something sacred. It is no such thing.

This is the danger we are thinking of.

There are many strikes, strikes which are inimical to the welfare of the community and the State, which would have to be put down with a strong hand. Take, for instance, the amendment—"peacefully to persuade any other person or persons." If you inserted that amendment could not a person approach the police, for instance, and ask them to go out on a sympathetic strike? It might be called peaceful persuasion, but I would call it sedition.

What about the Pay-No-Rates campaign?

There was never such a campaign, and this brings me to another point. If, for instance, income tax payers, in opposition to the Minister for Finance, were to form an organisation and call a strike against the payment of income tax, do you mean to say that the Government would stand powerless and not pass emergency legislation to deal with the situation?

For instance, a sympathetic strike in the Civil Service could not be tolerated, and yet in a grave national emergency, if we were to accept Deputy Johnson's amendment, there is nothing to prevent the civil servants or the police going out on strike in sympathy and thus utterly paralysing the whole administration of affairs in the country. I submit that the right to strike is not a sacred thing and that it is a question of expediency. We tolerate the principle that an individual may withdraw his labour or service, but to make that unlimited is not desirable in the interests of the community.

Perhaps it might be well for the Deputy who has just spoken to read the amendment.

I have read it.

"Nothing in this Act shall be construed to alter the making of any regulations imposing any form of compulsory military service or industrial conscription..." Now the Deputy has stated my case and absolutely proved what I am contending for. In two years time the Deputy will be Minister for Justice.

Or a judge.

He will go through his course as Minister for Justice before he will arrive at a judgeship.

That would be a national emergency.

It might be the occasion for a revolution. The statement of the Deputy does exhibit the existence of a state of mind in the community or in sections of the community which makes it requisite to be very careful in handing over powers to the Executive. If the Deputy were in the position of Minister for Justice and he made regulations in the form of his speech just now, then I submit that it would be a proof that this Dáil, in passing this Bill without conditions of this kind, had been very negligent of its responsibilities. I say that the Deputy has proved the necessity for my amendment.

Question put.
The Committee divided: Tá, 12; Níl, 45.

Tá.

  • Seán Buitléir.
  • John Daly.
  • Séamus Eabhróid.
  • Tomás Mac Eoin.
  • Tomás de Nógla.
  • William Norton.
  • Tomás O Conaill.
  • Aodh O Cúlacháin.
  • Eamon O Dubhghaill.
  • Domhnall O Muirgheasa.
  • Tadhg O Murchadha.
  • Pádraig O hOgáin (An Clár).

Níl.

  • Earnán Altún.
  • Earnán de Blaghd.
  • Séamus Breathnach.
  • Seoirse de Bhulbh.
  • John J. Cole
  • Bryan R. Cooper.
  • Máighréad Ní Choileáin Bean
  • Uí Dhrisceóil.
  • James Dwyer.
  • Osmond Grattan Esmonde.
  • Seán de Faoite.
  • Desmond Fitzgerald.
  • John Good.
  • Thomas Hennessy.
  • John Hennigan.
  • William Hewat.
  • Connor Hogan.
  • Seosamh Mac a' Bhrighde.
  • Liam Mac Cosgair.
  • Séamus Mac Cosgair.
  • Seán MacCurtain.
  • Maolmhuire Mac Eochadha.
  • Pádraig Mac Fadáin.
  • Patrick McGilligan.
  • Seoirse Mac Niocaill.
  • Liam Mac Sioghaird.
  • Liam Mag Aonghusa.
  • Pádraig Mag Ualghairg.
  • Martin M. Nally.
  • John T. Nolan.
  • Peadar O hAodha.
  • Parthalán O Conchubhair.
  • Eoghan O Dochartaigh.
  • Séamus O Dóláin.
  • Mícheál O Dubhghaill.
  • Peadar O Dubhghaill.
  • Eamon O Dúgáin.
  • Aindriú O Láimhín.
  • Séamus O Leadáin.
  • Séamus O Murchadha.
  • Seán O Raghallaigh.
  • Máirtín O Rodaigh.
  • Seán O Súilleabháin.
  • Caoimhghín O hUigín.
  • Seán Príomhdhall.
  • Liam Thrift.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Morrissey a nd Nagle. Níl: Deputies Dolan and Connor Hogan.
Amendment declared lost.

I beg to move:—

In sub-section (2), line 23, to delete the word "but" and substitute the words:—

"But may be added to, altered or revoked by resolution of both Houses of the Oireachtas or by regulations made in like manner and subject to the like provisions as the original regulations, and."

The object of this amendment is to make it possible for the regulations which are to come before the Oireachtas to be amended, modified, or altered by the Oireachtas; that is, instead of having absolutely to turn them down and refuse them, to make it possible for them to be modified or amended in the Dáil or Seanad. The section as it stands practically leaves the position that if the regulations are made and presented, the Dáil then must accept them en bloc or defeat them en bloc. The proposal of the amendment is to make it possible for them to alter or revoke by resolution or by regulations made in manner similar to the original ones. It is giving more authority to the Dáil over the regulations than they would have by the Bill.

This would be a departure from what has been the practice in practically all Acts that have been passed whereby any regulations made under them would be subject to annulment by resolution. "Added to, altered or revoked." In essence it would mean that legislation would be passed by resolution. Of course, it can be countered on the other hand by saying that legislation can be made by regulation, but I think it would be much more desirable in cases of this sort to have it definitely settled whether or not the Executive Council making those recommendations, made them to the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the Dáil rather than they should be subject to pretty considerable debates in either House or both Houses, and that pretty considerable canvassing might take place outside as to the merits and reasons for amending them and so on. It does not appear to me that it is likely any progress can be effected by amending the regulations. By revoking them, of course, in a case like this it would almost inevitably mean that the Government of the day would be confronted with the position which is provided for in the Constitution, that is, it would no longer possess the support of a majority of the House. A situation might reasonably arise in which one House of the Oireachtas might pass an amendment to the regulation, and while it would not affect the issue it would certainly affect the public confidence of the time, and if a question of national emergency were to arise the main idea running through our mind would be to maintain public confidence, and to that extent I am satisfied that the method in the Bill is a better way to have these regulations brought up for consideration. Either reject them by failing to pass a resolution or give them the force they ought to have from the Oireachtas.

I do not know whether other Deputies have noticed it, but there has within the last year or so been a very great addition to the number of what are in effect legislative acts that are completed by merely laying regulations on the Table—that is to say, we have added a great deal to the number of occasions when the Minister can make regulations which have the force of law by simply laying them on the Table, and we know very well that many of those regulations would, if they had undergone scrutiny, be amended in some degree. This proposal in the Bill is intended to follow the lines that the Ministry can do no wrong or the Ministry, if it is thought to be doing even a little wrong in the formulation of a regulation, must be defeated. By this method you are practically saying that the Ministry must be defeated on a vital issue and you are challenging the House to defeat the Ministry, and, by that way, you are running a risk or else you must accept the regulations en bloc, giving us no time whatever to call attention to errors or difficulties or unreasonable propositions. The Dáil cannot amend a regulation. It must defeat the Government. I think it is very much better to assume that the Ministry is not infallible, that it may make mistakes and that it may ask for powers unnecessarily wide, and that the Dáil is in a position to give consideration to regulations and to suggest amendments and even to impose amendments.

The position under the Bill is that we have no discretion. We have got to defeat the regulations, which means defeating the Ministry and risking a change of Government or dissolution at a time when everyone will say: "This is no time for changing Ministries." I cannot understand why a proposition of this kind cannot be accepted. This is the practice of the British Act, and their experience is much greater than ours. If they found it possible to do this thing by regulation without having power to amend I think they would have done it. If they thought there was any evil in this method they would have avoided that evil. It seems to me that in the Dáil we are foregoing some of our responsibility if we are to hand over to the Ministry our right of amending any regulation dealing with the most vital matters. We are inviting Ministers to add, illimitably almost, to the executive authority they have. We are giving them occasion to say: "You have got to take it or leave it," or: "If you do not accept it we go out of office." That is the position the Ministry asks us to take. I say this is a reasonable proposal. If a regulation is made and laid before the Dáil it should not be put up to us that the only alternative is to defeat or pass it. Surely we ought to have a right to consider it and to amend it.

We are told this is putting temptation before the Ministry and that the Dáil is being asked to forego its functions and hand over illimitable power to the Executive Council. Consider the illimitable power. A regulation is made. The making of that regulation makes it necessary to summon the House and the regulation may be discussed. Deputy Johnson says it is presented in the manner of "take it or leave it; accept it as it stands or the Ministry resigns and you are going to have a dissolution at a time of national emergency." You have to envisage what is going to happen to bring about a proclamation and the making of the regulation. Something that is considered as a national emergency is considered as the occasion which warrants the bringing forward of a certain type of regulation and the House meets to discuss it. Surely there is this power left to the Dáil to say if that regulation be not brought forward in another way we are going to defeat that regulation and going to throw, on the Ministry, the responsibility of driving the country into the throes of a revolution by sticking fast to some type of regulation which the House is not going to accept. I think there is no question of handing over responsibility and illimitable power. The making of every regulation operates as a summons to the House, and the House can discuss the regulation.

Does the Minister suggest that the regulations do not operate until the House discusses them?

No, but a period in which the House can discuss them is limited and the position in sub-section (2) is different from the British Act, because the British Act follows a procedure of its own House and not the procedure that is laid down here.

It seems to me that Deputy Johnson's amendment is what he claims it to be, a very reasonable proposal, because from the moment the regulation is framed and issued it operates, and under the later sub-section (3) the only thing that is left to the assembled House is to pass a resolution annulling the regulation. The only alternative is to annul or accept, and unless annulled the regulation goes its way and operates as if it never had been challenged here. That, I hold, is to take from the Oireachtas, more particularly from this House, its rights to share in the government of the country. This, we must remember, is an emergency measure for a national emergency, and the value of regulations issued at such time under such conditions will lie largely in the fact that the regulation was the expression of the national will on the matter as coming through the House by its representatives. Yet the power of the representatives to alter or modify is absolutely taken away in this measure. It is "a take it or leave" that is left to the House through this declaration that it may annul or pass it.

I think the case made by Deputy Johnson for this amendment is a good one. The Minister has not answered that case, except to say that if the House does not like the particular regulation drafted, we can tell the Government to bring it back in another form. I suggest that that is not dealing with the merits of Deputy Johnson's case. If the procedure as regards amendments is recognised in the case of an ordinary Bill it should be recognised as the most suitable form of dealing with regulations made under this measure. It is possible that the House will agree to certain matters which are included in the regulations, but it may not be disposed to agree with the regulations as a whole, and in that case it is placed in the position of saying to the Government: "We will defeat the whole of the regulations or else take this regulation back and bring it in in another form." I do not think that that is a suitable way of doing it. I am sure the Government of the day will always be able to persuade its own party in a situation of that kind that its dignity is at stake, whereas if it is open to the House, as in the case of an ordinary Bill being amended, there would be no such fear on the part of Deputies to table an amendment to remove the objectionable features of the regulations. The regulation operates from the time it issues, and it may mean that something irretrievable may be done under the regulations, and that damage may be done before an opportunity is given to the House of telling the Government to take back such regulation and present it again in a more suitable form. I do not think that Deputy Johnson's amendment is unreasonable, or that it asks the Government to do anything which it could not agree to, or which would not be in accordance with ordinary democratic procedure.

Has the Deputy read the amendment? How can he say that something that has been irretrievably done can be undone by this amendment?

I say that once the regulation is made it could never be amended, but under Deputy Johnson's proposal it could be.

The Deputy stated that under the section as it stands, damage could be irretrievably done before the House met. If the amendment is carried, the damage will be still irretrievably done, because the House must meet to pass the modifications. The Deputy referred to the procedure with regard to a Bill, but that is not an analogy. The analogy should be that of the regulations laid on the Table in regard to a Bill. The practice in this House is that such regulations laid on the Table cannot be amended or modified.

The practice we have got into is so dangerous we ought to alter it. We ought, at least, to have formal assent to regulations laid on the Table. What may be justified with regard to ordinary administrative operations is not a fair criterion of what is proposed to be done in a Bill of this kind. There are very extensive powers granted in this Bill, powers to make regulations which shall, while they remain in force, have effect as if enacted in this Act, but the regulations are not to be subject to any revision, amendment, or alteration. They have to be formally annulled absolutely. That, of course, means that in time of emergency the Ministry has the whip hand, because it can say "We are going out." The proposal to allow the Dáil to revise or amend the regulations made under this Bill is a very reasonable one, and I cannot understand why it should be opposed so strongly.

Everybody knows that when a national emergency arises there are many minds with many opinions as to how it should be dealt with. The more these minds explain themselves to the public and the more criticism there is of anything that is done, the more people you have to suggest the method of dealing with a national emergency. One of the difficulties of the Government is that everybody looks on as if with a microscope, to find where a regulation offends against certain delicate susceptibilities. That attitude always comes to the surface at such a time. That has been our experience on some former occasions. A time of emergency is a time when definite action must be taken, and the responsibility for answering for that action rests on the Executive Council. It is not a time when you can have 1,000 telephones operating with 1,000 suggestions coming from outside in order to make regulations to suit every-body's convenience. That is not possible.

It is for the Dáil and not for the telephone exchanges.

The Dáil being representative of the community, various representatives of the community will acquaint the Dáil as to how things should be done.

Is that wrong?

I say it is wrong to stand in the market place and say what we here ought to do.

The President is going back on what he said.

No, I am not. If Deputy Magennis has anything to say he should speak up.

Is the President to be at liberty to twit me on a remark to a Deputy which was not intended for the House?

I know something about national emergency, and I know the nervousness of certain people. I say that regulations dealing with national emergency ought to be regulations which should be passed or rejected entirely. That is my experience and if that is objected to I cannot help it.

I hope the House will take notice, and the public through the Press, that here we have at last a more frank confession than we have had hitherto of the attitude of mind of the Executive Council towards representative Government. In moments of national emergency the junta is to operate. The House of representatives must be silent in the matter because, as the President says, they will have been informed by various members of the public as to what the public thinks is desirable. In other words, the voice of the people as expressing the will of the people is to be suppressed on an occasion like this. Surely that is to advocate not government by representation, but the Mussolini form.

I did not say the will of the public. I said the opinions of certain people.

The voice of the public.

The voice of the people outside.

Let us hear Deputy Magennis.

If the President wishes to mend his hand I have not the slightest objection. He often speaks at random.

Not as often as the Deputy.

I have never spoken at random yet in this House. I have a fuller sense of my responsibility. I hold, and I think reasonable men will hold the same, that in a national emergency such as this measure is intended for, the greater the authority that attaches to the body that issues the regulation, the better for the public peace and public welfare. It will command authority and respect and meet with obedience, general and whole-hearted, from the public if the public are able to realise that the regulation is not ex parte, that it does not proceed from a small body of men, but that it comes from the House of representatives who have considered the situation and have reached this decision. The argument that the President urges against Deputy Johnson's amendment is an argument against deliberation, discussion and debate on any big measure, for it is only a question of degree as to whether the situation that the Bill proposed is intended to meet is an emergency of such and such enormity and such and such a character, or whether it is a public necessity of a lesser kind. The argument goes to show that when the people voice their views and demand to have them expressed through their representatives here—that there is something wrong in that arrangement is an argument against representative government root and branch. The President has given us an example of the maxim that he who proves too much proves nothing.

I think it right that we should get back to some point of fact with regard to this measure. We have heard now about silencing the voice of the people, of acting against representative government and ruling out discussion, root and branch. Every regulation made under this Bill operates as a summons to the House that the regulation may be discussed. If that is to be called silencing the voice of the people and operating against representative government, I have failed to understand what these terms ordinarily mean.

Discussed with a pistol at one's head.

A pistol at one's head in a time of national emergency! You are asked to come here, and the situation will be that if there is what I would call a small point of an amendment such as would not persuade this House to defeat the amendment altogether in a time of national emergency, then the amendment should not be allowed to go through. You must have regulations to meet a very serious situation, and the idea here is that all the small points that might be urged on a particular measure should be urged with regard to that regulation if the thing reaches the point that, being so obnoxious, the House has the right to say, "We are not going to take that; that is a thing that should be considered." If the House has the right to say that of every regulation brought forward in a national emergency, you should allow your regulations to be modified and to be subject to ordinary debate and all the numerous amendments that can be moved to a section of a Bill, you are getting definitely away from the whole question of emergency and the seriousness of the situation that must arise before any proclamation can be issued or any regulation made.

The Minister for Industry and Commerce is arguing against what I did not put up. I daresay he will congratulate himself on the victory of demolishing a case that was not made. I argued purely and simply against the President's argument in which he recommended the rejection of Deputy Johnson's amendment. We all know that this measure is intended for an emergency, and I daresay the emergency in which it would be put in operation would be one where action would have to be taken, and taken quickly and with decision. Therefore, I am alive to all these considerations which weigh with the Minister for Industry and Commerce, but I address myself solely to the argument of the President to show that if it proves anything it shows that we could deal with a grave situation and meet the national interests better by doing away with debate and discussion and giving power into the hands of a few men who would be administering the affairs of the country unchecked. That is a different proposition.

I do not know if I am allowed to speak again on this amendment?

Being in charge of the Bill, the President is entitled to speak again.

I want to make clear the type of people I had in mind when I said we were getting thousands of suggestions. I mean the type of people who write to the newspapers, the type who always say that things should be done in another way, the type who will not take a decision, the type who seeks to escape responsibility, and occasionally the type who like to leave people with any responsibility at a time of national emergency.

Of course there is a rapidly growing school which believes that representative institutions are quite impossible as governing legislative bodies, and that you should leave this sort of thing to the Executive, to the small Executive, and let them act; men of strong will and decision. Democracies and legislative assemblies are so much incumbrance and should be destroyed. The proposition here is that in a time the Executive deems to be one of national emergency, when they make regulations, using powers and giving power to confer other powers upon individuals dealing with matters of very great importance to the country, that those regulations may be amended by the House. They may be acceptable in principle, they may be acceptable as a whole, subject to alteration, but surely in such a time of emergency it is not too much to ask that the House should have certain rights? The Ministers have conjured up these emergencies in great bulk, shall I say, when things must be done on the instant or the country goes to ruin, but there is also an emergency such as that which has been pictured to us by the Minister for Industry and Commerce, the kind of emergency which might arise next week and go on growing slowly, one which might affect a particular district, and which could not be described as causing a national emergency, but something of importance to the country as a whole which they, perhaps, might call a national emergency—shall we call it grade two? Regulations that are to be made to deal with that kind of crisis, or problem, surely should be subject to the possibility of amendment without having to be utterly destroyed. As I have said already, they let us have the alternative placed before us of changing the Government or accepting the regulations en bloc. I must say that the attitude of the Ministers makes one suspicious that there is some other purpose in this if they are not prepared to consider a reasonable amendment of this kind proposing to give the House the right to revise. The Government always have a majority, and by the very fact of their existence are presumed to have a majority, and yet they cannot allow the House to discuss a proposition affecting the daily lives of the people.

Amendment put.
The Committee divided. Tá, 17; Níl, 41.

Tá.

  • Seán Buitléir.
  • John Conlan.
  • John Daly.
  • Séamus Eabhróid.
  • Connor Hogan.
  • Séamus Mac Cosgair.
  • Tomás Mac Eoin.
  • Liam Mag Aonghusa.
  • Tomás de Nógla.
  • William Norton.
  • Tomás O Conaill.
  • Aodh O Cúlacháin.
  • Eamon O Dubhghaill.
  • Mícheál O hIfearnáin.
  • Domhnall O Muirgheasa.
  • Tadhg O Murchadha.
  • Pádraig O hOgáin (An Clár).

Níl.

  • Earnán Altún.
  • Earnán de Blaghd
  • Séamus Breathnach.
  • Seoirse de Bhulbh
  • Próinsias Bulfin.
  • Bryan R. Cooper.
  • Máighréad Ní Choileáin Bean Uí Dhrisceóil
  • James Dwyer.
  • Osmond Grattan Esmonde.
  • Desmond Fitzgerald.
  • John Good.
  • Thomas Hennessy.
  • John Hennigan.
  • William Hewat.
  • Donnchadh Mac Con Uladh.
  • Liam Mac Cosgair.
  • Seán MacCurtain.
  • Pádraig Mac Fadáin.
  • Patrick McGilligan.
  • Seoirse Mac Niocaill.
  • Liam Mac Sioghaird.
  • Pádraig Mag Ualghairg.
  • Martin M. Nally.
  • John T. Nolan.
  • Michael K. Noonan.
  • Peadar O hAodha.
  • Parthalán O Conchubhair. Eoghan O Dochartaigh.
  • Séamus O Dóláin.
  • Peadar O Dubhghaill.
  • Eamon O Dúgáin.
  • Aindriú O Láimhín.
  • Séamus O Leadáin.
  • Fionán O Loingsigh.
  • Séamus O Murchadha.
  • Seán O Raghallaigh.
  • Máirtín O Rodaigh.
  • Seán O Súilleabháin.
  • Caoimhghín O hUigín.
  • Seán Príomhdhall.
  • Liam Thrift.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Morrissey and Magennis. Níl: Deputies Dolan and Sears.
Amendment declared lost.

I move:—

In sub-section (3) to delete all after the word "made" in line 33 and substitute:

"and shall not continue in force after the expiration of seven days from the time when they are so laid unless a resolution is passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas providing for the continuance thereof."

I had hoped that it would not be necessary to put forward this amendment, because had the last one been carried the House would have had some opportunity of considering the regulations in a formal way. The proposition in the amendment which I have now moved is that the House shall before the expiration of seven days have time to consider whether the regulations in question ought to be continued. It is provided by this amendment that the regulations which have been promulgated shall have force for a period of seven days, unless in the meantime a resolution is passed by both Houses providing for their continuance. Within that seven days we would have time to appreciate the value of the regulations, the importance of them and what they are likely to achieve, and if it is desired to continue them longer than seven days the amendment would make it necessary that they should come formally before the Dáil and the Seanad for confirmation.

Under the Bill as drawn, it is provided that "if either such House shall within the next subsequent twenty-one days on which the House has sat pass a resolution annulling such regulation, such regulation shall be annulled accordingly." If this amendment were passed it would simply mean that the resolution should be tabled in both Houses and passed in order that regulations should be continued. The effect, to my mind, is the same. It is possible to rescind the regulation within an earlier time than seven days. The position as far as the Oireachtas is concerned is carefully provided for in sub-section (3), and I do not see the necessity for the amendment.

Amendment put.
The Dáil divided. Tá: 12. Níl: 41.

Tá.

  • Seán Buitléir.
  • Séamus Eabhróid.
  • Tomás Mac Eoin.
  • Liam Mag Aonghusa.
  • Tomás de Nógla.
  • William Norton.
  • Tomás O Conaill.
  • Aodh O Cúlacháin.
  • Eamon O Dubhghaill.
  • Domhnall O Muirgheasa.
  • Tadhg O Murchadha.
  • Pádraig O hOgáin (An Clár).

Níl.

  • Earnán Altún.
  • Séamus Breathnach.
  • Seoirse de Bhulbh.
  • Bryan R. Cooper.
  • Máighréad Ní Choileáin Bean Uí Dhrisceóil.
  • James Dwyer.
  • Desmond Fitzgerald.
  • Thomas Hennessy.
  • John Hennigan.
  • Connor Hogan.
  • Seosamh Mac a' Bhrighde.
  • Donnchadh Mac Con Uladh.
  • Liam Mac Cosgair.
  • Séamus Mac Cosgair.
  • Seán MacCurtain.
  • Pádraig Mac Fadáin.
  • Patrick McGilligan.
  • Seoirse Mac Niocaill.
  • Liam Mac Sioghaird.
  • Pádraig Mag Ualghairg.
  • Martin M. Nally.
  • John T. Nolan.
  • Michael K. Noonan.
  • Peadar O hAodha.
  • Parthalán O Conchubhair. Conchubhar O Conghaile.
  • Eoghan O Dochartaigh.
  • Séamus O Dóláin.
  • Peadar O Dubhghaill.
  • Eamon O Dúgáin.
  • Mícheál O hIfearnáin.
  • Aindriú O Láimhín.
  • Séamus O Leadáin.
  • Fionán O Loingsigh.
  • Séamus O Murchadha.
  • Seán O Raghallaigh.
  • Máirtín O Rodaigh.
  • Seán O Súilleabháin.
  • Caoimhghín O hUigín.
  • Seán Príomhdhall.
  • Liam Thrift.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Morrissey and P. O hOgáin (An Clár). Níl: Deputies Dolan and Duggan.
Amendment declared lost.
Question—"That Section 2 stand part of the Bill"—put and agreed to.
SECTION 3.
The following amendment stood in the name of Deputy Johnson:—
Before Section 3 to insert a new section as follows:—
It is hereby expressly declared that nothing in this Act shall be construed or have effect so as to limit, restrict or impair the right of free expression of opinion and the right to assemble peaceably and without arms and the right to form associations or unions guaranteed by Article 9 of the Constitution.

The amendment is not in order.

I do not know whether you intend to rule the amendment out of order, but I indicated that I was not moving it. If I thought it was going to be moved out of order I would be inclined to test your ruling.

srd

It repeats words that are already in the Constitution.

Amendment not moved.
Question—"That Section 3 stand part of the Bill"—put and agreed to.
Title put and agreed to.
The Dáil went out of Committee.
Bill reported without amendment.
Barr
Roinn