I want to take this opportunity to discuss a certain aspect of this Bill, and I think it is better to discuss it on this Money Resolution than to try to discuss it when the Bill is in Committee. I am hopeful as a result of what I have to say that the present Ministry may agree to alter the character of the Bill. I fear that the opportunity that was afforded yesterday morning, in the few hours which we had to consider the Bill, was broken into by other events and it was not possible for Deputies to give it the consideration it really deserved and so essentially requires. Since the Second Reading I have been forced to the conclusion that neither the Ministry nor the House realises what this Bill may involve and how important, drastic, and far-reaching the powers that are to be given to the Executive for the time being are contained in the Bill. Part of the discussion yesterday assumed that what was being done here in this Bill was necessary—to arrest people guilty of certain offences. Deputy Vaughan, for instance, drew attention to certain incidents of which he was aware where 100 armed men were drilling in County Cork. That, however, will not be prevented by this Bill. That is an offence that would be dealt with under the Treasonable Offences Act, 1925, and the ordinary law, and nothing in this Bill is going to affect that kind of offence, except very indirectly.
It may be said that if you can intern the wirepullers, or the organisers of an organisation which on the outskirts results in the drilling of men in County Cork you may prevent drilling. I do not think that that has been the experience in the past, but running through the discussion yesterday there was an assumption that the Bill was designed to deal with the perpetrators of that particular kind of offence, and Deputies seemed to forget the existence of the Treasonable Offences Act, 1925. I want the House and the Ministry to realise what they are doing by making this Bill part of the ordinary statute law. It is not a Bill to hand over temporary powers to an Executive Council to deal with extraordinary occurrences, or a peculiar temporary situation arising out of the preparation of an insurrection, an insurrection itself, or anything of that kind, but to add to the Statute Book a Bill which would enable the Executive Council at any time, so long as it had a majority supporting it in the House, to override the law and all the protection which we were presumed to have obtained by the Constitution.
The proposition is, if at any time a Ministry considers that within the State some emergency has arisen which is called a national emergency, and that it is in the public interest that Part II. of the Bill should be put into force, then a proclamation shall be issued, and the powers that follow in Part II. will be automatically in the hands of the Executive Council. A proclamation is issued saying that a state of national emergency has arisen, and automatically the Dáil is called into being, if it is not already in session. The House is not asked to approve of the declaration of a national emergency, or the handing over of the powers under Part II. to the Ministry. It is called merely to sit so that an opportunity will be given to disapprove of the proclamation. That is just the opposite course to that which has been adopted—I was going to say, to the parallel, but it is not by any means a parallel—in the Emergency Powers Act of Great Britain. There the regulations made under the proclamation must have positive approval. Here there is no such requirement and all that is required is, when a state of national emergency has been declared by the proclamation that the House should be called together. Once it has been called together and no disapproval has been expressed by the House then the powers remain with the Executive. It is true that there may be a revision, or rather that the proclamation must be remade within three months or, at least, at the expiration of three months, and consequently the House will be required to come into session. Presumably, of course, an opportunity will be given to the House to revoke the proclamation.
I want to draw the attention of Deputies who are concerned about Constitutional development and the protection of the citizen to the possible encroachment of the Executive Council. I am not referring to the present situation at all. I am quite prepared to leave the year 1926, and next year, 1927, out of the discussion. I am concerned with the proposal to hand over to a governing authority, powers which can only be justified in the very gravest circumstances. In a time of war, in a time of insurrection, rebellion by armed forces, and in very extreme circumstances it might, perhaps, be justifiable and excusable for the Executive Council to get the powers sought for in this Bill. I ask the House to bear in mind the situation in other countries besides Ireland at the present time, or within the last few years, and the general state of Europe in regard to constitutional government. Under this Bill it would be possible to remain within the law and conduct the proceedings in a perfectly legal way, allow a Government authority to arrest and intern all its political opponents, and keep them in internment for the whole period of the Parliament, and automatically have a majority to come up periodically, or every three months, to have the proclamation restated. That is not so fantastic or unthinkable a proposition as we might have imagined 15 years ago.
In the Schedule there is a list of 14 offences in respect of which, if any member of the Executive Council is satisfied suspicion attaches to any citizen then that citizen may be interned by order of the Minister. The list covers a very large number of possible offences: inciting persons to overthrow the State, possessing arms, assuming military rank and designation, and so on. Number 14 reads: "Any act the commission of which is under or by virtue of the Treasonable Offences Act, 1925 (No. 18 of 1925) treason or misprision of treason, or a felony or a misdemeanour." So that any person who may be suspected of committing any act described as treason, misprision, or a felony under the 1925 Treasonable Offences Act may be served with an internment order and may be arrested and interned for a long period. The Treasonable Offences Act covers offences in respect of which suspicion may easily apply to any Deputy of this or future Houses. A person will be guilty of a felony if, for instance, he harboured, encouraged or protected a person actually engaged in one of the more positive offences of the previous paragraphs, such as attempting to overawe the Executive Council or any member thereof. These are very grave offences, but a person who may be suspected of encouraging, harbouring or inciting the commission of such offences is liable to be interned by order of the Minister. Any person who may be suspected of taking part in the formation of a secret society within the army or police, or any person who may be suspected of encouraging the refusal to carry out his duty on the part of a Civil Servant may be interned under the Bill. It may be said that in times of grave national emergency even these powers should be given to the Executive Council.
Let us assume that what I say is not an unthinkable proposition at all. We have comparatively quite recent examples which should form a headline in other countries. Political excitement prevails after an election. A Government comes into office and takes it upon itself to declare a state of national emergency. It has a majority, the proclamation continues in force, and the powers are by that fact taken by the Executive Council. They may then arrest and intern the more active members, let us say, of the Opposition.
Let us, for the sake of clarity, come down to something more concrete. A Communist Party or a Fascist Party gets a majority and forms a Government. It prefers not to create a revolution; it prefers to go through by the ordinary processes of law, if possible, and it takes this Bill as its own. In this state of national emergency, where the farmers or the business men or the Trinity College representatives or the Constitutional Labour Party is in active opposition, the leading members of those Parties are interned, and newspaper editors are interned, quite legally, in due accord with the law. Three months expire, and the proclamation has to be reconsidered by the Dáil. The Opposition is interned, and the proclamation passes. That is repeated during the whole period that that Parliament exists—for five years if the new proposals are carried. I fear that that can be done, and there is no real protection, either under the Constitution or under the law, if the Executive deems it advisable, in its own interest, to adopt that course.
There is an Appeal Council, and any such person may appeal, and the Council may decide that there is not sufficient evidence to warrant the continued detention. But the Executive Council or a Minister may find new evidence and submit that to the Appeal Council. The Appeal Council is not a court, and cannot order release. If even that is possible to be done by a Ministry under the law, quite apart from the likelihood, I think it is very wrong for us to add such powers to the ordinary statute law of the country. It is a reversal of everything that we have been taught as regards freedom. The Constitution tried to suggest to the people that there would be guaranteed to them those personal liberties under the law, and then we proceed to make a law which in times, not of grave national emergency in any true sense, but in times when a majority Ministry may consider that it is desirable to proclaim a state of national emergency to put down a particular kind of military organisation, or alleged military organisation, or any other such conspiracy which they consider difficult to deal with by the courts.
Previously, when we had Bills of this kind we were invited to pass them mainly on the ground that it was difficult to get juries to convict in face of evidence. That is not the claim now. The claim now is the difficulty of getting positive evidence to put before a jury. I am quite willing to concede the point that there may be difficulty, but surely we ought not to give such powers to an Executive in permanence. If you are dealing with an immediate emergency, treat it as such. Do not let us add to the regular statute law of the country a provision of this kind, which says that in circumstances which the Ministry likes to utilise even the Legislature might be made of no effect as a check against tyranny.
I do not think there is very much, if anything, needed to enable the Ministry under the Bill to do exactly what has been done in Italy or Russia. You can prevent, under this Bill, all public discussion by the act of internment of those whom you suspect, and you may keep them in internment for many months under the law. You may make of non-utility the Dáil or Seanad under the law, if you pass this Bill. I am confining my protest at this stage to the giving of those powers permanently and to making this Bill anything but a very temporary Act.
