It is well, I think, that we should have a statement from the Ministry on their defence policy when we are asked to provide money for the provision of the Army, Navy and Air Forces, presumably for defence purposes. After considerable effort at different times, we had on the 8th February a statement from the two Ministers most nearly concerned in the problems of Defence. From the Minister for Defence, who was primarily concerned, we had a statement that the defence policy of the Government is "to defend this country as far as it is humanly possible, within its resources, against every enemy from whatever source." While that is a quite satisfactory statement of purpose and object, it is hardly informative enough as a statement of policy. The Minister for External Affairs supplemented the statement of the Minister for Defence, and explained that there was bound up with the defence policy of the Ministry in respect to the Free State a defence policy of these islands. He said:—
In view of so powerful a neighbour, so near, and our close relations, it is undoubtedly in the interests of this country to have a general idea as to what the defence policy of that country is. We need not blink the fact that it is quite possible, in the event of a general attack on these islands—it is perfectly obvious— our Army must co-operate with the British Army. It is practically inconceivable that our Army would ever be opposed to the British Army. But that our officers should go there to learn what they could in general about military matters, and of the scheme of defence which is in the mind of the Government and the military forces, which in the event of a general attack on these islands would have the major share of the defence, was, I think, entirely desirable.
I would like to preface what I have to say in this matter by the observation that, in my opinion, it is very desirable that the relations between the Saorstát, the British people and the British Government should be of the most cordial character possible—as cordial as the interests of Ireland will allow them to be. But I think that cordial co-operation does not necessitate a unified defence policy or a unified foreign policy. There is so much of inter-dependence between foreign policy and defence policy that I think the two must be taken together and thought of together. I refuse to believe that in the British Commonwealth of Nations, the cordial co-operation of the nations constituting that association, necessitates co-operation in military affairs or necessitates co-operation in external policy. The information we have from the Ministry as to the line of thought which is apparently determining their views upon the defence of this country is that there must be the conception of an attack upon "these islands." And it is having regard to that conception that I believe it is essential that we in the Dáil, and the people of the country, should understand what the defence policy of the Government is. I cannot, myself, conceive of the position, within any reasonable period, which would require that Ireland should be prepared to resist an attack upon these islands, unless there is to be a united policy in regard to foreign affairs and an acceptance by our Government of some share of responsibility for British foreign policy, or a refusal by non-British Powers to recognise the independence and the sovereignty of this State. I do not believe that there will be such a refusal on the part of non-British Powers, provided that our Government makes its position clear and insists upon that position at all times. That can be done in the most friendly way and with the most cordial feelings towards the British people and the British Government.
This statement of policy from the Minister for External Affairs on behalf of the Ministry opens up a very big question, and makes it imperative that we should have a statement so that our minds would be clarified and so that a proper understanding will be the result as to where we stand in this matter. It is undesirable that we should wait until something has been accomplished, and then be told that it has been done, without having had a preliminary statement as to what the intentions are from the Government benches. We have to bear in mind, for instance, that there has been a preliminary Conference, following and in accordance with the Treaty provision that in five years' time the question of the naval defence of these islands was to be reviewed. We have been told that such a Conference was held a couple of months ago; that is to say a preliminary meeting was held in London, and the Conference was adjourned for three months. I take it, therefore, that within a month the new Conference will be held, and presumably some decisions will be arrived at. Therefore, we ought to have some statement from the Ministry as to their policy in this matter. So far we have had to rely upon the statement of the Minister for External Affairs, coupled —and I want to emphasise this—with a report of the Imperial Conference. I am going to ask the Dáil to give some consideration to this report of the Imperial Conference, and to read it in the light of the statement made by the Minister for External Affairs on the 8th February. The report of the Imperial Conference was divided into several parts, and the only portion of it which has yet had any consideration here has been that dealing with inter-Imperial relations. There was a portion of it which dealt with defence, and this is surely the occasion when matters under that head, which were discussed at the Imperial Conference and reported upon with the approval of our Delegation, should be discussed. That report explains that questions of defence, and the methods by which the defence arrangements of each part of the Empire could be most effectively co-ordinated, had consideration. The Prime Minister of Great Britain initiated the discussions and reviewed the work of the Committee of Imperial Defence, emphasising the purely advisory and consultative character of this body. He explained that since the previous Conference there had been certain developments, notably the creation of the Chiefs of Staff SubCommittee. "Meetings also took place at the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Air Ministry, at which the situation from the standpoint of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain was presented in greater detail, and other phases of common interest were considered at a meeting held at the offices of the Committee of Imperial Defence." I want to lay special emphasis on this paragraph, which says that Mr. Baldwin "was followed by the Senior Officer of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee (Admiral of the Fleet, Earl Beatty), in a survey of the general strategic situation."
Now I gather that the Ministers who were present at the Conference had the views of the British Admiralty as to the strategic position, and they will be able to give the House some information as to what part Ireland plays in regard to these matters. It appears that the resolutions of defence adopted at the previous Conference were re-affirmed. These resolutions are printed in this report, and they explain that "the Conference affirms that it is necessary to provide for the adequate defence of the territories and trade of the several countries comprising the British Empire," while recognising that it was "for the Parliaments of the several parts of the Empire to decide the nature and extent of any action which should be taken by them." Subject to that provision certain suggestions were made as guiding principles. One of these principles was "the desirability of the maintenance of a minimum standard of naval strength, namely, equality with the naval strength of any foreign power, in accordance with the provisions of the Washington Treaty on limitation of armaments as approved by Great Britain, all the self-governing Dominions, and India."
I would like the Minister to tell us whether, on this question of naval strength and on the other allied question of the limitation of armaments now being discussed, it is part of the general defence position of these countries comprised within the British Empire that the defence forces of all those countries are to be treated as a unit. When there are questions of the relative strength of the military and naval forces, let us say, of Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France and Italy, are the forces of Australia, Canada and the Irish Free State taken as part of the forces to be counted as the British forces for the purpose of comparing strengths? It is a matter of importance that we should know how we stand in that matter. Then I find that the Conference re-affirms "the desirability of the development of the Air Forces in the several countries of the Empire upon such lines as will make it possible, by means of the adoption, as far as practicable, of a common system of organisation and training, and the use of uniform manuals, patterns of arms, equipment and stores (with the exception of the type of aircraft) for each part of the Empire as it may determine to co-operate with other parts with the least possible delay and the greatest efficiency."
I think that we should be told as to whether that is the practice of our Ministry of Defence. Are they conferring as to the use of uniform manuals and systems of organisation and training and co-operating accordingly. That was part of the resolutions adopted at the Conference in 1923 and re-affirmed at the last Conference.
"The Conference observes that steady progress has been made in the direction of organising military formations in general on similar lines; in the adoption of similar patterns of weapons; and in the interchange of officers between different parts of the Empire; it invites the Governments concerned to consider the possibility of extending these forms of co-operation and of promoting further consultation between the respective general staffs on defence questions adjudged of common interest."
That is of interest to us and should be noted when we are discussing the Defence Bill or the financial resolutions connected with such Defence Bill. It is requisite that we should know whether included in that steady progress towards co-ordination of the defence forces, methods, systems, formations, patterns of weapons, and so on, the Irish Free State has made any progress; whether we are part of that general movement, or whether it is clear that so far as progress is concerned we have not kept step with the other portions of the Empire which entered upon this Conference. This is of particular importance when we are discussing the question of air forces. The 1923 Conference passed a resolution which was reaffirmed at this Conference, and it refers to the maintenance by Great Britain of home defence air forces of sufficient strength to give adequate protection against air attack by the strongest air force within striking distance of her shores.
In making an estimation of the strength of that force which was necessary for protection, are the two air forces counted together? Is the British Air Force counting upon the assistance which might be rendered by the Irish force? Or is the Irish force counting on the assistance which might be rendered by the British force? This is a matter, I think, upon which we should have some information, particularly in the light of the paragraph on page 36 of the Report, which speaks of
"The necessity for creating and maintaining an adequate chain of air bases and refuelling stations" and "recommending for consideration by the Governments interested the adoption in principle of a system of mutual interchange of individual officers for liaison and other duties, and of complete air units so far as local requirements and resources permit."
The importance of these recommendations and of having an explanation as to our Government's attitude towards them, is enhanced by the statement made by the Minister for External Affairs, because presumably the conception behind the defence policy is that of attack upon "these islands." I ask the House to give thought for a moment or two to the international situation, and the possibility of an attack upon these islands. The Minister has assured us very definitely that so far as international affairs are concerned, we in the Saorstát have no responsibility for the action of any Government which is not the Saorstát Government, and consequently we cannot be held in any degree responsible for the consequence of such acts. I take that to be the position generally maintained. I am hopeful that position will be maintained and will be advertised amongst other nations; but that being so, what conceivable occasion for attack upon "these islands" would arise? I look around and I cannot imagine an attack upon these islands—including Ireland—from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Spain or Portugal. As to the European Powers, Germany is out of the question so far as naval attack might be considered as a possibility. Italy is almost inconceivable as a force that would be attacking this island. What other forces are there? There is the remotest possible chance of the Saorstát being involved in war with Japan or China. We have no particular interest in oil wells or rubber plantations, and I do not think that our people have very many or very important financial commitments in Asiatic or Oceanic governmental bonds that would require the military backing or the naval force of this State. We are driven back on the possibility of France or the United States being the attacking force. Is it conceivable that this island is going to be attacked by a French naval force? Is it conceivable that this island is going to be attacked by the United States naval forces? I think the possibilities are nil. It is waste of energy and money to make preparation for defence of this island against attack by the naval forces of any of these countries I have spoken of. It may be said that there is a possibility—if there is the possibility of war at all—of attack by any force, by either of these countries or combination of them against Great Britain.
There is, no doubt, the possibility but why are we to assume the possibility of an attack upon "these islands"? That is what I want to put before the Ministry. We have to get some idea as to why they should imagine that these islands are to be attacked because of the action of the Government of one of the islands. It is, of course, said that there might be an attack on these islands and that therefore defence will be required, also there might be an attack by these islands, or one of them, though probably it would be said that there never has been an aggressive war of a major kind entered upon by Great Britain and that all Britain's wars have been wars of defence! I am sure that the Minister will agree with that! Consequently, if we are not bound up with British foreign policy, the chances of attack upon these islands are so dim that it is waste of money to be spending it upon means of defence against that kind of possibility. There is a possibility, of course, of war arising in some part of the world in which Great Britain is engaged, but if the Ministry's policy is to be maintained we, at least, need not fear that we are going to be bound up in any warlike activities because of Britain's engagements in such wars. Consequently, it seems to me to be a very great mistake to be conceiving the possibility of attack on these islands as the basis of our defence policy.
I have had occasion to read a certain series of pamphlets with which the Minister for External Affairs will no doubt be familiar. They were written by a well-known Canadian publicist, Mr. John S. Ewart, K.C., and the thesis of these pamphlets is, that "of the British wars since Canada became part of the British Empire in 1763 there is none on which the British people could confidently look back as having been essential and at the same time unescapable." He has taken his readers through the history of the origins of the wars since that period, beginning with the American War of Independence, 1775 to 1782, the Anglo-American War, 1812 to 1814, the Revolutionary wars of France, 1793 to 1818, the Crimean war, the Afghan war, the Opium war, the Burma war, the Zulu wars, the Indian wars, the Egyptian war, the Abyssinian war, the Transvaal war, the South African war, leaving out of account the war of 1914 onwards. In not one of these can it be said that it was unescapable and essential but he has pointed out to the Canadian people, and it might well, I think, be pointed out to the Irish people, that as matters have stood both the Canadian people and the Irish people have been involved automatically in these military and naval affairs and that they would never, except perhaps in one or two cases, involve themselves in those wars had they had any volition of their own. I want to put the case to the Ministry that in looking for a defence policy we are bound to connect it up with our attitude to external powers, and that we ought insistently to make it clear that we are not bound by any action of Great Britain in diplomacy which might result in war, that therefore we cannot be bound to join with them in offensive or defensive action. If an attack is made upon Ireland then, of course, we are bound to do what is in our power to defend Ireland. Are we similiarly bound if because of war in the Far East or in the Pacific, some kind of proposals for defending these shores arose, to be involved in that movement? These proposals emphasise the importance of inter-imperial international overseas trade. It seems to me we ought to know where we stand in regard to the use that is going to be made of the shores of Ireland in respect to British naval warfare.
I said at the beginning that I was hopeful and desirous of the most cordial co-operation in civil matters, in industry, commerce, cultural development, science, art and literature, between this country and Great Britain and other British nations but that I refused to believe in the inevitableness of that kind of co-operation involving military or international foreign policy co-operation. I ask myself— what are the risks of that co-operation and cordial feeling being broken? To my mind the greatest danger to a development of that good feeling lies in the conditions which attach to the Treaty, namely, that we are bound to "give facilities in time of war or strained relations with a foreign power such harbours and other facilities which the British Government may require for the purposes of such defence aforesaid." I feel that in that particular clause we have an occasion for disturbing the friendly relations, and that if ever it were thought well by Britain to take advantage of that particular clause in the Treaty it would almost inevitably be the means of breaking off the friendly relations and disturbing the chances of growing friendliness. I am not quite sure, but I think it is arguable, that that particular provision in our Treaty is inconsistent with the Covenant of the League of Nations which we entered upon at a later stage, and that by virtue of one of the clauses of the Covenant of the League, by the fact that it is not in accord with the Covenant of the League, it is cancelled and we ought to seek release.
Whether that is so or not, I believe, while we have that provision of the Treaty existing it is likely to disturb the constant growth of friendly relations, and is really of no value as a means of defence. It is only of value as a means of offence—offence upon trade routes. offence upon mercantile marine traffic, between Europe and America. There is, too, connected with this policy outlined in the Imperial Conference Report, reference to uniformity of air forces, mutual interchange of officers and so on. Again, I want to ask the Minister for Defence where he stands in this matter. Our defence policy must have some regard to the possibilities of warfare, and I wonder whether it is the conception of the Minister that Ireland can be defended by the forces at his disposal in respect to the possibilities of air attack. What is the basis of any suspicion of the possibility of an attack upon Ireland by sea or by air? Is it not fair to say that the only occasion that could be given for an attack upon Ireland by air or by sea would be the fact that we might be conceived as part of the defence forces of these islands?
We cannot defend, let us say, by our present or contemplated air force, an attack by, let us say, for the sake of illustration, a French air fleet upon the power station at Limerick. If we were part of the defence forces of these islands and by that fact became involved in warfare, our vulnerability is obvious. If we are going to depend, as we must, to a greater degree than is perhaps thought of, upon electrical power, surely we ought to have in our minds the possibilities of an attack upon the sources of that power, and whether we can defend it against modern warfare. Is not our best defence in giving no occasion or no excuse for an attack? I submit that when we are considering these islands as a unit of defence, by that fact we give occasion for attack. We are not likely to be at war of our volition, and there will not be an attack unless Great Britain is at war. Ought we to involve ourselves in the defence of this island as part of a unified system? I am again going to risk the Minister's displeasure by insisting upon the new arm —the air force—and the risk to any country which may be attacked from chemical gases. I quote from a statement made by the service head of the British Air Forces at the present time, Sir Hugh Trenchard. He said:
"It (aviation) may be more of a blessing for this Empire than for any other country in the world, but I feel that what good it will do in civil life cannot balance the harm that may be done in war by it. If I had the casting vote I would abolish the air. I feel that it is an indisputably more harmful weapon in war than any other."
Another authority who was Director of air operations on all the British fronts in the year 1918, when air warfare was at its height, General Groves, said this:
"In the first phases of the next war there is little doubt the belligerents will resort to gas bomb attacks on a vast scale. This form of attack on great cities, such as London and Paris, may entail the loss of millions of lives in the course of a few hours. All gas experts are agreed that it would be impossible to devise a means to protect the civil population from this form of attack."
It is necessary to emphasise these things in this country when we are discussing military defence, and to point out the danger to this country and its people, if we are to conceive ourselves as part of the defence forces of the British islands, that if an attack is made upon Britain by air forces from the Continent of Europe, we are by that fact bound up in it, and we are, therefore, part of the belligerent forces, and running all the risks of that attack. I hope the Minister will tell us that this is entirely wrong, that the Minister for External Affairs was not stating the position accurately.
