This Bill gives effect to recommendation 7 of the Joint Committee's Report on the Constitution. The provision of the Constitution at the moment is that a Bill having passed Dáil Eireann is considered by the Seanad. If the Seanad passes it with amendment or amendments which are unacceptable to the Dáil, and if agreement is not reached between the two Houses, it is held up for a period of 270 days.
PRIVATE BUSINESS. - CONSTITUTION (AMENDMENT No. 13) BILL, 1928—SECOND STAGE.
On a point of order I call your attention to the fact that the President is more than usually indistinct. There is a considerable amount of talking amongst the Deputies in the Lobby, and we cannot hear what the President says.
There is noise on both sides of the gallery.
He will rapidly disperse the remainder.
I was explaining when the Deputy informed you that he could not hear me, that if a Bill having passed the Dáil was either passed by the Seanad with amendments or rejected, and if the Dáil disagreed with the amendments made by the Seanad and agreement was not reached between the two Houses, the Bill was held up for 270 days. After that time, unless three-fifths of the members of the Seanad so requested, it automatically became law. If, on the other hand, one of two things happened— after the Bill has passed the Dáil—if two-fifths of the Deputies of this House present a petition to the President of the Executive Council, or, alternately, if three-fifths of the members of the Seanad present a petition to the President of the Executive Council, in the first place, the petition which comes from two-fifths of the members of the Dáil would require to be accompanied by a petition of 50,000 voters, or in the case of three-fifths of the members of the Seanad so requesting, the Bill could be referred to a Referendum.
This Bill provides for an extended period of the holding up of a measure which has passed the Dáil and obviates two other courses which I have mentioned, or rather precludes them from being put into operation. The position in this Bill is that a measure having passed the Dáil can be held up by the Seanad. After a period of eighteen months, the Dáil may pass a resolution again sending up the Bill to the Seanad, and if the Seanad does not pass it, then at the end of sixty days the Dáil again passes a resolution, and the Bill in question is due for signature by the Governor-General and becomes law. It may so happen that by agreement a Bill can be held up for twelve months after the eighteen months have passed, and at any time during that twelve months the Dáil could by resolution declare that the Bill was deemed to be passed. It is a rather involved statement, and if Deputies wish, I will repeat it, with a view to making it more clear.
The Bill is not concerned with Articles 47 and 48 at all.
No, sir. I made a mistake about that. It is Article 38 I should have said. I need not go over the position at the moment as regards the holding up of a measure. I simply take up this particular Bill and state what the case is. Once the Bill has passed the Dáil, it is sent to the Seanad, and the Seanad may amend it. If the amendments are not accepted by the Dáil, and if there is no agreement reached between the two Houses, there is first of all a period of eighteen months in which the Bill cannot become law, except by agreement, as I have said. At the end of the period of eighteen months the Dáil will require to pass a resolution, again sending the Bill to the Seanad. If the Seanad again rejects the Bill, a period of sixty days elapses and the Bill is again due for consideration by the Dáil, and the Dáil may by resolution again send the Bill forward, and whether the Seanad accepts it or not, it automatically becomes law.
There is a provision for a Dissolution occurring, and in that case, perhaps, to make the matter clearer I will mention dates. We will suppose that the Bill has passed the Dáil by the 1st May. Eighteen months in the ordinary way would run from the 1st May, but a Dissolution takes place on the 1st August. A new Dáil then considers the measure and the eighteen months period is cut down to the first day of the assembly of the new Dáil, if the new Dáil so desires. A period then of twelve months can run with the wish of the Dáil, but two months from the date of the assembly of the Dáil, the Dáil, by resolution, could pass the Bill and it would be due for signature and would become law. There is the intermediate period of eighteen months, and that intermediate period having run and no agreement being reached, the Bill might be, by agreement, held over for twelve months. At the end of that period, it would require a resolution of the Dáil in order to pass the Bill into law. I formally move the Second Reading.
Will the President state why this Bill has been picked out as one of the urgent Bills?
In the ordinary way a Bill is held up for 270 days, and it is then subject to either of two courses. One is a petition from two-fifths of the members of the Dáil, and the other is a request from three-fifths of the Seanad.
Is that to prevent it becoming law?
The Bill which has just passed a Second Reading gave the right of Referendum. That right will now be taken away from the Seanad if that Bill becomes law. The compensation which is offered in respect of that particular right which is being delivered up is that they get eighteen months, or at most, twenty months, against nine.
Why not seven years?
The President has explained the mechanism of the Bill. Can he explain the fundamental principle? What advantage is it to the State to extend the period during which the Seanad can hold up legislation? I think on the Second Reading as it is generally understood, the principle of a measure has to be explained, and the benefits which the State will derive from the operation of that measure ought to be clearly stated by the person who makes himself responsible for it. I intervene to suggest to the President that, before he concludes his statement, he ought to put before the House the advantages which are to be derived from this measure.
The alleged advantages.
Yes, the alleged advantages which the people will reap from the constitutional amendment now proposed.
The Deputy will understand that while nine months is a very long period for mature consideration, twenty months affords a greater opportunity, and gives liberty for more mature consideration.
You think that, unlike eggs, the legislation will not deteriorate?
No. Very often accommodation is reached in a period of twenty months which is impossible in a period of nine months, and it was considered that by affording the period of twenty months there would be better opportunity for that consideration I have referred to. Alternatively, let us say, there is a dissolution, and the new House sends forward a Bill with a particular restriction upon the power of the Dáil to have the measure passed more quickly. That power is restored to the Dáil, but it is a matter for the judgment of the various members of the Dáil as to whether or not this is a better arrangement than the old one. I consider it is. I consider, in the first place, that while the Seanad might not wish to put the State to the expense of a Referendum, accommodation may be reached, and is possible to be reached, in twenty months which might not be possible in nine. They are giving up a right bestowed on them five or six years ago when the Constitution was being considered. They are giving up the right of submitting such legislation as they considered was inadvisable to a Referendum.
They are giving up a considerable amount, and some consideration must be restored for the consideration which is being surrendered. In this case the eighteen months is a fair consideration, I might say, in respect to both the Seanad and the Dáil. In one case only did the Seanad hold up a Bill for nine months. In one other case the Dáil presented a petition of two-fifths of the members, but that petition was not persisted in.
The President said that there was here a principle of compensation. Is this compensation for vested interests in the Seanad that interfere with the will of the people expressed in legislation through the Dáil? Is that what the compensation means?
There is no vested interest in it.
Then what are you compensating them for?
The compensation is not meant in the sense of pounds, shillings and pence, as apparently the Deputy has interpreted the matter to be. I will make it more simple for the Deputy if he so wishes.
You used the term, suggesting compensation for something which is being taken away. What has been taken away? Their power to interfere with legislation passed by the Dáil being carried into effect? I suggest the principle behind the Bill is compensation for interference with vested interests in their interference with the will of the people as expressed through the Dáil.
Will it not be possible to allow a discussion on the main question?
The second amendment, as has been previously indicated, is not in order. It raises the question generally. On this Bill questions are restricted to the provisions of the Bill itself. Deputy Lemass's amendment is simply a formal amendment which, if moved, would enable the general question to be discussed. The Deputy need not necessarily move it at the first stage.
It is scarcely necessary to preface what I have to say by stating that we intend to oppose this Bill just as we are opposing some of the other Bills. The remark just made by the President that this is intended to compensate the Seanad for certain powers which it is proposed to take away from the Seanad is rather interesting. If we look at the Articles which are being taken away just now, we will see that three bodies, as I said before, are struck at. The people were struck at, because the power of the Initiative was taken away from them. They were struck at because their position had been that of final arbiters of legislation. That was taken away from them. The Dáil was struck at inasmuch as the power of a minority in the Dáil to have legislation referred to the people was taken away from them. We find that the only people who are to be compensated are the Seanad. The Seanad had the power also of referring certain questions to the people. There is no question of the people who talk about the will of the people compensating the people for the powers that are taken away from them, and there is no talk of compensating the representatives of the people for the powers taken away from them.
The only people whom it is proposed to compensate are those who are strong enough to drive a bargain, those in whose behalf all these Bills are being passed, because with the interests they represent they hold the balance of power which is keeping the Executive in office. It is there that we are going to find the reason for this urgency compensation. They are well able to strike a bargain as we can see. They are not going to take anything on the statement of the President. He does not think it sufficient, in dealing with them, to say: "We are going to extent the period," or anything like that. He puts it down in black and white for them so that when they come straight to the question of giving up any of their powers, they will have, side by side with it, their quid pro quo. I hope that the people whose powers are being interfered with, and who gave the present Executive their support for the last five years, because they posed as the champions of the people, will at last waken up to the fact that these were all promises, and that this was all window dressing in order to deceive these people for the last four or five years. The President also performed a certain service here by proving the case which was made by those to-day who opposed this all-night sitting. His attempt to explain this Bill, which he is introducing, shows quite clearly that he did not understand it himself, or that he is half in the land of dreams at the present moment.
If the Deputy has any question to ask me on the Bill I will answer it.
All I can say is that if I had to depend on the President's statement for my understanding of what is in the Bill I would misunderstand it. So that we may see clearly at this hour of the night what is in the Bill, and have clearly in our minds what we are doing, I think I had better take these propositions seriatim.
took the Chair.
The first thing in this Bill is that Article 38 of the Constitution shall be amended by the deletion of "the portion thereof beginning with the words `but a Bill,' and ending with the words `last passed by Dáil Eireann.' " Let us see what the Article was before this was put in, and as it stood before these words were deleted and what it is going to be when they are deleted. Article 38 of the Constitution reads: "Every Bill initiated in and passed by Dáil Eireann shall be sent to Seanad Eireann and may, unless it be a Money Bill, be amended in Seanad Eireann and Dáil Eireann shall consider any such amendment."
Now this is what is proposed to be deleted: "But a Bill passed by Dáil Eireann and considered by Seanad Eireann shall, not later than two hundred and seventy days after it shall have been first sent to Seanad Eireann, or such longer period as may be agreed upon by the two Houses, be deemed to be passed by both Houses in the form in which it was last passed by Dáil Eireann."
Now why is it proposed to delete this particular portion of the Article? I was a member of the Joint Committee, and there was a good deal of play about the word "considered." All that I got out of that was that, apparently, as it stands, the Seanad might do what the Dáil did with the Petition, namely, refuse to consider it, and, therefore, this Article would not apply. Seeing that the Dáil itself sets such a good example, I suppose they think it very well for them to have such a thing to play with, but that the good example is not to be followed elsewhere. The other part of it is that which mentions the period of 270 days. That was the period, or such longer period as might be agreed on by the two Houses, within which the Seanad would have to pass a Bill, or else it would be deemed to have been passed by both Houses. There is a further proposition which is intended to make up for that part which is deleted. I will come to it later, and do not propose to discuss it now.
Then we see the effects of this. One is to omit the portions of the Articles that say that within 270 days any Bill other than a Money Bill shall be deemed to have passed both Houses. In the second part there are to be deleted the words "Provided that." These words are introductory to the sentence "Provided that every Money Bill shall be sent to Seanad Eireann for its recommendation, and at a period not longer than 21 days after it shall have been sent to Seanad Eireann it shall be returned to Dáil Eireann, which may pass it, accepting or rejecting all or any of the recommendations of Seanad Eireann, and as so passed or if not returned within such period of 21 days shall be deemed to have been passed by both Houses." Apparently all that is intended there is that the words "Provided that" shall go out of the Article and that the Article is to proceed: "Every Money Bill shall be sent to Seanad Eireann for its recommendations, and that a period not longer than 21 days after it shall have been sent to Seanad Eireann it shall be returned to Dáil Eireann, which may pass it, accepting or rejecting all or any of the recommendations of Seanad Eireann, and as so passed or if not returned within such period of 21 days shall be deemed to have been passed by both Houses." The third deletion is the sentence beginning with the words, "When a Bill" and ending with the words "of the same." That is the deletion, and the final sentence in Article 38—namely, "When a Bill other than a Money Bill has been sent to Seanad Eireann a joint sitting of the members of both Houses may on resolution passed by Seanad Eireann be convened for the purpose of debating, but not of voting upon, the proposals of the Bill or any amendment of the same."
Let us see what power exactly we are depriving the Seanad of or the reverse. When a Bill other than a Money Bill has been sent to Seanad Eireann there is to be a joint sitting of the members of both Houses. It may on a resolution passed by Seanad Eireann be convened for the purpose of debating, but not of voting upon, the measure.
So this deletion proposes doing away with this joint sitting for the purpose of debating a measure on which there has not been agreement, if the measure is other than a Money Bill. So far as it is a matter largely of deletion we have no particular complaint to make. As I have said very often, we believe that the Seanad is not fulfilling any useful purpose as far as interests of the Irish people are concerned, but the reverse, and accordingly we are not going at any stage to offer any opposition to any proposals which may deprive them of power. The next proposal, that contained in the second section, is that:—
The Constitution shall be and is hereby amended by the insertion therein of the following Article immediately after Article 38 now contained therein, that is to say:—
"38A. Whenever a Bill (not being a Money Bill) initiated in and passed by Dáil Eireann and sent to Seanad Eireann is within the stated period hereinafter defined either rejected by Seanad Eireann or passed by Seanad Eireann with amendments to which Dáil Eireann does not agree or is neither passed (with or without amendment) nor rejected by Seanad Eireann within the said stated period, Dáil Eireann may within one year after the said stated period by resolution expressly passed under this Article again send such Bill to Seanad Eireann in the form (save only for such modifications as are hereinafter authorised) in which it was first sent, and if Seanad Eireann does not, within sixty days thereafter or such longer period as may be agreed to by both Houses, pass such Bill either without amendment or with such amendments only as are agreed to by Dáil Eireann, such Bill shall, if Dáil Eireann so resolves after the expiration of such sixty days or longer period aforesaid, be deemed to have been passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas at the expiration of the said sixty days or longer period aforesaid in the form in which it was so last sent to Seanad Eireann with such (if any) amendments as may have been made therein by Seanad Eireann and agreed to by Dáil Eireann."
Does the Deputy propose to read the whole Bill?
I think it is the quickest way we could possibly get at an understanding of what is contained in it.
It is a very bad precedent.
Seeing that the President, in attempting to explain without the text, made such a mess of himself, I think it would be very unwise to venture on such a course.
I again suggest that if the Deputy has any question to ask me bearing on the Bill, I will answer it.
The President got his chance, and he made such an attempt that I think it would be very unfair at this hour of the night to talk on the measure without reading the Bill.
Will the Deputy give me a chance?
When the time comes the President will get his chance all right.
Could not the Deputy deal with the Bill without reading it all?
I have to take this bit by bit to see what bargain we are striking with the Seanad, and what we are going to give them. As this is a Bill to deprive them of certain privileges they have already this is a bargain that has to be struck. This is what the Seanad have to get. We have to ask ourselves why are we singling them out to give them these special privileges when no attempt is to be made to recompense the people as a whole or the Dáil for powers taken away from them. We have first of all the distinction between Money Bills and ordinary Bills. I think we should have a separate discussion on the two parts to see exactly how we stand with respect to each of them. Take Bills, not Money Bills, and see what the Seanad can do with them, as explained in Section 2 of the Bill.
What it means, therefore, up to this point is, if the Seanad either rejects a measure or tries to put off considering it or introduces amendments into it to which the Dáil does not agree then there is to be some remedy.
That is so.
What is this remedy we are supposed to have? Of course we will have to watch the stated period within which they must take action.
That is right.
We will all know it before we are finished.
The Deputy can write down eighteen months after that.
I prefer the written text to the recollection of the President.
We will be wiser before breakfast.
I think the Leas-Cheann Comhairle had some idea that this was altogether from the point of view of killing time. He is making a mistake.
Oh no, I was only thinking of what would happen if this was a Bill of 50 sections.
These measures are all by themselves. I do not think we can establish any precedents except ones that relate to the same type of matter. I am much more interested in other sorts of precedents that are being set. I was going to say, working at this hour of the night, that we should be very careful of what we are passing. We should read it carefully. Therefore, I believe I am performing a very useful service to the House in getting through in this particular fashion. Within a certain period, anyhow, the Seanad must take action. We will know what that period is afterwards. Dáil Eireann may within one year after a said stated period add another year on to that. Within that year Dáil Eireann has the power of doing certain things. The word "suspension" has apparently dropped from the Report. The words of the Report were that the Bill was to be suspended for a period. I take it this is the type of suspension that is provided "within one year after the said stated period by a resolution expressly passed under this Article against such Bill to Seanad Eireann in the form, save only for such modifications as are hereinafter authorised, in which it was first so sent, and if Seanad Eireann does not within sixty days thereafter or such longer period as may be agreed to by both Houses pass such Bill either without amendment or with such amendments only as are agreed to by Dáil Eireann, such Bill shall, if Dáil Eireann so resolves after the expiration of such sixty days or longer period aforesaid, be deemed to have been passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas...."
Does the Deputy consider it necessary to re-read the Bill?
I am afraid we have to pull out of it what is hedged in so much verbiage. If I am going to give a considered vote on this Bill, I want to know exactly what is in it, and to analyse it from that point of view.
I was rather reluctantly prepared to allow the Deputy to read the Bill once, but I am not going to allow him to re-read it.
Surely it is necessary. If we read the words "sixty days" in three lines, I want to make sure that there is nothing added by the repetition of the words. It seems to me, having read it now two or three times, that there is not. I want to be sure of that.
If every Deputy wants to make himself equally clear and wants to read the Bill twice or three times over, no business will be done.
I am doing what it was the President's duty to do, going through this Bill, so that we might understand what we are doing. He shirked the duty. I dare say he read the Bill, but I hold that his explanation was quite different from my interpretation of it. He has put in 18 months where there is a year in question from the sixty days involved.
I certainly cannot allow the Deputy to read the Bill and then to re-read it.
I submit that to construe a sentence like that of about 20 or 25 lines, having read it as a whole it is necessary to break it up into fragments to see what each piece means. I cannot explain what is contained in the Bill intelligently either to myself or anybody else otherwise. It will be said, "That is your interpretation of the Bill." I am trying to get the Bill to interpret itself. In that way we will get to the end very much more quickly than by talking, as we often hear people talk, away from the Bill. You will admit that at least I am talking absolutely to the Bill.
I assume that the Deputy and other Deputies have read the Bill before now —that the Deputy is not reading the Bill for the first time now. The Deputy will see my point that if Deputies are to be allowed to read Bills as they come in and to re-read them, no business will be done.
I agree with that as a general principle. But I say if the President did his duty, it would not be necessary. This Bill confers certain powers, and the fact that there was a condition in a similar Article, portion of which gave rise to a great deal of trouble, should make it necessary to consider it in this way. If that had been considered as I am trying to consider this, we would not have these difficulties. It is because these things are not considered carefully and the text read in such a way as to pull out of it what is in it, and to see that there is nothing hidden in it, that we do it in this way. Really the bringing in of these Constitution Bills is a farce in itself. If the Constitution is to be regarded as a fundamental, surely it ought not to be rushed through in this particular way, particularly at this time of night. It is necessary in order to keep ourselves awake to advert fully to the things that are contained in this, to read them and to break them up into their parts. If I may, I will try as best I can to limit the re-reading. It is necessary to see exactly where we stand. We have, to start with, a stated period within which the Seanad must take action. That is a period of——
Eighteen months——
That is to be mentioned later. We will come to that. Now we have had a period of sixty days coming in, after which a resolution——
In view of the simple idea in the Bill, the straightforward way it is expressed, and the way the Deputy is dealing with the matter, I beg to move: "That the question be now put."
Well, well!
I cannot accept that.
I submit that the Deputy is simply fooling in the way in which he is speaking to this Bill.
I think the Minister has no right to submit anything of the kind. Surely we want to know what exactly we are talking about.
The Minister forgets that he is no longer commander-in-chief, and that he cannot shoot men out of hand.
And apparently he has not read the Standing Orders.
The Minister for Murder and Massacre.
That statement made by Deputy MacEntee must be immediately withdrawn.
I withdraw the expression of the statement, but my opinion of the Minister remains.
The Deputy must make an unqualified withdrawal of the statement.
I make an unqualified withdrawal of the statement.
One year after this stated period, which appears later to be about eighteen months, the Dáil may by resolution send back a Bill to the Seanad a second time. It is to be sent back in the form in which it was sent originally or with such amendments, I take it, as are agreed upon or such changes other than those I have mentioned, and if there are any changes other than those they should be amendments which come under the heading "save only as are hereinafter authorised." These are to be certified, I understand, by the Ceann Comhairle, as due to the lapse of time. The next thing is that within sixty days thereafter, or if the Dáil agree to have a longer period—I take it the other House, if they are disposed to hold up a Bill, will look for the longest possible period—they may pass such Bill either without amendment or with such amendments as are agreed to by Dáil Eireann, "and such Bill shall, if Dáil Eireann so resolves, after the expiration of such sixty days or longer period aforesaid, be deemed to have been passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas at the expiration of the said sixty days or longer period aforesaid in the form in which it was so last sent to Seanad Eireann, with such amendments, if any, as may have been made therein by Seanad Eireann and agreed to by Dáil Eireann." The sum of it all apparently is this: that there is a stated period which is defined later to be eighteen months, and within that period the Seanad must consider that Bill. If it rejects the Bill or sends it back to the Dáil with amendments to which the Dáil does not agree, there is a year within which the Dáil may take action by resolution and send it back again to the Seanad. After a second sending up there is a period of sixty days, or a longer period if agreed to by the Dáil, within which the Seanad must finally pass the Bill. The only restrictions upon sending it up a second time are that it shall have no changes in the form in which it was first sent up, except those agreed to by the Dáil, or such as are certified by the Ceann Comhairle to be necessary owing to the lapse of time. I think we understand fairly clearly——
I think the Deputy made one slight mistake. A measure can be considered in relation to the minimum period and to the maximum period. The minimum period is exactly twenty months—eighteen months and sixty days. I think with that exception the Deputy's explanation is correct.
What is the maximum period?
That is a matter for agreement, but ordinarily it should be eighteen months and twelve months and sixty days.
We have got to this point that we are beginning to see fairly clearly what powers the Seanad is getting instead of the two hundred and seventy days. I happen also, in this matter, to have had the advantage of being a member of the Committee. It was remarked there, I think by members of the Seanad, certainly by more than one member of the Committee, that in the Referendum the Seanad had a power which was more apparent than real, that they had a power of Referendum which they did not dare to use, that they had a useless power as far as they were concerned. We are proposing now to give them a power that could be made very effective for a House that wished to obstruct the majority Party here, if that majority Party should not have their own particular viewpoint. In other words, if there should be in this House a majority sent by the Irish people with views other than the views of the present Executive, the Seanad, instead of having a power of Referendum, which they did not dare to use——
Is not the majority sent here by the Irish people?
The Seanad is not sent here by the Irish people.
Do not try to blame the people.
It was Cumann na nGaedheal selected you?
I do not know who selected you.
As I say, the Seanad had the power of Referendum, it had the power of holding up for two hundred and seventy days, which is the only power it had. Here there is a period of about twenty months as the minimum involved. The bargain they have struck is this, that a power which they did not dare to use, and that would be no good to them in the circumstances that I indicated, is being taken from them. A body is sent here by the people to carry out a certain programme which is not the type of programme that the Seanad would be likely to favour. They would not dare to go to the people, and they have not, as a matter of fact, ever attempted to use the Referendum. They would not dare to use it in the circumstances I indicate, but with the new power given them they could very effectively hold up an Executive or a majority Party here, to whom they are opposed, for a period of some twenty months.
I say that we ought not to give them that power. When I was speaking on the Seanad generally, I said that as far as I was personally concerned I was not a doctrinaire; as to the question of a single chamber or of two, that I could very well conceive a framework of government in which two Houses would be necessary, but it would be a very different framework of government from the one that is here, and I could see in the Seanad as it exists here nothing but a device to block the way of the Irish people towards the completion of their march to freedom. I see that in this Bill they are to be given a power that they did not have before for doing that, power of holding up legislation during the greater part of the life of a parliament, because probably four years will be about the average duration of a parliament. Five years is the maximum as it is, but we may take it that four years will be about the average period of work of a single parliament. Therefore this Bill gives the Seanad power to hold up for two full years the action of, say, an executive duly appointed after a general election.
I think it wrong to take away the powers from the people such as they have for initiating legislation themselves, and further to hamper them by saying that, even after a general election, there is to be a House here consisting of people who, in the new circumstances, will largely elect themselves, and who in the present circumstances are nothing more or less than a tail, so to speak, of the majority Party at present in the House. It is an indirect way of giving the present Executive power to hold up legislation, over and above whatever powers they may have when they come to be in opposition. They would then have not merely such powers of holding up legislation as their numbers might give them, but they would be looking for the support of this other House which they are building up. They are preparing that House for the day when they will be trying to prevent the passing of legislation by another Executive. I said also, when we were considering this before, that what we want is not a House that will be a clog on progress, that if it were possible to devise a second chamber which would give a lead in legislation there would be some reason for a second chamber. As I have already said, we are conservative by character; we are conservative by reason of the occupation of the greater number of our people, and we are conservative by reason of the forces against which we are contending. We are up against outside threats, and these are all forces that are tending to keep the nation back. I appeal to any member here who at any time wished to see the realisation of the aspirations which were common to all of us a few years ago, not to vote for setting up another House which will be a clog upon progress.
The Deputy is wandering somewhat from the Bill now.
No, I submit, a Chinn Comhairle, that I am talking very much to the point, that I am speaking of the character of the Seanad in connection with the powers which they are to get. In this Bill you are giving them powers of holding up a popularly-elected Executive to which they may be opposed; you are giving them the power of holding up legislation for a period which is more than twice as long as the period for which they can hold up legislation at present. And as far as the Referendum is concerned, as I have said, they have nothing in that that would be detrimental to the progress of the country, because if the majority of the people were in favour of a certain line of action there was very little use in the Senate appealing to Caesar; Caesar hath spoken, and therefore that power was one that was more apparent than real. But you are giving them real power now to hold up legislation for one-half the normal Parliamentary period, and if the Executive were not changed in the interim, the period of office of an Executive which would come in on certain social or political programmes would be held up for two years. I have heard this House spoken of many times as sovereign. I would be willing, on my own behalf anyhow, to make a bargain with the President— to get rid of this Constitution altogether. I know that the Labour members and others would not be prepared to deal with the matter in that way, but I am quite prepared to accept this House as sovereign and representing the people. There would be some sense in speaking of the House as sovereign if you had no Constitution and no bonds in the form of another House, and things of that kind. But it is nonsense to speak of this House as being sovereign if it is to give away its sovereign powers by making it possible for another House so to cloak legislation that progress would become practically impossible. I will leave it to other speakers, if they choose, to deal with other parts of this Bill. As far as I am concerned, my attitude is this, that I would not give twenty months' power of holding up to the Seanad. If the Seanad is intended to give a reasonable time to the Dáil for second thoughts, a reasonable time to the Dáil to reconsider its previous decisions, to have amendments to legislation, surely the original 270 days—nine months—is sufficient. I made a motion in the Joint Committee to reduce it to nine months.
Did the Deputy get any other vote than his own for it?
When you had got half of the Committee interested in preserving for themselves their powers it was not likely that I would get very much support, and when you had another portion of it interested, as the Executive at present is, in keeping this power, which, as I said the other day about the valve, will be used one way, on account of the fact that they will owe their position to them, they need not be expected to harass the present Executive very much. Therefore, we had, against that proposition, the Seanad representatives on that Committee. I do not know if all of them were against it, but apparently, in view of the suggestion that I had no vote but my own they were all against it. Naturally, I only wish that this House was as anxious about retaining its powers and its supremacy as the Seanad was about retaining theirs. We would then make some progress. Apparently they voted solidly to retain these powers, and I do not blame them if they believe that a second House is valuable, and. having a good opinion of themselves, by all means it was natural that they should try to preserve their powers. But what does that voting indicate? You might have expected straight away that you would have got six Seanad members against it, and that you would have got a section of the Dáil members, representing the majority here, against it, expecting that the Seanad would be useful to them. In fact, the Seanad is going to play the same role in this country as the House of Lords used to play in England: it is going to be a help to the Tories, and the moment any progress is proposed to be made by those who are progressive it will hold them up until the cup becomes full. As I said in the Committee, from one point of view I might be very glad that this whole series of propositions is going through. Allowing the Seanad to elect itself, although there is no direct contact with the people, and giving them these powers of holding up the popular assembly, can be very useful when the time comes to clip their wings, as it will surely come.
As I say, my opposition to this is to giving them these powers to hold up for a period of twenty months. To my thinking the period of nine months that was there was quite long enough. It would give time to any party interested to get public opinion interested. It would give time to make sure that nothing was done in haste or without due consideration, but to give them any longer period necessary, to enable them to function in that particular way as a suspending or delaying body, to give mature consideration to anything is to erect a machine for deliberately obstructing the people's advancement. That is the main ground on which we oppose this measure. I would like also to know from the President—perhaps he would not mind answering me before I finish —whether this is the end of the powers to be conferred on the Seanad. Have we all the Bills here, or are we going to be presented with another sheaf?
I am almost certain we have.
"Almost." If you had anyone on this side anxious to forget words and to blind himself to the obvious I would have forgotten the "almost."
The Deputy would not believe me. He would not take my word.
I believe in acting, as apparently the Seanad is acting. I would like to see what we are going to get. I have a fair amount of experience how approaches of that kind have been dealt with, and I want in future to see a thing in black and white. It would be important in considering these Bills, and it is only fair to us if we are going to have the Seanad question dealt with piecemeal in separate Bills, that we have, at least, the whole sheaf of them before us, in order that we might know exactly what is the extent of the powers to be conferred on the Seanad. There was something else I was looking for and which we thought we would see figuring here.
If I can help the Deputy I am willing to do so.
I do not wish to suggest anything.
Oliver Twist.
I am waiting for the President.
I want to know in what way I could help the Deputy.
Perhaps the President would tell us if he proposes to confer any further powers on the Seanad.
Oh, not at all.
Then we may take it with the same assurance as we were told we could take the other statement this evening, that in these ten Bills you have all the powers you propose to confer on the Seanad.
These are all the powers we propose to take from the Seanad.
No, all the powers you wish to confer on them.
We will have it both ways, both taking away and conferring.
In other words, this finishes it?
Yes.
Does the Seanad propose to extract any further powers?
I can assure the Deputy that I had no consultation with Senators either on this or any other Bill.
That is very interesting.
I am simply carrying out the recommendations of the Joint Committee, of which the Leader of the Opposition was a member.
I was a member with a well-defined programme and a well-defined purpose of which everybody in this Dáil was aware.
The Deputy should not disown his own child:
I have not disowned anything. There is nothing to disown. I made my position so clear that they were all anxious to assure me that anything I said would not merely not be used in evidence against me, but that everyone understood what my aim was; seeing that I was not able to push the ending of the Seanad in that Committee, at least I was able to make it as little harmful as possible. You will find that there is rigorous consistency in every amendment which I moved there, my purpose being to make the Seanad as little harmful as possible. There is one of the Bills which we are opposing, that dealing with the question of age, in regard to which I plead guilty to proposing that the age be changed from 35 to 30, my reason, which was a very clear one, being that I hoped to get a little more progress if there were people in the Seanad under 35. I feel that as I had no chance of fixing the age at 21 or 10 that I would have to agree to 30. It gave a chance of getting people there with progressive ideas.
Are not men of 75 good men?
As the Deputy has just challenged me on that point, I may say that another suggestion that occurred to me was to make the age over 80. Either 10 or 80 would suit my purpose. I have indicated fairly fully my objection to this Bill. The point is that, to my thinking, the period should not be longer than it was. There is no question of compensating the Seanad, because the powers you take away have no real substance in them. They were powers that could not be used in order to block the progress of the nation. These powers can be used. That is the main basis of our objection to this particular Bill.
I do not like to give a silent vote on this Bill, and signs are not wanting that if I do not speak now I may not have a chance of speaking later on.
The Minister is on the war-path.
Mr. O'CONNELL
Exactly. I am very strongly opposed to the principle of this measure. The principle, despite the involved verbiage, is simple. It proposes to extend the period during which the Seanad can hold up legislation passed by this House from a period of nine months to, at least, a minimum period of twenty months. That is what it proposes to do. I am opposed to that, and would be opposed to that extension even if we had no proposal to change the method of electing the Seanad; but it is doubly and trebly objectionable when coupled with another proposal before the House, namely, to prevent the election of the Seanad by a direct vote of the people. The Seanad is being made more unrepresentative, shall I say, and, at the same time, it is being given more power to hold up legislation passed by the representatives of the people. That is the position in a nutshell, and for that reason I am opposing it, and the President cannot use the argument which he used in the case of the other Bills, namely, that this is a proposal which has been put to the people at a general election or any other time, and that it is the will of the people that it should be passed. He knows that if it were put to the people it would not be accepted by them, and they would not give this power to the Seanad to hold up legislation passed by the elected representatives of the people. I do not think it is necessary to say anything more about it. I propose to vote against the Bill.
I move:—
To delete the word "now" and add at the end of the motion the words "this day twelve months."
In support of that amendment I think I can quote with advantage the speech which the President made in introducing the Bill. If any useful purpose can be served by introducing provisions for delaying a Bill about which there is disagreement in the Seanad, for a period of twenty months, in order to enable reconsideration to be effected, then surely a strong case can be made out for delaying this Bill for a period of twelve months to enable reconsideration to be possible here. If there ever was a Bill introduced in this or any other House which would require reconsideration, and reconsideration in a perfectly calm and cool atmosphere, this Bill is such a Bill. The phraseology of the Bill is most involved. The machinery established by the Bill is most involved. The average man with average intelligence trying to get behind the purpose of that Bill could not do so unless he had read it over a number of times and then had it translated into ordinary English. Having done that, he might get a glimmering of the idea behind it, and having done that and then proceeding to compare it with the original Article of the Constitution, to find out what changes would be made, he would come to the conclusion that it is not a Bill that should be rushed through in an assembly at a quarter past two in the morning. If it is essential that provision should be made by which the Seanad can, if they so desire, take twenty months over a Bill, surely it is equally essential that this Dáil ought to have an opportunity of giving it proper consideration. The purpose of the Bill, stripped of all its qualifications and verbiage, is to increase the power which the Seanad has of vetoing Acts of this House. The purpose of the Bill is practically to double its powers. Any Bill dealing with the Article of the Constitution concerned, which would be likely to get the support of the Deputies on this side of the House would have to be a Bill that would propose not to increase these powers, but to abolish them. It is an extraordinary thing, in my opinion, that a Bill of this nature is introduced by the present Government at all, but it becomes a much more extraordinary thing when we consider that this Bill is introduced, as Deputy O'Connell has pointed out, along with another Bill or two other Bills which propose to alter the constitution of the Seanad in a manner which will provide that it will in no sense be a democratically-elected body, representative of the people. It is proposed to give this power, this extraordinary power, of vetoing Acts of this House, suspending Bills introduced here for a period of twenty months, to an assembly which will be partly nominated and partly elected in a manner which could not confer upon them the right to claim that they were able to speak on behalf of the Irish people.
I think that proper consideration has not been given to the idea of abolishing the power of the Seanad to interfere in the acts of this assembly. It has been denied by the Government that the Seanad was established to give to a particular class in this country a certain power which they could otherwise get, but if there is any strength in this denial then a strong case can be made out for taking out of the hands of the Seanad power to hold up legislation. If, however, the charge is true, and if the Seanad has been established and is being maintained to veto the power and to veto the acts of the people's representatives for a certain privileged class, then this Bill is in accordance with that policy. The criticisms that were made upon the Bill which has just passed, and the action of the Government in waiting till the year 1928 after all that has happened in between, to effect an amendment holds good in this case also. In this year 1928 we have these proposals to take from the people and the Dáil certain powers and rights which the Constitution bestowed upon them and to confer upon an undemocratic and unrepresentative oligarchy additional powers to interfere with the people's will. That power of veto should be abolished. I have stated, of course, that the attitude of this Party is that, if there must be a Seanad— and we are not strong enough yet to secure its abolition—it should be a Seanad so much under the control of this Dáil that its operations would be harmless, that we should hold them under our thumb so that they would not be able to squeak unless we lifted our thumb, and certainly we ought to hold them so tight that they could not wriggle. If there was a Nationalist Government in office—I will not say even a Republican Government—that had kept its anchors in general National principles, it would be their purpose to reduce the Seanad to that condition and not to entrench them in the position in which it is now proposed to put them. It is, I maintain, ridiculous for the majority of the elected representatives of the people of this State to sit here and sleep here while a Bill is being passed through this House to confer the right of vetoing their acts upon an assembly in which we have a number of members who represent nobody, who were nominated by the President of the Executive Council, and who could not be said even to represent him; numbers of persons holding offices and titles of honour from the British Crown, a number of members of the British Parliament, a number of pensioned officers of an alien army—an assembly of that nature——
I do not think the Deputy ought to criticise the present personnel of the Seanad.
I submit it is an important consideration.
I do not think it is desirable, but it could be done in a general way.
I do not propose to mention names or anything of that kind. But this Seanad, which does exist—and remember the period of office even under the new system will be nine years—and which has power to reproduce itself, does include persons of that class amongst its members. It is to a body of that nature, and, consequently, representative of the views that you would expect in a body of that nature, that we propose to give additional powers to veto the acts of the people's representatives.
We go through the farce of holding a general election and of electing 152 Deputies, who are supposed to be the representatives of the people and entitled to speak on their behalf in all matters affecting legislation. These representatives of the people are proposing, without consulting the people, to confer upon an undemocratic body the right to interfere with the legislation which we, as the people's representatives, consider necessary for the people's welfare—to give them the right to hold it up for two years. Deputy de Valera stated that the normal life of the Dáil is probably four years. I am sorry to disagree with him. That is not my opinion. The normal life of the Dáil has been much less. If we take the period of existence of the four or five Dala which have existed here, we will find that the average life is about two years.
Is the average and the normal the same?
I presume there is a difference. In due course, when the present Government has been removed and a Fianna Fáil Government elected, the normal period and the average period will probably be the full period of five years. But at present we must take the average to be the normal, because the normal has been the average, and that has been about two years. It is for the average period during which the Dáil remains in existence that we propose to confer upon the Seanad, which remains for a much longer period, the power to hold up legislation.
I have no doubt that we will not be able to convince the Government of the unwisdom of their action. They are, I think, beyond redemption in matters of that kind. They have, no doubt, arrived at some arrangement or understanding, as a result of which this Bill has been introduced. They are going to confer upon the Seanad this power, or else we presume they will resign as a Government if the Dáil refuses to co-operate with them. I have no doubt that the Dáil will co-operate with them, that the Bill will be passed and that the Seanad will get this power.
I wish, therefore, to draw the attention of the Government to a matter on which it might be possible to get some alteration of their opinions. Is it necessary that the procedure by which the veto of the Seanad will be exercised should be as complicated as this? If somebody sat down, or if a Committee sat down, to devise the most complicated procedure possible, could they have beaten this? Was it not possible to say that the Seanad will have the right to hold up a Bill for twenty months, and if at the end of twenty months no agreement has been reached the Bill becomes law in spite of them? That would be quite simple. But what happens here? This Dáil in its wisdom passes a Bill, and that Bill goes to the Seanad, and the Seanad can either reject, amend, or refuse to consider it. If they reject it or amend it in a manner not agreeable to the Dáil, or refuse to consider it, a period of eighteen months elapses. After the conclusion of that eighteen months, the Dáil has discretion for a further period of twelve months to consider whether or not it will pass a resolution concerning the Bill. If it does pass a resolution the Bill goes again to the Seanad, and if the Seanad refuses to pass it, or to amend it in a manner agreeable to the Dáil, or to consider it, the Dáil, at the expiration of another period of sixty days, again passes a resolution, and then the Bill proceeds to the Governor-General to get his signature across the bottom of it. There are five separate stages: The Dáil passes the Bill; the Seanad does something with the Bill; the Dáil passes a resolution; the Seanad again does something with the Bill—rejects it; and the Dáil passes another resolution; and all to effect what I suggest could be effected by a much simpler procedure. What you want to do is to give to this collection of Lords, Dukes, Earls, and people of that kind, the right to veto our decision. Could you not say definitely that the Seanad will have the right to hold up a Bill passed by the Dáil, with which they disagree, for a period of twenty months, and that if in the meantime agreement cannot be reached, then the Bill becomes law despite the collection? That is all that is required. Instead of that we have a sentence here consisting of some twenty lines, each line containing about ten words. It is broken up by several provisoes, commas, brackets, and things of that kind, all establishing an elaborate machinery that I contend is unnecessary. Then a number of provisions are added, all equally complicated, and all equally designed to do the one thing, which could be done in a much simpler manner.
There is one sub-section of the Bill with which I am in complete agreement. It is, strange to say, a sub-section that the President in his introductory remarks did not refer to, and because he did not refer to it, I propose to refer to it and to indicate the reasons why the sub-section should be carried. That is sub-section (c) of Section 1, to delete the following sentence in Article 38:—
"When a Bill other than a Money Bill has been sent to Seanad Eireann a joint meeting of the members of both Houses may, on a resolution passed by Seanad Eireann, be convened for the purpose of debating, but not voting, upon the proposals of the Bill or any amendment of the same."
It was a senseless provision which it is just as well to get rid of. Certainly no one on this side of the House has any desire to meet these Senators, and join in a joint sitting to discuss anything. We do not believe any useful purpose would be served by it or any light thrown upon our discussions. If the President will agree to delete all the other sections of the Bill and leave that one sub-section in it, I am for it, but not otherwise.
To summarise my objections to the Bill: They are, first of all, that the Seanad should not have power to veto at all. If they have power to veto, as they have under the existing Constitution, it should not be the function of this Dáil to increase these powers. If it is proposed to increase the powers, or allow them to retain the powers, a Bill doing so should be worded in a manner that an ordinary individual could understand, and not be a sort of Chinese puzzle, as this is. For these reasons, I hope the Dáil will reject the Bill, and I hope they will reject it also because, while I am certain that the majority of Deputies present have not read it, they will have been convinced of its nature by the very confused statement concerning it with which the President introduced it. I hope the Dáil will reject the Bill, and I move the amendment to postpone it for twelve months in any case.
I suggest that while the President is at it he might delete as a consistent part of this work the Preamble of the Constitution Act which acknowledges that all lawful authority comes from God to the people. He might delete that as a joke as soon as he has passed these amendment Bills. This series of amendments to the Constitution is in fact the answer of the Cumann na nGaedheal Party to the coming of the Fianna Fáil Party into this House. The Public Safety Act was the remedy if we stayed out, and this is the remedy to prevent us making any progress in this House now that we have come in. Bills of this sort will have a most invidious effect upon Irish life, because they are making a new attack upon a certain minority in this country absolutely necessary, giving them power to interfere with the national life of the country to such an extent that the country will lose all patience with them, and their condition in the end will be worse than it has been in this country before. In fact the best and the worst that can be said of this Bill is that it does give that type of minority in this country enough rope to hang itself with. Two years' delay means that a party after it has been in power for two years can at that stage take it for granted that anything in the nature of controversial legislation will be a dead letter, because it will be held up for the life of that Parliament.
The President seemed to think that because Deputy de Valera was in a minority of one in the Committee, in his view on the matter of the Seanad, that therefore his view was to be taken lightly. As a matter of fact, it was rather a reflection upon those who represented the Cumann na nGaedheal Party on that Committee that they should be willing to give away the rights and privileges of the House. There is not a great deal that I can say about this Bill. In principle it is a very simple one. It is crude enough, and will be an added argument in the mouths of those who are trying to prove that there is no possibility of making use of any institutions in the Free State for the purpose of forwarding the cause of Irish freedom. It is playing directly into the hands of the younger generation of revolutionaries in this country. And although we come along here in a humdrum kind of way, taking it for granted that different people will take different views, and we get accustomed to one another, at the same time, in the light of subsequent history, those imposing those limitations upon the progress of the nation will figure in a very sorry light. They will figure as those who have been condemned in the past for opposing the will of the people, for playing the game of the British, and will figure in the future as those who are taking up the attitude of doing the work of the only enemy that Ireland has ever had. This Bill, if nothing else would, would justify all opposition being put up to the Government. It is antidemocratic, it is anti-national, and upon those grounds I support the amendment.
I desire to support the amendment, moved by Deputy Lemass, asking that the consideration of this change in the Constitution should be postponed for 12 months. When the Joint Committee of both Houses was appointed to discuss the question of the Constitution, it was appointed, as far as I can make out, with special reference to the pending elections of the Seanad. It was quite natural that in their recommendations the Committee should make proposals to make the procedure for the election to the next Seanad more expeditious and more easy. But whatever the views of the members of this House who are in favour of the Government policy of passing legislation to put all these recommendations of the Committee into operation, I am sure that if they could look at it, from the broad national point of view, or from the democratic point of view, they will see that there is something more at issue than the mere question of the procedure as to the election to the Seanad.
There is in this Bill, as Deputy Little pointed out, something which no one can say can be regarded as purely a political issue that is raised by one side of this House any more than another. It is an issue that affects all parties in the House, and that is the issue as to whether or not this Dáil, which is elected by the people, is to be sovereign and representative in making the laws of this country, or whether it is now, at this stage, going to place in the hands of the Seanad powers which they had not before for the holding up of legislation. I suggest that if you are going to make a change of that kind in the Constitution, which will radically affect the relation between the two Houses, without members having had the opportunity of viewing the thing from the point of view of constitutional development—if they look at it from that narrow point of view alone—without having the opportunity of examining it from that point of view, and show that you are deaf to all entreaties from this side, to look at it from a national point of view, I think you are setting a very dangerous precedent.
The English House of Lords is a very old-established institution which had very strong rights grown up after centuries of normal development. It held a well-established place in the English legislature. Under modern conditions it was found, no matter what might have been the value of the House of Lords at one time, that modern circumstances demanded that there should be a definite change, and that the Lower House should definitely assert its superiority. Here we are not alone going to change the method of election and to give the Seanad, as it seems to me, much larger powers than the Second House can elsewhere claim in regard to money matters, but we are also, of our own deliberate initiative and our own free will, going to place another body superior to the people—another body which, no matter what Government may be returned here, and no matter what mandate it may have to carry out certain legislation, will have the power, no matter what the will of the people may be to the contrary, to hold up that legislation for a period of two years. Holding it up for such a long period is not, in my opinion, as the President insinuated, merely giving sufficient time to think over it and to discuss it.
We must assume that if you have normal conditions and you have two large parties working in a normal parliamentary manner, any party that in future will form a Government will come back from the country with a majority, with a mandate behind it, and the questions which it will endeavour to legislate will have been discussed thoroughly and will have been understood by the people, if they are not understood now. We can assume that in the course of time the people will have a better knowledge of these matters, and you now want to close the door to that line of development. You do not want to give the people the chance to see whether constitutional amendments will be made possible or not. Will you destroy the right of the Referendum? Will you take away that power from the people? You ought to be consistent if you do so, and take away the power also from the Seanad; but you are not doing that. You take from the will of the people which you prate so much about on the one hand, and at the same time you attack your chief opposition and you hand over new powers to the Seanad when, if you have any faith at all in democratic power, you should equally weaken the Seanad which cannot speak for the people, which has not the same foundation as the Referendum itself would have, or as any body elected to this House would have. It is a body which has no claim to say that it has the same democratic sanction as the people themselves. While you abolish the Referendum, you deliberately hand over to the Seanad an additional power, and what you pretend to take away with one hand you hand back with the other.
What is the reason of that? Are we to assume that you are really working on a definite policy? If you are working on a definite policy, and if you believe the right thing to do is to take away this power from the people and take it away from the Dáil, why not be logical and take it away also from the Seanad? What is the reason for giving the power to the Seanad to hold up legislation? Is there any sanction or any argument from any other Parliament in the world which could justify it? I do not believe any Minister on the opposite side can advance any argument, can show any analogy, or give us any case of where a lower chamber of its own initiative gave those powers simply because a certain committee sat, a committee which, in my opinion, was simply an ad hoc committee and had not the resources nor the time at its disposal, nor had it the facilities, to go into the whole question of the relations between the two Houses. As a result of a few hours sitting of that Committee you are going, at the beginning of the establishment of this new State, to hand over to the Second Chamber a power they could not possibly get without your sanction here. I suggest that matter is entirely above Party. It is up to the Government Party who believe that their State is well established, that they have reasonable conditions of stability and security here and that there is a prosperous and peaceful future before the State—I suggest that they ought to show reasons, historical reasons or democratic reasons, for making this change.
I say whatever excuse there may have been in 1922 or 1923 to rush legislation of this character through the House without giving Deputies an opportunity to digest it, without giving them at least the same opportunity that it is proposed that the Seanad will have, there is no excuse now. If there is an attempt to rush the whole thing through in a few hours to give them power to hold up laws for two years, I suggest the question is more important than that. If we are ever going to get anywhere the Ministry will have to face the thing in a better spirit. That is not the reply they ought to make to the entry of the Fianna Fáil Party into this House. I try to look at it as dispassionately as I can. I say I am in agreement with Deputy Little when he says that we can only regard it as being simply a trick to accomplish that which they could not otherwise secure. It is an attempt to strengthen the powers of the Seanad and give them in addition to the ample powers which they already possess the entirely new power of holding up legislation for such a long period, which, I think, practically means negativing that type of legislation. I suggest the House is not cognisant of the facts and is not doing itself justice. The members of the House, if they are true to themselves and true to Ireland, will stop and ponder over the thing. They will try to look more clamly than they have been looking at the history of the past two years. If they are in earnest let those on the other side who say there is a constitutional way show us where the constitutional way is now. Let them show us how a Party which is returned with a majority will be able to proceed unimpeded in this work of achieving the full national aspirations of the Irish people on constitutional lines.
If this blockade, this barrier which it is now sought to put in the way of that future majority, is passed by this House into law, I suggest it is incumbent upon them not alone to do that, if they are honest in their argument that there is a constitutional way, but that it is up to them also—if we can afford to leave the national question out of the matter altogether, and I do not think we can—to look at it simply from the point of view of the history of development of other countries and to say what are the arguments in favour of this. Surely the members of the House who have had experience over the past six years and who have taken an interest in the Constitution that we have not taken, who have taken it to their hearts and who believe that there is something in it which could benefit the country and leave the country firm, are not going to allow themselves to be jockeyed into a false position on the pretence that there is an obstruction policy, and are going to create an obstruction which will be the obstruction of a body which will have no claim to speak for the Irish people, and which will not represent the plain people of Ireland. On the mere pretence, the excuse, that obstruction is being offered in this House—and why not, when arguments are not produced to defend the legislation that is sought to be passed? —are they going to be so bereft of their dignity as Deputies and representatives of the people, and are they going to think so little of the future of their country as to vote simply and purely from the Party point of view because they are told to vote in a certain way? I appeal to the members on the opposite side to view the question more sancly and more dispassionately than that, and to agree with me that this whole question is really a serious question and an important question. This question of the additional powers of the Seanad ought to be discussed quite separately. There has been no reason given for bringing this measure forward at this particular juncture.
When the President was questioned in his opening statement on the reason for urgency in connection with this Bill, he was not able to state it. He simply put forward an argument which I venture to think had little thought behind it. The President was anxious to get his summer holidays. He is so anxious to rush business that he cannot take time to explain what he means when he says that the simple proposal and the whole object of the Bill is to delay legislation and give the Seanad and Dáil sufficient time to consider matters and come to an agreement. I cannot believe that. I have heard no argument which would lead me to believe that this is an honest effort to help us towards real peace in the country and real freedom. I can only regard it as a trick, as an endeavour on the part of a Government who feel that they may be at any time displaced from office, and they want to leave something very definite after them. I say they have no mandate for that, and if they went to the people to-morrow on the whole question of the Seanad they would find the country would not support them.
They have no right, even though they may have what they interpreted as a general mandate to set up a certain type of Government and a certain institution, to come along now without having said anything to the people at the election with regard to extending the powers of the Seanad, and act in this fashion under the pretext of arranging for a Seanad election. They are now trying to alter the Constitution by a subterfuge. They now come to alter the Constitution, and they are taking a serious step like this, which may cause trouble in the future and which may waste the energies of the country in a fresh struggle between the two Houses. This is a matter which requires fuller consideration than we can give it at present. The proper course is to delete this measure until we have had wiser constitutional opinion on the whole matter.
Whatever way I vote on this Bill, I can assure the House that I will be glad to hear what is the real view of the Government on this matter. Are they in earnest in trying to perfect the Constitution or are they simply trying to destroy the Constitution, to tear and render it asunder, not in any way with a view to making it for the good of the country, but simply for their own political advantage, trying to hold themselves in power for a slightly longer period?
Táimse a cuidiú leis an leasú seo. Ní thuigim in aon chor ná ní thuigeann muinntear na tíre cad na thaobh gur thug an Rialtas isteach an Bille seo. Tá aon rud amháin cinnte agus isé sin nár thug muinntear na tíre aon chead don Rialtas Bille den tsaghas seo do thabhairt os cóir na Dála.
Aontuím leis an Teachta adubhairt dá mba rud é go gcuirfaoi an Bille seo os cóir na ndaoine go gcuireadh siad in a aghaidh. Tá an Bille seo ag tabhairt an iomad comhachta do mhuinntear an tSeanaid agus dár sean-namhaid.
Dubhairt an t-Uachtarán go raibh comhacht i láimh na ndaoine acht pé comhacht a bhí i láimh na ndaoine, tá an t-Uachtarán anois á thógáil uatha agus á thabhairt thar nais don tSeanad.
Ní raibh aon ghá le Bille den tsórt seo agus ní raibh aon deifir leis. Tá rudaí áirithe go bhfuil deifir leo—rudaí mar dhroch-pháipéirí agus drochleabhair atá ag teacht isteach sa tír. Bheadh réasún nó argóint ar son seisiún oíche chun gnó mar sin do dhéanamh. Acht níl aon ghá le Bille mar seo. Níor iarr an t-Uachtarán é san Togha agus níor iarr éinne de lucht Cumann na nGaedheal ar mhuinntear na hEireann guth do thabhairt ar son an Bhille seo.
Ní amháin go bhfuil muinntear na hEireann in aghaidh comhacht mar seo do thabhairt don Seanad ach táid i gcoinnibh an tSeanaid ar fad. Tá furmhór na ndaoine sa tír i gcoinnibh an tSeanaid.
Ní thuigim an Bille. Ní thuigeann Teachtaí ar aon taobh den dTigh annso é, agus go mór mór ní thuigeann na Teachtaí é atá 'na gcodla amuich no atá na gcodla annseo. Nuair a thiocfaidh na Teachtaí seo isteach ar ball chun guth do thabhairt, ní thuigfidh siad an cheist in aon chor. Nuair a dhúiseoidh siad, siúlóidh siad isteach annseo agus tabharfidh siad a nguthanna fé mar a chuirfidh an tUachtarán in úil dóibh.
Sé an rud atáimíd á dhéanamh anseo anocht ná ag déanamh muga maga den Dáil. Bhí an Dáil dona go léor go dtí seo acht cuireann an gnó seo an donas ar fad air. Más é sin an sórt measa atá ag na Teachtaí ar mhuinntear na hEireann ní bhfaghadh siad san puinn measa o mhuinntear na hEireann nuair a bheidh seans acu meas, no drochmheas, do thabhairt ortha.
Sé mo thuairim-se nach bhfuil ón Rialtas ach cúpla Bille eile mar seo do chur os cóir na Dála agus ansan Bille a thabhairt isteach chun coimisinéirí do thogh chun obair na Dála do dhéanamh agus gan guth ar bith a thabhairt dos na Teachtaí i rialú na tíre. B'fhéidir gur dóigh leis an Rialtas nách bhfuil aon ghá le Teachtaí Fianna Fáil ná Teachtaí lucht oibre ná le aon Teachtaí eile ach le n-a lucht leanúna féin sa Tigh seo agus nár mhaith leo aon bhaint a bheith le gnó na tíre ag aon dream ach a ndream féin. Tá súil acu go gcuiridh an Seanad ar gcúl aon Bhille nar mhaith leo féin.
Níor thuig éinne anso an miniú do thug an tUachtarán uaidh ar an mBille seo agus b'fhéidir nár thuig sé féin é. Sórt cross-word puzzle a bhí sé ag iarraidh do dhéanamh den Bhille. Ins an gcéad áit, dubhairt sé rud eicínt i dtaobh trí scór laethe go bhféadfaí an Bille san chur ar leath-taobh san tSeanad. In a dhiaidh sin, thiocfadh leo. da mba mhian leo, an Bille do chur ar lár ar feadh blian go leith. Agus in a dhiaidh sin, thiocfadh le cuid áirithe den Seanad agus cuid áirithe den Dáil an Bille do chur ar leath-taobh go ceann bliana eile. Nuair a thiocfadh an Dáil arís le chéile, b'fhéidir gur Dáil nua a bheadh ann. Cuir i gcás go dtugann an tAire Oideachais Bille isteach agus go bhfuil an Dáil mí gan suidhe. Tar éis smaoiniú ar an gceist, b'fhéidir go ndéanfadh an tUachtarán socrú go mbeadh mórthogha ann. Nuair a thiocfadh na Teachtaí nua ar ais, dhéanfadh siad praiseach den obair a rinneadh. Ní fheicim cadé an sórt brionglóide a bheadh aca an chéad uair a thiocfadh siad annso.
Níl fhios agam cadé an sórt tuairime a bhéas ag muinntear na tíre nuair a chífidh siad an oráid a thug an tUachtarán agus é ag tabhairt isteach an Bhille seo. Ní shaoilim gur rud cóir do na Teachtaí ar an dtaobh eile, no do na Teachtaí ar an dtaobh so é, agus ní rud cóir don tír é. Is ag déanamh magaidh den Dáil a bhí sé.
I feel that we ought to put quite clearly and definitely on the records of the House our opinion of what the meaning and purpose of this Bill is. It is a bargain made under blackmail with a superior authority. It is compensation to a self-reproducing, nominated Assembly for disturbance in the vested interest it has built up in interfering with the will of the elected Assembly. That is the definition of the Bill: Compensation to a nominated, self-reproducing Assembly for disturbance in its vested interests in interfering with the will of the elected Assembly. That an elected Assembly of those responsible to an elected Assembly should of its own free will and volition introduce such a Bill is unthinkable. One would have to look very carefully for motives which are not the customary motives by which honest and honourable men justify their actions, in order to find a free elected Assembly doing anything of that kind. There would have to be some suggestion of a bargain, some suggestion of a consideration, or of compensation to that elected Assembly before one could conceive any such thing being done, and what is perfectly obvious is, that whoever is getting a consideration and whoever is getting compensation, it is not either the elected Assembly or that to which the elected Assembly is responsible.
We must assume that the actual pressure of superior force not merely exists, but is in operation. What is the force which enables this nominated, self-reproducing Assembly to enforce, against the elected Assembly, compensation for a vested interest of that character? It is the Constitution as it exists. As the Constitution at present exists, the Seanad has the power to hold up, not merely this law, and not merely all laws which pass from this House to it, but to select out of the series of laws which are sent to it that which suits itself, and to reject that which does not suit itself for a period which is altogether longer than the period which intervenes between this date and the date at which an election under the old system shall take place. They could have it either way. They are in a position to compel this House to make for them better terms than exist under the existing Constitution, and therefore we are forced, if we touch the existing structure at all— remember, we were not compelled to touch the existing structure—to alter it in a direction and in a nature which would be beneficial to that self-reproducing, nominated Assembly as against the elected Assembly which derives its power and its authority from the people.
I want the House to consider that in relation to this Bill and to every one of the Bills which had to do with the election of the Seanad, which has to do with Articles 48 and 47, that in all these matters the choice is completely and absolutely in the hands of the Seanad. They can pick out of these ten Bills Nos. 5, 7, 9, 13 and 14 to be passed, the others to be rejected, and once they leave our hands we have no power to prevent that choice. Not merely can they compel us in relation to every individual Bill—that is the explanation of this Bill to give them better terms than exist under the existing Constitution—but they can pick out of the bunch exactly what suits them. They can pass them in spite of us. once they have left our hands, and they can reject for a period too long for us to get control of them those that they do not like. I do not want to suggest to these good people some of the powers which possibly they may not have adverted to their possession of.
Perhaps I am optimistic in assuming that they do not know the full extent of their power, and the extremely foolish and parlous position in which we are putting ourselves in sending them a whole series of Bills of this kind. They can do much more than I have told you, and my opinion is, from what I have known of the Seanad and from what I know of the ability of the malevolent brains which do exist there, that they do know, and that this Bill has blackmail written in every line. That is my chief objection to this Bill. It gives power to tighten the grip. It is usual nowadays to recognise the formula that political liberty without economic self-control is simply for all practical purposes a contradiction in terms. Not merely is this country controlled politically——
Your country or ours?
If you say outside the privileges, protections and the inhibitions of the Dáil that this is not my country I will give you every opportunity to prove the contrary.
I will say it any time you like.
Order, I do not want to hear any more interruptions.
Here you have a Bill deliberately limiting the power of the elected assembly—the assembly which is elected upon a manhood suffrage of 21 years, and with proportional representation. What reasonable idea—I am not suggesting for a moment there is any democratic idea, but I am assuming that is an open question—or what sound political or economical purpose has been exhibited and has been given as a justification for limiting in this country by a nominated assembly the complete control of the democratic assembly by the less democratic? I think I am speaking now within the knowledge of the House, within the recollection of all that was said from the Treasury Bench, and if anything has been said from the non-political benches, that no suggestion or reason has been given. We are simply told that is the purpose, that is the machinery, but no one has suggested even that they ought to give any justification for that deliberate invasion of the democratic principle, nor has anyone attempted to show—I can imagine the argument being put, but it has not been put up, nor has it been attempted —that that vested interest in interfering with the right of the democratic branch of the legislature to express the will of the people is founded on any sound principles of advantage to the country. Again—I speak within the recollection of the House—has it been put before you that the actual composition of that assembly, with the history of its individuals, and with the corelated brilliance of the whole of its people, what characteristic in wealth or in station to the people has given them a legitimate vested interest in interfering with the free functioning and expression in law of the will of this people? We have had no suggestion that I have heard of, and we are entitled to it, as to why they are entitled to hold vested interest and where it arises and from what it arises.
Perhaps the Minister for Finance, now that he has come back, will tell us why this nondemocratic, self-reproducing, nominated body should have a vested interest in interfering with the expression of the will of what we will call the Lower House. No one has. Are we simply to take it that because of this compensation for vested interests that it must be a vested interest, and that that vested interest must be legitimate, that because it has been allowed for one reason or another to hold up the will of this people if it chooses for nine months, that it has got a property in the power of holding up, and that that has to be compensated for by increasing the time limit over which they can operate? To me that is an amazing proposition. It is a proposition I would like to hear argued. and I would like to see justified, but certainly it is not right, it is not fair, it is not respectful to the House, and it is not democratic to offer us simply that proposition without any justification whatever and to ask us to swallow it whole. Personally I will not swallow it whole. At some time or other and by some machinery or other, the thing that is being attempted to be done here now will be upset. Why is it being done? It is being done because it is part of a policy to ensure that that grip which now exists shall not be disturbed by any combination of the popular will in the reasonably anticipated future. The sands are shifting. The people are coming together. There are possibilities again of a national spirit. I am not speaking now of this side of the House nor of any other side of the House. I am speaking of the fact that it is possible to co-relate and coordinate all sections of the national will to give its expression in the voting power of the electorate. This whole thing is part of the machinery of seeing that that shall not operate, and exactly in the same way as on national grounds we think that we are not merely entitled, but we are bound to oppose the possession of the means of production, the means of life, and the possibilities of development in this country by certain existing powers inside and outside of this country. So too, on exactly the same grounds, we are bound to attack and to prevent the development, under this Bill, or any other Bill, of that strength into a more effective position.
May I ask is a Deputy entitled to read a paper entitled "L'Europe Nouvelle" in this House?
I would not think so. I think Deputy Esmonde should not read a newspaper in the House.
On a point of personal explanation, I was trying to find some analogy to the situation which exists in this House at the present moment. I have discovered it in this paper. I was just studying the exact position which exists in reference to the situation which has arisen here. I think I am entitled to study that.
Will you allow me to move that the question be now put?
I think I would like to give Deputy Flinn an opportunity of concluding his speech before accepting that motion. In regard to the question of Deputy Esmonde reading a paper, I think the Deputy should not read a periodical in the House. If he wants to study it, I think he should study it elsewhere.
It does seem to me extraordinary that we should be sitting up all night for the purpose of devising machinery to delay us in legislation. I mean that is a very remarkable proposition. The whole object of this Bill is to delay, to put a brake on the power of this House to legislate— I mean time delay—to extend from 9 months to 20 months the power of some outside body to interfere with our legislation. Are we in such a hurry to delay that for 20 months that we must stay up all night to do it? Does it seem a reasonable proposition that we should be asked to sit up all night hastily to drive through legislation in order to compensate a nominated, self-reproducing chamber for disturbance in the vested interest it has in interfering with our legislation? I think it is the most extraordinary proposition that has ever been put before the House. It is one which nobody with a sense of respect and certainly with a sense of humour would dare offer to an intelligent assembly. Apart really from the mere point of view of a sense of humour and proportion, certainly from the point of view of any democratic idea, it is a disgrace to the Ministry from which it comes, and it will be a disgrace to the House that passes it if it does pass it.
Before the Minister moves that the question be put, I would like to ask a question on a point of information regarding the third paragraph on the second page. I do not know what it really means that a Bill can be introduced otherwise than under this Article.
It might happen that a Bill which would be quite non-controversial, like, say, the Slaughtered Animals Bill, might have been passed and have gone to the Seanad. Then, say, within a month of its being passed a dissolution might take place. That dissolution would rob the Seanad of any right to examine the Bill, because immediately on the re-assembly the 18 months would be taken as having expired. The object was to enable a Bill like that to run through its stages again and be sent up to the Seanad so that it might be treated as an ordinary Bill.
Before you put the motion for the closure, we on this side must protest very strongly against the attitude of the Minister in moving it. This Bill was introduced at 1 o'clock. We have been discussing it for 2½ hours. It is a Bill to amend the Constitution and to confer greater powers on the Seanad, and after 2½ hours discussion the Minister thinks it is right to move the closure, that the matter has been sufficiently debated. I suggest that that is an unwarranted usurpation on the part of the Minister. Every member in this House is entitled to participate in a debate to amend the Constitution, and every member in this House who may have pertinent or relevant ideas on the matter is entitled to express them. At least he would be if it were not as I tried to say in my speech here that the Executive Council are setting themselves up as an autocracy on this Constitution.
I would like to point out also that the only statement we have had from the Government was the statement made by the President and that statement showed that he did not understand the matter very clearly.
At any rate the position is that the Ceann Comhairle is now being asked under the Standing Orders whether he will accept a motion that the question be now put and that this debate be brought to a conclusion. I propose to accept the motion and let the House take a decision.
Question put.
The Dáil divided; Tá, 68; Níl, 47.
Tá
- William P. Aird.
- Ernest Henry Alton.
- James Walter Beckett.
- George Cecil Bennett.
- Ernest Blythe.
- Séamus A. Bourke.
- Michael Brennan.
- Seán Brodrick.
- Alfred Byrne.
- John Joseph Byrne.
- John James Cole.
- Mrs. Margaret Collins-O'Driscoll.
- Martin Conlon.
- Michael P. Connolly.
- Bryan Ricco Cooper.
- William T. Cosgrave.
- James Crowley.
- Peter de Loughrey.
- Eugene Doherty.
- James N. Dolan.
- Peadar Seán Doyle.
- Edmund John Duggan.
- James Dwyer.
- Barry M. Egan.
- Osmond Thomas Grattan Esmonde.
- Desmond Fitzgerald.
- James Fitzgerald-Kenney.
- D. J. Gorey.
- Alexander Haslett.
- John J. Hassett.
- Michael R. Heffernan.
- Michael Joseph Hennessy.
- Thomas Hennessy.
- John Hennigan.
- Mark Henry.
- Patrick Hogan (Galway).
- Richard Holohan.
- Myles Keogh.
- Hugh Alexander Law.
- Patrick Leonard.
- Finian Lynch.
- Arthur Patrick Mathews.
- Martin McDonogh.
- Michael Og McFadden.
- Joseph W. Mongan.
- Richard Mulcahy.
- James E. Murphy.
- James Sproule Myles.
- John Thomas Nolan.
- Richard O'Connell.
- Bartholomew O'Connor.
- Timothy Joseph O'Donovan.
- John F. O'Hanlon.
- Daniel O'Leary.
- Dermot Gun O'Mahony.
- Gearoid O'Sullivan.
- John Marcus O'Sullivan.
- Patrick Reynolds.
- Vincent Rice.
- Martin Roddy.
- Timothy Sheehy (West Cork).
- William Edward Thrift.
- Michael Tierney.
- Daniel Vaughan.
- John White.
- Vincent Joseph White.
- George Wolfe.
- Jasper Travers Wolfe.
Níl
- Frank Aiken.
- Richard Anthony.
- Neal Blaney.
- Gerald Boland.
- Patrick Boland.
- Daniel Bourke.
- Seán Brady.
- Robert Briscoe.
- Henry Broderick.
- Daniel Buckley.
- Frank Carney.
- Frank Carty.
- Archie J. Cassidy.
- Patrick Clancy.
- Michael Clery.
- James Coburn.
- James Colbert.
- Eamon Cooney.
- Fred. Hugh Crowley.
- Thomas Derrig.
- Eamon de Valera.
- James Everett.
- Frank Fahy.
- Hugo Flinn.
- Andrew Fogarty.
- Patrick J. Gorry.
- John Goulding.
- Seán Hayes.
- Samuel Holt.
- Patrick Houlihan.
- Stephen Jordan.
- Michael Joseph Kennedy.
- James Joseph Killane.
- Mark Killilea.
- Michael Kilroy.
- Seán F. Lemass.
- Patrick John Little.
- Thomas McEllistrim.
- Seán MacEntee.
- Séamus Moore.
- Thomas J. O'Connell.
- Patrick Joseph O'Dowd.
- William O'Leary.
- James Ryan.
- Timothy Sheehy (Tipp.).
- Patrick Smith.
- John Tubridy.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Duggan and P. Doyle; Níl: Deputies G. Boland and Killilea.
Motion declared carried.
Question: "That the word `now' stand part of the motion," put.
The Dáil divided: Tá, 67; Níl, 47.
Tá
- William P. Aird.
- Ernest Henry Alton.
- James Walter Beckett.
- George Cecil Bennett.
- Ernest Blythe.
- Séamus A. Bourke.
- Michael Brennan.
- Seán Brodrick.
- Alfred Byrne.
- John Joseph Byrne.
- John James Cole.
- Mrs. Margaret Collins-O'Driscoll.
- Martin Conlon.
- Michael P. Connolly.
- Bryan Ricco Cooper.
- William T. Cosgrave.
- James Crowley.
- Peter de Loughrey.
- Eugene Doherty.
- James N. Dolan.
- Peadar Seán Doyle.
- Edmund John Duggan.
- James Dwyer.
- Barry M. Egan.
- Osmond Thomas Grattan Esmonde.
- Desmond Fitzgerald.
- James Fitzgerald-Kenney.
- D. J. Gorey.
- Alexander Haslett.
- John J. Hassett.
- Michael R. Heffernan.
- Michael Joseph Hennessy.
- Thomas Hennessy.
- John Hennigan.
- Mark Henry.
- Richard Holohan.
- Myles Keogh.
- Hugh Alexander Law.
- Patrick Leonard.
- Finian Lynch.
- Arthur Patrick Mathews.
- Martin McDonogh.
- Michael Og McFadden.
- Joseph W. Mongan.
- Richard Mulcahy.
- James E. Murphy.
- James Sproule Myles.
- John Thomas Nolan.
- Richard O'Connell.
- Bartholomew O'Connell.
- Timothy Joseph O'Donovan.
- John F. O'Hanlon.
- Daniel O'Leary.
- Dermot Gun O'Mahony.
- Gearoid O'Sullivan.
- John Marcus O'Sullivan.
- Patrick Reynolds.
- Vincent Rice.
- Martin Roddy.
- Timothy Sheehy (West Cork).
- William Edward Thrift.
- Michael Tierney.
- Daniel Vaughan.
- John White.
- Vincent Joseph White.
- George Wolfe.
- Jasper Travers Wolfe.
Níl
- Frank Aiken.
- Richard Anthony.
- Neal Blaney.
- Gerald Boland.
- Patrick Boland.
- Daniel Bourke.
- Seán Brady.
- Robert Briscoe.
- Henry Broderick.
- Daniel Buckley.
- Frank Carney.
- Frank Carty.
- Archie J. Cassidy.
- Patrick Clancy.
- Michael Clery.
- James Coburn.
- James Colbert.
- Eamon Cooney.
- Fred. Hugh Crowley.
- Thomas Derrig.
- Eamon de Valera.
- James Everett.
- Frank Fahy.
- Hugo Flinn.
- Andrew Fogarty.
- Patrick J. Gorry.
- John Goulding.
- Seán Hayes.
- Richard Holohan.
- Patrick Houlihan.
- Stephen Jordan.
- Michael Joseph Kennedy.
- James Joseph Killane.
- Mark Killilea.
- Michael Kilroy.
- Seán F. Lemass.
- Patrick John Little.
- Thomas McEllistrim.
- Seán MacEntee.
- Séamus Moore.
- Thomas J. O'Connell.
- Patrick Joseph O'Dowd.
- William O'Leary.
- James Ryan.
- Timothy Sheehy (Tipperary).
- Patrick Smith.
- John Tubridy.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Duggan and P. Doyle; Níl: Deputies G. Boland and Killilea.
Motion declared carried.
Question: "That the Bill be now read a second time," again proposed.
rose.
I move: "That the question be now put."
Question put.
The Dáil divided: Tá, 68; Níl, 47.
Tá
- William P. Aird.
- Ernest Henry Alton.
- James Walter Beckett.
- George Cecil Bennett.
- Ernest Blythe.
- Séamus A. Bourke.
- Michael Brennan.
- Seán Brodrick.
- Alfred Byrne.
- John Joseph Byrne.
- John James Cole.
- Mrs. Margaret Collins-O'Driscoll.
- Martin Conlon.
- Michael P. Connolly.
- Bryan Ricco Cooper.
- William T. Cosgrave.
- James Crowley.
- Peter de Loughrey.
- Eugene O'Doherty.
- James N. Dolan.
- Peadar Seán Doyle.
- Edmund John Duggan.
- James Dwyer.
- Barry M. Egan.
- Osmond Thomas Grattan Esmonde.
- Desmond Fitzgerald.
- James Fitzgerald-Kenney.
- D. J. Gorey.
- Alexander Haslett.
- John J. Hassett.
- Michael R. Heffernan.
- Michael Joseph Hennessy.
- Thomas Hennessy.
- John Hennigan.
- Mark Henry.
- Patrick Hogan (Galway).
- Richard Holohan.
- Myles Keogh.
- Hugh Alexander Law.
- Patrick Leonard.
- Finian Lynch.
- Arthur Patrick Mathews.
- Martin McDonogh.
- Michael Og McFadden.
- Joseph W. Mongan.
- Richard Mulcahy.
- James E. Murphy.
- James Sproule Myles.
- John Thomas Nolan.
- Richard O'Connell.
- Bartholomew O'Connor.
- Timothy Joseph O'Donovan.
- John F. O'Hanlon.
- Daniel O'Leary.
- Dermot Gun O'Mahony.
- Gearoid O'Sullivan.
- John Marcus O'Sullivan.
- Patrick Reynolds.
- Vincent Rice.
- Martin Roddy.
- Timothy Sheehy (West Cork).
- William Edward Thrift.
- Michael Tierney.
- Daniel Vaughan.
- John White.
- Vincent Joseph White.
- George Wolfe.
- Jasper Travers Wolfe.
Níl
- Frank Aiken.
- Richard Anthony.
- Neal Blaney.
- Gerald Boland.
- Patrick Boland.
- Daniel Bourke.
- Seán Brady.
- Robert Briscoe.
- Henry Broderick.
- Daniel Buckley.
- Frank Carney.
- Frank Carty.
- Archie J. Cassidy.
- Patrick Clancy.
- Michael Clery.
- James Coburn.
- James Colbert.
- Eamon Cooney.
- Fred. Hugh Crowley.
- Thomas Derring.
- Eamon de Valera.
- James Everett.
- Frank Fahy.
- Hugo Flinn.
- Andrew Fogarty.
- Patrick J Gorry.
- John Goulding.
- Seán Hayes.
- Samuel Holt.
- Patrick Houlihan.
- Stephen Jordan.
- Michael Joseph Kennedy.
- James Joseph Killane.
- Mark Killilea.
- Michael Kilroy.
- Seán F. Lemass.
- Patrick John Little.
- Thomas McEillistrim.
- Seán MacEntee.
- Séamus Moore.
- Thomas J. O'Connell.
- Patrick Joseph O'Dowd.
- William O'Leary.
- James Ryan.
- Timothy Sheehy (Tipp.).
- Patrick Smith.
- John Tubridy.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Duggan and P. Doyle; Níl: Deputies G. Boland and Killilea.
Question declared carried.
Main Question put.
The Dáil divided: Tá, 68; Níl, 46.
Tá
- William P. Aird.
- Ernest Henry Alton.
- James Walter Beckett.
- George Cecil Bennett.
- Ernest Blythe.
- Séamus A. Bourke.
- Michael Brennan.
- Seán Brodrick.
- Alfred Byrne.
- John Joseph Byrne.
- John James Cole.
- Mrs. Margt. Collins-O'Driscoll.
- Martin Conlon.
- Michael P. Connolly.
- Bryan Ricco Cooper.
- William T. Cosgrave.
- James Crowley.
- Peter de Loughrey.
- Eugene Doherty.
- James N. Dolan.
- Peadar Seán Doyle.
- Edmund John Duggan.
- James Dwyer.
- Barry M. Egan.
- Osmond Thos. Grattan Esmonde.
- Desmond Fitzgerald.
- James Fitzgerald-Kenney.
- D. J. Gorey.
- Alexander Haslett.
- John J. Hassett.
- Michael R. Heffernan.
- Michael Joseph Hennessy.
- Thomas Hennessy.
- John Hennigan.
- Mark Henry.
- Patrick Hogan (Galway).
- Richard Holohan.
- Myles Keogh.
- Hugh Alexander Law.
- Patrick Leonard.
- Finian Lynch.
- Arthur Patrick Mathews.
- Martin McDonogh.
- Michael Og McFadden.
- Joseph W. Mongan.
- Richard Mulcahy.
- James E. Murphy.
- James Sproule Myles.
- John Thomas Nolan.
- Richard O'Connell.
- Batholomew O'Connor.
- Timothy Joseph O'Donovan.
- John F. O'Hanlon.
- Daniel O'Leary.
- Dermot Gun O'Mahony.
- Gearoid O'Sullivan.
- John Marcus O'Sullivan.
- Patrick Reynolds.
- V. Rice.
- Martin Roddy.
- Timothy Sheehy (West Cork).
- William Edward Thrift.
- Michael Tierney.
- Daniel Vaughan.
- John White.
- Vincent Joseph White.
- George Wolfe.
- Jasper Travers Wolfe.
Níl
- Frank Aiken.
- Neal Blaney.
- Gerald Boland.
- Patrick Boland.
- Daniel Bourke.
- Seán Brady.
- Patrick Clancy.
- Michael Clery.
- James Coburn.
- James Colbert.
- Michael P. Connolly.
- Eamon Cooney.
- Fred. Hugh Crowley.
- Thomas Derrig.
- Eamon de Valera.
- James Everett.
- Frank Fahy.
- Hugo Flinn.
- Andrew Fogarty.
- Patrick J. Gorry.
- John Goulding.
- Seán Hayes.
- Samuel Holt.
- Patrick Houlihan.
- Robert Briscoe.
- Henry Broderick.
- Daniel Buckley.
- Frank Carney.
- Frank Carthy.
- Archie J. Cassidy.
- Stephen Jordan.
- Michael Joseph Kennedy.
- James Joseph Killane.
- Mark Killilea.
- Michael Kilroy.
- Seán F. Lemass.
- Patrick John Little.
- Thomas McEllistrim.
- Seán MacEntee.
- Séamus Moore.
- Thomas J. O'Connell.
- Patrick Joseph O'Dowd.
- William O'Leary.
- James Ryan.
- Timothy Sheehy (Tipp).
- Patrick Smith.
- John Tubridy.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Duggan and P. Doyle; Níl: Deputies G. Boland and Killilea.
Motion declared carried.
Bill read a Second Time.
Committee Stage ordered for Tuesday.