PUBLIC BUSINESS. - CONSTITUTION (AMENDMENT No. 10) BILL, 1928.—THIRD STAGE. – Dáil Éireann (6th Dáil) – Tuesday, 26 Jun 1928

PUBLIC BUSINESS. - CONSTITUTION (AMENDMENT No. 10) BILL, 1928.—THIRD STAGE.

The Dáil went into Committee.

SECTION 1.

Article 14 of the Constitution shall be and is hereby amended by the deletion of the words "and Initiative" now contained therein.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

The amendments on the Order Paper seem to me to be contrary to the principle of the Bill, at least to section 1.

We are opposed to this section of the Bill, the purpose of which is to delete the Initiative and deprive the people of the right to initiate laws. As far as we are concerned, I have already indicated that we regard that as an important right which should be preserved for the people. It is not necessary, except perhaps in summary form, to repeat the arguments which I have already used. The principal argument is this: that there are questions which had best be decided by being separated from other questions and put as distinct issues. It is easy to imagine, at a General Election, a party being elected to which the people would be prepared to give authority on broad general terms, but there were certain particular points of their policy to which the people as a whole objected, or that there were certain questions in which the people were interested and on which it was likely that party would not take action. As far as we are concerned, we believe there is one particular question—this is an example —in which the people would be very glad to have an opportunity of declaring their will when separated from other issues. I indicated that by saying that the people wished to change Article 17 of the Constitution. A petition brought here to this House, signed by over 96,000 persons, indicates the widespread interest that there is in that particular matter. If the Initiative is deleted from this particular Article of the Constitution, it is only the preliminary to deleting it elsewhere, as we can see from the whole Bill. On that account, we intend to oppose the section, because we believe that the Initiative ought to be preserved for these reasons. It has worked satisfactorily in other places and is, I submit, a particularly satisfactory way of dealing with a situation such as in our circumstances we are likely to have to deal with. The events during the last four or five years were such that we believe the people have been confused. My point of view is that they have been deliberately confused as regards certain issues, and we want to give them the opportunity of separating these issues and have them brought up for separate decision by the people.

The PRESIDENT

The real purpose of this is to regularise and to implement the democratic rights of the people. I could quite understand a case being made in respect of certain alterations in the Constitution by giving a larger number of electors such a right.

The number that is down in the Constitution would represent approximately three per cent. of the electorate. Now the position would be that three per cent. could put into motion something which 60 or 70 per cent. of the electorate do not want, and impose considerable expenditure on the general community. As regards the particular question mentioned by the Deputy, three per cent. of the electorate could seek to make a majority of the representatives of the people carry out the policy of a minority. That is not democratic, and I do not stand for it.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

Section 3 of the Bill is the really operative section as regards Article 48.

Mr. DE VALERA

Might I ask the President what is the basis of his thought at all? Is it not clear that before anything can be passed there must be a majority of the people in favour of it? If we talk about majority rule at all, where are you going to get it more clearly expressed than when a single definite question is put to the people, and they are asked to decide upon it. Talking about the majority party having to carry out the will of the people, I understood they were supposed to be the Ministers of the people, that their object was to carry out the policy that the people agreed upon and not to impose some policy of their own on the people. The whole question of the Initiative is clearly to indicate that the people want a certain thing to be done. If the Executive do not want to do that, then the remedy is to get some people who will do it. As far as we are concerned, we believe that when there is a clear question settled by the people, by the majority vote of the people, that it is the duty of the Ministry to implement that and carry it out as their policy.

Mr. LITTLE

Did I understand you to say, a Chinn Comhairle, that it would be better to discuss the whole question on section 3 or can we discuss it on this question?

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

Section 1 is in the Bill merely because of section 3, and I think that it is on section 3 the provisions of Article 48 can be discussed. The whole machinery of the Constitution provides the matter can be discussed on Section 3 rather than on Section 1. I would be much more satisfied to allow section 3 to be discussed widely than to allow the whole matter to be discussed on Section 1, on which the matters in Article 14 do not really arise.

Mr. LITTLE

Article 14 when passed will read:—"All citizens of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) without distinction of sex, who have reached the age of twenty-one years and who comply with the provisions of the prevailing electoral laws, shall have the right to vote for members of Dáil Eireann and to take part in the Referendum—" and then the words "and Initiative" are omitted, and it follows on: "All citizens of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) without distinction of sex, who have reached the age of thirty years and who comply with the provisions of the prevailing electoral laws, shall have the right to vote for members of Seanad Eireann." That, of course, is amended by another Act, so I need not refer to that. There will not be much left of Article 14 by the time the amendments are passed. It is in respect of this Article it is sought to deprive citizens directly of their rights to the power of the Initiative, for Article 48 rather puts into force what Article 14 lays down. Article 14 gives the right to all citizens of the Free State to take part in the Initiative. Of course, the Initiative is an experiment in a sense. The argument that the Initiative has succeeded or not succeeded, or that some particular measure has not existed before, is a relevant argument, but it should not carry much weight with a country trying to break new ground in democratic methods. Even if the Initiative has failed in other countries, or had not been properly tried, that is no reason why it should not be tried here.

Once it is put into the Constitution there is every reason to give it a fair trial and experimenting properly with it before it is turned down. The whole attitude of the Government in this matter is one very definitely distrustful of the people, and is a gradual departure from relying on the people for any liberal institutions. The people are quite as intelligent as those who are at the head of the Government, and in the end representative government may be found very imperfect indeed. There is a good deal of fiction talked about representative government, a good deal of what might be called myths gathering round the sacred institutions of representative government. It may be found in the long run that a more sensible, but in some ways perhaps less picturesque, way of dealing with certain matters of local government may be found in direct government and not in representative government—I mean a meeting of the people or a direct judgment by the people, and not a judgment merely by representatives of the people. There is no reason why people should not be educated up to such a standard that they would be able to think in masses as well as to think as individuals.

There is no reason why on large issues they should not have the power of Initiative. People cannot develop their strength unless they try and practise. No matter what people are put to they must develop the strength to do it. They must be educated to do a thing. When they are given the right to do something and they try to do it they will get to know how to do it. If that right is taken away on the grounds they are unable to do it, that is stultifying oneself entirely. Once the Initiative is there the people should be given the opportunity of trying it. When we had supplied the opportunity by the petition the reasonable thing was to see whether it was going to work properly or not. The argument that there is apathy in the country, or that the institutions of freedom have not been exercised, or that the people should lose their institutions simply because of the amount of apathy, would also apply to the present Government which depends on a minority of 61 representatives out of a House of 153, but the Government is not going to go out of existence simply because it happens to be in a minority. Similarly, if the Initiative was supported only by a minority that is no reason why it should not be recognised. The people as a whole should have the right to exercise their powers, and if they do not that is their business and it is no reason why their rights should be taken from them.

Question put.

The Committee divided: Tá, 48; Níl, 27.

Tá

Ernest Henry Alton.
James Walter Beckett.
George Cecil Bennett.
Ernest Blythe.
Séamus A. Bourke.
Seán Brodrick.
Alfred Byrne.
John Joseph Byrne.
Mrs. Margt. Collins-O'Driscoll.
Martin Conlon.
Michael P. Connolly.
William T. Cosgrave.
Sir James Craig.
James Crowley.
Eugene Doherty.
James N. Dolan.
Edmund John Duggan.
Barry M. Egan.
Osmond Thos. Grattan Esmonde.
Desmond Fitzgerald.
James Fitzgerald-Kenney.
Denis J. Gorey.
Michael R. Heffernan.
Michael Joseph Hennessy.
Thomas Hennessy.
Mark Henry.
Patrick Hogan (Galway).
Richard Holohan.
Patrick Michael Kelly.
Myles Keogh.
Finian Lynch.
Arthur Patrick Mathews.
Joseph W. Mongan.
Richard Mulcahy.
James E. Murphy.
John Thomas Nolan.
Richard O'Connell.
Bartholomew O'Connor.
John F. O'Hanlon.
Daniel O'Leary.
Dermot Gun O'Mahony.
Gearoid O'Sullivan.
John Marcus O'Sullivan.
William Archer Redmond.
Martin Roddy.
William Edward Thrift.
Michael Tierney.
George Wolfe.

Níl

Frank Aiken.
Denis Allen.
Richard Anthony.
Gerald Boland.
Seán Brady.
Robert Briscoe.
Daniel Buckley.
James Colbert.
Eamon Cooney.
Thomas Derrig.
Eamon de Valera.
Frank Fahy.
Hugo Flinn.
Patrick J. Gorry.
John Goulding.
Seán Hayes.
Mark Killilea.
Seán F. Lemass.
Patrick John Little.
Seán MacEntee.
Séamus Moore.
Daniel Morrissey.
Thomas J. O'Connell.
Daniel O'Leary.
James Ryan.
Patrick Smith.
John Tubridy.

Tellers.—Tá: Deputies Duggan and Conlon; Níl: Deputies Allen and G. Boland.

Motion declared carried.

SECTION 2.

"The Constitution shall be and is hereby amended by the deletion of Article 47 thereof."

Mr. DE VALERA

I move:—

I suppose we are in order in opposing the section. Article 47, as I indicated, might be included in a series of Bills of this kind, and the deletion of it might have been put down in a Bill simply because it had reference to certain powers of which it was proposed to deprive the Seanad. The Article itself gives power, first of all, to two-fifths of the members of Dáil Eireann to demand in writing the suspension for ninety days of any Bill passed by a majority. It gives power also to the majority of members of the Seanad to do the same thing. The result of these powers, particularly those of the Dáil, if exercised, would be to send any Bill which passed both Houses to the people for final decision. That power of final decision gave the people the power of veto, which is a very important one. In other Constitutions the power of veto over acts of the Legislature is given sometimes to the Chief Executive—a partial or suspensory veto, and in some cases there is power of complete veto. To give such power to anybody but the people is unreasonable. The people ought to have that power and be in a position to say that a certain measure, which it is proposed by a majority to pass, shall not be passed.

I say it is only reasonable if the people are the fount of all authority on all questions that they should ultimately decide all questions, questions as to the laws that ought to govern them, and particularly questions about the Constitution, which was to be the fundamental law governing all the other laws. I think I indicated also that as far as I was concerned I did not think that power ought to lie anywhere except with the representatives of the people—the power of sending back laws. I think there ought to be a fair proportion of the elected representatives required in order to compel a Bill to be submitted to the people, and the number asked here is two-fifths. It seems to me to be a very fair number. It means, for instance, that in this House it would be necessary to have 61 or 62 signatures—62 would probably be held to be the number—before a Bill could be referred to the people. That would mean that there would be substantial opposition to the measure from the representatives of the people, and those who would demand that it should be sent back to the people would be taking a certain responsibility upon themselves. If it were a frivolous demand, they would be running a certain risk when they came before the people later for reelection. The people would say, "Very well, you abused the power which you had on a certain occasion; you caused money unnecessarily to be spent." I think that would be a sufficient safeguard for the people, and would ensure that this power of the Referendum would not be abused.

A good deal was said about it when the Constitution was going through. One section, for instance, said that it was likely to be a clog upon legislation, that it was going to be used in a reactionary sense. Well, if we are going to admit the principle that the people are to be the ultimate masters, I hold for one that we must be prepared to take it when it is a clog as well as in the other direction when it is an incentive to action. We must look at our own circumstances. After all we are not sitting down and theoretically examining these questions. We must regard our own conditions; our people are conservative and the barriers there as to progress are many. The clogs on their action generally are very great. One should not be in a hurry, I will admit, to give any further powers in that direction, but again I say that if we are going to accept the principle that the people are ultimately to be masters, to decide all questions affecting the general interest, we cannot get over the fact that they should be permitted directly to decide upon questions whenever they are considered sufficiently important to be referred to them by such a large minority as two-fifths of the total number of members here.

I objected to the Seanad and that was why the amendment was put down. I object to giving that power to the Seanad, particularly the Seanad that you are going to have. It is a Seanad not directly elected by the people. There are objections to having a Seanad directly elected by the people. We have mentioned these in another connection. Seeing that the Seanad that is going to be the Seanad here are divorced largely from the people, we think it is improper that they should be in a position to hold up legislation by referring it unnecessarily back. That does not, we think, apply to the case where we have 62 members out of 150, or two-fifths. When you have such a proportion opposed to a measure, and when they are prepared to take the responsibility of referring, that power should not be denied them. We are opposed, therefore, to the deletion of Article 47 on that account —that it takes away from the representatives of the people, the members of this House, the right which they understood they had and which the people understood they had. Finally it is taking away from the people the opportunity of finally deciding. There is a further safeguard beside the safeguard of having to get as many as 62 members to make the demand; there is the safeguard that that is only sufficient to suspend the Bill for 90 days. After that, within the 90 days, a petition must be signed by not less than one-twentieth of the voters on the Register. That is a safeguard against arbitrary action on the part of the representatives. Not merely must there be 62 representatives, but they must be able to get, within 90 days, something like 90,000 signatures. When you can get 90,000 signatures within 90 days against any particular measure, there must be a good deal of public interest in it and of opposition to the particular Bill.

As to the Referendum, as was stated in one of the papers this morning, there would have been conscription in Australia had the people not possessed the power of the Referendum. I believe there will be many occasions here on which the people will regret that this power of the Referendum has not been retained for them, should it be taken away now. These are, in the present connection, the considerations which have decided us to vote against the deletion of this Article 47. We believe that it is not playing straight with the people to take away this Article without giving them an opportunity of expressing their will upon it, in view of the fact that at several elections the democratic nature of this Constitution was held up as a reason why it should be supported and why the Executive that was in favour of this Constitution should be returned.

Perhaps it would not be out of place to refer to the final sentence in this Article which says:—"This provision shall not apply to Money Bills"— there is good reason for that, of course —"or to such Bills as shall be declared by both Houses to be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety." I am quite sure that anybody taking that Article and voting for that sentence in it did not think that it would ever be used to call upon the House to declare what was an obvious falsehood—to declare that in connection with the present measures there is any urgency, in the sense that there would be in the case of a Money Bill, or that there was involved a necessity for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety. We got notice of a certain motion which is going to be moved under this Article, and when we see the use that it is proposed to make of that Article, one only wonders why anybody bothers about the Constitution at all. We held certain views about this Constitution generally before we came here. Since we have come here we have not seen very much which would cause us to alter our views. We have believed all the time that it would be used in a partisan fashion; that one section would use it to prevent the Irish nation from marching ahead, and that whenever they wished to abuse or ignore it they could do so. Our opposition to the deleting of this particular Article is because of the principle contained in it, but as far as I am concerned for one, the moment this set of Bills has gone through, if they do go through, whatever little regard I had for it up to the present will have vanished. I for one will believe, if we are going to be reasonable at all, that everyone will regard themselves here as being in an assembly for which there is no fundamental law. I am very glad to accept that position any day, but the Executive are not honestly declaring that to be the position. They want to maintain and to carry on the camouflage that there is a Constitution—that they will use it to interfere with their political opponents, use it simply for that purpose. But from the point of view of getting respect for it as fundamental law, that respect must have vanished from the mind of anybody who saw what happened here on Article 48, what is happening now in connection with this particular Article, and particularly what is going to happen in connection with the application of the last sentence in that Article. For my part, I am quite glad—very happy about it. I hope everybody in the House will realise that the position we are arriving at is one in which this House and its will to do anything is to be sovereign; that we have definitely arrived at a position in which we will say that there is no fundamental law whatever; that this House is sovereign from day to day; that what it does to-day it can change to-morrow without any restrictions whatever, except the momentary restrictions which may be law; in other words, we are getting rapidly to the stage in which there is no fundamental law. If that be the purpose of the Executive and their action at present, I for one will welcome it. The only thing is that I would like to have it clearly declared, and not simply a pretence being carried on that we have a Constitution to which we must give a certain amount of obedience and respect.

Mr. T.J. O'CONNELL

During the debate on the Second Reading of this Bill most of the discussion centred round Article 48, which provides for the Initiative. That was the impression one got from listening to the debate. Little was said, especially from the Government Benches, with regard to Article 47, which is the subject of this particular section. To my mind, no good or sufficient reason, in fact no reason, was put forward from the Government Benches that I remember to justify the deletion of this Article 47 from the Constitution. Whatever semblance of argument there might be for the deletion of the Initiative, in my opinion, there was none for this one, and there is none for this one. This Article provides a check on legislation introduced into the House by an unscrupulous Executive and forced through the House by a small majority. That was the object of the Article—to give the right of check to a minority, and, as Deputy de Valera said, it is only in the case of a substantial minority that that right is given. Two-fifths of the Dáil are empowered under this Article to hold up legislation for 90 days during which it is possible, on the application of a certain proportion of the voters, to have the matter subjected to a Referendum—in other words, to have the question submitted directly to the people and to let the people decide. As I said, that was put in definitely as a check on legislation that would interfere with or infringe the rights of the minorities. With its disappearance there will be no check. An Executive elected, let us assume, and returned to power on whatever specious pleas, such as are put forward at a general election, will have complete power to do almost whatever it likes for the period of five years. There will be no check upon them. This Executive that we have here are removing the last check which is in the Constitution upon such power. They tell us they have authority for that. Where is the authority from the people? We have it from the President that this was put before the people at the last election. What proportion of the President's manifesto, issued on the 25th August, did that particular question occupy? I have not the manifesto before me. I wonder could the President tell us whether it is mentioned in that manifesto that he proposed to take away this power from the people which was given them by Article 47? I do not believe it is in his manifesto at all. He comes here now and tells us that he has authority from the people to remove this Article and that he is acting in the name of the people. If he is genuinely acting in the name of the people, he should not be afraid to submit this question to the people. That he is afraid to submit this question to the people and that he is not sure what their decision would be, he has already given evidence of in the motion that appears on the Paper this morning. The question of expense is mentioned. It was mentioned that a small proportion of the people could set certain machinery in motion. Why should not a small proportion have the right to set the machinery in motion if they wish to do so? If it is thought that a proportion of one-twentieth is too small and not a sufficient number, they can increase it.

The President has no evidence whatever to justify his contention that this will be used for vexatious purposes or to clog legislation. After all, a substantial number of Deputies—two-fifths—will not, purely for the sake of clogging legislation or hindering legislation, submit a question of this kind to the people time after time. They know it would destroy their political future if they adopted measures of that kind, and it is only when they believe that the question was a substantial one, on which the people as a whole felt very strongly, that they would take the risk of submitting a question of this kind to the people and getting their decision upon it. If the majority of the people decide that the question is one that ought not to be adopted, what right has the Executive here, who speak in the name of the people, to put it into force?

The PRESIDENT

The majority of the people are the majority of those voting!

Mr. O'CONNELL

The majority of the people who voted are the people that put the Executive into power. If you insist upon the point in one case you must insist upon it in the other, and also insist that before any Executive can claim to have power in this House a majority of the voters on the register must have voted for them. Is the President prepared to take that view? He knows if he took that view he would not be in power to-day. If the principle is good in one case it is equally good in another case. If it is necessary that the majority of the people on the register must vote in the case of the Referendum to decide the question, then it should be equally necessary or proper that a party that claims to have power should get a majority of the voters on the register and not a majority of the votes cast in the election.

This Article was put in by the Provisional Parliament which framed this Constitution to show that the people had power and always would hold that power. The President talks a lot about democracy here. The tendency of a democratic people always is to resist the power of the Executive. It may not be necessary for us to say anything about this particular Executive to realise that an unscrupulous Executive is a possibility and, therefore, it was the object of the framers of this Constitution, and the people who passed this Constitution, to take measures to protect the people against that possibility or contingency, and now, just because there is an obedient majority in this House prepared to follow this Executive into the Division Lobby on a matter of this kind without question, it is proposed to take away this check from the people, and it is proposed to adopt methods that are not worthy of any Executive in order to carry out the object of preventing the people having a right to say whether or not that should be done. I think that every right-minded person is in duty bound to protest in the strongest possible way against the action of the Government in this whole matter.

The PRESIDENT

Mr. FAHY

And other questions.

The PRESIDENT

And the work of the Executive, the general tenor of legislation passed there, is canvassed at the elections in those constituencies and at general elections and before general elections take place. I submit that it is the height of nonsense, simply nonsense, to be talking about those things and talking about the taking away of the rights of democracy. We must secure the rights of democracy, and we must see that the will of the majority of the people is going to carry. It does not happen that on every single issue that is presented to Parliament it is possible to get a decision in connection with that from the people. But there ought to be finality, and finality can only come through the ordinary methods of Parliamentary representation and decisions in the Parliament. I would like to know if it is within the experience of Deputies who have made an examination of the Constitutions of other countries whether such a thing as this is included in the Constitutions of other countries, whether it would not make for instability rather than stability, and whether it would not make for less respect for the institution of Parliament and less confidence in Parliament if this were the practice and the usage in the ordinary way?

Mr. COONEY

Why did not the President say that when it was being put through?

Mr. FLINN

He forgot it.

Mr. GEORGE WOLFE

The people know very well where respect for the will of the people was.

Mr. LEMASS

They know it now; they did not know it then.

Mr. GEORGE WOLFE

And they knew it then.

Mr. LEMASS

They were not told in last September that the Constitution was to be abolished.

There is no check in the Constitution once you remove that Article.

Mr. FITZGERALD

There are means——

We were quite young and inexperienced then. We were very conscious, when we passed it, that there would necessarily be many imperfections in it. We were very conscious of that. But we arranged that the Constitution could be changed by ordinary legislation over a period of eight years after its passing. Our experience during the last six years has been such that we are satisfied that that period of eight years is not by any means sufficient time to enable us to make changes in the Constitution. Do Deputies on the opposite side maintain that the Constitution as passed in 1922 should be inviolable and unchangeable for all time?

Mr. LEMASS

Would the Minister state what experience he has had of the working of Articles 47 and 48 of the Constitution since they were passed?

Mr. T. O'CONNELL

Or the ill-effects of them?

Mr. FITZGERALD

From the position that I have occupied I have necessarily been forced to give a certain amount of thought as to what government means, and as to the ethical effects of what government is, and as to how government can be achieved, especially in a country where we had short experience of government. I have given more thought to it than I did six years ago. I am satisfied above all things that an alien government is better than no government. A bad government is better than no government. I suggest that any form of democracy that is imposed or is accepted in any country is imposed as a test. And the test is: Does it unfailingly provide that there shall be a government to order the affairs of that country? If it meets that test then it is bound to stand for a time. If it does not it stands condemned on the face of it. I suggest if Deputies opposite would consider the system of the Referendum they would be satisfied, after very little thought, that that system does not necessarily make for government. They will be satisfied, I think, that it is pre-eminently a machine that could be used for the negation and for the destruction of government and as such has tremendous potentialities for bad in it. Deputies have pointed out that an absolutely irresponsible government might carry on for a long time after it had ceased to serve any useful purpose, and to prevent the possibility which, if you like, might happen once in 100 years, you are perpetuating a system the whole effect of which and almost necessarily the effect of which is a negation of government. A negation of government is anarchy which, I admit, might be desired by a number of people in this country, because they have no experience of it possibly.

But there is one definite ethical thing, and that is government. I know no better way of securing that than by the ordinary system of general election. The system of the Referendum I regard as something which is definitely harmful and interferes with that system which provides for democracy. It puts upon democracy the necessity for thinking and it permits a coherent policy of government being carried out by the men elected by the people to do that. The Referendum is aimed against that. It aims at very great perfection, but in actual fact it falls into an abyss of imperfections. I maintain, with all honesty, having given the matter possibly more thought than Deputies opposite, that the system of the Referendum has nothing essentially democratic in it. It looks simple, of course, and would be splendid for a good many people. The most perfect form of government would be that every man should come into the Dáil and air his own views. That would be splendid democracy, but it would not be government. There are many things that, superficially, look splendid and perfectly simple, but when you come to examine them closely they are not nearly so splendid or simple as they look. The Referendum looks a splendidly democratic thing, but there is nothing necessarily democratic in it. Where it has been worked it has not necessarily led to the will of the majority prevailing as regards the government of a country. The will of the majority may prevail on one point, but the will of the majority does not necessarily prevail as regards the whole government of the country. That the will of the majority should prevail as to the whole system and programme of government and as to the working of government in its generalities is more important than the triumphant victory of the will of a majority of the people on any one given point. When Deputies suggest that the taking away of the Referendum is undemocratic, they are suggesting what is the contrary to the truth. I quite believe it is possible to have a better and a more democratic form of government than the existing Parliaments. It is quite possible that there is a better way of forming a government and of running a country than by an ordinary general election, and of the majority so elected forming a government. There may be better ways, but if there are, let us hope we will some time here adopt them. I do not agree that the Referendum or the Initiative is the better way. On the contrary, there are much worse ways. They stand condemned because they do not make for government at all. They make for anarchy. The Deputies opposite may want that. I am not sure that they do not want it. If they do they might as well get up and say that they want it, and not say that their hearts are burning and that tears are welling in their eyes at the mention of the word "democracy" and the will of the people.

Mr. FLINN

Mr. DAVIN

Where?

Mr. FLINN

I do not suppose that there are any of them here, but three would change it over. That is what you are resting on. That is your whole majority. That is your whole sanction. That is the whole machinery which enables you to pass these Bills, and say that they are urgently necessary for the public peace and public health of this country. Yet you throw ridicule on the idea that democratic veto or veto of an adult electorate might not be thoughtful enough, even if it was a majority, to enable the people to correct a fundamental wrong which will be done.

There will, when this is passed, be handed over to the Executive, if they dare to use it, absolute power. Nothing can hold them. It is under that power they are putting over this Dáil a Seanad which can hold up for twenty months anything done by the Dáil. It is under that authority they are making George, King of England, capable of being a member of the Executive Council of this House, and it is under that power, when the restraint of the Referendum is taken from them, they can do any other Party thing, do any other sectional thing, do any other anti-national thing, do any other "coherent" thing, coherent with their policy of anti-nationality, coherent with their policy of sectionalism. There is no limit. "Allow me to assert," says the apostle of thinking among the common people. There is no protection when it is gone. All you have got to do is to find out whether you have got your men in the House or not. Three men more and you can do what you like. I do not know whether you can succeed in keeping silent the Minister, who had no more sense than to make the perfectly silly speech which he did make, but within these limitations all power which is in the control of the people to-day disappears from them when Article 47 disappears from the Constitution. That might be all right if you did believe that on the front bench, animating that majority of three, there were those inspired supermen, there were men with a full sense of responsibility and a full knowledge of what was required in the Government of Ireland and that outlook upon her future such as they ought to have, but have they? Would you trust them? Would you yourselves individually, in relation to the affairs of your private life, employ them? Which of them— these people who, when the Referendum is gone, will have the complete power to decide on the future of this House, on the fundamental law of this country— would you employ in your private business? To which one of them would you pay a salary for commercial purposes? Is there one of them, the Minister for Fisheries, the Minister for Defence, and after you heard the Budget statement of the Minister for Finance——

A DEPUTY

You are not in Galway now.

Mr. FLINN

I am going to Galway again. The Minister for Fisheries— would you employ him? Would you employ the Minister for Defence for any commercial and productive purpose? The Minister for Agriculture has told us his own value in the profession in which he has been trained. From what you know of the Budget of the Minister for Finance, would you appoint him as a cashier in a retail grocery?

I will say for both of us, then.

Mr. G. BOLAND

And 1921.

Mr. HOGAN

There was the 1922 election. Up to a point that was a free election.

Yes.

Mr. HOGAN

Is there any country in the world where the ordinary citizen has as much power and, if so, name it? Let me go back a little further. I am entitled to say this without interruption, because I have been listening to gibes for the last fortnight or three weeks on this question. Who ever attempted to stop the people from exercising those rights? The Deputies sitting opposite, and well they know it. Who first of all refused to accept the people's will? The people who refused to accept the majority of seven on the Treaty—a majority of the Deputies of all Ireland.

Mr. KILLILEA

Why did you not always tell them so?

Mr. HOGAN

It makes a good deal of difference to me in this matter. I am going to insist that the Minister will conclude his speech on this Bill and will deal with the section, and there will be no further interruption.

Mr. HOGAN

I will deal with this one point. Deputy Flinn ended with this sentence, "Away with the whole duds." You will find that this is relevant to the Bill. We have heard that song before. Is not that very statement an admission that the people are sovereign and that they will have their rights? There will be another election, I am sure. I suppose that I could not go into any speculation on the matter now. If I stated that I am perfectly certain the Party opposite would never get a majority, they would not believe me. You could say that is a perfectly reasonable contention for a member of one political Party to put forward; there is no more in it. But supposing you do get a majority, I am absolutely satisfied. You are then the majority party. It means that you are then the masters of this country. You will find nobody on your flank. I will be a good looker-on, and I will be anxious to see whether all this talk about the great programmes—I do not want to mention them specifically—means anything. I will be anxious to know whether, in regard to these great political and economic programmes, you will be able to carry them out; whether you really mean what you say and whether you will have the guts to carry them out. I doubt it.

Mr. MacENTEE

The Minister for Lands and Agriculture, who has just sat down, apparently did not advert to his continued absence from the House last week when the Second Stage of this Bill was being discussed. He began his speech by saying that no argument had been advanced in justification of Article 47 and that the case for the Referendum had not been argued upon its merits. I do not want to recapitulate all the arguments that were used by the Deputies on these Benches on that matter, but certainly we did show that Articles 47 and 48 had a very special place and a very special value in this Constitution. The Minister asked in what other country had the people so much power as here. Apparently he wants to make the case that because we have universal suffrage in this country exercised by citizens who attain their majority, that the people here have a special and unique power. This is not the only country where such conditions prevail. Great Britain, America and Germany have similar conditions and, so far as the fact that every man and woman in the Free State is entitled to vote is concerned, it does not at all justify the statement which the Minister made, that in no country in Europe had the people so much power as in the Saorstát. What other justification has he for the statement? So far as the Constitution is concerned, at the present moment the people have certain rights and liberties which are enjoyed by other States; but the people in this country have no more rights and no more liberties than are enjoyed, if you like, in the most democratic States in Europe or America.

The Minister asked what was the justification for the Referendum. The justification for the Referendum is this —the old principle that for every power and every authority for which you cannot provide a superior, you must at least provide an equal; that is, if you want to preserve the fundamental liberties of the citizens. It is a fact admitted by those who are competent to analyse and judge upon these matters that representative government throughout the world has very largely broken down, in so far as, at the present moment, the principle that there was safety only in the division of political authority or power among several components of the State, has now practically broken down everywhere. The power that the head of the State had has disappeared in so far as England is concerned and, I admit, in so far as the Free State is concerned.

Mr. ESMONDE

Does the Deputy admit that seriously?

Mr. MacENTEE

I do admit it, if every Article in this Constitution is honoured and given effect to; but if you are going to emasculate the Constitution as written, then it is a different matter. We do not know what hidden power may be controlling the Executive Council. We know very well it is not the Dáil that controls the Executive Council; we know it is not the Cumann na nGaedheal Party that controls the Executive Council. We have had several instances in the past few weeks showing that the policy pursued by the Executive Council is dictated, not in this House, but by some power outside this House, by some power that is not afraid to voice the policy which it desires the Executive Council to follow. What we want to assure ourselves is, that upon great vital issues affecting the rights of the people and the liberties of the State, a substantial minority, a minority sufficiently large to prevent an abuse of the power already existing in the Constitution will be able to refer such matters to the people.

I do not wish to enter into a sidetrack and to show why if, in fact, the people have power under this Constitution, the trappings, the fictions and the symbols of monarchical institutions, as the late Vice-President and Minister for Justice described them, should disappear from this Constitution as being dishonourable symbols and trappings which we, representatives of free men, should not wear. I will get back to the question of the Referendum. I was saying, I think, that representative government has largely broken down, because, in fact, political power at the present moment, practically in every country in the world, is concentrated in the hands of the political Executive. The theory at one time was that the Executive was responsible to the Houses of Parliament, to the legislative assemblies which elected the Executive. But in point of fact the Executive Council controls those Houses now and we have seen measures—and those Bills which we are discussing at the present moment are examples of such measures —discussed not in this House, but discussed at a meeting of a little committee, the reports of whose proceedings have not been published. We have seen Bills introduced here by the President and the only argument he advanced in support of them was that these Bills were giving effect to the findings of a Joint Committee consisting of six Deputies from the Dáil and six members from the Seanad who met in Committee, discussed in Committee in private certain Constitutional changes.

That was an example, one example of the position of affairs to which representative government has been reduced. It is not the worst example. We know very well that the Executive does meet in secret and discusses certain matters in secret, advised, not by Deputies in this House, but by interests outside this House, and it then comes before the Dáil, puts before it a legislative policy, and demands that the Dáil should pass that programme under the penalty that, if they refuse to pass it in the form in which it is presented, the discussion is to be closured, that the health of Deputies is to be broken down in order that these Bills should secure free passage. That is what has happened. Up to the introduction of this Bill for the repeal of Article 47 the minority in this House who do represent a section of this nation—the minority on these Benches represent what will one day be the dominating factor in the councils of this nation— had some redress. They could take the matter out of the hands of a tyrannical Executive, and it could be referred to a court of the people. That was a great safeguard which minorities had, and it does not matter what political complexion the minority may have, that was a great safeguard which minorities have under this Constitution. I think, speaking on the Second Reading, I said that I was perfectly certain that those who were interested in the drafting of this Constitution, particularly the two men who made themselves the principal sponsors to the Irish people for it, welcomed these Articles, and saw the advantages that would be derived from them and the safeguards they would afford to the people. Deputy Flinn asked the Minister what the position would be as soon as these Articles disappeared. The Executive Council are proposing to repeal Article 47 of the Constitution. It has been stressed time and again in this House that Article 17 has a special significance in the Constitution. Article 47 has an equal significance in the Constitution. I believe it was thought one of the Articles which would remain in that Constitution for all time. If you refer to Article 50 you will see that Article 50, which is the Article which gives power to amend and change this Constitution, has one sentence which is very significant. It says: "Any such amendment may be made within the said period of eight years by way of ordinary legislation and as such shall be subject to the provisions of Article 47 hereof." That was to show that any Constitutional amendment under Article 50 should be referred to the people by a Referendum in order that it might have the people's express sanction.

Does the President of the Executive Council propose to honour that Article of the Constitution? The President has given notice of motion, and that notice of motion is to declare that the Bill to delete Article 47 is a Bill declared by both Houses to be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety. And the grounds upon which the President asked the people to renew their confidence in him in 1927—he may have changed his tune in September, 1927— at any rate, the ground was this: he asked them to return him to power in order that he might maintain in its entirety this democratic Constitution. I remember when certain by-elections were being fought in the Irish Free State, when we on these benches founded the Fianna Fáil organisation and launched an attack upon the Oath, that the President came out with a statement that this was the most democratic Constitution in the world, and that in order to safeguard the people from the abuse of power on the part of the Executive, there were Articles 47 and 48 in the Constitution. He referred in glowing terms to the Referendum and to the Initiative. When we see the President now come into this House and asking the House now to delete these Articles from the Constitution, it reminds me of a few lines I once heard and which I remember:—

"You are old, Father William," the young man said,

"And your hair has become very white,

And yet you incessantly stand on your head,

Do you think at your age it is right?"

"In my youth," Father William replied to the son,

"I feared it might injure the brain.

But now that I am perfectly sure I have none,

Why, I do it again and again."

They were well satisfied.

The PRESIDENT

I remember the shrieks the last time and they are still ringing in my ears.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

took the Chair.

Mr. MacENTEE

If the Executive Council thought that the sectional interests of its party would be served by extending the life of the Dáil for any term of years, even ten years, I believe that they would do it. I am fully convinced, having witnessed their proceedings in this House, having seen the Minister for Finance hand in a motion to curtail discussion upon this most important Bill in Committee to four hours, having seen the President, by the abuse of his majority, compel the House to sit through a night discussing important Constitutional amendments, I believe that the Executive Council would be capable of doing anything in order to secure and to serve the ends of their party. I am sure that under such an Executive Council there is not a single right of the citizens, whether it be of liberty, or honour, or of property, which is secure. And the one safeguard that there was for such right, the one safeguard which prevented abuse by the Executive Council of its powers, was Article 47 and Article 48 of the Constitution. If these Articles are removed what redress has any minority in this House? The law will afford them no protection. The Executive Council, which sets such a bad example in other matters, has set an equally bad example in this. It has created the worst of precedents. The law will afford nobody in this country any protection, because the law is not permanent; the law only stands so long as it is not in conflict with the wishes and desires of the majority party in this House.

Surely I am entitled to do that occasionally. I object to being barred out entirely.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

There is less than an hour left for this discussion, and the more relevant it is the more effective it will be, I presume.

Mr. LITTLE

I think, apart from this, which is incidental to the moment, that where you have proportional representation, where you have groups coming back, each with a certain set of mandates, if it is necessary to amalgamate, or for certain groups to come into coalition to carry on Government, which I admit is so, then a Referendum is absolutely essential, because you must have machinery to test whether the people as a whole approve or, at least, do not violently disapprove of measures carried through by that coalition. I think the President argued that where you have proportional representation a Referendum is not necessary.

I think he reverses the real truth, that where you have proportional representation, if you are not to carry on government by minority rule pure and simple, you must have the machinery of the Referendum there at least for the purpose of two-fifths of the House, which represents a substantial body of opinion behind it. You should then have the machinery for finding out whether their objection is a popular objection or not. I think that is reasonable and logical, and that it is approximately scientific. In contrast to that, you have the contention which is in its own way logical, that no matter how a minority is scrambled or wangled together it represents the sovereign people. That is not a joke. That is a fact, and that is the fact as regards the present majority which is ruling in this country. It is argued by the President that there would be a danger of a minority vote with the Referendum. Suppose there was a minority vote with the Referendum. Suppose it was four-seventeenths and a minority to that extent. The support which the Cumann na nGaedheal Party got at the last general election was 400,000 out of a total electorate of 1,700,000, so that any argument of that sort, if it holds good against the Referendum, holds equally good against the existence of the present Government. There is one remarkable anomaly in the present Bill. In Article 14 there still remains established the principle of the Referendum, because it says that "all citizens and so on" shall have the right to vote for members of Dáil Eireann and take part in the Referendum and Initiative. The words "and Initiative" have been deleted, but the word "Referendum" remains. Later on in Section 4 of this Bill a portion of Article 50 is going to be deleted, but the words "submitted to the Referendum" will not be deleted. They will be left, so that we are actually destroying the only possible form of machinery to implement the principles established in these two Articles. We are destroying the only means of carrying out effectively the principle laid down in two other Articles of the Constitution. It is a common trick to say, "Oh, yes; I am in favour of the principle in general," but the hypocrite, when it comes to its real application, takes good care that it is made impossible, and that is exemplified in the present Bill.

The President referred to the one instance when Article 47 was put into force. It was done at the instance of the Labour Party, together with the Fianna Fáil Party, but I think mainly by the Labour Party, in order to postpone the coming into force of an Act which imposed an affidavit or oath. The President argued that because that was not carried out in the full that it was a proof that this particular Article should be scrapped altogether. Obviously, it was not necessary at that time to carry that out to the full, and for this reason—that another petition had already been initiated which would have covered the whole ground. If that particular petition had been carried out, it would not have been commonsense to carry out two petitions at the one time dealing with the one object. The argument of the President was flippant and was really an insult to the intelligence of the House. Any stick is good enough to beat the Fianna Fáil dog. I have some notes here dealing with the speech of the Minister for Agriculture, but I am afraid, now that the Ceann Comhairle is back in the Chair, that I will have to confine myself to the section before us.

The root of the matter is this. There are two sets of principles embodied in the Constitution, and two sets of people see that Constitution from two different angles. There is one set of Articles which gives in this so-called Irish Constitution to British influence a very definite and established power and right. There is a set of Articles dealing with that. From one side of this House they are regarded as the root and vital part of the Constitution, and any attack upon them is described as wrecking the Constitution. On the other side of the House, and also on the Labour Benches, to some extent at least, there is a different view: that the root of the Constitution is in the Irish people, and that the Irish people ought to be the only people concerned in the Constitution, as occurs in any free country in the world, and that these are vital clauses. I submit that amongst those clauses there is the principle of the Referendum, and that in the long run either one or the other set of principles will have to go, either the principles vesting power in the people and in the machinery of the State must go, or else the clauses dealing with the supremacy of England over Ireland must go.

Mr. HEFFERNAN

I desire to make a few remarks lest my silence might be taken as acquiescing in a statement which Deputy Little made at the opening of his speech. I want to correct the statement he made. He referred to the Government majority and to the number of its supporters in this House, He said that in order to get a majority the Government had entered into an arrangement with a member of the Farmers' Party. I want to make the position clear in view of the fact that statements of the same kind may be made in the course of the debate by other Deputies on the benches opposite. The position is that the Government did not enter into any arrangement with a member of the Farmers' Party. Any arrangements that they entered into were with the Farmers' Party as a whole, and with the full consent and support of the Farmers' Party as a whole.

Mr. BLYTHE

The argument was put forward by Deputy Little and also by Deputy MacEntee against this Bill that the provisions for the Referendum and the Initiative in the Constitution would prevent a corrupt, unscrupulous or tyrannical Executive Council from doing certain things. My opinion is that while constitutional checks will prevent hasty and ill-considered legislation, that legislation being passed in good faith by a particular House of the Parliament, I do not think that any checks can be devised which will frustrate the policy of an unscrupulous Executive, supported by an unscrupulous majority in the House.

Mr. LEMASS

Are you speaking from experience?

Mr. BLYTHE

No. Tyrannical action would most likely be taken in the Executive sphere, and a certain course of action along executive lines would enable any checks that might be devised to be overcome or evaded. I may be permitted to repeat what I said on a previous stage of the Bill, that ultimately there can be no protection for a minority except a sense of fair play on the part of the majority. If there is a Parliamentary majority supporting the Executive in power, and if the Executive determines on a particular course of action, if that majority supporting them is unscrupulous, then nothing can be devised that would prevent them carrying out that line of action. No constitutional check can be devised which would prevent them from carrying out their policy. Checks were provided, such as the Second Chamber and the delaying machinery designed to prevent legislation initiated in good faith, but which may be wrong or ill-considered or panicky legislation, from being passed. If you had an unscrupulous majority in power the Referendum would be of no advantage. Taking a Referendum as governed by the ordinary electoral legislation, that legislation could be altered and so changed by an unscrupulous majority in the House that the Referendum would be no test. I think it was Deputy MacEntee who said that a judiciary might be overawed or over-ruled by this unscrupulous Executive with a majority. Then without altering the electoral legislation at all it would be easy for the Executive to make the Referendum no test. Deputy MacEntee asked if we were taking away these particular Articles what was to prevent an unscrupulous Executive from passing legislation to prolong the life of the Dáil to ten or fifteen years. I believe, but Deputy MacEntee might not regard this as any safeguard, that if such legislation were to pass, the Governor-General would be entitled on his own initiative and without the advice of the Executive Council to issue a proclamation dissolving the Dáil, so that the people might be consulted.

If there were an Executive with a majority in the House that would be prepared to go the length of prolonging the life of the House indefinitely it would be easily possible to conduct elections on such a basis that it would be unnecessary to pass any legislation prolonging the life of the House. I think there is no use in discussing these particular Articles along the lines that they provide a safeguard against an unscrupulous Executive backed up by an unscrupulous majority in the House. If Deputies would consider how elections might be conducted, and how as a matter of fact they are conducted in a great many countries that are supposed to have very democratic constitutions and very democratic electoral machinery, they would see that the safeguard lies really in public opinion and some sort of moral standard being held by any majority that may be in power. We must look at these proposals not as safeguards against the tyrannical majority, but simply as ordinary legislative checks designed to prevent hasty or wrong-headed action. I believe they are not good. I believe that they call on the people to do things the people should not be called on to do, and that the people would, in this country at any rate, show great reluctance to do it. We know how difficult it is to get a reasonable turnout of voters even when an election to the Dáil takes place. For the purpose of deciding the fate of a particular law it would certainly be a matter of the utmost difficulty to get any poll that would prevent a Referendum being an utter fiasco. You would have a very small poll and with a great number of voters not having considered the merits of the proposal before them.

Unless it was something of outstanding importance you could not get the ordinary people who are preoccupied with their own affairs, and who have very little opportunity of coming together and discussing these matters on their merits to turn out and vote on the day of the poll, although by providing transport it might be possible to get a certain number. People regard the elections as a certain burden and a burden which they would not carry in such a way as to give a satisfactory result if called on too often. In any case much legislation of the utmost importance to the people is specifically excluded from the operations of the Referendum. At present Money Bills are excluded, and it would be possible to get the vital parts of a great deal of new legislation through in a Money Bill, supplementing it by further legislation passed separately, and which perhaps would not be a Money Bill, but which could not be very well challenged, the main principle having been passed as a Money Bill, if it were found necessary, because there was a great resort to the Referendum to do such a thing. We really come down in this to the question as to whether we think that representative government can work, and whether we think that representative government with a wide franchise and a fair arrangement of constituencies is a good thing or not. Many of us agreed to provisions of this sort when we had given very little thought to the matter; when we had very little experience of carrying on government, or even of discussing matters with the people outside, because there was great interest in the country, great enthusiasm, during the Sinn Féin movement, and some of us perhaps were inclined to think that you could have that interest maintained in ordinary hum-drum legislation.

I think it is evident to everybody that you cannot get a lively interest in ordinary legislation. The reasonable, and the best, method is to have as democratic a system of election as you can have, and to allow the freely-elected representatives of the people to come together, to hear the arguments, and to decide on behalf of the people, and then to go back and meet whatever fate befalls them at the hands of their constituents, and either have a renewal of confidence or be replaced by other people who may undo what they have done. No machinery can be invented that can prevent mistakes. You could not even prevent a reversal of policy, prevent a law from being pealed, if it were made necessary to have a majority vote of the people for it before it was enacted, because experience of the working of that Act might show that it was wrong and would have to be reversed. If representatives of the people do wrong and their actions have to be reversed, that is no argument against depending on the judgment of the representatives of the people.

I believe if people come together in good faith, freely chosen by the people, if they look at problems put up to them, if they hear the arguments of their colleagues and opponents and come to a decision on them, you will get generally a very much closer approximation to what the people want than you could get by having a Referendum on which very few people would vote, and of which a great majority of those who would vote would vote without having given any serious consideration to the question involved. I believe it is no respect to the people to try to make them do work which can only be done by special machinery and which cannot be done directly. As I said before in repect of these Articles, long before there was any question of the members of Fianna Fáil coming into the Dáil, long before there was any question of presenting a petition under one of these Articles, members of the Executive Council met together to consider what changes ought to be made in the Constitution, and they reached the view that these Articles were unsuitable, unworkable, and, so far as an attempt might be made to operate them, they would tend rather to prevent what the majority wanted being done than to help to get it done.

Mr. CARNEY

It will not take very long to say what I have to say on this subject. First of all, however, I would like to say a word or two in connection with what the Minister for Agriculture said. He made it very pointed that he was making a reference to me in a statement which he made. He made an oblique sort of reference to the fact that I was in the British Army. I wish to tell the Minister this—he is not here at present, but he will get it in the records; I do not like to make a song about it—I never have; but from 1916, when I went to the Volunteers with my own rifle, I stuck by them until 1921, when the Minister was conspicuous by his absence. With regard to the matter under discussion, the country has it generally, so far as I have been able to hear, that any Article of the Constitution may be changed, including Article 47, by the Executive, if it is in the interests of the Irish people, and if it is not, and if, at the dictation of some outside power, there is some Article which may not be changed according to them, it will not be changed by the Executive Council. That is the opinion of the people, so far as I have been able to gather. Article 47 gave the people a certain power to do something if they wanted to do it. Although they did not happen to be a majority in the country, at least it gave them a chance of having the matter referred to the will of the people. We have heard a lot about the will of the people for the last five years, and it has been drummed into us incessantly that the will of the people must prevail. Why, then, should the people not get an opportunity of deciding what they would or would not like?

We have a lot of pleas put forward to the effect that this Referendum, this Initiative, might be used in futile efforts to do certain things, that it might be overworked in minor details. To my mind, all that is camouflage, because the whole thing is done with the object of obscuring the main issue, that is, there is a fear that if Article 47 were allowed to remain, and if action could be taken under it, the people might give a certain verdict which was not in conformity with the wishes of the power behind the Executive Council. When that might be so—I do not say that it would be so—the Executive Council found the best thing that they could do was to introduce certain Bills to amend the Constitution, particularly to wipe out Article 47, although in every election the Cumann na nGaedheal party have been engaged in they have always told the people that the Constitution could not be changed by one iota. Article 47 was, to a certain extent, a safeguard to the people. It could be used to do certain things which the people might want to do. It is not obvious that the people would, if, say, Article 17 were put to a Referendum, agree to its abolition, but even the fear of the will of the people was sufficient to cause the Executive Council to bring forward Bills, particularly this one, with the intention of abolishing Article 47 altogether. The Constitution, as a whole, is supposed to have been built on a certain bedrock and foundation, and, so far as I can gather from those who have spoken on the benches opposite, that bedrock and foundation seem to have been the Schedule to the Treaty, but it is questionable whether the foundation on which this Constitution was built is still in existence, and, if it is not in existence in its entirety, then the Constitution might be standing on something that is particularly rotten.

For instance—I will not go into this, because it would not be in order—two fundamental and vital articles of the Treaty were removed, and they applied particularly to us in the North. These were Articles 5 and 12. Therefore the foundations upon which the Constitution was built presumably have been undermined, and the Constitution, as it stands at present, cannot have been built on a foundation which was intended to last.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

We have got a stage higher than the foundations on this particular Bill.

Mr. CARNEY

This Article 47 is just as important an Article in the Constitution as any other. For instance, Article 47 must be just as important as Article 17 or any other Article of the Constitution. If Article 17 is so important that we are threatened with immediate and terrible war if it be abolished, then I hold that Article 47, which gives a certain amount of power to the Irish people, is just as important as Article 17, and if England would go to war with us over Article 17 I do not see why we should not be entitled to say that Article 47 is as important, and to do anything about it, even to go to war if necessary. I do not see how the Executive Council can come along here with ten Bills inside ten minutes and change the Articles of the Constitution, while if we attempt to do anything inside Article 47 of the Constitution to amend another Article we are threatened with immediate and terrible war.

Mr. FAHY

After the flippant jocu-the vituperation of my fellow-county-cies of the Minister for Defence and the vituperation of my fellow-countryman, the Minister for Agriculture, it was pleasing to hear some arguments put up by the Minister for Finance. The majority of the speeches on the other side were characterised by the speakers having recourse to the old debating stratagem of raising arguments that were never made by their opponents and then overthrowing them. The President said that this matter and others were before the people at several general elections and that the people had given their decision on them. His words were: "This question and others and the general tenor of legislation, that was put before them at the last election." That is precisely the point. Very little stress was made on this matter of abolishing Articles 47 and 48 at any meetings at which I was present, and I was present at many. Other interests cut across it— farming interests, land annuities, housing, etc. At elections you have many interests fighting their own side— agriculture, brewers or distillers, Labour putting their point of view before the people, and a matter like the abolition of Articles 47 and 48 of the Constitution, if before the people at all, receives very little attention. The President spoke of a reference made by Deputy O'Connell and Deputy de Valera to a possibly unscrupulous Executive. It is not beyond imagination that we might have such an Executive.

Mr. GOREY

Hear, hear.

Mr. FAHY

He said that it was strange that the Executive should be unscrupulous and the minority ought not be unscrupulous. He forgot the fact that if the alleged unscrupulous minority, 60 members of this House, insisted on getting a Referendum to the people, they are staking their political future on that, and if it happened on two or three occasions within the life of Parliament, there would be no political future for these sixty members, I am quite certain, so that there is a great difference between an unscrupulous Executive and a possibly unscrupulous minority. On this point, one of the methods of getting people interested in legislation or in Parliament, or in the use of or in the working of Parliament would be the Referendum. The President said that the people or the Committee that drafted the Constitution, and the Parliament which agreed to it, had no experience. They have had no experience of this Article, and the exercise of it has been found wanting. Deputy O'Connell said that on the only occasion on which there was some intention of making use of it, it was not pursued to having the actual Referendum, because it was appreciated that it is only in very important cases such steps should be taken. That is an argument in favour of maintaining it. The Minister for Defence spoke of putting individual pieces of legislation before the people, spoke of it as the usual means of government. Nobody ever dreamt of making this the usual means of government. It would be a very serious matter, I maintain, before sixty members of this House would be satisfied to put it before the people on Referendum, or to demand that it should be put before them, and if there were sixty members of this House so opposed to any legislation brought in here as to demand that it should be so put, I should say that there would be very good cause for it. It would be done after giving the matter thorough consideration and having it very well weighed.

The Minister for Defence spoke of a modus vivendi, and he went into the realms of government and the functions of government, but this is a modus negandi so far as the Constitution is concerned. He also referred to a general election and to a coherent general programme, and said that there would be two opposite programmes before the people at a general election besides programmes of a general character, but the programme might be an agreed one, I maintain. The three parties were agreed upon the question of the spirit duties and as to legislation in that matter at the last election. Many points in both programmes could be agreed upon, and even are agreed upon. But, at any rate, people have many things to consider, and they do not give full consideration to every particular point. There is need for the people to think. We are told that there is adult suffrage and that people think at the time of elections. But it is the same adult suffrage that will be there for a Referendum, and they are more likely to think more clearly when there is only one point to be considered. There is opportunity for the majority party to put a matter fully before them, and they are more likely in the majority of cases to have the Press at their backs also. They can get their case put thoroughly before the people. Of course, it was nonsense for the Minister for Defence to talk about a Referendum on the question of having taxation abolished and providing pensions at thirty. These are matters which are quite irrelevant to the discussion. A Referendum under Article 47 gives also, he said, a means of deluding the people.

There is no opportunity for deluding the people if both sides, those for and against, have the opportunity, in the Press and on the platform, of putting the case before them and explaining all the points and all the consequences. I am quite sure that whatever Government would be there would not let the people be deceived as to the possible consequences of their action in such an event. The Government have a sense of responsibility we are told—they have to stand over their acts. But the people in exercising their rights under the Referendum have a responsibility also; they have to stand over their acts. It is they pay eventually and they are the masters. Submitting each individual item of legislation to the people —no one has suggested any such thing. Even if the Referendum were never used—it might go for 20 years and be unused—it is a very good thing to have there as a check, a very excellent thing.

The Minister for Agriculture says that it is a matter of no importance. If not, why this rush legislation? Why come in in the middle of the Budget and the Estimates and everything else and pile all these Amendment Bills on top of us, particularly this one? Why not leave it over for another 12 months, if it is a matter of no importance? I think it is a matter of grave importance. It is showing a tendency which is very dangerous. The Minister for Agriculture was asked: "What is to prevent the Executive from abolishing proportional representation? Instead of answering that question, he put up another argument, that nobody in this House would stand for—union again with England. Nobody suggested that. No answer has been forthcoming as to whether in the same manner proportional representation could not be abolished by a majority vote. The President said—I think it was at the penultimate election—when there was talk of abolishing this oath of allegiance, that not one Article, not one line, not one syllable, not one comma of that Constitution would be changed. I believe these were his exact words. Now we are changing whole sections of it, the sections that I maintain are democratic.

The Minister for Agriculture spoke also of the liberty that the people enjoy, as in other States. The danger I see is that we are not a normal State. We maintain that it is not a normal State. This country is divided into two states and we have not full freedom in either section of it—more limited in one section than the other— and that it is towards preventing the people from achieving full freedom that methods might be used, as exemplified in this present instance. That is one of the reasons we on these benches have for strongly opposing it. The Minister for Finance said that the tyrannical action of a majority could not be countered in this way by the Referendum. I think the tyrannical action of a majority here in legislative matters would likely raise a revolt which would secure that two-fifths vote required to get a matter referred to the people.

The Minister said we assume an unscrupulous Executive. I say this honestly, the Executive is unscrupulous in trying to get this legislation through and in trying to abolish Articles 47 and 48; that is an example of unscrupulous action on the part of the Executive. What is to stop the same Executive from postponing elections for a few years on the same plea that such postponement is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace? They could change any Article of the Constitution, except, of course, Article 17 that they do not want to change, on the same plea. They are to be the judges. It would be better to let the people judge in these particular cases.

The people, we are told, should not be called upon too often. We do not intend to call upon them too often. It is a safeguard that would be very rarely used, and that might not be used more than once in a decade. The small poll is another objection. If a matter was important, and unless a Bill was important, it would not be put to the Referendum. I think you could get public opinion excited over it. You could get a much larger poll then at a General Election, on one definite point, and you would get a very definite decision upon it. One example upon which a Referendum might be taken would be the question of prohibition. Suppose that question arose here, and it is not outside the bounds of possibility that it should arise, it would be a good question upon which to go to the people, holding up legislation and letting the people judge. I am not a prohibitionist, and we on these benches are not prohibitionists, but it might arise in ten or twenty years' time that you might get a Dáil that would be of prohibitionist tendencies, perhaps bitten by the microbe from the United States, and the Referendum would be a very good means of deciding upon that question. We got one valuable lesson from the Minister for Finance. I think he made his case well, and we got the excellent lesson from him as to how it would be possible to break or evade the Constitution. The members of the Executive, we are told, thought this Article was unsuitable and unworkable. This Article did not get a fair trial, and I believe its abolition now is a danger to the country. In that I might speak personally, because I was consulted by many who had grave doubts when we came in here. I pointed out that some things might be done under the Constitution, and this was one. That goes now. Other Articles will go subsequently, and what answer will I give then, when these safeguards are gone but to say, thank God; they have no respect for the Constitution, and if we get the opportunity we will have as little.

It being now 8.10 p.m., and the period prescribed by the Order of the Dáil of the 20th June having expired, the Chairman proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary to bring to a conclusion the proceedings in Committee.

Question put: "That Section 2 stand part of the Bill."

The Committee divided: Tá, 52; Níl, 31.

Tá

Ernest Henry Alton.
James Walter Beckett.
George Cecil Bennett.
Ernest Blythe.
Séumas A. Bourke.
Seán Brodrick.
Alfred Byrne.
John Joseph Byrne.
John James Cole.
Mrs. Margaret Collins-O'Driscoll.
Martin Conlon.
Michael P. Connolly.
William T. Cosgrave.
Sir James Craig.
James Crowley.
Eugene Doherty.
James N. Dolan.
Edmund John Duggan.
Barry M. Egan.
Osmond Thomas Grattan Esmonde.
Desmond Fitzgerald.
James Fitzgerald-Kenney.
D. Gorey.
Michael R. Heffernan.
Thomas Hennessy.
Mark Henry.
Patrick Hogan (Galway).
Richard Holohan.
Michael Jordan.
Patrick Michael Kelly.
Myles Keogh.
Patrick Leonard.
Finian Lynch.
Arthur Patrick Mathews.
Joseph W. Mongan.
Richard Mulcahy.
James E. Murphy.
John Thomas Nolan.
Richard O'Connell.
Bartholomew O'Connor.
John F. O'Hanlon.
Daniel O'Leary.
Dermot Gun O'Mahony.
Gearoid O'Sullivan.
John Marcus O'Sullivan.
Vincent Rice.
Martin Roddy.
William Edward Thrift.
Michael Tierney.
Daniel Vaughan.
Vincent Joseph White.
George Wolfe.

Níl

Frank Aiken.
Denis Allen.
Richard Anthony.
Gerald Boland.
Seán Brady.
Robert Briscoe.
Daniel Buckley.
Frank Carney.
James Colbert.
Eamon Cooney.
Thomas Derrig.
Eamon de Valera.
Frank Fahy.
Hugo Flinn.
Patrick J. Gorry.
John Goulding.
Seán Hayes.
Patrick Houlihan.
Mark Killilea.
Seán F. Lemass.
Patrick John Little.
Thomas McEllistrim.
Seán MacEntee.
Séamus Moore.
Daniel Morrissey.
Thomas J. O'Connell.
William O'Leary.
Thomas O'Reilly.
James Ryan.
Patrick Smith.
John Tubridy.

Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Duggan and M. Conlon; Níl: Deputies G. Boland and Allen.

Motion declared carried.

Question: "That Section 3 stand part of the Bill," put.

The Committee divided: Ta, 52; Níl, 31

Tá

Ernest Henry Alton.
James Walter Beckett.
George Cecil Bennett.
Ernest Blythe.
Séamus A. Bourke.
Seán Brodrick.
Alfred Byrne.
John Joseph Byrne.
John James Cole.
Mrs. Margaret Collins-O'Driscoll.
Martin Conlon.
Michael P. Connolly.
William T. Cosgrave.
Sir James Craig.
Michael Jordan.
Patrick Michael Kelly.
Myles Keogh.
Patrick Leonard.
Finian Lynch.
Arthur Patrick Mathews.
Joseph W. Mongan.
Richard Mulcahy.
James E. Murphy.
John Thomas Nolan.
Richard O'Connell.
Bartholomew O'Connor.
James Crowley.
Eugene Doherty.
James N. Dolan.
Edmund John Duggan.
Barry M. Egan.
Osmond Thomas Grattan Esmonde.
Desmond Fitzgerald.
James Fitzgerald-Kenney.
D.J. Gorey.
Michael R. Heffernan.
Thomas Hennessy.
Mark Henry.
Patrick Hogan (Galway).
Richard Holohan.
John F. O'Hanlon.
Daniel O'Leary.
Dermot Gun O'Mahony.
Gearoid O'Sullivan.
John Marcus O'Sullivan.
Vincent Rice.
Martin Roddy.
William Edward Thrift.
Michael Tierney.
Daniel Vaughan.
Vincent Joseph White.
George Wolfe.

Níl

Frank Aiken.
Denis Allen.
Richard Anthony.
Gerald Boland.
Seán Brady.
Robert Briscoe.
Daniel Buckley.
Frank Carney.
James Colbert.
Eamon Cooney.
Thomas Derrig.
Eamon de Valera.
Frank Fahy.
Hugo Flinn.
Patrick J. Gorry.
John Goulding.
Seán Hayes.
Patrick Houlihan.
Mark Killilea.
Seán F. Lemass.
Patrick John Little.
Thomas McEllistrim.
Seán MacEntee.
Séamus Moore.
Daniel Morrissey.
Thomas J. O'Connell.
William O'Leary.
Thomas O'Reilly.
James Ryan.
Patrick Smith.
John Tubridy.

Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Duggan and M. Conlon; Níl: Deputies Allen and G. Boland.

Motion declared carried.

Question: "That Section 4 stand part of the Bill, put.

The Committee divided: Tá, 53; Níl, 32.

Tá

Ernest Henry Alton.
James Walter Beckett.
George Cecil Bennett.
Ernest Blythe.
Séamus A. Bourke.
Seán Brodrick.
Alfred Byrne.
John Joseph Byrne.
John James Cole.
Mrs. Margaret Collins O'Driscoll.
Martin Conlon.
Michael P. Connolly.
William T. Cosgrave.
Sir James Craig.
James Crowley.
Eugene Doherty.
James N. Dolan.
Edmund John Duggan.
Barry M. Egan.
Osmond Thomas Grattan Esmonde.
Desmond Fitzgerald.
James Fitzgerald-Kenney.
D.J. Gorey.
Michael R. Heffernan.
Thomas Hennessy.
Mark Henry.
Patrick Hogan (Galway).
Richard Holohan.
Michael Jordan.
Patrick Michael Kelly.
Myles Keogh.
Patrick Leonard.
Finian Lynch.
Arthur Patrick Mathews.
Joseph W. Mongan.
Richard Mulcahy.
James E. Murphy.
John Thomas Nolan.
Richard O'Connell.
Bartholomew O'Connor.
Timothy Joseph O'Donovar
John F. O'Hanlon.
Daniel O'Leary.
Dermot Gun O'Mahony.
Gearoid O'Sullivan.
John Marcus O'Sullivan.
Vincent Rice.
Martin Roddy.
William Edward Thrift.
Michael Tierney.
Daniel Vaughan.
Vincent Joseph White.
George Wolfe.

Níl

Frank Aiken.
Denis Allen.
Richard Anthony.
Daniel Buckley.
Frank Carney.
James Colbert.
Eamon Cooney.
Thomas Derrig.
Eamon de Valera.
Frank Fahy.
Hugo Flinn.
Patrick J. Gorry.
John Goulding.
Seán Hayes.
Patrick Houlihan.
Mark Killilea.
Gerald Boland.
Seán Brady.
Robert Briscoe.
Seán F. Lemass.
Patrick John Little.
Thomas McEllistrim.
Seán MacEntee.
Séamus Moore.
Daniel Morrissey.
Thomas J. O'Connell
William O'Leary.
Thomas O'Reilly.
James Ryan.
Patrick Smith.
John Tubridy.
Francis C. Ward.

Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Duggan and M. Conlon. Níl: Deputies G. Boland and Allen.

Motion declared carried.

AN LEAS-CHEANN COMHAIRLE

took the Chair.

Question: "That Section 5 stand part of the Bill," put.

The Committee divided: Tá, 53; Níl, 31.

Tá

Ernest Henry Alton.
James Walter Beckett.
George Cecil Bennett.
Ernest Blythe.
Séamus A. Bourke.
Seán Brodrick.
Alfred Byrne.
John Joseph Byrne.
John James Cole.
Mrs. Margaret Collins-O'Driscoll.
Martin Conlon.
Michael P. Connolly.
William T. Cosgrave.
Sir James Craig.
James Crowley.
Eugene Doherty.
James N. Dolan.
Edmund John Duggan.
Barry M. Egan.
Osmond Thomas Grattan Esmonde.
Desmond Fitzgerald.
James Fitzgerald-Kenney.
D.J. Gorey.
Michael R. Heffernan.
Thomas Hennessy.
Mark Henry.
Patrick Hogan (Galway).
Richard Holohan.
Michael Jordan.
Patrick Michael Kelly.
Myles Keogh.
Patrick Leonard.
Finian Lynch.
Arthur Patrick Mathews
Joseph W. Mongan.
Richard Mulcahy.
James E. Murphy.
John Thomas Nolan.
Richard O'Connell.
Bartholomew O'Connor.
Timothy Joseph O'Donovan.
John F. O'Hanlon.
Daniel O'Leary.
Dermot Gun O'Mahony.
Gearoid O'Sullivan.
John Marcus O'Sullivan.
V. Rice.
Martin Roddy.
William Edward Thrift.
Michael Tierney.
Daniel Vaughan.
Vincent Joseph White.
George Wolfe.

Níl

Frank Aiken.
Denis Allen.
Richard Anthony.
Gerald Boland.
Seán Brady.
Robert Briscoe.
Daniel Buckley.
Frank Carney.
James Colbert.
Eamon Cooney.
Thomas Derrig.
Eamon de Valera.
Frank Fahy.
Hugo Flinn.
Patrick J. Gorry.
John Goulding.
Seán Hayes.
Patrick Houlihan.
Mark Killilea.
Seán F. Lemass.
Patrick John Little.
Thomas McEllistrim.
Sean MacEntee.
Séamus Moore.
Thomas J. O'Connell.
William O'Leary.
Thomas O'Reilly.
James Ryan.
Patrick Smith.
John Tubridy.
Francis C. Ward.

Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Duggan and M. Conlon. Níl: Deputies G. Boland and Allen.

Motion declared carried.

Mr. MacENTEE

Before you put the Title——

AN LEAS-CHEANN COMHAIRLE

There cannot be any further discussion.

Mr. MacENTEE

But the Title is out of order.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

resumed the Chair.

Question: "That the Title stand part of the Bill," put

The Committee divided: Tá, 53; Níl, 32.

Tá

Ernest Henry Alton.
James Walter Beckett.
George Cecil Bennett.
Ernest Blythe.
Séamus A. Bourke.
Seán Brodrick.
Alfred Byrne.
John Joseph Byrne.
John James Cole.
Mrs. Margaret Collins-O'Driscoll.
Martin Conlon.
Michael P. Connolly.
William T. Cosgrave.
Sir James Craig.
James Crowley.
Eugene Doherty.
James N. Dolan.
Edmund John Duggan.
Barry M. Egan.
Osmond Thomas Grattan Esmonde.
Desmond Fitzgerald.
James Fitzgerald-Kenney.
D.J. Gorey.
Michael R. Heffernan.
Thomas Hennessy.
Mark Henry.
Patrick Hogan (Galway).
Richard Holohan.
Michael Jordan.
Patrick Michael Kelly.
Myles Keogh.
Patrick Leonard.
Finian Lynch.
Arthur Patrick Mathews.
Joseph W. Mongan.
Richard Mulcahy.
James E. Murphy.
John Thomas Nolan.
Richard O'Connell.
Bartholomew O'Connor.
Timothy Joseph O'Donovan.
John F. O'Hanlon.
Daniel O'Leary.
Dermot Gun O'Mahony.
Gearoid O'Sullivan.
John Marcus O'Sullivan.
Vincent Rice.
Martin Roddy.
William Edward Thrift.
Michael Tierney.
Daniel Vaughan.
Vincent Joseph White.
George Wolfe.

Níl

Frank Aiken.
Denis Allen.
Richard Anthony.
Gerald Boland.
Seán Brady.
Robert Briscoe.
Daniel Buckley.
Frank Carney.
James Colbert.
Eamon Cooney.
Thomas Derrig.
Eamon de Valera.
Frank Fahy.
Hugo Flinn.
Patrick J. Gorry.
John Goulding.
Seán Hayes.
Patrick Houlihan.
Mark Killilea.
Seán F. Lemass.
Patrick John Little.
Thomas McEllistrim.
Seán MacEntee.
Séamus Moore.
Daniel Morrissey.
Thomas J. O'Connell.
William O'Leary.
Thomas O'Reilly.
James Ryan.
Patrick Smith.
John Tubridy.
Francis C. Ward.

Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Duggan and Conlon. Níl: Deputies G. Boland and Allen.

Motion declared carried.

Surely we are in order in asking you to quote the Standing Order which gives you the right to allow such a motion to be made. We are contending that the Ceann Comhairle is bound by the Standing Orders as set out in this book. Standing Order 94 states that amendments may be moved on the Fourth Stage, while, Standing Order 25 states: All motions, to be put on the Order Paper for any day, shall be in writing, signed by a Deputy, and shall reach the Clerk not later than 11 a.m. on the fourth preceding day. Any amendments to such motions shall be in writing, signed by a Deputy, and shall reach the Clerk not later than 11 a.m. on the second preceding day. Provided that by permission of the Ceann Comhairle, motions may be made on shorter notice.

There is one Standing Order which makes it quite clear and says that amendments may be moved on the Fourth Stage of a Bill. There is another Standing Order which says that amendments must be put in on the second preceding day. Seeing that these two Standing Orders are there, I submit that before the Chair can accept a motion which runs counter to them that the Chair must quote some other Article in support of its decision. The Chair and the Minister must keep within the Standing Orders as set out here unless they move to suspend them altogether. There is only one way in which you can get the Report Stage of this Bill considered to-morrow, and that is by moving the suspension of the Standing Orders altogether.

Mr. MacENTEE

In regard to the points made by Deputy Aiken, I submit that Standing Orders 94, 90 and 25 must be read and construed together. I do not see how one can escape that. Obviously the purpose of the Report Stage is to give Deputies adequate time and opportunity to consider a Bill which has just emerged from Committee. I do not think that those who drafted the Standing Orders ever contemplated that we should proceed to-morrow without notice from the Committee Stage to the Report Stage of this Bill. At the present time it is too late to comply with the requirements of Standing Order 25, and I wish to enforce that point with reference to the Report Stage of this particular Bill. As Deputy Flinn has said, we have the right to submit amendments. I presume that that right is intended to secure to us and to provide that we can give the notice required by Standing Order 25. The two things must be taken together. If we have the right to put in amendments, then we must also have the opportunity of complying with the requirements of Standing Order 25. That, I think, is the important point that we cannot lose sight of. If we have the right under Standing Order 94 to move amendments on the Report Stage, then we must have, in the exercise of that right, the opportunity of complying with Standing Order 25 with regard to the giving of adequate notice.

There is no necessity. The motion is that the Bill be considered on Report to-morrow. Deputy de Valera moved an amendment to delete the word "to-morrow" and substitute the words "Tuesday next." I am putting the question that the word "to-morrow," that is to say, the word proposed to be deleted, stand part of the motion.

The Dáil divided: Tá, 52; Níl, 32.

Tá

Ernest Henry Alton.
James Walter Beckett.
George Cecil Bennett.
Ernest Blythe.
Séamus A. Bourke.
Seán Brodrick.
Alfred Byrne.
John Joseph Byrne.
John James Cole.
Mrs. Margaret Collins-O'Driscoll.
Martin Conlon.
Michael P. Connolly.
William T. Cosgrave.
Sir James Craig.
James Crowley.
Eugene Doherty.
James N. Dolan.
Edmund John Duggan.
Barry M. Egan.
Osmond Thomas Grattan Esmonde.
Desmond Fitzgerald.
James Fitzgerald-Kenney.
Denis J. Gorey.
Michael R. Heffernan.
Thomas Hennessy.
Mark Henry.
Patrick Hogan (Galway).
Richard Holohan.
Michael Jordan.
Patrick Michael Kelly.
Myles Keogh.
Patrick Leonard.
Finian Lynch.
Arthur Patrick Mathews.
Joseph W. Mongan.
Richard Mulcahy.
James E. Murphy.
John Thomas Nolan.
Richard O'Connell.
Bartholomew O'Connor.
Timothy Joseph O'Donovan.
Daniel O'Leary.
Dermot Gun O'Mahony.
Gearoid O'Sullivan.
John Marcus O'Sullivan.
Vincent Rice.
Martin Roddy.
William Edward Thrift.
Michael Tierney.
Daniel Vaughan.
Vincent Joseph White.
George Wolfe.

Níl

Frank Aiken.
Denis Allen.
Richard Anthony.
Gerald Boland.
Seán Brady.
Robert Briscoe.
Daniel Buckley.
Frank Carney.
James Colbert.
Eamon Cooney.
Thomas Derrig.
Eamon de Valera.
Frank Fahy.
Hugo Flinn.
Patrick J. Gorry.
John Goulding.
Seán Hayes.
Patrick Houlihan.
Mark Killilea.
Seán F. Lemass.
Patrick John Little.
Thomas McEllistrim.
Seán MacEntee.
Séamus Moore.
Daniel Morrissey.
Thomas J. O'Connell.
William O'Leary.
Thomas O'Reilly.
James Ryan.
Patrick Smith.
John Tubridy.
Francis C. Ward.

Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Duggan and P. Doyle. Níl: Deputies G. Boland and Allen.

Motion declared carried.

Question put: "That the Bill be considered on Report to-morrow."

The Dáil divided: Tá, 52; Níl, 30.

Tá

Ernest Henry Alton.
James Walter Beckett.
George Cecil Bennett.
Ernest Blythe.
Séamus A. Bourke.
Seán Brodrick.
Alfred Byrne.
John Joseph Byrne.
John James Cole.
Mrs. Margaret Collins-O'Driscoll.
Martin Conlon.
Michael P. Connolly.
William T. Cosgrave.
Sir James Craig.
Michael Jordan.
Patrick Michael Kelly.
Myles Keogh.
Patrick Leonard.
Finian Lynch.
Arthur Patrick Mathews.
Joseph W. Mongan.
Richard Mulcahy.
James E. Murphy.
John Thomas Nolan.
Richard O'Connell.
Bartholomew O'Connor.
James Crowley.
Eugene Doherty.
James N. Dolan.
Edmund John Duggan.
Barry M. Egan.
Osmond Thomas Grattan Esmonde.
Desmond Fitzgerald.
James Fitzgerald-Kenney.
Denis Gorey.
Michael R. Heffernan.
Thomas Hennessy.
Mark Henry.
Patrick Hogan (Galway).
Richard Holohan.
Timothy Joseph O'Donovan.
Daniel O'Leary.
Dermot Gun O'Mahony.
Gearoid O'Sullivan.
John Marcus O'Sullivan.
Vincent Rice.
Martin Roddy.
William Edward Thrift.
Michael Tierney.
Daniel Vaughan.
Vincent Joseph White.
George Wolfe.

Níl

Frank Aiken.
Denis Allen.
Gerald Boland.
Seán Brady.
Robert Briscoe.
Daniel Buckley.
Frank Carney.
James Colbert.
Eamon Cooney.
Thomas Derrig.
Eamon de Valera.
Frank Fahy.
Hugo Flinn.
Patrick J. Gorry.
John Goulding.
Seán Hayes.
Patrick Houlihan.
Mark Killilea.
Seán F. Lemass.
Patrick John Little.
Thomas McEllistrim.
Seán MacEntee.
Séamus Moore.
Daniel Morrissey.
Thomas J. O'Connell.
William O'Leary.
James Ryan.
Patrick Smith.
John Tubridy.
Francis C. Ward.

Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Duggan and Conlon. Níl: Deputies G. Boland and Allen.

Motion declared carried.

Ordered accordingly: That the Report Stage of the Bill be taken to-morrow.

Mr. COONEY

May I submit that we have not yet definitely decided when we are to take it, because I should like to have a definition of "to-morrow." I hold there is no legal definition.

AN CEANN COMHAIRLE

I shall give the Deputy a definition if the Deputy asks me to-morrow.

Dáil Éireann díospóireacht - Tuesday, 26 Jun 1928