Pending a proposal as to numbers by the Minister. When you are getting rid of the one argument that there is for a small council, namely, that it has executive functions—that is the only substantial argument that there is for a small council of fifteen—once you get rid of that as you are, by the Bill itself, by vesting executive functions in a single individual, I hope that the majority of Deputies will stand for a council big enough to be representative of all sections and interests in Cork. I indicated roughly what I thought would be a reasonably-sized council, and I gave thirty as the number which I was prepared to work on as a basis. I indicated on Second Reading that any number, say, from twenty-five to thirty would satisfy me. Sometimes it is convenient in matters of this kind to have a certain amount of latitude, when you are drawing up amendments, as to the precise number. For example, if you are dividing Cork into three areas, it might be found that to give more accurate proportional representation a number like twenty-seven or twenty-eight or twenty-five would be better. I would certainly be prepared to meet the difficulty of any situation of that kind by taking a number between thirty and say twenty-five. Roughly, from twenty-five to thirty would be the range which I think we ought to have before us when we are picturing the size of the council. A smaller council would not be sufficiently representative of the interests in Cork to allow a proper decision to be taken on some of the matters that will come before the council.
We all know that when you have a body of fifteen, four or five will be unavoidably absent. Four or five will roughly be the number out of thirty or twenty-five, just as out of fifteen. It may not work out absolutely like that, but generally you find that there is a certain number absent, and that it is not proportional always to the whole size of the council. Allowing for the unavoidable absence of four or five in a council of fifteen, you have practically a working council taking decisions with, say, ten present. Six will be a majority, and their decision may very well not be a decision which will be as representative of the position as you will get if you have a fuller council more thoroughly representative of the interests involved.
I agree with the Minister that it is mainly because I have in mind a council of that size that I am anxious to have a smaller body that will be able to keep in touch with the manager. What is the necessity for keeping in touch with the manager? First of all, with a man who has such power as is going to be given to this manager, it is good for him to know that there are people examining the particular details of his administration. They may not have power to interfere, but they will have, at a certain time, the power to criticise, and their criticism will be effective because it will be informed criticism. They will know the details. We have very often to criticise matters of administration here, and I wish there was an arrangement by which it would be possible to get in closer touch with the details than it is at present for those in opposition, even though those keeping in touch were only able to keep in touch from the point of view of collecting information as to exactly what was being done.
There is another function proposed here for this small body. We know very well that when a manager takes action in any particular case it becomes very difficult for him, if he is going to maintain his authority, to reverse engines and do something else. It is very much better that members of the council, representative of those ultimately affected, should have an opportunity of making representations before the final action is taken. If a manager proposes to take a certain action—suppose it is a question even of dismissing a certain official—it is a very useful thing that certain representations could be made. I have given the example of an official, but that actually is not the case in which it would apply; but we have no other definite case coming before us where representation should be made. I am not able to give at the moment a satisfactory example of the type of action which was in contemplation about which representation would be made, but we can easily see in the case of a manager having all the functions he will have, that occasions will arise in which the representatives of the people should have an opportunity before he takes action of making representations of a certain kind to him. They cannot make representations if they do not know that a certain thing is to be done, and the value of having this board as a consultative board will be to provide machinery by which representations might be made if the manager said that he proposed to do so-and-so. That is the idea of consultation. They might make representations to him which might very well make him change his mind on the matter. I believe that there is very often an advantage in a multiplicity of counsels of this particular kind, provided that finally the man has the responsibility of taking the action, having heard such representations as are made.
That is not going to weaken him in the slightest in his executive authority. It is not going to weaken him in his determination to act in the way he thinks right. In fact, a man who has heard representations, and has weighed the pros and cons that have been put forward, and who, after having heard these, is still satisfied, is really in a stronger position than if these representations had not been made because he feels, if there is a definite body bound to make representations of that kind, that the objections will be formally put forward and that he will not lose sight of them. If he is satisfied that he should not act in accordance with them, then he is really stronger, because he has satisfied himself that the objections to the line of action which he proposes cannot be sustained. There is no weakness in that at all. It is not going to weaken the manager; it is going to strengthen the manager. I hope, at any rate, that it will be provided somewhere in the Bill that the manager will be ultimately responsible to the Council. I do not expect the Minister wants to remove the manager from being ultimately responsible. Therefore, if there is a question of his having to account for his actions he is in the strong position that some representatives on the council already know the details of the case and that they are going to judge it with information and not pass judgment in the manner in which judgments sometimes are passed in matters of that kind—more or less on hearsay and on some general statement made and not substantiated. So that, in fact, the position of the manager would be strengthened, and at the same time he would be prevented many times from doing harm. It is a good thing for a man to know that he is being watched. I do not use the word "supervise" because it might be given a different meaning from what I would like to give it if I used it here. If a man's actions are under observation, it is a good thing for him, and even keeps a man straight where he would be inclined to be weak if he felt his authority was altogether arbitrary. Accordingly, I hold you should have, for proper representation, a council much bigger than fifteen, and if you want to keep constant contact with the manager to help him and to strengthen him as well as to prevent him from doing wrong you ought to have a body of this kind.
With reference to the name "alderman," I do not mind about the name at all. The name occurred in the Bill and I simply took it. The aldermen in the Bill have no functions at all. If, on the other hand, you make them a body to be elected by the council, you give them very special functions over and above those of the ordinary councillors. You associate them in a certain consultative capacity with the executive government of the city. But as that name comes to hand. I do not see any particular reason for rejecting it. I do not mind what name this body goes by. It was the definite name to hand and I put it down. I hope the Minister will not adhere as rigidly as he appears to be determined to do to the proposal that the body shall be of the small number of fifteen. I hope he will make the council sufficiently large to be really representative. What is his reason for small numbers? Length of debates, is it? The only arguments for reducing the numbers to small dimensions is that there may be lengthy debates. Very well. You can get four or five sitting around a table—that is my experience —that will cause as lengthy debates as the members of a council of thirty. They have to act in a more formal manner than persons sitting round a table. You introduce a certain amount of formality when you have a large number. It helps to get through the work. Particularly as they will have to make decisions only on big matters, I do not see any reason why the council ought not to be fairly large. If it is large you will want a small body to keep in touch with the executive work, and you can give them a number of other functions. That one that was indicated about dismissal simply fitted in, and that is the only reason for associating it with the setting up of the board.
