Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 4 Dec 1929

Vol. 32 No. 13

Military Service Pensions Bill, 1929. Second Stage (Resumed).

Question again proposed: That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

Mr. MacEntee

I should like to get away if possible from the atmosphere engendered in this debate by the silly, inconsequent, and demonstrably ignorant speech of the Minister for Agriculture who, I am sorry, is not here. I should like to do that for two reasons. First, because no one with any sense of responsibility or any feelings of public decency desires to have an issue so important as is raised in this Bill decided by the tactics of the virago or the weapons of Billingsgate. And secondly because this issue is one upon which, no matter how they may be divided upon other issues, those who desire to see clean government in this country or, if you like, to maintain clean government in this country, may co-operate with each other in resisting any proposal which may render these objects less easy to secure. In speaking to this Bill also, I would like to deprecate the frequent reference which has been made to the Public Accounts Committee. That Committee renders most valuable service to the whole community. It is able to do that solely because of the fact that it is an impartial Committee representing the general body of the Dáil and rendering decisions regardless of Party affiliations and Party advantages. The whole usefulness of the Committee and its capacity for service would be utterly destroyed if its proceedings were to become the shuttlecock of Party discussions in this House. I desire, therefore, if I can, to refrain from any specific reference to the proceedings of our own Public Accounts Committee and to base my arguments against this Bill on the principle of financial administration and practice which long experience has established elsewhere.

This Bill, I should like to repeat, strikes at the very roots of good government and sound financial administration in this country. It violates an important constitutional principle—the principle that the Dáil has complete control over public expenditure.

In order that the manner in which this violation will be made may be clear to this House, I should like to re-state how the control of the Dáil over public expenditure is made effective. The Dáil enforces its control over public expenditure first, by examining and sanctioning every head of that expenditure. It completes that control by learning from its own officer—the Comptroller and Auditor-General, against whose powers this Bill is deliberately aimed —after the close of each year, whether the limits which it has imposed had been obeyed and whether, generally, the financial administration of the public service has been orderly and sound. If the directions of the Dáil and its intentions as expressed in the several statutes or orders thereunder, and in the voted Estimates have not been observed, or if the expenditure has exceeded the amounts granted, the Dáil learns of this fact from the Comptroller and Auditor-General and, through its own Committee of Public Accounts, judges the infraction of the law and regulations thus brought to its notice.

Now, if there is one service which requires constant supervision it is the disbursement of public moneys. The history of other countries and the history of our own emphasise how easily that service may be abused and how grave the public evils which follow upon such abuse. To prevent that abuse and to escape those evils, the most constant vigilance must be exercised by the officer appointed to safeguard the public integrity. In other countries such an officer has been appointed by ordinary statute, but in this State the appointment of the Comptroller and Auditor-General is commanded by the very Constitution itself. By this fact, it is clearly indicated that the functions of this office are of no less importance and are no less indispensable to the well-being of the State and the whole community than are the functions of the legislature, the Executive or the judiciary. Like these, the Comptroller and Auditor-General is set in a class apart, with powers, duties and responsibilities not to be circumscribed nor limited except for the gravest reasons. In fact, in Great Britain, as long ago as 1876, after a prolonged and careful discussion extending over a period of years the following principles were authoritatively laid down for the guidance of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of Great Britain in the discharge of his duties. "You should," it was stated in a formal communication to him from the Treasury, "if you think fit examine the Vote, sub-head of a Vote, or head of a sub-head, as often as you please. In short, your discretion in the conduct of your examination should be absolutely unfettered."

Under the Constitution and the Acts relating to his office subsequently enacted or adopted by the Oireachtas, the powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-General were in no way curtailed, nor was the general principle which was to govern him in discharge of his duties, and which I have just quoted, qualified or limited in any way whatsoever. For instance, Article 62 of the Constitution provides:

"Dáil Eireann shall appoint a Comptroller and Auditor-General to act on behalf of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann). He shall control all disbursements and shall audit all accounts of moneys administered by or under the authority of the Oireachtas and shall report to Dáil Eireann at stated periods to be determined by law."

Again under the Comptroller and Auditor-General's Act (No. 1 of the year 1923) it is laid down:—

"It shall be the duty of the Comptroller and Auditor-General to control all disbursements and to audit all accounts of moneys administered by or under the authority of the Oireachtas at such time and in such manner as shall from time to time be prescribed by law."

In Section 7 (3) of that Act it is stated:

"Unless and until it shall be otherwise provided by the Oireachtas the Comptroller and Auditor-General shall have and exercise all such powers and perform all such duties as are prescribed by this Act or are conferred or imposed on him by any Act of the Parliament of the late United Kingdom having the force of law in Saorstát Eireann and adapted to the circumstances of Saorstát Eireann by or under the Adaptation of Enactments Act, 1922, and particularly by the Exchequer and Audit Departments Acts, 1866 and 1921."

Now so much importance did those who framed the Constitution and those who drafted the Constitution Act and the Adaptation of Enactments Act attach to the functions and powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, that actually after the section of the Adaptation of Enactments Act which established the Central Fund, the following section is inserted:—

"Every mention of or reference to the Exchequer or the Comptroller and Auditor-General contained in any British Statute shall in respect of the doing or not doing of any act, matter or thing after the 6th day of December, 1922, in Saorstát Eireann under or in pursuance of such Statute be respectively construed and take effect where the context so admits or requires as a mention of or reference to the Exchequer of Saorstát Eireann or to the Comptroller and Auditor-General of Saorstát Eireann as the case may require."

Therefore, under the law the office of Comptroller and Auditor-General here was established with exactly the same rights, power, privileges and responsibility as up to the year 1922 appertained to that office in Great Britain. Under the law, therefore and from the nature of the Constitution the Comptroller and Auditor-General has control over all disbursements—there is no exception made of disbursements under the Military Service Pensions Act—and is required to examine every appropriation account on behalf of the Dáil. There is no reservation that the appropriation account relating to military service pensions is to be exempt from the Comptroller and Auditor-General and not to be examined in the same way as he is entitled to examine other appropriation accounts. And in the conduct of such examination the principles laid down by the report of the Public Accounts Committee, 1876, are definitely adopted, and in the conduct of such examination therfore, as we have seen, the Comptroller and Auditor-General is to be absolutely unfettered. I have shown how the Dáil exercises and makes effective the constitutional principle that it controls all public expenditure of the State.

It may be asked what are the practical results which have followed from the appointment of the Comptroller and Auditor-General. Unfortunately our own control over our own financial affairs has been too brief to enable me to cite any instance from our own records which here have stood the test of time. We have always had a Comptroller and Auditor-General here. The State has always reaped the advantages of such an appointment, but in Great Britain where the principle that the House of Commons has sole control over supplies has been admitted for centuries, and where the operation of that principle had not been given proper effect until 1866 when, by the Exchequer and Audit Act, the Comptroller and Auditor-General was appointed, not as an officer of the Crown or even of the Parliament, but as an officer of the House of Commons, to supervise the disbursement of all public moneys in Great Britain, from that country we are able to cite opinions and to cite, if you like, considered judgments setting forth the beneficial results which have followed from the appointment of the Comptroller and Auditor-General.

In the report for the year 1876 the Public Accounts Committee printed a memorandum from the Treasury in which the benefits which had followed the establishment of the office of the Comptroller and Auditor-General were set forth in the following terms:—

"My Lord of the Treasury, indeed, believes that even many of those who have studied such matters are hardly aware of the revolution in the public accounts that has taken place under the Exchequer and Audit Act, through the reports of the Comptroller and Auditor-General addressed to the House of Commons. These reports are submitted to the judgment of the Public Accounts Committee, and each irregularity, which in former days would have been judged and buried within the walls of a Department, is examined and reported on.""Judged and buried within the walls of a Department," in exactly the same way as the Minister for Defence and others presenting this Bill to this House wish the findings and activities of this Board of Assessors to be judged and buried. "Judged and buried within the walls of a Department," where the skeletons would be always kept in the cupboard and never uncovered by the Comptroller and Auditor-General.

"This great administrative reform has been gradually effected during the 10 years which have elapsed since the passing of the Exchequer and Audit Act. The success of the measure may be tested by the reports of the Comptroller and Auditor-General ... as these reports testify to a regular and orderly administration of the public money..... If exception be made of certain questions which have stood over from former years and which are approaching settlement, the irregularities are few.

"My Lords gratefully acknowledge the result as showing the efficacy of the independent audit administered by the Comptroller and Auditor-General.... If on the one hand the responsibility of Parliament for financial order through the Service has been rigidly enforced, on the other hand... my Lords have, with the co-operation of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, been enabled to exercise far more completely than previously the control entrusted to them by constitutional usage and essential to the maintenance of the financial order for which they are responsible."

I would direct the attention of the House to the terms of the report. "My Lords, indeed, believe that even many of those who have studied such matters are hardly aware of the revolution in the public accounts.... Each irregularity which in former days would have been judged and buried within the walls of a department is examined and reported on. By "this great administrative reform"—the appointment of the Comptroller and Auditor-General with the wide powers given him—"my Lords have been enabled to exercise far more completely than previously the control entrusted to them by constitutional usage and essential to the maintenance of financial order." These words are not my words. They express the balanced and considered judgment of those who are responsible for a system of public administration unchallenged and unsurpassed by that which exists in any other State. This judgment has no partisan relation whatever to the matter now immediately under discussion. It was not expressed in relation to the awkward inquiry or request from the Comptroller and Auditor-General for certain files. It was expressed after that office had been established for 10 years, and after those who expressed that opinion had 10 years experience of its working and, therefore, it may be unreservedly applied in the present instance to indicate what the position might have been in this State if the position of the Comptroller and Auditor-General did not exist, and if the present occupant of that office had not endeavoured to fulfil his responsibility in accordance with the principles and practice so long established and accepted elsewhere. In the course of the report to which I have referred it is stated that the duty is imposed on the Comptroller and Auditor-General of ascertaining that the accounts of all the moneys provided for the service of the year:

(1) Are supported by proper vouchers and are ordered by proper authority;

(2) Are accurately computed;

(3) Are applied to the purposes for which Parliament voted them;

(4) Are in accordance with the Statute;

(5) Are in accordance with the Treasury authority—in our case in accordance with the authority of the Minister for Finance:

(6) Are in accordance with the formal regulations of the Department.

In exemplification of the purposes to be served by these inquiries, the Public Accounts Committee pointed out that in auditing the Military and Naval expenditure, the Comptroller and Auditor-General sees that a stated sum has been expended, and he receives the explanation of the Department that it has been expended on a certain object, and that this particular sum has been charged to the Vote in which such provision has been made, and to the proper sub-head of that Vote, as set forth in the Estimates.

To avoid misunderstanding I would point out to the House that in the year 1876, when the accounts of the Army and Navy were being considered, the Comptroller and Auditor-General——

Minister for Defence (Mr. Fitzgerald)

On a point of order, is this relevant?

An Ceann Comhairle

On what grounds is it irrelevant?

Mr. Fitzgerald

The Deputy seems to have an unlimited amount of archives of the British Government going back well into the nineteenth century. I do not quite see how it is immediately relevant at any rate to the Bill under discussion. The Bill which is under discussion is the Military Service Pensions Bill, a Bill the primary object of which is to exclude certain aspects of one given matter from survey by the Comptroller and Auditor-General.

An Ceann Comhairle

It seems to me to be impossible at this particular stage to rule out a Deputy from stating what the general powers of the Comptroller and Auditor-General are, which it seems is what Deputy MacEntee is doing.

Mr. MacEntee

That is my purpose. I will make the matter immediately relevant. I was pointing out that in the case of the Military and Naval expenditure in Great Britain the Comptroller and Auditor-General up to 1876 was confined to saying that a stated sum had been expended on a certain object, and that this particular sum had been charged to the Vote in which such provision has been made, and to the proper sub-head of the Vote, as set forth in the Estimates, and with that the Comptroller and Auditor-General's inquiry will end.

If the House will consider for a moment it will see that this is precisely what the present Bill proposes to do in regard to Military Service Pensions. If it passes, the Comptroller and Auditor-General will know that a stated sum has been expended on this service. He will then satisfy himself that the Dáil has provided money for that object, and that the amount so expended has been charged to the Vote in which such provision has been made, and to the proper sub-head of the Vote as set forth in the Estimates, and with that the Comptroller and Auditor-General's inquiry will end. This further quotation from the Report of the Public Accounts Committee of 1876 regarding the situation which is thus created will, therefore, be of particular interest to the House:—"In other words," the Report goes on to say, "he accepts more or less the evidence of the departmental examining officers on heads 1 and 2, and upon certain of that evidence he certifies that the money has been expended upon the services for which Parliament voted it; but upon such an examination alone he can never be in a position to certify of his own knowledge to the last three heads."

That is to say, that he can never be in a position to certify that the moneys have been expended in accordance with Statute, in accordance with Treasury authority or in accordance with the formal regulations of the Department, and therefore he is unable to discharge to the full the duties and responsibilities which have been imposed upon him in this State by the Constitution and by the law.

In view of the arguments which have taken place in this House as to the powers and responsibilities of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, I would like to point out that in Great Britain, to which we must go back for precedents and to which by the Act which appoints the Comptroller and Auditor-General we are entitled to refer, the wide powers which were given to the Comptroller and Auditor-General, limited as to examination and investigation as they were simply by his own discretion, were not given without question. For instance, as I have said, it took just 10 years to establish the fact that he was bound to examine the expenditure of two of the great spending departments. Similarly, year after year, the spending departments attempted on many occasions to confine the investigation of the Comptroller and Auditor-General within what they thought were the statutory limits. I do not think there is a single case on record in which those efforts were upheld by the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons. Here I may point out that this Committee like our own was composed of representatives of all Parties, from the Government Party as well as the Opposition Party, and that in many cases it might have been thought that the incidents reported upon reflected more or less unfavourably upon the administration of the party in power.

But in every case, so far as I have seen, the Committee acted regardless of such considerations, remembering only that the principles laid down and the practice defined when a Party was in power might be the greatest safeguard of that Party when it was in Opposition.

One particular problem which came before the Committee was the right of the Comptroller and Auditor-General to examine confidential documents, upon which payments were based. The whole purpose of this Bill is to deny in one particular instance to the Comptroller and Auditor-General access to such documents. In the course of his speech moving the Second Reading of this Bill the Minister for Finance stated: "the applicants who came forward were promised that the evidence submitted by them would be kept secret.""I think," he said, "that was necessary and that it was proper that that matter should be confidential." The reference is Col. 1012, Vol. 32. I will deal later with the question as to whether the submission of these documents when required to the Comptroller and Auditor-General could constitute a breach of any pledge which may have been given. I will content myself by noting here that any such promise must be interpreted in the light of constitutional and statutory requirements, and that no promise of this kind could be held to override any responsibility imposed upon the Comptroller and Auditor-General by the law and Constitution. Let us, however, consider the principles which have already been laid down in this matter, the powers to perform all such duties as are prescribed by this Act or are conferred or are imposed on him by any Act of Parliament of the late United Kingdom having the force of law in Saorstát Eireann and adapted to the Constitution by and under and on behalf of the Adaptation of Enactments Act of 1922. Here was the regulation which was to govern the Comptroller and Auditor-General and the heads of all Departments in relation to confidential documents.

"It is admitted that no Department has a right to refuse information, even although of a highly confidential character, to the Comptroller and Auditor-General if he requires it to satisfy himself that the expenditure agrees with Parliamentary appropriation.

"The Comptroller and Auditor-General," it went on to state, "is alone competent to say what information is necessary for the discharge of the statutory functions, and must exercise his discretion as to communicating to Parliament any information in his possession that is relevant to the Accounts upon which he is reporting."

That was in the year 1881.

In 1919 this question of confidential documents again arose, and in that connection the Public Accounts Committee for that year made the following report:—

"In connection with payments to a firm which were based on an examination by a Department Accountant of confidential documents, the Comptroller and Auditor-General requested that his officers should be associated with those of the Department in that duty. Your Committee are glad to learn that the Ministry concur in this course, as they regard it as of paramount importance that the Comptroller and Auditor-General should have access to all documents substantiating payments out of public funds, so that he may satisfy himself as to the propriety of the payments."

One further point, I think, remains to be brought out in this connection. It has been said that the Comptroller and Auditor-General has exceeded his duties in asking for these files. I have shown that he is bound to ask for all documents, even the most confidential documents, in order to satisfy himself as to the propriety of certain payments which have been made. In that connection, it has to be pointed out that, as the law stands at present, and as it stood in the year 1925, I think, when these documents were first asked, the Comptroller and Auditor-General was bound to ask for these documents. If he had not asked for these documents then he would not have discharged properly the duties of his office, and it would have been open to any Deputy in this House to move a resolution asking that he should be removed from office, on the grounds that he had not properly discharged the functions of it.

In Great Britain, as I have said, it was laid down that the Comptroller and Auditor-General holds office neither for life nor during the pleasure of the Crown, but during good behaviour—that is to say only during that period during which he fully and completely discharges the responsibility which has been laid upon him of ensuring that so far as possible the control of the Dáil over the expenditure of public moneys is effective and complete. In the Comptroller and Auditor-General Act of 1923 it is stated that the Comptroller and Auditor-General shall retire upon his attaining the age of 70 years and shall not be removed from his office except upon identical resolutions passed by Dáil Eireann and Seanad Eireann respectively and then only for misbehaviour or incapacity to be expressly stated in such resolutions.

I would like, at this point, to summarise the principal facts relating to the office of the Comptroller and Auditor-General in this State.

First, the office of the Comptroller and Auditor-General is to ascertain whether money has been applied for the purposes for which Parliament granted it.

2. This is to be done by examining the accounts for the purpose of ascertaining whether the payments made are supported by proper vouchers and are ordered by proper authority;

(3) are accurately computed;

(4) are applied to the purposes for which Parliament voted the money;

(5) are in accordance with Statute;

(6) are in accordance with Treasury authority;

(7) are in accordance with the formal regulations of the Department.

So far as the first two requirements are concerned the Comptroller and Auditor-General may accept more or less the evidence of the Departmental examining officer; but it is laid down that upon such evidence alone he can never be in a position to certify of his own knowledge first that the moneys have been expended in accordance with statute; second, have been expended in accordance with the authority of the Department of Finance, and, third, have been expended in accordance with the formal regulations of the spending Department.

It has further been laid down that in discharging his duties the Comptroller and Auditor-General, if he thinks fit, may examine the same Vote, sub-head of a Vote, or item of a sub-head, as often as he pleases. In short, his discretion and the conduct of his examination are to be absolutely unfettered. Further, the Comptroller and Auditor-General is entitled to look to the accounting officers for the information he requires, and such officers must be at all times ready to afford such information to him.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

took the Chair.

Mr. MacEntee

In this matter the Comptroller and Auditor-General is alone competent to say what information is necessary for the discharge of his statutory functions.

It is, therefore, not open to any Department, to anybody acting in any Department or anybody acting possibly under a statute of this Dáil, to refuse to the Comptroller and Auditor-General any document or any information as to the manner in which this money has been expended which he may think fit to require. The Comptroller and Auditor-General has, as I have said, in Great Britain, always exercised the functions of his office in accordance with the principles which I have stated. It is clear and manifest from the Acts which I have quoted, from the Constitution and from the Comptroller and Auditor-General Act, 1923, that it was intended that the Comptroller and Auditor-General should function here in this State in exactly the same way and in accordance with the same principle as the corresponding officer shall function and did function in Great Britain. That position was generally accepted until in February, 1926, the Board of Assessors challenged the right of access of the Comptroller and Auditor-General to their files and refused to submit to him the original application for Service pensions paid during the financial year ending 31st March, 1925.

Now I have dealt, because I think the House has not been aware of the important Constitutional principle which is involved in this Bill, with the important position which the Comptroller and Auditor-General fulfils in the economy of the State. I have dealt fairly fully with the position of the Comptroller and Auditor-General.

I now ask the House to consider what is the object of this Bill. Possibly the full purport has not been set forth in the Title of the Bill. At any rate, the Minister for Finance left us in no doubt as to the object of the Bill. According to him the object is to put the awards of military service pensions on the same basis vis-a-vis the Comptroller and Auditor-General as awards of the Court, so that, as the Minister says, if a pension is paid the Comptroller and Auditor-General cannot examine the merits of such payment.

What are the grounds for this extraordinary procedure? The Minister apparently wishes to justify it on the grounds that some promise was made to those who applied for pensions that the evidence submitted by them would be kept secret. I am sorry that the Minister for Finance is not present. Possibly, the Minister for Defence, when he rises, as I understand he is to rise, to conclude this debate, would tell the House where any record of such a promise exists. Where was it made, by whom, and to whom?

Where was it made, by whom and to whom? Even if it were made, does the Minister for Defence hold that such a promise must override the Constitution and the Statute?

I have shown that the Comptroller and Auditor-General, under the Constitution and by the statute, is entitled to have access to all documents, confidential or otherwise, if he thinks fit to require them in the course of his investigations. I ask the Minister for Defence, who will defend this Bill to the House, to state here does he think that a promise given in secret and given privately is to override the Constitution? Apart from this altogether, as I have shown, the Comptroller and Auditor-General has a right to examine all documents substantiating payments out of the public funds, even documents of a highly confidential character.

Since that principle was established before such a promise was made, the submission of such document to the Comptroller and Auditor-General does not constitute a breach of confidence, and any promise made to the applicants under the Military Service Pensions Act could not be held to prejudice, much less entirely to oust, the right of the Comptroller and Auditor-General to have access to all documents for the purposes of his investigation. The Minister for Finance, in the further course of his speech, stated that it would be quite impossible for the Comptroller and Auditor-General to come to any conclusion on the files. Why? Because, the Minister went on to state, the Board of Assessors were, in fact, a court. They had to examine written evidence and hear oral evidence, apparently keeping no written transcript of the latter.

I would like to make this clear, that this Board was not a court at all in the sense in which the Minister for Finance used the word. The Board of Assessors did not sit in public. There were no representatives of the Press present at these hearings. There was no report of the proceedings or recommendations of this Board of Assessors in the Press, and, therefore, the safeguard of publicity, which is of the utmost importance in all judicial proceedings was wholly absent. The findings of the Board of Assessors may have been wholly contrary to the evidence submitted to them. I am not suggesting that they were, since I have no personal knowledge of the matter, but if they were wholly contrary to the evidence there is no information given to the public which would enable it to satisfy itself upon that head. The public had no security whatever that this Board came to its findings in accordance with the evidence that had been put before it.

The second point which the Minister apparently wished to make in this connection was that the Comptroller and Auditor-General could not come to any conclusion merely on an examination of the files, because the Minister, apparently, thought that there was no record of oral evidence given to the Court. The Minister for Agriculture apparently was under the same misapprehension for he said: "But of the considerations that arise here the certificates are the least important part. Oral evidence which must be given on oath and given by persons who have been promised that their evidence was confidential is really the important evidence." He went on to say later, "Their applications which are governed by no rules of any kind must be decided on the merits of each case by oral evidence in which certificates of various parties are of no importance whatsoever." There is the position taken up by the Minister for Finance and by the Minister for Agriculture, that the most important element in the whole of this matter is not the certificate of service issued by the Board but that it is the oral evidence tendered to the Board. The President, in reply to a question which I put to the Minister for Agriculture during his speech completely torpedoed all this spurious reasoning by admitting that a longhand note of all the evidence was taken. Therefore, the file is as complete as it could possibly be. This oral evidence, which must be given on oath and which the Minister for Agriculture contended was the really important evidence, is there, and is available to the Comptroller and Auditor-General if this House, in the proper discharge of its duty, will reject this Bill and demand that such evidence be made available to the Comptroller and Auditor-General in accordance with the principle that all confidential documents are to be available to that officer if he requires them for his proper investigation.

With the statement that a longhand note of the evidence was taken, what becomes of the arguments of the Minister for Finance and the Minister for Agriculture?

The Minister for Finance wished the Comptroller and Auditor-General to accept only the certificates issued by the Board of Assessors, on the plea that no record of the oral evidence was available. The Minister for Finance wishes the Comptroller and Auditor-General to rely entirely on the certificate of the Board of Assessors. The Minister for Agriculture comes along and cuts the ground from under the feet of his colleague by stating that the certificates are the least important or, in fact, that they are of no importance whatsoever, and that the whole issue of whether these pensions are rightly or wrongly awarded must be decided on oral evidence. As I have said, when the Ministers were talking, neither of them was aware that a longhand transcript of the oral evidence existed. Then the President came along and in reply to a question which I put to the Minister for Agriculture exploded a bomb under their feet and blew their case sky-high by admitting that a longhand transcript of the evidence existed. Is it any wonder that while his argument was thus spinning in midair the Minister for Agriculture should have lost his temper and should have stated that the proposition that this transcript of evidence should be available to the Comptroller and Auditor-General in order that he should satisfy himself whether the awards of pensions were rightly or wrongly made was just the silly sort of proposal that he would expect from Deputy MacEntee?

I am sorry the Minister for Agriculture is not here, because, apparently, he has still something to learn about the process of justice in this State. I know, of course, that on one notable occasion he admitted that his knowledge of the law was not worth a halfpenny. At the same time, if he read the daily papers he might have had intelligence enough to gather for himself what actually was the procedure in certain courts in the land. Apparently, the Minister for Agriculture is unaware that all cases submitted to the Appeal Court in the Free State are decided, not upon oral evidence freshly tendered to the court, but upon the transcript of the evidence tendered to the court below. Apparently, the Minister for Agriculture is unaware of the fact that in criminal cases, involving the life or death of the subject, appeals from death sentences imposed in murder trials have been heard and decided entirely upon the transcript of such oral evidence. The issue of life or death might be decided upon a written transcript, but not the issue, according to the Minister for Agriculture, as to whether a pension has been rightly or wrongly awarded, whether it has been awarded in accordance with the statute or whether it has been awarded in defraud of the State. The most important issue that can be tried in the courts of this land, the issue of whether a citizen is to live or die, can be decided upon a written transcript. The mere paltry issue as to whether a pension may be paid or not is too important to be decided upon anything except the oral evidence, freshly tendered to the new investigator. That is the position which this lawyer, who has already admitted that his knowledge of law is not worth a halfpenny, wishes this House to endorse, if it accepts his arguments and votes in favour of this Bill.

Those who have spoken in support of the Bill have endeavoured to create the impression that the examination of the files by the Comptroller and Auditor-General must lead inevitably to the publication of the names of individuals and of occurrences in which those individuals were concerned.

Deputy O'Higgins, for instance, said it would not be in the public interest to rake up details and the specific activities of individuals during that period. Later, he went on to say: "Do we not know that year after year that particular report, the report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General, is made the subject of rather large headlines in the daily papers?" I regret very much that Deputy O'Higgins, who is himself a member of the Public Accounts Committee, and to whose impartial and zealous services thereon I can testify, should have made that statement which, unintentionally, no doubt, may mislead the House as to the procedure adopted by the Comptroller and Auditor-General in making his report. First of all, when he has examined the files, if this House permits him by rejecting this Bill to examine these files, upon what cases will the Comptroller and Auditor-General report? Upon those cases, and only those cases, in which, upon the face of the application made and the record of the evidence given before the Board of Assessors, it is plain and manifest that the intentions of the Dáil have not been carried out and that the requirements of the law have not been observed. I do not know if there be such cases; neither does the Comptroller and Auditor-General know if there be such cases; neither does this House know if there be such cases; but if, upon examination of the files, he finds no such case as this, then the Comptroller and Auditor-General will make no report. If upon that same examination he does find such cases, then that report will inevitably be made and this House will be made quite aware of the fact that some persons in this land, with the connivance or intended connivance of the Executive Council, are receiving moneys in defraud of the State. But, as I have already stated, and as I wish to repeat and emphasise, it will only be in those cases in which on the face of the documents and the evidence it is clear and manifest that awards have been wrongly made that the Comptroller and Auditor-General will report.

Is it the contention of those who are backing this Bill that if such cases do exist—cases where pensions have either been procured or granted in defraud of the State— that such pensions should continue to be paid and the State should continue to be defrauded thereby? Is that the attitude which the Minister for Defence takes up? Is that the attitude which the Minister for Agriculture and the Minister for Finance take up? Is that the attitude which the Executive Council takes up? Is that the attitude which those who will follow the Whips of the Cumann na nGaedheal Party into the Division Lobby upon this Bill will take up? Is it their attitude that if pensions are at present being granted in defraud of the State, those pensions should continue to be wrongly paid? It may be said that they are introducing this Bill because they have the fullest confidence in the Board of Assessors. Have they not the same confidence in the permanent heads of every one of the other Departments? Have they not that confidence, for instance, in the permanent head of the Department of Justice, who has to account to the Comptroller and Auditor-General for the expenditure of almost two million pounds of public money? Have they not that confidence in the permanent head of the Department of Finance? Have they not that confidence in the permanent head of the Department of Defence? Have they not that confidence in the permanent head of the Land Commission? I take it they have. I take it they have the fullest confidence in each and every one of these officers, and yet, for every penny piece of expenditure, these high, responsible and trusted officials have to account, and every document, confidential or otherwise, upon which such expenditure is based must be submitted without reserve and without question to the Comptroller and Auditor-General, should he see fit to call for it in the course of his inquiries. If you so far trust the Board of Assessors as to render their proceedings exempt from investigation by the Comptroller and Auditor-General, why not render all the other Departments which I have mentioned similarly exempt? In short, why maintain an office which, upon your own showing, is redundant and unnecessary? Why not abolish altogether and save to the State the £17,000 odd which is spent thereon? Or, if you are not prepared to exempt from the supervision and control of the Comptroller and Auditor-General all the other Departments for which these highly-competent, highly-trustworthy and permanent civil servants are responsible, why exempt this Board of Assessors whose personnel was not permanent, who were not civil servants of the State but who, instead, were political partisans out, if they could, to do a good turn for their supporters? Why exempt the Board of Assessors from this inquiry, while at the same time you enforce the inquiry in the case of those officers who are the most highly-trusted and the most competent in your service?

I have stated that the Comptroller and Auditor-General will make no report except in cases in which it is clear and manifest awards of pensions have been wrongfully made. In what manner will he report such cases?

Deputy O'Higgins and others stated that it would not be in the public interest to rake up details and specify the activities of individuals during that period. I think that by that he wished the Dáil to understand that the Comptroller and Auditor-General in his report would mention individuals by name and give such information as would enable such individuals to be identified. Possibly the best way to deal with that argument is by illustration. I will turn to the report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General on the Appropriation Accounts for the years 1924-1925. These will illustrate to the Dáil not only the manner in which these reports are made, but the kind and type of case which is reported. In Paragraph 58 of the Comptroller and Auditor-General's Report on the Appropriation Accounts for 1924-5 the following statement is made:—

"Section 4, sub-section (1) of the Army Pensions Act, 1923, provides that the pension shall commence on the day on which the officer or soldier to whom the same was granted was discharged from the force. On comparing the date (the Comptroller and Auditor-General went on to say) with the last date on which pay was issued I observed some discrepancy in a number of cases."

I hope that the paragraph has been clearly heard. What names are disclosed in that passage to harrow any person's feelings? Deputy O'Higgins referred to the manner in which the feelings of certain persons might be harrowed by reports of the Comptroller and Auditor-General. What names are disclosed in that paragraph to harrow any person's feelings, to endanger any person's life, liberty or occupation, or to reflect upon any person's character? So much for the manner of that particular report. What was the consequence of it? The consequence was disclosed by the Accounting Officer for Vote No. 56, the Vote on Army Pensions. In his examination before the Committee he admitted that recovery was made in particular cases referred to by the Comptroller and Auditor-General—that is to say, that these public moneys which had been wrongfully paid had been recouped to the State simply because the Comptroller and Auditor-General had access to the files and was able to say that these moneys had been wrongfully paid. In the same paragraph to which I refer the Comptroller and Auditor-General also reported as follows:—

"My examination of the awards of pensions to members of the Irish Volunteers showed that while a certificate stated that the claimants were wounded in the course of duty, in some instances the files"—the files, mark you, which are now not to be made available to the Comptroller and Auditor-General—"disclosed that the injury was received while individuals were engaged in their private occupations."

When you ponder over these words you can understand why the Minister for Agriculture declared in this Dáil that the certificates were of no importance whatever. The certificate in these cases, as reported by the Comptroller and Auditor-General, showed that the claimants were wounded in the course of duty, whereas the files—these precious documents which are to be locked away from the public gaze and withheld from the officer who, under the Constitution, is charged with the control of all public moneys expended on behalf of the State— showed that the injury was received while the individuals were engaged on their private occupations. Again, what information relating to any particular individual is disclosed in that report that would bring odium on him or endanger in any way his present or future? Remember, we were told if these files were once given to the Comptroller and Auditor-General, that the lives of men, possibly not living under the authority of this State, would be in danger, that their occupation would be in danger, and that they themselves, if allowed to live, would be made outcasts in their homes. The same report states:—

"I also observe that some ex-members of the forces in receipt of wound pensions were accepted for service in the Gárda Síochána, and continued to draw wound pensions without any modification of pay or pension."

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

What has that got to do with the Bill?

Mr. MacEntee

The argument against the Bill is that the Reports of the Comptroller and Auditor-General are going to be the subject of headlines in the newspapers, and that details are going to be given to the public which will harrow the feelings of people involved.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

While that up to a point is quite legitimate, the Deputy cannot use this Bill to criticise things other than those that come under the Board of Assessors.

Mr. Flinn

He is illustrating that.

Mr. MacEntee

I am not criticising that. I am merely illustrating.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The Deputy must realise that the Chair and not Deputy Flinn decides whether it is a question of order.

Mr. MacEntee

May I put it this way? If Deputy Flinn finds for me, if you like, the words I am looking for, the words which I used when I began to cite these cases, which I cited in order to illustrate the type of case reported by the Comptroller and Auditor-General——

Mr. Fitzgerald

So far as I understand, the Deputy having recounted some cases in regard to wound pensions, said that these were the files which it is now proposed to hide away from the public.

Mr. MacEntee

Not the files in these particular cases. These files were made available to the Comptroller and Auditor-General.

Mr. Fitzgerald

I think the Deputy went on to say that it was proposed to hide them from the public.

Mr. MacEntee

Not these files.

Mr. Fitzgerald

The Deputy stated that.

Mr. Flinn

There is a misunderstanding.

Mr. MacEntee

If anything which I have said is taken to imply that the files relating to the Pensions Act of 1923 were to be hidden away from the public I unreservedly withdraw that statement, but I do say that the files relating to the awards under the Military Pensions Act which may contain cases analogous to those quoted are going to be hidden, if this Bill goes through, from the Comptroller and Auditor-General, and that that is the sole and only purpose of the Bill. I know, of course, that the purpose of the interruptions was to make the House for a moment forget the cases put before them.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

What does the Deputy mean by interruptions? Does he refer to the Minister or to the Chair?

Mr. MacEntee

To the Minister's interruption.

Mr. Aiken

He cannot say anything about the Leas-Cheann Comhairle.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

Deputy Aiken must not make a remark like that.

Mr. MacEntee

I will give one last case. The Report went on further to say:

"In one instance an individual who offered himself for service as a Volunteer during the Rising in April, 1916, and who was apparently not accepted as such, was wounded by a sniper's bullet. He received a pension on the certificate of the Adjutant-General that he was a member of the Irish Volunteers."

That was the written report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General in relation to this particular matter. In the course of his earlier evidence before the Committee of Public Accounts the Comptroller and Auditor-General stated:—

"This is a case which the Audit Office felt bound to bring forward. The Adjutant-General thought fit to grant a certificate for pre-Truce service and in that way opens a door which may possibly lead to expense on the State later on. The Audit Office in considering this matter had before it a letter from the Director of Intelligence which states that the man was not a member of the Volunteers."

In the further course of evidence the Comptroller and Auditor-General went on to say:—

"I have definite information here that the man was not a member of the Volunteers. By granting him a wound pension you also grant him a certificate that may entitle him to a service pension later on."

That may be one of the service pensions awarded by the Board of Assessors. The man had post-Truce service, a further reason, possibly, for believing that he is one of the pensioners involved in these cases. The man had post-Truce service, and by getting this certificate of the Adjutant-General that he had pre-Truce service he might be entitled to a service pension—the Comptroller and Auditor-General does not say it, but I am going to say it—under the Military Service Pensions Act, 1924. Think of it. A man who, it was admitted, offered himself as a Volunteer and was not accepted, received a certificate from the Adjutant-General that he was, in fact, a Volunteer. On the other hand, the Comptroller and Auditor-General receives a written communication from the Director of Intelligence stating that the man was not a Volunteer. On the strength of the Adjutant-General's certificate the man was awarded a wounds pension, but, as the Comptroller and Auditor-General pointed out, the award of that wounds pension may have made that man eligible for a military service pension later on.

We do not know, and never will know if the Bill goes through, but that this man who, according to the Director of Intelligence, was not a Volunteer in 1916, may have been awarded a pension amounting to— after 5 years' service, which he did not render—if he is a private, £50 a year. If he is a second-lieutenant or captain, it may be £75 a year. If he is a major or a commandant, it may be £100 a year. If he is a major-general, as some of them were, it may be £125 a year—£125 paid out of the exchequer of the State to which that man is not entitled, and the facts are locked up in the files, which are not going to be made available to the Comptroller and Auditor-General if the Bill goes through. Again, consider the cases I have cited. In the first place, the Comptroller and Auditor-General reports that, in connection with the disbursement of Army pensions under the Act of 1923, he found that a number of pensions had been paid at an earlier date than that on which they were lawfully due. As a result of that report, the sum of money wrongfully paid was repaid to the State. In the second case, he reported that although wound pensions were only paid to Volunteers wounded in the course of duty, in some cases the files disclosed that the injury was received while the claimant was engaged in a private occupation.

In the third case wound pensions had been paid to persons accepted for the Gárda Síochána, and they continued to draw the pensions without any modification of either pay or pension. In the fourth case to which he drew attention, the claimant was drawing a wounds pension as a result of a certificate received from the Adjutant-General that he was a member of the Irish Volunteers in 1916, whereas the Comptroller and Auditor-General says that he had received a communication from the Director of Intelligence that the individual referred to was not a Volunteer. In this case, the Comptroller and Auditor-General further pointed out that the certificate of the Adjutant General might involve the State in further liability in respect of a service pension to this man.

I do not know whether the investigation of the Public Accounts Committee upheld the Comptroller and Auditor-General in relation to the reports which he had made. Whether they did or not is not really pertinent to the issue. What is pertinent is this: whether, on the facts as disclosed to him by the files, the Comptroller and Auditor-General was justified in reporting these instances to the House in order that they might be investigated in the manner in which they are in the Public Accounts Committee, where never, from first to last, is a name mentioned or printed. I want to know if there is anyone in the House, even one so recklessly foolish, say, as the Minister for Agriculture, who will get up and say that the good name, the reputation, the livelihood or liberty of any single person, no matter who he might be or where he might reside, was jeopardised by the manner in which these matters were reported by the Comptroller and Auditor-General to the Dáil? The case, I repeat again, has been made that if the Comptroller and Auditor-General had access to these files, information is going to be given to the public which is going to put some man's life, some man's liberty or livelihood in danger.

You have heard the report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General. Is there anything in the manner in which those reports are presented to the Dáil which would justify that argument which has been advanced in support of the Bill? Further, is there any Deputy who will get up and say that any one of these matters should not have been mentioned in his report by the Comptroller and Auditor-General to the Dáil? Is there any Deputy who will get up and contend that the Comptroller and Auditor-General, in drawing the attention of the House to these matters and saying that they were fit matters for investigation, exceeded his power or did anything which he was not bound to do by the trust which is reposed in him? All these cases I have cited arose out of the Pensions Act of 1923. Is there a disinterested Deputy in the House who will get up and say, if the files of the Board of Assessors under the Act of 1924 were examined by the Comptroller and Auditor-General in the way that the files relating to the cases of the 1923 Act were examined, that the Comptroller and Auditor-General might not find there matters just as worthy of report to the House as the instances which I have cited?

There is one other aspect of this question, that of confidential secrecy, to which I must refer. In the course of his reply to a question the President has, it has already been stated, admitted that a longhand transcript had been made of the oral evidence obtained before the committee. I am sure, furthermore, that there can be no doubt that the applications for pensions were made in writing and must have contained particulars of the applicant's service. Thus there is a record of every detail relating to each case from first to last.

The three members of the Board of Assessors had access to this written record. Then, the Adjutant-General had access to this written record. When the applications came in and when the transcript of evidence was made, no doubt, they were filed and indexed. Later these files must have passed from hand to hand throughout the Department in relation to inquiries which had been made regarding each application. And thus, without a doubt, the documents in each case must have come under the notice of a number of individuals ranging from the highest to possibly the lowest ranks in the civil service. I am quite sure that in no single instance was that confidence abused. I am quite sure that no member of the civil service would divulge confidential information which he acquired in this way. But, if there is any case at all to be made by those who are supporting this Bill, it is that the one officer who is not to be trusted in this State is the Comptroller and Auditor-General and that the one Department to which confidential documents should not be sent is the Department presided over by that officer, because it is only when documents reach that Department that the pledge of secrecy is likely to be violated and that only by the officer who, under the Constitution, is called to one of the highest positions of trust in our giving.

Mr. Flinn

He is our watch-dog.

Mr. MacEntee

I say that the argument advanced in support of this Bill constituted an attack on an officer who has always shown himself to be fully sensible of the weighty responsibility which rests upon him.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The Deputy said that the arguments advanced in support of this Bill constituted an attack on the Comptroller and Auditor-General. That is not so.

Mr. MacEntee

I have endeavoured to show that it constituted such an attack, because he is the one officer before whom a confidential document must not be placed. I was saying that that officer has shown himself to be fully sensible of the weighty responsibility which we have imposed upon him.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

I want to make it clear that the Chair will not allow the Comptroller and Auditor-General, or any other officer of the State, to be attacked.

Mr. MacEntee

I wish to make it clear that I am not suggesting that specifically he has been attacked, but that the whole trend of the argument has resolved itself into this, that he is a person in whom confidence cannot be placed.

Mr. Flinn

The actual contents of the Bill.

Mr. MacEntee

I was saying that that officer was fully sensible of the responsibility which we have imposed upon him. I was going to say that he has proved himself to be a zealous guardian of the great trust that we have put on him, and that he has been wholly discreet in the fulfilment of his responsibility and in the discharge of his trust. I wish to say further that, as well as being an attack upon that officer, the attitude of those who are supporting the Bill—not their words—is a reflection on the Public Accounts Committee.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

There has been no attack made upon the Comptroller and Auditor-General in this debate—the Chair would not allow it.

Mr. MacEntee

I understand that. What I am endeavouring to convey is that, not what they have said, but the attitude which they have taken up——

Mr. Fitzgerald-Kenney

What they have not said.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The Chair will not allow any Deputy to attack any officer of the House, or any member of the Civil Service, and that has not been allowed by the Chair in the debate on this Bill.

Mr. MacEntee

I accept that. I am quite aware that the Chair would not permit any specific attack to be made on that officer.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

Any attack.

Mr. MacEntee

Any attack of any sort. Yet the Chair can hardly prevent the reaction from decisions and speeches made in this House. That is beyond the control of the Chair— possibly beyond the control of those who make them. I was going to say that this Bill, in my opinion, is a reflection on the Public Accounts Committee of the House. Since it was formed, that Committee has had to investigate matters often of a highly controversial nature. Never once has a member of that Committee exceeded the bounds of discretion in any comment he has made. Never once has any member of that Committee been guilty of disclosing or referring to matters which came before him in the course of his duty as a member of the Committee, and which it was not in the public interest to disclose. Yet, if there is anything at all in the case which the Government is making for this Bill, it is that the members of the Public Accounts Committee are not trustworthy and discreet, and are, in fact, not honourable, and, therefore, matters involving pledges of secrecy or confidence cannot safely be entrusted to them for investigation. This Bill is a reflection upon the several members of the Public Accounts Committee which considered the report of the Comptroller and Auditor-General for the year ending 31st March, 1925, upon which the question of these documents was first raised. It is a reflection upon the members of the Committees which were appointed during the subsequent years of 1927, 1928 and 1929. It is a reflection upon Deputies J.J. Byrne, Cooper, Hennessy and Esmonde, Senators Johnson and Wilson, Deputies Derrig, Doherty, Wolfe, Good, Briscoe, Flinn, Davin. Cassidy, Bennett, O'Higgins and Haslett, Gun O'Mahony, Jordan, Ryan and Conlon, who are all of them branded by this Bill as unworthy of confidence and trust, incapable of honourably discharging their duty upon what is perhaps the most important Committee of this House. If Deputies Cooper, Esmonde, J.J. Byrne and Wolfe go into the Division Lobby in support of this Bill they will, by their votes, declare that they believe themselves to be incapable of discharging honourably their duties as members of the Committee of Public Accounts, and will brand themselves as Deputies who are capable of betraying a confidence and violating a pledge of secrecy. I will return again for a moment to the argument of the Minister for Finance and the Minister for Agriculture in support of the Bill.

Mr. Byrne

Might I ask the Deputy a question, as he has been good enough to refer to me by name as a member of the Committee. As a matter of fact, is this Bill not framed expressly to carry out the wishes expressed by the Public Accounts Committee, which are in black and white in the Report?

Mr. Flinn

They will be in black and blue when we are finished.

Mr. MacEntee

If some members of the Public Accounts Committee felt that this Bill was necessary in order that they could be prevented from giving way to their meaner nature, then you may say that this Bill was introduced on their behalf, but, so far as the independent members of that Committee were concerned, the members who had neither act nor part, nor truck in the giving of these pensions——

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The Deputy ought not to make a statement like that. The Committee of Public Accounts must not be criticised here. We must assume that every member of the Committee is an independent member. I think the Deputy will see that himself.

Mr. MacEntee

I withdraw that.

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

It was a very improper statement to make.

Mr. MacEntee

It was, I agree.

Mr. Byrne

Is not that Report signed by members of the Deputy's Party?

An Leas-Cheann Comhairle

The Deputy must allow Deputy MacEntee to make his speech.

Mr. Aiken

The Deputy can speak afterwards.

Mr. MacEntee

He cannot, and it is well for him he cannot. I was referring to the argument of the Minister for Finance and the Minister for Agriculture in support of the Bill. Here, I should like to say that if this Bill goes through it will not be the fault of the Ministers who have spoken in support of it. In the course of his speech, the Minister for Finance said that this Bill would prevent further references to the Public Accounts Committee, and discussions and disagreements which may take place in the Dáil. How are these discussions to be prevented? By compelling the Comptroller and Auditor-General to accept the findings of the Board of Assessors as final and binding, and to pass payments made merely upon their certificate. If the Bill goes through, the only documents the Comptroller and Auditor-General would have the right to examine would be the certificates of military service issued by the Minister for Finance, and issued on the report of the Board of Assessors.

What does the Minister for Agriculture say in regard to such proceedings and such certificates? "Am I not right in saying," said the Minister for Agriculture—the greatest Minister for Agriculture in Europe —after listening to the speech of his colleague, the Minister for Finance, "am I not right in saying that the Comptroller and Auditor-General has no function worth twopence in the matter if he is not to examine the files?" And that is precisely the position in which this House is going to put itself and its own officer, charged with a particular duty to this House, if they pass this Bill, in regard to the moneys issued and paid under the Military Service Pensions Act. They are going to make the functions of that officer in regard to the disbursement of those public moneys not worth twopence. Possibly, it is not fair to quote the speech of the Minister for Agriculture against the Bill. In this matter, we remember his rather hurried intervention at the end of the debate, thrust into it by the Party Whips as mere debating cannon fodder, ignorant of the whole matter, and for the sole purpose of slinging mud so as to obscure the issue. We may remember that during the debate the Minister was so mixed in his arguments and muddled in mind that he could not distinguish between myself and my colleague, Deputy Lemass, on this Front Bench——

The President

It would not be hard to make that distinction, without paying any compliment to Deputy Lemass.

Mr. MacEntee

If the President will wait for a moment I shall come to him. The quotation which I have given shows that the Minister for Agriculture did not know whether his arguments were for the Bill or against the Bill. Let me repeat it: "Am I not right in saying that the Comptroller and Auditor-General has no function worth twopence in the matter if he is not to examine the files?" But the whole purpose of the Bill, as the Minister for Finance said, is to prevent the Comptroller and Auditor-General from examining the files, and to prevent him from bringing before the Dáil cases in which public moneys have clearly and manifestly been wrongfully paid.

If this Bill goes through, pensions amounting to large sums will be paid annually without the Comptroller and Auditor-General being permitted to examine the basis on which they were calculated, and without being able to satisfy himself, and through him the Dáil, that the terms of the original Act have been complied with. Surely the Dáil did not contemplate when passing the original Act that the right of the Comptroller and Auditor-General to audit these accounts on their behalf would be restricted, or that his duty in that respect would be foregone. Deputy O'Higgins, I think, made the case that they did. To sustain that view it would be necessary to show that the Oireachtas by a specific provision of the Act deliberately debarred the Comptroller and Auditor-General from examining the validity of any payments, and unless that provision is deliberately written into the Act then those who withheld those files from the Comptroller and Auditor-General were guilty of an illegality. The Minister for Defence and the President of the Executive Council have acted in this matter in violation of the law and the Constitution, both of which the President has often boasted, on public platforms, he has done such terrible things to maintain.

I would like, at the end again, to remind the House as to the principles which are to determine the Comptroller and Auditor-General in the conduct of these investigations. Amongst other things, the first and most important is that no Department hitherto has had a right to refuse information, even though of a highly confidential character, to the Comptroller and Auditor-General, if he required it to satisfy himself that the expenditure agrees with the Parliamentary appropriation. The second principle is the Comptroller and Auditor-General alone is competent to say what information is necessary for the discharge of his statutory function. The third is that in all these matters the Comptroller and Auditor-General acts as the officer of this House. If he is not permitted to act and to examine moneys paid under the Military Service Pensions Act in accordance with these principles, what position is going to be created? If this Bill goes through the findings of this Board of Assessors will be made binding upon him, upon the Minister for Finance, and upon other tribunals and persons whatsoever. Even if it came to the knowledge of the Comptroller and Auditor-General that public moneys were being wrongfully paid, that pensions were paid to persons not entitled to them, the Comptroller and Auditor-General could not report to the Dáil the facts which were within his own personal knowledge. The Minister for Finance could not even report the facts. These pensions would continue to be paid year in and year out, and this Dáil and the people would have no redress in regard to them.

It being 9 o'clock and Private Deputies' Business being down by Order the debate stood adjourned (Deputy MacEntee).