I move that the Bill be read a Second Time. I would like to get the Second Reading concluded to-night for the reason that I think that discussion of any value that is likely to arise on it will take place in Committee rather than on the Second Reading Stage. I am assuming that the principle of this measure is one that is going to be accepted by all parties in the House. The details are the things that will probably require a certain amount of modification. I would invite very serious attention to the various sections and would even invite the putting down of a great number of amendments, because there is considerable argument to be had on details of this measure. I do not at all hold that the Bill is in its last or best form as it is at the moment. This measure, if it is passed, will supplement the existing legislation on the subject of merchandise marks. The existing legislation is mainly the Act of 1887, the Act referred to here as the Principal Act. In addition to that there are three Acts: the Act of 1891, one of 1909, and a third of 1911. Those three have to deal mainly with prosecutions and with enforcement of the Principal Act. Difficulty was experienced in the matter of enforcing the 1887 Act. These Acts, though they were not completely satisfactory, brought some improvement in the matter of prosecutions. The 1887 Act is deficient in at least three respects: first, in regard to enforcement, and the method of prosecution; and secondly, its scope is very limited. It has reference only to false indication of origin. If goods come into this country, say, without any indication of origin whatsover, there is no possibility of an offence under the 1887 Act. That Act refers only to false descriptions, to misdescriptions. The third limitation is this: where there is a false description or a misdescription it is only an offence under the Act if it is, as the words run, "applied to" certain articles, and by decision the word "applied" has come to have the meaning of actual physical application. Consequently an advertisement of goods which was not actually and physically attached to the goods could be as false as can well be imagined and yet might not form an offence under the Act of 1887. However, prosecution and enforcement and the actual physical application are two rather minor points.
The main defect of the 1887 Act was that it had reference only to misdescription and that goods that came into this country without any description whatever passed. That position was even recognised as being an unsatisfactory one as early as 1926 in England, and an amending Bill was introduced there and passed into law. Our Bill takes up all of the amendment which was carried into the 1926 Act, which does not apply here, of course. It goes further. This Bill has reference not merely to a false description of origin, but it goes further, and in certain cases requires a description of origin to be attached to certain goods on their entry into this country, and with regard to every other class of goods allows an application to be made to a Commission to be established under this legislation that certain goods shall not be allowed in, or that no goods should be allowed in unless a definite indication of origin is given.
The first class of goods to which I made reference is that referred to in Section 20 of the Bill—a certain classification of goods which once the Act is passed cannot be allowed into the country unless there is an indication of origin—the class of goods to which there is applied either the name of a manufacturer, trader or dealer in Saorstát Eireann or the trade mark of any such person as is previously mentioned, or a mark, emblem or device so closely resembling such trade mark as to be calculated to deceive; or, thirdly, the name of any place, district or area in Saorstát Eireann.
Goods marked in any of these three ways cannot come into the country unless, in addition to those markings, there is an indication of origin. With regard to any other classification of goods, it is open to any body of people substantially interested to make an application. That application goes through a certain procedure. It goes before the Commission, who consider it and report their consideration and recommendation to the Executive Council. The Executive Council may then act. If the Executive Council does act on the report, and that report is in favour of indication of origin being applied, then to such goods as those to which the order would apply there must be attached some indication of origin. There is given further power to the Commission, and consequently through them to the Executive Council, to determine the way in which the indication of origin must be given—the type of lettering, the size, space, where the letters are to be affixed, and so on. All these are matters of detail, and can be dealt with afterwards.
The Bill definitely betters the position with regard to enforcement and prosecution in a variety of clauses. Under Section 21 the Bill makes better provision with regard to what I mentioned as the third defect in the 1887 Act. Under Section 21 a false representation with regard to origin is interpreted to mean "any representation, direct or indirect, and whether verbal or in writing, and if in writing whether used in any advertisement or in any catalogue, billhead or other document, relating to the goods, or implied in the use of any trade name, or style.'— I need only glance at the machinery now. There is to be provision made for people substantially interested making representations to a Commission which is to be established. The Commission considers the application, and reports to the Executive Council. The Executive Council may act upon the report. If it does act and establishes a restriction order— either restriction with regard to sale or restriction with regard to importation—then that order comes before the Dáil, and unless negatived holds, and of course holds until negatived.
I should have mentioned earlier that the Bill also meets a further point in which there was a defect in the 1887 Act—that it not merely applies to importation, but can be made apply to sale also. Under the 1887 Act, goods might have been brought in properly described and whatever description was on them could be obliterated or removed before sale, so that, on sale, there was no chance of anybody even discriminating as between goods, because whatever indication of origin might have been applied—though there was no necessity to apply it— that indication might have been removed before time of sale. The Executive Council which has the power to make restriction orders has also power to grant exemptions. There is a special section dealing with that— Section 11, which is rather an emergency section. It would only apply in a case in which a restriction order was made and it was established later to the satisfaction of the Executive Council that the restriction either of importation or of sale was doing harm to a body of people interested in the country. Thereupon, an exemption order might be made. But if an exemption order is made, the Executive Council refers to the Merchandise Marks Commission the question whether or not the original restriction order should be amended to bring it into relation with the exemption order. There is also provision made for revocation and amendment of restriction orders on previous application to the Merchandise Marks Commission.
I said that there were certain points that would have to be argued in much greater detail in Committee. I want to refer to one or two of these. I call special attention to Section 20, which I read before—the section which refers to the sale of imported goods bearing the name or trade mark of a Saorstát Eireann manufacturer or trader or bearing the name of a place in Saorstát Eireann. Representations have been made to us by some Departments and by outside people that there should be a complete prohibition of, say, Irish place names or Irish trade marks on goods that are to be sold here—that if goods are found coming into this country bearing a name which is an Irish place name or a mark which is a trade mark or a colourable imitation of a trade mark of a particular person manufacturing here, those goods should be prohibited entirely and not, as suggested in the Bill, allowed in if, but only if, accompanied by indication of foreign origin. Even those who make that suggestion admit that there are certain designations which previously had their roots in, say, a place in this country or places elsewhere and that have, by custom and usage of trade, lost the old local significance. They are now simply classifications of quality. They are used as descriptions of goods and have no longer any application to the places referred to. There are instances in the use of the word "Balbriggan" and certain terms used in connection with lace which previously had their origin here. They have definitely, by Court decisions, come to be accepted as trade descriptions and no longer have any local significance. Those who have made representations that goods bearing what are called Irish names should be prohibited entirely and not merely allowed in if accompanied by indications of origin always say that you must exempt such Irish names as have become generic—that is to say, have lost their local signification and are trade names. I have put one suggestion in the Bill. The other suggestion—a very obvious amendment—can be argued and the two points of view will have to be met in this House. We will see which will commend itself to the Dáil. There is difficulty in connection with this suggestion. There would be difficulty in connection with the other suggestion. From the point of view of the home consumer, I think it can be argued that the suggestion in the Bill is the better one. From the point of view of the consumer abroad, from the point of view of holding on to an Irish place name for goods which are not going to be sold here, possibly there is something to be said for complete prohibition. Under this provision, of course, it is possible that a manufacturer may begin to use an Irish name, accompany that by an indication of origin, and drop the indication of origin if he comes to sell the goods in a market other than in this country. It is a matter that we can argue more in detail on a specific amendment in Committee.
A second point, and one akin to that, is the suggestion made that certain emblems and devices which are historically connected with this country should also be prohibited on goods. I have no objection to including a list and saying either that these shall be prohibited entirely on foreign goods sought to be imported into the country, or else allowed in only if there is a definite indication of origin. The difficulty is to get a list. That is either a lengthy list, a list that will commend itself to people, or an exhaustive list. One's mind turns immediately to the shamrock, the harp, and other devices like that. The difficulty is that in the course of trade these things have become attached to certain manufactures outside this country entirely. There is also the difficulty that people have got into the habit of attaching to goods produced here certain other devices not related to this country, and there is the definite likelihood of conflict of an international type being created on this matter. However, the emblem matter can be dealt with. If the Dáil decides that, it can draw up a list that is suitable and is nearly as exhaustive as we want it to be; then that list can be incorporated.
The third thing on which there is a certain amount of divergence of opinion, even amongst Departments, is in connection with Section 21. Section 21 is the section which enlarges false representation in the single matter of misdescription of origin, and enlarges it to representation, whether direct or indirect, whether verbally or in writing, whether by way of advertisement or physically applied, or even verbal representation. It has been urged that that section should be made to extend to a variety of other matters. In the 1887 Act, trade descriptions, if false, are made an offence, and the term "false trade description" is defined in this way: any description, statement or other indication, direct or indirect, as to the number, quantity, measure, gauge, or weight of any goods; as to the place or country in which goods were made or produced; as to the mode of manufacturing or producing any goods; as to the material of which any goods are composed; and as to any goods being subject to existing patent, privilege, or copyright. Let me take out two. The 1887 Act applies to the number, quantity, measure, gauge, or weight of any goods, and to the material of which the goods are composed, in this limited way: that if a false description is given with regard to these things and it is physically applied to the article, then there is an offence. Now we are taking false description or misrepresentation, and, keeping it still inside a framework of false description of origin, we extend the representation so as to include representation not merely physically applied to the goods, but also if it is verbal or in writing, or used in any advertisement. It has been urged upon us that that enlargement should be applied also to, say, misdescription with regard to material. The suggestion even has been made that we should really enlarge the criminal offences under the 1887 Act as amended by this Bill, and make it an offence for an assistant in a shop verbally to say that goods were woollen when, in fact, they were a mixture of wool and something else. That, I think, is pushing the verbal representation too far. That is the only guiding line I can throw out in relation to this matter, that it is impossible in a Bill of this sort to multiply in any very large way the number of criminal offences until one has got an indication that the practice which it is intended to render a criminal one is widespread and doing harm to consumers of any type. We leave for the moment the enlargement at verbal representation on the matter of false representation with regard to origin, and that only.
These are the main matters on which I wish to speak. As I say, I think the Bill is an important one, on which there can be a more valuable discussion in Committee, because, as I said, I take it that the principle of the extension of the merchandise marks idea to the marking of the country of origin is one likely to be readily accepted by the House, and it is only a matter of how far it should be extended. I have mentioned three points in which certain good arguments, but not sufficiently weighty arguments, to my mind, have been put forward in favour of extension. We shall leave it at this stage for the moment. I even invite amendments on the three points mentioned, so that specific amendments can be discussed.