Committee on Finance. - Vote 67—External Affairs (Resumed).

Debate resumed on the Motion: "That the Estimate be referred back for reconsideration" (Deputy Belton).

I moved to report progress on this Vote on the last day on which it was before the House. The President gave us a very sketchy account of the work of the External Affairs Department during the past year. In particular, he said nothing on this Vote with regard to that aspect of external relations which has, by far, the greatest importance for us—that is to say, our relations with Great Britain and Northern Ireland. I propose to confine my remarks to that subject.

In other countries, strong efforts are made to arrive at some sort of agreed foreign policy as between Government and Opposition Parties, so that there can be continuity when Governments change. Foreign policy or external policy—whichever you like to call it— has a far more vital influence upon home affairs in this country than it has in any other country and, accordingly, the desirability of arriving at agreement and continuity is even greater here than it is elsewhere. Speaking on this Estimate last year, I pressed for the making of a sincere effort towards arriving at such unanimity and I want to press the same view to-day.

Before there can be any hope of getting agreement, there has got to be understanding. There has got to be clarity. My principal complaint against the Government on this subject is the complete want of clarity that distinguishes their utterances and the state of mental confusion in which they seem to be themselves and which they are creating in other people. Our discussion on the Estimate for the Department of External Affairs will be well worth while if we get any further towards clarifying the situation, as to what the Government and the Fianna Fáil Party really have in their mind, if anything.

What a hope!

I think we can start by agreement on one thing. We can say on both sides of the House that we all want to achieve a united Ireland of Thirty-Two Counties as a political entity, and that we want that united Ireland to have the right to determine for herself, at all times, what her constitutional relations shall be with Great Britain, or with any other part of the globe. I think the fact that we can get as far as that ought to be some help and consolation to us, ought to stop us from using violent expressions about each other and casting reflections upon each other's patriotism. After all, that is the fundamental thing, if anything is. Further, we can agree upon this, that nobody is in favour of trying to achieve that ideal by force; at least nobody in this House is in favour of trying to achieve it by force. The President of the Executive Council himself has made that quite clear on more than one occasion, and most recently in his speech on his own Department a few days ago, when he announced that if there were a European war, this country would not allow itself to be used as a base for hostile operations by any other country against Great Britain. Obviously, if there were any intention to attempt to bring partition to an end by force, that declaration of the President could not have been made. I take this opportunity of saying that I consider his declaration was a statesmanlike one, and can do nothing but good, from whatever point of view you regard it. I think that we, just as much as his own supporters, must realise the desirability of that particular fear being eliminated from the mind of the British Government.

But if we are all agreed that the ideal cannot be achieved by force, we must be equally agreed that it can only be achieved by persuasion and consent, and I am afraid I must remind the House once again that there has not been the smallest approach since Fianna Fáil came into office towards achieving it along these lines. It is because I consider that the element of general consent is so necessary, that I have never been able to feel much interest in the question of merely defeating the present Government and the Fianna Fáil Party. Something more important than that has got to be done. They have got to be converted; they have got to be induced to change their point of view, because, merely throwing them out of office and leaving them still to continue to act as a fatal barrier in the way of re-union with the North brings us no further towards the accomplishment of our object so far as national policy is concerned.

It would be a great thing to drown them, would it not?

The first thing is to try to get our minds clear, and to try, especially to get the minds of Deputies opposite and Ministers clear. A certain number of ingenious gentlemen, interested in the stories of Conan Doyle about Sherlock Holmes, have tried to reconstruct a private life of Sherlock Holmes, apart from his detective activities, from the various hints about that private life included in the detective stories. They have never succeeded in producing a coherent life of Sherlock Holmes along these lines because of the multitude of inconsistencies in the obiter dicta which Holmes lets drop in his conversations with Dr. Watson. One can pardon Conan Doyle for that, because he was writing fiction. But we are in a similar situation if we try to arrive at an understanding of what really is the national policy of the present Government by a study of the speeches of Ministers. They contradict each other, and they contradict themselves. I am going to make an attempt to induce the President or some of his colleagues to bring order out of chaos and to tell us what the Government's policy really is.

At one time the President speaks in this House as if separation from the British Commonwealth was something that would have to be deferred to a future generation, and, at another time, he speaks as if separation would be achieved in the morning, if only the British Government promised not to make themselves disagreeable in the event of such separation taking place. We had a speech in the Seanad last summer by the Minister for Finance, in which he said that he would hate to think of our future as permanently divorced from that of the people of our blood in Australia and Canada, in which he expressed satisfaction at the nature of our association with these countries, and said that, as far as they were concerned, our association with them was free and voluntary. He also spoke of the great attraction of continuing association with people of our blood not only in those countries overseas, but even in Great Britain. He seemed to imply several times in that speech that, provided we got the theoretical recognition of our right to withdraw from the Commonwealth at any time, he, at any rate, would find the arguments in favour of such association as he described overwhelming. A speech was made in this House last December by Deputy Flinn, in which he referred with indignation to my suggestion that it would be better to have immediate separation for the Twenty-Six Counties than to go on keeping the country in turmoil by a policy of republicanism without a republic. He made the following comment, and it appears in the Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 54, No. 5, column 1700:—

"There is not a man in this House who does not know that when he speaks of the Twenty-Six Counties he speaks of some artificial entity which has no reality in relation to the fundamental matters of his own soul. Yet people who knows that have the effrontery—there is no other word for it—to suggest that we can take in our hands the Twenty-Six Counties of Ireland and tear them away from the rest of the component body of Ireland. We have no right to do that. We have no power; we have no will, and we have no intention of doing anything of the kind."

On the other hand, we have had speeches, even over this week-end, from the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs and the Minister for Finance, which are in a very different key. The Minister for Finance has announced his intention of dying a republican in a republic. I do not know how soon he expects that lamentable event to occur but, at any rate, sooner or later that is his ambition, and moreover, it is to be a republic that has been obtained by the now President of the Executive Council. What sort of a republic is he talking about? Is it one for Twenty-Six Counties or one for Thirty-Two Counties?

The atmosphere of Finglas was intoxicating.

The Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, over the week-end, said that we would go out of the Commonwealth—speaking, apparently, of the Twenty-Six Counties—as soon as it was convenient, economically, for us to do so. The Minister for Local Government said the same thing. He claimed that the present Ministry should be entrusted by the Irish people with complete power to choose the day. But he also refrained from saying, quite specifically, whether he was talking about the existing area of the Irish Free State or of the whole of Ireland.

I assume that those Ministers, who were talking over the week-end on this matter, were talking of the area of the Irish Free State; otherwise, their remarks were merely nonsensical. But, surely, in view of these diverse utterances, we have a right to ask for more clarification. It is quite impossible to co-operate, however anxious we might be to co-operate, if we cannot make head or tail of the speeches of Ministers. Let them tell us definitely do they or do they not intend to establish a republic for the area now covered by the Irish Free State at the first moment that they feel economically strong enough to do so? Is it their view that there should be a referendum taken of the population of the Irish Free State before they would feel authorised to take the action of establishing a republic for the Twenty-six Counties? Must they wait until they have cured unemployment or are they prepared to face the possibility of Irish unemployed in Great Britain being deported and sent back here to find employment in this country, possibly in numbers amounting to hundreds of thousands? In one of his speeches the President suggested that we could not have separation for the Twenty-six Counties until the British Government evacuated their maintenance parties from Cove and Berehaven. Is that to be taken as an indication of the conditions that must be brought about before any sort of Twenty-six County republic is declared? Have we got to wait until the British evacuate Cove and Berehaven and Lough Swilly? All these things are left in a state of most undesirable obscurity. I ask the President to give us one straight answer as to what he himself, and his colleagues, mean by these various utterances.

I think that with regard even to the Twenty-six County republic we could go this distance towards agreement: that we would like to see that question disposed of one way or another. We on this side of the House would be delighted to see it settled on its merits and we do not want to see it settled on the basis of any intimidation either outside or inside this country.

The Minister for Industry and Commerce, speaking last week, quoted from a letter of mine to the Times; and he was unfair enough and audacious enough to imply that I wrote that letter, and the rest of the letters I wrote on the same topic, for the purpose of denying the right of this country to dispose of its own destinies. But in point of fact, every one of my communications to the Times was written for the purpose of asserting that it was desirable from everyone's point of view that we should have freedom of choice as to whether we would remain within the Commonwealth or not; and while I have never disguised my belief that it was desirable for us to be inside the Commonwealth, I want the question to be dealt with by the Irish people, on its merits, and I am, of course, prepared to acquiesce in any decision the Irish people give on the merits of that question.

The President says that the whole situation has been what he described as "bedevilled" by the Treaty. He took the phrase "bedevilled" from the ex-Minister for Agriculture, Deputy Hogan. But Deputy Hogan declared that the whole situation was "bedevilled" by the President. The President says that it was "bedevilled" by the Treaty. It is an unfortunate fact that in the forefront of our relations with Great Britain there stand two agreements—the Treaty and the Ultimate Financial Settlement.

That is interesting.

It is unfortunate because in the present state of the world a treaty of any kind has only got to show its nose in order to induce somebody to want to break it. Treaties, like disarmament conferences, seem, in the present state of world opinion, to provoke people into acts of bad feeling and unreasonableness. I, personally, would rather see relations with any country develop out of the logical facts of the situation than out of any agreement whatsoever. Nevertheless, I cannot admit that the "bedevilment" of the Irish situation originated with the Treaty. I think the frame of mind that makes it so difficult for matters to be considered on their merits in Ireland, dates from a good deal longer than that; and, so far as our immediate modern history is concerned I would say it originated from the Carson movement against the 1912 Home Rule Bill and the amount of support that was given to that movement of violence and treason, if treason has any meaning, by British politicians; and that it also originated from the episode called the Curragh Mutiny. This already exasperated state of mind was further accentuated by the threat of conscription during the War. While I agree that the Treaty and the ghosts and memories immediately associated with the Treaty have had the effect of preventing many in this country from thinking straight upon a subject on which it is very important that we should think straight, I think that "bedevilment" began at an earlier date than the date of the Treaty.

Now, although it is the fashion of the day to make light of engagement of any kind, and to break a treaty where a treaty exists, I suggest to the President that what he has got to keep very much before his mind is that probably there has never been a treaty which should really irritate those whom it affects less than this particular Treaty, because it produced not a static but a dynamic condition of affairs in regard to our relation to the Commonwealth of Nations. We are put on a level by that treaty with Canada, South Africa, Australia and the rest, and according as their sovereign position has developed, ours has developed also. I, for one, do not interpret the Treaty as imposing a restriction upon our right to separate the Twenty-Six Counties from the Commonwealth, if we choose to do so. When the President talks about a forced position, as he continually does, it seems to me that he is talking about the past rather than the present. Even if the phrase was a fair phrase at any time, I suggest it is not a fair phrase now and that, in fact, he is giving away a part of the Irish case that he should not give away, by suggesting that the Treaty should be interpreted as depriving us of the constitutional position that other parts of the Commonwealth have attained, explicitly attained, since the signing of the Treaty, by the Statute of Westminster and by the general development of constitutional thought throughout the Commonwealth.

Then there is the other agreement which upsets his mind and produces, as he calls it, "bedevilment"—the Ultimate Financial Settlement. There is no sense in taking hold of that document, calling it a thing of shrede and tatters and displaying it here as an exhibit to excite us all, unless you mean to imply by that exhibition that there is some ambiguity about its terms. Even if there was not anything on paper, that agreement would still, in honour, be a binding agreement, if those who were connected with it, on both sides, were clear on what was agreed to, and that is, after all, the situation. Even if the agreement had been a verbal one, I maintain it would still be binding upon us. The fact that it does not seem to have emerged from a solicitor's office for somebody to sign according to correct legal form and that it may not be a polished legal document, is nothing to the purpose unless there is some doubt as to its terms. There is no such doubt. There was no novelty in that agreement except such novelties as were favourable to this country.

Except such novelties as were favourable to this country. At the time of the ultimate financial settlement it had not even entered the heads of Deputies opposite that the annuities should not be paid. They had been paid year after year.

What about the Boundary?

It was only an afterthought, a discovery by that ingenious man, Colonel Moore, or somebody else, that there was what he considered a legal flaw in the situation—a theory on which he had to work very hard for a long period of time before he could get the Party opposite to accept it—it was only that which brought about the state of affairs and the dispute in which we now find ourselves. The Ultimate Financial Settlement, it seems to me, is more of a tie, if "tie" is the word to use, than the Treaty, because the Treaty, as I suggest, created a dynamic constitutional position. The Ultimate Financial Settlement was a perfectly clear and honourable agreement between two nations with regard to finances.

And alters the Treaty.

That is nothing to the purpose. Assuming that it were true, it is quite irrelevant. Both parties having consented to it, it is in honour binding upon us. Therefore, I suggest there is no reason for getting into a state of righteous indignation about the Ultimate Financial Settlement at all.

The fact of the matter is that if some hypnotist could get the President of the Executive Council and his colleagues in succession to call upon him, if he could put them into a hypnotic trance and, while in that condition, could suggest to them that there never had been such a thing as a Treaty; if we could start afresh, simply on the basis of the actual facts of the situation and if the hypnotist could make a similar suggestion to the President, even as regards the Ultimate Financial Settlement, I think that the Government, starting afresh and "unbedevilled", with those causes of excitement removed from their minds, would arrive at an arrangement with Great Britain, satisfactory to all concerned, very much more easily than they seem at present likely to do. The President referred contemptuously to my recommendations as Couéism. But Couéism has its uses. It has its uses particularly with hypochondriacs who think they are sick when they are not. Couéism would have a very useful effect on the present Government——

On Deputy Dillon for instance.

—— who have induced themselves to believe that they are being put upon, and that we are all slaves instead of being free men, when as a matter of fact we are perfectly free and nobody has put anything over on us at all. Could we not see if it would not be possible to get some way towards a national external policy by getting rid of these complexes with regard to the Treaty and the Ultimate Financial Settlement? After all, I have heard about a certain document—Document No. 2. I presume that Document No. 2 would have involved a treaty of some sort. I do not know whether we have moved away altogether from Document No. 2 or whether it is still regarded as a satisfactory basis for the relations between Ireland and Great Britain. It would have involved some sort of agreement, possibly a more static and more rigid agreement than the other. So the President should not really be quite so severe as he is about the iniquity of anybody who makes a treaty with Great Britain at all. But, let us get away in thought, from treaties and just think of the logic of the situation looking at the facts of the present day as they are, and starting from there. If we did that, I cannot help thinking that our path towards an agreed external policy for national affairs would be a very much easier one.

Over and above the "bedevilment" created by the existence of these agreements, which grate upon the President so much, there is one other state of mind which stands very much in the way of any sensible progress and that state of mind I can best describe as racialism. It was exemplified in the debate on the President's Department by the speech of Deputy Cleary. The Government should make up their minds first and then tell us whether their aim is an Irish Ireland, a Gaelic Ireland, or a Gaelic 26 counties. Is either a Gaelic 32 counties or a Gaelic 26 counties a sensible object?

On external affairs?

It is very relevant to our external affairs I submit, because if we are to have satisfactory relations with the people across the water, it can only be upon a basis that will hold out some hope of a united Ireland. I do not see good feeling between this country and Great Britain being brought about until we have some sort of hope or plan for reconciling the people of the North. That reconciliation with the people of the North is impossible if we allow a spirit of racialism to dominate us. We have got to take the statesmanlike view that there are two stocks in this country to be reconciled and that our national aspirations, to which Deputy Cleary referred as something that we, on this side, were inviting the country to surrender, can only be fulfilled by that reconciliation. Our policy with regard to external affairs includes our attitude with regard to the people in the North. Deputy Cleary, for example, exclaimed that a person like me ought not to be in the Free State at all, but that I ought to be in Northern Ireland doing missionary work among the Northern Unionists. In my time, I have done a great deal of missionary work among the Northern Unionists. When contesting West Belfast, I preached the same doctrines of reconciliation and opposition to racialism which I have been preaching here.

How did you get on?

If I had been elected by the Northern Unionists the whole problem would have been solved. Unfortunately, I was not. If I went back much beyond that—and I could go back 25 years—I could show Deputy Cleary, or anybody like him, speeches of mine made in Northern Ireland in advocacy of exactly the same principles. There is a great deal of missionary work to be done in Northern Ireland, I quite agree, but, unfortunately, there is a great deal of missionary work to be done here too, and there is a great deal of missionary work to be done in Great Britain and they ought all to be going on simultaneously. Missionary work ought to be going on everywhere for the purpose of bringing about reconciliation, for the purpose of beating down racialism and for the purpose of creating friendly feelings between ourselves and Great Britain and a united national feeling that can be shared by ourselves and the Unionists in Northern Ireland as well as the Nationalists in Northern Ireland.

I invite, then, Deputies opposite to reflect upon these problems from that point of view. We are in no way desirous of making Party capital out of external affairs. We take remarkably little interest indeed in the question of turning the present Government out of office as compared with the far greater achievement, if we could accomplish it, of modifying their point of view. Every now and then one of them makes a speech which gives us a glimmer of hope that they are seeing sense, and then, feeling that he has gone a step too far, he makes a speech, a few days or weeks or months later, which completely obliterates the effect of his lapse into sanity. Take, for example, the famous effort of the Minister for Finance on the subject of the roofless monasteries and Penal Laws.

And the Protestant succession !

And the Protestant succession.

One of the symbols which Deputy MacDermot wants us to accept.

The Protestant succession upon which, I understand, Document No. 2 made no attack and which men of our race and blood in Australia and Canada appear to be able to accept without excommunication. I suggest to Ministers and Deputies that they should make a serious effort to clear their minds and give us the benefit of the consequences of that process of clarification, and should present to us a policy that offers some hope of national advance towards union with the North. Even if they put aside for the time being, as something for a future generation—though I am all against their doing so—the question of unity with the North, let them at least see whether we cannot arrive at an agreed policy with regard to the relations between the 26 Counties of the Irish Free State and the British Government. Let them make it clear whether it is separation for the 26 Counties that they are after; let them make it clear whether they wish the Irish people to have an opportunity of deciding that question on its merits; and let them make it clear what are the conditions under which they think that act of separation would be justified, because if they are going to wait until the British have been turned out of Cove and Berehaven, or until our unemployment problem has been so completely solved that the absorbing of another 200,000 Irishmen from Great Britain would offer no difficulties to us, or until the British market is of no importance to us, it appears to me that we are going on forever with the state of turmoil here which is produced by this policy of republicanism without a republic.

The Minister for External Affairs, in introducing this Estimate, followed the example of the President—no introduction. I am beginning to think that the President is one of the most naive and simpleminded men in this Assembly. He has never introduced an Estimate, covering no matter what policy, about which he thinks it is necessary to say anything. His mere presence, his mere existence, so to speak, is sufficient explanation. He generally starts his reply to the various criticisms that are passed on the administration of the Votes for which he is more directly responsible by drawing attention to the fact that as usual the Opposition has started by criticising him because he made no introductory statement. By this time, it might dawn upon him that the Opposition expects an introductory statement from him and that if he is to make that complaint of his at the beginning of each exculpation of his conduct, it is because he has fallen into the bad habit of telling the House nothing about his policy. I do not say that it would enlighten the House if he did; I do not say that the country would be anything the clearer.

What do you want it for then?

It is interesting always. It might not clarify our minds, but it is very often an interesting effort in gymnastics to watch when the President or the Minister for External Affairs tries to clarify his own mind or the minds of his followers on quite a number of subjects. Here, at least, we might have expected from him some introductory statement, because I think he will admit that this is a Department about whose activities most of the people in the country know comparatively little. I am not suggesting for a moment that it is a Department that is not active, but it is certainly a Department on whose activities the country is not very well enlightened and there was an excellent opportunity for the President to state precisely, or even in general outline, what his Department was doing. As usual, he refrains from any statement of general policy or any summary of the activities of the particular Department even during the last 12 months. That, of course, has one great advantage—I am not suggesting that it is the reason why the President uniformly follows this course—in that the people who come after him are not in a position to criticise what he has said. He is in the strategic position of always being able to conclude, and his concluding statement is the only statement he generally makes on an Estimate. As I say, the strategic advantage of that is so obvious that I am rather slow to attribute it to the President, whose motives, generally speaking, are anything but obvious. My colleague, Deputy MacDermot, seems to be suffering from an attack of tremendous optimism. He thinks that because he has put a number of definite questions to the President he is going to get definite answers to any of them. Everybody knows that he will not. Does anybody think, with two elections on, that he is going to get a definite answer? Not likely. Everybody knows it is now a case of policies for everybody. If you are an out-and-out republican, the Minister for Finance—he has left the House— gives you a policy for the moment anyway. If you are a dilatory republican you have the Vice-President. If you are leaning a little towards Communism the Minister for Defence will threaten the farmers if they do not fall in with Government policy. If you are not quite sure what policy you stand for you have the President. Could there be more excellent tactics than that, with two elections on? No elector need be dissatisfied. He can take his choice. There is an election in County Dublin, and it is supposed that the conservative element, generally called ex-Unionists, have a considerable vote there. We have the statement that if England gets into a war this country is safer for her. If you are an out-and-out republican, who takes seriously the statements of the President and the Vice-President that we have only one possible enemy, there are explanations of that, too.

Everybody will remember—at least I remember—that a couple of days ago I ventured to make a prophecy that we should probably hear something about negotiations for a settlement being again started; that the time had come; that there were elections on. I ventured to predict, basing my prediction on the experience of every member of this Party, that we should hear whispers through the country coming from people in the confidence of the Government, that a settlement and a good settlement was coming at last. We have heard that at every election—by-election, county council election, and every other election. I ventured to say that here last week, and I got an interruption from the President. The idea of the thing! He scoffed at it as coming from their side. But that very same night the President got up and told the Dáil: "We are not going to stab England in the back if there is a fight." In that way the ball was set rolling, and the ball will keep rolling for the next fortnight. After that there will be insuperable difficulties to the further rolling of the ball owing to our national position. We shall be quite ready to enter into business negotiations with Great Britain. We shall be delighted to settle all those outstanding difficulties, but we are not going to sacrifice our national position. I admit that during the next fortnight it will be rather difficult to keep together all those horses pulling as they are in their different directions, but I have no doubt that the President and Deputy Donnelly between them will manage to keep all those unruly horses in some kind of order, and therefore make an appeal to everybody. What is the use of the President's making a statement here for an hour, an hour and a half, or two hours, notwithstanding the anxiety of Deputy Little to finish the proceedings quickly? The net result of any of those statements, so far as the definition of the policy of the country is concerned, is that he has managed to confuse a few extra minds. He has added to the number of people who do not know precisely where the country stands, where the Government stands, or where the President stands in relation to any of those things. I think even Deputies opposite will almost acknowledge that that is the general result of what I have ventured to call a clarifying statement by the President on his position.

As I say, my colleague Deputy MacDermot is certainly unduly optimistic if he expects anything like—I was going to say a straight answer—a definite answer to the very definite questions which he has put. I venture to say—and I hope my prophecy will not be as true as the one I made last week—that after the President's statement Deputy MacDermot will find it still more difficult to know when the Republic is going to be declared, for what area it is going to be declared, and why it is not being declared. Deputy MacDermot also referred to the fact that he was rather shocked at the President's raising, more or less "off his own bat," the suggestion that we are not free to leave the Commonwealth. The suggestion has come, as Deputy MacDermot rightly pointed out, mainly from the President in the last couple of years. I am not at all sure that the President wants to be clear in his own mind on that matter. I think he would prefer not to know whether he has that particular constitutional power or not. I do not think he wants to know that. I think he has deliberately raised that difficulty because he wants that difficulty there. That piece of subtlety fits in, I suggest, with the rest of his policy.

He said he asked Mr. Thomas because he knew Mr. Thomas would not answer him.

Precisely. He achieved two things. He raised the question, and, therefore, it was a live question so far as he was concerned. He is like the person playing golf who puts an unnecessary bunker in front of him. I have seen it done, but it is not generally done by persons who take the game seriously.

Like the Bean Sidhe who envelopes herself in a fog.

What are the activities of that Department? Deputy MacDermot has dealt with one particular aspect of what should be the activities of that Department. I hesitate to think that the rest of the activities are as futile as the clarification of the statement on our relations with Great Britain. The President is remarkably silent on the matter, so I get a gleam of hope from it; he does not spend the columns over it that he does over our relations with Great Britain, and, therefore, the activities of the Department are possibly carried on in a more normal fashion. What has it done for him? He is Minister for External Affairs in this State. It may be that the Deputies opposite think we should not have our eyes on the end of the earth, and that we have enough and more than enough to do in looking after our own little business here. That may be true but we have a Department of External Affairs. We are discussing its estimates. What is it doing? Has the Minister any outlook on external affairs? If he has, he certainly has been remarkably careful to conceal it from the public. We have representatives in different capitals in Europe. Have they submitted reports to the President on the general or particular situation? The President may remember that in the course of the last couple of weeks there was raised here by a Deputy in this House—a man who can claim, at all events, to speak for his whole Party or the 50 per cent. of it which is generally here, Deputy Belton—the question of European affairs and their possible reactions upon us. We have had no statement from the Government. We have had no indication that they are the slightest bit interested in those matters. The only statement on external affairs which we have had from the Government was the humorous peroration to the speech of the Minister for Finance in introducing his Budget. The last three pages of the Budget statement constituted the only statement on external affairs which we have had from the Government up to the present, and these were the Minister's most choice pieces of humour. Here we are discussing the Vote for External Affairs with all the relevant information, if there is any relevant information, not exactly concealed, but certainly not given to the House.

We have made treaties with different countries. We do not know whether the Department of External Affairs was or was not active in the negotiation of these treaties, or whether the negotiation of them was confined almost exclusively to the Department of Industry and Commerce. We have not had an opportunity of discussing the value of these treaties and the price paid. The President and members of his Party may take up the line that in external affairs we are really so small that we do not count; that in European affairs it is only the larger nations that count.

Hear, hear!

Deputy Donnelly may say "Hear, hear." I wonder does that represent the attitude of the President—that it is only the larger nations that count? If so, apart from trade relations, why does he not scrap his Department? I state that if that is the attitude of the President, he is wrong. I am not pretending for the moment that a small nation does or ever will count as much as a great nation—it cannot count as much, and it would be absurd if it did—any more than in a country a small minority should count as much as a large majority; in the same way in international affairs, the small nation cannot count as much as the big nation. But it does not follow that it is of no account at all, any more than that a minority is of no account, or that its voice cannot be heard on very important matters.

People may criticise as much as they like the League of Nations, but my experience of it has been this, that there is no place where the small nations can count as much—altogether out of proportion to their size—as they do at the League of Nations. It was rather illuminating that when the Party now in Opposition were responsible for the Government they did achieve a position of importance, I think, in that Assembly, and they certainly were able to play a part altogether out of proportion to their strength and the size of the country. That was shown by the fact that, despite a considerable amount of opposition, despite a certain lack of enthusiasm on the part of some members of the League, we did succeed in getting elected to the Council. That was a tribute, at all events, to the position that we had achieved when the present Government entered into office. The Minister for External Affairs might now at least inform us what use he has made of his office during the years when he was a member, not merely of the League, but of the Council. For three years this country was a member of the Council.

Three years?

Yes, three years a member of the Council. Are my mathematics wrong?

You are right.

You are good at simple arithmetic. For three years we were a member of the Council. We have been out of it now for a little time. Is our position as strong as it was? Can he give us proof that it is as strong as it was? Is our prestige as good as it was when he entered as a member of the Council? These are matters on which he could have enlightened us. He should have placed us in a position to be able to discuss these matters. With that modesty that sometimes sits rather peculiarly on the President, he has refrained from singing the praises of his Department. There are a number of things upon which he could have enlightened us.

For instance?

His Ministers have been busy abroad. We heard nothing about their activities. He has added to their number. We have heard nothing as to the reasons for the addition—trade reasons or otherwise. Did members of his Department negotiate these trade instruments, be they good or bad, which have been negotiated between this and other countries within recent months? On that, as usual, the President was silent. I understand there is a trade treaty with Germany. Quite recently Deputy McGuire raised a matter of some importance to business men in the city and the country, namely, the fact that when foreign documents came into the Customs, they were sent to the business firm concerned to supply a translation because there was nobody in the Customs able to translate the particular documents. The answer of the Minister for Finance was "Why should the Customs officials do the business of private firms?" Is the President aware that though he has negotiated a treaty with Germany he has not people in the Customs offices of the capital of the country—I take the facts as put forward by Deputy McGuire—capable of making a translation, and is he aware that the Civil Service Commissioners have issued a notice that German is to be no longer a subject for examination? Is there any kind of co-ordination in the policy of the Government in great matters or in small matters? As regards the way the President has treated the House on this Vote, the worst thing I can say is that it is characteristic.

One would have thought that with the return of the leader of the Opposition—and we are all glad to see him back, and well physically—there would have been some kind of co-ordination in the speeches delivered from the Opposition Benches. Mentally, I do not think the leader of the Opposition has much improved, judging from his speeches over the week-end, and possibly that is reacting on his followers. Deputy MacDermot attacked a phrase used by the President last week, that the whole position had been bedevilled by the Treaty, and he switched on also to the Ultimate Financial Settlement. I agree with him to a great extent that the position as regards the North was bedevilled by the Ultimate Financial Settlement, so much so that it has been almost impossible to make any advance. The whole position was surrendered, so far as the North was concerned, at that particular time. Not only do the Deputies on this side of the House agree with that attitude, but I think Deputy MacDermot will find quite a lot of his own colleagues of that opinion. I do not think it could better be described than by a quotation. The whole position was put by Deputy McMenamin in the Batt Hall, Ballybofey, in June, 1927, when he said, referring to the Ultimate Financial Settlement: "It was referred to as a White Paper but we regarded it as the blackest document in Irish history since the Act of Union... every claim made by Ireland was surrendered to the British." That was the opinion offered by Deputy McMenamin of the Ultimate Financial Settlement and the Deputy is one of Deputy MacDermot's colleagues. That was the general opinion all over the country—that it was a surrender. Not only was that the opinion then but it is reacting still. Prior to that settlement President Cosgrave, as he then was, in a speech that he made at Letterkenny, said: "They were standing on the Treaty; on every line of it and every sod, every bit of territory in the North that should go into the Free State would go in. One of the cleverest men they had in their Party had been appointed to that Commission." That was the Boundary Commission. Certainly, if ever a national position was bedevilled it was bedevilled by the Treaty and it was bedevilled in addition by the Ultimate Financial Settlement. I agree with Deputy MacDermot that it was bedevilled.

We could go back a little further but it is not necessary; neither is it necessary to reply to Deputy MacDermot with regard to the attitude of the Party. It was one of those things that do not make for much good. It was started, we are told, by a lot of politicians here, but Deputy MacDermot could have said it was started by leaders of political thought in England, people who formed the Government there afterwards. It was these people who came over here to start it. It was started by men like Lord Birkenhead.

The Treaty did bedevil the national position. And it was worsened afterwards by the Ultimate Financial Settlement which Deputy Cosgrave called a "damn good bargain." A good bargain ! Clause 12 of the Treaty, which protected the people in the North-East, was given as a quid pro quo, and in addition £5,000,000 a year was paid to England. That was one thing that we were able to rescue from the wreck— this money that was being exported to England on the strength of this Ultimate Financial Settlement, if we can call the document which the President produced in this House a settlement. But we were able to keep at home that money, and to that extent we have rescued something out of this national settlement. I was glad to hear Deputy MacDermot speak of his mission in the North. Next month will be a good time for missionary work in the North. I suggest that the Deputy should go back to his old constituency and hold a few meetings there, canvass their views, and, when he comes back, let us hear what they say.

To do them justice Deputy Donnelly said they treated him well.

There is the impression sought to be conveyed that the population of the North is wonderfully attached to the Empire. Well, there is a half million of the population there who are not attached to it. There is as good a Republican Party there as in any part of Ireland and any time they have been asked to do anything they did not hesitate to do it. I suggest to Deputy MacDermot that one of the best steps he could take would be to carry out missionary work in the North. It will improve his own ideas of nationalism and it will lead him along from the path he is following at the moment. I do suggest to him that he should take a little trip to the Mourne Mountains, along South Down and South Armagh and Tyrone and Fermanagh, and other parts of the North and not allow his whole idea as to the people of the North-East to be formed from the experience he gathered in Belfast. There is a big hinterland to that city and in that hinterland of that city he will find views expressed that will at any rate stop him from making the type of speeches that we have been hearing from him for some time past.

Surely Deputy Donnelly understands that I think the poison of racialism is rampant in the North of Ireland both amongst the Orangemen and the republicans who are both suffering from the same disease as Deputy Donnelly and Deputy Cleary.

My reply to that is that racialism is a manufactured article. Racialism as expressed here is a manufactured pro-British argument. The finest types of Irish nationalists, the finest types of republicans, were the Protestants of the North. That is my reply to that. The best types of Irishmen in the world, types like John Mitchel, were northern Irishmen. All this talk about racialism was an inspired argument— inspired by the British. I never found anything yet but wholehearted nationalism from people in that part of the country. The whole talk about racialism is only a manufactured argument. I was glad to hear Deputy MacDermot say that he wanted no dictation outside or inside as regards the question of the republic. It is a good thing to hear the Deputy say that. If the Deputy does not know it himself, Deputy Cosgrave can inform him that the Treaty would never have been signed but for the threat of war.

Threats on both sides—threats all round.

Lloyd George told the Irish delegates that they should take it or leave it. The Deputy should go down to the Library and read the debates on the Treaty. Let him understand the threats under which the document was signed. Yes, certainly the whole national position was bedevilled from the time the conditions in these documents were signed. When the President says we must safeguard the national position in any negotiations that follow as a result of the present dispute, then it is absolutely necessary to safeguard that position. One thing that the people of the country as a whole will react to and one thing they always did react to is to safeguard the national position and safeguard our scheme for independence.

Is it not deplorable, Sir, to hear a man like Deputy Donnelly rambling as Deputy Donnelly has rambled just now. There is neither head nor tail to what the Deputy has to say. Yet he springs to his feet for the purpose of answering Deputy MacDermot. Was there a single concrete question put by Deputy MacDermot to the Fianna Fáil Party in his speech this afternoon which Deputy Donnelly even attempted to look at, much less to answer? Now that is exactly the mentality of the unfortunates who labour under the servitude of President de Valera at the present time. When we put a question to Deputy Donnelly he points down to President de Valera and says "He will do that".


"God spare us from the necessity of doing it; he will do that," says Deputy Donnelly. "The President is a shrewd politician and a shrewd man; we will blindly follow him and he will give answer." President de Valera is either unconsciously or deliberately setting out upon a policy of wrecking this country. I agree with him that it is better to follow President de Valera with an absolutely blank mind and drop the luxury of thinking for himself. Because, if one indulges in that at all, if one had a mind of his own one would have to leave the benches opposite. Deputy Donnelly attacks Deputy MacDermot harshly for referring to racialism. He calls to mind the memory of John Mitchel, and he says "John Mitchel was a Protestant Nationalist." What in the name of Providence has racialism to do with Protestantism, or what has racialism to do with a man's class consciousness? There are two types of pests in this country——

We know one of them.

——one is the creature who is perpetually going around proclaiming himself to be a Gael; the other is the abortion who is going around proclaiming himself to be a Briton. They are the two sides of the one kind of narrow-minded, ignorant bigotry. The Gael wants to deny to everybody who is not prepared to kneel down and adore some futile objectives he has before him, all claim to patriotism, all claim to sincerity, all claim to nationalism, and he styles himself a Gael. The Briton is that pre-historic kind of fossil who expects everyone, who desires to live in good-fellowship and friendship with his neighbours, to wrap himself up in the Union Jack and sing the British national anthem on every available occasion. One extreme is, in my opinion, as loathsome as the other to any decent Irish nationalist brought up in the nationalist tradition in this country.

As I understand Irish nationalism, we were brought up, not to look upon ourselves as Gaels or Britons, but Irishmen who were prepared to serve this country and who wanted to see this country and its people happy and prosperous. We did not believe it was a form of patriotism to set up a national policy which led your people down to destitution and misery in order to vindicate the political past of one individual.

The Vote before the House is External Affairs, not the internal policy of the Government.

Unfortunately, the great bulk of the suffering to which our people are being brought at present is due to the external policy of our Government. I do not think anyone can listen to the cool reasoning with which Deputy MacDermot approaches these questions without feeling that here is a really sincere desire to arrive at an amicable and early settlement of any divergence of views which separate the Parties in this House on foreign affairs. I wish I could feel with him that that was a realisable possibility. I do not deny that at one time I hoped it was. But the more I see of President de Valera shaking his shackles that nobody but himself can perceive in the eyes of the world and proclaiming for the edification of the least initiated sections of our people that he has broken another shackle in the sacred name of Irish independence, the more I am driven to the conclusion that all this national confusion, all this war atmosphere, all the boundless suffering in which our people have been involved in the last three years through President de Valera's foreign policy is for no other purpose than to demonstrate to posterity that any misfortune in which this country was involved in 1922 was everybody's fault but President de Valera's. It is all so futile and so imbecile; and the President himself is falling into the trap that he perceived himself some years ago. He is forgetting that there is growing up after him a generation who are not interested in the details of the controversy that took place in this country 15 years ago; who are concerned that this country should survive and advance in the world as a dignified nation, and should not hold itself up before the world as a nation which, having realised liberty devotes its entire energies to tearing itself to pieces.

Is there any other nation in the world with the opportunities we have, with the constitutional position we have, with the advantages that there are there for the taking, who would deliberately embroil themselves in a war with an enormously powerful nation who, we ourselves admit, are anxious to be friendly and are anxious to establish good relations with us at the earliest possible opportunity? Who can question, or who can doubt, disastrous as it would be, in my opinion, to declare a Republic for Twenty-Six Counties, that it would not be far better to face that disaster now than to go on for ever dangling the carrot in front of the donkey's nose and leading the people from one disaster to another, with that continual goad of threatening that if they retire, that if they elect a form of government other than a republican form of government they are betraying those who died for Ireland.

One of the horrible qualities of this question to my mind is that it has so many tragic aspects and so many ludicrous aspects at the same time. Whenever I think of President de Valera and the Republic my mind inevitably gets back to Alice Through the Looking Glass. Deputies who are familiar with Lewis Carroll will remember how Alice, whom I somehow or other always identify in my mind with the Vice-President, plaintively asked the Red Queen when she might expect to have jam for tea; and the Red Queen replied: “We always have jam for tea.” Then Alice inquired: “Why haven't we jam for tea now?” and to that the Red Queen replied: “We always have jam yesterday; we always have jam to-morrow; but we never have jam to-day.” Let me substitute for the word jam the word Republic, and I will offer a farthing prize to the first member of the Fianna Fáil Party who will identify the Red Queen in this House.

There is one thing—it is easy to identify the Mad Hatter.

I shall not make any tart remark about the March Hare. I ask Deputy Donnelly, because I know he is an extremely shrewd politician, this question, but not in the hope that he will answer it, because there is no more prospect of his answering the question than there is of President de Valera answering Deputy MacDermot's question: What is there that Deputy Donnelly wants to do on behalf of the Irish people within the jurisdiction of Saorstát Eireann that he could do under a republic, and that he cannot do with the powers vested in this Assembly at the present moment?

Give them jam.

He can even give them jam to-day. There is nothing to prevent Deputy Donnelly putting down on the Order Paper of this House a motion that the oppropriate steps be taken forthwith to declare a republic, and there is no constitutional clog upon this House taking whatever steps are necessary to proclaim that republic to-morrow morning.

This House only functions for 26 counties.

What is there within the area of jurisdiction of Saorstát Eireann that Deputy Donnelly cannot do as a member of this House, with the powers vested in this Assembly, that he could do if this was a republic? That is the first question I want to ask him. The second question I want to ask him is if he agrees with me that there is nothing for the dignity or welfare of our people that we are not in a position to do: does he believe that in his lifetime, or in mine, or in that of as many generations forward as we can see as public men, there is any prospect of restoring the unity of Ireland on the basis of a republic? Having considered that question, I ask the Deputy does he believe that if, as a sovereign nation, we co-operate with what seems to me to be the only effective league of nations in the world, and that is that league of nations known as the British Commonwealth of Nations—if we co-operate with the other sovereign nations that are in it, does he seriously contend that Ulster, or the Six Counties thereof which constitute the independent constitutional unit at the present time, will go on remaining the only constitutional anachronism in the whole Commonwealth of Nations? Or will they set up a separate Dominion Government for themselves, or, as I suggest to Deputy Donnelly, will they do what I believe the British people want them to do, and what I believe the Ulster people would be glad and willing to do in a very short time if certainty was arrived at—the only thing that can contribute anything valuable from them to the Commonwealth of Nations or to the welfare of this country—and that is to join us in founding a sovereign State, not of Saorstát Eireann or of Northern Ireland, but of all Ireland?

Did any of them ever make the slightest suggestion of that kind at any time?

All I can say to that question is that if two men are going to stand on two sides of a fence and if each one takes up the attitude: "I am prepared to make no advance until you make one," nobody will ever advance anywhere. Moreover, if there is one party to the dispute who says, as we have consistently said for the last three years to the people on the other side of the fence: "Not only will we make no advance, but we give you fair warning that if we can ever ‘deluther' you into coming over, we will put you in a republican pocket, and it is ‘As go brath leat,' then."

What about 1920?

Let us not go into the things that are past. When the Deputy goes back to 1920, my mind goes back over the decades even further. It is clear to me, however, that it is no more use for me to be discussing 1912 or 1914, or the year afterwards, than it is for Deputy Donnelly to be discussing 1918, 1919 and 1920. I ask Deputy Donnelly carefully to consider the three questions I have put to him. I want now to communicate to the House an apprehension that I think seriously threatens the Constitution of the country. I think that we are arriving at a stage when the independent members of the Commonwealth of Nations will tell us to get out: will kick us out. I was discussing this matter recently with a very prominent supporter of the Fianna Fáil Party and I said to him: "My apprehension is—not that any difficulty will be created by our going out, because I do not think there will be the least difficulty; I do not think anybody in England gives two hoots whether we are in the Commonwealth or not— that the assembled nations of the Commonwealth of Nations will determine that the time has come to tell Saorstát Eireann to get out; that they are sick of them." In fact, I said, "My grave apprehension is that at the next meeting of the independent Nations of the Commonwealth Great Britain will ask the other members to join with her in ejecting Saorstát Eireann." The reply of this prominent supporter of the Fianna Fáil Party to that was: "Ah, she would never do a thing like that." And I am perfectly convinced that, in the back of the minds of the vast majority of Deputies sitting on those benches, there is the profound conviction that they can go on blathering about the Republic, and proclaiming themselves irreconcilable die-hards, in the deep conviction that Great Britain would never do anything nasty: would never do anything mean on them, and that there is never any danger there, in any case, of their turning the anvil on them——

And they did not try it, did they?

——which will undoubtedly happen sooner or later.

Talk sense!

The Deputy does not appear to look forward to that date with any great anticipation. What would be his reaction to it? He is a bit doubtful. He is not quite sure. Surely, it is time the Deputy cleared his mind on those questions. Surely, it is time he took the desperate risk of thinking. Surely, it is time for him to realise that, although President de Valera is available—and I hope will be available for many, many years—to do the thinking of the 76 or 77 members of the Fianna Fáil Party——

It will soon be 78.

——it is very necessary that there should be some additional thinking done also by the other members of the Fianna Fáil Party. Let them realise that, while they may manage to maintain their unity on a universal blank mind, there is always the danger that at any moment a single member of the Fianna Fáil Party may start to think, and if that happens, disaster will fall upon them immediately. I suggest that that is a rather unpleasant state to be in. I have refrained from addressing any of my queries to President de Valera, because I am sure that he has absolutely no intention of answering them. If anything is said that he does not like, the President will shake the front lock of hair over his eye; he will thump the table, and say eventually: "If you want to sell out to John Bull, sell away. As long as I am here the national position will never be compromised for a mess of pottage."

Hear, hear!

And Deputy Mrs. Concannon will say blandly, "Hear, hear," and everybody will sit back feeling very comfortable and satisfied. Deputy Smith will go down the country and say "President de Valera is on the right road." The Minister for Finance will say that, ere his whiskers grow grey, he hopes to see the Republic established here by President de Valera; and the interrupters of Finglas will say that they take leave to doubt that. But the bulk of the members opposite will speak of their readiness to die for Ireland, and some of us will be reminded of the story told here some time ago by Deputy Burke of Cork, about the thousand men who were ready to die for Ireland but the "polis" would not let them. And we can say that there are in Dáil Eireann 76 members who will lay down their lives for Ireland the moment they are certain that Mr. Thomas will say he will let them. They are all ready to die for Ireland by Mr. Thomas's leave, and even then to die only a theatrical death, because, according to the President, if there is any threat from the far side of action which would involve us all in the danger of defending the Republic against Great Britain, the declaration of the Republic will be indefinitely postponed. I only trust that the Minister for Finance's whiskers will not have grown too long or too white before the danger, which the President anticipates, will have passed away. I hope that his anticipations of one kind or another will be realised before he goes down unhonoured to the grave, but if he has no greater confidence in the President than I have, then he had better be prepared to die as an unreconciled Imperialist and as a Republican only in embryo.

This particular Estimate was introduced very lucidly by the Minister in words which might be briefly described as saying: "There is nothing really to report. There is nothing unusual happening. The situation on the Continent is black, and we are doing all we can to help in maintaining peace." Of course, it took a much longer time to say that than I have taken in the short explanation I have given of it. As a matter of fact, I would not wish to waste the time of the House on this Vote if it were not for the intervention of Deputy Donnelly. I want to thank him for his courteous observations and his welcome back. I would like to assure him in connection with the remarks I made on Saturday night about the Budget, to which he takes exception, that these were taken from the Minister's own speech; they were his own words. I would much prefer to take the other line, and to say to him that the Minister got the information from No. 3 Merrion Square as to what to say in connection with this Budget and the balancing of accounts, but, as he himself preferred to say, and did say, that he was borrowing on the strength of the land annuities to balance his Budget, that is his affair and not mine.

In the course of this debate, with his usual relevance and with his eye on the two pending by-elections, Deputy Donnelly was kind enough to mention the Treaty and to explain what imperfections there were about it. He said in connection with one clause of it, that which deals with the North of Ireland, that it had been hopelessly mishandled by the previous administration. There is no Vote before the House for the previous administration, but the people of the North of Ireland were invited to come in here and to warm their hands at the fires which the Party over there were lighting at that particular time, and to enjoy the destruction that went on. Every possible effort that could be made was made by individuals and by the people in that Party to bedevil, to destroy and to make inoperative the Treaty. Was not that their whole policy? It is not a question upon which I need make any defence at all. History will deal with that, and I am not concerned how it will deal with it.

History will deal with it.

So far as the Ultimate Financial Settlement is concerned, this House was told about that in the first instance. The matter came before the House on nine occasions. There was not, as has been so lucidly described by the Minister, a secret agreement. The House was acquainted with every penny that was involved in connection with it. The Minister's own counsel, Deputy Gavan Duffy, as he then was, was a member of the House when the necessary Estimate was introduced in connection with the very first payment that was made to Great Britain. Let us now, on this occasion, when this Vote is before the House hear something about the secret disagreement there is with the British Government. We have not heard it yet. There is a dispute between the two countries. This is one of the matters which might naturally fall to the Department of External Affairs to deal with. We have been told occasionally by Ministers, as a sort of peroration, that we can have a settlement by yielding on our tariff policy. Can we hear, in connection with the secret disagreement, whether any such condition as that was mentioned by any British Minister? Can we hear what terms, if any, were offered? Can we hear what there is in connection with that matter which would be of interest to the people of this country?

Assuming for the moment that there is all this difficulty in connection with the previous agreement, is there not a way of dealing with it, the way that ordinary business people would deal with it, and why should not Governments do likewise? Why not say: "If you do put that up as an obstacle towards a settlement, let us consider the matter in the fashion in which business people would consider it and say: ‘well, we will admit that without prejudice', " and you are no worse off than you were before. The Minister will remember his own statement, made at the time that we were dealing with financial matters: his own observations as to what the British demanded at that time. The figure that, I think, he mentioned was £19,000,000 a year. That was a great help to us. We have given help from the commencement of this dispute with a view to a settlement of it. I say that, not because we have any interest in the Ministry. Speaking for myself, there is not a single person sitting on the benches opposite—I regret to have to say it— whose word would bear any weight with me. We have done that, not for them but for the country, the people outside whom we represent, or misrepresent, whichever you wish.

The country, according to the Minister, is suffering. When Deputy Donnelly says that we have stopped this money going over, we have the Minister saying that they are getting it more expensively in another way. That is hitting some people much harder than a good many have any appreciation of. It is not hitting the Ministry. They are making money out of it. This is obviously a case where, if they had any sense of justice, if they had any charity in them at all, they would stop this awful drain that there is upon one section of the community. In connection with that we are prepared to give them all the help that they need, and well they know it. I am not making any complaint about the fact that I got no help from them. I got nothing from them but hindrance, but I was able to get on without their help and I did not care about their hindrance.

I am not so sure about that.

And then about the Treaty. What are the facts? We had benches here empty for five years. They are full now. Did they come in simply to reap the fruits of office, or did they come in to represent the people? At any rate, the previous Administration never deceived the people about any single thing they did. They made no attempt to make themselves popular. They made no attempt at any time to put an undue burden on any person's back in this country.

The Deputy never got the people to believe that.

I do not care whether they believe it or not. That is their business and not mine. If the interruption that was made from the benches opposite last week when this or some other matter was under consideration—"you will never get over here again"—is to be taken as the Deputy's conception of the duty of a citizen of this State, I want to say it is not mine.

But the Deputy used to regard the people as the best judges.

Perhaps they are under the Constitution, but it is upon them that the real weight of any mistakes made will fall and perhaps they will find that out sooner or later.


Yes, perhaps, and let us hope that it will not be too costly. A little examination of the internal condition of affairs in this country might, perhaps, shake the laughter off the faces of some of the Deputies opposite. Perhaps the Minister himself would make inquiries in his own constituency from the mental hospitals as to whether or not Government policy has not increased the number of persons in them. That is not a matter to laugh at. We had over here quite recently some members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. I wonder did anyone ask them, how was their business getting on since the dispute occurred? I wonder whether, if there was a settlement, there would not need to be another Ottawa arrangement or agreement? While one may smile, perhaps, at what Deputy Dillon said here this evening——

Hear, hear.

——just at this moment this dispute is benefiting people at the ends of the earth. One may ask, has there been a greater sale for goods from places thousands of miles off than would have been the case if the people of this country had their rights in the British market? These are matters which the Minister, if he has not got the time to look into them himself, might ask the Department of External Affairs to go into. Whatever national advance this country is going to make, it will make that advance only when we have a sound, balanced economy and sound financial conditions in the country. One may prate about national advance and about forms of government, but the whole thing comes down to this in the long run: that you require to have employment for your people, the means of making a living for the vast majority of them. If you are ever going to make advance, to have ultimate union with the North of Ireland, you are not going to achieve that by pointing out to certain sections of the people up there that they have never conceived the idea of a united Ireland. The way to bring that about is by persuading them, and one of the methods of doing that is by letting them see that we can do our business down here in a proper manner. If we did that we would have a very much stronger standing than we have. We would be in a much better position to help in keeping peace on the Continent and elsewhere if we could say that we, too, were at peace, economically and politically, with our neighbours. While, according to some of the speeches that have been delivered recently, our national economy must be framed with a view to possibility of war, we, apparently, do not mind that when making a trade agreement with people much farther off than our immediate neighbours. We cannot have it every way. In the long run, the Minister's Department will be faced with the special responsibility of effecting an accommodation with our neighbours—an accommodation that will be beneficial to this country. As Deputy MacDermot has said this evening, this Party believes that there should be a common foreign policy for all parties represented in the Parliament.

The President said last week, with that grace and charm which we expect from the type of mind whose supreme pleasure it is to administer gall and wormwood to members on this side, that he would not answer any questions of mine—in other words, that he would not answer any questions from a representative of the people of Carlow-Kilkenny. I can understand that he may have a certain objection to that constituency because he was faced with certain questions, through my agency, in the town of Borris, which he did not entirely enjoy. There are quite a number of questions which I might put with regard to his Department. A couple of years ago, I gave the President an opportunity of letting the House know whether certain property stolen from this State in Paris had been returned. We have never been told that, although we have been asked for a supplementary Vote of about £5,000 to the man who was guilty of that crime. I referred also to certain negotiations in which a man now employed by the President in his Department had participated with a man who was known by the secret name of "Marino." I invited the President to let the House know whether or not that was with a view to getting money from outside sources to assist in the overthrow of social order in this State.

The Deputy raised these points last year and the year before. They involve charges against men easily identifiable. I do not think that they should have been made under privilege in the House, in the first instance, and they certainly should not be repeated now for the third time.

I am very anxious that the President would clear the atmosphere with regard to them.

It was cleared but the Deputy wants to raise the question eternally.

I would not be raising the question now if a straight answer had been given. I wanted to know if certain files belonging to that Department had been returned. This House has never been told that. I regret very much that last year we did not take what I should have considered a right and dignified line. A country that seeks to make its voice heard in international councils should, at least, have a definite point of view and have its mind made up on any point that arises. There was the question of the admission of Russia to the League of Nations. One could understand that the President or his Department or this country might have been entirely in favour of Russia coming into the League of Nations or entirely opposed to it. If I remember rightly, on that question of Russia coming within the comity of nations, our country voted neither for nor against. That was our contribution to that question. I could quite understand that there might be good reasons, unknown to the public, for a certain course of action but the natural course would have been that taken by Mr. Motta.

Another thing that seems to me to have militated against the good name of this country arose from the fact that there are two types of nations completely unpopular in the international sphere, because they make trouble. One is the big bullying nation and the other is the small truculent nation. The small nations of truculent, arrogant, exaggerated nationalism have been the cause, and possibly are the cause, of enormous injury to and lack of peace in the world generally. I do not think—this is only a personal judgment—that a small nation which truculently enters into a condition of war, even though it be only an economic war, with a country for which it is not a match, is likely to be a good advocate of world peace. If every country sits down and morbidly considers what, in its own morbid condition, it regards as full justice, then the only possible condition for the world is a state of chronic war.

The attitude of the President and of the Government is always that of complaining of existing facts. What is our real quarrel with England? That geographically we are very near her. Another quarrel is that we are an agricultural country and need her market. We have that as a sort of grievance. Whether we are a small or a big nation, there are going to be certain disadvantages attached to our position. Let me give an instance of that. A few years ago, the British went off the gold standard and the value of their £ decreased to about 16/- or 15/-. The natural reaction of that was that the new type of £ would not buy as much as the former type of £. That is to say, considered in £'s, a larger number of £'s would be required to buy the same commodity. It is well known that the effect of that action by the British was to diminish the producers' and wholesalers' prices all over the world. In Patagonia, Australia, Yugo-Slavia, Africa and all producing countries, they found that, because the British Government had decided to change the value of their £, the goods they produced changed in value to something less. They had a grievance about that. That comes from the fact that Britain, with its 45,000,000 people—the greatest consuming and importing country in the world—is so important in the world market that their action in regard to their £ meant that 16/- could buy as much as 20/- did before. Because the British are in that position, they suffer a certain weakness. They are an enormous importing country, depending on sea-borne food. Because of that position, in which they can change the value of goods in all parts of the world, they have to maintain an enormous navy, because otherwise they could be cut off from their food supplies and starved out in a short time. In that way, they have to pay the price of their advantage. We have the disadvantage of being next to an enormously powerful country, but we have the advantage that it is our natural market. We have entered into a completely absurd and futile quarrel with the British. It is all right to sit down and think of the possible rights you can claim as long as you can make that claim operative.

What did we do? We started a row about the land annuities. It was proposed at first that the question should be negotiated. Speaking from memory, I think the President seemed to be afraid that the British might agree to an international tribunal, and speaking subject to correction, at another stage he found it necessary to raise not merely the legal question about the land annuities, if it was to be arbitration, but also the whole political question.

Another proposal I understand was that there should not be arbitration but that there should be negotiations; that two Irish representatives and two British representatives should meet to consider whether some agreement could be come to on the disputed question of the land annuities. What the public understood at the time was that the British were agreeable, but that at one stage they said that the land annuities that had been previously paid should continue to be paid, and that if, as a result of the negotiations, the payments were remitted, wholly or in part, then they would send back the amount overpaid during the period of the negotiations. We understood that our Government objected to that and said they would retain the land annuities in a Suspense Account while the negotiations were going on. The British as we understand then said "Very well, in that case tariffs will be maintained on Irish produce during the period of the negotiations," so that the proposal came to nothing. One can understand that the Government might have some point of principle in that. They might have said that the mere fact of not agreeing to enter into negotiations with the British, while they are making their claim operative, might tend to prejudice the case to be considered during the negotiations.

In the month of January we were told that negotiations had taken place on parallel lines, and that while they went on, the British continued to collect tariffs. In spite of that, agreement was reached, under which the tariffs were to remain. The agreement created a condition in which the total sum collected by way of tariffs was going to be greater. Is it not possible now for the President to say that what was talked of in 1932 could have been made a reality? We say that there is no objection whatever in principle to negotiating with the British on questions arising out of the economic war while they continue to collect the tariffs on our goods. If that is so, is there any objection to the previous proposal, having two or 20 Irish representatives meeting a similar number of British representatives to go into the whole question, even while tariffs are being collected on our goods, and while we retain the annuities? What is the objection? Is there any reason why that should not be done? As a result of the Government's action in having the matter thrashed out with the British, to see if what they propose is something that we can consider acceptable or, in the alternative unacceptable, we are committed to nothing. It is only a short time since the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Finance, in the course of a speech, wanted to know what were our proposals, or what could we promise in the way of getting the British to forego their claim to the money. If we said that we could promise anything it would be dishonest to do so. We could not promise that. If we did so, Fianna Fáil spokesmen would immediately go around the country, as they did before with typical dishonesty, saying: "Clearly, you are acting treacherously; you are negotiating with the British behind the backs of the Government." We have no right and no authority to do that.

But what did the Government do? If the position of 1932 remains, that can be ascertained by short negotiations or by protracted negotiations, and the whole matter can be thrashed out with the British without in any way prejudicing any point of principle that the Government might have at heart. They can put to themselves the question put to us by the Parliamentary Secretary, and be able to tell the people what are the maximum concessions to be got from the British, and let the people then judge whether it would be worth while making any concession on our side, with a view to reaping from whatever the British might be prepared to give, any advantage that it would bring to our people.

This Department has been referred to as the Cinderella of the Departments. I do not want to be injust to the Minister, but it seems to me that during the last couple of years it has been turned into a sort of Limbo. We have seen a man transferred from the Irish Press into this Department. We saw another man jettisoned into this Department—I do not wish to refer to this because I have only seen a newspaper report— who, it is suggested was over the Civil Service retiring age. I could quite understand such a situation in the case of a man with particular qualifications, which would make it an advantage to disregard the ordinary Civil Service rules and to bring him from outside. As far as my knowledge goes the men who have been brought into this Department were brought in to the detriment of the ordinary progress of promotion, and consequently of good order, the contentment of the staff and of ordinary justice to men who have given good service. Men from outside, including, I am informed, men beyond the ordinary Civil Service retiring age, were brought in, as if the Department could not produce men for the various functions to be performed. I referred to a similar type of thing with regard to the Army. I do not think it is very important, but it seems to me to err against justice.

The cost of the Department is increasing. I do not complain of that, only that it does seem rather strange, while the Minister for Finance should assume that he would be able to make each Department cost something between 3 and 4 per cent. less than estimated, yet, within a few weeks he has to come along for an additional Vote which indicates that instead of being able to make a saving on the original Vote the Department will cost more.

I feel that there is a general attitude of truculence, especially amongst the stronger powers. In ordinary life we know that people have to have regard to existing circumstances. If a small man threatens a big man and suffers for it we all say, "It serves him right; he was asking for it." This Government came into office and immediately began to challenge our constitutional relations and even our financial relations with Great Britain, the only justification being that the Government would have been able to get away with it. It has not, but it has inflicted enormous hardship on the people.

It is right and proper that the existing Government of this country, irrespective of what their past may have been, should be in the closest co-operation with Great Britain. Instead of that we have Minister's representatives going around the country telling the people that we are not free, that we have got to suffer and to cripple ourselves economically merely to show that we are not satisfied, while others hold out an ideal of freedom not attainable by any country. The British people are forced by the attitude of other countries to maintain a Navy. If they had not got it their ideal of freedom would be an immediate jeopardy. We have been told that other countries are not satisfied with their position. Belgium is not free according to the President's ideal of national freedom. I might say that the United States is not free, according to the President's ideal of national freedom. I pointed out here before that, although the United States Constitution provides that no alcoholic liquor was to be brought into American territory, the United States entered into an agreement with Great Britain and other countries, which permitted the Constitution to be overridden. In order to meet the wishes of Great Britain and other countries, the American Constitution was overridden. I remember when in the Department of External Affairs some time ago, that Belgium and Holland proposed to make an agreement with regard to the navigation of the Scheldt and we were asked to agree.

I hope you agreed.

We did, but the proposal did not come to anything in the end. If such a position happened with regard to us, if we were not able to negotiate any change or arrangement with regard to the navigation of our own waters without the permission of other countries, we would have the Fianna Fáil Party declaring that this was intolerable and that we would never rest satisfied with such conditions. On this ground Belgium, or any other country would not have internal peace. Spain is not in turmoil because Britain holds Gibraltar. This country is to be kept in intolerable turmoil until England is in a position to give assent to something she wants. What we want above all else is to let things rest for a while and build up our own country. Was Spain never to recognise any proper authority in her Government, until that country had got control of Gibraltar? Were her people to be justified in disregarding all law and order until such conditions came to pass? There you have a position that cannot be changed until some outside power agrees.

We are apparently to keep things in turmoil here until some change takes place in Great Britain, although we are not in a position to force that change upon Great Britain. One Minister has gone round this country at one time declaring: "Peace with England!—never!" In his view Ireland was never to be at peace until we were free, according to his view. We are to be punished by never enjoying peace in this country until such time as some change takes place in England. As far as I can judge, there is every possibility at the present time, as there has been in the last three years, of the difficulty with Great Britain being overcome, and overcome not by what Deputy Donnelly would call the complete surrender of this country—far from it. It can be overcome by an agreement that will recognise our economic position at the moment, and the harm done to us by having to pay, and will recognise our position in historical circumstances and the right for our goods to enter their market under privileged, instead of penal, conditions. The President admitted that the present situation has inflicted additional cost and expense on our people by having to pay tariffs, but he maintained there is a very high principle at stake. He has, however, shown that there is no principle whatever which precludes our negotiations with Great Britain upon every aspect of the case even with tariffs in operation.

We had several hours' debate here on the Vote for the President's Department and it was because of that that I understood there was ground for hope that the other Departments—External Affairs and, to a certain extent, perhaps, the League of Nations Vote—would be dealt with and finished on the last occassion. Now in a long speech I dealt, I think, fairly fully with the points raised, and with the question of our relations with Great Britain. I see no point whatever in going back over that ground again. Particularly do I feel it is unnecessary to do so because members of the House are fully aware of what the Government's attitude is, and because if I did go back upon it, no matter what I said it would be discounted by a cry raised from the benches opposite, that I was speaking simply because two by-elections were on. I do not want to speak on these matters in this House when by-elections are on. If I am going to speak on election matters I shall speak to audiences in the constituencies affected, and the people of the country as a whole can hear what I have to say. I am not going back, therefore, over the question of our relations with Britain on this Vote. I dealt with them completely and indicated the attitude of our people on the matter already.

With regard to general policy, the policy that this Government would adopt, if returned to office, was stated more clearly and definitely than ever a political party before put their programme before the people. We stated our programme and put it before the people at the elections, and have not departed from it in the slightest degree. Fault was found because when introducing this Estimate I did not make any statement. As a matter of fact, I think, as a rule, in dealing with these Votes, I give more information to the House than Ministers under the previous administration were in the habit of giving. On this Vote, however, Deputies will remember, there was a motion to refer it back. Deputy Belton was in charge of that motion, and took up the time that was available in introducing it. I might have been tempted to read some notes to the House on our trade agreements and trade relations abroad were it not for the fact that every Deputy has had a copy of these agreements. They were circulated, and the people of the country have been kept fully informed of their tenor through the Press. I do not see any advantage in wasting the time of the House by going over matters of this sort. I have here a very short summary of the position but, as I say, I do not think there is any point whatever in going over here again matters dealt with extensively in detail by their circulation amongst Deputies and also in the Press.

There has been a suggestion that since we came into office the Department of External Affairs has, as one would think listening to some of the Deputies opposite, disappeared from the map. There is no truth, of course, in that. It was said that we were represented at the Council of the League of Nations for three years. The greater part of that time was during the period of the previous administration. I came on at a time in which it became our turn—it does not happen except after long periods—to occupy the chairmanship of the Council. During that period, I think, most Deputies are aware of the attitude which representatives of this country took in the matter. On later occasions, in relation to the unfortunate conflict that has been going on in South America, as far as the representative of any one nation could, we tried to bring public opinion, and the whole weight of the League of Nations, to bear on bringing that conflict to an end.

I said here on the last occasion, speaking about the general situation in Europe, that a small State could not do much and that is the truth. When a storm is coming on, when you have a situation such as there is at present in Europe, it is only the big States who can speak, everybody knowing that they are able to back their views with heavy armaments and can be powerful allies to other countries. We see that the whole idea of peace which was prevalent for some years after the Great War, is now being put aside and that we have a reversal mainly to the old idea of alliances, balances of power, and all the rest of it. In circumstances such as these, representatives of small countries like ours cannot hope to do very much, but we can do something and we are doing it. We have been doing it consistently. Our strength must lie in creating a general public opinion, a public opinion in our own country and in countries situated as we are and throughout the world generally, as to the necessity for bringing about a certain relationship between nations and such organisation if possible as will ensure that we are not going to have a war such as we had before. We have consistently on every occasion thrown in our weight on the side of reasonable accommodation between nations. We have adhered consistently to the principles upon which the League of Nations was founded. We shall be only too happy to assist anything that can be done to make the League of Nations a more effective instrument in the maintenance of peace.

It is not right, therefore, to say that we are unduly lowering the esteem in which we should hold ourselves and our influence, by that statement. Deputy Costello found fault particularly with me for that. Of course, I was simply expressing a well-known fact. It is a fact that we are members of the League of Nations and as a member of the League of Nations we have co-operated. We have a voice in the questions coming to the general body of the League. Our whole attitude in the League has been one of co-operation with the small States, that like ourselves can afford to take up a position of independence and who have taken up a position of independence in like matters. I had intended to leave this question until the League of Nations Vote was reached, but we might as well deal with it as it has been raised in connection with this Vote. I think everybody in the country, except Deputies on the opposite benches, is aware of the part that has been played by the representatives of this State at Geneva since we took office and that our actions there have received far greater attention than the actions of our predecessors when they were in office. It is all nonsense then to suggest that since we took office there has been some extraordinary eclipse of the energies and the efforts of the Department of External Affairs.

The ordinary routine of the office is not a matter that it is necessary I should speak about. On the last occasion I spoke about it in so far as it is possible to indicate the routine of such Departments. I have been asked what is the justification for the extension in the case of Spain. In the short statement I made I indicated clearly that our purpose in making this extension was in accordance with a general plan. We propose to be represented in the greater European capitals and also at centres in which we have special interests. Deputy Costello, I think, referred in particular to Canada and South Africa. I do not know if he mentioned Australia. There is no doubt that in Canada and Australia there are special interests of ours which would merit representation from our State, but the Deputy is aware that there are considerations of various kinds which might possibly weigh with the Governments in these countries, and of course before we could possibly establish representatives in these countries we should be assured that we would be able to have representatives of these countries here—that there would be an exchange at any rate.

Deputy Fitzgerald continued statements of innuendo and suggestion which were made very fully by him on previous occasions. He talks about the stealing of files or something of that sort. These were files which this representative had when he was representing a Republican Government. It appears that these files were not given back in 1922 or 1923. I have not asked that these files be given back. I am perfectly certain if I had asked for them to be given back they would be, but I have not asked for them. There was a position here in this country which everybody is aware of it. This particular representative supported the State which he believed was the constitutional State at the time. He has been brought back to the Civil Service. Why should he not? Was he not entitled to come back? There was also a suggestion that I brought somebody from the Irish Press into this Department. Why should I not? He was entitled to come back. He had been Secretary of the Department of External Affairs at its inception. He was the first Secretary of the Department of External Affairs. Why should he not be brought back? He has been brought back just as other civil servants have been restored to their positions.

Deputy Fitzgerald spoke about one man and suggested that he had had something to do with some negotiations with reference to Russia or somewhere like that. There is no truth whatever in that, and that was pointed out to Deputy Fitzgerald before, but nevertheless, he comes along here with it on each occasion in the hope, of course, that somebody will sometime believe him.

With regard to our extension abroad, we are extending to Spain because Spain is one of the principal European countries, because of past associations with that country and because of the trade relations which we are reestablishing with that country. The position with regard to Spain was that we had an altogether unbalanced trade with Spain and by a recent agreement we have advanced, not to parity—we are still a considerable way from parity —but in a direction which is going to be of particular value to our people. What is it then the Opposition want to know about the Department of External Affairs that they do not know already? Is there anything? I have spoken of our external policy as regards Britain, and they have in the Estimates a very full list of the offices and salaries. They know what our consuls and diplomatic representatives in general are doing. They know that we get reports from them from time to time on the changing situation, which are of great value to us if we go to the League and want to know exactly what the European position is and so on, but these, in their very nature, are not matters which you can make the subject ordinarily of a discussion here.

It has always been one of the difficulties about the Department of External Affairs that you have not got the thousand and one details that are criticised in the case of other Estimates here. In the case of other Estimates— the Land Commission and so on— Deputies speak about certain points of administration and criticism them. I was waiting for criticism on points of administration or criticism generally, but, of course, these criticisms do not come. They do not come because the activities of this Department do not come so directly under the notice of Deputies. The general idea, however, and what is being done by the Department is known; the general policy of the Department and what is being done are so completely and sufficiently known at present that I think it would be a waste of the time of the House to enter into a long explanation as to what is happening and what is being done.

May I put just one question to the President about the policy of the Department of External Affairs? Is it aiming at separating the Twenty-Six Counties of this country from the Commonwealth?

I have said that I had already spoken on the whole question of our external relations on a previous Vote. I am not going to go into any one of these things separately now because I would have to speak at considerable length.

Just yes or no.

I will not answer yes or no.

Deputy O'Sullivan was not far wrong.

Obviously, yes or no answers are not the answers that can be given to a question of that sort. I am not such a fool as to think of reply ing yes or no to a complicated question like that.

It is a simple question.

It is not a simple question and the Deputy knows that full well, but he thinks that there are simpletons on this side who would attempt to answer such a question in a yes or no fashion.

The President need not shout angrily at me. I did not do so at him.

You should have manners and keep your seat and allow the President to deal with these matters.

In regard to this matter of the general policy of the Government, as I said, it was stated originally at the time of the last election, and we have followed our programme scrupulously. People are asking why we do not go out and declare a republic. They know perfectly well that we told the people we were not going to do any such thing during this period of office and they would be the first people to shout and cry that we were acting beyond what we had authority to do if we attempted to do it. As I have said, apart from the question of our immediate relations with Britain, there is on this Vote very little I can do usefully in the way of general explanation. I was asked whether these trade agreements were negotiated by our Department. Representatives of our Department were in the delegations. We have a Trade Department which is there to examine the possibilities of international trade and to assist the Department of Industry and Commerce in regard to these treaties, and, as a rule, when trade agreements are being negotiated, the delegation includes a represent tative of the Department of External Affairs, with representatives of the Department of Industry and Commerce and the Department of Agriculture as being the three main Departments concerned.

Will the President say if these trade delegations consult the trade itself before they make these pacts?

The Department of Industry and Commerce is in touch with all the industries in the country and with the trading sections of the community. They are constantly in touch with them and, therefore, any arrangements of that sort that are made are made by people who have a knowledge of the conditions and the needs of the trading community. I have no doubt whatever that wherever there are any matters that affect them, their opinions—not directly because you cannot negotiate by asking every trade whether they would agree and so on; if that is what the Deputy means, it is quite impossible—are borne in mind. They have the knowledge and if they want to know how a particular agreement would affect a particular industry, they would probably find out. It would be their duty, I take it, if they did not know already how it was going to affect them, to find out. I am sure that is being done and if there are any complaints that particular interests have been affected, it is for those interests to bring them to our notice. I have no information that any particular firms had special objection to any of these arrangements that were made, but, even if they had, the Department, having heard any objections they might have to make, would have to decide in the general interest. Having heard any particular point of view, they would have to decide in the general interest. The Department of Industry and Commerce is constantly in touch with these matters and, therefore, representatives of that Department are always included in these delegations that are responsible for the negotiating of trade agreements. I do not think there is anything further that would justify me in keeping the House. There has been no question raised in detail and with the general questions I have already dealt on the President's Vote.

Question put: "That the Estimate be referred back for consideration."
The Committee divided: Tá, 32; Níl, 53.

  • Alton, Ernest Henry.
  • Bennett, George Cecil.
  • Brennan, Michael.
  • Broderick, William Joseph.
  • Burke, James Michael.
  • Cosgrave, William T.
  • Costello, John Aloysius.
  • Curran, Richard.
  • Desmond, William.
  • Dillon, James M.
  • Doyle, Peadar S.
  • Esmonde, Osmond Grattan.
  • Fitzgerald, Desmond.
  • Holohan, Richard.
  • Keating, John.
  • Lynch, Finian.
  • MacDermot, Frank.
  • MacEoin, Seán.
  • McFadden, Michael Og.
  • McGovern, Patrick.
  • McMenamin, Daniel.
  • Minch, Sydney B.
  • Morrisroe, James.
  • Mulcahy, Richard.
  • Nally, Martin.
  • O'Higgins, Thomas Francis.
  • O'Mahony, The.
  • O'Sullivan, Gearóid.
  • O'Sullivan, John Marcus.
  • Redmond, Bridget Mary.
  • Thrift, William Edward.
  • Wall, Nicholas.


  • Aiken, Frank.
  • Bartley, Gerald.
  • Boland, Gerald.
  • Bourke, Daniel.
  • Brady, Brian.
  • Breathnach, Cormac.
  • Breen, Daniel.
  • Briscoe, Robert.
  • Cleary, Mícheál.
  • Dowdall, Thomas P.
  • Flynn, Stephen.
  • Gibbons, Seán.
  • Goulding, John.
  • Harris, Thomas.
  • Hayes, Seán.
  • Kelly, Séamus P.
  • Kehoe, Patrick.
  • Kelly, James Patrick.
  • Kelly, Thomas.
  • Kissane, Eamonn.
  • Lemass, Seán F.
  • Little, Patrick John.
  • MacEntee, Seán.
  • Maguire, Ben.
  • Maguire, Conor Alexander.
  • Moane, Edward.
  • Moore, Séamus.
  • Concannon, Helena.
  • Crowley, Fred. Hugh.
  • Crowley, Timothy.
  • Daly, Dennis.
  • Davin, William.
  • Derrig, Thomas.
  • De Valera, Eamon.
  • Doherty, Hugh.
  • Donnelly, Eamon.
  • Murphy, Patrick Stephen.
  • Norton, William.
  • O'Briain, Donnchadh.
  • O Ceallaigh, Seán T.
  • O'Dowd, Patrick.
  • O'Grady, Seán.
  • O'Reilly, Matthew.
  • Pearse, Margaret Mary.
  • Ruttledge, Patrick Joseph.
  • Ryan, James.
  • Ryan, Martin.
  • Ryan, Robert.
  • Sheridan, Michael.
  • Smith, Patrick.
  • Victory, James.
  • Walsh, Richard.
  • Ward, Francis C.
Tellers:— Tá: Deputies Doyle and Bennett; Nil: Deputies Little and Smith.
Question declared lost.
Vote put and declared carried.