Perhaps the House will agree to take the Fifth Stage now?
Ordered accordingly.
Treason Bill, 1939—Final Stages.
Question—"That the Bill be received for final consideration"—agreed to.
Question proposed: "That the Bill do now pass."
On the Committee Stage I proposed certain amendments to this Bill. Those amendments were, unfortunately, ruled out by the Chair. The object of those amendments was that this Bill should not have the death penalty for certain offences for which it was grotesque and absurd that the death penalty should be applied. In my speech on the Second Reading I suggested to the Prime Minister, who was then in charge of this measure, that he should withdraw the Bill and bring in a new Treason Bill, a Bill which would do away with constructive treason as an offence punishable by death. I pointed out to the House on that occasion, and I do not wish to point it out to the House again, because I would take up the time of the House by pointing it out again, what is meant by constructive treason. Unfortunately my amendments, which would leave the death penalty for the real carrying on of genuine warfare against the State——
If I may interrupt the Deputy, this is the Fifth Stage of the Bill and the debate on the Fifth Stage of a Bill must be confined to what is in the Bill, and the debate cannot range over amendments which have been ruled out on the Committee Stage. That has been long laid down as a precedent here.
I am explaining my reasons why, having voted for this Bill upon the Second Reading in the hopes that it could be amended, I am now asking the House to reject this measure, because it is in its present form, and I wish to make perfectly clear to the House the reasons why I am asking Deputies to reject this measure now. I had hoped that this Bill would be amended, and that the death penalty should only be applied to genuine acts of treason, to genuine acts of warfare endangering the lives of the citizens of this State. I expressed the view, which I still hold, that if persons engaged in acts of warfare against the State, if they took away the lives of those who uphold the integrity of the State, if they shoot down soldiers defending the State, or Guards defending the State, then those acts, and the conspiracy to do those acts, are matters which are justly subject to a death penalty by the laws of this State.
But when you come down to constructive treason, I think it is quite different. We have an ancient, antiquated and barbarous definition of treason in the Constitution, and now we have an antiquated and barbarous statute such as this, putting life into the dead bones of the definition in the Constitution. It was stated by the Prime Minister, when he spoke here on a previous occasion, that levying war would not be taken in the sense that it has always been taken, in the sense that it has always been construed by the courts, but that it would be taken in some other sense in which he suggested it was meant to be taken. The rule of construction is perfectly clear and perfectly definite. It is not what may lie hidden in the back of the mind of any person introducing a Bill that can be taken in the construction of that Bill. It is one of the clearest things that a court, in construing the Act of Parliament, looks to one thing, and one thing only, and that is to the expressed intention of the person who introduces it. That must be so. They must look to the expressed intention, and they cannot go guessing what the intentions may have been behind the persons introducing the measure, different from the intentions which they have expressed on paper.
Here we have the words "levying war", words which have been defined by court after court, and always defined in the same way, not by decisions nearly 200 or 300 years ago, as was suggested here, but decisions running right down to our own time. Levying war has been construed in the prosecutions brought under the Treason Felony Act as including acts of constructive warfare, that is to say, endeavouring to achieve any public purpose by acts of violence.
I presume my amendments were ruled out of order owing to the Long Title of this Bill. But I did think that treason could be divided into several parts. I did think there could be the death penalty for genuine treason and that there could be other penalties for other acts of treason. I presume—I do not know—that the ruling of the Chair was that it was the title of this Bill and not any inherent difficulty in the thing itself that was responsible for ruling my amendments out of order. Since we are now faced with a Bill which, as I have said, is barbarous in its application of the death sentence to offences in which it would shock the public conscience if the death sentence were carried out or passed by a jury, I consider that this Bill should not pass this House.
That is not leaving us without a Treason Bill. It is not leaving us without the offence of treason being punishable if it be committed to-day or to-morrow. We have a Treason Bill which will be enforced if the House rejects this measure, as I ask the House to do. I ask the House to reject this measure because, as I have said, it is antiquated and is entirely barbarous in its definition. The words are used, "levying war". Those words have been construed again and again. They can only be taken in the one particular way in which they always have been construed by the courts and that must have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution. Why do they use the words "levying war"? "Levying war" is archaic English. Whoever talks of "levying war" in everyday conversation? Would any member of the Government, talking to another member of the Government, say that Japan is "levying war" at the present moment on China? Would you see written in any newspaper, even, at the present day that Japan is "levying war" upon China? It is antiquated English. You would say, "Japan is at war with China." You would say that Japan was committing acts of warfare against China. A newspaper would write, and possibly persons in conversation would say, "Japan is waging war against China." But, I have never heard in ordinary conversation and I have never seen printed in a newspaper the statement that one country was "levying war" against another. We have gone back to archaic English. Why have we gone back to archaic English? The reason is perfectly plain and definite. We wish to use that archaic term because its meaning has been made perfectly clear by decision after decision, from generation to generation, of judges.
I may be told, of course, that, although we have a barbarous code of treason, it is only in cases of real treason that the law will be put in force. My answer to that is twofold. In the first place, I say that it is a wrong thing for us to have on our Statute Book a statute over the morality of which we cannot stand, even though it never be put in force. I have also got to say that, though persons may not be indicted under Section 1, possibly, for acts of constructive treason, under Section 3, they may be for acts of misprision of treason. For example, if we take an association, possibly formed for the purpose of having all the grass land of Ireland broken up, that is a public purpose. If that is followed by cattle driving, and the object is, not to clear one particular farm, but to clear all the farms of the country, that is constructive treason, and that is an offence punishable by death, according to this statute.
No doubt, no Government would ever indict cattle drivers for treason, and, no doubt, they would not get a jury, and I do not think they would even get a military tribunal, to find cattle drivers guilty of treason and to hang them. But I do think it is quite possible, especially when I consider certain provisions in another statute which is going through this House, that, under Section 3, every person who, knowing that any act the commission of which would be treason is intended or proposed to be, or is being, or has been committed, does not forthwith disclose the same, together with all particulars thereof known to him, to a justice of the District Court, or an officer of the Gárda Síochána, or some other person lawfully engaged on duties relating to the preservation of peace and order shall be guilty of the felony of misprision of treason and shall be liable on conviction thereof to penal servitude for a term not exceeding five years or imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. So, therefore, if there was a general conspiracy to drive cattle off all the farms in Ireland, which amounts to levying war, according to all the authorities which I read to the House upon the Second Reading, and if, as I say, somebody knows that a cattle drive in pursuance of that general intention is going to be carried out and does not immediately go and tell a district justice or a member of the Gárda, he is liable to imprisonment for five years.
No doubt, as I have said, indictments for constructive treason would probably never be preferred by a Government, but I do not see that it is at all unlikely that indictments for misprision of treason, under this Section 3, would not be preferred by a Governments and, if people did not give information to the Guards or to district justices if they knew that some act, the commission of which would be treason, was going to take place, I can readily understand their being indicated under Section 3. And, in the disturbed condition of the country which we must visualise before any charge of that nature would be likely to arise, I can very well understand their being brought before a military tribunal and sentenced under that Section 3.
But, there are other things. We proposed an amendment to Section 2 to the effect that, if a doctor finds somebody, who has been guilty of a treasonable offence, dying or in danger of death, that doctor should go to his help, and should alleviate his suffering; should perform an act of Christian charity, and should not be in the eyes of the law thereupon regarded as a felon. That seemed at any rate to be a very moderate amendment, but, sticking firm to their determination to keep this Bill as it is upon the Statute Book, even that very moderate suggestion was rejected by the Minister, and was rejected by the majority of the House which they have at their command. Therefore, taking this Bill as it stands, I ask the House to reject this Bill.
I again wish to reiterate the position I am taking up. It is not because it is a Treason Bill; it is not because it makes the very grave offence of carrying on acts of real, genuine warfare against the State, an offence punishable by death, that I oppose it; but I do oppose it, and I do ask the House to reject it upon the ground that it is a bad Treason Bill; because it is a Bill that goes altogether too far; because it is a Bill which is carrying out, in a very foolish and unnecessary way, that antiquated and unchristian definition of treason which the Constitution contains. It is not because it is a Treason Bill, but because it is a bad, and a very bad Treason Bill, as it stands now, that I ask the House to reject it.
We accepted it upon the First Reading. We voted for it upon the First Reading because of what I, at least, took to be promises that amendments would be inserted, though they were not definite promises. I am not putting forward any breach of faith, but, because hopes were aroused in us that this Bill would be amended so as to make it a proper Treason Bill, no more extreme than is necessary, we voted for it upon the Second Reading. But, because it comes before this House, upon the Fifth Stage, entirely unamended, in all its naked rottenness, I ask the House now to reject it.
This Bill has been the subject of a good deal of discussion in the House, but, having regard to the relatively short character of the Bill, it is not necessary to say very much. I want to indicate on this stage what I have already indicated on the Second Stage, namely, that this Party is opposed to the passage of the Bill, and considers that there is no set of circumstances existing in this country to-day which justifies the hasty introduction of a Bill of this kind. No attempt whatever was made by the Minister introducing the Bill, or by the Taoiseach, who has taken an unusual interest in it, to show that the circumstances here to-day justify its introduction.
The country to-day is more peaceful than it has been for many years, and yet, as if peace was something to be abhorred, the Government present this House and the people with two Bills: one a Treason Bill and the other a Public Safety Bill masquerading under another name, in order to produce as much yeastiness, perturbation and disquietude in the country as it is possible for two such mischievous Bills to create in the public mind. Instead of the House devoting itself to matters of serious economic concern to the people, devoting its attention to remedying the depressed condition of agriculture or endeavouring to create employment for the 106,000 unemployed people that we have, it is being asked to divert its efforts to dealing with the Treason Bill and a Public Safety Bill. That is the contribution which the Government makes towards creating stability and order in the State.
I said on the Second Stage, and I say now, that this Bill is a much more extreme Treason Bill than the Treasonable Offences Act of 1925, because under this Bill it is possible to prosecute a person for treason on the capital charge when it was not possible to prosecute that person for treason under the Treasonable Offences Act of 1925. By the introduction of the phrase "levying war", and the meanings which have been attached to levying war in the British courts and in the Irish courts, it will be possible to indict a person for treason under this Bill even though the charge which may be levied against him is very far removed from the overt act of levying war. As I said before—I think it will bear repetition as showing the wide meaning of levying war—the British courts one time held that it was levying war against the king if you made love to his eldest daughter and subsequently changed your mind. It will be possible to have various grotesque meanings given to the phrase of "levying war" in the light of the circumstances existing to-day. It will be possible, by the inclusion of the phrase "levying war" in this Bill, to prosecute persons and impose the punishment of death for offences which can be brought within the ambit of that phrase "levying war". This Bill, therefore, is much more extreme than the Treasonable Offences Act of 1925 which was bitterly denounced at the time by the Party now in power.
I object in particular to the introduction of this Bill at this stage. If there was any case which could be made against the Bill on the ground of its extreme character it was made by an English paper a week ago. Referring to the fact that certain Irishmen were being charged with offences in Great Britain, and referring to the severity —what I can only describe as the savagery—of the sentences imposed upon them, this English paper said:
"Well, after all, they got off lightly because if they did this in Ireland Mr. de Valera would charge them with high treason on the ground that they were levying war against the State, and they would be sentenced to death."
So that the English paper, in justifying the savagery of the sentences on young Irishmen in Britain says, "Ah, we are treating them lightly. If they were in Eire they would be sentenced to death by the Government under the Treason Bill of 1939," which we are now being asked to pass by the Government.
I think this Bill was unfortunate in its conception, and was introduced at a most inopportune time. Efforts have been made in Britain to create a scare, to mobilise artificial indignation against Irishmen. At a time when many of our countrymen have their backs to the wall, with that mob massed opinion artificially mobilised against them, we fan the flames against them by demonstrating, in the peaceful conditions which exist here, that it is necessary that Irishmen should have a Treason Bill and an Offences Against the State Bill, in order to induce them to conduct themselves. The Government has been panicky in introducing a Bill of this kind. It has been introduced with indecent haste. It has been introduced without a shadow of justification for its introduction. Even at this stage the Government ought to realise that it is asking the House to pass a Bill which, in its terms, is much more stringent and much more rigorous than the Bill which it denounced in 1925. No case has been made for the Bill. We have no circumstances here justifying the introduction of such a Bill. I, for one, do not believe that there is a situation which demands that the Government should ask the House to inscribe on its Statute Book a Bill so severe in its terms as this, and particularly at this very inopportune time.
I oppose this Bill. I opposed it on the Second Stage because I consider that it is very imprudent to enact a law at the present time which makes treason an offence. My reason for saying that is that for generations in this country treason has been regarded as a virtue. Because of that, I submit that this is a most inopportune time to enact a law which makes treason an offence subject to the death penalty. In almost every city in this country you have monuments erected to the memory of men who gave their lives because they were held to have committed the offence of treason. Treason was then defined as levying war against the King or against Great Britain. If it is now defined as levying war against the Irish State it will be difficult for the plain people of this country to draw a distinction between the two circumstances. For that reason I hold that many years should be allowed to elapse before we enact a law making treason an offence. I may be asked how can the Government, or how can State institutions, be protected if there is not in force a law of this kind. Treason, in this Bill, is defined as levying war against the State. I cannot see how a citizen of this State can do that without violating some of the ordinary laws of the country.
Therefore, if a person goes out to levy war against the State he must endanger life or property or inflict some injury upon a fellow citizen. If he commits any of these offences he is guilty of an offence against the ordinary law. Why, therefore, is there any necessity to introduce and reenact in this State the offence of treason? Surely out of respect to all those who have suffered for the offence of treason as it was regarded up to the establishment of this State, the legal offence of treason should be left aside for a time. Anybody who studies the question seriously must admit that it is possible to preserve the democratic institutions of the country without enacting this extremely drastic law.
It must be remembered that this is not emergency legislation. It is an enactment which is intended to be permanent. It is an enactment which is intended, I think, to implement one of the clauses of the Constitution. Under one of the clauses of the Constitution treason is defined as levying war against the State. I do not see that there was any immediate or urgent need to implement that particular clause of the Constitution. It may be no harm to have that clause in the Constitution giving a definition of treason; but there was no urgent need to follow it up by enacting penalties for that offence. Everybody who studies the question will admit that there are adequate provisions in the ordinary law of the State for the punishment of any acts which can, under this legislation, be regarded as levying war. For that reason I think that this Bill is altogether unnecessary. Apart from being unnecessary, I think this Bill is altogether too drastic, that the penalties provided are altogether excessive. We are told that levying war against the State, or the various offences which may be defined as treason, are equal to the offence of murder. I hold that there is no offence which can be regarded as equal to the offence of murder. I hold that, out of respect for the sanctity of human life, the State should not take upon itself the power to execute citizens for any offence except murder in the first degree. In the past 25 years there have been altogether too many executions, both legal and illegal, both official and unofficial in this little country. It is time we turned over a new leaf.
I am afraid that the Deputy is going outside the four walls of the Bill. The debate on the Fifth Stage is confined to the four walls of the Bill and we should not go back on what might have been.
I am not speaking of what might have been; I am speaking of what should be in this Bill. We should not enact a law which gives the executive Government of the State such drastic power, power which they may be tempted to use against political opponents. When we consider the extent to which the term "levying war" could be enlarged; when we consider the number of circumstances which may be regarded as levying war; when we consider how in a time of excitement any political party, agitating perhaps for certain reforms, could by a very slight stretch of imagination on the part of an excited and partisan Government in future—I am not referring to the present Government—be regarded as levying war, is it right that the Executive Government should be given this drastic power to inflict the death penalty upon people who may be simply political agitators, or perhaps, agitating for some economic reform?
When every aspect of the question is considered, I think the Government would be well-advised at least to suspend this Bill. Whatever may be said about the other legislation, they should not enact a law which seeks to justify the infliction of the death penalty for what may be regarded as a political offence. There is at the present time considerable agitation in this country and other countries for the abolition of the death penalty for murder. I do not think that that agitation is completely justified. I can visualise, and I think every Deputy can visualise, circumstances in which the State would be justified in executing for deliberate murder. But I cannot visualise any circumstances under which the State would be justified in executing for any offence other than murder.
It may be suggested, of course, that anybody who would be guilty of treason might perhaps cause the death of a number of citizens or considerable loss both of life and property. The same could be said of a Government that might unwisely involve this country in an international war. Suppose a Government, without justification, committed this country to war, they might cause a loss of hundreds of thousands of citizens' lives. You cannot judge the matter from that angle; you must judge the matter from the actual gravity of the offence. Everybody will acknowledge that there is a natural gravity in the offence of murder. Every right-minded citizen revolts from that offence. Every right-minded citizen regards a person who commits murder as he would regard a beast of prey. But there is not in any country the same attitude towards a person who may be involved in some political agitation which may be regarded as levying war against the State. Because there is a certain vagueness about the offence of treason, I think there should not be such a drastic penalty inflicted. I do not think that public opinion in this country is in favour of such a drastic penalty. I think that this country can be adequately protected by the existing law.
It is not legal enactments that protect a State, or the institutions of a State, so much as the vigilance and efficiency of the forces of the State, added to the common sense and loyalty of the general community. The Irish people have proved themselves to be common-sense people. They have survived many great difficulties since the establishment of this State, 17 years ago. It was the common sense of the plain people, and not the wisdom of their leaders, that enabled this nation to survive, and that has resulted in the continuance of this State as a democratically-governed State. If this State is to continue to survive——
The Deputy is straying very far from the Bill. He is treating us to a dissertation on political philosophy. He must come back to the provisions of the Bill.
He will be taken up for treason if he is not careful.
Mr. Morrissey
He, certainly, deserves some penalty for that speech.
There seems to be a feeling that there is absolutely no power in the hands of the State at present to preserve order or to protect the institutions of the State. So far as I can see, there is no chance for any person to overthrow the Government or make any attempt seriously to interfere with the administration of the law without violating some existing part of the ordinary law. Why should we add to the existing law? Why should we seek a new enactment which provides the same penalty as that for murder for what must be a vague political offence? It would be wise for the Government to realise that the Constitution as it stands, without further implementation, is quite sufficient. There is in the Constitution a definition of treason, without additions, and I think we should be satisfied with that, for the present. A certain time must be allowed to elapse before public opinion in this country becomes accustomed to the changed conditions under which we are living. A certain time must elapse to enable people to distinguish between treason as it existed prior to the establishment of this State and subsequently.
It has, I think, been suggested by some Deputies that those who have opposed this piece of legislation are in some way sympathetic to those against whom it is supposed to be directed— that those who are opposed to the Bill are in some way sympathetic to those who may be penalised under it. So far as I am concerned, I have absolutely no sympathy whatever with anybody who might be inclined to overthrow this State or who would be guilty of the offence of treason. I am as strong a believer as anybody here in the principles of democratic government, and I hold that the Government of this country is the lawfully established and properly constituted Government, and that there is absolutely no reason why any section of the community should seek to overthrow the established Government by unlawful means. Further than that, I think it has been clearly demonstrated that the Constitution enables any organised section of the community——
I have given the Deputy great latitude. If he desires to continue his speech, he must strictly confine himself to the provisions of the Bill.
The main reason why I am opposing this Bill is because it is undemocratic. It is supposed to be introduced to protect our democratic institutions while, as a matter of fact, it may result in the complete destruction of those institutions. Democracy can be attacked and has been attacked——
Mr. Morrissey
And is being attacked.
By other forces than those opposed to the Government. Democracy has been attacked and destroyed by Governments——
Will the Deputy forget democracy and come down to the provisions of the Treason Bill, 1939? Otherwise, he must sit down.
I am appealing to the Government to withdraw this Bill because it is imprudent, having regard to the fact that sufficient time has not elapsed since this State was established, having regard to the fact that it is unnecessary, since there are already in existence sufficient laws to protect the Government and protect the State, and having regard to the fact that the penalties provided in the Bill are altogether too drastic and too severe.
On the Committee Stage of this Bill, the Taoiseach gave an undertaking that various points raised by the Opposition would be considered before the Report Stage. These points have been carefully considered and examined and we have come to the conclusion that we could not embody them in the Bill. This Bill flows naturally from the Constitution and it is based on that Article of the Constitution which defines "treason". Looking back on the reports of the debates on that Article, one is surprised, if not amazed, to find that no such hubbub was raised then as has been raised since this Bill was introduced and that the criticism offered on this Bill was not offered then. That Article gave a new definition of treason if I may so, and it certainly gave it a new relation. To get away definitely from what might have been in people's minds in this country —the old definition, the definition I think in which Deputy Cogan seems to have got involved—when treason in this country was regarded as a virtue, I want to say that this is entirely a new definition. It is a definition that applies for the first time clearly to this State and to this State alone. One of the points that have been most emphasised here was the point with regard to this definition of "levying war". I am somewhat surprised—I do not want now to talk of the slave mind or something of the kind—why we always have to concentrate on what is the definition in another State, a State in which high treason is there described and in terms which had been enforced against the people of this country in times gone by. I would have been more interested if when we talk about definitions we would talk about other States and definitions that might arise there.
Might I ask the Minister a question?
Yes.
Is the Minister's point that no British decision should be quoted in our courts?
No more than a decision in the United States, or in any other country in the world.
Does the Minister know that it is regularly done and followed?
The Deputy knows very well that it is not regularly followed. I might quote the Lord Glanely case which went to the House of Lords.
Surely the circumstances were not the same. The circumstances were entirely different in that case.
They were not entirely different.
Would the Minister put in a section preventing the courts here from quoting a British decision on "levying war"?
I have more respect for the courts than to think that they would not interpret what is in an Act in a common-sense way.
To interpret archaic terms?
Surely the Deputy should not talk about archaic terms, the Deputy who has been quoting about an Act passed in 1351 in the reign of Edward III.
When was the Treason Felony Act passed in which these words occur?
I am taking the Deputy up about his "archaic terms" and now the Deputy comes along and wants to make out that they are modern terms.
The Minister is going back to archaic terms.
I did not interrupt the Deputy. When the Deputy talks about "archaic terms" he knows that in 1878, the British Government, anxious to remove the anomalies that existed in the criminal code, appointed Sir James Stephens, who was known as one of the greatest criminal lawyers of his time, on a judicial committee. The report that followed approved—and it was introduced as a Ministerial measure—the phrase "levying war."
Levying war on the Government.
Let the Deputy give some decision on it since 1878.
But I have given them already.
That is not my recollection. "Levying war" is a phrase that is in the Constitution. The Taoiseach or any Minister dealing with the Bill would be anxious, so far as possible, to meet the Deputy's views if he had any doubt that there was anything dangerous in that particular phrase or that it might be used or abused in a way that was not intended by the Legislature. I suggest to the House that in interpreting this Bill, when it becomes an Act, what the judges will have to fall back on is that Article of the Constitution. They will not look for a decision outside. If we want to introduce into this Bill some provision for altering the phrasing of that Article of the Constitution, then this Bill would be in conflict with the Constitution. Deputy Fitzgerald-Kenney appreciates that as well as anybody in this House. When the Constitution was being enacted perhaps was the time when the Deputy might have dealt with this question of "levying war". We will have to rely on the common sense of the judges here to interpret it in the common sense way. The Deputy knows how words were strained in some old English decisions. He knows of the famous Judge Jeffreys Hallam commenting that words could be made to lose their ordinary meaning. Some judges then strained the ordinary meaning of words. We rely here on the judges' common-sense as judges of this State, interpreting this Bill in a plain, common-sense way. So far as levying war is concerned, the Deputy could have got an amendment —I know it is not in order to refer to it now—but he could have framed an amendment when that Bill was here for discussion in this House in some such way as this:—"That the act which constituted treason, where it consisted only of (a), (b), (c), (d), and so on, could be punished by a lesser penalty than death."
That is what I did.
That is not what the Deputy did.
I beg the Minister's pardon.
I beg the Deputy's pardon. I say there again that there were difficulties. We have considered this and considered it carefully. We feel that we would be taking an unreasonable risk in making amendments along those lines as well as feeling that they were unnecessary. The Deputy complained that an amendment dealing, for example, with the doctors was not accepted. There, again, one has to rely on the ordinary common sense of the judges and juries to deal with it. But putting in an exception such as leaving out the doctor in the course of his duty comforting a person engaged in treason might be construed afterwards in some other case in a way that was not considered at the time the Act was passed. It might be made out that those others were intended to be dealt with as——
Plus common sense and minus common sense.
The Deputy can put it anyway he likes in that sense. I could talk on a number of exceptions that could be made. I do not think that any jury or judge would, for example, convict the mother who harbours her son in certain circumstances or would convict other people who are related in some capacity of that sort. There was no mention of the clergy. To put an exception like that in would show that we were not a civilised country at all, that we were living in a barbaric age.
Then it is better to have a barbaric statute.
The reason we have not made these exceptions is simply and solely because we feel that other cases might arise which would happen in the future and for which provision had not now been made; it would call the attention of the judges or the juries who were dealing with it that these were deliberately left out. In all this matter we have to rely on the common sense of our courts to deal with it. You have the position that, first of all, the Attorney-General must indict any person who is guilty of treason or misprision of treason.
Nobody of common sense would say that any common-sense Attorney-General is going to indict for treason a person who is guilty of cattle driving or something of that sort. You have a judge and jury trying cases arising under this Bill, and I think it would be an unfair strain to put on a judge that in certain circumstances he should have to decide whether in a particular case the extreme penalty or a lesser penalty should be imposed. We will have here an Executive responsible to the people, which has the power of mitigation, the power of remission or otherwise of any sentence which may be imposed, and I think that, being in touch with the people and knowing the circumstances in which those offences may be committed, they will be in a much better position to deal with the matter than if it were left in the hands of the judge, of having to say whether in certain circumstances the death penalty or a lesser penalty should be imposed.
Deputy Norton talks about the necessity for the Bill at this time. It was pointed out by the Taoiseach in introducing this Bill that provision was made in the Constitution for such a Bill. The offence was defined there, and all that is being done now under this Bill is that we are stating what is the punishment for the offence which was at that time defined. It is implementing the Constitution. Instructions were given for its preparation when the Constitution was enacted by the people. It is not brought in here in any hasty manner. Deputies had been informed of it already. I stated on another Bill that anything being done here is not being done either by suggestion or dictation from outside.
As regards Deputy Cogan's remarks, I am not in a position to translate most of what he has been trying to put before the House, but I certainly cannot follow the argument that it seems to be all right to kill people in the name of treason, but it is a different thing if somebody commits murder in some other way not related to treason. That is not an argument that I can follow. It is an argument that is based on the outlook of somebody who does not understand what the position here is. It is the argument of somebody who does not realise that there is a Constitution here made by the Irish people themselves. I think if the Deputy could get that idea into his mind or if somebody could help him to get it into his mind, he would not be putting forward those ridiculous arguments—if one may give them a higher description than they deserve by calling them arguments—which he has been putting forward here in this House.
Question put.
The Dáil divided: Tá, 58; Níl, 32.
Tá
- Aiken, Frank.
- Allen, Denis.
- Bartley, Gerald.
- Beegan, Patrick.
- Boland, Gerald.
- Bourke, Dan.
- Brady, Brian.
- Brady, Seán.
- Breathnach, Cormac.
- Breen, Daniel.
- Breslin, Cormac.
- Carty, Frank.
- Cooney, Eamonn.
- Crowley, Tadhg.
- Derrig, Thomas.
- De Valera, Eamon.
- Flynn, John.
- Flynn, Stephen.
- Fogarty, Andrew.
- Fogarty, Patrick J.
- Friel, John.
- Gorry, Patrick J.
- Harris, Thomas.
- Hogan, Daniel.
- Humphreys, Francis.
- Kelly, James P.
- Kelly, Thomas.
- Kennedy, Michael J.
- Killilea, Mark.
- Lemass, Seán F.
- Little, Patrick J.
- Loughman, Francis.
- Lynch, James B.
- McDevitt, Henry A.
- Meaney, Cornelius.
- Moore, Séamus.
- Moran, Michael.
- Moylan, Seán.
- Mullen, Thomas.
- Munnelly, John.
- O'Briain, Donnchadh.
- O Ceallaígh, Seán T.
- O'Grady, Seán.
- O'Loghlen, Peter J.
- O'Reilly, Matthew.
- O'Rourke, Daniel.
- Rice, Brigid M.
- Ruttledge, Patrick J.
- Ryan, James.
- Ryan, Martin.
- Sheridan, Michael.
- Smith, Patrick.
- Traynor, Oscar.
- Tubridy, Seán.
- Victory, James.
- Walsh, Laurence J.
- Walsh, Richard.
- Ward, Conn.
Níl
- Belton, Patrick.
- Bennett, George C.
- Brennan, Michael.
- Broderick, William J.
- Brodrick, Seán.
- Browne, Patrick.
- Corish, Richard.
- Cosgrave, William T.
- Dillon, James M.
- Doyle, Peadar S.
- Everett, James.
- Fagan, Charles.
- Fitzgerald-Kenney, James.
- Giles, Patrick.
- Gorey, Denis J.
- Hannigan, Joseph.
- Hickey, James.
- Hughes, James.
- Hurley, Jeremiah.
- Keating, John.
- Keyes, Michael.
- Mongan, Joseph W.
- Morrissey, Daniel.
- Mulcahy, Richard.
- Nally, Martin.
- Norton, William.
- O'Higgins, Thomas F.
- O'Neill, Eamonn.
- Pattison, James P.
- Reynolds, Mary.
- Rogers, Patrick J.
- Ryan, Jeremiah.
Tellers:—Tá: Deputies Little and Smith; Níl: Deputies Doyle and Bennett.
Question declared carried.