Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Wednesday, 17 Apr 1940

Vol. 79 No. 12

Committee on Finance. - Vote 63—Army.

Minister for Defence (Mr. Traynor)

I move:—

Go ndeontar suim ná raghaidh thar £2,237,020 chun slánuithe na suime is gá chun íoctha an Mhuirir a thiocfaidh chun bheith iníoctha i rith na bliana dar críoch an 31adh lá de Mhárta, 1941, chun an Airm agus Cúltaca an Airm (maraon le Deontaisí áirithe i gCabhair) fé sna hAchtanna Fórsaí Cosanta (Forálacha Sealadacha), agus chun costaisí áirithe riaracháin ina dtaobh san; chun costaisí Oifig an Aire Cóimhriartha Cosantais, agus chun costaisí áirithe fé sna hAchtanna um Chiontaí in aghaidh an Stáit, 1939 agus 1940, agus fén Acht um Réamhchúram in aghaidh Aer-Ruathar, 1939.

That a sum not exceeding £2,237,020 be granted to complete the sum necessary to defray the Charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1941, for the Army and the Army Reserve (including certain Grants-in-Aid) under the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Acts, and for certain administrative expenses in connection therewith; for the expenses of the Office of the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, and for certain expenses under the Offences Against the State Acts, 1939, and 1940, and the Air-raid Precautions Act, 1939.

The Army Estimate for the financial year, 1940-41, rests on an emergency establishment for the regular Army, including officers and crews for vessels, of 14,243 all ranks. This figure is made up of: officers, 1,065; N.C.Os., 2,993; other ranks, 8,874; crews for vessels, 136, cadets, 75; recruits, 1,100; making a total of 14,243.

Compared with the establishment obtaining last September, when the

Volunteer and Reserve forces were mobilised, this emergency establishment shows a decrease of 29 officers and 6,793 other ranks.

During the present year, it is intended to keep the regular Army at a strength of 1,065 officers and 12,003 other ranks (including crews for vessels), but if conditions warrant, it is also intended to reduce the Army further to an extent consistent with safety. In addition to that number, we shall maintain 75 cadets and 1,100 recruits. Of the cadets, 50 are already studying at the Military College, and 25 will be recruited from the open competitive examination held annually by the Civil Service Commissioners, or from N.C.Os. in the Army. In addition, 20 short term commissions in the Air Corps will be given and these are provided for in the strength of officers.

As regards the 1,100 recruits, we hope for a steady flow of 1,100 recruits for the Volunteer force every three months of the year. They will undergo initial training for a period of three months with the regular Army and will then be transferred to the Reserve.

The cost of maintaining this force of 14,243, all ranks, together with 9 chaplains, 17 nurses, 3 civilian doctors, and a number of officiating clergymen who are not, of course, included in the Emergency Establishment, is £2,099,270 approximately, and is made up as follows:—Pay £1,135,264, personal cash allowances £424,104, personal allowances in kind £516,028, transport £23,874; making a total of £2,099,270.

The strength of the Reserve, as distinct from the Regular Army, for which this Estimate provides, is 11,757 all ranks. That is made up as follows:— Class A Reserve 1,532, Class B Reserve 138, Officers Reserve 57, Volunteer Force 10,030; making a total of 11,757.

Included in the figure of 10,030 for the Volunteer Force are 286 officers and 4,376 recruits. The latter are expected to receive initial as distinct from annual training during the year.

The cost of the entire Reserve Force of 11,757 all ranks is £125,579, and is made up in the following manner:— Pay £94,191, personal cash allowances £10,415, personal allowances in kind £13,422, transport £4,280, other services £3,271; making a total of £125,579.

The salaries, wages and allowances of civilians form another item in the direct cost of the Army. The total number of civilians paid by the Army and covered by this Estimate is approximately 1,199. They cover a variety of occupations such as labourers, tradesmen, herds, caretakers, technical experts and civil servants, and the total cost of such services as represented in this Estimate is £236,668.

Another element of expenditure covered by this Estimate is the purchase and maintenance of stores. Here it is necessary to distinguish, as the Estimate itself distinguishes, between ordinary and warlike stores. Ordinary stores may be generally described as stores not directly destined for fighting purposes, and include such items as medical appliances, mechanical transport, petrol and oils, vessels, animals and forage, fuel, light and water, barrack services, engineer stores, motor cycles, bicycles, shops equipment, etc. Their cost as shown in this Estimate is approximately £334,607. Warlike stores, on the other hand, are stores directly intended for fighting purposes. They include rifles, machine guns, revolvers, field guns, anti-aircraft guns, tanks, fighting vehicles, aircraft, patrol vessels, motor torpedo boats, with all their necessary components and accessories. The cost of such stores as borne on the present Estimate is approximately £460,651.

Another service covered by the Vote, but not directly concerned with the Army as a fighting force, is the protection of the civil population against air and gas attack, or, as it is more generally called, A.R.P. The amount provided under this sub-head includes £87,500 as grants to local authorities, £10,000 as grants to essential undertakers, and a sum of £19,355 for miscellaneous stores and equipment.

Finally, there are a number of minor services covered by the Estimate which cannot be included in any of the headings already dealt with. These include the incidental services provided under sub-head X—horse shows, military educational courses abroad, telegrams and telephones, compensation, maintenance of military lands, grants to welfare funds, the expenses of special courts, etc. The total cost of such miscellaneous services is £36,123.

The gross cost of the Army as provided for in this Estimate is £3,409,753, and that sum is distributed over the headings already described in the following manner: Pay and allowances of regular Army, £2,099,270, or 61.6 of the total; pay and allowances of Reserve, £125,579, or 3.7 of the total; pay and allowances of civilians, £236,668, or 6.9 of the total; ordinary stores, £334,607, or 9.8 of the total; warlike stores, £460,651, or 13.5 of the total; A.R.P., £116,855, or 3.4 of the total; and miscellaneous services, £36,123 or 1.1 of the total; a total of £3,409,753.

In the debate on the Supplementary Estimate for 1938, it was pointed out that the percentage of the Estimate spent on warlike stores had risen from 5 per cent., in 1932, to 12½ per cent., in 1938, and in the debate on the Supplementary Estimate for 1939, it was suggested that we were not adhering to the policy of buying warlike material in progressively increasing quantities. The figures already given show that there has been no change of policy in respect of such purchases, for they show that, on an analysis of the present Estimate, we propose spending no less than 13½ per cent. of the total Estimate on fighting materials.

Moreover, the sum of £460,651 provided for only represents the value of the stores which in the considered judgement of the Department will be delivered within the financial year. In point of fact, orders have been placed for military and naval stores to the value of approximately £3,385,251, and payments against those orders up to 31st March, 1940, totalled in value £727,815. We have, therefore, orders outstanding to the extent of £2,657,436, and, against them, we are providing the sum of £460,651 in the present Estimate. We would have provided more had we any reasonable hope of getting delivery of the material, but if our expectations prove during the year to have been too conservative, and if we get more than we expect, it will be necessary to bring in a Supplementary Estimate.

Dr. O'Higgins

Are we dealing with the Army and the Army Pensions Votes, or with the Army Vote alone?

An Ceann Comhairle

The Army Vote only.

Dr. O'Higgins

Am I to move the motion to refer back now?

An Ceann Comhairle

Due notice should be given of motion to refer an Estimate back for reconsideration. The motion to which Deputy O'Higgins refers was not handed in until 3.15 this afternoon, but since the majority of Deputies did not know until this morning that the Army Estimate would be discussed to-day, I am prepared to accept the motion.

Dr. O'Higgins

I move:—

That the Estimate be referred back for reconsideration.

If any argument were required in support of this motion, I think it has been supplied by the Minister's speech. In practically a world state of war, when the peoples of all countries are concerned with military policy, military plans and military expenditure and with the dangers, probable or possible, confronting their countries, we have the extraordinary picture of a Minister for War standing up in this Parliament and asking for the largest sum that has been asked for for a very considerable number of years and reading out for us the items in the Book of Estimates. We have got not one word about policy, not one word about plans; we have got not one word of explanation as to why the extra millions of money are required, and not one word of explanation as to what happened the millions already voted.

We are told that there are orders for warlike stores amounting to about £3,000,000, that the orders have not been filled, and that if they were filled, we would be looking for more. We are not even told where the orders were placed, why they were placed without any understanding as to when the orders would be filled, and whether efforts were made to get them in other places. We have not got a word of explanation as to why we waited to make our preparation until a situation arose when we could not make any preparations. Presumably the men are mobilised to handle instruments. The instruments are not available, cannot be made available, and the Minister does not know when they will be available, but we are going to continue to mobilise men, to feed them, to pay them, and to keep them away from their ordinary trades and avocations. In a poor country like this, with destitution widespread and rapidly increasing, and with the amount of unemployment so great that it is not merely a tragedy, but is in itself a menace to peace, one would imagine that before any Minister would come to the Dáil to ask for £3,500,000, at least he would make some little effort to satisfy the Dáil, and the people it represents outside, that there was a sound and solid reason for asking for the money; and if the money was voted that it was going to be sensibly used according to some plan arrived at to meet some probable danger which he would not shirk indicating. We are supposed to be so very trusting, so very docile in this Assembly, that we would heartlessly turn our backs on conditions outside, and cheerfully walk into the Lobby to vote away millions of money, without even being told why, where we were voting them to, and when we were going to get the goods.

It is only a year since we had the Taoiseach standing up in this House and moving a Defence Estimate, and telling us that it was proposed to spend £1,000,000 on aeroplanes and £1,000,000 on anti-aircraft guns. Was either of these £1,000,000 ever expended? Was it ever the intention to spend £1,000,000 on aeroplanes and £1,000,000 on anti-aircraft guns? Apparently we have three anti-aircraft guns and the other winged birds broke down under the strain. That is our equipment in that direction. Now we are told that there is a "close-down" at the stores, that the goods that were ordered 12 months ago cannot be delivered and are told by the man responsible for the safety of this country which, apparently, is beset with dangers—if we are to believe that there was any real reason for the mobilisation of the last available man—that the goods ordered to be put into the men's hands have not been supplied, and that he does not know when they will be supplied.

We did embark on a policy of ordering goods from any country that was unlikely to supply them, and studiously and deliberately withheld orders from the only country that was likely to supply them. We found all the foreign countries beset with their own troubles, with war on their frontiers and armies mobilised north, south, east and west. When they did not fulfil the orders placed with them, we placed our orders nearer home, and naturally with the result indicated by the Minister. We had grandiose speeches here about the preparedness of the army for any danger that might threaten this country, with our armouries chock full, our arsenals filled to bursting point, but, judging from the statement we heard to-night, and the events of recent months, the only thing we succeeded in doing was effectively to empty the only arsenal we had. I think it is a responsibility of Parliament to know why it is voting the money, and for what. There is a responsibility on any Minister for Defence, before he comes to Parliament, and asks for double or treble the normal sum, at least to take Parliament into his confidence by telling it why he wants so much money. If there is a danger on the horizon it is his responsibility to have the courage to point out where danger lies, and the direction of the danger.

We had a statement from the Taoiseach to the effect that, following the recent Agreement between this country and Great Britain, war between the two countries was unthinkable; that if we were involved in any war in the future England would be our natural ally; and that whatever money was wanted by the Minister for Defence was required for the increased efficiency of the combined forces of Great Britain and Ireland. I do not know whether that was a serious statement, made as a result of consideration and discussions, but assuming that it was, surely we should not have the "close-down" on supplies to which the Minister for Defence pointed. Surely there should not be the apparent impossibility of securing equipment for our troops. Surely orders amounting to millions of pounds should not be outstanding for 12 or 18 months, without even a hope of having these orders filled. In view of a statement like that made by the Minister some explanation is required by the Dáil, as to where the orders were placed, and, with a drying-up of the stores, why the orders were not taken from the country concerned and given to some other country; and if our position is to be this, that in the opinion of the Government there is a really dangerous and menacing situation, to such an extent that we have got to treble Army expenditure, and having done that, we are to sit back casually and wait for one, two, three or four years before we get supplies for that Army.

That is what the Minister's statement amounts to—that we may never get the supplies. At best, we may get them next year or the year after but, in the meantime, the situation is sufficiently dangerous to require the extra millions of pounds. Surely the whole statement is contradictory. If the situation is so free of danger that we can wait until 1941 or 1942 to get the material we were told in 1938 was urgently required, if we can wait indefinitely for the material urgently required two years ago, surely you should case the burden on the backs of the people and wait for your extra £1,500,000 annual expenditure—wait until you get the equipment which was urgently required two years ago and which we are now told may never come. I do not know how Deputies sitting behind the Minister are sufficiently loyal and sufficiently tolerant to put up with the kind of nonsense that is given to us from that Front Bench every time the Army Estimate comes up for discussion. That blind loyalty could be respected if it were not that it is so costly. Can any Deputy sitting opposite, any more than any Deputy sitting here, explain to destitute people in his constituency how he is justified in voting £2,000,000 a year more for the Army when the Minister for Defence says that the equipment, the warlike stores, the armaments and the ammunition for these troops may come next year or may never come? We have got to assume that already it is 12 or 18 months on order.

We have embarked on an Army on a grand scale. Something happened last September and we mobilised, in a panicky, disorderly, discreditable way, every man on whom the Army had then had a grip. We rolled them into barracks without thinking a day in advance as to what was to be done with them the day after or how we were to feed or clothe them the first night there. One would imagine from the haste and panic that an enemy was belching at our gates. Having mobilised the last available man, we spread them out around the bridges, put them scouting on empty lorries up and down the roads and kept them marching and counter-marching and circling around barracks. We know now that we acted in haste and in panic, that nerves got the best of us. We see everything going on the same as ever, but political faces are of more importance than the purses of the people. Having blundered once, we must continue to blunder. Having mobilised, we must continue to pile up the cost and so we get an Army of twice the dimensions we had last year. What was the big danger last September? Prior to last September, there was a doubt in the minds of every responsible person as to how far the neutrality of this country would be respected or recognised. We were told by the Taoiseach that there was no danger of that neutrality being violated by Great Britain, but that there was always the possibility of a country at war with Britain attempting to invade or do damage to this country. Right up to last September, that doubt was in everybody's mind. But we only proceeded to mobilise the last man when we received assurances —unsolicited assurances—from both sides that our neutrality would be respected. Then we proceeded to mobilise the last man.

I do not believe that it is tactful to go out of our way to give offence to any country. I think that the most offensive thing we could have done was to mobilise immediately we got an unsolicited assurance from the German representative that the neutrality of this country would be respected. However, I am prepared to assume that the Minister or the Government did not impose these extra millions on the people out of a sheer spirit of recklessness. There was some reason. We are the people who are asked to vote the money, and the money we are asked to vote is not our own money. We are asked to vote money out of the pockets of people who cannot afford it. Could we hear even now, in the course of this debate, from what point our neutrality is menaced? I accept the word of the Taoiseach that there is no danger from Great Britain. Is it then contemplated that the German Army is going to run the naval gauntlet in order to land in this country and have a section of their troops isolated here without any line of supply? With what object would that be done? It certainly would not be to obtain command of the resources of this country, because those resources would be worthless unless the seas were open and they could be sent back. It might be for an attack on Great Britain, but there are points on the Continent which could be reached with less risk and which are merely within the same striking distance as we are.

I do not believe that it is wise to go too fully into that, but I want to make this known, that we are asked, as responsible Deputies, to vote millions of pounds in blinkers without being told for what purpose. A halt has got to be called to that. The Minister knows very well that Deputies on these benches are not unapproachable. The Minister knows full well that there is a sense of honour in Deputies in this House, and that if there is any real danger that he wants to indicate in private in order to justify what appears to be sheer spectacular extortion, then there is not a Deputy in this Party or on the Labour or Independent Benches that he could not take into his confidence with safety. I move to report progress.

Progress reported, the Committee to sit again to-morrow.