I move that the Bill be read a Second Time. As the Long Title of the Bill indicates, it is a measure to restrict the taking or continuing of legal proceedings in respect of damage caused by accidental fire. As a consequence of a fire which occurred at the Athlone Woollen Mills in November, 1940, an action for damages was taken against the Athlone Woollen Mills Co., Ltd., in respect of the destruction of certain adjacent premises which were used as a private school. The Supreme Court, on appeal, recently decided in favour of the claimants on the ground that, as the mill premises were not a house within the meaning of an Act of the Irish Parliament, of 1715, the company was not protected against claims for damages caused by a fire accidentally originating in its premises and spreading to other property. Prior to that decision of the Supreme Court, the law on the matter was not generally appreciated and there had been a common assumption that the law afforded full protection against claims for damages in such cases. It now appears that the Irish Act of 1715 affords protection only where an accidental fire originates in a house, chamber or outhouse and spreads therefrom to other premises or property. If the fire originates, not in a house, chamber or outhouse, but in a factory or mill, then persons suffering damage by reason of the spreading of that fire are entitled to make a claim, since the Supreme Court decided that the word "house" had not a wider significance than a dwelling-house or place of habitation.
In the course of the judgment, one of the judges, referring to the English statute of 1774, which enacted that no action should be maintained against any person in whose house, chamber, stable, barn or other building or on whose estate a fire should accidentally begin, suggested that the time had arrived when a similarly wide provision should be enacted in this country. Following the decision of the Supreme Court, various representative bodies, such as the Federation of Irish Manufacturers, the Associated Chambers of Commerce, the Drapers' Chamber of Trade, as well as other interests, made representations in the matter. They pointed out that the decision would have the effect of placing upon the owners of industrial and business premises an increased and indeterminate liability for loss or damage arising from spreading fires. Insurers have no rate for that risk and have all along paid claims in respect of loss or damage caused by fire spreading from other premises in the same way as if the damage were caused by the fire originating in the premises themselves. In other words, they have acted as if the law in this matter were the same here as it is in England. Now that the Supreme Court has given its decision on the legal position, it would, it appears, be open to an uninsured or under-insured property owner, or to an insurance company or another insurer, to seek indemnity from the owner of the building in which the fire originated. In these circumstances, the various bodies to which I have referred have urged the necessity for legislation. The Government have considered these representations and are satisfied that there is good cause for such legislation and this Bill has been drafted to meet the position.
As Deputies will see, the Bill is a very short one. It provides that where any person has suffered damage by reason of fire accidentally occurring in or on the building or land of another person, no legal proceedings shall, after the passing of the Bill, be instituted by or through the injured person on account of such damage. It further provides that in the case of any legal proceedings instituted after 16th November, 1942, which was the date of the decision of the Supreme Court, and pending at the passing of the Bill, such proceedings shall be discharged and made void subject to such order as to costs as the court or a judge of the court may think fit to make. As a corollary to these provisions, the Bill proposes to repeal the pre-Union Irish Statute of 1715.
Deputies will observe also that the Bill is so framed as not to deprive the plaintiffs in the Athlone case of the benefit of the judgment in their favour. In the case of any other proceedings instituted after the date of the Athlone judgment and pending at the time of the enactment of this Bill, however, the recovery of damages will be precluded, it being left to the court to make any appropriate order as to costs. I do not anticipate that there will be any opposition to the measure, which simply proposes to make it clear that the legal position will henceforth be what, until the recent Supreme Court decision, it was always commonly assumed to be.