I find myself in the same position as Deputy MacEoin. I had an amendment down dealing with this question of assessing the value of active service, but it was ruled out of order. While appreciating the difficulty of arriving at a satisfactory definition of active service, I agree with Deputy MacEoin in thinking that the Minister should, in this Bill, have at least laid down the principles on which the Referee would treat active service. Now, ordinarily speaking, active service should mean active participation in military operations in an active area or theatre of warfare. That would be the ordinary definition as applying to the recognised army of any State fighting either inside the State or outside the State. Something of the same general principle should apply here. After all, "they also serve who stand and wait", sometimes. We have seen some extraordinary results from the administration of the 1934 Act by the Minister's Department. I know several cases where men who were in similar engagements and had similar service, were treated differently in the matter of pensions. It is difficult to understand by what process of reasoning a distinction was made in those cases. I think that the grievances of many of those men could be got rid of if we would face up to a definition of active service. We all know that in an army it may be by accident a man who goes into the firing lines finds himself there. It may be by an accident of administration that a man, who is very keen on being in the firing line, is denied that opportunity, and is retained behind the firing line in an administrative capacity, owing to the fact that he is considered better fitted for a position there. We also know that some individuals are particularly expert in the making of munitions or, perhaps, in matters of transport or intelligence. It is, as I say, merely accidental, so far as the individual is concerned, that he finds himself in a military organisation in a given position at any given time. I think, having regard to these considerations, we should at least have some general principles to safeguard individuals when the Referee comes to consider claims for pensions.
We had the statement from the Minister to-day that pending claims will be disposed of by the arbitrary will of the Referee, and that no restrictions whatever will be imposed on him. I hope no influence of any kind will be exercised from any section of the House or by any section of the Minister's Department. That may or may not be a good way to reach finality in these matters. I know there are great difficulties and that it is essential that finality must be reached. At the same time, the case of these individuals is to rest on the arbitrary will of the Referee. All the machinery procedure of the 1934 Act is cut away and there is nothing left but the arbitrary will of the Referee. Under sub-section (1) of Section 2 he need not consult the committee. We set up a committee, and yet we say that he need not consult it. I do not know why the House went to the trouble of setting up a committee at all if we are going to leave the matter to the discretion of the Referee and ask no member of the committee to assist him. The committee need not function unless it is requested to do so by the Referee. That seems an extraordinary provision. Assuming that there is a reason for it, and I suppose the Minister has a good reason for it, though it has not been disclosed to the House, we reach the position that the Referee, and he alone, will decide the matter. That is placing a serious responsibility on him. We are cutting away all legal procedure, scrapping the rules of evidence and any rules or regulations that were made under the 1934 Act. All the administrative procedure is being scrapped and you are giving the Referee carte blanche.
Therefore, it is clear that if there are any malcontents, as a result of the administration of this new measure, the position will only have been caused by the Minister and the Referee acting under his directions. This House cannot be blamed. Deputy MacEoin has pointed out that in this respect we have been trying to put the Bill on right lines. We are really trying to safeguard the individual who may have a legitimate grievance from the exercise of the arbitrary will of the Referee. I have no doubt that, under the present dispensation, the Minister will see to it that all pending cases receive a reasonable hearing. But, nevertheless, in this matter it has to be remembered that the House is conferring these extraordinary powers on an individual civil servant who owes his position to the Minister, who acts in accordance with the will of the Minister and serves only during the pleasure of the Executive Government. I do not intend to go into that question again. I dealt with it on the Second Reading of the Bill. I do want to say that it is a bad precedent for this House to establish, that it is a bad precedent to scrap what was really intended as a judicial procedure, and go to the opposite extreme of setting up in its stead the arbitrary will of a referee. I want again to register my emphatic protest against this. It is a type of precedent and of legislation that every free-minded citizen and every Deputy should reprobate and resist with all the strength at his command. The other unsatisfactory feature of the section is that, while scrapping that machinery, the Minister in Sections 5 and 7 proceeds to refine what he means in sub-sections (3), (4) and (5). He proceeds to amend the original Act, and in sub-sections (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7), and paragraphs (a) and (b) refines what is meant in certain cases. The position is that you have a refinement within a refinement and an amendment within an amendment. That is an extraordinary type of legislation, and to the ordinary citizen and Deputy it must appear very confusing.
As regards the arbitrary date fixed in the Bill, we asked the Minister to agree to an alternative date. The majority of our amendments suggested that the date should be the date of the passing of the Act. I do not know what the Minister would have to fear from a provision of that kind. A very short period will elapse until this Bill becomes law, and I doubt that in the meantime very many cases can come before the courts. Moreover, the Minister is taking very good care in a later amendment to ensure that if any cases come before the courts the costs, so far as the applicants are concerned, will have to be met by the applicants themselves. Therefore, the argument put forward in favour of this section falls to the ground. We were told that we would have multitudinous applications to the courts for conditional orders and that these would involve the State in enormous cost. In the first place, the Minister is taking good care to ensure that that will not happen. Where the rights of a body of citizens such as the men we are concerned with here are in question, of men who gave their services voluntarily to the country and who risked their lives in difficult and troubled days, the cost should not count. The services that they rendered could not be measured in terms of money even if the cost were £5,000 or £10,000. If that is the only reason that the Minister can put forward for denying those men their rights, then we must say that we have reached a deplorable position in this country: that for a mere matter of £10,000 or £5,000 those men are to be denied their rights— rights which were given to them by this House and by the present Government Party. Finally, I ask the Minister to consider the cases that may be put up to him, where applications were made to the courts and conditional orders were made but where, through no fault of the applicants, the conditional orders were not confirmed.
Deputy Bennett has already mentioned three cases. I do not think there are many more cases of the kind, but in the particular cases he mentioned, conditional orders were obtained, and now the applicants concerned, through no fault of their own, find themselves without any means of redress. Those cases go back as far as 1943; they do not come within the terms of this Order and, accordingly, I would ask the Minister that in any case of that kind which comes to his notice—and I think he has full power to deal with such cases under Section 3—he will deal with them sympathetically, because, I feel that if we were to do so, it would take a great deal of the sting out of this thing, so far as these people are concerned at the moment.
