I move amendment No. 13:—
In page 9, to delete lines 29 to 31, inclusive.
The purpose of this amendment is to delete sub-section (4) of Section 27. Sub-section (4) of Section 27 appears to make provision for the very unlikely development that a person convicted for a second offence under this Bill shall not have available to him the benefits of the Probation of Offenders Act. At first glance, that would appear to be a most reasonable provision, but I would ask the House to pause and reconsider this matter. It is highly unlikely that any rational district justice would apply the Probation of Offenders Act to a person who had, in fact, been convicted once before. All of us, however, who had any experience of the effort to provide mandatory penalties in legislation, have discovered from experience that it does not work. If you take away from the presiding judge the discretion to deal with each case on its merits, sooner or later, you will come up against some extraordinary case where you will bitterly regret having withdrawn the discretion originally there.
I am sure the Minister has had that experience himself. I certainly had it. The number of times I have laid down an absolute rule that in no circumstances whatever is any file to be put on my desk suggesting that a penalty in regard to a fishery offence should be remitted on compassionate grounds, is legion. I have never given such a direction, but some case turned up subsequently in which I was prepared to revise my views and say: "Here are circumstances I had never contemplated, never envisaged, in which I would be wrong if I allowed the natural inclination towards maintaining consistency to deter me from altering my original decision in order to see substantial justice done."
Can I persuade the House that sub-section (4) of this section is providing for a most unlikely contingency, but the very fact that it seeks to do that appears to me to withdraw from the district justice a most necessary discretion, because if circumstances ever arise that would bring into the district justice's mind the thought of giving a second offender the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, then the assumption is they are circumstances of the most exceptional character.
Let us not try to protect C.I.E. by grinding in the dirt some insignificant individual who, because the discretion has been taken from the district justice, has a penalty visited upon him, which in the eyes of justice, tempered by prudent mercy, should not be visited upon him. We are all inclined in this House to take a general view that I have heard leading members of the Government express, that you cannot have omelettes without breaking eggs. I am always thinking of the egg. If we do our duty in this House, it is with the egg we ought to be preoccupied. The strong, the organised and the vested interests can all defend themselves. It is the insignificant person who gets caught in the machine of the law who requires our solicitude as members of the House. All of us will agree that the institution of the Probation of Offenders Act was a great reform in the administration of the law. I want to urge on the House that you could not find a more inappropriate place wherein to withdraw the protection of that Act from the insignificant and weak than a Transport Bill, simply because we have an idea that we want to make the law more watertight than it has been heretofore in regard to illegal haulage.
I bespeak the solicitude of Deputies on all sides of the House for the person appearing before a district justice—a person once convicted and now charged again, but whose circumstances are so exceptional and extraordinary that the district justice wants to give him the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act. I ask Deputies to consider the circumstances in which that possibility can arise and to decide that in the rare case where such circumstances do present themselves, the district justice shall not be stripped of his discretion in this matter and forced by an Act of this House to do something he believes, as an independent judge, is not justice, but which he must do because we have made it mandatory upon him to do it, even against his better judgment as a justice.