I should like to clarify the position in relation to our amendment in view of some of the statements following upon Deputy McQuillan's opening remarks. First of all, in reply to the Taoiseach's suggestion that opposition to this Bill is an attempt at exploiting a situation in order to make the Government unpopular, let me point out immediately that Governments have on occasion to do unpopular things, but it does not follow from that that, because one speaks for the purpose of airing what one believes to be public opinion on certain matters, one is necessarily attempting thereby to embarrass the Government. Indeed, had the Taoiseach given a little thought to the amendment, he would have found that, were he to accept the amendment, he would save himself and his Government very considerable embarrassment, since the recommendation to increase judicial salaries following upon the appointment of an independent committee of this House would be a recommendation by both sides of the House. The Government would thereby be saved both the embarrassment and the political odium to which the Taoiseach feels opposition to this Bill may possibly give rise since we would all be jointly responsible for the decision taken.
It is because we fully appreciate that this question of assessing the proper remuneration for persons in these exalted positions in our society is so important that we believe we are not competent to say whether £4,000, £3,000, £1,500 or £2,000 is adequate compensation for the varying scales of responsibility which fall upon the shoulders of the different members of the Judiciary. Secondly, if an increase is necessary, we do not feel competent to decide that a two per cent., an eight per cent. or a ten per cent. increase is desirable over all, or whether the percentage should be varied in such a way that those on the lower scales would receive a higher percentage and those on the higher scales a lower percentage.
There are many considerations into which a committee of this House could usefully examine, with all the facts at their disposal, in order to reach an equitable decision. When people say the members of the Judiciary are overpaid, they should remember that there are members in the lower categories of the Judiciary who are only moderately well paid by present day standards. To condemn the whole Judiciary because one section appears to be overpaid is, in my opinion, being unnecessarily extravagant and, to a certain extent, a little irresponsible. Despite Deputy McGilligan's comments, I still feel that the precedent established—a precedent which appears to have satisfied the House on a former occasion, and the Judiciary likewise— is a good precedent, and a wise precedent. As I have already pointed out, I believe its adoption now would save the Government considerable embarrassment and, for that reason, it should recommend itself to the Government.
Like Deputy Lindsay, I found the Taoiseach's intervention, far from clarifying the position, only succeeded in making confusion worse confounded. I cannot accept the proposition that there is a section in our society who must be paid to stay honest. I do not say those are the exact words used by the Taoiseach, but that was the implication. He implied that, in order to maintain the independence of the Judiciary, it is imperative that they should be paid at a particularly high level. I do not accept that point of view. There is some basic morality in all of us which determines our interpretation of what is right and what is wrong. We do not become incorruptible because of a particular salary. If that principle were accepted, surely it should apply right down throughout every section of our community.
Consider the position of the Garda. They are in a very vulnerable position. They are the custodians of law and order. As compared with the salaries paid for similar work elsewhere, they have perhaps a greater grievance than have the members of the Judiciary. From that point of view and from the point of view of their vulnerability to corruption, or their being prevailed on to indulge in dishonest practices, they are in a much worse position. I do not think the case made in that regard is a valid one.
My remarks would apply equally to higher civil servants, who have very responsible functions to perform; to politicians, who have very grave responsibilities and very important functions in the State; to Cabinet Ministers; and, in particular, to the Taoiseach himself. All these sections in our society could justify the payment to them of fabulous salaries on foot of the argument advanced by the Taoiseach that, if the Judiciary are not extremely well paid, they will not remain honest. I join with Deputy Lindsay in dismissing that case made on behalf of the Judiciary, It is one which does an injustice to the Judiciary. I believe they are just as likely to remain honest and conscientious in the discharge of their functions without any increase in remuneration.
I cannot join with the Taoiseach in the case he makes that, because of the greater remuneration paid in Northern Ireland and Great Britain, there is necessarily a case for increasing the pay of our Judiciary here. That argument could equally well apply to every single section that goes to make up our society. It could apply with the greatest force perhaps to that section in which I am particularly interested, the old age pensioners, the unemployment benefit and unemployment assistance classes, and all the other classes dependent upon social services. These are at a disadvantage compared with their counterparts elsewhere. I do not think that argument helps the Taoiseach's case at all.
The Taoiseach suggested that there is no relationship between the attitude we should adopt to these people and the attitude to be adopted in relation to the higher civil servants. Now, Deputy McQuillan did not introduce that comparison of his own accord. He introduced it because it was first introduced by the Judiciary themselves in their submission to the Commission in 1953. On page 11, they set out the different scales of salary for the various higher civil servants, chairman of the Revenue Commissioners, various secretaries of Departments, the secretariat and so on, so the comparison has been made by the judges themselves.
We believe it is relevant and we also believe it is permissible to compare these people. On the general question of conciliation, we do not see why it should not be adopted. It is a good practice; it is a fair practice; it is one which leaves no feeling of discontent in the mind of anybody, whether agricultural workers, rural workers, salaried workers, civil servants or whatever they may be. So long as they feel there was a fair examination of their claim for increased remuneration, then everybody is satisfied, including, and most important, the public who will have to foot the bill. Consequently, we believe the precedent already established is a good precedent and one to which the Government should continue to adhere.
On the question of the other point made by Deputy McQuillan with regard to the conditions of appointment and the facilitating of a committee to investigate those conditions, he became rather—heated is not the right word —concerned about this whole problem of the appointment of the members of the Judiciary. He seeks to break away from the sacrosanct principle that the Judiciary must be appointed by the Government. There may be a case for the continuation of the system whereby the members of the Judiciary are appointed by the Government, but I do not believe there is anything really sacrosanct about such a conception of appointment. It seems to me that the slogan that they must be the supreme authority and that the Judiciary must be ensured of independence of the Government is one of those phrases which people have accepted from generation to generation without any very deep thought or examination. It is rather like the idea which was accepted at one time of the divine right of kings. Those slogans were not examined to see if they had any real validity.
There may be a case for the retention of the present system, but I do not think that the suggestion that it ensures the independence of the Judiciary is correct. I think the contrary is true, although I should like to make it quite clear that I join with other Deputies in believing that the Judiciary have been independent of successive Governments. I do not think it necessarily follows, or need necessarily follow, that because the Government choose a member of the Judiciary, he is independent of the Government. That does not follow at all and, on the contrary, indeed a member of the Judiciary who may have been appointed by a particular Government may have less reason for feeling independent of that Government which appointed him particularly if he happens to have been closely affiliated as a political colleague with the men who appointed him, prior to his appointment.
I suggest, if that is the case the Taoiseach makes for the retention of the present system, it is not a valid case. It would be wise to examine the position in the light of the fact that there is some public disquiet that the making of appointments to the Judiciary appears to be solely determined by the amount of political service and the quality of the political service rendered by the appointee before the Government came into office. Whether or not the Taoiseach is prepared to face up to that, the Minister should be prepared to do so. That is a generally accepted belief amongst members of the public and it is no good pretending that is not so.
I should like to reiterate the two points we have made in our amendment. The precedent already established should be repeated. The Taoiseach asks: why single out the Judiciary? We are with the Taoiseach in that question: why single out the Judiciary for special treatment? We have no hesitation in saying that if a joint committee of this House goes into the case made by the members of the Judiciary for an increase in salary, and if, as the Taoiseach suggested, instead of 10 per cent., the increase recommended by the joint committee were 15 per cent.—I do not agree that it would be; I doubt if it would be 10 per cent., but if it were 15 per cent.—we are prepared to abide by that decision because it would be the judicially considered view of persons able to examine all the facts and come to, what we can and must accept, as the decision of our colleagues, as a fair, just and equitable decision on the facts as they had them before them.
On the second point about the assessment of the conditions of appointment of the Judiciary, I do not think a case has been made by the Taoiseach for the retention of the present system. If he really wanted to satisfy the public, he would allow a special committee to examine the whole question. If that committee reported back to this House that there is no better alternative to the existing situation, then we would readily accept their decision.