I think it would be well worth while, even though the moth might be under the handicap of trying to consume some of the material already in stock. I was very glad to hear the Minister's reference to civil defence. To my mind at least it shows it is an effort to end the sabotage by people who say that we cannot defend ourselves against an all-out nuclear attack. That is so obvious that people think there is no business in civil defence. I think the Minister put his finger on the weakness of that argument by pointing out that we are not providing for defence against all-out nuclear attack on this country, certainly on the Republic, but for the after-effects—the nuclear fall-out of an attack on our neighbours. I think that makes sense of the whole procedure of civil defence and that explains why there is no frantic excitement being made about providing deep shelters and all that sort of thing in defence against all-out nuclear attacks.
There is no conceivable danger that anybody will make a nuclear attack on us, but in view of the fact that accuracy of direction of intercontinental missiles is still somewhat problematical there is the danger of the after-effects and we must be prepared to defend ourselves against those. That is where an observer corps would be valuable. They would immediately size up the dangers and warn and prepare the population as to what measures they should take to protect themselves from radioactive fall-out.
I find myself in agreement with Deputy Esmonde's comment on the Naval Service under subhead P.2 of the Estimate. As I said last year, I still feel that the whole concept is wrong in describing this as a Naval Service. I was rather horrified last year to hear the proposal that the senior officer of the Naval Service was given the opportunity of going on naval manoeuvres with a United States naval squadron. That experiment did not come off for various reasons. At the same time it shows a complete misconception of what this branch of the Defence Forces is intended to do.
We have no need for a proper navy. We have no far-flung dominions with whom we have to keep in contact by means of heavily-protected convoys and so on. All we have to do is to protect our fisheries. That is quite a big enough job but it is not a job for a navy. Here again I would hope there would be some new thinking on this whole question. I am not at all impressed with the idea of purchasing a new vessel for naval training. It would be far better to purchase modern small craft of the type of the motor torpedo boat. They would not need to be equipped with torpedoes; they would be simply fast motor launches designed for operating in the open sea and which could give very quick and effective protection to our fishing grounds at vastly less expense than the maintenance of three corvettes and a complete shipyard to look after them.
The maintenance of these three vessels is far too expensive and is bound to become even more expensive as the vessels get older. Smaller motor launches would need fewer crew members, fewer shore staff and would involve much lower maintenance costs. I would hope we would look at this in a realistic way and say we do not want a Naval Service, that we want fishery protection. This could be achieved by something in the nature of a small corps of marines who could co-operate with the Army in matters of landing troops on coastlines, taking them off or helping with river crossings, and so on. In that way the seagoing branch of the Defence Forces could be more closely integrated with other services of the land forces.
The provision for the Reserve Forces under Subhead Y.I. also gives me reason for considerable concern. The position in relation to the Reserve of Officers, First Line, is reasonably satisfactory but the Reserve of Men makes provision for almost 1,000 fewer men than last year. In addition, the total provision is £65,000 but there is a deduction of £36,000 in respect of non-attendance at annual training, that is, a reduction of over one half. If you have a Reserve of Men of not quite 3,000 men and do not expect half of them to attend for annual training, I fail to see the value of that reserve at all. The position in regard to officers is considerably better, possibly because they are better paid. The Reserve of Men deserves very careful review to see whether it is serving any useful purpose or whether or not it could be improved.
With regard to the F.C.A., I must be even more drastic. The total provision there is over half a million pounds, £562,000; yet there is a deduction from that of £140,000 in respect of non-attendance at annual training, a reduction of 25 per cent. We should be making provision for a force of 22,000 this year as against 21,000 men last year but, if there is a very poor attendance at annual training, there is tremendous waste of money there. For those who actually do attend that annual training, no praise could be too high. When I was on holidays in Donegal last year I spent two afternoons with the F.C.A. at Finner and I was greatly impressed by the keenness and enthusiasm of all ranks of the F.C.A. What impressed me more than anything else was the amount of training which was being carried out by F.C.A. officers and N.C.Os of their own men. At the same time there was a very large number of regular Army personnel training as well.
It was only afterwards I began to ask myself what were these men actually training for. They were being exercised in modern weapons but I could not for the life of me see whom they were going to fight. I saw one field exercise which took me back to the volunteer force of pre-war days where the situation was exactly the same—a simulated situation of an enemy invader moving up the valley whom we were trying to repulse, an unreal situation which could not possibly arise any more because there is not the slightest possibility of a land force trying to invade us, within our lifetime anyway. For that reason it seems to me that a great deal of money is being spent for which there is no reasonable return.
I was glad to see a report which is not mentioned in the Estimate but which I assume is accurate, that a considerable quantity of old guns and ammunition is now being disposed of to some unmentioned destination. I am not curious as to where it is going but if we got 2d. for it I still feel it was an extremely worthwhile sale, I am convinced there is a tremendous amount of obsolete and unnecessary equipment in the Army which is probably being carefully cleaned, oiled and maintained though it is of no further use. I would hope that more of this obsolete stuff could be disposed of at any price.
There is no mention in the Estimate at all of any payment in respect of the operation in the Congo except, curiously enough, a provision for allowances for chaplains. I presume that the only overseas allowance payable to chaplains is in respect of chaplains serving with troops serving under the United Nations but there is no reference to any overseas allowance to officers, N.C.Os and men and no reference to any repayment by United Nations in that connection.
Many of us would like to have further information from the Minister as to exactly how this operation is financed. The Minister did make reference today to the fact that there would be a reduction in the amount of money spent on feeding the troops who were now in the Congo, as these were now the responsibility of United Nations and not of this country, but I certainly would like to know who bears the cost of the ordinary pay. I assume that we still pay our officers, N.C.Os and men at the normal rate, but who pays the overseas allowance which has now been granted? Is that entirely paid by United Nations or have we any responsibility at all in that regard? If it is paid entirely by United Nations, we are due some explanation as to the niggardly way in which this overseas allowance was paid initially. It was paid at a very low rate, a rate which my information is was far below that paid to any other troops serving in the United Nations. If the entire amount is defrayed by United Nations our men should have been paid very much more and very much earlier.
As before, I am still seeking for a general statement of our defence policy. The only statement we have got in recent years was from the Minister who stated that the general policy was to produce a force to defend this country against invasion. As I said before, I feel that this contention is entirely ludicrous, that there is not the slightest chance in the world of anyone invading this country any more. Previously we were of considerable strategic importance so far as Britain was concerned but now, with long range weapons, we have lost any strategic or even tactical significance whatever.
It is time that we reconsidered the whole matter and had a debate at some period on what our defence policy should be, what the main purpose of the Army should be. Is it purely in support of the civil power or if it is trying to defend us or preparing to defend us against something, against what are we being defended? My own view is that its main purpose would be in aid of the civil power but at least as important as that nowadays is its responsibility for complying with the requests of United Nations in times of trouble or unrest in other countries.
In 1958 I made reference in the debate on the Estimate for the Department of Defence to the possibility of officers serving as observers with United Nations in other countries. I am sorry to say that no particular notice was taken of my reference in that regard. There was rather a flurry then when we were asked to send officers to the Lebanon. That was done and well done. In 1959, that is two years ago exactly, I referred to what had happened and forecast that it would not be very long before the United Nations would call on us to send troops under arms to serve with United Nations forces. Then, again, I am afraid nobody paid any particular attention to me. Possibly, I annoyed somebody about it but I felt very deeply about it and in actual fact it came true. Troops had to be found.
That brings us to a general consideration of the whole Congo operation. Much appreciation has been expressed of this operation and the way in which it was handled. Everybody said how magnificent it was. I should like to say quite categorically that I regard that whole Congo operation as nothing more or less than a masterpiece of improvisation with very few signs of proper advance preparation at all. There was no real pre-planning, no real previous appreciation of such a situation. It is only because the Army has always been a master of improvisation that that operation succeeded at all.
We were never given the equipment we wanted in the Army. It was not purely a question of money but we always had to make do. That, I suppose, has always been the tradition right from the start of the War of Independence but I think we have carried it a bit too far. I think the Congo operation should have been a triumph of organisation instead of of improvisation only. To my mind it was absolutely tragic that when the request came to us to send troops to the Congo at once we had no legislation to enable us to do it and we had no body of troops anyway. We could not send one battalion of troops anyway because there was not one single battalion in the Army which was ready and prepared to move. So, a perfectly horrible compromise was adopted of a hotch-potch mixture of isolated individuals from all over the country and it was called a battalion.
The officer placed in charge of that battalion, the 32nd Battalion, was not even a battalion commander himself when he was appointed to this office. No serving battalion commander was given command of the 32nd Battalion going abroad. The same applies to the 33rd and 34th Battalions. It is a horrible reflection on those who are at present serving as battalion commanders that they were overlooked or else found not sufficiently well qualified to take command of a battalion in the field.
This Congo operation was a dangerous enough operation for any force, however well equipped and however well prepared, because the troops were going into a situation which was full of uncertainty. Into that positively horrible chaos we sent a body of fine men very few of whom knew one another at all or had served with one another before. The battalion commander was commanding a battalion which he did not know and he had a battalion staff which he did not know. He had officers serving under him, some at least of whom he had never met before and some of the officers had never met their commanding officer before. The officers had never met their N.C.Os before and in many cases the N.C.Os had never met their men before. It was a mixture of infantry, signals, engineers and everything else. How that hotch-potch of a unit held together and served so magnificently is something which I do not think anyone will ever know. It reflects the greatest credit on the inherent discipline and enthusiasm of all involved but it is a perfectly fearful risk to take to send out a unit in that way.
I have no hesitation in saying that no battalion should be sent abroad on a mission anything like this without at least six months collective training, six months of shaking down and getting to know one another. Our lads got no previous training together at all except, maybe, a week or two at company level. They met one another at the Curragh for a period of a few days during which time they were being inoculated and indoctrinated at such a rate that they hardly had time to know what was going on.
Out of this curious hotch-potch three magnificent units have been formed. The 32nd and 33rd Battalions both managed to do extraordinarily well and both managed to build up a very real esprit de corps which is invaluable. I was excited and thrilled to find such a thing happening because it is something for which we have looked so long. Now we have three battalions with active service experience, composed of men who have soldiered together to some extent and shared hardship and danger. Two of these battalions came back and what a tragedy it was that these two were allowed to disband and disappear. What a tragedy it was to hear the commanding officer of one battalion say: “I saw my battalion only once on the Curragh before we went. I have never seen them as a battalion since and now they are gone.” Why on earth was that magnificent unit broken up?
I appealed two years ago for the formation of units in preparation for an occasion such as this and I feel now that they should have been kept together. The 34th Battalion is serving out there now and the Minister has made no reference to any provision being made for their release when their six months period comes to an end. The relief battalion should now be fully formed and in full training. If its formation and training are to be left to a week or a month before its departure, we will be doing a bad day's work. We got caught out quite unnecessarily in the past, but we have plenty of notice now that one other battalion, at least, will be required and needed by General MacKeown in his position as Commander of the United Nations Force.
I would appeal to the Minister to take that decision here and now and to get that battalion, the 35th Battalion or whatever the Army authorities may decide to call it, formed up and ready, so that the officers, N.C.Os and men can be thoroughly prepared for the onerous duties ahead of them, so that they can get to know each other, and so that they can be out on training together and see how they react to the hardships and all the trials which active service may involve.
This, to my mind, should be the Army's finest hour and it has signally failed to be so. One of the most disappointing things is the virtually complete failure of the recruiting campaign. It has made no impact on me and the only thing which has made any impact on me is the magnificent advertisement by the Irish Assurance Company Limited which makes a magnificent recruiting poster. It was published in all the daily newspapers by the Irish Assurance Company. It was a magnificent photograph of Irish troops moving off to their service with a very good piece of writing underneath it, describing just one isolated incident in the experiences of our troops in the Congo.
The Minister said in reply to a Question that about £600 was spent on the recruiting campaign. I know, as a businessman, that £600 spent on advertising gets nobody anywhere. If you want a recruiting campaign with an impact on the public mind, you will have to spend at least £6,000. It is no use employing amateurs to do it. I have no knowledge of the business but I could see that whoever designed the advertisement of the Irish Assurance Company was no amateur. He did a good professional job. Those are the sorts of people who should be assigned to publicising a recruiting campaign.
It is tragic that the troops who have had service overseas are now back with their units again. I should have hoped that the two battalions would have been reformed and sent in company strength to various centres of population in the country to give demonstrations so as to lend power to a general recruiting drive. It would have made a big impact on our young men. A simple notice posted in a Garda station or church to the effect that there will be a recruiting meeting in room 107 in the barracks is not sufficient. By the time the fellow has found the room in the barracks, he will be so depressed and discouraged that he will not want to join the Army. It has to be done with glamour and if it had been handled properly, there would be thousands of recruits now.
Unless we face up to the situation, we will be in the position of having sent out the Chief of Staff of our Army to do a difficult and dangerous task and then having to tell him that we have no soldiers to serve with him. Our troops are ideal for this sort of duty. They have done wonders and it is miraculous that the casualties were so slight. It is a great credit to all concerned that they carried out their duties with comparative freedom from casualties.
I feel it is essential that better training be given to our men before they are sent out. They were sent out on the first occasion after long periods of barrack and garrison duty. I was disappointed, when I went to see them off at Baldonnel, to notice that while they looked reasonably fit, they did not look fighting fit. That condition of training can only be achieved by real active service training.
One of the things which has saddened me is that fact that casualties have occurred through the accidental discharge of firearms. In previous years I have always stressed the value of more realistic battle training. I am afraid our troops were sent out to the Congo without ever having used ball ammunition except at firing practice or on sentry duty. It does take a period of getting used to, having ball ammunition and live grenades at your hand all the time. The fact is that those men were sent into a situation in which they were under considerable strain and in which they have accidentally discharged firearms and caused casualties amongst their comrades.
I suppose a certain amount of that is inevitable but there has been too much of it, as far as our lads are concerned. If they were properly acquainted with their weapons and were accustomed to having their weapons loaded at all times, these accidents would not have occurred. In particular, I think training in the use of the Gustav submachine gun is not sufficient as far as other ranks are concerned. The Gustav is an extraordinarily efficient but extraordinarily dangerous weapon. As soon as it is cocked it is dangerous and there is no safety catch. In the conditions in which our men are operating it is only reasonable that very frequently they would have not only a fully-loaded magazine on the gun but that in a moment of anxiety they would cock the gun. It is then quite a job to release the bolt in such a way that the gun is not discharged. Up to this I gather that training in the Gustav submachine gun has been rather restricted but we find now that practically all our men serving overseas are armed with this weapon and it is this weapon that has caused some of the damage among our own men.
Therefore, I make a further appeal to the Minister to give maximum encouragement to full-scale active-service battle training for all our troops and particularly for those who may be about to serve overseas.
Much more money could be spent on the Army; the only trouble is where to get it and I fear I am being forced more and more towards the conclusion that the one way in which we can save considerably on this Estimate would be to abandon the F.C.A. and the Slua Muirí. I say that with considerable reluctance because they are a fine body of men and they serve with great enthusiasm, but I say it because I cannot honestly see what these men are being trained to do. I see no way in which they can be called upon to use the training which they are being given. Not only is well over half a million pounds being spent on the F.C.A. directly but a tremendous amount is being spent indirectly under other subheads of the Estimate such as motor transport and petrol. Never again, so far as we can see, will we require to increase the size of our regular Army in order to provide for our defence against land forces. That just cannot happen any more and the F.C.A. is no help to the Army in its efforts to provide troops for service with the United Nations overseas.
I know some people say it is very good that these young men should be kept out of trouble and given something useful to do and that it is a valuable social service to give them this military training. There is something in that but not much and I should prefer that if we are going to do social work under the heading of the Department of Defence it should be concentrated on physical training. There is real value in physical training, athletics, sports and so on. It would be of real value to young men to get professional assistance in that way. Some is given in the F.C.A., but I cannot see the point of having aiming practice with rifles, Vickers guns, Gustavs, Bren guns and so on, which these men will never use. That is not merely a pious hope. Therefore, I am seriously advocating complete abandonment of the F.C.A. I appeal again for a general realistic appreciation of the world situation because I think our defence policy is something that must be realistic and at present is not. I appeal for an Army properly equipped and organised for active service.
At the moment I reckon that we have about 20 per cent. of our troops suitable for active service already overseas. Previously when the whole of the 9th Brigade were out, it was about 40 per cent. For about five months 40 per cent. of our effective troops were overseas and for about a week or so 60 per cent. of them were out of the country. Yet the whole Army is still organised on a peacetime basis although a very large percentage of its effective troops are already on active service. It is time that we faced up to this and put the whole Army on an active service basis. The whole organisation—infantry battalions, field companies and the various corps of the services—is obviously quite out of date and quite inapplicable to present circumstances. We should have a proper mixed battalion formed and ready now for Army service overseas. Immediately that is despatched we should get ready the next one and there should be competition for selection for that special unit.
I appeal, as I have done before, for a reduction in the number of barracks. We are still spending too much time on maintenance of barracks that are out of date and depressing and a great strain on resources, from the maintenance viewpoint. They are horrible places in which to live however clean they may be. They are depressing and very often damp, and they are so old that maintenance costs are enormous.
Above all, I would ask for more realistic Army training for the regular Army so that they should be cut clean away from ordinary barrack duties and kept on active service, training hard under active-service conditions, getting them to fire ball ammunition not just on ranges but out in the countryside, up in Kilbride and other places where there are Army lands available, where they can be trained in endurance techniques with long periods without food, without sleep and really made to realise the sort of situation in which they may be placed at short notice. At the moment we are living in a sort of fool's paradise and if we are going to send out any more troops in the hotch-potch way in which it was done in the past I think we are taking a terrible risk which is quite unjustifiable.
There are many obstacles in the way of complete Army reorganisation. There are tremendous vested interests, the battalion commanders who do not want to lose their battalions, commanders of field companies who do not want to lose their commands and so on, but what is at stake is the lives of our men. It is impossible to say why the Niemba ambush really took place but probably the main reason was that probably our men had so often succeeded in making friends with these unfortunate tribesmen that they were a little off their guard for once. It speaks volumes for their kindliness that they erred on the dangerous side in that way but we must not allow a unit to go out unprepared again. We have had a great amount of luck in suffering so few casualties but that situation may not last. If our troops are to become involved in more active operations than mere patrolling and guarding of various keypoints they will need all the training we can give them before they go. In concluding, I must say how glad I am to know that the 32nd and 33rd Battalions are being reformed for the purpose of taking part in a parade through the city.
May I say, as I said last year, that I still feel that Easter Sunday is primarily a feast of the Church and should not be devoted to an Army parade. It shows mental laziness on our part that we devote Easter Sunday to this. We do not want to give up St. Patrick's Day to an Army parade. We do not want to give up Easter Monday. We take the easy way out and have it on Easter Sunday. Having it on Easter Sunday offends me. I shall be in church when that parade is taking place and I shall not see it. I shall be very sorry to miss it. I do not wish to ruin anyone else's bank holiday, but surely we could have this parade on a weekday? The traffic could be blocked for once, if necessary.
I shall be delighted to see these battalions reformed, even for one day. Would the Minister and the authorities consider, when they have these men together, keeping them together a bit longer and using them for recruiting and perhaps the basis of the next battalion to go out? That would be a good day's work. Do not let us have the same situation that we had the last time. Do not let us have five men here and ten men there, a few signallers and a few engineers, an infantry officer in charge of N.C.Os and men out of other groups. That is awkward. It is irritating. At times it can be fatally dangerous. We have had an opportunity of learning and I hope that our experience will be put to good effect. Let us have another battalion formed and trained and ready. Let it be well trained, realistically trained, so that it will not only discharge its duties against those who may oppose it but also reduce the danger of casualties occurring through lack of experience in the handling of every type of ammunition.
