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Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 28 Oct 1969

Vol. 241 No. 11

Committee on Finance. - Vote 45: External Affairs.

I move:

That a sum not exceeding £1,085,000 be granted to defray the charge which will come in course of payment during the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1970, for the salaries and expenses of the Office of the Minister for External Affairs and of certain services administered by that Office, including a grant-in-aid.

With your permission, a Cheann Comhairle, I propose to take the Estimates for External Affairs and International Co-operation together.

The Estimate for External Affairs at £1,085,000 represents a net increase of £67,000 over the Estimate for 1968-69, including supplementaries. The amount required for salaries and allowances is increased by £48,500; the provision for travelling and incidental expenses is up by £11,000. The other expenditure subheads show lesser variations and the receipts under Appropriations-in-Aid are expected to be £5,430 less than last year's.

The increase of £48,500 in the salary subhead, which is about six per cent of last year's provision, is due to normal departmental expansion and pay increases of staff, both home-based and locally recruited abroad. It has proved necessary to include an extra sum of £11,000 under subhead B—Travelling and Incidental Expenses—in order to meet the continuing increase in the cost of services provided for in this subhead. Charges for postage, telephone and telegraph services continue to rise with increasing commitments, as also does the incidence of foreign travel.

The amounts included for cultural relations with other countries and for information services show small increases. They are still relatively modest provisions and are at what I regard as the lowest level necessary to maintain any sort of reasonable programme for cultural activities and information services.

It was expected that the amount required for repatriation and maintenance of destitute Irish persons abroad would be £4,000 as against £6,750 last year. It now seems, however, that the level of advances in the current year may be as much as £7,000; but if that is the case there will be a corresponding increase in the repayment of these advances under subhead G—Appropriations-in-Aid. The reduction of £5,430 shown in subhead G is due largely to a reduction earlier anticipated in the repayment of repatriation and maintenance advances.

The Estimate for International Co-operation for 1969-70 is for £290,000 and is £29,000 more than last year's £22,000 of the additional amount required arises from increased contributions pledged to the United Nations Voluntary Agencies. Increases are also shown in our contributions towards the expenses of the Council of Europe, the OECD and the United Nations. These increases reflect the rise in the operational expenses of the organisations.

At the outset I should say that as I spoke on the North of Ireland situation in last week's debate I shall not deal with it in this speech. In the major areas of tension and conflict in the world, the record over the last year and a half, since the Estimates of this Department were last discussed in Dáil Éireann, has been sombre and discouraging. The United Nations Secretary-General in submitting his recent annual report to the organisation stated that it was clear to him that he could report very little progress in the world at large towards the goals of the United Nations Charter—to maintain international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations and achieve international co-operation. Moreover, the Secretary-General remarked that he had a strong feeling that time is running out.

In the period under review we have witnessed the violation of international law and human rights in the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia; in the Middle East the situation has steadily deteriorated with an ever-increasing frequency of raids and reprisals on both sides; in South East Asia, although peace talks have been in progress now for over a year, the war in Vietnam still seems interminably to drag on and there has been no progress on the basic issues which must be solved before real peace can begin to be rebuilt in the whole area. In the far-East the rulers of Communist China continue segregated from the rest of the international community. In Latin America there has been constant political tension and in the continent of Africa there are the running sores of colonial oppression and apartheid in South Africa and the disastrous conflict in Nigeria.

These problems are aggravated by the widening economic gap between the rich countries and the poor. And over all our heads the nuclear arms race still hangs as a continuous menace and a potential means of universal destruction. It is scarcely to be wondered at that throughout the world the young are rebelling against the principles and the methods of the preceding generation in the conduct of international affairs when they consider that, despite brilliant scientific discoveries and technological achievement, mankind has made little progress in implementing the universally acknowledged primary goal of achieving justice and peace among men. On most of the major issues I have mentioned, the policy of the Government is well known. In the community of nations, Ireland is a small country with correspondingly small resources and influence, but we can exercise a certain moral suasion for peace which has a useful though limited effect. Our international position is strengthened both by our own past history as a nation and by our firm commitment to the principles of the United Nations Charter. We have demonstrated this commitment by the record of the Government's policies at the United Nations over the years and we have proved it in a practical way through our participation in United Nations peace-keeping in many parts of the world over the last decade.

I do not propose to enter into a detailed exposition of all the major areas of international political relations with which my Department have been concerned over the past year and a half; instead I will confine myself to a brief survey of the Government's position as regards the following: the European Economic Community, the Nigeria/Biafra problem, the question of disarmament and our role in United Nations peace-keeping.

The House will be aware that the question of enlargement of the European Communities by the admission of new countries, including Ireland, has again become a live issue. The talks I had last July with representatives of some of the member Governments and with the EEC Commission indicated that a decision to open negotiations with the applicant countries could be taken before long. I have received the same impression from the discussions I was able to have in New York with Ministers of the Six and the applicant countries, and from the reports of my Department's Missions in Europe. Every effort is accordingly being made here at home to ensure our readiness for negotiations should these become a reality in the fairly near future.

While the prospects for negotiations now seem brighter, I would, nevertheless, hesitate to predict how soon they are likely to commence. The Common Market is at present faced with a number of formidable internal problems on some of which at least progress will apparently have to be made before negotiations could start. If the member countries of the EEC should find themselves unable to reach agreement on some of these fundamental problems in the coming months, then there is room for doubt as to whether it will be possible to set an early date for negotiations with the applicants.

A foremost objective for us in the negotiations when they do commence will be to ensure that they lead to our accession simultaneously with the other applicants, particularly Britain. Earlier this year there was a suggestion that enlargement should take place by stages, with Great Britain admitted to membership in advance of the other applicants. I do not have to tell the House of the grave consequences this would have for us in view of our close trading links with Britain. It was largely my serious concern at this suggestion that prompted me to seek meetings last July with the Foreign Ministers of Belgium and the Netherlands, and the President of the EEC Commission and with the French Foreign Minister in New York last month. Fortunately, the idea of a Community of Seven now seems to have been abandoned but, nevertheless, I intend to have the situation carefully watched.

The hopes of the applicant countries are now fixed on the summit conference of the EEC member States, which is to take place in The Hague on 17th and 18th November. This meeting could well prove of historic significance for the future of Europe if it leads to the opening of negotiations on the four membership applications, thus giving a new impetus to Europe's aspirations and resuming the movement towards the goals set by those who framed the Treaty of Rome. Even if our hopes in the outcome of the summit conference are not fully realised, I am, nevertheless, convinced from the different discussions I have had that the great fund of goodwill and the self-interest of the member Governments must, sooner rather than later, surmount the obstacles to enlargement of the communities.

At the Hague Conference the heads of state and government of the six will no doubt be greatly assisted in their deliberations by the commission's updated opinion of the 1st October on the question of enlargement. It is appropriate, therefore, that I should call attention to some of the more important aspects of that document, copies of an unofficial translation of which have been placed in the Dáil Library. The document supplements an earlier opinion of 29th September, 1967. In its latest opinion the commission pays special attention to the development and strengthening of the community in the context of enlargement, as it believes that only a strong community can act as a proper vehicle for the reception of new members. The commission consequently urges rapid progress in the adoption of a number of measures to strengthen the community's institutions. It points to the necessity for the applicant countries to accept what has already been achieved in implementation of the Rome Treaty and to co-operate with the measures being taken for the future strengthening and development of the communities. The commission rejects the idea of enlargement by stages. It feels, however, that fully concurrent negotiations with all the applicants may not be possible but recognises the need for adequate co-ordination on questions which cannot be negotiated with individual countries in isolation. The accession of the four candidate countries would then take place simultaneously. The importance of co-ordination and consultation on problems of common interest is, indeed, a matter on which I laid particular stress in my talks with representatives of the member governments and the commission. Finally, the commission recommends that negotiations with the applicant countries should be opened as soon as possible. I should like to take this opportunity of publicly welcoming this valuable and constructive document of the commission.

With the improved prospects in relation to the EEC, it is vital at this stage that the country should not only continue but, indeed, intensify its preparations to meet the obligations of membership. The time available to us to carry through further desirable adaptations and improvements in efficiency over the whole economy may now be relatively short. The precise terms of our entry and the transitional arrangements we receive can only be determined in the course of negotiations. One thing however is clear, namely, that membership of the European communities will subject us to new disciplines extending over the entire range of our economic life and will also have implications in the social and political spheres. These we must be prepared fully to accept.

The Government remain convinced that membership of the EEC represents the best means for realisation of our full potential as a nation. On the agricultural side we undoubtedly stand to gain from our participation in the common agricultural policy even though that policy may have undergone certain modifications by the time of our accession. Industrially we can look forward to the much wider possibilities which will be opened up to us as a result of our ready access to a vastly increased market. The experience which Irish industrialists have had in adapting to the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement has undoubtedly been a most valuable preparation for membership of the EEC. This experience also provides gratifying cause for confidence in the capacity of our industry to meet more broadly based competition in the future.

This House and the country will be kept as fully informed as possible on future developments in relation to the EEC and on the likely effects to be expected from membership. It is only right that this should be done given the far-reaching implications of membership for the nation. As the Taoiseach indicated last week, a more detailed or firm assessment of the implications of membership than that already given is scarcely possible at this stage when the member Governments are confronted with finding solutions to a number of major internal problems likely to affect the future evolution of the Common Market.

Finally, I should like to assure the House that the closest contact will continue to be maintained with the Governments of the Six and of the applicant countries through Ministerial and official visits and through our missions. It is, in fact, my intention to take the earliest opportunity for further talks with some of these Governments.

The conflict in Nigeria has been going on now for over two years. As Deputies are only too well aware, there has been vast suffering and loss of life with hundreds of thousands of people on both sides either killed in the hostilities or dying the slow death of hunger and disease. I do not wish to enter into the causes of the conflict: these were complex and there were certainly legitimate fears and grievances on both sides. Even before the war began, we strongly urged reconciliation between the two sides and an avoidance at all cost of recourse to arms. Here I would recall the words of His Holiness Pope Paul VI when in his "message to Africa" shortly after the Nigerian conflict began, he urged that the rulers of the African nations will "look for peace" and "be quick to dialogue and to negotiate rather than break off relations and resort to force". The war in Nigeria has not only led to human suffering on a vast scale but it has also already left a terrible legacy of tribal bitterness and recrimination, particularly in the areas which once formed the eastern region of Nigeria: this bitterness will not be easy to eradicate.

The Government's policy, as I have already stated in the Dáil, has been concentrated on doing whatever is in our power to do to promote a peaceful settlement between the parties to the conflict and, concurrently, and most urgently, while the search for peace continues, to increase the supply of relief to the civilian victims of the conflict. As I informed the Dáil last July, I made a complete review of the whole situation after I took office but my conclusions did not lead me to hope that at the time we could take an initiative which could have any real influence in helping to solve the major issues.

In my general debate speech at the United Nations on 26th September, I expressed the sincere hope that a just settlement of the Nigerian problem would be speedily reached with the assistance of the Organisation of African Unity. As Deputies are aware, the OAU is the regional organisation with the primary responsibility of providing good offices in disputes in Africa.

Moreover as an African body, it is ideally suited to offer mediation in situations where attempts by European Governments or groups of Governments meet with mistrust no matter how pure the motives, in view of Africa's well-founded suspicion of European colonialism, based on bitter experience.

In September, 1967, the Organisation of African Unity meeting in Kinshasa established a six-nation consultative committee on Nigeria, and this committee under the very active and positive leadership of Emperor Hailie Selassie of Ethiopia has been constantly working to achieve a settlement between the two sides. It hardly needs to be said that no matter how many offers of mediation are made or how hard the mediators work, it is ultimately the two sides that must agree on a settlement.

Delegations from both sides have under the auspices of the OAU put forward their respective views at Niamey, at Addis Ababa and at Algiers in 1968 and in Monrovia and most recently again in Addis Ababa in the present year. Also in this year His Holiness Pope Paul and the African Hierarchy endeavoured to bring the two sides together in Uganda. However, despite these meetings and the intense diplomatic activity that is constantly in progress, the basis for a negotiated settlement does not yet appear to have emerged.

In July last, our Ambassador to Nigeria on my instructions travelled to Addis Ababa, where he had discussions with both the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry and the Secretariat of the Organisation of African Unity. We have been, of course, also in close touch with both sides to the conflict, and recently at the United Nations General Assembly I have had discussions with many delegates including in particular the representatives of several of the African countries most involved. While we recognise the duty of the whole international community to promote peace in this terrible conflict, and particularly the duty of countries such as ourselves who for many years have had close bonds of friendship with the people on both sides, the policy of the Government is aimed primarily at supporting the efforts of the OAU and its member States to bring the parties to the conference table and to suggest ways in which negotiations may prove fruitful.

The Ethiopian Foreign Minister declared earlier this month that Emperor Hailie Selassie will continue his efforts, undaunted by the lack of progress so far until a solution is found to the conflict. Recently, since the meeting of the OAU at Addis Ababa last month, both General Gowon and General Ojukwu have been reported as indicating a willingness to enter into negotiations. I sincerely hope that such negotiations will take place, and that with the ground prepared carefully and quietly in advance, progress will be made.

As Deputies are aware, we have always urged direct contact between the two sides, if only on an informal basis and on limited topics: we feel that such contact, if made away from all publicity, could help to bring about a climate of trust between the two sides, if only in a very limited way to begin with. The absence of all trust between the two sides at present is, I think, the greatest obstacle to genuine negotiations.

In the last few days I have been glad to note that there has been new activity in the search for peace. On Sunday the Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, accompanied by the Secretary General of the OAU, delivered in Lagos to General Gowon a special message from Emperor Hailie Selassie, Chairman of the OAU six nation consultative committee on Nigeria, who is constantly in touch with both sides. Yesterday General Gowon had consultations with the President of the Congo, who is a member of the OAU committee. And today, he is having further consultations with the President of the Cameron Republic, who is Chairman of the OAU itself.

I should like to emphasise that the Government are convinced that the only solution likely to last is a solution that comes from negotiation, not from war. Any such solution that can be agreed on by the parties concerned will be welcomed by us, provided always that provision is made for adequate guarantees for the fundamental human rights of the peoples involved. Apart from this stipulation, we have no preconceptions of our own about the type of relationship which should ultimately be evolved to allow these people, for whom we have the greatest of good will and sympathy, once again to live in peace and mutual co-operation. Agreement, however, if it is to come should surely be postponed no further.

While this tragic war goes on, the Government will continue to urge respect by both parties for humanitarian behaviour in accordance with the internationally accepted standards of conduct of war, as set out in particular in the Geneva Conventions. As Deputies know, the Government have frequently deplored all aerial attacks on non-military targets and centres of civilian concentration whichever side is responsible. Such attacks result in the wanton killing or wounding of large numbers of defenceless civilians, they terrorise the local population, make the task of eventual reconciliation more difficult and serve no military purpose whatever.

We have deplored all such attacks that have been brought to our notice in the past. A recent incident, as Deputies will be aware from press reports, was an attack on a road near Owerri which resulted in the death of among others an Irish sister engaged in the relief operation there. The Government have been greatly concerned by these reports and we have taken the matter up with the Nigerian authorities through our Embassy in Lagos.

I am sometimes asked why the Government do not recognise Biafra as an independent State. This question is usually based on the assumption that by so doing some humanitarian gain could be achieved. This is, of course, not so. The Government have never contemplated granting recognition as a separate State to the areas claimed by the secessionist authorities. There are many and weighty reasons for this but one important practical reason is that if we were to do so, we would immediately cease to be able to conduct a dialogue with both sides in our endeavour to promote peace and to increase relief, and most important we would seriously hinder or possibly be the cause of ending the very valuable humanitarian work being carried out by Irish people, particularly our missionaries, on both sides. And let me emphasise that this humanitarian work on the spot is the greatest contribution by far that Ireland can make to help the people of Nigeria, particularly those in the war affected areas, at this critical time.

In accordance with this premise, the whole question of relief for Nigeria and Biafra has been a major preoccupation of my Department during the period under review. The heroic work for relief and rehabilitation being performed by our missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant, and by our medical teams in the field has been generously supported by contributions in cash and kind and offers of service from the public here at home. A survey made in the first quarter of this year ranked Ireland as eleventh among the world's largest donor countries in Nigerian relief and placed the Irish per capita contribution in fifth place among all countries. The general concern of the public in this matter has been fully shared by the Government.

As Deputies are aware, while there has been suffering on both sides in the conflict the major suffering among the civilian population has been taking place in the Biafran controlled areas, where the people have been concentrated in a small enclave, only a fraction of the former area of Eastern Nigeria. In this congested area, the civilian population have had to depend since early 1968 on the nightly airlift of essential relief supplies organised by the international relief organisations, with Caritas Internationalis as the courageous pioneer in the whole relief operation. The organisations have been principally the ad hoc interdenominational group of Church agencies known as Joint Church Aid and the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The principal relief negotiator with both sides has been the ICRC supplemented since February of this year by the work of the United States Government Special Co-ordinator for Nigerian Relief, Ambassador Ferguson. The ICRC has, of course, also been continuously engaged in its primary responsibilities under the Geneva Conventions in regard to prisoners of war, civilian victims of the war and so on. The relief negotiations which were extremely complex and delicate, were aimed at obtaining agreement between the two sides for new improved methods of supply, whether by land, by water or by air. It has long been recognised that not only are the relief supplies which are brought in by the night flights inadequate but the hazards of the present system have been shown by the fact that to date 25 pilots and crew have paid the supreme penalty in this humanitarian cause.

Early in the current year the Dutch Government took an initiative in an endeavour to assist the relief negotiations, by inviting a group of the major donor countries sharing a generally similar stand as regards the political issues in the war to meet for informal discussions on the problems involved. This group which has come to be known as the Hague group comprises Austria, the Benelux Countries, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, the United States and ourselves. The relief negotiations involved have been concerned principally with the opening up of a water route into Biafra and of an air corridor for relief flights in daytime to Uli. As the possibility of a water route appears to be no longer feasible under present conditions, I will confine my remarks to a brief description of the negotiations for day flights.

The ICRC have always been in favour of day flights, and they have been engaged in difficult negotiations with both sides on this question since May, 1968. As Deputies will recall, in the earlier part of this year, the ICRC came under attack from both sides during these negotiations and on 5th June an ICRC relief plane was shot down by the Federal airforce. This was followed by the declaration of the ICRC Commissioner General for West Africa as persona non grata in Lagos and the removal by the Federal Government of the co-ordinating role which had been given to the ICRC as from 30th June.

Despite all this, the ICRC made a further attempt at the beginning of August to suggest to both sides the general framework of a compromise plan for daylight flights. This plan required a main concession on the part of the Federal Government to allow flights to take off from the ICRC bases outside Nigeria with inspection at these bases and on the part of the Biafran authorities the dropping of their condition for third party security guarantees. Already on 30th July the United Nations Secretary General U Thant had addressed an appeal to both sides urging the restarting of the ICRC emergency flights "even if concessions are required from both sides".

Basing ourselves on the new ICRC proposals and on the appeal of the Secretary General, we made approaches to both sides, pointing out that the Government strongly reject the idea of the starvation of the civilian population no matter who is responsible. We asked specifically that both sides should make compromises, as requested by the ICRC and the UN Secretary General, and we urged acceptance of the ICRC compromise plan.

By the latter part of August, the Biafran authorities had indicated their agreement in principle to the ICRC relief plan, with the proviso, however, that it was "the understanding of the Biafran Government that its acceptance of the ... proposals is without prejudice to the continued use of Uli airport for its own operations": and a detailed agreement was worked out on 27th August between the Biafran authorities and the ICRC in Geneva. In this agreement there was no mention of the vexed question of third party security guarantees. The Federal Military Government, despite an initial unfavourable reaction, continued the relief negotiations, and finally on 13th September signed with the ICRC in Lagos a separate agreement which in the main provisions was similar to the previous agreement between the Biafran authorities and ICRC. Similar to the clause inserted by the Biafran authorities, the Federal Government included a clause that "this agreement shall be without prejudice to military operations by the Federal Government".

The agreement with the Federal Nigerian Government specified a trial period of three weeks and a relatively small number of flights per day was envisaged. The ICRC hoped that these separate agreements, which apart from the clauses referring to military operations, were similar in their provisions, would be accepted in a positive spirit by both sides as a basis for beginning daylight flights on a trial basis. As to the so called "military clauses", it was always conceded that, relief flights or no relief flights, the war would continue to run its course, but that the relief agreement should be of no military advantage to either side and that the ICRC would guarantee this.

During this period, the Government were through our permanent mission in Geneva closely in touch with the ICRC and my Department was represented specifically in connection with Nigerian relief at the XXIst International Conference of the Red Cross which took place in Istanbul early in September. In addition, we were in contact with other interested Governments particularly the members of the Hague group. The ICRC were confident of success and they had their relief planes standing ready at Cotonou. On 14th September, however, the Biafrans announced that the agreement reached in Lagos was unacceptable because of the so called military clause and they reverted to their previous demand for third party security guarantees.

We were greatly concerned by this reaction. The Federal Government had shown humanity and courage in making the important concessions which the ICRC, supported by many Governments including our own, had requested. I can fully appreciate the deep-seated Biafran fears about security, but in this case I feel that these fears were exaggerated, particularly with the agreement being backed by the great authority of the ICRC. This lack of progress is greatly to be deplored, because of the serious consequences which may result for the civilian populations concerned. If the ICRC compromise plan could be put into operation and tested for a limited time, we would have hoped that a better and more extensive plan could be worked out based on actual experience and on the trust built up between the two sides. Such a legally agreed scheme acceptable to both parties could be of the greatest importance particularly when one bears in mind how tenuous the present arrangement is and that if, some day, the risks prove too great for the night flights to continue, the sole life line that is keeping hundreds of thousands of men, women and children in existence would be cut off. I should add that the Government made known their willingness to consider favourably any request that might be received for the provision, with the consent of the parties concerned, of Irish personnel to assist with relief inspection.

As regards the Government's contribution for relief in Nigeria-Biafra in the current year, as Deputies will recall, we have already pledged, subject to the approval of the Dáil, £25,000 for Irish Red Cross medical teams for either side and 25,000 dollars for the UNICEF Emergency Programmes for Nigeria/Biafra. My Department is at present engaged in urgent discussions with the Irish relief organisations including the Irish Red Cross and Africa Concern as to further ways in which we can assist.

Apart from the suffering in Nigeria, there has also been great suffering in another part of Africa. I refer to the recent flood disaster in Tunisia which has resulted in considerable loss of life and has left over 250,000 people in North Africa homeless. The League of Red Cross Societies and the Tunisian Red Crescent have launched an international appeal to aid the victims of this disaster and the Irish Red Cross is making available out of the emergency relief fund a sum of £500 to the League of Red Cross Societies for this purpose. The Government have the greatest sympathy for the people of Tunisia in this time of natural disaster.

On the question of disarmament, the Secretary General of the United Nations in a recent introduction to the annual report of the organisation has stated that the momentum and promise of previous years appears to have been lost and that the past year has seen little progress. He has pointed to the disquieting fact that the solution for the problems of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is still hanging in the balance, that the testing of nuclear weapons continues apace, that global military expenditures continue to mount at an alarming rate and most dangerous of all that the world seems threatened by an uncontrollable escalation of the nuclear arms race.

As a government we are deeply anxious at this lack of progress in the various proposals for collateral disarmament and particularly in the failure to halt once and for all the spread of nuclear weapons both within and outside existing stockpiles. Deputies will recall that there were high hopes early last year when the two rival super powers, the USA and the USSR, agreed on the final text of a non-proliferation treaty. That treaty was widely commended by the General Assembly and was finally opened for signature on 1st July, 1968. As the first member of the United Nations to propose in 1958 a draft resolution in the General Assembly on the prevention of the wider spread of nuclear weapons and as having proposed in 1961 the conclusion of an international agreement for this purpose, we were naturally gratified when our suggestions in this vital field of disarmament appeared at last to be bearing fruit.

In the debate in the General Assembly in May, 1968, on this item numerous delegations paid tribute to the wisdom and the perseverance of my predecessor as Minister, Deputy Frank Aiken, in the pursuit of his ideas in this matter. As an example of these tributes I quote from the official record of the General Assembly of 30th April, 1968, when the Foreign Minister of Canada, Mr. Sharp, speaking in the First Committee said:

Many delegations will recall the early proposal put before the Assembly, designed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. That was the renowned "Irish resolution" of the late fifties which was eventually and unanimously adopted on 4th December, 1961. We are all indebted to the Foreign Minister of Ireland for his foresight and fortitude in persevering in that initiative—often in the face of formidable odds.

The Government have never considered the non-proliferation treaty as a completely satisfactory instrument or for that matter as an end in itself. We have considered, however, that the first essential is to obtain the widest possible adherence to the treaty both on account of the immediate effect of the treaty in halting the spread of nuclear weapons and also because this itself will help to create the climate for the negotiation of many other very desirable agreements. Such agreements might include for instance measures to cover further security guarantees and the vast field of making available the peaceful uses of atomic power for all humanity. We have stressed this view both in the General Assembly and also at the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States which took place in Geneva in August, 1968. Recently we submitted our application to join the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to participate more fully in all these developments and my Department was represented at the Vienna meeting of that agency last month. As yet, however, the non-proliferation treaty has not entered into force because the required number of ratifications by 43 states including those of all the three signatory nuclear powers have not been forthcoming. Only 17 states so far have ratified the non-proliferation treaty and these do not include either the USA or the USSR.

As Deputies will be aware Ireland was the first country to ratify the treaty. Already at the present session of the General Assembly I have expressed our concern that the treaty has not yet become effective, and we shall continue to urge the vital necessity for the entry into force of this treaty as the single most important and urgent disarmament measure which can be effectively implemented at this time.

At the present session of the Assembly, we intend also to support any further constructive disarmament measures which are proposed. These will probably include proposals on bacteriological and chemical warfare, the draft treaty on the denuclearisation of the sea bed, and the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty to include testing under ground. We are glad that preliminary discussions on the opening of bilateral US-USSR strategic arms limitation talks have now been announced for next month.

Turning to the question of peace-keeping, an area in which the United Nations can operate with the greatest of practical effect, I regret to report that a solution to the fundamental problem of achieving adequate financial arrangements seems to be as distant as ever. The special 33 Nations committee which was established in 1965 to undertake a comprehensive review of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects, including ways of overcoming the present financial difficulties of the United Nations, has been taken up with discussion of a number of side issues and has made no progress on the central question of financing.

It seems unfortunately true that at this stage the political will to substitute an adequate system for the present unsatisfactory method of ad hoc voluntary financing is lacking among member states. We regard this as a central flaw in the structure of the organisation and we shall continue to bring to the attention of the Assembly the duty of all member states to see that a comprehensive and soundly based solution should be found if the United Nations is to go forward as an influence for peace and security in the world.

As regards the practical aspects of peace-keeping, we have continued to maintain our contingent of troops with the United Nations force in Cyprus. The strength of the contingent, stationed in the Lefka district in north west Cyprus, was 507 all ranks up to September, 1968. Since then, as a result of a decision taken by the Secretary-General in view of the improved situation, the size of the force has been reduced considerably. The present Irish contingent numbers 419 officers and men including the Irish element at the headquarters in Nicosia.

The basic function of the United Nations force in Cyprus, as defined by the Security Council, is to prevent a recurrence of fighting and as necessary to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions on the island. The Secretary-General has recently stated that the situation has continued to improve slowly but steadily from the point of view of the return to normal conditions of civilian life. He has further stated that this is in good measure attributable to the tireless efforts of the United Nations peace-keeping operation, now in its sixth year. I should like to pay a tribute here to all the Irish soldiers who have served and are still serving with the United Nations in Cyprus. They are held in high regard by all with whom they have come in contact and in addition they have reflected honour on the United Nations and their country.

The Secretary-General has, however, sounded a note of warning as regards the future of the peace-keeping force. He has pointed to the urgent need for progress in the talks aimed at restoring normal relations between the two communities—the Greeks and the Turks— in Cyprus and stated that the passage of too much time may hamper rather than facilitate a settlement. He has described how in the five and a half years since the violent disturbances first abruptly severed communications between the two communities, a new generation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots has been growing up who hardly know each other at all except in hostility.

The Secretary-General has expressed his view that the members of this generation will have a far greater difficulty in finding a basis for living in peace with each other than those of the older generation now searching for a solution. The Government fully share the Secretary-General's concern at the slow rate of progress which has been made in seeking solutions for the basic issues dividing the two communities, and we are pleased to note the Secretary-General's offer of good offices to the parties concerned either directly or through his Special Representative in Cyprus.

In the Middle East, the second area in which Ireland is helping the United Nations in its peace-keeping role, the situation, as Deputies are only too well aware, has gravely deteriorated. There have been an increasing series of incursions and counter incursions across the cease-fire lines, large scale guerilla activities, and reprisals which have grown in frequency and extent. The Secretary-General has recently said that war actually is being waged throughout the area, short only of battles between large bodies of troops. In the last few months the Secretary-General has warned the Security Council on two occasions of the almost complete breakdown of its cease-fire in the Suez Canal sector and the virtual resumption of war there despite—and, I quote the words of the Secretary-General—"the unceasing and valiant efforts of the United Nations military observers, who are exposed to great danger, to maintain the cease-fire."

It is in this situation that our officers with great courage are providing such a valuable service on both sides of the cease-fire line. Fourteen of these officers are currently serving in the difficult Suez area, two are in Damascus, two in Jerusalem and two in Tiberias. We are of course constantly in touch with the United Nations Secretariat about the safety and welfare of these men and I can assure you that the United Nations is taking all reasonable precautions and safeguards. I think all of us owe a very great debt of gratitude to these officers.

As regards the fundamental issues involved in the Middle East, the views of the Government are well known. As a first step, however, it is urgently necessary that both sides should desist from all provocative acts of any sort, and that they co-operate with the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Ambassador Jarring, in his efforts to negotiate for a settlement between the parties concerned in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council on this matter.

In the present year the Council of Europe has celebrated the twentieth anniversary of its establishment. As a founder member it has been our policy during those 20 years to co-operate to the maximum extent possible with the other members to achieve the basic aim of the Council which is the greater unity of its members.

In line with this policy we have continued to participate fully in the deliberations of the organisation at parliamentary and governmental levels. The parliamentary delegation attended plenary meetings of the Consultative Assembly which met at Strasbourg in May and September, 1968, and in January, May and September, 1969. Members of the parliamentary delegation also attended the several extrasessional meetings of the Committees of the Assembly. Ireland was host to one of these meetings, that of the Economic Committee, which was held in Dublin in July, 1968.

At governmental level Ireland was represented by my predecessor at the meeting of the committee of ministers held in Paris in December, 1968, and at that held in London last May to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the organisation. We are represented at all meetings of the committee of ministers' deputies which meets in Strasbourg about once a month. Officials from Government Departments regularly attend meetings of committees of governmental experts of the Council which provide the committee of ministers with technical advise over most of the fields of activity of the Council.

Since the Estimate for my Department was last presented, the Government have ratified the European Agreement for the prevention of broadcasts transmitted from stations outside national territories and signed the European Agreement for the protection of animals during international transport. In addition it is intended to ratify within the next few weeks the European Agreement on the abolition of visas for refugees.

Perhaps the field in which the Council of Europe is best known is that of human rights. With the ratification in October, 1968, of the Fourth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, the Government became a party to all the human rights instruments of the Council of Europe. In order further to achieve the collective advancement of human rights, the Irish Parliamentary delegation at the Consulative Assembly, led by Deputy Aiken, submitted at the September meeting a motion for a Recommendation calling for an additional Protocol to the Human Rights Convention. The Irish motion secured a total of 42 signatures from 11 countries, was inscribed on the Register of the Assembly without objection and has now been reffered for consideration to the Assembly's Legal Affairs Committee. While it is clear that these proposals will need careful consideration by all European Governments I feel that great credit is due to Deputy Aiken and the entire delegation for their initiative and constructive efforts on this important question.

Deputies will recall that the year 1968 was designated as the International Year for Human Rights to commemorate the adoption in 1948 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. As a major part of the programme emphasis in this country was placed on the signature or ratification of the various international conventions or agreements which deal in one way or another with this subject. I have already mentioned the Fourth Protocol to the European Convention. In addition the Government in the course of the year signed the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, acceded to the Convention on the Political Rights of Women and also acceded to the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. The Government have also approved the preparation of legislation to enable this country to accede to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

It must be accepted that trade and foreign earnings are virtually the lifeblood of this country and I am most anxious to see my Department's Missions abroad playing an everincreasing role in these spheres. Indeed, the importance of ensuring the effectiveness of our Missions in these fields of activity is a matter I feel deserves my closest attention. I have no doubt that the Missions are well placed to make an increasingly important contribution to the country's efforts to increase its foreign earnings. They have ready access to the necessary contacts for this purpose and can draw upon a wealth of accumulated knowledge of local conditions. While my Department's Missions are, I am confident, serving their country well in the economic field, I am particularly concerned to ensure that their potential is exploited to the full. In this context I attach particular importance to the suitable training for economic work of the Department's officers, and this is a matter which is being kept under constant review. I also feel that the effectiveness of our Missions would be improved if greater use were made of their facilities by exporters and others concerned with the increase of our foreign earnings.

Owing to the increasing liberalisation of world trade, the scope for the conclusion of bilateral trade agreements at Government level has tended to diminish. Our Trade Agreements with France and the Federal Republic of Germany have been renewed, but their content has naturally been reduced because of the operation of the Common Market. The possibility of negotiating a Trade Agreement with Japan continues to be explored. Because of the continuing import surplus in our trade with Eastern European countries, the Government recently decided to seek discussions with certain of these countries with a view to the negotiation of Trade Agreements which would open the way to increased Irish exports to them. It is now expected that talks with some of the countries concerned will take place fairly soon.

Ireland continues to make its due contribution to the work of the OECD. Among the matters now receiving close attention in that organisation is the proposed scheme of general tariff preferences for the developing countries. Each prospective participant in the scheme has been requested to submit to the organisation a provisional offer of tariff preferences. There is almost universal agreement that a worthwhile tariff preferences scheme could be of real benefit to the developing countries. We have supported the scheme and have tabled a provisional offer. It is not possible to foresee at this stage what the final content of the scheme will be or when it is likely to come into operation.

As we all know, the general question of aid to developing countries has been a matter of increasing public interest here during the last few years. This, no doubt, derives from a growing awareness of the immense problems facing those countries in their efforts to raise the living standards of their peoples. Indeed, in the world generally there is mounting interest in the whole question and the approach of the Second Development Decade, which begins on 1st January, 1971, has helped to focus the re-thinking which is being done on the subject.

I have no doubt that our people generally feel deep concern about the needs of the developing countries and would wish this country to make, and to be seen to make, a worthwhile and realistic effort in the aid field. I have accordingly thought it appropriate to initiate a review of the whole aid position at this stage. My Department, therefore, recently commenced discussion on the subject with the other Departments concerned. It is intended that the inter-departmental consultations should produce an evaluation of our aid performance to date and frame recommendations for future policy.

I would not wish to appear to be in any way complacent about our performance to date in regard to aid. I can say, however, that our total official aid has been steadily increasing. It has been in excess of £1 million for each of the last three years and our stated aim, as expressed in the Third Programme for Economic and Social Development, is to increase it further. This official aid consists mainly of contributions to international organisations concerned with development aid such as the UN Development Programme, the World Food Programme, the World Bank and the UN Children's Fund. We also do what we can to aid the developing countries by providing training and educational facilities here for their nationals and by recruiting qualified Irish personnel for service overseas.

But by far the greatest part of our contribution to the developing countries comes from the private sector. We cannot but feel justly proud of the great work being done in these countries by our missionaries, doctors, nurses, teachers and others. In addition, substantial help is being provided as a result of the fund-raising activities of private organisations here. It is only right that I should use this opportunity to pay well-deserved tribute to these truly humanitarian efforts.

There are no ready or immediate solutions to the difficulties of the developing countries. For our part we must, I think, continue to keep their cause in the forefront of our minds and resolve to play what part we can in assisting them at the cost, if necessary, of diverting some resources from uses which would be of more immediate selfish interest to ourselves. As I see it, a degree of self-sacrifice and unselfishness must inspire our policy if it is to be really creditable.

Ireland has continued to serve as a member of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Our three-year period of membership extends to the end of 1970. The 27-mem-ber council, which has two main sessions every year, directs and coordinates the economic and social work of the United Nations and its related agencies. Its work programme embraces a great volume and diversity of problems and we have been concerned to make what contribution we could to the council's deliberations and decisions.

My Department continues to attach importance to the provision and dissemination abroad of accurate and up-to-date information on Ireland in support of our objectives in the international sphere. Amongst its activities in this field are the development of contacts with the press and other communications media by our diplomats abroad at all levels; the briefing by the Department of foreign journalists who visit Ireland and the invitation to Ireland of selected groups of journalists from time to time to familiarise them with the Irish scene. In addition, the Department produces a fortnightly bulletin which is widely distributed abroad, booklets and brochures in several languages and films on various aspects of national life. I am arranging to have the Department's information activities further expanded.

With the advice of the Cultural Relations Committee the Department is pursuing abroad a varied programme designed to make our culture better known abroad. I would like to pay tribute to the work of the committee, the distinguished members of which are unstinting in giving of their time and talents. I am glad of this opportunity to express in public my sincere thanks to the members of the committee.

I am sure the members of the Dáil would like me to express our pleasure that General de Gaulle chose Ireland for an extended stay earlier this year.

Since I became Minister for External Affairs the two matters which have most engaged my attention have been the North of Ireland problem and the EEC. As I explained, because of my intervention in last week's debate I have not mentioned the North of Ireland problem today.

The statement I have now made to the House has dealt in varying detail with some of the more important aspects of my Department's many responsibilities. Each of these has its own particular significance in the context of our over-all foreign policy. If I were to single out one subject, apart of course from that of the North of Ireland, which will require my special attention in the coming months, as I see it now that subject will be the EEC. While there is, as yet, no assurance of early progress towards enlargement of the Communities I feel I must spare no effort in promoting our interests in this matter.

Like the Minister, I propose to take the line that as we discussed the North of Ireland last week it is not desirable to go over the same ground again today. There has, perhaps, been no single international tragedy which has evoked such a spontaneous feeling of sorrow and regret in the minds of the Irish people as the tragedy in Biafra. It is one that affected the missionary houses which had sent missionaries to Biafra and Nigeria; it is one which has affected the relatives here of those in those missionary fields, and it is one in which modern means of communication have brought home to everybody the appalling suffering there, suffering from which humanity naturally shrinks. That does not mean that because one says all that, direct positive steps will always help in the solution of the problem.

It would be an easy and facile way of trying to solve the problem by saying we would be making a stride towards that solution by recognising Biafra but to do so would mean, on the one hand, that we would lose the channels of communications to which the Minister has referred, and on the other, involve us in very considerable difficulties of precedence in another sphere. The utmost that we can do, and the utmost that must be done by the Minister and his Department, is to ensure that no opportunity is lost of making our influence as a small country—but a small country with widespread social, educational and missionary contacts— felt and to ensure that not merely is there material aid brought to endeavour to alleviate the suffering but that the parties are brought together in an effort to find a permanent solution, and a permanent solution on a political basis is the first essential towards providing in the future adequate means to prevent the appalling starvation and degradation of which all of us are aware.

I want, therefore, to say that I agree with the Minister that much though it does appear perhaps that we are not doing anything it is, nevertheless, in our view correct that there should not be a cutting off of ourselves from one side by accepting or taking the line that recognition was the same as human concern. Of course it is not, and indeed, very often the greater the human concern the harder it is not to take a step that would at least make it appear that one was doing something, though that step taken openly would not have any real effect.

I want to join with the Minister in the tribute he paid to our troops in Cyprus. They have brought honour on our country and in a real way they have supported the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter. However, any peace-keeping force in Cyprus, or anywhere else, can only be a temporary expedient pending the time when it is possible to work out permanent solutions. They provide a breathing space, a breathing space to enable the two sides in any dispute to get together to try to see where the permanent solution lies. In Cyprus the peace-keeping force has been successful in preventing warlike attacks but, of course, the longer it goes on as a temporary expedient the harder becomes the finding of a permanent solution.

The Minister has not adverted in any way to any efforts that he has made in that respect. With the experience we have picked up through the peace-keeping force it should be possible for the Minister for External Affairs, with the confidential reports available to him, to make suggestions for a permanent solution of what indeed is a most difficult problem. I want, too, to join in the commendation of our officers in the Middle East itself. All of us feel the same in relation to the Middle East, that we never know, when we turn on the news on the radio, or open our newspapers, whether the powder keg will have blown up not merely in a small explosion but in the big explosion of which we are all so very much afraid. The fact that our officers are there is again in keeping with the initial principles of the United Nations Charter, although I am sorry to say that they do not appear to have there the same success as they are having in Cyprus.

The world in which we live is, as the Minister has stated, an uneasy place, an uneasy place in which we are likely unfortunately to have explosions from one side or another. It is easy sentimentally to say that war in any particular sector must end overnight. Those of us who are old enough to remember the thirties also remember that there are occasions when to allow sentiment to overcome judgment may very well mean that the results of that sentiment will be far worse than that which same judgment shows to be the right course. All of us hope, without exception, that the war in Vietnam will end as soon as possible, but all of us equally hope that the method and the result of its ending will be such as to ensure that there will not be any overrunning of the South Vietnamese, or any other people in South-East Asia, by China or anybody else.

The Minister has indicated that his main preoccupation in the year ahead will be with the European Economic Community. We have said again and again that Fianna Fáil Governments in the past have not given sufficient attention to the affairs of the Community and to the necessary to make contacts with the people concerned in running the Six and the Community itself. We are sometimes inclined to forget that it is now 12 years, 12 years last March, since the Treaty of Rome was signed. In addition to that, the 31st December this year will mark the end of the transitional period provided by the Treaty of Rome. Those years have gone by pretty quickly and I do not think that it is unfair to say the Ministers for External Affairs in that period, particularly in the last ten years since the Treaty of Rome became effective, and the personnel of the Department of External Affairs have not directed themselves as much as they should have towards seeing where our prospects lay and where advantages to us would accrue.

There was, I think, a facile assumption by the Ministers of the Fianna Fáil Governments that, because we could not—with 70 per cent of our trade with Britain—contemplate accession to the Community unless Britain too was accepted as a member, there was no necessity to examine the problem at home or to set up the initial working parties to study the problem until British entry became more or less a real likelihood, perhaps even a fait accompli. We can in consequence, I think, justly criticise—the Minister has not been there long enough for him to bear any of the criticism—the Governments of Fianna Fáil because they did not take adequate steps in regard to this particular matter. Very often one particular Deputy voiced, in Europe and elsewhere, the suggestion that the Community would be wise to enlarge itself from six to seven by the admission of Britain and to wait then to see whether they were able to digest the seven before considering further applicants for membership. That particular view has now passed. It has been dropped not merely by the Commission, not merely by the Ministers of the Six, if they ever held it, but also by the vast majority of political thinkers in the countries of the Community.

It is inevitable that there must be some staggering in the negotiations for entry into the Community. That is inevitable because, for instance, the balance of trade we have with Britain makes it clear to us that we cannot possibly enter the Community unless Britain enters too. Equally, that very balance makes it clear that the entry of Britain into the Community without the simultaneous entry of Ireland would create problems even more difficult than the technological problems that would arise in the early formative years.

There was a suggestion in one of the leading papers last Sunday that the only realistic way in which the Community could face the issue of what had to be done in order to marry in the British economy with the economy of the Six was to postpone still further the transitional period and, with that postponement, to lay down new datelines for the various steps that must be taken, steps which have not, even in regard to the Six, been as yet thoroughly agreed at all. Obviously that is not something with which we can hope to influence the decision of the Community. It is not something in which our voice would be very powerful, even if it were the voice of the Minister, before the Ministers and the Six meet in the middle of next month to decide these matters. But it is something about which there should have been a very complete and exhaustive analysis by the Minister and his Department and that analysis should have been made available to the House in the form of a White Paper.

It is very, very many years now since there has been any up-to-date assessment officially in the form of a White Paper of the effects of our gaining access to the Community and the effects of our becoming a member of it. It is very many years since there has been any analysis of the benefits likely to accrue on the industrial side so that we could put them against the disadvantages likely to accrue in relation to the difficulty of prohibition of dumping under the provisions of the Treaty of Rome. The various alterations there have been in the Community's agricultural policy will have an immense impact on us in Ireland, and I must criticise the Minister strongly for not having put an official assessment of the effect of the various agricultural and industrial policies before the people in an official White Paper. I know that he may say in reply that it is difficult when there are changes being made from day to day. You will never get anything static. If you wait for static conditions for an analysis of that sort the result will be that you will never get any analysis at all.

It does seem reasonably clear now that there is an anxiety that was not there before for the Ministers and the organisations and all in the Community to see whether it is possible to have a new effort made in 1970 towards an examination of the problems that would be created by an enlargement of the Common Market. The Common Market itself, of course, has hardly been having a very easy passage in the last period. It was involved in the October of 1967 crisis in the £ sterling. It was involved in the spring of 1968 in the dollar crisis which led to the introduction of new monetary measures. We have had since May of this year the problems that have arisen in relation to the Deutschemark, culminating in its revaluation the other day, and we had before that the problems raised by the devaluation of the French franc. The one thing that appeared clear in respect of all those four different crises was the fact that they were certainly greatly exaggerated, if not caused virtually entirely, not by fundamental weaknesses in the countries concerned, but by speculation— caused, exaggerated, by speculation and the world of speculation which even in today's paper one sees has now caused the flow with speculators taking their profits from the revaluation of the mark.

I do not know where the Minister and the Government think the balance lies in relation to these problems. I do know—and there would not be any possible difference on any side of this House—it is obvious that we must get more strength from the strength of the £ and that we must suffer by any weakness of the £ sterling. That is not to say that it is not an unhappy and an unhealthy situation for us to be in when we are dependent for approximately 70 cent cent of our trade on Britain, when we are dependent, for example, also, for some 79 per cent of our trade on Britain, the Community and the other countries, Denmark and Norway, that are asking also for membership. It is one of the facts of life that it is no use blinking. We have got to accept that we must take the step if others go and that we must take the step with the knowledge that it will entail dangers on the one hand, but, at the same time, much wider scope and much wider opportunities for developing our markets and for developing the extent of certain markets.

The development of markets as a whole is something that perhaps will mean in the future much greater stress on large organisations and unless we can get a very high degree of specialisation and see where the opportunities for that specialisation arise, then we are not going to be able to take real advantage of any enlargement of the Economic Community from six to ten.

I was glad, therefore, to hear the Minister say, as he did say in his speech, that he had directed the officers of his Department to make it their business to further trade as such. I am sorry to say that from the comments and the criticisms I hear from time to time it would appear that that message has not been sufficiently strong to get across. I said this before when Deputy Aiken was Minister for External Affairs. Again and again I hear compliments on the one hand in certain instances where members of our embassies abroad have been able to help in fostering trade but, on the other hand, again and again I hear that contracts and opportunities have been lost by our exporters because the contracts were taken by other nations who were able to get the members of their embassy staff to come in and help them in a much more positive way than we have been accustomed to do. If this is so—and none of us can really tell except from what we hear unless we have personal experience as exporters —then it is something that has got to be changed because we must make certain that the embassies that we keep abroad, and particularly the embassies in the Six Common Market countries, are geared to ensure that not only do they appreciate the value and the prestige of a high official of the embassy staff coming in to assist an exporter but that it is their job as well to keep their ears open at all times and to feed back news of opportunities to Dublin to be disseminated amongst the business community to endeavour to ensure that our exports will be increased.

There was up to quite a short time ago a feeling that it was beneath dignity to engage in seeking trade opportunities. I believe that that feeling was engendered because of the atmosphere and the aura of protectionism that was built up by Fianna Fáil. I think there has been an effort made in recent years at the top to change that but it has not got down and it must get down if we are to get the value that is necessary from embassies abroad to be able to assist us to expand our living standards.

The year ahead will be one of the most vital for us in that it will decide which way we are going. If we do not succeed in gaining suitable terms of accession to the Community we must, without question, have another very hard look at the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement. The agreement was accepted because it was stated to be an express advantage towards building the facilities that were necesssary and desirable to our becoming a member of EEC. It has given certain of our exporters some considerable benefit but its overall effect has been to ensure that British exports to this country now far exceed our exports to Britain. We are Britain's second-best customer in Europe and her fourth-best customer in the world. That being so, surely the Taoiseach and the Minister for External Affairs should make it their business to make cleat to the British Government that the continued breach of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement, by the Special Deposit Scheme, is something we are not prepared to put up with.

Hear, hear.

We are in a different position now in that regard. The British economy, we all hope, will improve because increasing strength for the £ sterling will assist us. Equally, however, we now have a market here which they must accept as a market of no mean proportions for them. There is an unanswerable case for the revision in our favour of the Special Deposit Scheme if for no other reason than that, like them, we are an applicant to join the Community. A powerful argument could be built on the fact that exceptions to the general scheme of those who are about, we hope, to join with them in the Community—Norway, Denmark and ourselves—would not mean a breach in their whole system elsewhere. By joining EEC, they are foreseeing and making an end of EFTA, an organisation which never had very much attraction for us because it did not include agricultural produce. The increase of the Community to ten will mean the end of EFTA as it is; on the other hand, failure to make suitable arrangements for increasing the Community to ten will inevitably mean the strengthening of a different type of organisation outside the Community in Europe in the same manner as the Scandinavian States would then build up NORDEK.

These are matters about which we are entitled to get first-hand information in this House from the Minister for External Affairs. They are not matters in respect of which we should be put in the position of picking up such bits of information as we can get from papers here or from papers there, from papers reports of "leaks" from Ministerial meetings or from press reports of unilateral declaration by Ministers. They are matters on which it should be the task of the Minister to put down in black and white the information the Irish Embassies have garnered to enable us to make an assessment with the facts before us, and to enable us to see where we are going on the next step which, we were told at the time, was just around the corner when we were asked to pass the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement. I suppose it would be more appropriate on the Vote for the Department of Industry and Commerce to discuss the details of that agreement and the lack of successful effort to prevent dumping in many respects but it does seem that there is another criticism to be made here of the Minister.

The Minister referred to the Council of Europe. I am not afraid or ashamed to say categorically in this House—in relation to the passage of the motion sponsored by 42 signatories to which the Minister has referred and in relation to which a very great part of the credit must go to his predecessor-inoffice, Deputy Aiken—that during the course of the recent session in Strasbourg, it became clear to me that all parties in this House had perhaps been making a mistake. In our effort to ensure that as large a number of Members of the Oireachtas as possible got experience abroad at parliamentary conferences of one sort or another at meetings of the Council of Europe, all parties in this House have changed their delegations very frequently. That is not the practice of other continental countries at the Council of Europe. The result was that when we really badly wanted something accepted, as we did want this new addition to the Human Rights Convention, by countries from all parts of Europe, there was not the same personal knowledge of the delegates from other countries as they have among themselves because they have been keeping, not a static delegation but a delegation with people going there for far longer periods than we have done.

It was particularly noticeable that when one was able to get a delegate from another country to the Council of Europe to agree with the case, when he had been persuaded of the justice of the case that we had made, he found it a great deal easier to make other contacts himself than, perhaps, the members of our delegation were able to do because they had not been there anything like as long as the Germans, the Swedes, the Norwegians, the Danes and so forth.

I feel that we shall have, in all parties, to take a serious look at the practice that has grown up, a practice that has grown up for the purpose of ensuring that as many people as possible in this House and in the Seanad would get that experience, to see whether giving them that experience is compatible with getting the best value out of the delegation and whether it is not better to provide that there will be at least a couple of delegates there at all times who have been there for a good many years during which they have got to know personally the delegates and the leaders of delegations from other countries.

That is not something that I say in criticism of the Government alone. I say it equally in criticism of my own Party. It is something that was brought home to all of us when we were endeavouring to push the resolution accepted by the Bureau, put to the Consultative Assembly and accepted unanimously that it should be examined by the legal committee and will come again to the January session of the Assembly we hope.

There has been in Ireland in recent times a greater awareness of the necessity for an aggressive policy, if I may use the expression to describe a policy rather than action, by the Department of External Affairs. This is partly the result of the improvement in communication, the result of television, of seeing so quickly what happens in other countries instead of having to wait, as we had to wait before, for so long to see it. That will mean a pretty radical change in the future and it will mean that the Minister for External Affairs will have to do a great deal of revitalising of thought in Iveagh House, a great deal of revitalising his own thoughts on the employment of our personnel here and in the embassies abroad. If we do not see signs, real signs, of that between now and this time next year we will be able to tell him that at least we warned him that it was coming.

I should like to begin by welcoming the fact that the Minister made such a relatively long and substantive statement initiating this debate. It was, as I recall, rather the practice in former years to make a very brief statement at the start, mainly of a financial order, and to reserve the major statement for the end. I feel it is useful to have this full statement at the beginning and it gives something for the debate to go on, although, of course earlier speakers in the debate, like myself, cannot have had the opportunity fully to absorb everything in this document.

I would make the point that the document in question, the Minister's introductory statement here is, in fact, more substantial and I believe longer than his statement in the general debate of the General Assembly of the United Nations. I think that has to do with a tendency which exists, and which I shall refer to later on, of pointing the activity of the Department of External Affairs rather more in the direction of home public opinion than of international public opinion. I shall try to substantiate that later.

I cannot, of course, go critically into all the subjects which the Minister has covered in an expository way in his opening statement. Other Deputies speaking from these benches will go more thoroughly into some of these aspects, for example, into the question of the EEC and other matters which belong not only to the domain of external affairs but also to that of internal and economic affairs.

I should like to say a few words about what the Minister says about Biafra. I welcome, first of all, the fact that he has gone into the matter at length. I think it is the first extended statement we have had on this tragic and very complex subject. The Minister said, and Deputy Sweetman agreed with him, that it would not be of advantage to recognise Biafra. I agree, certainly as regards the present time. It would deprive us of any stand we might have in mediation or in intercession or even quite possibly deprive our relief activities of some of their openings and it would, quite possibly, endanger our people, our missionaries, in other parts of Nigeria. However, I think this is not what people have been asking for. What people have been asking for in connection with this matter is that the Minister should join those who have called unequivocally, clearly, and openly for a cease-fire in this war, a cease-fire without political pre-conditions. I think that is not too much to ask. I think it would not endanger anybody nor reduce our possibilities of mediation.

On my way to Biafra last Easter, talking to the people in Sao Tome who were organising the relief flights, I heard from them the expression: "Peace is the best relief". I know that the Minister does not disagree with that. Obviously, he does not, but I think it is a question of how our policy on this has gone over the nearly two and a half years that this war has been going on; we have subordinated our views and our activities too much to those of the British Government on this matter. The British Government have supported, in fact—and I regret this very much—the policy of a quick kill, of over-running Biafra and they have supplied the arms for that. We have never criticised that course of action. I feel we should have done so in moderate but clear and firm terms. It was a very wrong policy and we have a certain right to put this point to the British Government.

We all accept here the idea, as relevant to this island, that unity shall not be imposed by force, that a minority is not to be coerced. What is happening in Nigeria is the attempted coercion of a minority, a minority, incidentally, three times greater than our population in this part of the country. What we rule out for ourselves we should also rule out in reference to others. We should support the position that President Nyerere of Tanzania took on this matter which is quite clearcut but, above all, we should throw our weight behind the proposition that there should be a cease-fire now without political preconditions. That should be clearly said.

The Minister, in the part of his statement relating to Biafra, paid a wellearned tribute to the work of Joint Church Aid and Caritas Internationalis and many private people here have contributed to that effort. In the past as I understand it, our Government have not contributed as a Government to these efforts. We have contributed to the International Red Cross and its activities which have much more of the approval of the Nigerian Government and, I may add, of the British Government. Joint Church Aid and Caritas, on the other hand, have been running the night flights of which the Nigerian Government disapprove. I believe our Government should contribute, if only as a taken of their support for what Joint Church Aid is doing and it has done in my opinion, rather considerably more in the area than the International Red Cross. The Government should contribute to these efforts financially. I hope we shall hear from the Minister that is being done.

I must own to some disappointment at the nature of the Minister's reference here to the situation in the north and to the activities of his Department on this issue at the UN and no doubt at the Council of Europe and elsewhere; to its bearing on the information activities of his Department and so on. I am aware that this matter was discussed in general and that the general question of the situation in the north was discussed here in the debate on the Adjournment. I think it is not quite enough, as far as the activities of the Department in this matter are concerned, to say that we have had a general debate on Partition and unification. This is a matter on which the Department which is under discussion——

The Chair must point out to the Deputy that since this matter was the subject of discussion within the past week it should not be raised again on this Estimate.

With the greatest respect, I ask for a certain measure of indulgence from the Chair on this point, if I may explain what I mean.

The Deputy will appreciate that if the debate were to be reopened at this stage, this matter having already been discussed the whole subject matter would be again traversed——

Surely this comes within the ambit of the Minister's Department and its activities? The Department is carrying out extensive propaganda to which the Deputy is entitled to refer.

Since when have our activities in relation to the situation in Northern Ireland been debarred from Parliamentary debate? Could this possibly be done?

The Deputy will appreciate that this matter was debated here and the Deputy contributed to the debate.

We are now discussing Estimates.

Some of the expenditure involved in this Estimates has been incurred as a result of our activities in the UN and elsewhere. I agree we cannot go into it in depth but most certainly Deputies must be in a position to refer to it in passing.

May I say something which I hope will help the Chair in making a decision on this? I would up for our Party in the debate in question. Deputies may recall that the Ceann Comhairle had allowed me three-quarters of an hour. I surrendered 15 minutes of that time to faciliate another Deputy. In surrendering time then I deliberately omitted the question of how this matter had been treated and dealt with at the United Nations. I did so in the confident belief that this being directly relevant to the Department of External Affairs Estimate and the International Co-operation Estimate I would be allowed to discuss it, not at any tremendous length, but to raise it here and to talk about it. I should like to appeal to the Minister for External Affairs to support me on this point.

Mr. J. Lenehan

Write a book on it.

The position so far as the Chair is concerned is that there has been a two-day debate on this matter and the situation in Northern Ireland has already been discussed. The raising of the matter at the United Nations was also discussed in that debate last week and consequently it would be regarded as repetition of material on this occasion.

Are we to understand that it is the Minister's wish that the northern situation should not be referred to on this Estimate?

I have at no time expressed any desire to prevent a discussion. I explained last week in the presence of Deputy O'Leary and Deputy O'Brien that I intended to go thoroughly into the UN operation on the Estimate but because of the debate arising separately on Northern Ireland I made there the contributions I would have otherwise included in my Estimate speech. I have expressed no desire to prevent discussion now.

The position is that we are discussing Estimates for the Department of External Affairs. There has been expenditure in relation to the situation in the Six Countries from the External Affairs Estimates and we cannot be debarred from referring to it in this debate.

The position as regard this debate is that External Affairs up to this has not included any responsibility in regard to that portion of the territory referred to as Northern Ireland. The Chair does not object to a passing reference to these matters but getting into depth on them would be bound to reopen the debate and it is because of that that the Chair must hold firm on this decision.

With all respect, I suggest it would be completely improper to debar any Deputy from discussing a matter of expenditure by the Department under the Estimates.

I agree with the Chair's desire that we do not have another discussion on the North of Ireland but could we say that we certainly may refer to our activities at the United Nations in regard to this matter? Surely this is in order and avoids the Chair's concern that the debate should not concentrate once more on the Northern question?

May I raise a related point? I had proposed in speaking about our foreign policy to refer in passing and in no depth to our policies in regard to Northern Ireland in so far as they form part of, or are a reflection of or are related to our foreign policy in regard to Britain. I should like to establish at this stage that such references, which are directly related to the general question of foreign policy without going into Northern Ireland affairs in any depth, will be permissible under your ruling.

The Chair must remind the Deputy that the took an extensive part in the debate on the previous occasion and had an opportunity then to refer to these matters. The Deputy will appreciate that repetition on this occasion would not be in order.

I am not quite clear to which Deputy the Chair is referring but the matters I should like to refer to are matters relating to our foreign policy generally of which Northern Ireland affairs form only a part. I could not have gone in depth into the question of foreign policy in the other debate. I only want to be sure that in referring to Northern Ireland as part of one aspect of our foreign policy in relation to Britain I shall not be ruled out of order in this debate.

What the Chair is concerned with is staying within the rules of order so far as the debate is concerned. It has been a rule of order that there shall not be repetition of previous debate.

I engage myself not to repeat anything which I have said before. I did not touch on this topic before. It seems to me that the question of how our Minister for External Affairs deals with a given problem at the United Nations, or elsewhere, is something which a Deputy, with great respect, should have an opportunity to discuss, if he has not discussed it before, on this Estimate. I do not propose to and, in obedience to your ruling. I shall not enter into the substance of what happened in Northern Ireland, nor shall I go over any of the ground covered in the debate.

I want to say something on this topic because—I am a former official of the Department of External Affairs —we always used to be informed that a major objective of that Department was the reunification of our country. I believe that most people in this country assume that to be the case. The Minister's party which have described themselves as the party of national reunification must believe that and must use their Department of External Affairs to that end. So I shall confine my remarks to the Department of External Affairs and to international affairs and I am sure that you will not wish to constrain me from referring to this most major aspect of the work of the Department. As I say, I undertake to you, Sir—and I assure you that I shall keep my promise—not to go over any ground I have already gone over before.

Let me, moving aside a little from that—to the relief, perhaps, of the Chair—refer to an episode which took place at the end of the war the relevance of which, I think, will become apparent fairly soon. At that time in Italy, public opinion was greatly concerned about the problem of the Italian colonies. There was a strong wish among Italian public opinion that these colonies should be retained. At the same time, those responsible for the foreign policy of Italy had to take into account the reaction of the great powers of Britain and America in particular. So the problem was what to do about this question. It was felt that it had to be raised but how far ought it to be pressed? At that time—and the story is a favourite one in the corridors of the United Nations because it is often relevant in many circumstances— the delegates in question, the Italian plenipotentiaries, received a telegram from the then Italian Foreign Minister, Count Sforza which read simply: "Fight to the end but lose."

Were those, in substance, I wonder, the instructions given to the Minister as to how a recent matter of importance was to be brought before the United Nations. Speaking as one with some experience of the United Nations and having been a delegate to the Assembly, a member of the Secretariat and a student of the political workings of that institution, I offer it as my considered opinion that this, indeed, must have been the spirit and substance of the instructions in questions: "Fight to the end but lose."

I base this opinion on a study of the recorded interventions and activities of the Minister at the United Nations in August and September, and also on the observation of certain silences and nonactivities of his and of his Government during the same period. Let me explain what I mean. Up to 17th August of this year, no attempt was made to raise the issue formally at the United Nations. It might have been useful to have it raised under the general head of Human Rights. It might have exercised a restraining influence over the progress of events had it been done moderately and clearly at that time, but it was not done.

Then came the eruption of mid-August, and this was followed by formal Government activity involving External Affairs and the United Nations. We informed the British Government, as you will recall, that the British troops which were then engaged in protecting the lives of the people in the Falls Road and in Bogside were unacceptable, and we demanded that the British Government should invite the United Nations to provide a peace-keeping force to replace those troops. If we are to take that move made by the Minister at the United Nations at its face value, it was unrealistic in two ways. First, it was obvious that the British Government would do nothing of the kind and would not invite a United Nations force into what it regards as its own territory.

The Deputy seems to be reopening the debate which took place here on two days last week and repetition, as the Deputy well knows, is not in order.

I entirely agree and I shall, of course, respect your ruling. At the same time, you may recall that speaking during that debate my own winding-up speech was truncated and, in truncating it, I assumed that it would not be out of order to refer in this debate not to the substantive question of Partition or reunification but to the handling of this matter by the Minister at the United Nations. I shall limit myself to that.

The British Government predictably and immediately rejected our Government's demand and our Minister then sought to have the request addressed directly to the Security Council. This, again, if it were to be taken at its face value, was a very large order indeed, an order so large as to border on the fantastic. Great Britain is a founder member of the United Nations and a permanent member of the Security Council. Its official title in both capacities is the "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland." We could not ourselves have been admitted to the United Nations without the sanction of that entity. We have never, so far as I know—and the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—formally challenged its right to that official designation. We have never in all the 14 years of our by no means silent presence in the United Nations formally requested the inscription of this question on the agenda of any organ of the United Nations.

Again I am truncating some of my arguments in deference to your ruling Sir. So, after all these years of prudent silence on this subject, broken only by a few discreet and harmless asides during debates on other matters, suddenly up we pop with the modest proposal that the Security Council should decide to send in forces against the known and firmly expressed wishes of a permanent member. I believe that, in the whole history of the United Nations since the Charter came into force, there was only one action that could have constituted something resembling a precedent for the action we were ostensibly requesting the Security Council to take. That was the decision during the Korean War to authorise General MacArthur as Commander of the United Nations Forces to cross the 38th parallel into the territory of North Korea. That is the only occasion, so far as I know, on which the United Nations forces entered what was recognised as the territory of a State against the will of that State. North Korea was not a member of the United Nations and it had already been branded as an aggressor State by reason of its invasion of South Korea.

In all the other cases where United Nations peace-keeping forces were set up and sent into troubled areas, this happened only at the invitation of the Governments in question which were internationally recognised as responsible for the areas. That was true in relation, for example, to the United Nations peace-keeping force in the Congo to which we contributed and in which so many of our soldiers served so bravely. Katanga, when there was fighting there, was regarded internationally as a province of the Congo and it was under that mandate that United Nations peace-keeping forces were there. They could not have been there had they not been invited by the Government of the Congo.

In blocking our move on this the British Government invoked Article 2.7 of the Charter which forbids the United Nations, and I quote the article.

To intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the State in question.

In certain circumstances—and I shall come to that in a moment—there may be real doubt as to whether Article 2.7 applies. There can be no doubt at all that that Government was on firm ground at the United Nations both in asserting that the area had always been recognised by the United Nations, with the mute exception of ourselves, as essentially within its domestic jurisdiction and also in asserting that the dispatch of a United Nations peace-keeping force to the area without the consent of that Government would constitute an intervention in the most obvious sense of that term and would, therefore, be ultra vires.

If all that did not suffice, under Article 2.7 (3) of the Charter the Security Council could not decide to take any such action without the concurring vote of Britain as a permanent member—this was the so-called veto situation—and it was definitely known an advance that Britain's concurrence would be withheld, that is to say, that even if a minority of the Security Council, against all probability and against the letter of the Charter, should decide in our favour, the Security Council could still take no action once Britain held out, but no one supposed we could get that far and we did not get that far.

In appealing to the Security Council to dispatch a peace-keeping Force our permanent representative emphasised that, responding to the feeling of the people of Ireland, the Irish Government could not stand by and could not tolerate this situation. This kind of language, "cannot stand by", "cannot tolerate" and so on is used infrequently in diplomatic interchange; it usually indicates that the country using it is either on the verge of going to war or thinks it appropriate for internal or external reasons to give an impression that it may do so.

The Security Council considered rather briefly not the substance of our Government's request but the question of whether it should be inscribed on the agenda. It was never so inscribed but the Minister for External Affairs was allowed to make a statement to the council in explanation of his request. I shall have something to say a little later about the substance of the Minister's intervention which was couched in rather calmer though not always wiser language than the original request for inscription. Zambia's motion to adjourn was unanimously accepted. As matters at present stand, the question has not reached the agenda of the Security Council, and it has been allowed to wither away.

The next move was a request to include the matter on the agenda of the General Assembly. In this also we failed. The British delegation opposed inscription on the agenda of the General Assembly and appealed to the Minister to withdraw it. The Minister did not withdraw it but simply allowed it to lapse.

It would have been an extraordinary achievement, indeed, an impossible one, to get the Security Council to set up a peace-keeping force in such a context. On the other hand, to fail to get the matter even inscribed on the agenda of either of the main organs of the United Nations was an extraordinary nonachievement on the part of our Government. I shall read the relevant articles, 34 and 35, of the Charter. Article 35 says:

Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34 to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

Article 34 says:

The Security Council may investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or a situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

That is very widely drafted. It is true that since our request to the Security Council was couched, by our own decision, in terms of a request for the setting up of a peace force and since that request ran so clearly counter, in the opinion of most members, to Article 2.7, the decision to exclude the item was understandable, but as regards raising the matter in the General Assembly, here a simple request for inclusion on the agenda failed. That, to anyone who knows the United Nations, takes quite some doing.

Article 2.7 was invoked that article which prohibits intervention in the internal domestic affairs of any country; but for years, since 1959 at least—and the Minister himself quoted the relevant text from Ambassador Cabot Lodge, who at that time was simply summing up existing practice—Article 2.7 was never operated to prevent the General Assembly from discussing anything; in fact, nothing on earth literally can prevent the General Assembly from discussing anything because it regards it as its business to discuss everything on earth. The internal affairs of South Africa have been discussed. Rhodesia has been discussed, which is regarded as an internal affair of Great Britain, curiously enough. The question of the human rights of the inhabitants of the South Tyrol, which was in dispute between the Governments of Italy and Austria, has also been discussed, as have many other similar matters.

There is one conclusion which forces itself on anyone who studies this: The Government wished, for the benefit of home opinion, to give the impression of discussing this matter, but it also decided, in order not to annoy the British Government too much, not really to press the matter home to the full degree which was in its power— Count Sforza's dictum: "Fight to the end but lose".

I am obeying your ruling, Sir, in not entering into the substance of this matter, and as I had, I must avow, intended to enter into the substance of the matter, which seemed to me to be relevant, this places me in a little difficulty in which I must ask for your indulgence.

The whole exercise at the United Nations, from the United Nations peace-keeping force down to the exhumation of the so-called federal solution, was an exercise in semantic gimmicks conducted mainly on the platform of External Affairs and of the United Nations and intended for just two purposes, to take the heat off the party of unification, especially the internal heat and to preserve its image before the electorate. I think it is relevant to this debate to make this point because there is always a temptation to use the external affairs, the international relations of a country, for scoring points in its internal electorate. That is what has happened here and I think it is dangerous. Of course, some good did come out of this but also some evil, and here I should like to look at some of the Minister's statements which he made on this before the United Nations.

The Minister, in addressing the United Nations Security Council, said :

The use of British troops alone is unacceptable because British troops constitute a basic factor in the perpetuation of partition.

That position could be sustained only through military support from outside. The presence of a foreign— British—force in Ireland and the intransigence of the Northern Unionists remain the two elements in the division of Ireland.

I should welcome an assurance from the Minister that that statement has been superseded by the Taoiseach's statement. If British troops are, as the Minister told the Security Council they were, a "basic factor" in that situation what does that implv? Why should they be a "basic factor" if there is no intention on our part in any circumstance to coerce the majority there? If these troops are a redundancy—one might describe them as an irritation—they could not be a "basic factor" in that situation. They only become a "basic factor" if what we are saying—with half of our minds—is, "We could conquer you if the troops were not there". Then they are a "basic factor", but if that is not so then they are not.

This is a revelation on the international plain of the deep confusion which exists under the surface of our minds and all our recent good professions on this matter. The Minister should talk to the House about the logic of those remarks—I refer not to the Minister's remarks which were, I think he will agree, unfortunate on this point but to the Taoiseach's remarks— which implied that our efforts must be addressed to persuasion or to laying the ground work for future persuasion. We might expect the Department of External Affairs to play a part in that through cultural relations activity and the like. I do not think we should get bogged down in the kind of quibble —which is perhaps necessary to make legal distinctions and so on—that the north is not an external affair. It may not be in the profound spiritual sense, but as long as it is internationally recognised as part of an entity, an entity which we all agree to be foreign, the United Kingdom, then I do not see how the Department of External Affairs can avoid having something to do with it. In fact, they do not avoid that.

The activities of the Department of External Affairs which I have discussed so far are fairly typical. I do not mean to say that they are typical of the Department's activities but they are typical of the kind of use which the present Government make of that Department. I should like here to mention the case of Vietnam, which, as far as I can find out, was passed over in total silence in the Minister's speech to the General Assembly. It was not passed over in his speech to this House. I would prefer that the Minister had passed it over in silence here and had spoken about it at the General Assembly, but, I am sorry to say, the Minister chose the other course.

Deputy Sweetman said he thought the Chinese should not intervence in Vietnam. I fully agree with him. I do not think the Chinese should interfere in Vietnam and I do not mind anyone quoting me on that.

Or the Cubans.

Or the Cubans. The American Government should not have 493,700 troops, which by the latest count is what they have, out there. It is at least 493,699 more than the Chinese or the Cubans have. This is a situation which over the years has given immense concern, not only to many millions of people in the United States—possibly a majority there now recognise that it was a mistake—but to European Governments which are no less friendly with the United States than we are, who have come out against this commitment and called, in terms as friendly to the United States as they could be, but clear and firm, for an ending of this terrible commitment there. We are in default in relation to our own traditions, our own responsibilities and our own moral professions in passing it over in silence. The principles of the United Nations Charter, that commitment for recourse to peaceful solutions, which we support, is being violated by the largest war that is now going on. I do not think we should have been silent on this, nor do I think we should address our remarks solely to ourselves on this matter.

In the past we have said things about apartheid, about the practices of the South African Government, the situation in Rhodesia and also about the illegal occupation of the South African Government in South West Africa. Again, the Minister has mentioned some of these themes here but he did not judge it necessary to take them up at the United Nations. It might be said that this was because we had made our position clear on earlier occasions. There is such a thing as making a position clear and then making another position clear by a silence. That is to say while you pay lip service to this subject you are not emphasising it, you are in fact fading it out. The South Africans, of course, understand that.

I do not think it irrelevant that Córas Tráchtála, with the approval of the Government, have given their sponsorship to a South African Trade Mission here. These trade missions have political objectives. In fact, since the South African Government have no economic interest in promoting sales of our goods to that country, one might see in purporting to help us in this matter that they are motivated by political reasons and we are helping their political ends by our sponsorship of such a trade mission. I cite this example as symbolic of our subordination in practice to the requirements of the interlocking network of Western capital. In our external relations we may pay lip service to principles which transcend these, such as the "brotherhood of man regardless of race", but on the strict understanding that where there is the possibility of a lucrative deal these principles will be regarded as irrelevant. Many of our people do believe in these principles and believe that our Government in their external relations are maintaining them, but that is not the case.

In so far as there is a wide divergence between the principles which we profess and what we actually do, between the positions we take up publicly on a major national issue and how we act in apparently putting these things forward, there is a misuse of resources of high quality. Deputy Sweetman in the course of his remarks criticised some members of the Department of External Affairs. I am sure that some members of that Department, like all other human institutions, deserve such criticism. However, I believe it to be the case that we have a greater number of highly trained personnel in that Department, perhaps greater in proportion to its total size, than in any other Department.

If I am not mistaken, when these people are required to involve in activity which contains a large element of make believe, like the recent sudden chorus, equally suddenly stilled, for a major public relations campaign on Partition, they are disoriented, they are demoralised, they fail to see a consistent thrust and a consistent purpose behind external affairs. The lack of such a coherent central thrust and purpose was evident in the Minister's speech to us today. It was essentially a collection of papers prepared in different sections of the Department. That in itself is obviously unobjectionable but they were not held together by any central concept of where we are going and of what we are trying to do.

On that point, I should like to mention with regret the fact that the Department of External Affairs have sought to prevent the Irish people from finding out about foreign situations in which interest here was aroused. I am not blaming the present Minister for External Affairs, I am not blaming any personality: I do not wish to do that during debate on any Estimate but I am speaking of Government policy, in particular of the statements, rather widely made and recently brought out in an important book Sit Down and Be Counted by Lelia Doolan, Jack Dowling and another. The book is about various pressures brought to bear on RTE.

I am not concerned with any of these pressures here except in so far as they do not affect and do not bear on the activities of the Department of External Affairs. However, there were two which did. RTE intended to send a team to Vietnam so that the Irish people would be directly informed by direct coverage. That was cancelled under pressure from the Department of External Affairs. A similar mission to Biafra later was also cancelled. The obvious conclusion was that the live picture which would result from direct coverage would be contrary to the picture which the Department of External Affairs wished the Irish people to have of the situation. It is a highly undesirable situation that the Department of External Affairs should concern themselves with a kind of censorship on the inflow of relevant data to Irish public opinion. That should not be the concern of the Department of External Affairs and I hope the Minister will give an undertaking that under his guidance, the Department will altogether refrain from that or indeed any other kind of pressure or censorship in relation to our life in this country.

We on these benches believe that Ireland could and should recover and assert its independence in its external relations, an independence which has gradually eroded during the years to the point where our vote at the United Nations on major issues is entirely predictable. The Minister may wish to contest that. I should be happy if he would, if he could show us that we have a fully independent policy.

He included in his speech just now a brief and rather opaque reference to the isolation of China, an important matter, and also a test case in the UN of the independence of voting of member States. Almost all delegations in the UN, as the Minister will be aware, if they could be consulted offstage, as it were, would agree that it would lead to the strengthening of the UN and to a safer world if China, that is the real China whose capital is Peking, were seated in the UN. The reason for that is not that China would bring an extravagant importation of virtue or moderation into the proceedings of that organisation but that it is representative of a very large fraction of the human race and that it is safer to have China in than out so that the peacesaving processes of the UN can be used in relation to situations in which the Chinese are involved. They are kept out mainly due to American internal policy as between the Republicans and the Democrats, and through the influence which the US wields on other delegations, including ours.

Under Deputy Aiken, as Minister for External Affairs, for a time at least we liberated ourselves from that situation to a degree. Afterwards, we gravitated back into it and now we find ourselves saying very peculiar things about the rights of Formosa to a UN delegation of its own which nobody is seeking. I hope we will extricate ourselves from that and vote straight, as many other countries do, for the seating of the Government of China in the Security Council and in the General Assembly.

We believe that by following a genuinely independent policy in our external relations we would not worsen but improve our relations with other countries and especially with our neighbour, Britain. They are among the most important of our relations. We believe these relations are not well founded when they involve, as they do at present, a general routine of subservience as on Nigeria and Biafra, for example, tempered by occasional tantrums on a subject matter to which it would not be in order for me to refer. These tantrums have been followed by private explanations, and by the public but unexplained fading out of the subject matter in dispute.

We believe a better, more even, more self-respecting, more rational way of conducting our relations with Britain and other countries can be found. It contains more respect for the interlocutors and our own people than is always evident in the present style. We hope that Irish men and women will increasingly realise that external relations are not something to be left to the Government or the so-called party of reunification. We hope they will realise that the question of reunification—which is still a matter of concern to the Department of External Affairs, I believe—depends not on some gimmick of the day but on the nature of the relations between the two communities in our island and the character of the two social systems in the two parts of the island. I quoted Mr. de Valera on this subject the other day and I hope his pregnant saying of 1933 has not been forgotten. If we can realise that, and if it stays in our vision and our actions, we can begin to make progress in this and other matters, including the general conduct of our external relations.

Listening to Deputy Cruise-O'Brien, I was rather amused at some of his remarks and comments on external affairs as carried on under the present Minister and myself. His reference to subservience to Britain is most amusing.

You look very amused.

In the last three years when I was in charge of the Department of External Affairs there were 23 UN votes on major issues. Of those 23 major votes, once we voted similarly to Britain and on no occasion did we vote similarly to the US.

What about you?

I will not let the Deputy interrupt me when I did not interrupt him. It is strange to think of Deputy O'Brien casting aside Formosa as if it were of no importance, as if it had not as much right to its independence as the Irish people or as 100 per cent of the countries who got their freedom since the war. It is all very well for Deputy O'Brien to say: "Let in China." I am in favour of letting in China but I am not in favour of letting in China while still holding prisoner a nation which has as much right to its freedom as ourselves and as the nations which have got their independence since the war.

The present China includes Formosa.

When Chiang Kai-Shek retreated to Formosa in 1949, when he was driven off the mainland or driven out of China, which is a better way to put it, they tried to stop him landing to reoccupy Formosa. Chiang Kai-Shek and his troops slaughtered tens of thousands of Formosans who were trying, as we were over the years, to maintain their independence against a great neighbour.

We would have no right to vote that China should be recognised as a sovereign state with sovereignty over Formosa. Deputy O'Brien accused us of not having put down a motion in the United Nations or taking some action which would have repudiated the title by which Great Britain is recognised in the United Nations, that is, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Great Britain was recognised before we got in. Neither the previous Government nor ourselves had an opportunity of objecting to its inscription under that particular nomenclature. However, as I say, I am in favour of seating China in the United Nations.

Why did you not vote for it?

I spoke about it. I am not in favour of admitting China with sovereign power over a people who are as much entitled to their independence as we are ourselves.

The existing representation?

Please do not interrupt me. There are certain things Deputy O'Brien has said which I think require to be answered. I have not answered them because I did not want to and I did not think it a wise thing, because some individual who has his role to play tries to make controversy on certain items of foreign policy on which we are all agreed or largely agreed except himself. I do not believe in facilitating him by always answering every statement he makes. However, I answer, first of all, this charge about China and I want to say this. When I became Minister for External Affairs leading the Irish delegation in the United Nations I voted for the discussion on China in the United Nations much against the will of the Americans. A lot of song and dance was made about it. It was the only time we had a real debate or a division in relation to External Affairs in the Dáil. We voted for a debate on the representation of China. We continued to vote for a debate on it, and against the Americans, until the Americans came around and voted with us for the debate. What do you expect us to do? When the Americans came along and voted for the debate were we to turn around and vote against them and say there would be no debate?

Every year, while I was there, we spoke about Formosa and we spoke about China. We had no hesitation in stating what was our view on the matter. It was that the Formosan people had as much right to their independence as any of the nations which had got their freedom since the war and that if they respected their own freedom and wanted to maintain it for their children they had a right to vote for the admission of China but only representing China and admitting Formosa as an independent state.

They are Chinese.

Will Deputy Desmond cease interrupting and allow Deputy Aiken to speak?

He should be interrupted because we have not heard from him in years. It is years since we heard him speaking.

You may say that because it suits your book at the moment. The Formosan people do not think they are Chinese any more than we think we are British. They fought very gallantly and lost tens of thousands of their population when Chiang Kai-Shek came along in 1949. It is also amusing to hear Deputy O'Brien assert that the Chinese should be permitted to grab Formosa——

The present Chinese.

——and at the same time he claims for the Congolese that they should have had Katanga, with which I agree, and he denies that the Nigerians should have the eastern province. There is no doubt but that the Federal Government of Nigeria had as much moral and legal right to prevent the hiving off of the eastern province as had the central government of the Congo to prevent the hiving off of the eastern province——

Or the Chinese to prevent the hiving off of Formosa.

——of Katanga. If the Deputy wishes to take the line of being pro-Chinese to the extent of wanting to give them Formosa, he is entitled to take that line but he will not have me with him.

They have Formosa.

The British had Ireland for many years and we objected to it. The British had Ireland for centuries longer than the Chinese had Formosa. And for hundreds of years before they overran the country the British Pale in Ireland was much wider than the width of the Pale when the Japanese took Formosa from the Chinese a few decades ago. The only foreigners who ever went through the whole of the country of Formosa were the Japs.

I wish to say something now about the problem of Nigeria. The Irish people were very much aroused by the slaughter and the frightful suffering that went on there. They responded very generously by raising funds for the purchase of supplies for people in need in that part of the world. We were the first Government in the world to allot money to help the people in distress in Nigeria. Within a few months of the start of the war I approached certain university authorities regarding the few hundred Ibo students from the Eastern Province who were studying here and I told the authorities that the Government had undertaken to grubsteak these students and see them through their courses at the university. The university authorities, too, were very generous in their treatment of these students.

We were one of the first Governments in the world to have made available a reasonably large sum of money to the Red Cross with which to purchase relief supplies. The sum made available was £100,000. To Deputy Cruise-O'Brien I wish to say that the Red Cross is a very respectable and highly respected international organisation that has done a lot of good work during this war to calm rancour, to stop fighting and to aid those people suffering from disease and hunger. I am aware that Deputy Cruise-O'Brien is very enthusiastic about joint churches of all descriptions but, perhaps, he might agree with me when I say that in this particular case the Joint Churches Organisation was not quite as acceptable to the people of Nigeria——

Acceptable where the need is greatest.

——as the international Red Cross. The Red Cross has been continuing negotiations to get an arrangement whereby Colonel Ojukwu would allow the Red Cross to send in food to prevent the children form starving and, I think, they got an agreement from the Federal Government that would allow the food to be sent in provided that it was inspected by, among others, representatives of the Federal Government. After all, there is a certain legitimacy in their approach. This is a war; it is not child's play. Thousands of people are dying and the future, not only of Nigeria but also of Africa, is being decided by the outcome of this war. At any rate, the Federal Government insisted on being allowed to inspect the material on any plane that was stated to be carrying relief supplies. I heard an Oxfam representative boasting on a radio programme that they did not take ammunition with the food—that they only put food on the ammunition planes into Eastern Nigeria. He was not stating any secret. It was well known that double cargoes were going in and Colonel Ojukwu made no bones about the fact that he would not take in food if by doing so it would prevent him getting in arms. He is a soldier and he is trying to win the war that he started. Naturally, the other people do not want him to win it and if they did it would be the same sort of situation as if Katanga had won its independence.

That is preposterous. It is wholly incorrect.

The same sort of outside forces were working in the two countries. As I often said to my African friends during the years, we all recognise that Europe made a savage cutting up of Africa. They got together in Berlin and drew lines on the maps across rivers and across mountains while completely ignoring tribal considerations. I said to the Africans that these are the boundaries that were set up and I told them that if they were to agitate for the rectification of the boundaries then for goodness sake to do it peacefully and not to try to repeat the history of Europe for the past couple of thousand of years. If, as is my belief—and I persuaded the Government to go along with me on this—the Ibos succeeded in getting their independence by force of arms——

Let us hope they do.

——and with control over tribes that think they have as much right to be independent of the Ibos—the Tivs and the Ibidios and the Rivers people in the eastern region think they have as much right to be independent or at least not subject to domination by the Ibos——

The Biafrans are not a tribe.

——as the Ibos think they have to be free from the rest of Nigeria. There are 200 tribes in Nigeria. If one tribe got started on this, the other 199 would think that they had as much right to be independent as the Ibos had.

The Biafrans are not a tribe.

There are 2,200 tribes in Africa. Each one of them will make as good a case for independence as the Ibos. I am not against the independence of the Ibo people, or of any of these other tribes. I would advise them that if they want independence they should try to get it in some other way than by taking up arms, and that they might start a movement that would result in Africa's future history being as bad as Europe's past history has been from the point of view of wars, slaughter and famines.

I persuaded the Government that we should not, in our circumstances, be the first European country to recognise the independence of this African tribe which was breaking away from its federal state. I had several good reasons for this, not only for the sake of the Africans but for the sake of the Irish who are scattered all over it.

On our television here there was a repetition of the canard which appeared in one of our papers about my part in advising the Government not to recognise Ibo independence. The story was that the British had hundreds of millions of pounds invested in Nigeria and that they were naturally very keen to protect their investment. It was said that the reason we did not recognise Biafra, as it was called, was that we had an investment there, through Guinness's, in the federal country. That was hitting pretty low. The real fact was that we had 2,500 Irish men and women, lay people and clerical, scattered throughout the whole of Nigeria including Biafra, the Ibo country. I suppose one-third of our people were in Ibo-held country and the other two-thirds were in the federal-held country. We were naturally anxious about these people. If any motive we had could be held to be unworthy in the light of all the circumstances it was that one of the reasons we were not keen on recognising the Ibos was that two-thirds of our people in that part of the world were in the federal-held territory. It is not correct to say that we were cowardly in not recognising the Biafrans. Any motive can be put on our action. I resented very keenly when Irish television came out and repeated this canard.

Irish television never went out.

Irish television showed a programme. I can tell you how the story was got for the programme. It showed pictures of poor, starving children and of people dying, and it wound up by saying that Ireland did not recognise Biafra because Ireland had an investment in the federal territory, the investment being the Guinness (London) group. There was no mention on the television programme that we had any other interest than to protect this Guinness (London) company investment.

Why did the Deputy not let RTE go to find out?

I did not know that RTE were proposing to send a team to Biafra until I read in the papers that the team had been called home from Lisbon. Some people do not want to recognise Lisbon; they want to recognise Cuba. Lisbon was a very vital centre in all this business. This picture was used in order to incite people during the election. It was taken 18 months or two years before. Part of it was used in support of this canard. I did not know that it was proposed to send the RTE team to Nigeria, but I knew that certain gentlemen were using Lisbon as a centre. They had got the money from Americans and this was published because the men who got the money had to disclose it to Congress and the Government. They got one million dollars or so to help Colonel Ojukwu on the promise of future oil concessions. These dollars were used to buy a plane in America. I can tell the Deputy where the plane was bought and from whom but I am not going to tell him here. This plane was bought and they came to Britain and they hooked up as many television teams in Europe as they could and also nobbled our television team to go to Biafra. The assembly point was in Lisbon, Portugal. We know, of course, that there were certain people in Lisbon who were helping Ojukwa, not for the sake of his big brown eyes but because they, as well as certain people in South Africa, wanted to see, above all, that any African Government which threatened to become stable was broken up.

(Interruptions.)

I will come to Lagos. Do not take me away from beloved Biafra.

I am glad to hear the Minister use that expression.

Deputy Cruise-O'Brien does not care very much for the Portuguese but the Portuguese were the people who supplied Biafra with arms. They supplied them——

What did the Deputy say?

I said the French, rather than the Portuguese.

The French came into it very late in the day, not until 18 months after the war started, and they came in for their own purposes. The Portuguese were the first into it, the second were the American oil companies and the third were the South Africans, these wonderful South Africans fighting for the freedom of the poor blacks in Biafra.

Very few of these people did anything.

Wait a moment. Other great supporters of theirs were the Rhodesians. They were highly delighted to get an opportunity of supporting one black man to kill another black man. That was the situation. I do not want to go any further into this business. It is a great tragedy that these poor countries, which had been struggling for their freedom, had been suppressed over the centuries, and through the accident of a world war had run into a situation in which they found that their oppressors were not as strong as they used be and their oppressors discovered that for themselves and so they released them by the score, without any preparation and without having given them any training in handling the problems of modern Government.

The Deputy asked about Lagos. I knew most of the Ministers in the Lagos Government right from their independence and I knew some of them before that. They were doing as good a job as they could with the Constitution that the British left them. I remember discussing the Constitution with the British official who negotiated and set up the Constitution. I said I thought that he was very wrong to have made only three provinces and that if they had made 33 there would have been a better chance of stability. One province can defy two provinces but one province cannot defy 32 so successfully. Lagos was trying to make a reasonable job of creating a stable situation, of having a progressive Government, and giving everybody a fair crack of the whip.

The Ibos, although they represented only about one-tenth of the population, had three or four Cabinet Ministers in the Federal Government. One of these was a very famous man who attended Trinity College. He was their foreign Minister for many years. Unfortunately, the situation broke down with the murder of Sir Abubaka Belawa and his Cabinet. That was a tremendous tragedy because he was the man who had kept the Nigerians together, who was trying to make progress and trying to get the tribes to understand that they were in favour of creating one Nigeria for all its peoples who would be treated equally and in which the liberties of all would be respected. That revolution was led by four young Ibo officers and it had its repercussions with the attacks on Ibo civilians. That, again, was followed up——

The Minister means the massacre of 30,000 people?

One of the best authorities on that was an Irish priest who said he thought that it was about 300. Three hundred was too many. Even if there were only 300 or if there were 3,000 or 30,000 Ibo people who lost their lives——

They were not all Ibos.

But these were not the first killings. The first killings were by the four Ibo officers who slaughtered a Government and then, when they got control, proceeded to slaughter any officers who had come from the northern region. Then we had the war starting and all I can say is that I hope the people here will continue to support those who are suffering on both sides and that they will realise that the genesis of these troubles in Africa does not derive from any double dose of original sin that Africans have any more than the Europeans have, but from their history of colonial oppression and the fact that when the colonists were retreating they retreated in bad order and left the potential of civil disorder and chaos behind them.

May I congratulate Deputy Aiken on one point? I have heard him on many occasions answering questions in this House and never before has he mentioned the word "Biafra". This evening he said it for the first time in his life. Perhaps, it was when he got carried away with interruptions that he referred to "Biafra". Heretofore, he always referred to the people fighting there for their existence as the "Eastern Province". I do not think I ever heard him refer to the Ibos before this evening. He recognises the fact that the Ibos exist and are a strong tribe in Africa.

I should like to say to Deputy Aiken, the former Minister, that it is becoming day by day ever more evident to me what a tragedy it was that he did not go to Africa himself. We were so closely and intimately connected with what was going on there that it should have been the first duty of the Minister to go there himself to see what was happening and, had he done so, a great many lives might have been saved and progress might have been made along the road to peace. I hope his successor will go to Nigeria and to Biafra as soon as possible so that he may fully inform himself of the conditions there.

Deputy Aiken's suggestion that one would have 199 tribes looking for independence if the Ibos, who are numerically 8,000,000 strong, achieved their independence is utterly ludicrous. I was glad he admitted at the end of his discourse that one of the motivating causes of the breakaway by the eastern provinces, as he called them—I prefer to call them Biafra—was due to the massacre of 3,000 people; he acknowledged that 3,000 were too many. He admitted that others were massacred, but this was the first wholesale massacre and it was the predisposing cause to the war in Nigeria today.

But the murder of the Hausa government was preceded——

The Hausa government?

It was largely a Hausa government.

It was a coalition government, including Ibos, Hausas and the northern tribes as well.

But the Ibos had fled at the time when the Hausas were murdered.

If 3,000 Fianna Fáil people were massacred the rest would probably flee as well.

Out of the government?

Yes. They fled out of the government and armed to defend themselves. Numerically, they were not in full strength in the overall position. The Biafrans were never consulted one way or the other.

That is true.

When the former Minister says we are not following on the lines of the United Kingdom I say that we are. The United Kingdom is supporting the existing Nigerian state, which has no meaning whatsoever from the point of view of population, tribes, or anything else. There are 8,000,000 Ibos and surely they are entitled to their independence? If the present Minister and his predecessor knew anything about Africa they would know that nearly all the states there are small and a population of 8,000,000 in an independent African state is the exception rather than the rule. There are many African states with populations of only 1,000,000 or 2,000,000 people.

Nigeria is, as the former Minister said, the key to peace in Africa. They were a most stable people there. I was there many years ago and I met many of them. I have met many of them since on the political level. These people were forced into insurrection by the stupidity of the colonial power. I have listened to two debates in the House of Commons and the story is always the same: the argument is that Britain must keep supplying arms because supplying arms will put an end to the war. There will be no end to this war. The only solution is a "cease fire". If Ireland had played her proper part we would at least have had the opportunity of taking pride in having done so. We have done absolutely nothing from the word "go".

The Minister dealt fairly considerably with the problem in his speech today. There is no change in either his attitude or his outlook. The idea seems to be that this war must end soon; we have done all we can to supply help and consolation and so on. We are the only European people who have a direct interest in Nigeria on both sides of the existing frontier. We have contacts with both sides. We are not a political power. The policy of the Minister is a continuation of the policy of his predecessor: leave it to the Organisation for African Unity to settle the matter. If the Minister and his predecessor knew anything about Africa and Africans they would know that there is a greater chance of settlement if that settlement is brought about by someone completely outside Africa. There is no country in Europe which has the standing there that we have. For no other country have the African people such a high regard as they have for us. That is due to the fact that we have so many missionaries and other devoted people in Africa.

I regret, as do my colleagues, that so little action was taken when two of our nationals, nursing sisters, were killed in Africa recently. The Minister referred to this in his speech today but he did not tell us what pressure was put on; neither did he give us any indication of what our representative there actually did. Our Parliament has a right to be informed in a matter of this kind. He did not give us any information as to what the reply from the Nigerian Government was. I have in my pocket a letter, which I will show the Minister, written to me by a missionary describing what happened. An aeroplane came over, flying low; the occupants of the plane could see who the people were and what they were doing. The plane went away, came back again, and bombed them; it went away again and came back a third time, again bombing the people and killing this unfortunate Irish sister.

I have always pressed that we should take an active part in trying to end this war in Africa. We send ambassadoes to different countries. We send people on trade missions and so forth. Inevitably and inexorably Biafra will become an independent state.

Hear, hear.

It will be a solvent state. It will not be dependent on subsidies from any other country because, say what one likes about the Ibos, they are an intelligent and hardworking people. They occupied most of the important jobs in the state of Nigeria when it was one because of their ability and application. Biafra will be an independent state. I believe it is our duty to support Biafra in her hour of trial and tribulation but, quite apart from that, from a material point of view surely we ought to have enough common sense to appreciate that ultimately this state will be an independent state and we will want to trade with it? I hope the present Minister will send an Irish Parliamentary delegation—this is something practically every other European country has done —to Biafra at the earliest possible moment and then to Nigeria to use there the influence we command, an influence the Minister's predecessor would know we command if he had ever gone to Africa. This delegation should be despatched as soon as possible.

The Minister spoke pretty extensively about our entry to the European Economic Community. He spoke with some optimism on the subject. I recall the stock-in-trade answer of the former Taoiseach Mr. Seán Lemass, who is no longer with us in Dáil Éireann, that we would be in the EEC in 1970. Of course, the advent of General de Gaulle ended that. Now the situation has changed somewhat politically. The de Gaulle era is over and Monsieur Pompidou is now President of France and hopes have been raised that there will be an early response to the applications of the United Kingdom and the other three countries for membership of the Common Market.

The Minister for External Affairs brushed aside as practically non-existent the Monet proposals. The Monet proposals are something that many of us have dreaded for a long time, that is, that negotiations with the United Kingdom should take place first and that the other countries should open their negotiations afterwards. May I say that the benefits that we Irish people hope to get from the Common Market are totally different from what the British would expect? The British look for large industrial expansion, as undoubtedly they will get with their long tradition of industry and their up-to-date methods of manufacture. We are comparative newcomers to industrial life and must expect to face severe competition in the industrial arena. In any negotiations we have we must ask for that fact to be taken into full consideration. Nobody seems to have thought about that. The benefits that will accrue to us will be largely agricultural. At present the agricultural position in Europe is again in a state of flux. Originally there was the rather ingenious arrangement of a common agricultural policy beneficial to all the member states. We would be very interested in securing for ourselves agricultural markets as early as possible and for that reason we should negotiate as soon as possible.

I do not like the tone of the speech of the Minister for External Affairs today. I do not like the implication in it that everything is all right, that the United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark and Ireland will negotiate, that the door will be opened and that we will walk into the Common Market. We do not want to be walked up that path again.

I have stressed time and time again that we should open our negotiations just as soon as the British start to negotiate and, if possible, we should open our negotiations before the British do. I do not see any great problem in that. From my experience in Europe, which is considerable—I spent 12 years on the Council of Europe and took a very active part in its debates and in its committees generally—I know that the tendency in international circles is to consider the big fellow first and to leave others aside. It is only by pushing yourself and forcing your opinion and your aims and ambitions at every corner of the street day in and day out that you will have an opportunity of being heard in the councils of the European nations.

I envisage—and this is what I fear— that we will be told in this House that our application stands on the statute book—or whatever is the official description—and that negotiations are starting on behalf of the four countries. That is not what I want to see happening because I know that negotiating on behalf of the four countries will mean that we will be talking to junior officials who have no say or very little say, who can discuss matters with us but cannot take vital decisions, whereas the United Kingdom will be negotiating her entry into the Common Market. It is only wishful thinking to think that the United Kingdom—and British parliamentarians will tell you this; they have said it to me often—are going to ensure that we get into the Common Market. The only people who can fight for us are ourselves. We must fight and must fight alone. The sooner the Minister realises that, the better.

There is one thing that strikes me about the situation relative to the European Economic Community at the moment. There is a general consensus of opinion that negotiations will start immediately. That, to my mind, is untrue. Very long and difficult discussions took place some 12 months back at which the agricultural policy of the EEC was hammered out and finalised. Since then we have had the devaluation of the franc and the upgrading of the German mark. The up grading of the German mark, perhaps, more than anything else has made nonsense of the European Economic Community's agricultural policy. It is for that reason that the line of thought has been growing not only in Europe but throughout the world that there should be a stabilised international monetary currency instead of having the sterling, hard sterling and the dollar competing with each other and repeatedly getting into trouble, which would be bound to destroy the very basis of agreement on the EEC. If the members of the EEC wish to put their house in order as I am sure they do, it is likely that there will be a stabilised monetary unit so that they can all co-operate and avoid what has happened so recently within their sphere. Not alone has it happened to them, it is happening all over the world. Our trade suffers the economic repercussions as soon as currencies run into trouble. Therefore, I do not think negotiations for our entry are likely to take place immediately. I do not place very much credence on what the new German Chancellor more or less indicated, that the United Europe that we are all thinking about is just around the corner. Herr Willy Brandt has always been in favour of United Kingdom entry, has always felt that Britain should get in, that there was nothing to stop her getting in. I think there still would be a great deal of resistance against that. Even with the best will in the world, I do not think the EEC is in a position to take Britain in.

With reference to our aid to underdeveloped countries, in my view the most important factor for world peace today is for the wealthier countries to ensure that hunger is dealt with efficiently. We are not a very big State but we would rank as one of the wealthier countries because we are better fed than the average nation. It is said that we eat more. Perhaps, we drink more. I am not sure whether we do or not. It is necessary that all the wealthy countries of the world should ensure that the greatest problem in bringing about world peace, namely, hunger, is dealt with efficiently.

That brings us back to the question of unification of effort in the world. It is somewhat disastrous that so many philanthropic organisations and so many states are operating separately with the result that food and other requirements cannot be brought with the greatest efficiency to famine areas. Unfortunately, sufficient notice is not taken of the fact that there are people who hardly have one decent meal in their life. About one-third of the world's population is on the verge of starvation and another one-third is underfed. We do not stop to think of these things until some crisis descends on us.

In international conferences that I have had the privilege to attend it has always been brought to notice that the greatest problem in the world today is hunger. A great deal of time is devoted to discussion of nuclear disarmament and similar problems and of the Vietnam war and so on, which is disastrous in itself but there is no greater disaster than world hunger. We would all be well advised to bear that in mind whether we represent the Right or the Left. I am told I represent the Right: I do not know whether or not I do.

I went pretty thoroughly through his speech and, so far as I am aware, the Minister did not mention that, some years ago, the British Government— I think the Labour Government—imposed those levies and kicked us in the teeth shortly after the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement. I was in Europe at the time and I read all the European papers on the matter. They all acknowledged that, in view of our close economic association with Britain, we had been kicked in the teeth harder than anyone else by the imposition of those levies. In fact, they made nonsense of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement. It was just another trade agreement that went down the drain inside four or five months.

The other day, the levies were reimposed. I am told that our financial situation—our trade balance, and so on—is not so good today. To offset the levies imposed by the British Government last year, the Irish Government generously provided £3 or £4 million to pay the rate of interest. In other words, they gave the British side to the agreement a donation of that sum to ensure that the trade was continued between the two countries. When replying to the debate, I trust the Minister will tell us if the Irish Exchequer will be called upon again to provide a similar sum of money to offset the destruction to our trade which the further continuation of this levy will otherwise impose: he is responsible for trade agreements.

I propose initially to refer to the contribution of the former Minister for External Affairs, Deputy Aiken. We should not accept some of his sweeping partisan and biased assumptions. I think the 2,500 Irish nationals in Nigeria-Biafra today certainly must view and can only view with some disbelief and with some general dismay the contribution of the former Minister for External Affairs. If these are really his views, which he has finally conveyed to the House, most certainly I think they would not regard him as having very much perception on the affairs of that tragic nation. Certainly, he has used repeatedly the term "secession"; he has used repeatedly the term "Balkanisation". Then, there is the general favourite cliché of what I would call Jacobin politicians trying to justify deliberate suppression—there is no other word for it at this point of time—with the support of the Soviet Union, with the support of Britain, in Lagos, of some 14,000,000 Biafrans. It is because of the very dimensions of this problem, and because of the fact that 2,500 Irish nationals are involved, that we in Ireland would expect that Deputy Dr. Hillery should at least have proposed some elementary initiative in his contribution in this House today. Secondly, I think he could take up, and must take up, the call made by the Labour Party spokesman in this House, on this vote, Deputy Dr. Cruise-O'Brien, for a cease-fire without political preconditions. The Minister should take at least that elementary initiative in respect of Irish foreign policy rather than subject the House to vague pious aspirations for peace which have been trotted out here over the past 18 months in relation to that tragic situation in Biafra.

One of the quite remarkable aspects of the contribution of Deputy Aiken before his departure for his tea this evening was his total failure to refer to the fact that Britain repeatedly has given arms, that the Soviet Union, as the second major world power involved in this conflict, has given arms, through Lagos, directly to help the Nigerian Government—vastly more than any aid or assistance given through Lisbon or, indeed, through the belated entry of the French into this particular tragic strife in Biafra itself.

There is also, I think, the fact that we must place on record in this House our non-acceptance of Deputy Aiken's assumption that Biafra is, as such, the Ibo tribe, and, as such, that 14,000,000 people are being dominated by a few immature Army people from the Ibo group in that particular State. Frankly, I do not accept this. I think that, in the first place, Biafra is not a tribe as glibly suggested by Deputy Aiken. It is now, whether we like it or not, a multination State of some five main ethnic groups who have in common a unity of co-existence and, by and large, a common culture; by and large a Christian culture and, by and large, a visible solidarity in a State which certainly I have no doubt could emerge as a separate viable entity on that continent.

Certainly, the separation of Biafra from Nigeria in May, 1967, far from being the potential cause of the strife, which Deputy Aiken referred to, I would have thought was a continuing process of the general de-colonialisation of that particular continent because this, in fact, is what I think one can generally say it was. The colonial lines were drawn by the imperialists in that area. It is only right up to the nine years coming up to 1967 that that particular process of frontier dismantling, of frontier de-colonialisation, began in that area. I think Biafra is an elementary symptom and development of that approach. We had the break-up in French West Africa. We had the secession of Zambia and Malawi from the Rhodesian Federation; we had Ruanda from Urundi and so on. These were general developments which can be said to be developments which could be approved of and which certainly were a development of de-colonialisation in the area.

I think the tragedy has been that Deputy Aiken, in his long years of fraternisation at the United Nations, seeing that he was not preoccupied with EEC, seeing that he had dismantled any interest he ever had in Vietnam and seeing that he had no conception of civil rights for Northern Ireland, could at least have preoccupied himself with a finer and a more elementary understanding of the situation in Biafra generally and particularly South West Africa, Rhodesia, and South Africa itself, to which I shall refer at a later stage. Therefore, I would reiterate the Labour Party view that it is high time the Irish Government called with all their strength at international level for a ceasefire without political pre-conditions. The Minister for External Affairs should certainly take the initiative in that regard. Likewise, he should approach the British Labour Government and urge them not to continue to supply arms to the Nigerian Government. This should be done in an effort to deescalate the situation. There are two elementary topics which I would have expected to be dealt with in the Minister's speech today but in regard to which I am afraid we were sadly disappointed.

I do not want to sound carping or unduly critical. I know it is the role of Opposition Parties generally to find fault with Ministerial speeches but frankly I commend the Minister on this occasion. Certainly, he was more discursive in his 30-page document than Deputy Aiken was when he was Minister. Indeed I think this debate is generally better than what we were wont to hear when the former Deputy James Dillon gave us his annual diatribe on the terrors of atheistic Communism. We are also relieved to note that Deputy Burke is carrying the Government's foreign policy to the avid audience in New Delhi. At least we are spared those interventions in this debate, but we must say that the Minister's speech has been in many respects rather disappointing. He confined his comments as he said, to the EEC developments, to Nigeria and Biafra—important as these matters are—to disarmament generally and to the Irish involvement in the UN peace keeping operations. I feel that these four aspects, crucial and important as they are, pale into insignificance beside what we might have expected from the Minister. We saw no remorse, no comment, no observation, not one iota in relation to the situation in Vietnam where 450,000 American troops are involved, where there are many Irish people and people of Irish extraction in the American armed forces. Forty thousand Americans have died; billions of American dollars have been spent; there is Irish contribution in blood and yet no comment from an Irish Government on what America has done in the past three or four years. This frankly is a matter of regret.

In relation to South-West Africa we have seen the continued escalation of racial conflict in Southern Rhodesia and in South Africa itself. Again, apart from a general expression of regret about the running sore, as the Minister says, of colonial oppression and apartheid in South Africa and vague references, acceptable as they are, there is no general analysis of the situation. There is nothing in relation to the tremendous development now in progress in the Portuguese colonial territories involving seven million Africans. Whether we like it or not, this again is a major area of international conflict. In Guinea, Angola and Mozambique the Portuguese Government practise repression of the highest order in a completely colonial context. This situation, apart from the Minister's welcome comment of general disapproval this afternoon during Question Time, is not dealt with. There is no mention of the repression which has revolted the world currently in operation in Greece. There is no comment on the role of China in the United Nations apart from the general aberration we got from Deputy Frank Aiken, who still cannot make up his mind whether there are Chinese on Formosa Island or not, notwithstanding the fact that some 95 per cent of the population of Formosa are Chinese, and when Chiang-Kai-Shek came there some decades ago he got rid of remaining Formosans there, who did not particularly agree with him anyway. The Irish Government can produce an estimate speech which does not even refer to 25 per cent of the population of this earth, some 600 million Chinese who are a major international problem, requiring the most delicate attention on the part of an Irish Government, on the part of every government, requiring approaches which should be of major concern to all of us.

Likewise, there is no reference made in the Minister's speech, if I may make a general mention of the situation in Northern Ireland, to the fact that we seem to have had two Departments of External Affairs in operation in the past few months. I do not propose to develop this point but we have had the operations of six seconded public relations officers involved in Irish foreign policy and no reference to it in relation to the staff of a major Government Department here, namely, the Department of External Affairs.

There will be a Supplementary Estimate on which that can be discussed.

One would hope to hear the drama and the general saga of the Government's developments in that respect clarified at that point in time.

These, then, are some of the general aspects which one would have expected to see included in this contribution from the Government. One must first of all take the omissions from the speech itself. The first omission I would take is the question of South Africa. This is a question of major importance, one in which admittedly there may be involved a very considerable amount of repetition on the part of Irish Governments but one on which we have been very loath to comment extensively or as we might do at the United Nations. In South Africa we have a multi-racial state composed of about 12¾ million Africans, about 3½ million whites, 1.8 million coloured people—that is people of mixed racial origins—and over half a million Asians. Where is there an Irish policy in relation to that subcontinent?

It is a matter of regret that the Department of External Affairs did not seem to take any initiative nor did they seem to show any reaction to the promotion of trade with that country or to the promotion of advertising for jobs in that country by South Africa House. I have not seen any effort on the part of the Minister to point out certain things to Irish emigrants, who are being offered jobs, particularly in the Sunday Independent, a newspaper which has repeatedly given extensive coverage to South African advertisements of a quite misleading nature. I understand there is a general arrangement between that newspaper and the South African Government for such advertisements. It is high time the Irish Government pointed out to Irish emigrants who accept such jobs that if they go to South Africa, being white, most likely they will be joining on the white side in the general oppression of the people of that country. There is an obligation on the Minister to point out these things to our people.

Let us have no illusions about this. Irish people exposed to racialism are as easily contaminated and are as subject to the pressures of it as are the people of any other nation. We should, therefore, undertake this elementary act of foreign policy, political hygiene, in relation to Irish emigrants, such as has been undertaken in many other parts of the world. If an Irishman goes and works, say, in the mining industry in South Africa he gets an average wage of about £32 a week. This must be told to an Irish emigrant. He will of course have the right to vote in South Africa and the right to join a trade union. If he is typical, he will soon believe that South Africa, despite the fact that the non-white population—to use that terribly offensive term—comprises four-fifths of the population, is purely a white man's land.

While I appreciate that the Minister fully sympathises with our rejection of South African policy, nevertheless I feel that there should be much more publication of these facts by the Department. Everybody applying for an Irish passport to go to South Africa should be told the facts of life there by an Irish Government as an elementary development of Christian morality. The Minister should point out that any Irish person emigrating there will be demanded to enthusiastically respect and develop racialist policies in that country. He will have to give nine months of military training in that country—a fact often unknown to Irish emigrants to South Africa—and indeed that he may have to fight during that period of military training against those who are currently fighting for their freedom. It is like wise important to point out that an Irish Government should tell Irish emigrants that in the country to which they are going they will meet black people whose wages will be something in the region of about £8 per month whereas a white person gets £32 a week generally. These are facts of life which are not fully appreciated by Irish emigrants to South Africa.

The Government should point out that an emigrant will meet in South Africa black people who have no right to vote and cannot elect a parliament under any circumstances, who are not legally in a position to join a trade union or to live with them on a normal, common basis. Therefore, there devolves on the Minister a very definite obligation to have prepared in the Department a general exposition of this problem for Irish emigrants. The material is already available without any difficulty to the Irish Government from the United Nations and the International Labour Organisation and from the African National Congress there is open to the Government a vast literature on apartheid which should be availed of.

Likewise, there should be some general prohibition on bringing diplomats from South Africa to this country for the sponsoring of trade affairs and meeting Irish business people here because their exports to Ireland, whether we are prepared to accept it or not, come from employment which is exploited, which suffers the most rigorous repression and the goods concerned are produced mostly by the sweat of an exploited black labour force in South Africa. This is something of which we should be fully conscious and I deplore the fact that we had to employ members of the Special Branch of the Garda Síochána, to make sure that the stay of such trade delegates, so-called, would be most pleasant at the expense of Córas Tráchtála. These are aspects that must be emphasised and which I think have been ignored here. In Ireland we seem to think that because we live in a distant land with no particular colour problem automatically we are totally immune from pressures and that we cannot become deeply immersed in the relationship between the different races and so we take no further interest in such developments. These are some points I would ask the Minister to consider. He should do something about them before we come to the next Estimate in 1970.

As regards Portugal, the other omission from the Minister's speech, I would repeat what I already conveved to the Minister during Question Time this afternoon, that there is a good case for the general ending of diplomatic relations with that country. In his reply, the Minister said he wished to keep open liaison on diplomatic matters with that country mainly for communication purposes. I hope it is not the kind of communication envisaged by Deputy Aiken in the past few minutes.

Keeping communication open as distinct from expressing approval of their policies.

It is difficult to express approval or disapproval——

I expressed disapproval, but I want to keep open communication.

As I said this afternoon, I regard that approach as something of a legalism. I cannot see how it will contribute to the overall situation. The seven million Africans in these states—Angola, Guinea and Mozambique—regard the continuing presence of an Irish Ambassador in Portugal as something which overtly gives approval, perhaps unintended, by the Irish Government for the policies of that Government. I do not propose to refer to the internal affairs of Portugal or the farcical recent general election there, but I still think there is an opportunity open to the Irish Government, which has never in our history been availed of, of at least bringing pressure on the Portuguese Government and perhaps using our diplomatic presence and the possibility of its withdrawal in such a way that they might react in a more humanitarian and normal manner than heretofore. The Minister has an opportunity open to him to undertake action in that regard.

I also wish to refer briefly to the question of the Irish approach in Vietnam. It is significant that the American Government have now decided after internal traumatic upheaval to consider plans to withdraw some 300,000 troops from Vietnam by the end of 1971. There is also a possibility of a general unilateral cease-fire and I would hope that the US President, Mr. Nixon, is genuine in his statement that he would try to broaden the regime in Saigon itself on a slightly more democratic basis although, as we know, its current formation is very much open to question. This House I think must go on record very strongly against what one might almost call the conspiracy of silence by the Irish Government in relation to Vietnam right through the history of the war there, which is still very much in progress. I think the performance of Deputy Aiken—admittedly now in the twilight of his political career when it is easy for Deputies on this side to be critical— must go on record as one of massive equivocation, massive deafening silence, when the occasion demanded otherwise. When the Pope, for example, denounced American policy in many respects we still had reluctance on the part of the Irish Government to bring all pressures to bear, as they had every opportunity of doing, in the United Nations, so that that tragic country would be given its independence.

Hundreds of thousands of acres in Vietnam have been completely defoliated. Thousands of villages have been utterly razed to the ground. The country is literally pock-marked at this point of time with bomb craters from B 52 raids. These are filled with water and serve as nothing more than breeding grounds for malaria and other after-effects of international warfare. More tons of explosives have been dropped on that tiny country than were dropped by all the Allied powers during World War II. Yet, the Irish Government, apart from calling for peace in the most vacuous terms, never called a halt notwithstanding that Irish people were involved in America through the American armed forces. That can only be regarded as an indication of the lack of humanitarian concern on the part of the Government, that staggered most of us here.

Indeed, on occasions, the Irish Government, if anything, gave overt support for American policy which we certainly can only regard as being nothing short of reprehensible. I hope that in the future Vietnam will emerge unpartitioned as a free and independent country. It may be unpopular to place on record in this House the regard and respect which internationally was won for the leader of the North Vietnamese, Ho Chi Minh, who is no longer in a position to lead his country. Now that it is fashionable and safe to do so in international circles, one, perhaps, may pay tribute to the leadership which he gave to the Vietnamese people down through the decades when they were being oppressed by the French and by the Americans in turn. I have no doubt that in time the Vietnamese will achieve the national independence which they have so long sought. This is something which, perhaps, we have failed to appreciate fully.

We could equally condemn, as has been done by Deputy Dr. O'Brien in his comments here this afternoon, the reaction of the Department of External Affairs and, more particularly, the Minister's—one must always segregate the permanent staff from the Ministers; they have my sympathy on many occasions——

Which has the Deputy's sympathy?

In relation to Vietnam I would certainly deplore the intervention of the former Minister for External Affairs in preventing an Irish RTE team from going there. In effect, he succeeded for once in literally suppressing an opportunity to obtain the truth in relation to that country. We must equally point out that no matter how humiliating it will be for America —and that humiliation must in many respects be very great—they have no option open to them now but a unilateral cease-fire and a withdrawal in toto from that country. This is a painful operation for America. I do not particularly propose to add to it, but there is an obligation on the part of the Irish Government to make sure that that operation is done as speedily, as effectively and as urgently as we can possibly demand from them.

There are now 40,000 American dead. There are some 300,000 American people wounded or maimed for the rest of their lives as a result of that conflict. America has built up armed forces of some 5,000,000 Americans with all the interdependent facets of militarism, a society in which government is the operative word in almost any activity between any group of people. You have therefore a situation in American in which 50 billion dollars is spent on a war which this Dáil overtly approved of because we had not got the common courage to oppose it when the occasion was presented in this House. I should like to pay tribute to Deputies on my side of the House, such as Deputy O'Leary who raised it on occasions when the backbenchers of Fianna Fáil poured forth a cascade of reaction simply because somebody dared to talk about a withdrawal from Vietnam. Therefore I have the opportunity of paying that tribute to him.

There is also an opportunity open to the Irish Government for a reapproach to the involvement of the Chinese people in the affairs of the world. I know this will be a delicate operation but, now that we have shed the distinguished Deputy Aiken from the affairs of Formosa and Vietnam, now that this is no longer a matter of any great international importance, and particularly to the Americans, I have no doubt that there is an opportunity open to China to make a major contribution in the United Nations. When they get through their current ideological clashes with the Soviet Union, when the border clashes cool off and when Ho Chi Minh departs— and I do not think his continued presence in China in many respects can by and large——

Mr. J. Lenehan

I thought he was gone.

When he departs I have no doubt that there will be a glorious opportunity for the Irish Government to back the entry of China into the United Nations. You cannot have a situation in which 600 million people in that country are debarred from fruitful participation in the United Nations. I do not think we need worry ourselves unduly about Formosa or, indeed, their presence in the Security Council itself. I do not think that is an aspect about which we should be unduly worried.

In his speech this afternoon the Minister congratulated the former Minister on being the general innovator in respect of Ireland being the first member of the United Nations to propose in 1958 a draft resolution in the General Assembly on the prevention of the wider spread of nuclear weapons. I do not want to be unduly partisan but the Deputy sitting next to me and Deputy Aiken, I think, can jointly claim to have been responsible for that and I do not think this remark is amiss or unduly inappropriate in this House — and I include the staff involved on that occasion. These are aspects which are of major importance.

Another area about which one can express concern is the lack of involvement on the part of the Minister, admittedly new to his position, in relation to the Middle East. The Minister stated that as a first step it is urgently necessary that both sides should desist from all provocative acts of any sort. Well, we said that in relation to Vietnam originally. We said it in relation to Nigeria and Biafra. We are now saying it in relation to the Arabs and israelis. I am afraid we will continue on with this kind of pious platitude. There is an opportunity open to the Irish Government to state as must be stated no matter how much it may pain the Israeli Government, that the settlement based on the November, 1967, Resolution involving an Israeli withdrawal to its pre-May, 1967, borders—with UN troops, I would hope, on both sides—certainly is an equitable solution, and it must be brought about with a general recognition of Palestinian rights. Frankly I think there is an opportunity open to the Irish Government to make approaches along the lines of the United Nations Resolution.

If the Deputy will forgive me for interrupting, I said that our policy is well known but what we want now is to stop provocative acts. The things the Deputy mentioned have been published by my predecessor.

In relation to the current Middle East situation I would not regard the Irish Government as having any position. I would regard our statement on the reduction of provocative acts as being a non-comment in the context of foreign policy.

I was assuming the Deputy knew the policy as published by my predecessor.

Deputy Aiken did not publish very much when he was Minister. I think we have to appreciate that there is a serious situation there and that if one takes any area running from the Mediterranean to the Pacific, if one goes from Tel Aviv down to Capetown, one will find there a government that supports the current policy of the Israeli Government. I am afraid there is an obligation——

Mr. J. Lenehan

Hitler did not support them either.

——on the Irish Government to indicate to that government that it should in fact live up to the spirit and the intent of the UN Resolution. This opportunity is open to the Minister in the year ahead in the United Nations. I have no doubt that with the concurrence of the Israeli Government a lasting peace can be brought about.

I must confess that when I hear General Dayan in some of his statements on the general extension of Israeli policy I begin to doubt that, but I have no doubt whatever that President Nasser and Mrs. Meir and many other of the Israeli spokesmen who claim to be socialists—in many respects that is rather ironical—can reach a solution if there is a reduction of provocative action particularly on the part of Israeli. I think this must be stated in this House because, while nobody is under any illusion about the aspirations in that part of the world, nevertheless, at this point of time the balance of advantage does not lie with them.

In relation to the Common Market, the Minister indicated in his speech that the hopes of the applicant countries are now fixed on the summit conference of the EEC member states which is to take place at The Hague on 17th and 18th November, and that this occasion would be of historical significance in relation to EEC developments. It would be appropriate for the Irish Government, if possible, to have top-level representatives present as observers at that summit conference. The Minister would then be in a position to convey to this House a more coherent and informative report on that conference.

There is also a case to be made for consideration by the Government of the revision of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement. We have had the rather amazing spectacle of the British Government deciding to continue the 50 per cent import levy, now reduced to 40 per cent, and no response from the Irish Government apart from the vague expression of regret by the Minister for Industry and Commerce. That is just not good enough. It means another £2 million of the Irish taxpayers' money must subsidise this decision on the part of the British Government. It means a continuation of the alleged breach of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement. There is a good case to be made for a White Paper from the Government on EEC developments related to our trading relations with the United Kingdom. This is overdue, and the Minister could usefully join with the Minister for Industry and Commerce in circulating to Deputies an up-to-date analysis of the position in the Common Market itself.

There exists on all sides of the House a very common desire to ensure that Irish foreign policy is a true reflection of what all Irish people think in relation to foreign policy. Unfortunately, in the Northern Ireland debate the Taoiseach made one of those typical Fianna Fáil—if I may use the term: I have not mentioned "Fianna Fáil" this evening—allusions, namely, that "we are the party of national reunification and the other parties are welcome to join in with us in advancing that policy", again this assumptive concept of their being the repository of all the political wisdom in a nation of over two and a half million people. Now that we have had a breath of fresh air brought into the Department and presuming that the Minister will be resident in Ireland for the greater duration of his tenure of office, I think we can certainly ask him to consider the proposition that there should be established an all-party committee on foreign affairs. While I would be loath to suggest that Deputy Cruise-O'Brien would be his permanent adviser, nevertheless, from all sides of the House, from Fine Gael, from Labour and Fianna Fáil there is to be expected a contribution in depth and in public. I would hope our committees would meet in public, not like the notorious shambles of the Government's committee on health before which I remember appearing, with the former Deputy MacEntee acting very much like Chiang Kai Chek in the Formosan situation; we were banished every ten minutes. One would hope that there would emerge working papers on various aspects of Irish foreign policy with the assistance of the permanent secretariat in the Department of External Affairs. This would be a valuable and useful innovation. I think it can be said that in many respects there is unanimity of attitude among Irish people and this could be expressed more coherently in future.

It is with that in mind that I express some disappointment with the Minister's contribution here, not in any patronising sense. We had references to Russian intervention in Czechoslovakia, the Middle East situation deteriorating, a critical situation in south-east Asia, the Vietnam war dragging on interminably, Communist China continuing to be segregated from the international community, the running sore of South Africa and so on. None of these were dealt with adequately in the Minister's contribution here this afternoon and I would certainly hope to see them elaborated on at greater length in the future.

I can assure the Minister that our criticisms are made in the expectation of the long-awaited evolution in this country of a foreign policy which up to now has been deposited in the files of this country at the United Nations in the personal command almost exclusively of Deputy Aiken from whence he occasionally came to this House to pronounce on various aspects and from which he went again and nobody was one bit the wiser as regards Irish foreign policy.

As the only ex-colonial country in Europe we can, I am convinced, with a greater discussion of foreign affairs in this House, make the kind of contribution we certainly made during the early fifties when we emerged as one of the most highly respected members of the United Nations. I look forward to learning from the supplementary Estimate the extramural activities of the public relation officers employed during the recent Northern Ireland situation. I would have wished this afternoon to discuss the situation in Northern Ireland but in deference to your ruling Sir, I have not done so. Conscious that this House is in urgent need of Parliamentary reform, I certainly hope we shall have an opportunity of discussing it on the next Estimate.

I should like to congratulate the Minister, who is only in office a few months, on his handling of the Northern Ireland situation at the United Nations in the past month. I think few will cavil at or genuinely criticise the way the Government and the Minister carried out a most difficult task in New York and conveyed to the world that we were genuine in this part of the country in our concern for our fellowmen in the north being subjected to absolute persecution.

Things will never be the same again, I am sure, in the Six Counties, that part of Ulster, and thanks to the Miniter's handling of the situation the world has been made aware of the real problem. While many solutions were put forward here for the ending of this misery in the Six Counties, we should not be over-optimistic or naive about the effects this will have. It has been said here that Partition started 300 years ago.

Discussion on the subject matter of last week's debate would not be in order on this Estimate. We had a two-day debate on this matter previously and already this evening the Chair has deprecated any reference back to it.

With all due respect to the Chair, I submit the Minister, in his brief, said he would not refer to the north, thereby establishing the fact, that if he wanted to, he could refer to it. I thought that would apply to other Deputies in the House.

The Chair has repeatedly pointed out this evening that Deputies should refrain from discussing what was the subject matter of last week's debate and should keep to the debate on External Affairs as it is in the Minister's brief.

I bow to the Chair's ruling, but I do not accept it fully.

The Minister in his speech covered more than the Six Counties. Listening to the criticisms of Deputies on the Opposition benches one finds it hard to think they were genuine.

The Labour Party speakers slated the United States as though they were the only country in the world who had interfered in the affairs of another country. We never hear any of them criticise China for the rape of Tibet and for the attempted rape of India; or Russia for the rape of Czechoslovakia. Apparently, if it is American it is bad and if it is Chinese or Russian it is good.

Deputy Desmond referred to a former Member of this House, Mr. MacEntee. I think it should be part of our attitude and conduct here not to criticise former Members of this House. However, I would like to assure Deputy Desmond that if Deputy MacEntee were here he would take the pants off Deputy Desmond in no uncertain fashion.

Reference has been made from all sides of the House to the Nigeria-Biafra conflict. The children of this country, by their penny and shilling collections, have helped to send £420,000 worth of aid to Biafra. If Deputies were to follow the example of the children we would, perhaps, have some more definite action taken to relieve the terrible misery in both Nigeria and Biafra. It is not for us to say whether the powers behind this conflict are the Russian or the British armament maunfacturers, who make money from war, or the American oil companies but the fact is that thousands, if not millions, of human beings are suffering there. Anything we can do to alleviate that suffering should be done. The most effective attitude for us to take is not to ask why they fight but to do what we can to bring about an end to the fighting. There are between 2,500 and 3,000 of our people, lay and missionary, working out there, and in anything we might say about the conflict we should be careful not to jeopardise the lives of our fellow countrymen out there. Recently an Irish nun was killed in an air raid. The Government took up this matter and although it will not bring the nun back it may show that we regard the death of anyone there with grave concern, particularly the death of a lady who went put there simply to carry on the tradition of this country over the centuries of bringing faith and education to these people and showing them that Christianity when practised is the real thing for this life.

Criticism has been made in the past of the amount of money spent on the Department of External Affairs. When one looks at a sum of a little over £1 million one wonders how this Department carries on as well as it does. I should like to see an embassy or consul in every country with which we have any connection. Apart from the many trade benefits we would get, it would also mean we would be better informed of what is happening in every country. We have to realise we are a small country and that our influence is not great; whether we vote one way or the other at the UN it seldom makes much difference. We can show as a people who had to fight for freedom that we are conscious of the sufferings and the needs of the people whether they be in Vietnam, Biafra, Nigeria or the Middle East. I know we cannot end the wars but we can show our goodwill towards these people and in that way play our greatest role in trying to achieve world peace.

The last speaker criticised the recent elections in Portugal. I am always puzzled by the attitude of the Labour Party on this point. Perhaps, next year, an excursion might be made to Russia or China and there they will see a democratic election.

Deputy Aiken, in a very fine speech, stated our attitude towards the admission of Communist China to the UN. I recall ten years ago, when Deputy Aiken voted at the UN for the question of the admission of China to be raised, he was severely criticised here for doing so. The fact that he had done so was used against his Party at a bye-election which took place at the time. It is better to have Communist China in the UN than outside it but we would be unworthy of our past if we were to attempt to vote to admit Communist China and sacrifice the admittance of Formosa. It is like the people of our own history who, on being driven to Connacht were then abandoned because they had not stayed in the main part of the country. We may criticise their leader——

Who is their leader?

The Deputy is an expert, he can answer that.

I do not think they have one. They are all Chinese. There are not any Formosans.

We must never throw over those people who suffered first at the hands of the Japanese and are now suffering at the hands of the Chinese mainland.

This country in its short history at the UN—except for a few lapses in the beginning—has shown that we have an independent attitude and that we value the things that should be valued. We do not shut our eyes to the sins of Russia or China, while we berate the United States. The mother in Nigeria whose child has been slaughtered does not care what make of plane was responsible, whether it was a British plane dropping Russian bombs or a Russian plane with British bombs. That does not matter, the fact is that the child has been killed. We have not a great influence, but by our attitude in the UN and by sending help to the unfortunate people in Africa, we can help to ease the terrible suffering there.

I wish to pay tribute to a body in the city called Africa Concern which has been the main fund-raiser for Biafra, and I hope that the Government will see their way to increase the contribution towards international relief. As a small nation we cannot do very much, but we can show that as a country which suffered at the hands of an imperialistic power we realise what suffering is and perhaps other countries would follow our example. We rank eleventh in the list of contributor countries, but on a per capita basis we are much higher and this is indeed a tribute to our people who are ever generous in a good cause. Perhaps in the coming session of the UN the Minister would make known our disgust at, for example, the Russian treatment of Czechoslovakia. This is something that we must not forget and we must not hesitate to drive it home, that the hypocrisy which is being preached that socialism is synonymous with mercy is altogether wrong.

The election is over.

What election?

The recent general election in which Labour policy was totally distorted.

On Russia?

I was speaking of the attitude of people who suggested to this House that our party had not condemned Russia.

I have not mentioned the Deputy's party. The point is I have appealed to the Government—and I know with the present Minister, Dr. Hillery, there is no need to appeal— for greater help for those in need. This could be our greatest role in international affairs; we are too small to influence people militarily but we can influence them by showing them our genuine desire to help by providing assistance in food and clothing. At the moment nearly all of the food going into Biafra is transported by air. There is one small Irish ship which goes there very frequently and the best thing the Minister could do would be to ensure that this ship could go directly into Port Harcourt so that much more food could be carried.

The fact that we are not allowed to discuss the north has been a disappointment but I must abide by the ruling. In conclusion, I wish to congratulate the Minister on his very fine effort at the United Nations recently. It augurs well for the future of our place in the international sphere.

When the nineteenth Dáil convened on 3rd July last, I complimented the Taoiseach on his appointment of Deputy Hillery as Minister for External Affairs, pointing out that Deputy Hillery, as a medical man, might view the Nigerian conflict with a little more sympathy than his predecessor. However, since 3rd July, we have had absolutely no action whatsoever from the Minister——

I made an appointment with the Deputy and he did not turn up. In the lobby he asked me for an appointment and he did not turn up. He was worried about them. He asked me to meet a delegation and he did not turn up.

In his speech, the Minister stated that the war in Nigeria has gone on for a little more than two years. It has gone on for two and a half years.

What has the Deputy done since then? He asked me for an appointment but he did not turn up.

The Minister has done absolutely nothing in the past two and a half years. During that time there has been tremendous loss of life in Biafra, not due to war wounds or to gun fighting but due almost entirely to starvation. The situation there can be compared with the ancient siege of Jerusalem where mothers and children had to eat rats in the city. I visited Biafra with a team of Irish doctors who went there voluntarily more than a year ago and I saw people eating lizards and selling rats. Despite the massive interest being shown in this tragedy by the Irish people, the Department of External Affairs have done absolutely nothing to alleviate the situation. We may have sent a few hundred pounds, only a drop in the ocean.

£100,000.

It is completely inadequate to make any impact on the situation there.

Will the Deputy tell us how long he spent there?

(Cavan): There is a lot of cackling from the backbenchers.

The ignorance of the Fianna Fáil backbenchers——

I will deal with the Deputy.

He thinks £100,000 could make the slightest impact on the situation there. There is a procedure in this House and there is no need for the Deputy to show his ignorance here. He will have an opportunity to speak later. If the Deputy wants to speak let him do so.

I know the rules of the House.

Deputy Andrews may not admonish the Deputy who is speaking. He should allow him to make his speech without interruption.

It is misrepresentation.

I think Deputy Andrews should not try so hard to follow in his father's footsteps. If I may continue, I would suggest to the Minister that he send a parliamentary delegation out to both sides. I hope the Minister does not take me up wrong. I do not mean to rib him on this. I certainly agree that an appointment was made at one stage. Unfortunately, I became ill and was in hospital afterwards and could not keep the appointment. The situation as it is now is very much more serious than it was when the Minister was appointed Minister for External Affairs of the Irish Government. I would request, in fact I would implore, that you send a delegation to Biafra, that you travel with the delegation——

Not the Ceann Comhairle.

——and see exactly what the circumstances are like for himself. Referring to last week's Order Paper, when a question was tabled regarding the circumstances under which an Irish nun was killed in Biafra your reply said——

Will the Deputy use the third person? The Deputy I take it is addressing the Chair.

The Minister stated that inquiries were made into that. I should very much like to know what the result of those inquiries were, and who the inquiries were made to. Last October we had a visit from a person called Chief Enahoro who represented the Nigerian Government. During the course of his press conference he stated that four Holy Ghost Fathers, the names of whom had been given to him by the Minister for External Affairs, then Deputy Aiken, were running guns into Biafra and that this Government had supplied him with the names of the four Irish priests. This is a dreadful situation.

I suggest the Government try as best they can to send in food and also to provide aircraft for the relief organisations at work there. I know the aircraft can be provided if the Government agree to underwrite the loss of those aircraft and that pilots are more than willing to fly those aircraft into Biafra if they have sufficient life insurance on them. I know also that there are many doctors in the Republic who would willingly give months of their time out there serving in the refugee camps but, unfortunately, there is no permission or no sanction from the Government to do this.

Increasing this contribution to £100,000 is only an insult to anyone who wants to do anything. This sum should be substantially increased. Financial aid, material aid, every effort to underwrite the planes offered and condoning the entry of doctors into the Biafran war zone should be undertaken without delay.

I think that was a maiden speech and I should not have interrupted.

I propose to address myself briefly to what I regard as the most important aspect of our external affairs, that is, the question of our accession to the European Economic Community. I must confess that I am somewhat disappointed that the references to the EEC in this debate were rather fewer than one would have expected. It is opportune for us I think in this Assembly to use an occasion such as this to bring home to the people in the Six and the four applicant countries that we are in earnest about our application and that our lack of interest in it, as evidenced, perhaps, by the sparsity of reference to it, should not be taken as a lack of determination on our part to succeed with our entry. I am not referring to the Minister's speech because a section of it did deal with the EEC.

It is important that we newly elected Deputies in this House, as well as others, should give a lead to public opinion in this matter. It is true that our application for accession to the community was made in the early 1960s and was reactivated later on in 1966 or 1967. It is also true that a debate was held in this House on the 25th July, 1967 and earlier than that in the Seanad but I think we must avail ourselves of every opportunity to lead public opinion on this question of the desirability of accession to the EEC. I am glad of the opportunity to make my first remarks in Dáil Éireann and to place on record that I, speaking in my personal capacity, am thoroughly in favour of and willing to do everything in my power to see that our application succeeds.

It is important for us to try to get the background to this situation clearly in our minds. The background to the European question dates back to the last war when Europeans could still believe that they belonged to an important continent, perhaps, the world's principal continent. This view was an illusion, an illusion which was largely shattered by the war which ended in 1945. Socially and economically Europe was devastated and enfeebled. Politically and militarily Europe was overshadowed by two giants, the USA and the USSR who met symbolically in the centre of Europe in 1945.

The post-war extension of the Communist world, the desire of the USSR to separate from the rest of Europe by what Churchill called in his Fulton speech of 1946 "the Iron Curtain" could be explained away by Stalin's fears, traditional to Russia, fears that his position might be weakened by the attraction of the western democracies apart altogether from his traditional reasons of territorial expansion. The upshot of the situation was that he formed a series of buffer states stretching from the Mediterranean to the Baltic which in turn brought about a reaction resulting in the fall of Czechoslovakia, the formation of the Brussels powers, the Brussels Treaty, the Berlin blockade of 1948 and the formation of NATO.

The European situation divided into two camps and those who now find it convenient, perhaps, to refer to NATO in derogatory terms might do well to remember that at one time we in this country and in other western democracies were very glad of its umbrella of protection. I realise that times have changed but it would be well to recall those facts. The political changes in Europe were brought about by devastation in a kind of war unknown in Europe since The 30 Years War in the 17th century. Seventeen million soliders were killed, 35 million wounded and six million Jews exterminated in what was regarded as the final solution, apart altogether from nine million refugees. The material loss resulting from this war was daunting. Capital investment in roads, bridges and so on was minimal except where they served a military purpose.

Peace did not bring prosperity and it was in this situation that a far-seeing statesman, Marshall, launched his plan. The organisation of this plan, which resulted in the OEEC, was the first practical step towards organisation in Europe. Within Europe the reactions to the war released a force of idealism which Churchill gave voice to when he spoke at the University of Zurich in 1946. I think it important, too, that we should recollect some of these things if only to fan the flame of European idealism which, to some extent, is now dormant in most of the countries of Europe. Churchill said:

If Europe were once united in the sharing of its common inheritance there would be no limit to the happiness, the prosperity and glory which its 300 or 400 million people would enjoy. We must create a united states of Europe. In this way only will hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and hopes which make life worth living.

At this time in Europe there emerged a divergence between those people on the Continent of Europe who wanted to move towards a federal solution and those Scandinavian and northern countries which preferred a kind of intergovernmental organisation in which assemblies of delegates from national parliaments would meet to discuss matters. The Council of Europe which resulted was too weak to achieve the success that its founders had hoped for, although it did some useful work in such fields as culture, education and human rights with results like the European Cultural Foundation.

By the late 1940s a divergence of views on the achievement of unity in Europe was becoming evident and, unfortunately, whether it was our own fault or not, we were placed in the position of being with the northern Europeans outside the main stream of movements towards European unity. This divergence was later institutionalised in the form of the EEC and the EFTA. The historic pronouncement of Schumann on May 9th, 1950, was a very important step towards European unity. I do not intend to go into the details of that but by pooling the coal and steel resources of the major powers he tried to set up a situation where these powers would not again go to war.

The success of the ECSC and the emergence of the super powers made it seem that only through a pooling of economic resources could Europe regain a position of influence in the world. The success of this scheme led to the meeting of Foreign Ministers at Messina in 1955. This resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Rome.

Britain remained outside these various bodies partly because of loyalty to the Common wealth, attachment to her own special relationship with the United States and partly through a sense of peculiar detachment, political and economic as well as geographic from the Continent. Perhaps Britain had not—as the Six had—a faith in her institutions shattered by the experience of war. However, British public opinion in the late 1950s began to indicate a realisation of the mistake of being excluded from the economic advantages of a large trading community and a lack of political interest which resulted therefrom. This was instrumental in the setting up of EFTA which, if not as successful as the EEC, has been more successful than many predicted. Perhaps this was because of the fact that the standard of living at the time in the EFTA countries was higher than that enjoyed by the rest of Europe. Nor does EFTA contain the political objectives inherent in the EEC which successive British Governments came to accept.

As a result of the Irish lining up with Britain and the Scandinavians, the Council of Europe failed to evolve into an integrated community. Our subsequent negotiations on the Maudling Plan were so successful that we succeeded in convincing the other countries that our economy was so weak that we should be given special treatment and if negotiations had succeeded we would have become associate members. We did not participate in the discussions towards EFTA because of the agricultural situation in this country.

The Minister, in his speech, referred to the fact that the coming "summit meeting" which will take place at The Hague on the 17th and 18th November will be a historic moment. It is opportune for us to reflect that this meeting will take place in the very hall in which, in 1948, Churchill, Speak and others met to launch the European idea. In less than three weeks from now the Prime Ministers of France and the other five countries will meet to discuss what line can be taken regarding the present impasse in which Europe finds itself. Beyond the summit meeting there lies the fact that at the end of this year the EEC transitional period will be over. Beyond this point there is no chart by which the ship of Europe can find its way in the future and when we view Europe from this point of time we find that the political tide has ebbed away from Brussels. There are no more signposts to unity of the kind that made the Six compose their differences and there is little left of the will to work together. The EEC bureaucracy continues to turn out proposals. Ministers now come to Brussels more in the spirit of horsetrading than of trying to achieve unity. No one now seems to have the vision of a United Europe that inspired the founding fathers of the Community—Monnet, Schumann and Adenauer.

Three times since July of this year and once more on November the 10th, the Foreign Ministers will have lunched to hear French Foreign Minister, Maurice Schumann, spell out his views. Before the end of this year and before they can talk to Britain, France wants a new and binding agreement from the partners on the financing of the Common farm policy. This means that they want the Five to agree to an open-ended commitment to pay their share of the support and subsidies bill now running at 3,000 million dollars a year. With that in the bag they say that they could work out their plans for the future of the Community and that only then would they be ready for negotiations with Britain.

It might be said that this meeting in three weeks' time is the last chance that the Five will have to refuse the French and squeeze out a date for negotiations from the French Prime Minister. If not, Britain's membership and ours could be postponed indefinitely because the French plans contain a series of traps along the way.

To the French, completing the community means financing the new farm finance package. They conveniently ignore the fact that by the end of the year a new atomic research programme, blocked by the French and Germans, and the right of free settlement throughout the Community for a long list of the professions, should have been completed. They conveniently gloss over the fact that they have been given a two-year moratorium on the common farm policy granted to them because of their recent devaluation—and recent events show that the Germans may receive the same thing. The invidious position here is that the French can say that anyone who refuses to agree to the farm finance commitment will be accused of blocking the application of Britain for membership. If the Five agree, France will then list the things on which they want agreement before the talks begin—agreement on monetary policy, industrial policy, regional policy and social policy. The list can be endless. We can ask what they have done over the 12 years in which the community was in existence? Perhaps we may look at the Dutch to see whether something can be salvaged from this and we hope to see that they will call for an extension of the powers of the European Parliament.

France's partners are, I hope, in no mood to accept dictates in order to arrive at the negotiating table with no guarantee that even then negotiations would succeed.

In view of the magnitude of the problems yet to be resolved after 12 years, we can find only negative integration—the removal of trade barriers and things like that. The achievements of the Common Market to date pale into relative insignificance. The only real step forward towards the federal system has been the common farm policy with its central budget and the decisions taken jointly in Brussels, and even this is in crisis, as we see when we look at the problems about surplus butter and so on. The only long-term solution would be to move from the small, heavily subsidised farms to bigger, economic units. This seems to be running into political difficulties in the European countries although Dr. Mansholt is aware of this and is trying to force the Six to accept his ten-year structural reform plan.

Since the summer the Six have faced a more pressing problem and that is the connection between Bonn finance and monetary policy. The people at Brussels for a long time thought that common farm prices, set in dollars, would make parity changes impossible and that countries would not risk shifting the ratio of agricultural to industrial prices. The French and the Germans have both proved this to be the contrary. When France was forced to devalue she was allowed to break away for two years from the EEC price level. German revaluation may bring about the same problem. It will take two years to phase German and French prices back into line. Monetary union will have to come first, after all. Will the Six accept the modest monetary plan put forward by the Vice-President of the Commission which is a commitment to give one another automatic aid in balance of payment crises? The Six have had short term coordination which has proved insufficient without close and steady coordination of economic policies. Medium-term coordination has been going on for several years. It was not enough to prevent the divergence which made French and German parity changes necessary. We can have no farm policy without a monetary policy and no monetary policy without a coordinated economic policy but this latter means a policy on industrial development, on the supply and price of energy, on the rates and infrastructure of transport and on regional development.

Do we realise the extent to which the Community has lost its impetus? There has been no move on the proposals for housing grants for migrant workers, on tax harmonisation, or on European company law. The countries of Europe have allowed themselves to be driven back from the original idealism to a kind of retrogressive nationalism. Some of the blame for this should lie with the Commission. The new Commission of 14 members under Monsieur Rey has worked out longterm plans for the community.

Each one is going his own way as, for instance, Dr. Mansholt, on agriculture, Von de Groeben on regional development and there is a lack of overall strategy. The governments' interest in the community is declining. The French have been allowed to get away with their devaluation leaving the Commission to find a way to gloss over the rules. The Germans adopted a floating exchange rate and snubbed the Commission by refusing to accept its recommendations. Few are willing to make the sacrifices of going on to a more common policy worked out and decided on in Brussels. The solution might be to extend the transitional deadline at the end of this year but to do so the EEC Commission must take the initiative. Up to the present it seems reluctant to do so. It was true then when the Minister said in his speech that the Common Market were faced with a number of formidable internal problems on some of which at least progress will have to be made before negotiations can start. We would all agree with that.

Coming back to our own situation, can we in this country say we have used the last eight years since our application in 1961 to stir up a truly European feeling in this country? I do not think our country is as European as it could be. This may be due to the fact that we are placed between two large English-speaking groups and most of our news comes to us from the English and American press.

I am sorry the Minister is not here to listen to this point but I think it is time Dáil Éireann took a more systematic and continuing interest in the whole question of our accession to Europe. I would suggest that the time has come to set up a Select Committee of this House, drawn from the various parties, to be helped by the interdepartmental committees of experts which I am sure are working on this question. Such a Select Committee would help to keep all Members of this House in touch from day to day with the changing aspects of Europe's economic and commercial integration. Further, we must pay more attention to the small things that lead to a truly European climate in this country. For example, in the Estimate for Education, to which I will only refer to in passing in this context, for the purpose of running the European Schools Day we vote £800. This is an infinitesimal sum. If we were serious about it I am sure we could increase this money to enable a better job to be done. Have we proceeded with the various taxharmonising procedures necessary? Do we discuss the VAT and other matters? I do not think so. There is much to be done to convince our own people of the desirability of European unity.

I will end with the point I made at the beginning by saying that it is a disappointment to me that so little reference was made in this debate to the European ideal and to the question of European integration.

Níl sé ar intinn agam labhairt i bhfad. Is é seo an chéad uaim domsa ar mo chosa. Bíonn faitíos ar dhaoine áirithe labhairt ar an meastachán seo i nGaeilge. Tá sé ar intinn agam labhairt i nGaeilge mar feicim go bhfuil dlú-bhaint ag an nGaeilge leis an meastachán seo. Ba mhaith liom, ar an gcéad dul síos, a chur in iúl go raibh áthas orm an cainteoir deireanach, an Teachta Risteárd de Búrca, a chloisint. Bhí sé ábalta labhairt ar feadh leath-uair an chlog agus a chuid pointí a chur trasna gan droch-mheas a chaitheamh ar mhuintir na tire seo ná ar rudaí a bhaineas leis an tír seo agus d'éirigh leis sinn a chur ag smaoineamh ar an gcuma ceart.

Presently, Sir, I expect that you may be called upon to remind me that references to the North of Ireland are not appropriate to this Estimate but may I say that I intend confining myself to references made by previous speakers to the situation vis-à-vis the North of Ireland and the United Nations? Perhaps you will allow me to express what might be termed the other side of the story in so far as the Minister's activities there may be interpreted. On the day the Minister returned from the United Nations I went, not as a representative of this House but motivated by the ideas and the ideals that I have, to Dublin Airport to compliment the Minister on my own behalf, for speaking in such an admirable fashion before the United Nations about the situation in the north. What I say will not perhaps stand up to the analysis and the technical dissection which we get of freedom from other speakers in this House; they are as much entitled to their ideas and ideals as I am but I am speaking about mine and I shall cherish them until somebody convinces me that there are better ones. As far as I am concerned Ireland is a 32 County Republic; Ireland is one nation surrounded by the seas. Other people may see is in a different light——

Including the Taoiseach.

Including the Taoiseach, and Craig agrees with him.

Presently Deputy L'Estrange can tell us how he sees Ireland. When I say that I see Ireland in that way I am not being so foolish as to say that that is the present position but——

This is the spiritual idea.

Yes, and perhaps if the Deputy and his Party were a little more concerned about things of the spirit——

Oh, we are.

——and less concerned with material things we might, I suggest, be a better nation.

(Interruptions.)

Deputy O'Leary will have the opportunity of demonstrating to me how things which are materialistic, and only materialistic, lead to the situation where his party and the Fine Gael Party, and indeed every party in this House, speak of the Ireland of which they dream as being one eulogised——

On a point of order, Sir, both yourself and the Leas-Cheann Comhairle ruled Deputy Cruise-O'Brien out of order earlier this evening when he began to discuss Northern Ireland. Are you now favouring one side of the House?

The Deputy is not discussing the North of Ireland.

I am making the point that I am entitled to praise the stand of the Minister for External Affairs, Deputy Dr. Hillery, at the United Nations and to be proud of that stand, as much as other Deputies are entitled to deride it. If I am not in order I shall bow to your direction, Sir, but not to a direction from some Deputy on the other benches who was not here when Deputy Cruise-O'Brien was speaking. I am speaking as one who sees, in the times that lie ahead, this spirit of Ireland as being a very useful factor. Some Deputies seemed to sneer at the situation in which a publication recently referred to British troops being on Irish soil. Was that not a true statement of fact? I am not suggesting that it was desirable, or that in the circumstances it could be regarded as the best that could happen, but as far as the statement itself is concerned it was a true statement of fact. The Minister, Deputy Dr. Hillery, spoke about the feelings of the Irish people and about their not being too anxious to wait in the present circumstances. The Minister, perhaps, is not speaking on behalf of the technical men or the people who will dissect and analyse freedom, but he is certainly speaking on behalf of the majority of the people in Ireland.

I do not pretend to make any capital out of that statement but it is a true statement of fact. There is no doubt that the feeling of the people is that British soldiers are on Irish soil. There is no doubt about that and they were anxious that the Minister should go to the United Nations. Again I am not concerned with the backroom boys of the United Nations. Perhaps Deputy Cruise-O'Brien was experiencing a certain nostalgia and perhaps he had a feeling that he might have been able to handle the position better than those who were handling it; I am not saying whether he could or could not, but he seemed to make little of the attempts that were made. He referred to a phrase used in another context where we were told "Go in and fight and make sure you lose." I should be very unhappy to think that that was the attitude of our Minister. I admit readily that we are not in a position to take, nor do we yearn to take, issue with the British Army, or any other army, but the people of Ireland are not happy with this situation and they will continue to gnaw at the problem until the time is reached when the ideals cherished by the people of Ireland, the ideals expressed by the patriots and soldiers whose busts are in this Chamber, are realised. Only then will we stop talking about it. That does not mean that meanwhile we should not be prepared to understand the problem that exists. I am prepared to listen to any recommendation regarding how we can live in harmony.

Finally, I should say that the purpose of my speaking here tonight was to compliment the Minister for External Affairs. On the one hand, the accusation was made that over the years the Department did nothing. On the other hand, in a situation in which a stand was taken and a statement made, it was inferred at least that it was a foolish and stupid exercise and that from the beginning—or ab initio, as our intellectual friends would say—it was doomed to failure. Now one cannot have it both ways; either we were wise in saying nothing over the years or we are foolish in saying anything now.

I apologise for going beyond my 15 minutes. I hope I have not said anything which would tend to inflame. It is not my desire to inflame any situation. The occasion has presented me with an opportunity of reminding those who need reminding that there are other things in Ireland besides material things. I hope that the Department of External Affairs in dealing with this and other situations will make at least some use of the Irish language and help to keep this distinctive image abroad, an image which will be important not only in the European situation but in the world situation.

The speech by the Minister for External Affairs dwelt more extensively on foreign policy aspects of our external relations than, I think, was the custom of his predecessor. His predecessor, it always seemed to me, seemed to feel that foreign policy was something which was very much a function of government and something which, therefore, it was perhaps unwise to encourage the Dáil to discuss at great length. He confined himself generally to very technical interventions directly related to the Estimate and to the sums of money involved, and in so far as he dealt with foreign policy issues he was very selective in those areas with which he chose to deal. When he came to the Seanad about three years ago, dealing with the question of the EEC, I remarked that in four major speeches he had made in the four preceding years, totalling 20,000 words, he had succeeded in devoting only 58 of them to the European Economic Community. The present Minister spoke at greater length today on many of these issues and his speech was more balanced in that he covered a good deal of ground and did not confine himself to just one particular aspect of our foreign policy. We are grateful for this wider introduction to the debate.

Having said that, I must confess to a little disappointment because he is a new Minister, the first new Minister for External Affairs that we have had for quite a long time, and I would have thought that he would, perhaps, have given us some of his ideas on the function of a foreign policy, the purpose of a foreign policy and how he saw foreign policy, under his direction and guidance, serving this country in the years ahead. Our debates here, partly perhaps because of the encouragement of the former Minister and partly perhaps because of our own defects and our tendency to dwell on detail, have tended too much to keep to the details of particular issues. We did not stand back sufficiently from the whole question and consider what we are at.

What is a foreign policy for? It has two functions which I shall try to develop. First of all, its function is to promote the national interest. In that context we have to consider just how the national interest can be promoted in the external field. Secondly, because we cannot confine ourselves to that somewhat narrow and selfish view, a foreign policy must concern itself with playing a constructive role in world affairs.

What is our national interest? We ought, I think, to give more thought to this. Our national interest involves, in fact, many different strands and one can promote one strand at times at the expense of others. There is a danger, if one has not thought out one's priorities and considered what is most important and urgent, that one will pursue conflicting policies and contradictory policies and policies which may undermine each other. This problem of seeking for priorities in foreign policy did not confront us in the early decades of the State. It was quite clear from the moment the Treaty was signed that the prime purpose of foreign policy under the first Government and under the Government that in due course would succeed it, its successor, would be to seek, first within the Treaty and then by going outside it, complete and full independence for the country which the Treaty made possible for us, or, at least, for the part of the country which had secured limited independence at that time. The efforts of the first two Governments were devoted fairly single-mindedly to this task to the exclusion — not the total exclusion, but the partial exclusion—of other more varied and, perhaps, wider issues of international affairs, although, indeed, they never took a narrow view to the extent of damaging our interest. They concerned themselves with world affairs, recognising that if we performed effectively in the general field of world affairs this would enhance our prestige and increase our prospects of securing full and complete independence.

Although we on the two sides of this House tend to think in terms of different, or even opposite, foreign policies being pursued in the 'Twenties and the 'Thirties, I have a shrewd feeling that inside the Department of External Affairs at that time it did not necessarily appear that way. The first Government worked. as I have said, with in the Treaty and achieved the complete right to sovereign independence in the Statute of Westminster of 1931, but that still left, under the Treaty, various trappings of imperial power which were offensive to our national aspirations, and the second Government proceeded, using the rights which had been secured by the diplomatic efforts of the first Government, to remove those trappings; and a third Government took the official step of declaring a republic in 1949. This was a consistent foreign policy consistently pursued and, while politicians on both sides took different views, I suspect that in the Department of External Affairs they viewed themselves as doing a single task, of going as far as was possible within the Treaty, to which the first Government were in honour committed and, then beyond that, of completing the task by using the powers of independence secured by the first Government to remove the trappings that were objected to, and that was part of their task in the 'Thirties.

A later development of that was the position of neutrality in the Second World War, just when we had almost completed this process of securing not only the reality of independence in 1931 but many of the appearances and forms of independence in the Constitution of 1937: just at that stage, and before the final stage of actually declaring a republic was reached, the Second World War broke out and the energies and efforts of the statesmen of the country, in opposition and in government, during those years were directed towards the task of preserving our neutrality. I am not sure that we understand fully what was at stake at that time and that we always interpret correctly the reasons and motivations of those who pursued that policy. It seems to me that a determining factor in our policy—perhaps it would be well if this were understood outside Ireland as well as within it— was the need to avoid an involvement in the war that would not only endanger this country, but—because I do not think our policy was motivated solely by considerations of cowardice— which would also have threatened our internal unity.

The civil war seems a long away now, certainly to my generation born after it. But, to many people in 1939 the civil war had ended only 16 years previously. Where would that bring us back to? —1953 in terms of the present day. We know how recently 1953 seems to us. There was a fear, I think a valid fear, that the illegal organisation which had erupted into violent activities in Britain immediately before the war, might secure sufficient minority support for an armed attack on the Government here if this Government became involved in the war against Nazi Germany. I think that fear, the fear of reopening the wound of the civil war, of creating further civil strife, which must have motivated very strongly both Government and Opposition in those years, was the real reason that determined our neutrality. I mention this at this point because I have to come back to it later. It seems to me that the accident of our being neutral in the war for reasons that were then very relevant but which are not relevant today, has created a neutrality complex amongst some people, has become, in fact, almost something of a doctrine, even though the neutrality was at the time something accidental and something that was intended for a particular purpose. I think it is important that we should perhaps recognise this and recognise that there is a danger of elevating neutrality to the level of a doctrine when it was a practical expedient to save this country from grave evils at that time. However, that is a matter I shall return to.

Those were the two tasks then of our foreign policy in the first 25 years of the existence of the State: first, the achievement of full independence and the appearance of full independance and, secondly, the preservation of neutrality. Our Ministers in those years were served by an extraordinarily brilliant team who enabled this country to perform extraordinarily effectively in this task, men who served both Governments with total loyalty, men whom Mr. de Valera coming into power in 1932 found loyal to him, found no difficulty in working with, found to be men who although they had served a Government which had had to fight a civil war against his friend, and himself at later stages, nevertheless were people whom he could work with and who worked with him loyally. The names of these men should go down in Irish history because although civil servants are normally anonymous, there were men who played a role which was of great importance to this State—Joe Walsh, Seán Lester, John Dulanty and Seán Murphy. A tribute should be paid to them and that tribute should come from both sides of this House.

I emphasise this for another reason that I will come back to—because the work done by these men and by the Ministers they served in both those Governments showed that this country when it applies its mind to a task of this kind fairly singlemindedly is capable of making a very considerable diplomatic impact.

Any of you who have had occasion to read the book The Restless Domintion which recounts the diplomatic efforts of the first Government in transforming the British Commonwealth— the British Empire as it was when they started the job—will I think appreciate how much can be achieved by such a team. We have a tendency to fall into an inferiority complex condition in which we think of ourselves as very small, very powerless and think that perhaps it is better to stay on our own, away from everyone else, in case the big boys will in some way intimidate us or do us down. The fact is that in those years the first Irish Government worked to bring about a transformation of the Commonwealth and the second Government carried on the task in a different form. The first Government succeeded in transforming the Commonwealth, not of course singlehanded, but took the lead in transforming the British Commonwealth of Nations—and anyone reading that book could not be left in any doubt as to whether that task would have been accomplished in that time but for the presence of the Irish Free State and its Ministers and its distinguished public servants at the council tables of the Imperial conferences of those years. We were the diplomatic leaders of the Commonwealth then, perhaps partly by the accident of history that our first Government were young men who remained in office for ten years before the Government changed in 1932. Towards the end of that period, they were, in fact, the senior Ministers of the Crown, as they were then referred to—an appellation that they were not always happy to receive, especially when it appeared in the press here. They were, in fact, the most experienced Ministers of the entire Commonwealth and this, of course, helped them to carry great weight in the councils of the Commonwealth.

A country, which despite its small size and despite the fact that it was regarded with suspicion by the other members of the Commonwealth when it first came to the conference tables of the Commonwealth, a country which was able to lead such a diplomatic effort, to achieve its objective which it had clear-mindedly set out to achieve, to achieve it by diplomatic skill and by convincing the other members of the Commonwealth to come with it bit by bit, is a country which need not have too much fear about playing its full part in the councils of the world, as we do now in the United Nations or—and this is where I will come back to my theme again later—in the councils of an expanded European Economic Community. I fear we tend to think in terms of joining a Community in which we would be so small, so unimportant that everything would be decided over our heads, whereas in fact in that Community we would play a full part and I think a part disproportionate to our size, to our numbers and to our economic strength.

Let us come back to the question of what a foreign policy is for, and what kind of foreign policy we have in fact in operation. When those two tasks were completed there was no single clear-cut task for Irish foreign policy to achieve and at no stage did the Government, which in 1945 had reached the point of having got through the war and neutrality successfully, sit down and think out what their foreign policy should be in future. I am not aware that the successors of that Government, who have been in power for the last 13 years, have undertaken any such reconsideration of the fundamental basis of our foreign policy since then. Or, perhaps they have, and perhaps in pursuance of what appeared to be the view of Deputy Aiken as Minister for External Affairs, they feel it best to keep such a review locked up in their files and not to let the Irish people know what kind of foreign policy they are up to. If so, I think it is a mistake; I think this is something that we should discuss because in the years since 1945 we have pursued a number of different foreign policies, policies which are mutually conflicting, contradictory, and to some extent, therefore, self-defeating.

I mentioned in the other debate and shall not therefore dwell on it now the pursuit of conflicting policies with respect to Northern Ireland; the "sore thumb" policy of trying to get other countries to force Britain to hand over the north; the good-relations-with-Britain policy of persuading Britain to hand over the north without the north's views being consulted, and the policy of co-operation with the north, trying to secure its consent—three different and conflicting policies. We now have a new variant which is a mixture of Nos. 2 and 3—the federation policy, the failure to express which in clear terms has enabled our friend Mr. Craig to sow confusion temporarily in our midst by suggesting that what the Taoiseach had in mind was a federation of these two islands. I do not think that is what the Taoiseach had in mind. The Minister for External Affairs will no doubt reassure us on this point at the end of the debate.

It is not only in relation to Northern Ireland that we have pursued policies which were at any rate somewhat differently motivated and which were directed towards somewhat different and perhaps conflicting ends. One foreign policy pursued, under the leadership particularly of Mr. Lemass himself as Taoiseach, from about 1959 onwards, was a policy of working towards very close economic relations with Britain. It is a policy which seems to have the support of other members of the Cabinet such as, perhaps, the Minister for Finance, a policy which might also be said to be likely to have the support of that Minister who spoke about the merits of home rule and the disadvantage of independence last year and who is now, perhaps partly as a result, Minister for Transport and Power. That policy of the realist school—"let us face the fact that we are close to Britain and have to be tied up with Britain and there is no way out of it; let us make the most of it "—has, of course, the possibility of producing some immediate economic benefits. It is possible to justify it in the very short term if pursued successfully. If, however, pursued unsuccessfully, as in the totally unbalanced Free Trade Area Agreement, and not in the short term in that instance—because the agreement is one which is supposed to be permanent, one which would apply in the longer term—that it is a policy which carries great dangers for the country, but it has been, not our whole foreign policy, but part of our foreign policy, for the last ten years.

There are other motivations also. We have also been pursuing—and this as a more long-term aim and certainly a more desirable ultimate objective, the policy of securing membership of the European Economic Community—a policy dictated by considerations partly economic and partly political, considerations which I think have never been adequately explained to the Irish people, which have never been put in clear terms. I think this is a task that the present Minister perhaps could usefully perform, starting in the closing stages of this debate. That policy I will come back to. I shall not discuss its justification now because I will come back to it later.

There is another strand in Irish policy and Irish policy thinking and this is something which exists not simply at Government level but amongst our people. There are very close ties of friendship with the United States. We tend, many of us, to think in terms of a degree of friendship with the United States greater perhaps than that which we feel towards Britain or other European countries. This is partly because of the large number of our emigrants in the United States; partly because, when we were seeking our independence, we recieved great help from that country; and partly because, in the period since the last war, the United States has appeared as the champion of freedom against militaristic Communism, particularly in the first ten years after the Second World War. As a country which is deeply anti-Communist, we tended to see the United States, in the post-war period— perhaps less as time goes on—as the champion of our freedom which indeed, it must be said, the United States has been during much of that period. During the period of the Cold War, the United States did deter a Russian attack on Western Europe.

These factors have given our foreign policy a pro-American tinge in certain respects. This may be legitimate up to a point, but it can find itself very much in conflict with other elements in our foreign policy. I have in mind here the profession of our loyalty to the European ideal and our desire to participate in the creation of a Third Force between the Soviet Union and the United States. In that regard, some Irish attitudes to the United States seems a little odd and, indeed, are unfortunately too reminiscent of the "special relationship" attitude of Great Britain to the United States. Here, we have a possible conflict, if pushed too far, with one of the other strands in our foreign policy.

Another—it has been mislaid in recent times but it was an active element at one period: it has never completely dies—is the policy of orientation towards the Third World. This was particularly notable in our foreign policy in the latter part of the 1950's and in the early part of the 1960's. It responds to a rather deep feeling amongst many Irish people that we, who fought the first great battle against colonialism and imperialism in this country, and won it, and gave a lead and example to other countries in other continents, must have a natural sympathy with other countries in the Third World who have fought and may even still be fighting the same battle. This is natural and right. Indeed, I think there is something constructive here, something in this natural sympaty that enables us, and will enable us in the future, to play a useful role, perhaps even a considerable role, in improving relations between different countries in different parts of the world. But it is something that, nevertheless, involves a different orientation from the other orientations, something which could bring us into conflict at one point with the pro-American strand in our policy, with the pro-British strand in our policy or the pro-European strand in our policy. Each of these different strands has its reason, its raison d'étre, its justification, its role to play. But we have never thought them out. We have never sat down and considered which of these should take priority in any given set of circumstances.

What is our main motivation? What is our principal objective? What are we trying to secure through our foreign policy? We have been confused in this matter since we achieved the initial objectives of our foreign policy, that is, the achievement of complete independence politically and, subsequently, the maintenance of neutrality during the war. Since then, these conflicting stands have been woven in and out of our foreign policy, have led to incoherent and patchy self-contradictory—at times. I am afraid, self-defeating policies. There has been a dispersion of effort leading to ineffectiveness and confusion. The reason is that we have not sat down and thought out what is our national interest.

I should like to put forward a tentative definition of that national interest in terms relating to foreign policy. It seems to me that what we are at in our foreign policy, what we are seeking to achieve in our foreign policy, is to give effect to our belief in the value of maintaining the national identity of this country—our belief, which we asserted in arms 50 years ago, that Irish interests are best served by a separate, individual, Irish presence in the world, and not—as the Irish Party believed, in good faith—by sharing in a powerful British presence. We must recall that many Irish people believed, in the years before 1916, that a Home Rule Ireland could have sufficient independence under Home Rule to run its own affairs and could then enjoy the benefits of sharing in the great enterprise, as it appeared at that time to many people, of the British Empire—sharing not only in the jobs but in what many people genuinely saw as the services that that empire, as it was thought in those days—preanti-imperialist days—was conferring on the subject people of the earth. That view was widely held. That view was rejected in this country—rejected at a cost that we no longer have that role in the British Commonwealth —although, indeed, many individual Irish people succeed in continuing to play that role even 50 years after the achievement of Irish independence.

What we felt then was that whatever losses there might be would be compensated by the gain of an independent Irish presence in the world. Why did we feel that? We feel it and felt it then because our culture, our way of life, our standards, our priorities, are different from those of our near neighbour, Britain. Though they may seem to be obscured by the general mishmash of Anglo-American culture which submerges us, I think those differences, if we look deeply enough into the way we live and the way we think—not just the way we talk and the way we sing—are, perhaps, more evident today or more real today even than 50 years ago, because, in that period, Britain has moved in a direction which we have not followed, at any rate not followed at the same pace.

Britain has moved away from the —I shall describe them in these terms, I think fairly: I do not want to be in any way sectarian on the issue— Christian values of this country which are shared even by people in this country who may no longer be practising members of a Church but who share this system of values. Britain has moved away from that and has tried to set up, is working towards, some new post-Christian system of values which, to many of us, does not seem very attractive although many British people believe that their permissive society has some great merit which is, perhaps, obscure to us. As they move in that direction, and as we do not follow, at any rate at the same pace, the cultural differences between ourselves and Britain become profound —far more profound than they were 50 years ago.

I think this belief is there instinctively among us, the belief that we had then different values, different priorities, different standards, a different culture, and that this is still true and, perhaps, even more true today than then. What we want to do is to preserve that difference because it is of value to us, because most of us want to live that way—those who do not want to do so can and do go to Britain —and because these difference have something of value to give to the world. It is not simply something that we want this for our own sake, but it involves something individual and special which we can add to the variety of world culture.

It is, then, this belief that lies behind our determination to retain our national identity and the task of our foreign policy is to ensure that that aim is achieved.

There are other factors, too. I think it is fair to say, speaking as an economist for the moment, that the British economy is so different from ours that, were we to be today a part of the British economy, our interests could scarcely adequately be looked after. No doubt we should get massive subsidies. No doubt the tens of millions secured by Northern Ireland in agricultural subsidies would be two or three times greater for this part of the country. I am quite sure that there are many economic benefits to be derived from being in the United Kingdom but that does not mean that our interests would really be looked after. It is one thing to be given a dole; it is another thing to be allowed to live in circumstances of self-respect in the knowledge that one is earning one's living and has the feeling of doing so.

I think that national independence has an economic justification as well as a cultural one. I think this is relevant to the question of our foreign policy— to the form it should take and towards what particular ends it should be directed. In speaking of the different elements that go to make up our orientation towards an independence Irish nation I have spoken in terms largely related to Britain and, indeed, this is something which only struck me when I had written down my thoughts in a few notes before this debate. The fact is that our policy of 700 years, perhaps, that is an exaggeration but at any rate of 300 years or so, the policy of trying to secure political independence of Britain, is one a projection of which in modern conditions we still should be and are partially pursuing. The fact is that our geographical and historical relationships with Britain are so close that when an Irishman asserts the identity of this country he is making an assertion not only of an absolute kind in its own right but also of a relative kind because he is asserting this identity not just against the world as a whole but also against Britain. It is still in large measure Britain which threatens. I use the word "threaten" not in any bad sense but it is Britain which is the threat to our national identity. The threat comes in fact from British cultural values, British economic power, British agricultural policies and they must be stressed too, because they are a vital element in our whole economic position. They are vital to our foreign policy. Therefore, it is, in fact, these elements of our relationship with Britain which are crucial. In asserting our independence, in asserting that we want to run our own affairs and in orientating our foreign policy to achieve these ends we are orientating it or should be orientating it, necessarily in the direction of Britain, not in being anti-British in any old fashioned sense—and indeed, there should be no feeling of hostility to Britain in this country today—but towards Britain because it is an objective fact that the economic relationship between Ireland and Britain today is one of very great dependence of this country on another country.

In fact, some years ago I read in an economic journal an analysis of the economic relationship between different countries in the world and it was stated there—and it had the mark of a very authoritative article by a man who seemed to know a lot about it— that there was only one relationship in the world between two countries, not even independent countries, which at that time, was closer and involved a greater dependence than that between Ireland and Britain and that was the relationship between Britain and Mauritius of all places. The trade relationship there was more intense. Mauritian trade was even more dominated by Britain than Irish trade is dominated by Britain. Apart from that single example there are no two countries in the world with a closer economic relationship than ours with Britain. There is no country which is more dependent on another country than we are on Britain economically. That is a vital factor to be taken into account by any country seeking to retain its identity and its economic and political independence. Therefore, our foreign policy has to be orientated towards Britain, has to be orientated towards the problems posed for us by the existence of Britain, by the shape and form of the British economy, by the size of British economic power, by the similarity of language, by all these factors and our foreign policy has to be designed to face this situation. It is an objective situation and one for which the British are not responsible; it is not their fault that they exist and that they happen to be beside us. I am sure there were many times in the past when they wished they were not, but though we need not blame them the fact is that they do pose a problem for us and our foreign policy has to be related to that point. I have emphasised that there should be nothing anti-British in our thinking. That would be disastrous. It simply means recognising that the revolutionary struggle of 1916 to 1921 and the diplomatic struggle of the years after 1921, although each successful within its own limits, did not complete the task. Complete political independence of Britain is not enough if we remain, as we remain, economically dependent on her to the extent that we do. We have to accept the fact that however generous or enlightened Britain may be—and, indeed, there were many countries which were more oppressed politically in the colonial period or economically thereafter—to be so dependent on one country is a serious defect and a serious undermining of the true independence of a country like ours.

I shall give one simple example of how it affects us and I have been struck by the extent to which people accept this as a matter of course. We have been told frequently—and I do not know that I can demur from this argument—that we cannot join the EEC alone but only when Britain does. This is probably a sound economic statement, certainly unless we got quite extraordinary generous terms from the EEC entitling us to derogate from the common external tariff in order to permit extensive imports of British goods free of that duty, which is highly improbable, membership of the EEC would, because of reversing the preferential relationship which we have with Britain in trade, totally disrupt our economy and plunge us for a period in poverty. There are those, perhaps, who argue that we should take that risk but they do not constitute the majority of the Irish people who do know and care which side their bread is buttered on. Therefore, although we have a political right to join the EEC—and if we did so there is nothing that Britain could do to stop us in the sense of any kind of legal power or even the power of duress by arms—we know that if we did so its effect would be for us so disastrous that we are not prepared to do it. That is what I mean by economic dependence.

Here is an opportunity for us to join a community whose agricultural policies would be as favourable towards us as British agricultural policy is unfavourable, and it is hard to put that any stronger—a community within which the institutional structure protects the weak from the strong, a community which to me at least though, perhaps, not to everybody in this House, has great attractions. And yet though I believe it has great attractions I am not free to press that we should join it now. Why not? Because, although we won our political independence in 1921 to a large degree and brought it to fruition in 1931 and gave it formal status in 1949, nevertheless, we are not independent economically. We are not free to exercise the rights which we have got, and what use is political independence if, in fact, one cannot exercise the rights it gives one? I do not want to dismiss political independence as of no value; indeed, the whole tenor and purpose of my speech is its immense importance to us vis-á-vis Britain in view of our historical and geographical relationship. Nevertheless, without economic independence it is of limited value and that is why I feel that our foreign policy should be directed primarily towards this issue, towards freeing Ireland of its economic dependence on Britain.

There is a dilemma here because we have another objective of our foreign policy, another objective of our national interest which we discussed here last week. We want to reunite this country. It must be recognised as a fact that the further we move away from Britain, which may be in the economic and cultural interest of this part of the country, the more difficult this task of reunion becomes. That is a genuine dilemma. It is not a dilemma which disappears if you stop thinking about it. It is a genuine dilemma. When you have such a dilemma you must have priorities. You can, of course, avoid the dilemma by not looking at it and hoping it will disappear. We, of course, can go on indefinitely pursuing conflicting policies without ever consciously deciding which is more important but, in fact, no matter how we try to do so, no matter how we try to cod ourselves that we are not giving a priority to one rather than the other, in practice the things we do will represent a choice of priorities.

If a given course of action is likely on the one hand to secure the continuing cultural identity and the separate existence of this part of the country, and on the other hand, perhaps, to make a little more difficult the ending of Partition, I think the long-term interests of this country rest above all with retaining our identity, even if this means postponing the ending of Partition a little longer. I may be wrong in that. Others in this House may feel that the priority should be different, that in those circumstances we should be prepared for a much closer link with Britain, prepared to give up the struggle for true independence because we might bring nearer the day of political unity. That may be a valid point of view and, perhaps, they may consider that that is a more patriotic viewpoint. It is not mine.

The point I want to make is that in our foreign policy we are faced continually with dilemmas and choices. When faced with them, you may avoid them by not consciously taking a decision, by not giving priority to one rather than another, but the facts of the situation force you to take decisions. Even not taking a decision is in fact a decision in these circumstances. One does in fact set priorities and make choices and one develops a system of priorities in foreign policy without knowing one is doing it. This is a mistake. It is better that we should be clear on what we are doing. We should be conscious of the kind of policies we are evolving rather than letting them happen when we are not looking that way.

There is a conflict here and it is one that has emerged in the last few days because of the rather dramatic form of Mr. Craig's clever misunderstanding of the Taoiseach's speech and one to which I think it is proper to refer at this stage. I believe—others may disagree and if they do they are as good Irishmen as I am; I am not challenging that—that there is no future in giving up any part of our independence for the sake of unity because if you give up independence you may never get it back, whereas unity will come in time. The aim of securing economic as well as political independence must, if there is a clash, take priority over the ending of Partition and not be subordinated to the aim of reunification. I do not wish to make any dogmatic suggestions that this is the only view that can be held. All I say is that in practice you must come down on one side or the other even if you like to pretend you are not making such a choice in your thinking or your action.

How can I state, in the light of what I have been saying, the aims of foreign policies because so far I have been speaking largely negatively in regard to what is wrong with our foreign policy. I shall now try to put forward some ideas as to what should be the aims of foreign policy in some kind of order. Logically, the first aim of foreign policy, the most important by its very nature but not necessary the one that will take up most of our time, is the preservation of peace. All we have and all our future depends on that. If at any moment there is something we can do that would contribute significantly to the preservation of peace, that action is more important, if we can contribute, than anything else we can do because if peace breaks down, if the world moves into war under present conditions, all else is futile and this country in those circumstances would no longer exist. That is, therefore, the first priority.

The second priority is the one about which I have been speaking, to seek to complete the task of securing economic independence from Britain by eliminating the exploitation of this country by British policy which is the crucial feature holding back the development, for example, of Irish agriculture today. Perhaps I should have said that it is one of the two crucial factors, the other being the Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries.

The third aim, turning from the negative to the positive, is to create the conditions in our international relationships most favourable to the advancement of our economy, especially our rural economy, and I emphasise that point. As a consequence of that and flowing from it, we should create conditions which would secure the maintenance of people in Ireland with a separate cultural and prevent that culture from being swamped from outside. Some people may say that is the most important thing of all, but it is not, because if you do not preserve peace in the world, there will be no culture here. There is some sense in the order of priorities I am suggesting.

Next—I put it next but I should like to hear the views of others on this —we should seek to secure the voluntary reunification of Ireland. I regard this as useless without the other three. I see no value in a reunited Ireland, in fact, if it will not be in some way culturally different and economically independent and have some life of its own. There would be no point in it: we might as well as back in the United Kingdom. So, logically, I think this must come fourth.

Finally, because all I have mentioned so far are matters ultimately of selfinterest, we should try to make the maximum contribution to the world we live in.

I put those forward as some suggestions for guiding principles for foreign policy. They may seem, at this point in my remarks, to be unexceptional aphorisms. I do not believe that is so. I see them as principle which, when you examine our existing policies against them, show up some of our policies as being wrong and misguided and against our interest and which, if you apply them positively, lead you to a specific foreign policy and one which I think we should pursue wholeheartedly.

First, let us examine our present policies against the background of these principles. There has been the policy of closer links with Britain, taking the particular form of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement. To may mind, in the light of the principles I have laid down, that is a move in the wrong direction, only dubiously justifiable as an interim measure pending participation in EEC. It is only justifiable as an interim measure if one were sure that one was going to be in the EEC and only if the agreement were well negotiated on equitable terms, and provided a reasonable balance of interest between the two partners to it, which, as I have shown previously in the other House and elsewhere, it did not do.

That is not the only way in which we have been moving towards Britain in a manner in which I think is unnecessary and undesirable. I have been struck in my four years in the others House by the number of measures coming up there from the Dáil harmonising us more closely with Britain. I recall an occasion when the Minister for Justice arrived in with a Bill for standard time and he informed the Seanad, very solemnly, that this was necessary because every country in Western Europe now had the same time and we could not be exceptions. I raised with him the question of Italy in which, in fact—I may have mentioned this in this House already—they have introduced double summer time for the past couple of years, from and to dates which are totally different from the normal dates at which time changes in Europe. The Minister was unaware of this fact. He remarked, giving himself away somewhat, that it was not in his brief. I suggested that the debate be adjourned for a week while he obtained a better brief. It was in fact adjourned though, perhaps, partly for a slightly different reason. I am a student of railway timetables in my spare time and it was the study of these that alerted me to the existence of double summer time in Italy. I am a student not only of current timetables but also of old timetables and I have a timetable of which I was given a present by a good friend last year, a reprint of the April, 1910 Bradshaw. I commend it to the House. The tables there about the Irish railways are a revelation and I have spent many happy hours browsing through them. What struck me most was that at that time when this country was part of the United Kingdom, crushed under British rule, the boats between Dún Laoghaire and Holyhead suffered from a slight complications. There was a difference of 25 minutes in the time between the two countries. Although we were one country legally we had different time in Ireland. It is only with independence that we abolished our own time. This is just an illustration of how we can thoughtlessly assume that it is necessary to harmonise everything.

I know I shall find myself speaking in this House in the years ahead in favour of harmonising many things, in the context of European policy. I am convinced there must be harmonisation of many policies for very good reasons but I am equally convinced that there is no point in harmonising where there is not good reason. Harmonising our time with Britain, harmonising our 10s piece and abolishing the 10s note with Britain and harmonising by getting rid of our half-crowns with the Britain and harmonising our £ with the British £, instead of having our own which would have suited us and would have avoided the mistake that Britain made in its currency decimalisation—these are all things we do not have to do. But I fear we have got into, or at least the Government have got into a mentality that when anything like this comes up we find out exactly what the British are doing, and copy it even to the number of sides on the 10s piece, virtually.

This is the negation of a national policy and is certainly a negation of any kind of foreign policy. We should think twice about it. I know I shall be challenged in this House in the years to come: people will say: "You are favouring the harmonisation of social policy, the harmonisation of cartel policy" and there are many policies I would be in favour of harmonising when that is to the benefit of this country. What I am against is harmonising things that do not have to be harmonised, the diversity of which, in fact, helps to establish our identity and keep us conscious of the fact that we are a different country. There are so many things we do not have to harmonise; let us keep different the things we do not have to harmonise. I would appeal to the Minister to bear that in mind as a principle of Government policy in the years ahead. So much for that.

Let us take another aspect of our foreign policy which I have mentioned already, our orientation towards the United States. It seems to me that this orientation ignores the common interest we have with the rest of Europe in the preservation of the cultural values of Europe which, as we all know, are in danger of being over-run from the culturally and much more powerful if much less diverse United States. I also think that this US orientation ignores our common interests with the rest of Europe in maintaining Europe free from economic dominance by the United States an element in the European economy which has worried many people and about which a famous book has been written in the past couple of years by Jean Servan-Schreiber, Le Défi American.

I think our interests lie with Europe rather than with America. Others may disagree but I think this tendency to orientate ourselves towards the United States is not necessarily in our interest, although the United States has performed in the immediate post-war years a most valiant role for which we shall always have to be grateful. Nevertheless, her interests and ours in Europe are different. The kind of foreign policy I have in mind, which is concerned with preserving our interest, is one which would not be served by continueing or expanding this American orientation.

There is then the "third world" strand in our foreign policy in which I see great merit, but there is a danger that, if pursued too far and too exclusively, it could obscure our common interest with the other countries of Europe and could cut across, if pursued too exclusively, our interests as they should be pursued through our foreign policy. I believe—and I shall come back to this later—that our contribution can best be made by bringing Europe and the third world together, by being, if you like, the third world's agent within Europe, within the fold, by putting the view of the third world to which we more than any other country in Europe can be sensitive because of our history of a struggle against colonial oppression.

How can we reconcile these conflicting interests? How can we produce a foreign policy that will, instead of following these different orientations which in varying ways cut across our true interest, serve our interests? Let me take in turn each of the five points I made. Let us consider how these can best be implemented. The preservation of peace is the first point. I think that in Europe we have a role to play here as we have, indeed, in the wider sphere of the United Nations. We have a role to play in Europe. We are, after all, of Western Europe. Nobody doubts that our heart lies with Western Europe against the, in varying degree, tyrannous regimes of Eastern Europe. Yet, at the same time, we are not a member of NATO. We have pursued, at some points in our diplomatic career, fairly independent policies. Therefore we have earned some respect, even if some of it has been dissipated latterly.

I should have thought, therefore, that in seeking to preserve peace we can play a role within Europe, seeking to achieve a détente in Europe, working as I am sure the Department under the present and the previous Minister have been doing through the United Nations, working towards a European détente in collaboration, perhaps, with some of the countries in Eastern Europe which have a common interest, like Poland with whom I believe we have good informal diplomatic relations in the United Nations. We could perhaps bring some of this United Nations effort into Europe and perhaps work, as I said in this House previously, towards a détente in Europe and do some of that work in Europe.

In seeking to preserve peace we should also be alive to the desirability of building up in Europe some kind of third power as a buffer between these two super powers, not a third power of the same kind, not an attempt to duplicate them, not an attempt to have another atomic power, but some kind of fairly solid buffer capable of looking after itself to a large degree and therefore not dependent upon the assistance of one side or the other but able to take an independent line in the cold war and therefore able, perhaps, to calm down the cold war. In fact, the cold war was fought in Europe because of the weakness and the divided state of Europe. If Europe could be strong and united ultimately through a détente between East and West, the cold war, if it were fought at all, would have to be fought somewhere other than in our territory.

It seems to me, therefore, that in seeking to achieve the first aim of our foreign policy, the preservation of peace, while we have been working in the United Nations towards this end— and the Minister has given us some details of the work they have done there and some of the results that are coming from it and he and his predecessor can be congratulated on that work—we should not confine our efforts to the United Nations. We have a particular role to play in Europe because we belong to Western Europe and are not involved in the military alliance of the Western European countries. Therefore, we can be more of an honest broker, as Finland is on the other side of Europe.

That is why in July in this House I asked a series of questions seeking to elicit from the Minister information as to what response we had given to various diplomatic moves by Finland and Italy in seeking to secure a déterte in Europe. I did this because I feel this country has a role to play in Europe and not just in the United Nations. I must say I was disappointed at the response. I was, indeed, even surprised at the response because the response I got was that there was no diplomatic move by Italy. It transpired—I forget what word was used—that there was some semantic confussion, or at least so we were told, and that, in fact, because we had not had a letter from the Italian Government—they had merely made a speech which was published in the newspapers—we therefore had no formal knowledge of their move and it would not be polite of us to actually go and talk to them about it.

The Deputy's memory is deceiving him.

I am giving a very free interpretation.

A very free interpretation of a supplementary interjection by the Taoiseach. The answer to the question was full and adequate.

I am sure the Minister would not have given an answer which he did not believe to be accurate. I did not find it so, but such divergences of views are common between the two sides of the House. I shall not press that any further.

It seems to me that we should be pursuing a more active role in Europe because we could, perhaps, do something which other countries would not find it so easy to do. I am not entirely happy at being told by the Minister or his predecessor that it is all going on in the United Nations and we are playing our part there. I think—and I say this with deference not only to the former Minister but also to my fellow shadow Minister—that we tend at times to become unduly dominate by the United Nations. In fact, if there is one thing which the former Minister and my fellow shadow Minister have in common, as is evident from their speeches, it is this United Nations orientation. They both share this interesting concentration on the United Nations and this great distaste for talking about Europe, to which I do not recall my fellow shadow Minister making many references. This is something they have in common. I mention this because at times in the dialogue between them it might not be so clear that they have much in common.

So much then for the first aim of our foreign policy as I suggest it should be. The second is to try to complete the task of securing economic independence from Britain and, in particular, to eliminate the situation we are in of exploitation of our agriculture by Britain through her cheap food policy. How can this be achieved? There are two ways of achieving it. We can "join 'em" or "beat 'em". We can join then by rejoining the United Kingdom and getting the benefit of the subsidies and getting inside their scheme of things. This, clearly, I do not advocate and I hope no one else does in this House.

How else can one prevent this kind of exploitations? There is only one way that I know of—and, if anyone in this House has any other idea. I should be glad to hear it—and that is by encouraging the British to join, with us, some organisation whose laws do not permit the exploitation of the weak by the strong, an organisation with institutions strong enough and determined enough to prevent even a power as great as Britain from exploiting even a country as weak as Ireland. For that reason again I think our policy should be European orientated.

There is only one way in which this country will become free of British exploitation in this form and that is, as we have not the power to enforce it on Britain nor the will to rejoin Britain in the United Kingdom, by joining with them in the European Economic Community where we shall certainly lose some of our sovereignty—sovereignty which we have no effective power to exercise—but where Britain will also lose the sovereignty she exercises at our expense, and that will be the great gain to this country through Britain and ourselves joining the European Economic Community.

Progress reported: Committee to sit again.
The Dáil adjourned at 10.30 p.m. until 3 p.m. on Wednesday, 29th October, 1969.
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