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Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Thursday, 17 Jun 1976

Vol. 291 No. 9

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Financial Support Fund) (Agreement) Bill, 1976: Second and Subsequent Stages.

I move: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

The purpose of the Bill is to approve the acceptance by the State of the agreement establishing a Financial Support Fund of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and to provide for the participation by the State in the fund. The text of the agreement is set out in the Schedule to the Bill.

Let me say at the outset that this agreement has not yet come into force nor has the Financial Support Fund established by the agreement come into operation. In fact, given that member countries making up 90 per cent of the fund must ratify the agreement before it automatically comes into force, it may be quite some time before we see the fund in operation.

The second point I would like to stress is that it is certainly not envisaged that Ireland will be seeking finance from the fund if and when it is set up. Our interest in the agreement is to play our part in what we see as a useful international co-operative measure to boost confidence in the international financial system and to show solidarity with our OECD partners. To the extent that the establishment of the fund succeeds in this objective, all member countries will benefit and the fund's resources will be available as a last resort to any member in serious balance of payments difficulties.

The agreement to establish the fund developed as a reaction to the massive balance of payments difficulties encountered by many industrial and developed countries in the wake of the enormous oil price increases in 1973 and 1974. One of the main effects of these increases was to cause a sudden and unprecedented transfer of wealth from oil importing to oil exporting countries. Since the oil producers as a whole were not immediately able to spend this money on goods produced by the oil consumers, many of the oil consuming countries, and Ireland was no exception, were faced with the problem of financing the corresponding deficits in their balance of payments. In the event, the recycling problem as it came to be known, that is, the passing of funds from oil importers to exporters and back again either directly or by way of loans through the international money markets, did not create any major payments crisis. Nevertheless the massive flows of capital involved presented a significant threat to the stability of the international financial system.

The Financial Support Fund is generally seen as a form of mutual insurance scheme through which OECD member countries in serious balance of payments difficulties could borrow from or on the credit-standing of the other members. From this point of view the fund represents an earnest on the part of the OECD countries to work together to meet the problems facing the world economy. This in itself helps to restore confidence in the ability of the international economic system to surmount the kinds of difficulties so recently presented by the twin problems of the oil price increases and the worst recession since the war.

Although the immediate need for a fund is now perhaps less, as the world economy recovers, its existence will serve to lessen the pressure on member countries to resort to unilateral measures to reduce deficits in their trading balances.

International co-operative measures of this kind cannot, of course, be a substitute for correct internal policies. I do not think anyone can be under any illusions on this score. What the Financial Support Fund does is help maintain the proper international financial atmosphere in which well considered national measures to smooth the inevitable adjustment process become that much more feasible.

Let me now briefly describe the main features of the fund. Membership of the fund is confined to OECD countries. All the member countries of the OECD, including Ireland, signed the agreement setting up the fund, subject to ratification, in the spring of 1975. Since then the majority of OECD countries have passed legislation or taken the necessary administrative measures to implement the agreement. Most of these countries have, in fact, gone on to ratify the agreement. The agreement will come into force when member countries with at least 90 per cent of the quotas making up the fund have ratified it. The agreement may also be brought into force for themselves by the unanimous decision of at least 15 member countries of the OECD with at least 60 per cent of the quotas who have ratified the agreement.

The purpose of the fund is to lend money to member countries who cannot finance their balance of payments deficits from normal sources. In other words, it is intended that the fund will be a source of last resort. Applicants for loans will be expected to have first drawn down all other reasonable sources of finance, for example, their normal access to private markets, the IMF and, in the case of Community countries, their access under the various EEC schemes. To enable the fund to lend, each OECD member country has been allocated a quota and the total of these quotas, amounting to 20 billion Special Drawing Rights of the International Monetary Fund or £13 billion at current exchange rates, constitutes the fund. Quotas determine a country's maximum liability to lend to the fund, general level of access to the fund's resources, and voting rights. The quotas have been determined on the basis of relative economic weight. Ireland's quota is SDR 120 million or about £80 million, which is more than one-half of 1 per cent of the total.

In the event of the fund approving a loan to a member country, the fund will raise the money needed in two ways, either in international financial markets on the basis of the collective undertaking of the other member countries, or from individual member countries directly.

Should the fund approach an individual member country for money, the member has the option of making a direct advance to the fund or providing an individual undertaking on which the fund can borrow the necessary amount. In general it is expected that the fund will proceed on the basis of undertakings from the member countries. There are elaborate provisions in the agreement to ensure that the burden of providing finance for loans and risks on loans made by the fund will be shared by member countries in proportion to their appropriate quota level in the fund.

Loans by the fund will be subject to stringent economic policy conditions and the approval of different voting majorities of member countries depending on the amount of the loan to be provided. Voting is on the basis of quota strength but for most decisions a majority of the members as such is also required.

The lending powers of the fund will continue in force for two years from the entry into force of the agreement. The agreement may, however, be amended and its lending life perhaps extended by a unanimous decision of the members subject to the completion of any further legislative processes which may be necessary should this occur.

The fund will be run by a governing committee on which all the members will be represented. There will also be an advisory board. The secretariat will be provided by the OECD. The fund will have the usual immunities and privileges of an international organisation.

Let me now turn to the provisions of the Bill. The arrangements in the Bill in general follow the arrangements which apply to the International Monetary Fund and the EEC medium-term assistance schemes to which the Financial Support Fund has some similarities. In brief, the Central Bank of Ireland will handle the State's financial transactions with the fund up to the winding up of the fund.

Section 1 defines the terms used in the Bill. Section 2 approves acceptance by the State of the agreement. Section 3 designates the Central Bank as the single monetary authority responsible for transactions between the State and the fund. Under the terms of the agreement each member country is required to designate such an authority.

Section 4 provides that the Central Bank shall on behalf of the State make any payments or provide any undertakings to the fund as and when it is necessary to make such payments or provide such undertakings. The section also provides that moneys receivable by the State from the fund shall be paid to the bank on behalf of the State. These provisions do not apply to transactions arising out of the liquidation of the fund.

Section 5 gives the Central Bank the necessary powers to issue notes or obligations or enter into commitments in connection with the exercise of its functions under section 4. The section also provides for payments by the Central Bank in connection with the issue of such notes and obligations and so on.

Section 6 deals with the liquidation of the fund. The section provides in effect for the assumption by the State of its ultimate financial liability in respect of the fund's operations. It is of course most unlikely that an OECD member country would default on an international obligation and indeed the fund's existence is generally seen as aimed at reducing the possibility of such an unlikely event occurring.

Section 7 will enable the Minister for Finance, after consultation with the Central Bank, to bring the Act into force at the appropriate time. Section 8 provides that any administrative expenses incurred by the Minister shall be paid out of moneys provided by the Oireachtas. In general, administrative expenses are expected to be of a minor nature. Section 9 gives the short title of the Bill.

The immunities and privileges of the fund will be covered in the usual form of order under the Diplomatic Relations and Immunities Acts, 1967-76.

In conclusion, the OECD Financial Support Fund Agreement is a useful if somewhat technical measure aimed at maintaining confidence in the international financial system. I think it can be said that the agreement represents the kind of active willingness on the part of the international community of which we are a member to do something about the problems facing it which it is in the interests of a small country, such as ourselves, to support. I recommend the Bill for the approval of the House.

This fund, for which there is such an elaborate agreement as set out in the schedule, and into which so much effort has obviously been put, has still not been set up. This is indicative of the rather surprising situation that, despite the difficulties arising from the sharp increase in oil prices, the problems for non-oil producing countries have not been as serious as anticipated. That is not to say that such problems have not existed, but the serious and chaotic situation anticipated to arise at one time from the increase in oil prices has not in fact developed, in particular in relation to balance of payments problems. While we have had difficulties, some of them quite serious, arising from the increase in oil prices, our balance of payments problems are not now a major consequence of the increase in oil prices. Indeed, the effect of the increase in oil prices has been somewhat exaggerated on our economy.

I am not saying that it has not been substantial and serious but I am saying that the effect had been exaggerated by some people on some occasions for party political purposes to explain failures in other directions. However, it is important that the fund should be implemented in so far as it is necessary to do so and that it should be available for the member countries of the OECD if they were to get into difficulties to be able to fall back on this safety net, which is how it can best be described. The quota for this country, which amounts to £80 million, could be, if we were called upon to pay in full, a very serious imposition if it were to happen all at one time. That is most unlikely to happen. Indeed, we may never be called on at all, and if we are it is most unlikely that the sum required would be anything like the full amount of the quota. Nevertheless, it is a substantial contingent commitment to be taking on.

Apart from the major features of the agreement, which are what one would expect, the principal thing that emerges is the fact that any country which proposes to avail itself of a loan from the fund is to be subjected to the most stringent control in regard to the economic policies that it follows. We see this first in section 2 of the agreement where it is provided that: "The Governing Committee shall satisfy itself that the member applying to the Fund for a loan meets the eligibility requirements of paragraph (a) of this Section and that such member's policies are consistent with the objectives of the Fund specified in section 2 (a) of Article 1." Those objectives include the following of appropriate domestic and international economic policies, including adequate balance of payment policies and co-operative policies promoting increased production and conservation of energy.

We also find in section 3 that one of the conditions of obtaining a loan includes the following:

(c) Conditions relating to economic policies needed:

(i) to redress the external financial situation of the member which receives a loan from the Fund (hereinafter called the "borrower") over an appropriate period and

(ii) for the fulfilment of the objectives of the Fund

shall be agreed between the borrower and the Fund at the time the loan is granted.

Clearly the implications for any borrower are stringent control externally of the economic policies to be followed by the country concerned. This country is now aware of the fact that such controls can be applied as the price of borrowing by the State. We were never aware of it before, because it had never happened until the recent loan negotiated from the EEC. We should recognise the possibility that, so far as we might avail ourselves of the facilities provided for in this fund, we would be subjected to that amount of control externally in regard to the economy policy that we might follow. I hope it will not be necessary for us to avail ourselves of the facilities available in the fund. But, even if it is not, I would agree with the Minister's assessment that the completion of the necessary formalities for the setting up of the fund is a useful exercise in regard to the provision of additional confidence in the international monetary system, a system which is very much in need of any propping up it can get. On that basis as far as we are concerned, we would agree with adherence to the fund and the completion of the necessary formalities by this country and consequently with the terms of the Bill.

There is one matter in section 5 of the Bill on which I would like to get the Minister's views. It is clear from the Bill, and in particular from the wording of section 5, that the Central Bank are being given the responsibility to make decisions to enter into commitments, to issue notes and so on, in relation to either the receipt of money from the fund or the payment of money into the fund. I would assume that if on some occasion this country were to borrow money from the fund that would be a decision of the Government of the day and not a decision of the Central Bank, although it might be executed through the Central Bank for administrative reasons. I would think that is what is envisaged and that that is the way it will be done. But the Bill before us would appear on the face of it to authorise the Central Bank to make such decisions and such commitments without reference to the Government at all. I wonder whether that is appropriate or whether the Bill should not provide that the Central Bank can enter into various commitments and so on envisaged here after consultation with or on the advice of the Government.

I am grateful to Deputy Colley for his reception of the Bill and for his confirmation of what I said about this country's decision in relation to it. It is unlikely that we will have occasion to use this safety net which would be available to a country only if it were unable to meet its financial requirements elsewhere, and that is not likely to arise in respect of this country.

In relation to the powers of the Central Bank the agreement itself requires that the instrument from which the international co-operation will be exercised is the Central Bank of the individual member countries. The Central Bank will be exercising responsibilities in this area and in other areas which would reflect the Government's thinking. We have accepted commitments here. We do not know the extent to which we will be called upon to meet those commitments. We may have our views about it but in relation to any later developments our commitment here is going to be quite small. If our commitment is correspondingly larger because our estimates are not in keeping with what ultimately occurs, the commitments and difficulties of others will be much greater than ours because they will be more deeply involved. The Central Bank will be the instrument of State here in discharging our obligations.

Will it be merely an instrument and not the decision making body in relation to this?

In so far any decision comes to be made in relation to the operation of these responsibilities the decision was made by our signing the agreement. The only discretion will be whether or not our commitment will be made by a guarantee or an actual commitment of funds.

That is where we pay. Supposing it was a decision to borrow from the fund, that surely would not be made by the Central Bank?

No, not in isolation. It is a business matter which would affect the general management of the finances of the State. It is an area in which there is no existing legislation. We can to some extent isolate and identify responsibilities of the Minister for Finance on the one hand, and the Central Bank on the other. But the two do not move independently of one another, and there will be of course the normal consultation between the responsible Irish authorities as Ireland as a State discharges its obligation under this agreement.

Question put and agreed to.
Agreed to take remaining Stages today.
Bill put through Committee, received for final consideration and passed.
The Dáil adjourned at 5 p.m. until 2.30 p.m. on Tuesday, 22nd June, 1976.
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