I have no intention of trying to anticipate future arrangements at which we might arrive, whether for domestic reasons or as part of some new set of arrangements which might emerge in the European context. I was emphasising the importance of applying appropriate policies and ensuring that we operate the proper domestic arrangements if we are to derive the maximum benefit from participation in the European Monetary System. Those were the essential points in that area.
Then there was the question of what would happen if we were to join and the UK were to remain out. There were a number of points on this heading, one of which I did not deal with yesterday and I will do so, briefly, now. The question was raised by Deputy Barry. He emphasised the importance of the position in Northern Ireland and this was also referred to by many other speakers. It was said that if there were to be any change in parity between the British £ and the Irish £, this would introduce a new situation in the Northern part of the country. If Britain were to be outside the system and we were to be a member, this could give rise to exchange control arrangements and so on. While I would fully agree with speakers who cast their remarks and questions in the form that we should not do anything that would hinder progress towards Irish unity, I do not see this as in any sense implying that we cannot go ahead and participate in the EMS even if Britain should decide to remain outside.
If the implied argument is that we must always maintain the status quo in Northern Ireland, then by implication one is trying to say that there is no choice of exchange rate before the Irish Government and that we must always automatically lock ourselves into sterling so as to maintain the existing circumstances in the North. I would reject that approach. One could equally envisage that perhaps the fastest way to promote Irish unity is to demonstrate that an independent Irish monetary system is part of a set of economic arrangements which are accompanied by a faster rate of progress in the economic area than would be experienced as part of a sterling system.
That decision, therefore, has to be taken on its merits at the time in the light of the circumstances then prevailing and that is the only sensible course of action for any Irish Government to adopt. They should look at the situation as carefully as possible, assess the merits and demerits of either course of action and, when they come to weigh up the implications for Irish unity, they should choose that course of action which in their view will have the most favourable impact on that objective.
That brings me into the more political arena of the attitudes and stance adopted by many of the speakers on the other side of the House. I had started to deal with what I regarded as a tendency to display an excessive reliance on simply following the British position on these matters. I gave examples yesterday and there is no need to repeat them again. I went on to make the point that, while there are of course areas in which there might be a similarity of interests between Britain and ourselves, it is equally possible that on a number of items there are significant differences between British interests and Irish interests, between their circumstances and ours and between their expectations for the future and ours. Therefore, given those different circumstances, it would be perfectly rational for us to pursue a separate course of action from theirs. Incidentally, I cannot resist making the point that everyone talks about breaking the link with sterling if the situation were to arise in which Ireland would participate in the EMS and the UK would remain outside. Surely the more technically correct description in those circumstances is that Britain would be refusing a link with the Community and that Ireland, in common with the seven other members, would be sharing in a common European system. I would rather look at the matter in that context.
Having noted what I described as the "stage Irish" mentality, which may have been good entertainment, when it came to the actual question of identifying a course of action and deciding which action to take and which policy to pursue, there was an immediate shying away from all these serious matters and instead we had the deferential attitude that we should follow what the British do—if they go to certain meetings, we should do likewise; if they hang back, we should do likewise; if they take an initiative, we should support it. I reject all that approach. I concentrated in my examples yesterday on the Fine Gael speakers in illustrating this. Perhaps I should make it clear that I regard this inadequate approach as extending also to the Labour benches. If I were to summarise the overall approach of the Opposition, I would say that they were trying to pursue a tactic that can best be described as backing every horse in the race in order to back the winner, so as to be able to claim afterwards that they had indeed picked the winner.
