Léim ar aghaidh chuig an bpríomhábhar
Gnáthamharc

Dáil Éireann díospóireacht -
Tuesday, 18 Nov 1980

Vol. 324 No. 4

Courts Bill, 1980: Second Stage (Resumed).

Question again proposed: "That the Bill be now read a Second Time."

I welcome many of the provisions in this Bill but I wish to raise a matter which should be considered by all those involved. I believe that the Incorporated Law Society of Ireland and the Bar Council of Ireland should study the amalgamation of the two professions. We have followed the English judicial system to a large extent and the system has worked quite well. It is also true to say that there would be some difficulties in the event of amalgamation of the two professions. Senior and junior counsel have been regarded as specialists in particular fields. In litigation particularly there have been very eminent senior and junior counsel who specialised in probates, conveyancing and other judicial matters. In many ways the system has been satisfactory. The vast majority of senior and junior counsel reside in the vicinity of Dublin, while some live in the Cork area and there are various others around the country.

In the event of amalgamation the manpower involved in some cases would be less. At present there are a firm of instructing solicitors, a junior counsel and usually two senior counsel on the side of the plaintiff and there are a similar number on the side of the defendant. Amalgamation of the two professions would mean the involvement of fewer people on each side and this would definitely lead to a reduction in the cost of a case. It would also help to streamline the two professions.

The idea of amalgamation has been tossed around on occasion but I am not aware that it has ever been studied jointly by the Incorporated Law Society and the Bar Council. Such a study could result in the publication of a report to be considered by all sides of the legal profession detailing the advantages and disadvantages of amalgamation and whether it would improve the present situation.

When this Bill is passed it will bring the law somewhat closer to the people and make it more relevant to their needs. The extension of the jurisdiction of the District Court and Circuit Court will mean a very sizable reduction in the number of cases coming before the High Court. I hope that as a result of that many more of these cases may be heard outside Dublin than are at present. The list in Galway, Cork, Limerick, Kilkenny and so on is very extensive. A reduction in the number of cases in these venues will mean that there will be less people going to the high Court. Following upon this the High Court could be of assistance to the Incorporated Law Society and to the Bar Council in studying this matter. That is something that should be looked into at present. I am not advocating coercion or that some Minister or somebody in the Department of Justice should try to arrange a shot-gun wedding or something of that nature. But I am advocating that the matter be looked into because it could be of benefit to everybody involved in law.

Part of my reason for welcoming this matter before the House this afternoon —and I touched on this the last day— is that from the date that a High Court case is set down to the date of the actual hearing there can be a delay of from 15 months to a year and a half. That is a long time. But prior to the setting down of the case there can be a delay of perhaps three years in the preparation of the case so that from the date of the commencement of the action, that is from the date a person suffers some wrong from which he wants redress, to the date of hearing, the delays can at times be four, four and a half, or five years and this is a very long time for somebody to have to wait to have a case heard.

This 12 to 18 months period of waiting is impossible to explain to people; they cannot understand why the court system could have a backlog of something approaching a year-and-a-half from the date the case is set down. A person calls to his solicitor and is told that his case which has taken three years to prepare will take a further 18 months, half the time again. In the vast majority of cases the people involved are in poor circumstances following injury to the breadwinner of the family or perhaps even his death. These people have to wait a further year-and-a-half. This is not good enough. I am hopeful that this is going to get rid of that backlog with great speed because it is urgent that that appalling backlog is got rid of immediately. The only people benefiting from that backlog at present are the big insurance companies who can sit back and wait a year-and-a-half for a case to come up. It can happen that people who are not physically able are forced back to work to try to bring in some money to their homes; perhaps even a person who received very serious injuries has died in the meantime. The insurance companies can sit back and let all that time elapse. A delay of that nature is something approaching a social scandal.

This Bill may help to remove that backlog. I hope it will because I have the greatest sympathy for people who suffer injuries and have to wait all those years to have their case decided. In some cases a very sizeable award is made in the High Court to an individual and the insurance company then lodge an appeal and the case goes to the Supreme Court. The resulting delay can run into years again, all of this in many instances involving a litigant who is in very poor financial circumstances. All of this is of tremendous importance and I welcome these changes which I hope will remedy and alleviate a very serious situation.

The Bar Council have drawn attention to one particular matter. Indeed I welcome their comments in regard to the present appalling conditions of our courthouses around the country. Our High Courts are satisfactory. I am not aware of any Circuit Court that is in very bad condition. Some of them leave something to be desired but overall they are properly heated; in most instances there is reasonable accommodation for consultations, reasonable waiting rooms, reasonable toilet facilities. But our District Courts are an absolute disgrace. Quite a sizeable number are in extremely bad condition. They are held in old dance-halls, old schools, pool rooms, parts of publichouses, parts of GAA clubs or rugby clubs and so on. When one sees films of courts being conducted behind the Iron Curtain one is shocked at the system those people are operating. But if one were to visit some of the district courthouses here or to see them on television one would be absolutely appalled at their disgraceful condition.

I have been smoked out of courtrooms here where a fire would have been lit perhaps an hour beforehand by a member of the Garda Síochána or a caretaker and after a period the courtroom would be filled with smoke which, along with the cold and crowding made it appalling and totally unsatisfactory and much more relevant to the last century than to the present. I would like to know if the Department of Justice have ever conducted any type of survey of our courtrooms. I doubt it, because if they had and realised the conditions under which justice is administered here they would have taken action long before now. The Minister has promised to bring proposals before the Government in regard to this matter. I welcome this promise but I am sorry that he was not more definite in what he said.

We are now going to bring family law cases into the District Courts. There will be children involved in these cases and perhaps mothers and fathers who are separated and there will be decisions made, when this Bill becomes law, in these places. It concerns me greatly that such decisions will be made in the conditions under which our district justices are forced to labour at present. I would urge that an immediate study be conducted by the Department of Justice, that they would consult the District Justices Association, District Court Clerks and the Garda Síochána, requesting them for a list of the courthouses they consider to be unsuitable for the hearing of many cases. At present many of our courts beg description. Indeed, I would hope immediate steps would be taken so that difficult family law cases would not be heard in many of these courthouses. We must remember the sad plight of many young boys and girls of an impressionable age having important decisions taken in regard to their family. They may have been brought into court by their mother or father and be present when the justice asks some very relevant questions. This is sad and tragic enough even when such cases are heard in some kind of comfort and privacy, but when they are conducted in the circumstances I have described— and here I speak from personal experience in regard to these matters—then we place our judicial system under a strain.

I go along with a lot of the provisions of this Bill. At present district justices have a very large number of cases to hear. The extent of their work at present should be brought home to the Department of Justice. For instance, I believe that over the last five years our Garda force has been increased by something like 3,000 members. I am giving an approximate figure only. Has there been any increase in the number of district justices in the past five years? I honestly do not believe there has been. It is obvious also that the vast majority of that increased number of gardaí are detecting breaches of the law and bringing such matters before the courts. That entails a very sizable increase in the volume of work of our district justices in that section alone. In my view that necessitates an increase in their numbers.

The vast majority of judges in our District Courts, as in all our courts — here I am speaking of 99.9 per cent of the Judiciary — have been exemplary in their conduct at all levels. It is approximately 12 years since I first qualified and never have I had even the slightest doubt that any justice, Circuit Court judge or High Court judge ever made other than the most honest, straightforward and, in his view, correct decision. I say that without fear of contradiction. Our Judiciary have been impeccable in regard to the honesty of their judgments and in their conduct.

These matters are of immense importance in regard to the extension of the Guardianship of Infants Act and family law matters. These are cases needing to be heard carefully and diligently without the justice feeling he is being crowded out by volume of work. I believe this will necessitate an increase in the number of appointments at District Court and Circuit Court levels. I believe that these family law and other related cases on account of the care and attention they warrant, will necessitate an increase in the number of district justices in order that the justices will be able to give them their full and undivided attention without the feeling that there is a sizable backlog being built up. The Minister should examine this position very carefully and ascertain whether or not he will take steps in that direction. I make this case because of the sensitive nature of these cases, on account of the thought and care they warrant, and which I am confident will be exercised by the District Court Justices and Circuit Court judges. Basically the question of barring orders, the extension of the Guardianship of Infants Act and so on, will be dealt with in the District Court but the Circuit Court may well be involved also.

I wish to draw the attention of the House also to one very important matter. At present all family law, civil and criminal cases are heard on the same day. I regard this as totally unsatisfactory. I am speaking now of country areas and larger towns. I understand it is somewhat different in cities where there has been a division of responsibilities and where certain justices are assigned especially to family law cases, particularly in Dublin. However, in rural areas at present the situation is that family law cases are heard in camera but at the very commencement of the day's list. All of the people are summoned to attend on the morning of the court hearing at 11 a.m. Let us take the case of a wife who has initiated some proceedings against her husband. I have seen such a case come before a court in a crowded courtroom with perhaps 100 or 200 people present. In the presence of everybody a District Court clerk calls on Mr. A, from one side and, from the other, Mrs. A, so that it becomes immediately evident to people from the surrounding area that there is some serious family problem involved between the two of them. Therefore what that couple may have succeeded in keeping an internal family problem is fairly well advertised in those circumstances when it becomes evident that they are experiencing some kind of marital difficulty. Mr. and Mrs. A appear from two different parts of the building and they go in and are inside for about 15 minutes. The next case of Mr. and Mrs. B is called and they go to have their case heard. Everybody present in the courthouse is aware of the marital difficulties these couples are experiencing.

I see no problem of any magnitude in providing that family law cases would be heard on a special afternoon or day. This is of great importance to people who wish to have family law matters heard in court. I urge the Minister to ensure that any such matters would be heard on a specified day and that nothing else but family law cases be heard in that particular courtroom during that particular sitting. I want the Minister to set aside a specific period or sitting for the hearing of family law cases. If he fails to do that I intend to continue raising this matter in the House until I get an absolute guarantee from him that he will accede to this — not request because I specify that it is a demand. The existing situation is totally wrong and I am highly critical of it. If, through lack of finance, facilities or a shortage of judges the Minister deems it necessary to have civil and criminal law cases heard — I am speaking of contract and tort matters — at the one sitting along with criminal cases, while I would not be in favour of it I do not think it is of quite the same importance as having family law cases heard on their own on a specific day. That is important and would be welcomed. It would meet with the approval of the vast majority of people I have met who have been involved in family law cases.

There are two matters about which I am very pleased. I see that there will be an increase regarding judgment debt. That is welcome. As regards amendment of the Civil Liability Act, 1961, section 28, the £1,000 has been there since 1961. That amount is paid for mental distress suffered by people following the death of some member of the family. While that amount may have been relevant at the time of the passing of the Act it needs drastic amending. I note that the Minister has put in £5,000. While that is a five-fold increase in the 19-year period, and is welcome, I think that on the death of a member of a family I would personally recommend £10,000. I ask the Minister to consider changing the amount from £1,000 to £10,000. Such an increase would be of much benefit. It only arises in connection with the mental distress and suffering of a family following the death of a member. As the Minister knows, money is no great compensation for the death of a loved member of a family but over a period it may alleviate some of the sadness and hardship that follows. I very much favour an increase in the amount to £10,000.

I see that judgments under £150 do not carry interest. This is debatable if money is left outstanding for a long period. Even if it is a small amount. I suggest that, while £150 is not a fortune, it may be a lot to some people particularly if they are short of money. While a decree is a great encouragement to get people to pay up. I think that if they had the added fear that interest would be charged on the amount in addition to the decree there would be a greater incentive to speed up payment. I ask the Minister to reconsider the matter of allowing such payments to carry interest. It would be no great burden on anybody to have interest charged on such amounts. It would not cause any great problems to the District Court staff if these judgments carried interest.

In general, with the reservations I have mentioned. I think the Bill includes many benefits and improvements.

I agree with much of what Deputy Enright said. As regards his point about the £1,000 for mental distress under the Civil Liability Act. I understand that that amount was to be given a year's trial when introduced. Nineteen years later it is still on trial. Disagreeing in one instance with Deputy Enright. I think that the Minister in his wisdom in providing a figure of £5,000 is naming a proper figure. On an actuarial assessment £5,000 now compared with £1,000 19 years ago is about correct. I am not very good at mathematical computations but I spoke to an actuary about this and he said the Minister's figure was about right. However, in support of what Deputy Enright said, we should not have to wait another 19 years to increase the figure from £5,000 to £10,000. If it is possible, I respectfully suggest that the best way to deal with this matter is to give the Minister some power to increase the figure by regulation, say on a five yearly basis, rather than have to come back to the House to do it by way of legislation. That would be unnecessary and wasteful of the time of the House.

In respect of increasing the jurisdiction of the District Courts and the Circuit Courts, in the case of the District Court to £2,500 and in the case of the Circuit Court in regard to contract, tort and other items to £15,000, that is another matter that might also be considered from the point of view of giving these increases in jurisdiction by way of regulation. Again, it is a matter that I have not discussed or considered in depth, but it is a proposal made having regard to the length of time since the last increases were made and the increases now proposed in this Bill. The last increases, of course, in the Circuit and District Courts were in 1971, so we are discussing these increases in the context of a nine year lag.

Another item which has emerged during the course of this debate is the feeling in the public mind that justice is diluted when administered in the District Court. Our District Courts have been established for many years now and, like Deputy Enright, the Minister and others. I believe they have served the country well as courts of first instance, whose powers are very far reaching and wide. All offences, with certain exceptions because of their gravity — murder, attempted murder, robbery and so on — can be dealt with by the District Court on a plea of guilty. The criticism levelled at the court is somewhat unfair. I was rather surprised to hear the Fine Gael spokesman on law reform make very sweeping charges against either the District Court bench as a whole, or certain members of that bench. To quote accurately, he said that some of them should not be there. Deputy Keating holds himself out to be a responsible Member of this House and a responsible public representative. He makes these charges against people who, in the context of their position, are not able to defend themselves. If a judge or justice behaves improperly, there is the constitutional remedy for his removal. If Deputy Keating, as would appear, has information about some district justice, he has an obligation to operate that remedy. In the meantime, he has, firstly, damaged in the public mind the concept of a fair hearing at District Court level. Secondly, his remarks, as they stand, bring district justices collectively into disrepute, since we do not know to whom he refers. Thirdly, although he is entitled to express constructive criticism, he is entering into a dangerous area in the democratic system.

The separation of powers—executive, legislative and judicial—is well established. To generalise as between these different levels is wrong and dangerous. Deputy Keating has an obligation to establish in the public mind against whom he is making these charges. Finally, and least important, in comparative political terms the Deputy might end up indicting one of his own Government's appointments. We do not know about whom he is speaking but we do know that he has accused others of being unfair and unjust and he is doing those very things himself. I am not certain if he was referring to members of the Circuit Court bench, but he accused certain members of the District Court bench in a very unfair and unjust manner. To bring about a balance of fair play he has an obligation to tell us about whom he is speaking and not only that, but in what context he is accusing these people.

This is not necessarily a contentious Bill but I was concerned when I read the report in the public media. I had not an opportunity of studying the Deputy's remarks in the Official Report and if I have done him an injustice I shall return to the House and apologise to him, but I do not think that I have. In the meantime, he should put the record right. I heard a number of comments, not in the Daéil but outside it, in relation to his remarks. The type of comment one heard was, "Who is he speaking about?" or "What cases was he referring to?" I certainly did not know about whom he was speaking and certainly could not refer these people to the cases. It is very difficult to defend that very damaging generalisation. We as politicians have been accused in the same way and when the accuser is challenged he may say "Oh, I heard it from somebody else." or at third or fourth hand. There is a cloud hanging over the District Court bench throughout the nation and the Deputy has an obligation to dispel that cloud.

It is generally accepted that this is an excellent Bill, doing much of what has been called for over the last number of years. I query the whole system of adjudication of family law as presently known. For example, the Family Home Protection Act and the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act of 1976, effectively deal with relatively new concepts of family law in this country. One wonders, concomitant with this legislation, should one have set up a different type of judicial system in the sense that at the moment it operates under the adversary system which, as Deputy Enright properly points out gives rise to all sorts of problems and difficulties. Perhaps we should use an investigative system. I do not think that the adversary system is the proper one for dealing with family law problems. A more informal system under the investigative method is, in the main, a proper way to deal with family law problems when they can be dealt with in that fashion. As Deputy Enright points out, using the adversary system we have two individuals on either side of the court and lined up confronting them, is a number of barristers and solicitors and the judge is there to adjudicate on an almost unsolvable problem in the context of, not so much the law, but the emotion which the particular difficulty has generated between the two individuals concerned.

In the investigative system, there would be an informal hearing in the privacy of some room and I would see a District Court or Circuit Court judge being assisted by an assessor or assessors. An assessor would be qualified in the discipline of psychiatry, psychology, sociology and so forth and be completely competent in relation to the problems confronting the court at that time. There would be a full investigation. The matter at present is dealt with in a mandatory way as, unfortunately, it has to be because of the growing number of problems here in this regard. These are matters for the future. There are no instant solutions for these problems. This idea is not new, but it should be looked at. Perhaps the law, in the context of family law, may evolve in that way. The greatest sufferers under the adversory system are the antagonists. The people who are looking for solutions are left with more problems than they had envisaged.

Another question for consideration is that of court accommodation. It has been properly pointed out that, particularly in relation to the District Courts in rural Ireland—this was referred to by Deputy Enright, a practitioner in rural Ireland who knows more about this situation than I—court accommodation leaves a lot to be desired. Speaking from my own limited experience in the District Court in relation to family law cases, I can say that the accommodation is primitive. It is not possible to conduct a proper consultation with a client. Generally speaking that consultation must take place outside the court room because of lack of facilities. The present system provides a vehicle of gossip for the prurient. As Deputy Enright pointed out, people do not want to make their problems, particularly those related to family law, public. If a husband and wife are in disagreement it becomes obvious to those around what is going on. The prurient are always around in Irish society.

In today's edition of The Irish Press Enda Wymes made a point in relation to a more informal court system, something which supports my point of view. Mr. Wymes stated:

In relation to small claims it is worth recalling that in November 1979 the then Minister of State at the Department of Industry, Commerce and Energy told the Daéil that the possibility of setting up a system of small claim courts was then under discussion. The provision of such courts would be a major advance and would make the law available to everybody for matters on which they might not wish to become involved in the expense and intricácies of the established courts.

I am glad that the examination in relation to that principle is continuing. I hope that the Minister will be in a position to introduce legislation in relation to that in the near future. The inauguration of the civil legal aid scheme was referred to in the course of the debate. It is a good scheme and is working well. I would like to see more centres opened but we must bear in mind the availability of cash. There are other outlets in the social system of equal priority. The system should be given a chance to operate.

There has been a general welcome for the main provisions of the Bill. The Minister may well have to examine the possibility of increasing the number of District Justices and Circuit Court judges. The existing Circuit Court areas are large and, with the increased burden provided for in the Bill on Circuit Court judges, it is possible that those areas will have to be reduced. That will mean an increase in the number of Circuit Court areas and judges. One of the reasons the Bill can be classed as good is that it has been welcomed by the various legal groups. There has been a certain amount of criticism of it but a Bill that is not criticised in a constructive way is hardly an effective one. A number of eminent legal bodies voiced criticism of the Bill and that criticism should be accepted in the spirit intended. For many years those groups did not take the opportunity to express their views on legislation in this area.

It is not my intention at this stage to concern myself with the question of the amalgamation of the professions. That is a matter for future discussion. However, Mr. Wymes stated:

I would rather say let us move towards change and perhaps begin by getting rid of the wigs and black gowns introduced to mourn good Queen Anne who died in 1714. It is necessary to change.

It is necessary to change, but not to change immediately. More damage could be done by changing immediately and without thought than by evolutionary change. The system we have operated in recent years is a good one and has not often been found wanting. Where it was found wanting the law was amended. It will have to be amended in relation to bail, particularly arising out of the O'Callaghan decision of the Supreme Court. That matter will also have to be dealt with in the near future and that is all part of the evolution having regard to social change, social attitudes and social conditions. When one is talking about amending the law one should talk cautiously.

(Cavan-Monaghan): This Bill seeks to increase substantially the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court and the District Court. The changes will come into operation six months after this Bill is passed. By and large the Bill follows the recommendations of the Committee on Court Practice and Procedure. Like the Minister and other speakers, I would like to thank the learned gentlemen who served on that committee for their contribution and their time. In a very real way this Bill affects rural Ireland. It affects the District Court, which operates in the remotest parts of the country, and the Circuit Court, which is largely a rural court although, of course, it operates in Dublin as well. I am casting no reflection on the members of the committee on Court Practice and Procedure because I recognise them as first-class practitioners and busy men who gave their time to the committee, but the committee would have been stronger and more effective if there had been a rural practitioner on it.

It is a remarkable fact that there was no rural practitioner on the committee which reported to the Minister. It may be said that the learned gentlemen of the Bar practise in rural Ireland, and that is true. Most of the barristers on the committee practise in the city of Dublin and have a far greater experience of Dublin city courts than of rural Ireland courts. There may be people with other legal qualifications on the committee, but I know there were two practising solicitors on it. Both of them practise in the city of Dublin and, so far as I know, have practised there during all of their professional lives.

I want to make it perfectly clear that I am not complaining about or criticising the two Dublin solicitors who were on the committee, but it would have been better if, in addition to them, there had been a couple of country solicitors, as they are called, who would know the difficulties experienced by country practitioners and the difficulties presented to country litigants. That is all I want to say about that.

The Bill does not interfere directly with the right to trial by jury in civil matters. I want to put it on record that I have no vested interest in the profession at the moment. I have ceased to practise but I think it is generally known that I have quite a wide experience as a practitioner in the country courts. I should not like to see trial by jury in civil cases abolished or limited in any way, and certainly not until a free legal aid system has been perfected and made available on a general and liberal basis. The right to trial by jury stands between the big insurance company and the poor litigant. It stands between the monied man and the man with little or no money who wants to have his case litigated in court. About that I have no doubt.

Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Bill deal with the extension of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court and the conferring on that court of jurisdiction in divorce cases a mensa et thoro. The Minister increased the jurisdiction of the District Court from £2,000 to £15,000 and, in doing so, he did not follow the recommendation of the committee, which recommended an increase to £10,000. The Minister proposes to increase it to £15,000 because he has increased the damages which may be awarded for mental distress from £1,000 to £5,000. These damages for mental distress are awarded in fatal cases only.

I would think that, even with a jurisdiction of £15,000, the fatal accident cases, or the Lord Campbell Act cases as they are called, or used to be called, which would be brought in the Circuit Court would be few and far between because, if there was any substantial pecuniary loss to a widower or infants, when that pecuniary claim was added to the mental distress, it would obviously put the claim over the proposed jurisdiction or the present jurisdiction of the Circuit Court.

Speaking from experience, I have some reservations about the jurisdiction of £15,000 in the Circuit Court in what are commonly called running down actions. If the person risks bringing the case in the High Court and does not get more than £7,500, he is confined to the Circuit Court costs and, even if his award is over £7,500, he must get a certificate from the trial judge before he can get other than Circuit Court damages.

One reservation I have is that £15,000 for personal injuries can involve pretty substantial injuries and can involve professional witnesses of a very high calbre: consultants in the medical field and perhaps in the engineering field in the case of injuries sustained at work. I fear will be more difficult for the plaintiff who has no money, and who will be operating if at all as of now under a very limited free legal aid scheme, to get these professional witnesses from Dublin to rural Ireland — to Cork, even to Cavan Donegal. It will be much more difficult him to get those witnesses down to those places than for him to get a county surgeon up to Dublin. For a start, legal practioners in the country will be dealing with professional witnesses in Dublin whom they know very casually and perhaps have only met in the course of the case. These witnesses will be asked to travel from Dublin with maybe an over-night stay and the case may not be reached and they will have to come back again. If a person has been referred to a Dublin hospital by his general practitioner or to a Dublin specialist, the legal prctitioner will have to ensure that the witness will be available 100 or 150 miles away from Dublin. I do not blame the specialists or consultants whose essential commitment is to attend sick people.

People might say that it is just as difficult get a county surgeon or a county physician to Dublin but it is not, as I know from experience. Very often the surgeon and the solicitor are on friendly terms and they do a lot of business together. I used to have an arrangement whereby I could ring up at ten o'clock in the morning and tell the county surgeon that the case was now on and we could arrange to have him there by two o'clock and into the witness box. The surgeon would be back home before the case was over and that was that. The same argument can be made for the consultant in the engineering faculty. It will be difficult to get these witnesses from the city to the country.

Plaintiffs in claims of up to £15,000 are virtually being deprived of the right to trial by jury. The Bill does not directly deprive plaintiffs of a trial by jury but plaintiffs in running down actions of any sort, up to £15,000, are being deprived of this right because the appeal from the Circuit Court is to a judge without a jury. For that reason juries are practically not used in the Circuit Court in civil actions. If they are, a subsequent appeal will be made before a judge without a jury. This will encourage insurance companies, for example, to fight a case that they might otherwise settle. Very often more justice is done by settling a case as in some instances one cannot be certain who is to blame. We all know that some judges are known as plaintiffs' judges and others are known as defence judges. Insurance companies know that as well as everyone else and if there is no jury and they know they are coming before a defence judge they will be more likely to fight than if there were a jury.

I have doubts about the wisdom of conferring jurisdiction on the Circuit Court in divorce a mensa et thoro cases. Up to now only the High Court enjoyed jurisdiction in that type of action. I know that in the High Court judges referred issues arising from this type of action to a jury for trial. The judge had the right to refer issues in divorce actions to a jury. That right will now be taken away from the parties in such an action because there are virtually no juries in civil actions in the Circuit Court.

So far as the Circuit Court is concerned the recommendation of the Committee to increase the jurisdiction to £10,000 was the right recommendation. That recommendation for Circuit Court actions is high enough and it will exclude more of the types of action in which the Dublin consultants is required as a witness. The jurisdiction in the divorce a mensa et thoro should not have been conferred on the Circuit Court. If I am right in my reading of section 5 it proposes to confer exclusively on the Circuit Court jurisdiction in divorce a mensa et thoro. I know that the High Court has an overriding and overall jurisdiction but the effect of the section is to give exclusive jurisdiction as far as possible to the Circuit Court in divorce cases.

Sections 6 to 15 increase very substantially the jurisdiction of the District Court from £250 to £2,500. There is a lot to be said for that. It always amuses me to hear people talking about upping the jurisdiction of the District Court and in the same breath talking about establishing a small claims court. I regarded the District Court as a small claims court and it was that when I started practising, when the tort was £10 and contract was £25. There seems to be a demand for a small claims court and the District Court as established by the founding fathers of the State was certainly a small claims court and performed well as that. The increase from £250 to £2,500 in contracts in tort, the granting of jurisdiction in various other areas such as the Act dealing with hotel proprietors and family law will increase its jurisdiction enormously. I have reservations about family law. It is going too far to give jurisdiction under the guardianship of Infants Act and family law in general to the casual discharge in an informal way of the District Court. There should be proper free legal aid and family law matters should be dealt with in the Circuit Court where there are more facilities and time to deal with them.

As well as the jurisdiction being conferred on it by sections 6 to 15 there is another Bill before the House, the Malicious Injuries Bill, which also confers jurisdiction up to £2,500. The Bill provides for its coming into operation after it becomes law. In one way I welcome that, because sometimes we pass Bills and they do not come into operation until the relevant Minister decides perhaps six months or a year later. However, I have reservations about this now because new jurisdiction will be conferred on the District Court without any preparation. As far as I know the Minister had consultations with virtually nobody about this Bill. He had no consultations with the Incorporated Law Society, whose members will be the advocates and practitioners dealing with the Bill in the District Court. I would not be surprised if the Minister has to bring in a short Bill postponing the conferring of jurisdiction on the District Court simply because he made no preparation for it.

Many district justices have jurisdiction over two counties and a substantial proportion of other counties. I do not know how they or the staff of District Court offices will be able to deal with the enormous increase in jurisdiction being conferred on them. Further justices and additional staff will be necessary in these offices. I should like the Minister to tell us what arrangements he has made for that increase in work and what consultations he has had with solicitors and the Incorporated Law Society, who are generally in favour of an increase in jurisdiction. If there is to be an increase it should be an orderly one. My information is that there has been minimal, if any, consultation with the people on the ground. That is unfortunate because the Bill cannot work unless the people concerned can reasonably operate it.

There has been some discussion here about the Judiciary. In my experience I have found the Judiciary to be a body of men of the highest intelligence who carry out their functions to the best of their ability and with the strictest impartiality. Nobody has said otherwise. However, that is not to say I would not prefer to be tried by one judge rather than another. I am not talking about District Court justices, but about men in the High Court. Certain judges are appointed to certain duties and it sometimes appears after their appointment that they are not suited temperamentally for the duties entrusted upon them. There is a jurisdiction — it does not rest with the Minister — to change these judges from one court to another. In my long experience, either from looking in from the outside or practicing, I have never known any judge to be taken from one court and put into another unless at his own request. That is a pity. A person can be temperamentally unsuited for the duties entrusted to him but he may be an excellent judge in another court.

I have known senior and experienced members of the legal profession to be afraid to go into the court of Mr. Justice So-and So. That is not good for the administration of justice. I have known it to be impossible to get even a very senior member of the Bar to go in to make a certain type of application to Mr. Justice So-and-So, which is unfortunate because sometimes it might have been very much in the interest of justice that such an application be made and granted, notwithstanding the fact that the cause for such an application might have been because some solicitor forgot to make a phone call, get a witness in court, or overlooked something else. Notwithstanding that, the long-term benefit to the client and the public might be that such an application should be made and should be granted.

I want to emphasise with all the sincerity I can command that as long as I can remember this country has been blessed with the integrity, absolute honesty and professional standing of the members of the Judiciary; but everybody is as God made him and it does happen that personalities seem to change sometimes. Personality seems to change once a person comes through a different door into the court and gets into the bench. It happens, and there is no use in saying it does not. In those cases perhaps the people with jurisdiction should talk to people like that. Perhaps they do not realise it. I do not think that Deputy Keating was saying that anybody on the bench in this country since the foundation of the State was lacking in integrity, honesty or professional responsibility. I do not think that anybody in these benches was saying that — and I am not saying it — but I am saying, with special reference to changing judges about, that perhaps it would not do a bit of harm.

Shuffling them.

(Cavan-Monaghan): It has been suggested by Deputy Andrews that things like the fixing of the amount which might be awarded for mental distress and jurisdictions in general should be left to the Minister of the day to fix by regulation. I would be against that completely. We are dealing now with the jurisdiction of the court and the venue in which cases might be heard. A matter of such importance as this warrants debate and discussion in the House. It affords us the opportunity of discussing such matters as we are discussing now, bringing out into the open matters that might need to be brought out into the open by way of public debate.

Therefore, I urge that the Minister do not take any further rights under this Bill to fix jurisdiction by ministerial order. The only thing that might decide one to say that sometimes it should be done by ministerial order is the length of time it has taken to increase the interest rate on court mortgages from 4 per cent. We have been asking about this since I was in Government — indeed, I was part of a Government who should have done it—but it seems to be impossible to get something done that one would think should be done by a Bill that would not take longer than half an hour in the House. It is postponed until another Bill is being brought in, and injustice is done. I think I am right in saying that the Minister is now taking power here to alter this rate by ministerial order. I think that is in the Bill and I do not begrudge him that.

That is all I want to say on the Bill at this stage. There may be other things that I will say on Committee Stage. The Minister and the House will note that I have sounded a warning rather than objected strenuously to certain things in the Bill. I think certain things in the Bill are dangerous and that they are not in the interest of the poor litigant, the man with no money, and if what I say is right that would be deplorable in the extreme.

I thank Deputy Fitzpatrick and other Deputies from all parties for their contribution to the debate and their comments on the Bill. I am indeed glad that Deputies on all sides of the House appreciate the importance of the Bill and welcome it in general terms even if there may be differences on some points of detail.

Many points have been raised in debate on the contents of the Bill and I suppose it is fair to say, on what is not in the Bill and I will endeavour to deal with the more important general points here. I hope that Deputies will not take it amiss if I do not deal at this stage with the more detailed points which may be more appropriately discussed on Committee Stage.

With regard to the opening contribution by the spokesman for the main Opposition party on the Bill, Deputy Keating, he spoke at great length about the deficiencies which he alleged existed among the members of the Judiciary, mainly, as far as I could deduce from the context, among district justices. At various points in his speech he said that he was referring to only a few or a very few, yet in other places his language gave the impression that he did not really mean that and that the deficiencies, faults and even malpractices were, if not commonplace, certainly common enough. He suggested that this House should, in some unspecified way, be able to exercise some kind of monitoring function over the performance of the Judiciary, and I think that that is what was implicit in his suggestions. He went on to urge that the news media should adopt a critical approach.

I want to make it very clear that the courts and the Judiciary are not exempt from public criticism. However, I must say also that I think it is essential in the public interest that any criticism that may have to be made should take account of the special position of the courts in our society and should, therefore, be confined strictly to what the facts justify. I regret to have to say that I believe that, despite his disclaimers and the fact that he may not have intended this or intended it fully, what Deputy Keating said is open to be interpreted as almost a generalised attack and will, in fact, be so interpreted in some quarters. I think that that impression will have been created in part by the very length of his comments on the subject. Furthermore, I think that in the particular context of his speech, which referred to miscarriages of justice, his suggestion that the news media should adopt a more active and aggressive approach — I repeat, a more aggressive approach — was dangerous, indeed, very dangerous. There is a very important role, certainly, for the news media to play in relation to reports on the administration of justice, but there is one thing that we do not want, and which I believe the community would rightly insist that we would not accept, and that is any form of trial by newspaper. I believe that the Deputy's remarks could be interpreted as encouraging some such trend.

I accept that an independent Judiciary, free from any influence by the Executive or pressure from any source, is an essential part of a free parliamentary democracy.

The proposals in the Bill have come in for heavy criticism because of the lack of suitable courthouse accommodation for family law cases at many venues throughout the country, particularly at District Court level. It has even been suggested that this Bill should not have been introduced because of this problem. As I made clear in my opening speech, this criticism is unsound. The correct approach is, of course, to clear up the difficulties in this area—and I propose to do this—but such practical considerations as these should not be allowed to stand in the way of legislating for what is right in principle.

In other words, the real problem is that existing jurisdiction arrangements make it awkward for many people to obtain access to justice. We must therefore change the law to make it easy to obtain legal redress. If by doing this practical problems are highlighted, then by all means let us tackle them. Let us not, however, put the cart before the horse, as has been suggested we should do, by confining family law cases to the High Court merely because that court happens to have reasonable facilities for the hearing of such cases. We should not be swayed from doing what is objectively right by the ill-founded arguments of vested interests.

I accept that at many court venues the court accommodation is less than satisfactory but, as I indicated in my introductory speech, I have in preparation a set of proposals relating to court accommodation which I will be putting to the Government in the near future and which should pave the way for upgrading court accommodation to an acceptable standard.

I accept also that many court venues lack facilities, such as separate waiting and consultation areas, considered desirable for dealing with family law business, but I am not satisfied that the volume of this business will ever be such as to justify the cost of providing these facilities at all court venues. Indeed, a statistical analysis of the 1,744 family law cases in 1979 shows that in the 257 out of 259 venues outside the Dublin area for which figures are available, in 116 venues there was no such case heard; 34 had one case each; 85 had not one case on average per sitting, and another 12 had an average of fewer than two cases per sitting. This leaves only ten venues throughout the country with two or more cases per sitting. One solution to this problem might be to direct all family law business to one or two venues in each district where the required facilities either exist already or can be provided without too much difficulty.

I might add that in Tralee and Waterford, where new court accommodation is in course of construction, the necessary facilities are being provided.

Allied to the physical accommodation question, of course, is the question of how best to organise the use of the accommodation available and of court time. In anticipation of the enactment of the legislation now before the House my Department have been considering ways and means of improving the organisation of the District Court in order that it may be in a position to cope with the increased jurisdiction which will be conferred on it. Already plans are well advanced for the enlargement of the Dublin Metropolital District Court district in order to provide for greater flexibility in the disposal of District Court business in Dublin city and county. Plans are also well advanced for the reorganisation of a number of provincial District Court districts in order to relieve pressure on some justices.

My Department will consult closely with the President of the District Court, the justices, the local legal profession and the Garda to see what further improvements can be made. Deputy Enright's suggestion that different days be set aside in each District Court area for the hearing of the different categories of business coming before the court and his other suggestions for the more expeditious disposal of court business will be borne in mind when the administrative arrangements necessary to implement the new jurisdictions are being made. The various interests concerned will, of course, be consulted.

Provision has not been made in this Bill for additional judges of the Circuit Court or justices of the District Court to take account of any increased workload falling on these courts as a result of the jurisdiction proposals as it is difficult at this stage to forecast the extent of the increase.

At the levels of litigation prevailing at present, the only certainty is that the workload of the District Court would increase, justifying the appointment of some additional justices and court staff, and that the work of the High Court will be reduced. As far as the Circuit Court is concerned, however, and still assuming the present level of demand on court time, it appears that any new work falling on the court as a result of the increase in the contract and tort jurisdictions would, at the least, be offset by the District Court taking over the Circuit Court's existing caseload in its entirety.

However, it must be emphasised that the direct result of the proposals must be to reduce the overall workloads of all the courts since they involve a transfer of cases from courts of considerable procedural complexity to courts of comparatively simple procedures. The real uncertainty in estimating future demand on court time arises from the successful outcome of the proposals in terms of access to justice — in other words, the greater ease with which legal action may be taken as a result both of the provisions of this Bill and of the civil legal aid scheme. I am sure that many Deputies will be aware of instances where difficulties might have been resolved by recourse to the courts but for the inconvenience or costs of taking such action. It is impossible to quantify the number of such cases which as a result of this Bill will now come before the courts.

I am reluctant, therefore, to make provision for an increase in the number of the Judiciary until such time as the scale of the increase can be determined with a reasonable degree of accuracy.

I propose to introduce an amendment at a later stage increasing from 11 to 12 the number of ordinary Circuit Court judges. I would like to make it clear at this stage that the proposal is not related at all to the effects of this Bill on the workload of the Circuit Court. It is related to an existing situation in that court which I will explain at the appropriate time on Committee Stage.

A number of Deputies claimed that the lower courts, and particularly the District Court, are ill-suited for the new jurisdictions being conferred on them by section 12 of this Bill. This section deals with jurisdiction under the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act, 1976. The existing position here is that the District Court already has jurisdiction to make barring orders under that Act for periods of three months and can order maintenance of up to £50 per week for a spouse and £15 per week for each child. The provisions in this section were made following representations from various women's organisations and increase the maximum District Court barring order from three to 12 months as well as doubling the limits of maintenance awardable by that court. These representations, seeking as they did to broaden the District Court's powers in these areas, can be taken as a vote of confidence by women's groups in the suitability of the District Court as a forum for hearing cases of this nature.

The more general question of the establishment of special family law courts and procedures, and the fundamental issue of the suitability of adversary-type tribunals for the hearing of such matters, were raised by a number of Deputies. I have spoken at length in reply to parliamentary questions on this topic since coming into office, but I think it no harm to cover the ground again in the context of this Bill. First of all, let me say that the Committee on Court Practice and Proccedure have under examination the question of establishing special family law tribunals and the Law Reform Commission are also considering the best type of structure appropriate to deal with these matters. Secondly, the proposals in this Bill will go a long way towards making less formalised procedures available to many litigants in the family law area. Furthermore, there has been, and continues to be, substantial expansion in the welfare officer service attached to the courts. I would also like to point, among other things, to the valuable back-up service available in family maintenance cases, where the District Court clerk can act as "go-between" for the payment of maintenance.

Whatever the practical difficulties that have to be faced in relation to the proper hearing of family law cases in any court, I am absolutely clear that there is nothing inherently inappropriate in giving the District Court the widest possible jurisdiction. This matter was specifically covered by the courts committee in paragraph 17 of their 20th report which states:

these (lower) courts are better geared to cope with the frequency with which several applications in the same case tend to recur because of changing circumstances. There is also the considerable advantage of local venues and the additional advantage of appeals by way of complete rehearing to the appropriate appellate jurisdiction instead of the present costly and time-consuming system of appeal to the Supreme Court. If any particular point of law arises in respect of which the opinion of a higher court should be sought the existing statutory provisions with regard to the stating of a consultative case are available to the District Court, the Circuit Court, and the High Court hearing an appeal from the Circuit Court.

In this regard also I would like to acknowledge that Deputies Enright, E. Desmond and Andrews welcomed the extension of family law jurisdition in the District Court.

A number of Deputies were worried in particular about the implications of conferring jurisdiction in the custody of children on courts which are constitutionally of limited jurisdiction; it was felt in particular that the jurisdiction which this Bill proposes to confer on the District Court might in some way be limited by the constitutional provision. I would like to reassure Deputy Keating that this is not the case.

I have been advised that no problem arises in relation to the constitutionality of this provision. But even if that were not so, I think that I should — as perhaps the Deputy should — give some weight to the fact that the recommendation to give custody jurisdiction to the District Court has been made by a committee chaired by the senior ordinary member of the Supreme Court and the membership of which also included the Presidents of the District and Circuit Courts.

(Cavan-Monaghan): That is equating the right to decide the custody of a child to £500.

No. It is a question of constitutionality.

(Cavan-Monaghan): The Supreme Court held that to impose a fine of more than £500 was a big thing and would violate the Constitution.

There was a suggestion from all sides of the House that the monetary limits of the lower courts be linked to the consumer price index and that changes should be effected by ministerial order rather than by an Act of the Oireachtas. This suggestion was considered when the Bill was being prepared, but was considered inappropriate for two reasons, firstly, the inherent importance of the issue which, many would say, justifies the full attention of the Oireachtas itself acting through the legislative process, and secondly, the special constitutional position of the courts which arguably makes it inappropriate in principle that Parliament should seek to delegate to any other authority the right or power to determine the level of jurisdiction of particular courts.

I do not think that was suggested. It was suggested that the flexibility of the court which is important would remain and that the parameters within which those——

The suggestion was very definitely made.

I did not make it.

I did not say the Deputy did.

What about the variation of that?

The Deputy must try to let me deal with this as best I can. That particular suggestion was made. Deputy Fitzpatrick would agree——

(Cavan Monaghan): I agree with the Minister.

——and Deputy Andrews would not agree. As I said, it came from Deputies on all sides of the House and I gave the reasons why I believe that should not be so, but I want to say the matter was considered.

The Minister is dismissing it very simplisticly.

The Deputy is an expert on simplicity.

The Minister without interruption, please.

I am making the point that the Minister did not answer——

Something appears to be bugging the Deputy. I am not aware of what it is, but if I could understand it I might be able to help him. It has been suggested that a concentration of tort cases in the District Court and the Circuit Court might create difficulties in the provision of the necessary medical evidence because some medical consultants might be reluctant to travel to various venues around the country rather than to the High Court in Dublin. The committee have said, and I am in agreement with them, that they are not satisfied that there is real substance in this objection because experience has shown that in many of the cases in the High Court the consultants come from outside Dublin. In cases of road accidents patients are more frequently than not treated in local hospitals and are treated by local consultants save in cases which develop serious complications where it may be necessary, as for example in the case of severe brain injury, to send patients to specialist units in certain Dublin hospitals. The committee and, while accepting the point that question.

(Cavan-Monaghan): That is why I said that if there had been one or two mountainy attorneys on the committee the result might have been very different.

I had intended dealing with that point later. In my opinion there was a fairly good spread on the committee and while accepting the point that none of the solicitors on the committee practised in rural parts of the country, there was a strong rural base. The Deputy knows also that the Incorporated Law Society made a submission on behalf of many earthy rural solicitors who could not be on such a committee and I am sure that the point raised by the Deputy was adverted to in that submission.

Turning to the position in the High Court, several Deputies spoke of the delays at present being experienced in waiting for a jury hearing. The position in the matter is that at 31 July 1980, the end of the legal year, there were 2,434 jury actions and 248 non-jury actions awaiting hearing. The average delay from the date of setting down to the date of hearing was, in the case of jury actions, 14 months, and in the case of non-jury actions five months. I might mention in passing that at the end of December 1979, the delay in hearing jury action was 16½ months, so Deputies will realise that there has been some improvement. However, I am not at all pleased that the delays are as long as I have outlined.

The position in relation to civil jury actions deteriorated in 1979 when because of the postal dispute it was not possible to serve jury summonses with the result that no such actions could be held from 9 March 1979 until the commencement of the Michaelmas Law Term on 1 October 1979. This accounted for almost seven months of the time lag of 14 months already referred to.

In addition there is an ever-increasing volume of business coming before the High Court. During the legal year ended 31 July 1980 a total of 2,342 new jury cases were set down for hearing as opposed to 1,691 during the previous legal year and 1,861 during the legal year before that.

Although additional High Court judges were appointed in October 1979 the effective strength of the High Court was increased by only one for most of the year because of the absence of Judge Costello on the Whiddy Island Disaster Inquiry. In addition, Judge Butler died before the end of the Trinity Term and that vacancy was not filled until the end of the Long Vacation. Nonetheless the court disposed of 1,879 jury cases during the year ended 31 July 1980.

The proposals in this Bill will have a major effect in alleviating this problem in two important ways: first, by increasing the monetary limits of the lower courts many cases which at present can only be taken in the High Court will now come within the jurisdiction of the Circuit, and in some cases, the District Courts; secondly, by extending the registration and interest facilities currently available in the High Court to all courts, we will encourage litigants to make use of the lower courts where delays are minimal and the court venues themselves are more conveniently located throughout the country.

Another way of relieving pressure on the High Court would be to change the law which permits the transfer of criminal trials to the Central Criminal Court, which is of course the High Court exercising its criminal jurisdiction. This is one of the courts committee's recommendations which are under active consideration by me and by my Department.

(Cavan-Monaghan): Is it proposed to prohibit transfer to the Central Criminal Court?

(Cavan-Monaghan): I doubt whether that would be a wise decision.

It is recommended by the committee and it is being considered but nothing can happen so far as changing the law is concerned without the approval of this House. Therefore, there will be ample opportunity to discuss the question.

(Cavan-Monaghan): I do not think there should be any change.

Concern has been expressed by several Deputies about the trial of civil actions by jury. The present position is that only the High Court has power to try such actions by jury. The right to jury trial in Circuit Court civil actions was abolished by the Courts Act, 1971, principally because it was a right that was seldom excercised. It is worth noting that this same Act also increased the tort jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to its current limit of £2,000. The new level of £15,000 proposed in this Bill has been arrived at partly on the basis of the considerations set in the committee's report and partly to take account of the increased maximum amount which can be awarded in fatal accidents to the deceased's relatives.

The situation at present is, as the courts committee brought out and as some Deputies have also mentioned, that legal proceedings arising out of many motor accidents may be taken in the High Court only. This is because of the Circuit Court's present low monetary limit: these range from cases where the serious disablement, or death, of a person with dependants is involved to cases where the damage involved may only be the writing off of a car. I am sure Deputies will agree with me that the more serious the accident and its repercussions on the victim and his dependants, the more important it is that it be heard in the High Court, where the option of a jury trial is available. On the other hand, in less serious cases where the injuries are not of a lasting nature, where medical and other expenses arising out of the accident are fairly clearly defined, and where the victim's earning capacity is only temporarily impaired, the amount of compensation being claimed is not likely to exceed the Circuit Court's new limit of jurisdiction. Quite often the only point at issue in such cases is whether one or other party to the action is liable. Such cases can be as well decided by a judge sitting alone as by a jury, but at considerably less expense both to the litigants and to the taxpayers.

I am satisfied that what is proposed in the Bill is appropriate to the nature of the cases concerned. I would not, in particular, see any merit in providing for the restoration of jury trials for some cases in the Circuit Court. I am also aware that there is a strong body of demand for the total removal of the right to a jury for negligence cases in the High Court or, in the alternative, for the restriction of the role of the jury to the issue of negligence — in other words that juries should have no say in the determination of the amount of damages. This, of course, is a far bigger issue than that raised by the Deputies who spoke on the Bill. I do not propose to go into the merits of that issue on this occasion. Clearly it is outside the scope of the Bill at present before the House.

Deputy Enright suggested that the amount awardable in fatal accident cases as compensation for mental distress be unlimited, and that it should be related to the economic circumstances of the relatives to whom it is awarded. This may, I think, be based on a misunderstanding of the purpose of this provision and its context in the Civil Liability Acts. The position is that the amount awarded by the judge under this heading is in his discretion, and purely as a gesture on account of the grief of the bereaved relatives; it is, however, in addition to medical, funeral or other expenses, and any damages for loss of earnings which may be appropriate. Thus, while a judge might determine the same amount to be appropriate as compensation for mental distress in two different cases, the total of the amounts awarded under all heads might be very different, depending on whether the deceased was unmarried and with no dependants or whether he was, for instance, the father and sole means of support of a young family. It seems to me that the solution adopted in the Bill — which follows the principle adopted in the 1961 Act, but up-dates the limit — is the appropriate one in all the circumstances.

A number of Deputies raised the question of "small claims" tribunals. I understand from the Minister for Industry, Commerce and Tourism that his Department are engaged on a study of the various types of procedures which could be developed to cater for small claims, many of which would arise out of disputes between the retailer and consumer. I would like, however, to remind Deputies that the proposals in this Bill are a significant step towards making the settlement of small, and indeed not so small, claims, easier. If we take motor cars, for example, being the biggest "consumer" item which most people buy, then after this Bill comes into operation disputes involving all but the luxury end of the motor car market can be taken in the Circuit Court, and many second-hand deals will be within the District Court's range. Under present arrangements the District Court would not even be able to take cases involving, say, a reasonably priced electric cooker.

I mentioned in my opening remarks that it would be, and must be, our intention not to allow the District Court procedures to become more complex and more formalised as a result of the increased jurisdiction under this Bill. I have every confidence that this will be the case and that the District Court will remain a suitable forum for these quick, informal and inexpensive disposals of small claims. Whether or not a totally different approach outside the courts system can be justified in the interest of consumer protection would be something on which the study I mentioned being conducted by the Minister for Industry, Commerce and Tourism would obviously throw some light.

Deputy Keating suggested that the Bill was "a lazy way out". He seemed to be suggesting that on one hand we were slavishly following some recommendations of the Committee on Court Practice and Procedure, while on the other hand we were ignoring other recommendations. This is simply not so. As I said in my opening speech, all the recommendations in the 20th report were given the fullest consideration and are being implemented either in exact terms or in the form considered best suited to give effect to them. In some respects the proposals in the Bill differ from the committee's recommendations and include some additions which are in line with, even though not covered by, the committee's report. These proposals, together with the provisions based on the recommendations of the committee on their Fifth and Tenth Reports relating to registration of District Court decrees and the interest rate payable on judgment debts, form a carefully considered legislative package which is designed to enable people to use the courts — particularly the lower courts — as the forum for settling their differences. The Bill is designed to make more easily available to more people the remedies which the law provides. It represents a considerable step forward in the evolution of our courts, so that they will be better able to reflect not only the changes which have taken place in the value of money but also the increased awareness among people at all social and economic levels of the significant role which can be played by the courts in resolving family difficulties.

There are, of course, other reports of the committee and other recommendations but they would not be appropriate for this Bill. It is my intention to introduce further legislation to give effect to these recommendations of the committee and related matters, and a good deal of work has already been done in this regard.

Question put and agreed to.
Committee Stage ordered for Tuesday, 2 December 1980.
Barr
Roinn